FID Recht - BLOGS Tiny Tiny RSS/23.04-0578bf802 (Unsupported) 2026-09-10T14:30:59+00:00 https://vifa-recht.de/feed/9 tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298372 Schrödinger’s Breach On Thursday, 10 September 2026, the oral proceedings regarding Germany’s preliminary objections in t...

]]> On Thursday, 10 September 2026, the oral proceedings regarding Germany’s preliminary objections in the Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany) case concluded. The case already has a complicated history. On 1 March 2024 Nicaragua filed its Application, alongside a request for provisional measures. On 30 April 2024 the Court declined to indicate measures, but neither did it find a manifest lack of jurisdiction. A year later, on 1 April 2025, Nicaragua notified the Court it wished to discontinue the case against Germany, but revoked that a week later (it might be worth noting that Nicaragua instead withdrew its Article 62 intervention in the South Africa v. Israel genocide case on 3 April 2025). Germany filed its Preliminary Objections on 21 October 2025.

It is thus perhaps unsurprising that this case has raised some particularly knotty procedural questions. I will attempt to unpack the most important and interesting, which were the focus of the oral proceedings.

The Arguments

Nicaragua’s ten discrete claims against Germany may be broadly bundled into four groups: first, failing to prevent, and being complicit in, genocide against the Palestinian people, through arms supplied to Israel (1-3); second, failing to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law (IHL), and providing aid used in their violation (4-6); third, denying the Palestinian right to self-determination and assisting an unlawful occupation, racial discrimination, segregation and apartheid (7-9); and fourth, failing to prosecute war crimes and apartheid (10).

In reply, Germany raises three objections (again, broadly framed). First, that no dispute existed between the parties when Nicaragua filed its Application, so the case is inadmissible. Second, even taking Nicaragua’s alleged dispute at face value, a number of the claims fall outside the temporal scope of Germany’s 2008 optional clause declaration, or Nicaragua failed to fulfil necessary preconditions, depriving the Court of jurisdiction outright. Third, the Monetary Gold admissibility argument (on which much has already been written, see, e.g. here, here and here) that adjudicating the merits of this case would require the Court to rule on the lawfulness of Israel’s conduct without Israel’s participation or consent to jurisdiction.

Objection One: Inadmissible Due to Lack of Dispute

As is well known, the Court’s duty is to resolve disputes between States. As such, the existence of a dispute is a necessary precondition to the Court’s exercise of otherwise apparent jurisdiction. The litigating parties must hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance of international obligations, and the respondent must have been “aware”, or could not have been “unaware”, that such positive opposition existed (for a more detailed consideration of the problems arising from this particular test, see here and here).

On this issue it must be said that at times Germany’s arguments devolved into the excessively formalistic. Nicaragua’s use of a Yahoo email address to send its Note Verbale to the German UN mission’s generic address was considered worth emphasizing despite its obvious triviality. The more substantive concern related to the speed with which proceedings were issued. Only a month (“the shortest month” (CR 2026/32 para. 10)) lapsed between the Note dated 2 February 2024 and the filing of the Application, and for two of those weeks Germany says it had not seen the email. Nevertheless, on 7 February 2024 a Foreign Office spokesperson said Germany was “aware of a press release” issued by Nicaragua restating the contents of its Note, and that “we naturally reject the relevant content of the press release” (CR 2026/30 para. 31).

Unfortunately for Germany, despite its claims that this “would be the first time that the Court would infer positive opposition from a reply to a journalist” (CR 2026/30 para. 33), it would certainly not be the first time that the Court would treat replies to journalists as binding undertakings from the State. Moreover, the general speed of proceedings does not seem to refute the existence of a dispute either; Ukraine’s application against Russia was filed only two days after the commencement of its “special military operation”.

Having said that, one area where Nicaragua may face difficulties is in establishing the existence of a dispute in relation to all its claims. The third and fourth listed above appear nowhere in the Note (save for self-determination) and the Application/Memorial appears to be the first time they were articulated. While the Court may at times adjudicate on ancillary claims, it is not clear that Germany’s alleged assistance to an apartheid regime (for example) is sufficiently related to the more core claims of failure to prevent a genocide such that it could be treated as ancillary. The Court may well find that certain claims were not adequately put to Germany so as to establish positive opposition.

Objection Two: Jurisdictional Limits

Germany’s optional clause declaration of 30 April 2008 covered “all disputes arising after the present declaration, with regard to situations or facts subsequent to this date” and Germany argues that many of Nicaragua’s claims have their “real cause” in Germany’s decades-long arms-export relationship with Israel, rather than in any activities post-dating the critical date. It seems difficult to sustain an argument that military exports form an unremitting monolith of conduct and cannot be parsed out into discrete acts, some of which took place after the critical date. It is worth noting that Judge Charlesworth at the conclusion of the hearings asked Nicaragua to specify, separately for each of the relevant claims 4-9, the situation or fact that is the source or real cause of the dispute (CR 2026/33, p. 38). If Nicaragua can do this, this argument about the critical date will likely become moot.

Separately, however, and at the risk of oversimplification for the sake of the word limit, paragraph (i) of Germany’s 2008 declaration excluded disputes “subject to another method of peaceful settlement chosen by all the Parties”. Germany argues that both States thus chose another method when they joined CERD in 1969 and 1978, respectively, and moreover that Nicaragua never attempted the negotiations demanded by Art. 22 of the CERD.

A sensible reading of Germany’s optional clause declaration would seem to suggest it was directed toward preventing parallel litigation or lis alibi pendens. Nevertheless, Nicaragua does invoke CERD in addition to the optional clause and Art. IX of the Genocide Convention as its basis for jurisdiction. This leads to a question of how the Court should consider competing grounds of jurisdiction, where some impose preconditions to their invocation, but others do not. As noted by the PCIJ in E.L.S.I. (relied upon by Nicaragua), multiple possible bases of jurisdiction suggest that the “Parties intended to open up new ways of access to the Court rather than to close old ways or to allow them to cancel each other out”, suggesting that the Court should proceed on the basis of the broadest possible ground of jurisdiction. The claims relating to racial discrimination and apartheid are not framed as breaches of CERD and could just as well be run exclusively as matters of customary international law. The issue is then what to do about paragraph (i) of Germany’s 2008 declaration. Does it import wholesale the requirements of a quite separate compromissory clause into an optional clause dispute, because there is substantive overlap between the treaty and the customary law? This strikes me as a complete reversal of the Court’s approach to jurisdiction in Military and Paramilitary Activities (again relied on by Nicaragua) insofar as customary law claims can endure a lack of treaty-based jurisdiction.

However, if the racial discrimination claims survive the dispute requirement, they perhaps face a small risk of being dismissed for want of jurisdiction should the Court accept Germany’s interpretation of its optional clause declaration.

