Eleonora
Celoria, Post-doctoral researcher, FIERI
Andreina De Leo*, Post-doctoral researcher, Maastricht University
Marcella Ferri, Research Fellow, Florence University
* Funded by the European
Union (ERC, SoftEn project, 101165167, PI: Lilian Tsourdi). Views and opinions
expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily
reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council. Neither
the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.
Photo credit: Jorge Franganillo, via Wikimedia Commons
Introduction
On 23 and 24 March 2026, the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held two hearings in the ongoing
proceedings addressing the compatibility of the Italy-Albania Protocol with EU
law and the broader implications of conducting asylum and return procedures
extraterritorially (Joined cases C-706/25 Comeri and C-707/25 Sidilli,
and C-414/25 Sedrata).
This may appear as a
déjà-vu. Less than a year ago, the extraterritorial processing of asylum under
the Italy-Albania Protocol had already come before the Court in the well-known Alace
and Canpelli cases (discussed on
this blog by Zamboni and Favilli
& Marin). The focus of those cases was, however, narrower, as it
concerned the criteria to designate countries as “safe countries of origin”
under the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) and their judicial review, a
classification that directly enabled the use of accelerated offshore asylum
procedures in Albania. Following those rulings, the Italian Government adjusted
its strategy, implementing a policy based on the relocation to Albania of
returnees already detained in Italian pre-removal detention centers under the
Return Directive (RD). While awaiting removal, these individuals may lodge an
asylum application which, according to the Government, can then be examined in
Albania. Against this backdrop, the new preliminary references raise a distinct
and more direct question: whether asylum and return procedures can, as such, be
carried out in a third country without breaching EU law. In doing so, they place
the legality of the Protocol as a whole squarely before the Court.
More specifically, the first
preliminary ruling, submitted
by the Court of Cassation on 20 June 2025, asks whether Articles 3,
6, 8, 15, and 16 of the Return Directive preclude transferring a migrant
subject to a return order to an extraterritorial detention centre, even without
a concrete prospect of removal. It also asks whether Article 9(1) of the Asylum
Procedures Directive, which requires applicants to remain on a Member State’s
territory, precludes keeping asylum seekers who lodge an asylum application
after being transferred to a third-country detention centre within that country
(see De
Leo).
The second preliminary
ruling, submitted
by the Rome Court of Appeal on 5 November 2025, directly
questions Italy’s competence to conclude an international agreement interfering with an area of exclusive EU
competence, as laid down in Articles 4(3) TEU, 3(2) TFEU and 216(1) TFEU (see Montaldo and delli
Carri). Alternatively, should the Court find that Italy has such
competence, it asks whether the safeguards under the APD and the Reception
Conditions Directive (RCD), as well as the Charter, particularly the rights to
liberty, an effective remedy, and health, preclude transferring asylum seekers
to, and detaining them in, centres outside EU territory.
It is worth recalling that
the stated aim of the Protocol is to “reinforce bilateral cooperation in
managing migration flows,” allowing Italy to transfer migrants to Albania
solely to carry out asylum and return procedures under Italian and EU law (Art.
4(3) Protocol). These procedures remain under Italian jurisdiction and are
conducted in accordance with national and EU law “to the extent compatible”
(Art. 4(1), Ratification Law 14/2024).
Although raising different questions, both Italian courts focused on the same core issue: whether EU law safeguards can be effectively ensured for asylum seekers and returnees detained in a third country and whether those standards are compromised merely because detention occurs outside the territory of a Member State.
Outline of the post
While awaiting further
developments, and notably the Advocate General’s opinions on 23 April (Sedrata)
and 11 June (Comeri and Sidilli), this post examines the key
issues raised during the hearings and outlines the main arguments on whether
asylum and return procedures conducted in a third country, yet under a Member
State’s jurisdiction, comply with EU law.