Objection Three: Monetary Gold

While Germany’s first and second objections may succeed in relation to some claims (particularly the third and fourth bundles), progression to the merits for the genocide, self-determination, and IHL claims (the first and second bundles, as listed above) ultimately appears to turn on the Court’s interpretation of the parties’ Monetary Gold arguments. Alain Pellet, appearing for Nicaragua, spent much of his appearance trying to curtail Monetary Gold. Indeed, he was described as a “self-confessed Monetary Gold sceptic” by Sam Wordsworth (CR 2026/32, para. 1) which resulted in a reply accusation of Wordsworth being a “Monetary Gold fanatic” (CR 2026/33, para. 1). In its place, Pellet argued for the creation of a “Corfu Principle” – recognising that in Corfu Channel, the Court was able to adjudicate Albania’s responsibility related to the mines despite the fact that Yugoslavia, quite possibly the State that laid them, was absent. The existence of the mines was a fact, regardless of who put them there. Similarly, Pellet contended that Israel’s breaches of IHL could be treated by the Court as facts, established by inter alia the Court’s 2024 Advisory Opinion, and likewise the plausibility of genocide could be treated as a ‘fact’ established by the Court’s orders on provisional measures in South Africa v. Israel. He noted that if, in the end, Israel did not commit genocide, Israel could bring a case against Nicaragua for “slander” (“dénonciation calomnieuse” CR 2026/33 para. 28) a point no doubt inspired by the Ukraine v. Russia case where the Court endorsed the possibility of seeking a negative declaration of compliance with the Genocide Convention.

However, the underlying nature of the obligations owed by Germany is a hurdle which Nicaragua does not appear to have overcome. Germany is not committing genocide or breaches of IHL, it is allegedly failing to prevent it (or is complicit in its commission). Whether or not there has been a failure to prevent something from occurring can only be assessed once the thing in question has unquestionably occurred. If it never happened, how did one fail to prevent it? The Court would have to open the box to know what happened to the cat. While multiple experts have concluded that there is a genocide taking place in Gaza (see e.g. here, here and here) it remains for the Court an open question which it cannot (indeed must not) predetermine. For now, it must keep the box closed.

Conclusion

Will Nicaragua prevail, and the case move forward? It’s not a given by any means, and at least it seems unlikely that all of the claims brought by Nicaragua will continue. Nicaragua’s claims regarding IHL appear to pass all three hurdles raised by Germany. It is indeed possible that the unlawfulness of the Israeli occupation (in general terms) could be treated as an established juridical fact. But it is worth noting the 2024 Advisory Opinion explicitly precludes events taking place after October 7, and thus a large swathe of the conduct against which Germany’s complicity would likely be tested. The case could be narrowed down significantly, perhaps to a question whether Germany was complicit in the commission of IHL breaches in the OPT between 30 April 2008 and 7 October 2023.

On the one hand, this is unfortunate. All States that are parties to the Genocide Convention do have a clear obligation to prevent genocide, and it would be potentially of great benefit for this obligation to be enforceable by way of court proceedings. It would also assist other States, insofar as it would bring some much-needed clarity regarding the scope of the obligation to prevent, and more broadly on the obligations of third States in the face of serious breaches of international obligations. If this case continues to the merits, I would not be surprised to see interventions from other States that currently supply arms or dual-use materials to Israel.

But on the other hand, the Court’s function has never been the general enforcement of international obligations; it is the resolution of the particular disputes properly brought before it. This case may prove to be a careful lesson for prospective litigants regarding the need to take procedure, including notice requirements and the terms of compromissory clauses, seriously and not simply throw matters at the wall to see what sticks.

The post Schrödinger’s Breach appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

]]> 2026-09-11T18:22:52+00:00 Juliette McIntyre http://verfassungsblog.de 2026-09-11T18:22:52+00:00 Verfassungsblog tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298368 Teaching Dido: Critical Perspectives on Aeneid 4 Teaching Dido: Critical Perspectives on Aeneid 4Ingo Gildenhard A companion to Virgil, Aeneid 4...

]]> Teaching Dido: Critical Perspectives on Aeneid 4
Ingo Gildenhard
Teaching Dido: Critical Perspectives on Aeneid 4 - cover image 

A companion to Virgil, Aeneid 4, with Study Questions, Vocabulary, and Commentary (https://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0527) (OBP 2026), Teaching Dido includes five essays that explore aspects of Virgil’s poetry in a student-friendly way. They range from issues in poetics (verse design, allusion) to key themes (‘historiographical Dido’, religion, pietās). Six reprinted scholarly articles follow, allowing students and their teachers to engage directly with some of the research that informs the essays and the commentary and to broaden their appreciation of Dido, the Aeneid, Virgil, and the wider historical context. Topics covered include the ethics of hospitality, the interface of intertextuality and psychology in the construction of character, Carthage and Rome as imperial powers, racecraft in Aeneid 4, Virgil’s authorial self-fashioning and negotiation of the Augustan new normal, the myth of Troy in Rome’s cultural imaginary, and Dido’s place within Virgil’s philosophy of history. 

 
PublisherOpen Book Publishers
Publication placeCambridge, UK
Published on2026-07-03
Book set
This book is part of a 2-volume set. The other volume in the set is:
Series
  • Classics Textbooks vol. 9
  • ISSN Print: 2054-2437
  • ISSN Digital: 2054-2445
ISBN978-1-80511-946-3 (Paperback)
978-1-80511-947-0 (Hardback)
978-1-80511-948-7 (PDF)
978-1-80511-950-0 (HTML)
978-1-80511-949-4 (EPUB)
]]> 2026-09-11T19:00:04+00:00 Chuck Jones http://ancientworldonline.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-11T19:00:04+00:00 The Ancient World Online: Law tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298369 Cicero, On Pompey's Command (De Imperio), 27-49: Latin Text, Study Aids with Vocabulary, Commentary, and Translation Cicero, On Pompey's Command (De Imperio), 27-49: Latin Text, Study Aids with Vocabulary, Commentary,...

]]> Cicero, On Pompey's Command (De Imperio), 27-49: Latin Text, Study Aids with Vocabulary, Commentary, and Translation
  • Ingo Gildenhard (author)
  • Louise Hodgson (author)
    •  Cicero, On Pompey's Command (De Imperio), 27-49: Latin Text, Study Aids with Vocabulary, Commentary, and Translation - cover image

    In republican times, one of Rome's deadliest enemies was King Mithridates of Pontus. In 66 BCE, after decades of inconclusive struggle, the tribune Manilius proposed a bill that would give supreme command in the war against Mithridates to Pompey the Great, who had just swept the Mediterranean clean of another menace: the pirates. While powerful aristocrats objected to the proposal, which would endow Pompey with unprecedented powers, the bill proved hugely popular among the people, and one of the praetors, Marcus Tullius Cicero, also hastened to lend it his support. In his first ever political speech, variously entitled pro lege Manilia or de imperio Gnaei Pompei, Cicero argues that the war against Mithridates requires the appointment of a perfect general and that the only man to live up to such lofty standards is Pompey. In the section under consideration here, Cicero defines the most important hallmarks of the ideal military commander and tries to demonstrate that Pompey is his living embodiment. This course book offers a portion of the original Latin text, study aids with vocabulary, and a commentary. Designed to stretch and stimulate readers, the incisive commentary will be of particular interest to students of Latin at both AS and undergraduate level. It extends beyond detailed linguistic analysis and historical background to encourage critical engagement with Cicero's prose and discussion of the most recent scholarly thought. 