It first considers whether
EU law applies to procedures carried out in Albania and whether such procedures
may interfere with its application, summarising the positions of the Italian
Government and the European Commission. Two aspects are examined: the Dublin
system and its founding principle of mutual trust, and whether EU safeguards
can be effectively guaranteed in detention centres abroad. Finally, the post
clarifies the differences between the Albania model, the so-called “return
hubs,” and the notion of a safe third country, as frequently referenced during
hearings and in public
debate.
EU Law Beyond Territory: Parties’ Arguments on Applicability,
Compliance, and Competence in the Italy-Albania Scheme
The Italian government
To justify the compatibility
of the Italy-Albania Protocol and its Ratification Law with EU law, the Italian
Government advanced two alternative lines of argument. Both were aimed at
demonstrating that: first, the Protocol does not risk adversely affecting the
internal rules of the Union and therefore does not encroach upon an area of
exclusive EU competence; secondly, that the extraterritorial application of the
relevant directives in a third country does not undermine their effet utile.
First, the Government argued
that the Albanian centres should be considered “representations of Member
States” abroad under the APD and RCD, and that EU law applies indirectly
through its incorporation via the Ratification Law. On this basis, the
Government maintained that the Italy-Albania Protocol is purely technical and
logistical: it does not alter the substance of the legal framework on
pre-removal detention, asylum procedures or reception conditions, which remain
fully applicable because the legislator has chosen to extend EU standards to
the situations covered by the Protocol. By virtue of this legal extension, the
Government maintained that third-country nationals detained in Albania receive
treatment equivalent to that in Italy. It further argued that instruments such
as the Dublin Regulation, though not explicitly mentioned in the Protocol,
continue to apply because the individuals remain continuously under Italian
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Protocol would neither interfere with the Common
European Asylum System (CEAS) nor encroach upon the Union’s external
competences.
With respect to the RD, the
Government argued that the transfer to Albania does not qualify as a “return”
within the meaning of Article 3, but it rather amounts to a temporary
relocation to a different pre-removal detention facility, legally assimilated
to ones located on Italian territory. Accordingly, it maintained that
compliance with the Directive’s objectives and provisions, including Articles
15 and 16 on detention and conditions of detention, are not undermined, as the
material conditions would be fully respected. Regarding the APD, the Government
contended that Article 9 is not violated when returnees apply for asylum after
being transferred to Albania, since they remain under Italian jurisdiction, and
thus do not risk refoulement, and continue to benefit from the full
application of both the APD and RCD.
Alternatively, the
Government argued that EU law could apply directly through a functional
interpretation of “territory.” In the absence of a clear EU definition of
“border” or “transit zones,” the centres in Albania could be regarded as a fictio
iuris, functionally equivalent to transit zones located on Italian soil. On
this view, the legal equivalence of procedures in Albania and Italy would
justify treating the Albanian centres as falling within the scope of EU law, in
the same way as their territorial counterparts.
While the Dublin Regulation
was not explicitly mentioned by the referring judges, it emerged as a
contentious issue. In particular, the risk of circumventing Dublin criteria for
unaccompanied minors (Article 8) and family members (Articles 9–10) was debated
during the Sedrata hearing. The Italian Government maintained that the
Regulation remains applicable because the Albanian centres qualify as “transit
zones” under Dublin III. This, however, raised a fundamental question from the
bench: on what legal basis could another Member State be required to accept a
Dublin transfer from a non-EU centre, and how would this not interfere with
common EU rules? Questions which were left unresolved.
The European Commission
The Commission, by contrast,
adopted a strict literal reading of the directives, distinguishing clearly
between jurisdiction and territory. While acknowledging that the individuals remain
under Italian jurisdiction, it stressed that asylum and reception rules are
territorially anchored and do not apply automatically outside Member State
territory. Nonetheless, the Commission did not view the Protocol as violating
EU law or encroaching on exclusive EU competences, so long as the legislator’s
choice to apply EU standards effectively preserves the effet utile of
the acquis. Its reasoning followed two separate lines, depending on the
instrument in question.