    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0045
    Landing pagehttps://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0045
    Licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
    CopyrightIngo Gildenhard; Louise Hodgson
    PublisherOpen Book Publishers
    Publication placeCambridge, UK
    Published on2014-09-03
    Series
    • Classics Textbooks vol. 4
    • ISSN Print: 2054-2437
    • ISSN Digital: 2054-2445
    ISBN978-1-78374-077-2 (Paperback)
    978-1-78374-078-9 (Hardback)
    978-1-78374-079-6 (PDF)
    978-1-80064-472-4 (HTML)
    978-1-78374-080-2 (EPUB)
    978-1-78374-081-9 (MOBI)

     

    ]]>     2026-09-11T18:56:28+00:00 Chuck Jones http://ancientworldonline.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-11T18:56:28+00:00 The Ancient World Online: Law     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298370 Virgil, Aeneid, 4.1–299: Latin Text, Study Questions, Commentary and Interpretative Essays Virgil, Aeneid, 4.1–299: Latin Text, Study Questions, Commentary and Interpretative EssaysIngo Gilde...

    ]]>     Virgil, Aeneid, 4.1–299: Latin Text, Study Questions, Commentary and Interpretative Essays
    Ingo Gildenhard
    Virgil, Aeneid, 4.1–299: Latin Text, Study Questions, Commentary and Interpretative Essays - cover image 

    Love and tragedy dominate book four of Virgil’s most powerful work, building on the violent emotions invoked by the storms, battles, warring gods, and monster-plagued wanderings of the epic’s opening. Destined to be the founder of Roman culture, Aeneas, nudged by the gods, decides to leave his beloved Dido, causing her suicide in pursuit of his historical destiny. A dark plot, in which erotic passion culminates in sex, and sex leads to tragedy and death in the human realm, unfolds within the larger horizon of a supernatural sphere, dominated by power-conscious divinities. Dido is Aeneas’ most significant other, and in their encounter Virgil explores timeless themes of love and loyalty, fate and fortune, the justice of the gods, imperial ambition and its victims, and ethnic differences. This course book offers a portion of the original Latin text, study questions, a commentary, and interpretative essays. Designed to stretch and stimulate readers, Ingo Gildenhard’s incisive commentary will be of particular interest to students of Latin at both A2 and undergraduate level. It extends beyond detailed linguistic analysis to encourage critical engagement with Virgil’s poetry and discussion of the most recent scholarly thought. 

     
    PublisherOpen Book Publishers
    Publication placeCambridge, UK
    Published on2012-11-22
    Series
    • Classics Textbooks vol. 2
    • ISSN Print: 2054-2437
    • ISSN Digital: 2054-2445
    ISBN978-1-909254-15-2 (Paperback)
    978-1-909254-16-9 (Hardback)
    978-1-909254-17-6 (PDF)
    978-1-80064-450-2 (HTML)
    978-1-909254-18-3 (EPUB)
    978-1-909254-19-0 (MOBI)
    ]]>     2026-09-11T18:50:34+00:00 Chuck Jones http://ancientworldonline.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-11T18:50:34+00:00 The Ancient World Online: Law     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298371 Cornelius Nepos, Life of Hannibal: Latin Text, Notes, Maps, Illustrations and Vocabulary Cornelius Nepos, Life of Hannibal: Latin Text, Notes, Maps, Illustrations and VocabularyBret Mulliga...

    ]]>     Cornelius Nepos, Life of Hannibal: Latin Text, Notes, Maps, Illustrations and Vocabulary
    Bret Mulligan
    Cornelius Nepos, Life of Hannibal: Latin Text, Notes, Maps, Illustrations and Vocabulary - cover image 

    Trebia. Trasimene. Cannae. With three stunning victories, Hannibal humbled Rome and nearly shattered its empire. Even today Hannibal's brilliant, if ultimately unsuccessful, campaign against Rome during the Second Punic War (218-202 BC) make him one of history's most celebrated military leaders. This biography by Cornelius Nepos (c. 100-27 BC) sketches Hannibal's life from the time he began traveling with his father's army as a young boy, through his sixteen-year invasion of Italy and his tumultuous political career in Carthage, to his perilous exile and eventual suicide in the East. As Rome completed its bloody transition from dysfunctional republic to stable monarchy, Nepos labored to complete an innovative and influential collection of concise biographies. Putting aside the detailed, chronological accounts of military campaigns and political machinations that characterized most writing about history, Nepos surveyed Roman and Greek history for distinguished men who excelled in a range of prestigious occupations. In the exploits and achievements of these illustrious men, Nepos hoped that his readers would find models for the honorable conduct of their own lives. Although most of Nepos' works have been lost, we are fortunate to have his biography of Hannibal. Nepos offers a surprisingly balanced portrayal of a man that most Roman authors vilified as the most monstrous foe that Rome had ever faced. Nepos' straightforward style and his preference for common vocabulary make Life of Hannibal accessible for those who are just beginning to read continuous Latin prose, while the historical interest of the subject make it compelling for readers of every ability. This book contains embedded audio files of the original text read aloud by Christopher Francese. 

     

    DOIhttps://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0068
    Landing pagehttps://www.openbookpublishers.com/books/10.11647/obp.0068
    Licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
    CopyrightBret Mulligan
    PublisherOpen Book Publishers
    Publication placeCambridge, UK
    Published on2015-10-05
    Series
    • Dickinson College Commentaries vol. 1
    • ISSN Print: 2059-5743
    • ISSN Digital: 2059-5751
    ISBN978-1-78374-132-8 (Paperback)
    978-1-78374-133-5 (Hardback)
    978-1-78374-134-2 (PDF)
    978-1-80064-494-6 (HTML)
    978-1-78374-639-2 (XML)
    978-1-78374-135-9 (EPUB)
    978-1-78374-136-6 (MOBI)
     

     

    ]]>     2026-09-11T18:47:11+00:00 Chuck Jones http://ancientworldonline.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-11T18:47:11+00:00 The Ancient World Online: Law     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298361 Assisted Dying Bill – Second Reading The Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill was introduced in the House of Commons by Lauren Edward...

    ]]>     The Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill was introduced in the House of Commons by Lauren Edwards MP on 17 July 2026; the House of Commons Library Research Briefing, issued on 4 September, 2026 is here. The Bill was given a Second Reading on 11 September 2026 and was defeated – Ayes, 270; Noes, 286. Following the vote, the Church of England issued the following Press Release:

    Bishop of Newcastle responds as MPs reject Assisted Dying Bill

    11/09/2026

    Following the vote in the House of Commons against giving Second Reading to the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill, the Bishop of Newcastle, Dr Helen-Ann Hartley, said: “I am relieved that the Assisted Dying Bill has been defeated today.

    “I recognise the deeply personal nature of this debate and acknowledge all those who will be affected by its outcome.

    “I am pleased that MPs have taken seriously the detailed scrutiny applied to the Bill in the House of Lords, work in which I was privileged to participate as a member of the Select Committee.

    “I hope that today’s decision now affords us space for reflection, but also for action: a clear and sustained commitment to improving palliative and end-of-life care, alongside the social care on which so many people and families depend.

    “These are urgent matters, and they must now receive the attention and investment they deserve.”

    Cite this article as: David Pocklington, "Assisted Dying Bill – Second Reading" in Law & Religion UK, 11 September 2026, https://lawandreligionuk.com/2026/09/11/assisted-dying-bill-second-reading/
    ]]>     2026-09-11T16:53:36+00:00 David Pocklington http://www.lawandreligionuk.com 2026-09-11T16:53:36+00:00 Law & Religion UK     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298363 Verbieten, sanktionieren, bestrafen Die Landesmedienanstalt Berlin–Brandenburg (mabb) durfte dem deutschen TV-Ableger von RT (RT DE Prod...

    ]]>     Die Landesmedienanstalt Berlin–Brandenburg (mabb) durfte dem deutschen TV-Ableger von RT (RT DE Productions GmbH) die Verbreitung seines Rundfunkprogramms untersagen. Zu diesem wenig überraschenden Ergebnis kam das VG Berlin in seinem Urteil vom 30. Juni 2026, dessen Entscheidungsgründe in Kürze veröffentlicht werden dürften. Einen Erkenntnisgewinn liefert die Entscheidung allenfalls in der Bestätigung, dass RT DE als eigenständige Veranstalterin und nicht bloß als Zulieferin der russischen TV Novosti galt und damit rundfunkrechtlich zulassungspflichtig war. Die Frage der Rechtmäßigkeit des nationalen Sendeverbots ist derweil nur noch von untergeordneter Bedeutung: Es sind die mehrfach erweiterten EU-Sanktionen, die dafür sorgen, dass RT und andere russische Staatsmedien in der EU – und damit auch in Deutschland – deutlich an Relevanz verloren haben. Gleichwohl setzt sich der von Russland schon vor Jahren ausgerufene „Informationskrieg“ mit Europa auf anderen Wegen fort. Die Maßnahmen gegen RT sind insoweit zwar wirksam, decken aber nur einen Teil der diversifizierten russischen Desinformationsstrategie ab.

    Auch Umwege führten nicht zur Rundfunklizenz

    Es ist nicht lange her, da verfügte RT über Erlaubnisse zur Verbreitung sowohl eines englischsprachigen als auch eines französischen Angebots. Das Angebot sollte nach Aussagen von RT-Vertreter*innen nach und nach ausgeweitet werden, und auch das deutschsprachige Programm sollte zum Rundfunkprogramm ausgebaut werden. Eine Lizenz wurde in Deutschland allerdings nie beantragt und wäre aller Voraussicht nach ohnehin an § 53 Abs. 3 S. 3 MStV gescheitert, der es verbietet, ausländischen Staaten oder von ihnen beherrschten Unternehmen eine entsprechende Lizenz zu erteilen. Dementsprechend war der Versuch, eine offizielle Zulassung für das deutschsprachige Programm zu erhalten, verworren. Zunächst wurde ein Zulassungsantrag in Luxemburg gestellt, allerdings nicht von der in Berlin ansässigen RT DE Productions GmbH, sondern von deren Moskauer Muttergesellschaft TV Novosti. Luxemburg erklärte sich allerdings für unzuständig, sodass TV Novosti die Zulassung, dieses Mal mit Erfolg, in Serbien beantragte. Der Schritt verwundert auf den ersten Blick, da Serbien nicht EU-Mitglied ist und das Programm durch die Zulassung nicht in den Genuss des unionsrechtlichen Herkunftslandprinzips kommen kann. Allerdings ist Serbien, ebenso wie Deutschland, Vertragspartei des Europäischen Übereinkommens über das grenzüberschreitende Fernsehen (EÜGF), sodass zumindest eine Anwendung der in Art. 4 EÜGF geregelten Sendefreiheit diskutiert werden konnte.

    Die mabb sah sich dadurch allerdings nicht daran gehindert, eine Untersagung gegen die RT DE Productions GmbH auszusprechen. Die Belastete klagte und verwies darauf, dass nicht sie, sondern TV Novosti Rundfunkveranstalterin sei, der Verwaltungsakt sich also an die falsche Adressatin richte. Die Idee dahinter dürfte gewesen sein, sich auf die Sendefreiheit nach Art. 4 EÜGF zu berufen. Die wohl nach wie vor gültige Lizenz von TV Novosti in Serbien hätte dann als Argument dafür genutzt werden können, dass in Deutschland keine Lizenz benötigt werde. Das VG Berlin stellte jedoch fest, dass die RT DE Productions GmbH als Rundfunkveranstalterin i. S. d. § 2 Abs. 2 Nr. 17 MStV anzusehen gewesen sei. Dies habe sich insbesondere aus der öffentlichen Kommunikation der Klägerin und ihrer werblichen Selbstdarstellung sowie aus der Ausrichtung des Programms auf den deutschen Markt ergeben. Ob TV Novosti eine serbische Sendelizenz erhalten habe, sei für das Verfahren irrelevant gewesen, weil es sich weder um eine Zulassung der Klägerin noch um eine Zulassung nach den Bestimmungen des MStV gehandelt habe. Generell dürfte sich die praktische Bedeutung der Untersagung aus zwei Gründen inzwischen in Grenzen halten: Zum einen hat die RT DE Productions GmbH mittlerweile ihre Geschäftstätigkeit eingestellt und befindet sich in Liquidation. Vor allem aber haben die EU-Sanktionen die Betätigungsmöglichkeiten von RT ohnehin sehr viel weitgehender betroffen.

    EU-Sanktionen…

    Zur Umsetzung der Beschlüsse des Rates nach Art. 29 EUV (Beschl. (GASP) 2014/145 und Beschl. (GASP) 2014/512) und der auf Grundlage von Art. 215 AEUV erlassenen ausführenden Verordnungen (VO (EU) 269/2014 und VO (EU) 833/2014) verhängte die EU schon im Jahr 2014 umfangreiche Wirtschafts- und Finanzsanktionen (sog. „restriktive Maßnahmen“) gegen Russland. Mit dem Angriff auf das ukrainische Staatsgebiet 2022 erfolgte eine Ausweitung dieser Sanktionen auf russische Staatsmedien, indem die bereits erlassene VO (EU) 833/2014 durch Änderungsverordnungen ergänzt wurde. Während die mabb mit Mitteln des Medienrechts wegen der fehlenden Zulassung vorgehen konnte und aus dem strukturellen Grund der Staatsferne die Zulassung auch nicht hätte erteilen können, bediente sich die EU also eines Instruments des Außenwirtschaftsrechts, um aufgrund des Programminhalts russische Anbieter zu sanktionieren (Ferreau, ZUM 2022, 505 (510)): Eine Reihe von Medien, die unter ständiger Kontrolle der Führung der Russischen Föderation stünden, würden kontinuierliche und konzertierte Propagandaaktionen verbreiten, um den Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine zu rechtfertigen. Dies stelle eine erhebliche und unmittelbare Bedrohung für die öffentliche Ordnung und Sicherheit der Union dar und spiele eine maßgebliche Rolle im Vorgehen gegen die Ukraine und ihre Nachbarländer (vgl. Erwg. 7 bis 9 der Änderungsverordnung VO (EU) 2022/350). Diese Erwägungen legen einen Konflikt bezüglich der Kompetenzverteilung zwischen der Union und den Mitgliedstaaten offen: Wirtschafts- und Finanzsanktionen sollen eigentlich wirtschaftliche Positionen eines anderen Völkerrechtssubjekts treffen, um dieses zu einer Verhaltensänderung zu veranlassen. Zwar ist mit dem Sendeverbot auch eine wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit eines Drittstaats betroffen. In erster Linie sollen die Sanktionen gegen russische Medien aber dem Schutz von Rechtsgütern innerhalb der Union dienen, also nach innen und nicht nach außen wirken. Dass diese inhaltsbegründete Sanktionierung nicht in die Zuständigkeit der Mitgliedstaaten nach Art. 167 AEUV fallen soll, sondern vom Zweck des Sanktionsrechts gedeckt ist, liegt zumindest nicht auf der Hand. Der EuGH entschied allerdings, dass die Union über einen weiten Spielraum hinsichtlich restriktiver Maßnahmen im Bereich der GASP verfügt (vgl. EuGH, Urteil vom 28. März 2017, C‑-72/15, Rosneft, Rn. 88). Die Sanktionen seien somit von der Kompetenz der Union umfasst (EuG, Urteil vom 27. Juli 2022, T-125/22, Rn. 52).