As for the RD,
the Commission noted that it does not strictly define its scope in territorial
terms but rather sets standards to ensure the effectiveness of returns from EU
territory. Since Italy has committed to applying these standards in Albania,
the Commission did not see any inherent incompatibility with the temporary
transfer of returnees outside the territory pending repatriation. Yet, this
conclusion was subject to strict conditions: the Commission emphasised that
detention should have been previously judicially authorised, that all
guarantees under Articles 15–18 of the Directive are fully respected, and that
the transfer to Albania must not constitute the execution of the return
decision. In essence, for the Commission the Directive does not require
detention to occur on the territory of the Member State: what is rather
decisive is that the Member State fully complies with its concrete obligations.
As for the APD and the RCD,
the Commission rejected the qualification of the Albanian centres as “transit
zones.” It stressed that the notion of territory is autonomous under EU law and
cannot be extended to third countries, and that thus a “transit zone” must be
located within the Union’s territory. When pressed by the bench on whether an
international definition of “transit zone” exists, it indicated that this was
ultimately irrelevant, as the notion must be understood as a matter of EU law.
Accordingly, the Protocol cannot extend EU territory, and the direct
applicability of the asylum acquis is thus excluded.
That said, the Commission
did not view the mere extension, via national law, of EU standards to
procedures in Albania as automatically undermining the directives’ objectives
or interfering with internal EU competences under the ERTA doctrine.
Such a violation would only arise if the arrangement risked affecting common EU
rules: a risk the Commission considered unproven here. Article 9 APD
illustrates this approach: if the asylum application is made in Italy, transfer
to Albania is precluded. Conversely, if lodged only after transfer, while the
Directive does not apply directly, its purpose, i.e. to prevent removal before
assessing refoulement risks, is fulfilled because Italy retains
jurisdiction and applies EU standards.
Regarding the Dublin system,
the Commission held that the Regulation does not apply outside EU territory,
revealing a potential paradox noted by Advocate General Emiliou during Sedrata:
if EU law does not formally apply, can it still be circumvented?
More broadly, the question
arises whether exclusion from the scope of the Regulation and Directives is
merely a consequence of its incidental inapplicability in a third country, or
the result of a deliberate choice by Italy, and namely, transferring
individuals to Albania. In the latter scenario, how can it be argued that the
Protocol and Ratification Law do not effectively allow Italy to evade its
obligations under EU law?
As President Lenaerts
highlighted, the key concern of the ERTA doctrine is preventing Member
States from using external bilateral agreements to regulate matters that fall
within EU law, in ways that could undermine its objectives. In other words, it
is not enough to claim that EU law does not directly apply in a third country,
but what matters is whether the external action could affect the effective
internal functioning and uniformity of the EU legal framework. In this respect,
the Commission’s position appeared unsatisfactory, as it failed to address the
broader systemic implications for the CEAS and the structural risks of
circumvention inherent in the scheme.
This brings us to our legal
assessment, where we examine the unresolved issues in the approaches of the
Italian Government and the Commission regarding the challenges of
extraterritorialising asylum procedures and applying EU law in a third country.
Assessing the Potential Interference of Procedures Conducted in a third
country with the EU Migration and Asylum Acquis
All in all, both the Italian
Government and the European Commission ultimately arrive at a broadly similar
conclusion: the Italy-Albania Protocol does not entail a violation of the
Union’s exclusive competences, nor does it compromise the effet utile of
the relevant directives, insofar as EU standards can be ensured, even in a
third country. However, this conclusion leaves several key issues unresolved.
First, it does not fully address the implications for the Dublin system.