    Konkret werden nach Art. 2f Abs. 3 der VO (EU) 833/2014 alle Rundfunklizenzen oder -genehmigungen, Übertragungs- und Verbreitungsvereinbarungen mit Unternehmen, die im Anhang XV dieser Verordnung genannt werden, ausgesetzt. Betroffen sind neben den RT-Gesellschaften zahlreiche weitere russische Medienanbieter. Art. 2f Abs. 3 statuiert ein Werbeverbot für Produkte und Dienstleistungen in den Angeboten der benannten Gesellschaften. Mit Art. 2f Abs. 1 soll eine mittelbare Verbreitung der Inhalte russischer Staatsmedien verhindert werden: Das Verbot dieses Absatzes richtet sich an „Betreiber“ und umfasst die Verbreitung der Inhalte über diverse Technologien, wie etwa Kabel, Satellit, Internetdienstleister oder Video-Sharing-Plattformen. Der Betreiber-Begriff ist dabei weit auszulegen und umfasst Internetdienstleister, die die Angebote sanktionierter Medien hosten oder die nötige Verbindung herstellen, reine Access Provider sowie Suchmaschinenbetreiber und Social-Media-Plattformen. Weiterhin sind auch natürliche Personen umfasst (Urteil vom 2. Juli 2026, C-67/25, „Traugott Ickeroth”, s.u.). Darüber, welche Aktivitäten Art. 2f Abs. 1 konkret erfasst, bestehen weiterhin gewisse Unklarheiten (siehe dazu hier). Nicht umfasst sein sollen allerdings Recherchen oder Interviews (vgl. Erwg. 11 der VO (EU) 2022/350).

    Um das Umgehungsrisiko zu minimieren, wurde mit dem Beschluss (GASP) 2026/508 und der Änderungsverordnung (EU) 2026/506 das bestehende Sendeverbot weiter ausgeweitet. Art. 2f der Verordnung (EU) 833/2014 erhält nunmehr einen neuen Abs. 1a. Dieser beschränkt die Ausstrahlung und die Erleichterung der Ausstrahlung von Inhalten durch Organisationen, die mit den Inhalten sanktionierter Anbieter vergleichbar sind (vgl. Erwg. 9 der VO (EU) 2026/506). Hierdurch kommt der Sanktionsgeber den ständigen Veränderungen von Websites, auf denen Inhalte von RT oder im Wesentlichen identische Inhalte verbreitet werden, zuvor. Alle „Klone“ von bereits sanktionierten Medien werden demnach ebenfalls Adressaten der Sanktionen.

    Damit ist ein mittlerweile sehr umfassendes Sanktionspaket in Kraft gesetzt, das auch immer wieder auf neue Entwicklungen zu reagieren versucht. Die Rechtmäßigkeit wesentlicher Teile dieser Sanktionen wurde vom EuG in Bezug auf RT France mit Urteil vom 27. Juli 2022 (T-125/22) festgestellt.

    … und strafrechtliche Folgen

    Zur Sicherstellung einer effizienten und einheitlichen Durchsetzung dieser Sanktionen harmonisiert die Richtlinie EU 2024/1226 das Sanktionsstrafrecht. In Deutschland wurde die Richtlinie im Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (AWG) umgesetzt. Demnach stellen Verstöße gegen EU-Sanktionen Straftatbestände und Ordnungswidrigkeiten dar. Die strafbewehrten Verbote erreichen, wie der Fall „Traugott Ickeroth“ zeigt, eine erhebliche Wirkung. In dem Strafverfahren ging es um drei Personen, denen angelastet wurde, die Website „Traugott Ickeroth“ als kriminelle Vereinigung betrieben zu haben. Die Seite war kostenfrei zugänglich, rief aber zu Spenden auf, wodurch die Betreiber im Zeitraum vom 1. April 2022 bis zum 3. August 2023 einen Betrag von insgesamt 60.038,65 EUR erzielten. Der strafrechtliche Vorwurf bezog sich darauf, dass auf der Seite Videos von RT Deutschland verbreitet worden seien, die aufgrund der EU-Sanktionen einem Verbreitungsverbot unterliegen. Dieses Verbreitungsverbot ist durch § 18 AWG strafbewehrt. In dem Verfahren kam es dementsprechend wesentlich darauf an, ob auch die Betreiber einer auf Spendenbasis beruhenden Website „Betreiber“ im Sinne des Art. 2f Abs. 1 der VO (EU) 833/2014 sein können. Diese Frage legte das zur Entscheidung berufene LG Saarbrücken in einem Vorabentscheidungsverfahren dem EuGH vor. Der Gerichtshof entschied, dass der Betreiberbegriff natürliche Personen umfasst, wenn diese Inhalte der sanktionierten Unternehmen auf einer Website verbreiteten und damit in Form freiwilliger Spenden und Schenkungen Einnahmen generieren (Urteil vom 2. Juli 2026, C-67/25, Rn. 58).

    Damit machen sich in Deutschland auch Blogger*innen, Content-Creator*innen und andere Betreiber*innen von Webseiten und Accounts strafbar, die die in der VO (EU) 833/2014 sanktionierten Medien verbreiten. Die Strafbarkeit dürfte unabhängig von kommerziellen oder ideologischen Beweggründen und unabhängig von den konkret geteilten Inhalten bestehen. Damit kommt es allein darauf an, dass ein sanktioniertes Medium verbreitet wird. Mit Blick auf die Begründung der Sanktionen vollzieht sich somit ein bemerkenswerter, wenn nicht bedenklicher Wechsel: Erlassen wurden sie, um die Verbreitung gefährlicher Inhalte zu unterbinden. Dieser Ansatz ist schon für sich problematisch, weil bestimmte Inhalte als „gefährlich“ und somit für den Meinungsbildungsprozess schädlich eingeordnet werden müssen. Er dürfte aber angesichts des erklärten Ziels russischer Medien, die Meinungsbildung in Europa zu stören, akzeptabel sein. Dass aber für die Verbreitung des für schädlich befundenen Programms unabhängig von den jeweiligen Inhalten auch Privatpersonen mit empfindlichen strafrechtlichen Konsequenzen rechnen müssen, irritiert. Diese Form der Sanktionsdurchsetzung wirft auch angesichts der starken Stellung der Meinungsfreiheit (und des im Übrigen weiten Schutzbereichs des Art. 11 Abs. 1 GRCh und Art. 10 Abs. 1 EMRK) Bedenken hinsichtlich der Verhältnismäßigkeit auf.

    Die Wirksamkeit der Maßnahmen

    Nachdem die Maßnahmen gegen RT mittlerweile seit mehreren Jahren gelten, stellt sich die Frage nach deren Wirksamkeit. Dies gilt umso mehr, als der Katalog stetig gewachsen ist. Bemerkenswert ist in diesem Kontext die ungewöhnliche Schnelligkeit und Einigkeit der EU beim Erlass der Sanktionen gegen russische Staatsmedien und die davon ausgehende Signalwirkung auf politischer Ebene. Zumindest in rechtlicher Hinsicht haben die Maßnahmen die Möglichkeiten von RT weitreichend eingeschränkt. Die Sende- und Verbreitungsverbote dürften mit dazu beigetragen haben, dass die RT DE Productions GmbH schließlich ihre Geschäftstätigkeit eingestellt hat, weil es für Russland keinen Weg gab, sie ihrem Ziel entsprechend zu betreiben. Gleichzeitig haben die Maßnahmen auf die russische (Medien-)Politik kaum Einfluss nehmen können.

    So hat sich gezeigt, dass sich RT bzw. TV Novosti nach dem Sendeverbot und den EU-Sanktionen nur begrenzt an die Untersagungen halten. Nach Recherchen des „CORRECTIV.Faktencheck“ seien zumindest bis Februar 2026 noch mehr als 20 verschiedene „mirror sites“ (Spiegelseiten) von RT DE aus Deutschland zu erreichen gewesen, welche Schätzungen zufolge insgesamt mehrere Millionen Aufrufe pro Monat erreicht hätten. Zwar bekämen die Spiegelseiten laut einer Untersuchung des Thinktanks Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) nur noch etwa ein Drittel so viele Aufrufe wie die früheren offiziellen Seiten von RT DE, was für eine gewisse Wirksamkeit der Verbote spricht. Dass die Spiegelseiten weiter frei abrufbar sind, zeigt aber, dass die Sanktionen schnell an praktische Grenzen stoßen. Die Durchsetzung der Verbote ist insoweit lückenhaft, weil es trotz des rechtlichen Verbots praktisch möglich bleibt, immer neue Spiegelseiten zu erstellen. Der Zugang zu diesen Seiten muss jeweils einzeln durch die verschiedenen Internetanbieter gesperrt werden, wobei es dafür in Deutschland keine regelmäßig überprüfte und aktualisierte „Sperrliste“, sondern lediglich eine unvollständige „vorsorgliche Information für Internetanbieter“ gibt. Daneben spielen Unsicherheiten bezüglich der Reichweite der Sanktionen (siehe oben) sowie bezüglich der (geteilten) Zuständigkeit für die Überwachung der Einhaltung der Sanktionen eine Rolle.

    Insgesamt zeigt sich damit, dass der russischen Desinformationsagenda durch das Ende der RT-Sparte ein Standbein weggebrochen ist, das aber durch neue Aktionsformen ersetzt wurde. Neben den bereits erwähnten Spiegelseiten ist dabei der zuletzt wieder verstärkt vorkommende Trend zu nennen, Desinformationsvideos mit den Logos seriöser Medienhäuser zu labeln. Damit verschieben sich die Ansätze, diesen Problemen beizukommen: Während es 2021, als Russland versuchte, legal Rundfunk zu betreiben, auch darum ging, eine Umgehung der rechtlichen Standards aufzudecken und zu adressieren, liegt das Problem heute primär darin, die Verantwortlichen zu identifizieren und zu erreichen. Die russische Strategie ist heute weniger denn je darauf ausgerichtet, Legalität auch nur zu suggerieren. Dies zeigt sich immer wieder, besonders aber jüngst im Zusammenhang mit Wahlen. Das Arsenal der „information weapon“, als das RT schon 2012 von der damaligen Chefredakteurin beschrieben wurde, hat sich insoweit verändert.

    Fazit

    Eine Bewertung der Maßnahmen gegen RT fällt vor diesem Hintergrund schwer. So sind sie einerseits sehr effektiv, weil sie die Desinformationskampagne über RT in vielerlei Hinsicht beschränken konnten. Gleichzeitig hat sich die russische Desinformation an das neue Umfeld angepasst, sodass kaum davon gesprochen werden kann, dass ihr ein schwerer Schlag zugesetzt worden wäre. Dies kann der EU wiederum kaum vorgeworfen werden: Akteure, Verbreitungswege und Erscheinungsformen von Desinformation verändern sich unablässig, sodass jede Regulierung droht, den tatsächlichen Entwicklungen hinterherzulaufen. Gleichzeitig werden die angenommenen demokratiezersetzenden Auswirkungen von Desinformation in der Forschung konstant kritisch hinterfragt. Für den „Globalen Norden“ lassen sich bislang keine robusten empirischen Belege für weitreichende Effekte von Desinformation finden. So richtig es ist, den russischen Staat nicht mit dem Anschein eines seriösen Nachrichtendienstleisters in Europa auftreten zu lassen, muss doch beachtet werden, dass die Einschnitte in Meinungs- und Medienfreiheiten unter Umständen groß sein können. Fehlende Erkenntnisse im Zusammenhang mit Desinformation verschärfen diesen Befund. Letztlich beruhen die freien Gesellschaftsordnungen nach wie vor auf dem Vertrauen in die Kraft des besseren Arguments, das sich in der Vergangenheit schon oft herausgefordert sah.

    The post Verbieten, sanktionieren, bestrafen appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

    ]]>     2026-09-11T16:08:30+00:00 Judith Beetz http://verfassungsblog.de 2026-09-11T16:08:30+00:00 Verfassungsblog     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298364 Towards the Smoothed Word This editorial is part of our “Behind the Scenes” series, in which our editors and authors describe ...

    ]]>     This editorial is part of our “Behind the Scenes” series, in which our editors and authors describe their creative process in the age of artificial intelligence. How do ideas come to us? How do we sow and water them, and how do we know when they are ripe? And what role does artificial intelligence play in all of this?

    İnsan olmaya geldim – I have come to be human. The line goes back to Nimri Dede, a folk poet from a village near Elazığ. If you know it, you probably know it in the voice of Arif Sağ, who turned the poem into one of the best-known spiritual songs of the Alevi-Bektashi tradition.

    Each stanza ends on the same rhyme, with only the word before it changing: Özde, in the core. Sözde, in the word. Yüzde, in the face. İzde, in the trace. Közde, in the embers. Registers of becoming human, listed one after another, none struck out or played off against the others – like a refusal to split being human into a part fit to be shown and a part one merely brings along. And after every stanza, the same refrain: the singer has come to lay his head in the Meydan, the space at the centre of the Cem where people dance and deliberate, and where you lay down nothing that is not yours.

    The academic world I work in often demands the opposite movement. It demands the split: bring the word, leave the core at home. One can try to pin this demand down and call it the postulate of neutrality and objectivity. It rarely comes as a rule, far more often as a tone, like an expectation nobody voices because nobody has to. The text is finished, someone reads it and leaves a comment in the margin that looks like a description and works like an objection: “positioned, engaged, pointed, personally coloured, political.” It does not claim that anything is wrong. It is not a counterargument one could respond to. What lies behind it is the message that someone has seen on me, and read in me, where I am writing from – and that this place means the text cannot be objective.