Indeed, the extension of Dublin obligations outside the Union could highly
interfere with the CEAS and the principle of mutual trust. Second, the
assumption that equivalent standards can be guaranteed extraterritorially
remains highly problematic, as the territorial scope of EU asylum law reflects
structural constraints necessary to ensure full compliance with procedural and
substantive guarantees. These two issues will be addressed separately in the
following sections.
The (application of the) Dublin system: a paradigmatic interference with
the CEAS
The application of the
Dublin system emerged as a highly sensitive issue during the Sedrata hearing.
While EURODAC was not discussed, the reasoning for the Dublin Regulation can be
extended to it, in light of recital 54 of EURODAC Regulation. The Italian
Government and the Commission took sharply divergent positions: the Government
qualifies the centres as “transit zones” under Dublin, a view opposed by the
Commission, which raises several critical questions.
First, how can the Albanian
centres be considered “representations of Member States” under the APD and the
RCD, or “transit zones” under the Dublin Regulation? This argument is
unpersuasive, as it would imply that the notion of “transit zone” differs
across two CEAS instruments, risking to undermine the system’s internal
coherence.
Secondly, if the Dublin
system were applied to asylum requests lodged in the Albanian centers, other
Member States would be obliged to accept transfers, as the Italian Government
argued. From a theoretical perspective, this would directly interfere with the
CEAS and undermine the principle of mutual trust on which it rests (Lenaerts, 2017). In fact,
the presumption of compliance with EU law standards appears questionable in
itself when it is applied to an asylum request lodged outside the territory of
a Member State — albeit under its jurisdiction. Yet, save for specific
exceptions, that principle prevents other States from verifying whether, in a
given case, Italy has actually complied with EU law in processing an asylum
application, notably that it has allocated responsibility in accordance with
the procedural guarantees laid down in the Dublin Regulation and with the right
to an effective remedy against the transfer decision. In short, extending the
Regulation to applications lodged in the Italian centres in Albania would run
counter to the principle of mutual trust underpinning the Dublin system and,
ultimately, the CEAS.
Third, from a practical
perspective, applying the Dublin Regulation outside Italy would adversely
affect the rights of asylum seekers lodging an application in another Member
State and seeking reunification with a family member detained in Albania
(Article 10 of the Dublin Regulation). Unless the applicants were also
transferred to Albania — which would amount to their de facto detention
— they would remain in Italy, thereby rendering effective reunification impossible. This impossibility, which stems
directly from the detention of the family member in Albania rather than in a
detention facility on Italian territory, would breach their rights to family
life and to the child’s best interests, as laid down in the Dublin Regulation
and in Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter.
By contrast, if, as the
Commission argues, the Dublin Regulation does not apply, Italy could evade its
obligations under Articles 8— 10 of the Regulation and Articles 7 and 24 of the
Charter. Once again, such circumvention would be achievable simply through the
deliberate extraterritorialisation of asylum procedures. In a nutshell, whether
applied or not, the Dublin Regulation illustrates the systemic and structural
interference with the CEAS created by the Protocol and Ratification Law.
Ensuring Effective Application of
EU Standards and Rights in a Third Country: Mission Impossibile?
We concur with the
Commission that the territorial nature of EU asylum law imposes inherent limits
on extending its directives beyond the Union. However, we diverge from the view
that voluntarily applying EU standards abroad via national law automatically
resolves compatibility concerns. This divergence is anchored in the structural
reality that the territorial scope of the directives is not merely formal: it
reflects the impossibility of fully guaranteeing procedural and material
standards outside the Union. Applying EU law where these guarantees cannot be
secured risks undermining the directives’ objectives, the uniformity of EU law,
and may raise concerns under the ERTA doctrine (see: De
Leo & Celoria, and Montaldo).
As highlighted by the
referring judges and the lawyers representing the migrants, a central issue is
the gap between the guarantees afforded to migrants detained in Italy and those
in the Albanian centres. The Government asserts that procedures in Albania are
identical to those in Italy, yet legal equivalence on paper does not ensure effective
protection in practice. In our view, the fiction that Albanian centres are
legally treated as part of a Member State is insufficient to secure genuine
compliance with EU standards on the ground.