    Legal scholarship, too, knows that no one writes from nowhere. As Arthur Kaufmann observed in Die Geschichtlichkeit des Rechts im Licht der Hermeneutik in 1969: even with sound method and critical reflection, “the personality can never be entirely eliminated as a co-deciding instance in a legal decision. The knowing subject does not remain outside the process of cognition but takes part in it – with all his prejudices, convictions, interests.” In the philosophy of science, positionality has long been a subject in its own right, and there are colleagues for whom scholarly rigour lies precisely in disclosing their own assumptions. So it is not insight that is lacking. Pre-understanding counts as a condition of all understanding. It only counts as bias once you can see it on someone. Miranda Fricker has coined a term for this: testimonial injustice, a credibility deficit ascribed to a person not because of their arguments but because of what others see in them. What makes this form of epistemic injustice so insidious is that it needs no rejection. Being rejected would be easier; rejection can be argued with. The text is given a provenance, while other people’s texts simply remain texts. And the neutrality postulate is where this injustice receives its academic seal of approval: it claims a standpoint without a location and generously overlooks the fact that this standpoint can only ever be claimed by those whose location no one asks about in the first place.

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    So far, so familiar. The point I am after lies one turn further, and it is more uncomfortable, because it shifts from accusation to confession: I have stopped waiting to be marked. These days I do the marking myself, earlier and more efficiently than any reviewer. Nobody ordered me to. I have internalized the verdict, and that is exactly what makes epistemic injustice what it is: at some point, it starts producing itself.

    Victor Loxen opened his editorial in this series with Vega and Elena Ferrante, Maximilian Steinbeis with mushrooms in the woods, and it would occur to no one – rightly – to see anything in this but erudition or creativity. I opened with an Alevi song in Turkish, with a bill running in my head that Ferrante and mushrooms never incur: how much argument I would need after an opening like this to win back the credit the first paragraph had gambled away.

    Loxen writes that AI engages in a kind of “clever dilettantism.” Since it does not itself exist in the world as an embodied subject, it never meets the provocations and pushback of an outside; and linguistic form can never become a cage for it, because nothing it takes is foreign to it. It was his editorial that prompted this piece. If writing lives on failing at something that does not come from one’s own text, then everything turns on what is recognized as that kind of failure. Reading is recognized, and so is a contradiction in the sources, a find in the archive, a judgment that doesn’t fit one’s thesis. The outside that I bring with me, by contrast, is deducted as mere distortion. The neutrality postulate is a gatekeeper. It sorts the world’s ideas and resistances according to whose they are.

    And for some time now there has been a machine that could make this deduction for me. The prompt would be simple: “Make this text more objective. Rephrase it so that it comes across as completely impartial and no one can accuse me of taking a position.”

    The paragraph would come back with everything still in place: structure, claims, citations, bigger names. What would be missing is the spot where you would have noticed that the person writing has something at stake. Nothing would be missing that a reviewer could object to. And yet the core would be missing. The AI would not hesitate. A colleague who smooths the same sentence for me has to look at me while she does it. She might ask, more carefully, whether I am sure, and she might know that she is taking something away from me. The AI has no empathy that would make it ask carefully, because it has never had a core. It is Söz without Öz, word without core, without face, without trace, without embers – and that is exactly what makes it the ideal instrument for an operation I already perform on myself.

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    That is my answer to the question this series asks. In my writing process, AI plays neither the role of idea-giver nor that of rival. It offers itself as an arbiter of objectivity. To objectify means to make objective – and to turn into an object. A system that books personal involvement as distortion demands a labour of adaptation. Now there is a tool for that: a machine that could edit my text and, in the same stroke, grind away whatever in me does not count in this business. Put bluntly, I could prompt: “Claude, make me objective. Dehumanize me. Erase who I am from my arguments and claims. Delete the unwanted outside I carry within me.”

    Nimri Dede says he is here to be human, in the core and in the word. AI could help me run in the opposite direction. From the positioned Öz to the smoothed Söz.

    I hope I will not need this machine. That I will no longer be the one who deducts the outside I bring with me as distortion, and will let it count instead as the resistance that writing lives on. That I will reach the core of what I want to say, and acknowledge what I have long known: that no one writes from nowhere. And that I will write texts I can lay down in the Meydan, because they are mine, in the core and in the word.

    *

    Editor’s Pick

    by MAXIMILIAN STEINBEIS

    Copyright: Maximilian Steinbeis

    Did someone say fascism? Yes, someone did, and more and more people do. One of them is the philosopher Eva von Redecker. She coins contemporary fascism as liquidierende Phantombesitzverteidigung, a liquidating defence of phantom property, a term inspired by a find she made at a flea market in Havelberg, Saxony-Anhalt: an old tin sign bearing the police notice “Looters will be shot.” Fascism, she argues, “imagines itself to be operating under the jurisdiction of such a decree. The hostility it celebrates presents itself as self-defence against looters.” Everywhere, there are people and powers supposedly coming after what belongs to you: my country, my women, my rule – all the more fiercely defended when the claim to ownership is every bit as imaginary as the figure said to be threatening it. At the heart of contemporary fascism, her argument goes, is a regime of property that breaks free from the law and from the democratic processes through which that law is made, and instead declares itself absolute and natural, as if it had always been there. It starts with the AfD, but it certainly does not end there. There are plenty of conceptual gems to discover in this book (my favourite: Verflixung), but its central analytical contribution is to draw this connection. Reading it may not make you feel any better, but it does leave you seeing things more clearly.

    Eva von Redecker: Dieser Drang nach Härte. Über den neuen Faschismus. S. Fischer 2026, (only available in German).

    *

    The Week on Verfassungsblog

    summarised by EVA MARIA BREDLER

    After months of research, warnings, hope, and despair, the scenarios have now leapt from the drawing board onto the Tagesschau: at the state election in Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD won over 43 per cent of the vote. Not an absolute majority, but only a wafer-thin margin short of one. It remains entirely unclear who will govern the state. No one wants to take the AfD’s outstretched hand.

    On Sunday evening, this sparked a heated debate on Caren Miosga, a political talk show on ARD. One political scientist argued that völkisch concepts such as “ethnopluralism” or the “ethnocultural community” are also part of democratic pluralism. FABIAN MICHL (GER) disagrees emphatically, taking these prime-time claims as an occasion to reflect on the responsibility of scholarship in the democratic constitutional state.

    How far will academia be able to live up to that responsibility in Saxony-Anhalt? FRIEDRICH ZILLESSEN and LUNA MONO (GER) examine just how much influence an authoritarian-populist minister of science could wield.

    Who will actually take charge of which ministry remains wide open. The AfD is three seats short of an absolute majority; with five seats, the BSW could become kingmaker (and is flirting with the idea). The remaining parties (CDU, Die Linke, SPD, Greens) hold 39 seats in the state parliament – exactly as many as the AfD. So far, so familiar. What has barely been discussed is that this arithmetic means the AfD could push its agenda through regardless, should six MPs from the other groups be absent or abstain. JANOS RICHTER (GER) explains why that could turn the Saxony-Anhalt state parliament into a game of Full House.

    Should the AfD take over the state interior ministry, it would also control the State Office for the Protection of the Constitution – and could restructure it in ways that abuse the law. HEIKO MEIERTÖNS (GER) analyses the limits set by the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution – and when the federal government can step in.