The main concerns identified
by the referring courts and discussed during the hearings include: the right to
liberty under Article 6 of the Charter, notably the requirement for immediate
release if detention is unlawful; guarantees related to detention conditions,
including access for lawyers, family members, national, international, and
non-governmental organisations, and access to healthcare; and the right to a
fair trial and effective remedy under Article 47, particularly the right to be
“advised, defended, and represented.” As emphasized by the rapporteur judge of Comeri
and Sidilli case, these discrepancies risk creating a distinction
between “two types of asylum seekers,” or even “two types of detainees,” solely
based on where and when an application is lodged.
Both the RD and the RCD
require that a person “shall be released immediately” if detention is found
unlawful (Article 15(1) RD; Article 9(3) RCD). This requirement is inherently
impossible to reconcile with the Italy–Albania scheme. Under Article 6(2) of
the Protocol, Italian authorities must “take the necessary measures to ensure
the permanence of migrants within the areas, preventing their unauthorised exit
into the territory of the Republic of Albania, both during and after the
completion of administrative procedures, irrespective of the final outcome.” In
practice, release on Albanian territory is impossible: individuals can only be
freed once transferred back to Italy. Therefore, even when detention is
considered unlawful, the person remains under continuous coercive control
throughout the transfer, i.e. from the detention center to the port, during
maritime transport, and until release in Italy (typically in Bari or Brindisi):
a process that may last from 24 hours to several days, depending on logistical
conditions. In this respect, the Italian National Guarantor has recently noted that, if
transfer cannot occur the same day, the person remains in a “separate area” of
the same detention centre, a practice arguably failing short of the “immediate
release” requirement. During this period, individuals are subject to a
“coercive measure that deprives [them] of [their] freedom of movement and
isolates [them] from the rest of the population” (CJEU, FMS, para. 223).
Both the Albanian centres and the transport arrangements display the defining
features of detention: a closed, restricted space where movements are limited
and monitored and exit is not voluntary (CJEU, FMS, para. 231). The
European Court of Human Rights similarly confirms that confinement on ships may
constitute de facto detention, even if nominally for the person’s
interest (Khlaifia
and Others v Italy, paras. 70–71). In sum, the extraterritorial setting
alters the legal consequences of detention, making immediate release
practically unfeasible and raising serious questions about compliance with EU
law.
Extraterritoriality also
affects effective access to detention centres. Under national law implementing
EU standards (Articles 16(2) and (4) RD; Article 10(4) RCD), a wide range of
actors, e.g. parliamentarians, national monitoring bodies, UNHCR representatives,
lawyers, family members, religious ministers, and civil society organisations,
should be granted access (Articles 21 DPR 394/99; 7 D.Lgs. 142/2015;
Ministerial Directive 19 May 2022). By contrast, Article 9(2) of the Protocol
limits access to “lawyers, their assistants” and “international organisations
and EU agencies,” raising questions about the interplay of the two regimes.
Even if Italy seeks to apply its broader framework, as argued during the
hearing, effective implementation depends on Albanian authorities’ consent.
This is because access requires entry into Albanian territory, which remains
under Albanian sovereignty. Article 9(2) subjects access to “applicable EU,
national and Albanian law,” while Article 6(1) confirms Albanian responsibility
for public order and security outside the centres and during transfers.
Consequently, Albania may lawfully restrict access based on domestic entry,
residence, or public order rules, limiting in practice the actors able to
monitor detention conditions. While the Italian Government argued that this
poses no practical concern, citing visa-free entry for holders of Italian
passports or residence permits, the effectiveness of EU law guarantees cannot
depend on conditions outside the Member State’s control. Making access
contingent on the rules or discretion of a third country introduces uncertainty
incompatible with the requirement to ensure EU rights in an effective and
uniform manner. Moreover, denials imposed by Albanian authorities cannot be
effectively challenged before an Italian court, which undermines the right to
an effective remedy for those having the right to access the detention centres.
Similarly, under Article
10(4) of RCD, lawyers, family members, and civil society organisations have the
right to communicate with and visit detainees, and any limitations must not
make access impossible or excessively difficult. In the Albanian centres,
however, restrictions appear structural and generalised rather than
exceptional, making them difficult to reconcile with Articles 7 and 47 of the
Charter and the proportionality requirement under Article 52(1). The
Government’s argument that similar limitations exist in Italy is unpersuasive:
in Albania, restrictions are the norm, access is more complex, time-consuming,
and costly, and a recent monitoring report by the Italian
National Guarantor for the Rights of Persons Deprived of Liberty notes that
some detainees were not informed of their transfer, further hindering visits.
Crucially, as noted above, the ultimate decision rests with Albanian
authorities, meaning that limitations stemming from a third State’s sovereignty
cannot be effectively challenged or remedied in Italy, thereby weakening the
effective enjoyment of EU-law-derived rights.
Additionally, discrepancies
in safeguards for lawyers are particularly pronounced. In Italy, appointed
lawyers can access detention centres without prior authorisation and often be
appointed in person after initial telephone contact. In Albania, this is not
possible, nor foreseen by the Protocol or the Ratification Law, which allows
travel at public expense only “when remote connection is not feasible” during
the detention validation hearing (Article 4(5), Law 14/2024). This effectively
precludes in-person meetings before or after the hearing to prepare a defence
or appeal a negative decision. Given the current five-day deadline to challenge
a validation decision, detainees without immediate lawyer access face
heightened risk of ineffective representation. In-person meetings are often
essential to identify vulnerabilities or health conditions that may render
detention unlawful, tasks difficult to perform remotely, particularly when
access depends on the private centre manager’s discretion and mobile phone use
is restricted. Physical distance, limited contacts, and communication
restrictions materially weaken lawyer-client interaction, undermining the right
to effective assistance and representation under Article 47 of the Charter.
Remote hearings further exacerbate these issues. By analogy with the Court’s
reasoning in FP
and Others (C‑760/22),
videoconference participation is not inherently incompatible with a fair and
public hearing, but its appropriateness depends on the individual being able to
follow proceedings, be heard without technical obstacles, and communicate
effectively and confidentially with their lawyer. In Italy, lawyers attending
remote validation hearings can choose to be in the courtroom with the judge or
at the centre with their client: a flexibility that is simply unavailable for
detainees in Albania, further undermining effective representation.
Finally, significant
disparities exist regarding the right to health, guaranteed under Article 16(3)
RD and Article 17(2) RCD. Detainees in Albania face substantial limitations in
medical services, particularly psychiatric and addiction care. Unlike in Italy,
where detainees are integrated into the National Health System, no equivalent
framework operates in Albania, and on-site medical teams cannot provide
comparable treatment. These deficiencies have already led to serious
consequences, including self-harm and suicide attempts (see, report, here). A recent
report by the National Guarantor for the Rights of Persons Deprived of their
Liberty found that, of 26 detainees for whom updated medical assessments were
requested, 25 were deemed unfit for detention and released, highlighting the
centres’ inadequacy to ensure proper care. While Article 4(8) of the Protocol
obliges Albanian authorities to provide treatment in emergencies beyond Italian
capacity on site, healthcare in a third country is by definition different from
that provided by a Member State’s National Health System.
Taken together, the
disparities analysed above make detention in centres located in a third country
significantly more burdensome than detention in Italy, casting doubts as for
its compliance with the principle of proportionality. There is no justification
for imposing a harsher coercive measure than would be applied in Italy,
particularly as the transfer to Albania does not demonstrably enhance the
effectiveness of return procedures under the RD. On the contrary, a report by the Italian
National Guarantor for the Rights of Persons Deprived of their Liberty shows
that only 56 of 192 individuals transferred to Albania were ultimately returned
to their country of origin, representing a return rate of approximately 29%,
which is lower than the general return rate.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while the
Italian Government frames the issue in terms of formal equivalence between
procedures carried out in Albania and those in Italy, and the European
Commission emphasizes that the voluntary application of EU standards suffices
to ensure compliance, our assessment shows that this approach does not
adequately address the structural limitations inherent in the de facto
extraterritorial application of EU migration and asylum law.
While awaiting the Court’s
decision, we maintain that the strict territorial scope of EU law in this area
is not merely formal but reflects a substantive requirement: it is meant to
operate within the territory of Member States, where its guarantees can be
fully implemented and monitored. Remaining under the jurisdiction of a Member
State alone is insufficient to ensure compliance, as EU law cannot be
effectively applied outside the Union without undermining its purpose,
coherence, and the procedural and material protections that are inherently tied
to the territorial context in which they are guaranteed.
Two key issues arise. First,
if the Dublin Regulation applies to applications lodged in Albania, the
Protocol and Ratification Law would undermine mutual trust and the functioning
of the Dublin system, since other Member States cannot verify compliance with
EU law outside the Union. Even if it does not apply, the deliberate
delocalization of asylum procedures to a third country allows circumvention of
EU obligations. Second, procedural and material safeguards ensured in Italy
cannot be fully replicated in a third country.
Thus, in our view,
relocating individuals to Albania undermines the effet utile of the
CEAS, creating tangible discrepancies in treatment that formal equivalence
cannot remedy. This, in turn, risks breaching the principle of loyal
cooperation and jeopardizes both the uniform application of EU law and the
trust-based cooperation that underpins the EU legal order.
A Final Note: Why Albania Is Different from Other Externalisation Models
Throughout the hearings,
“return hubs” were frequently cited as a possible analogy to justify the
legality of the Albania model. However, as repeatedly emphasized by all
parties, the two schemes are fundamentally different from a legal perspective.
The Commission’s proposed reform of the notion of a ‘return decision,’ which
provides the legal basis for return hubs, presupposes a formal removal decision
to a country other than the state of origin with which an agreement exists. In
that context, the transfer constitutes an actual return under EU law
(discussed, in this blog, here). By contrast,
the Albania model does not involve a removal but a temporary relocation of the detention
stage of the return procedure under the full jurisdiction of the Member State,
prior to any formal removal to the individual’s country of origin or habitual
residence. Consequently, it cannot be assimilated to the return hub framework.
Similarly, the Albania model
cannot be framed within the reformed notion of a safe third country without a
connection requirement (discussed, in this blog, here), as no
inadmissibility decision is taken in Italy based on Albania’s acceptance of the
asylum application. Instead, the procedure merely relocates the processing of
the asylum claim to Albania while keeping the substantive application under
Italian jurisdiction.
This distinction highlights
that equating the Albania model with return hubs or safe third country schemes
overlook its unique legal and procedural features. It underscores the
complexity of assessing its compliance with EU law and why the pending preliminary
rulings are essential to clarify the boundaries and practical limits of this
peculiar migration management scheme.
]]>
Both Labour and Conservative politicians have framed small-boat refugees as threats, citing war metaphors, security concerns, and inauthenticity of their refugee claims.]]>
The latest issue of Global Responsibility to Protect (Vol. 18, nos. 1-2, 2026) is out. Contents include:
The latest issue of The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (Vol. 24, no. 2, 2025) is out. Contents include:
Developments in the Israel-Palestine conflict should be also read in terms of their implications for the internal equilibrium of the OIC.]]>
The story of globalisation has come full circle, not as the transcendence of geopolitics, but as the return of power at its very core.]]>
Authoritarian regimes consolidate power not only through coercion, but by monopolising narrative and memory.]]>