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    For our Security & Crime Dossier, JANA TRAPP and MARKUS THIEL (GER) discuss what levers a state executive actually has at its disposal without a parliamentary majority. You can subscribe to the dossier here (it’s worth it, we promise). If the election still won’t let you go, we also recommend our spotlight on Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. What Maximilian Steinbeis says above about Eva von Redeker’s new book holds true here too: “Reading it won’t necessarily make you feel better, but it will make you see more clearly.” And that is crucial. Because after a brief Hydration Break, the election in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania continues on 20 September.

    Explosive material for security law isn’t confined to an AfD-led State Office for the Protection of the Constitution – it can also be found in the draft of the nationwide intelligence services reform, which the cabinet approved in mid-August. SOFIANE BENAMOR (GER) has taken a closer look at the reform and concludes: “The Federal Constitutional Court would have to perform some fairly dogmatic pirouettes to clear away all the constitutional problems.”

    Literal explosive material, meanwhile, turned up in Leipzig: after the explosive-drone incident at the airport, Foreign Minister Wadephul announced a package of measures against Russia – among other things, he wants to terminate the cultural agreement covering, for instance, the “Russian House” in Berlin. Actually shutting it down, though, will mean cutting through several legal Gordian knots first, as BERNHARD KNOLL-TUDOR (ENG) explains.

    While bridges to Russia and the US are collapsing, the EU wants to build new ones. But is the EU really serious about enlargement? Not ready, at any rate, argues ANDREW DUFF (ENG): the debate focuses too much on the adaptability of the candidate countries – and too little on the question of what the Union itself needs to do in order to take in new members.

    Maduro’s lawyers are asking a federal court in New York to drop the narco-terrorism case against him – a sitting head of state, they argue, enjoys absolute immunity. CARLOS MORENO (ENG) shows that the very notion that abducting foreign leaders poses no legal problem traces back to the case of a Mexican doctor from the 1990s whom almost no one has heard of.

    But what does terrorism actually mean? The US recently designated the Brazilian organisations Primeiro Comando da Capital and Comando Vermelho as terrorist organisations, reigniting the debate over the concept. LUCAS CATIB DE LAURENTIIS and LUIZ GUILHERME ARCARO CONCI (ENG) trace how Brazilian law justifies drastic legal consequences by invoking terrorism, while drifting further and further from the concept itself – a dynamic familiar from other countries.

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    So is the problem not the law, but politics? That’s a common narrative in international law too, used to explain today’s crises. In his long read, ITAMAR MANN (ENG) pushes back: “If we offload that responsibility and bask in our own legal purity, we do that only at our own expense.”

    Responsibility can take very different forms, quite literally. On 4 September, 164 UN member states adopted the “Correct the Map” resolution, calling for the Mercator projection to be replaced with fairer, equal-area world maps. LUIS ESLAVA (ENG) traces how maps help build our world, and how they can help us build another one.

    Incidentally, only one country voted against the “Correct the Map” resolution. Guess which one. Bingo! The US delegation dismissed the initiative as an “ideological project” and insisted on remaining at the bellybutton of the Mercator map, gorged on resources from a shrunken periphery. A good moment to reflect on our own “ways of seeing”. What have we become blind to? Which “mental geographies” are worth re-travelling, re-surveying? Just asking, from (West) Berlin towards (East) Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and back.

     

    *

    That’s it for this week. Take care and all the best!

    Yours,

    the Verfassungsblog Team

     

     

    If you would like to receive the weekly editorial as an e-mail, you can subscribe here.

    The post Towards the Smoothed Word appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

    ]]>     2026-09-11T14:24:44+00:00 Büşra Akay http://verfassungsblog.de 2026-09-11T14:24:44+00:00 Verfassungsblog     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298365 Zum geglätteten Wort Dieses Editorial ist Teil unserer Reihe „Hinter den Kulissen“, in der unsere Redakteur:innen und Au...

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    Dieses Editorial ist Teil unserer Reihe „Hinter den Kulissen“, in der unsere Redakteur:innen und Autor:innen ihren kreativen Prozess in Zeiten von Künstlicher Intelligenz beschreiben. Wie kommen wir auf Ideen? Wie säen und gießen wir Ideen, wann merken wir, dass sie reif sind? Und welche Rolle spielt Künstliche Intelligenz dabei?

    İnsan olmaya geldim – ich bin gekommen, um ein Mensch zu sein. Die Zeile geht auf Nimri Dede zurück, einem Volksdichter aus einem Dorf bei Elazığ. Wer sie kennt, kennt sie vermutlich in der Stimme von Arif Sağ, der aus dem Gedicht eines der bekanntesten spirituellen Lieder der alevitisch-bektaschitischen Tradition gemacht hat.

    Jede Strophe endet auf demselben Reim, dem nur ein anderes Wort vorangeht: Özde, im Kern. Sözde, im Wort. Yüzde, im Antlitz. İzde, in der Spur. Közde, in der Glut. Register des Menschwerdens, aufgezählt, ohne dass eines gestrichen oder gegen ein anderes ausgespielt würde, wie eine Weigerung, das Menschsein in einen vorzeigbaren und einen mitzubringenden Teil zu zerlegen. Und nach jeder Strophe derselbe Kehrvers: dass der Sänger gekommen sei, seinen Kopf in den Meydan zu legen, auf jenen Platz in der Mitte des Cem, auf dem getanzt und verhandelt wird und auf den man nichts legt, was einem nicht gehört.

    Der Wissenschaftsbetrieb, in dem ich arbeite, verlangt oft die entgegengesetzte Bewegung. Er verlangt die Zerlegung: Bring das Wort, den Kern lass zuhause. Man kann versuchen, diese Forderung zu greifen und als Neutralitäts- und Sachlichkeitspostulat zu benennen. Sie tritt selten als Vorschrift auf, viel öfter als Tonfall, wie eine Erwartung, die niemand ausspricht, weil sie niemand aussprechen muss. Der Text ist fertig, jemand liest ihn, macht eine Anmerkung über die Kommentarfunktion, die wie eine Beschreibung aussieht und wie ein Einwand arbeitet: „positioniert, engagiert, zugespitzt, persönlich gefärbt, politisch“. Dahinter steht nicht die Behauptung, etwas sei unrichtig. Es ist kein Gegenargument, auf das man etwas erwidern könnte. Dahinter steht die Mitteilung, dass man mir angesehen und angelesen hat, von wo aus ich schreibe und dass dieser Ort bedeute, dass der Text nicht sachlich sein könne.

    Dabei weiß auch die Rechtswissenschaft, dass niemand von nirgendwo aus schreibt. Auch bei methodengerechtem Vorgehen und kritischer Reflexion lässt sich, wie Arthur Kaufmann in Die Geschichtlichkeit des Rechts im Licht der Hermeneutik 1969 beobachtet, „die Persönlichkeit bei einer rechtlichen Entscheidung als mitentscheidende Instanz niemals ganz ausschalten. Der Erkennende bleibt nicht außerhalb des Erkenntnisprozesses, sondern er nimmt – mit all seinen Vorurteilen, Überzeugungen, Interessen – an diesem Prozess teil.“ In der Wissenschaftstheorie ist Positionalität seit Langem ein eigenes Thema, und es gibt Kollegen und Kolleginnen, für die Wissenschaftlichkeit gerade darin liegt, die eigenen Vorannahmen offenzulegen. An der Einsicht fehlt es also nicht. Das Vorverständnis gilt als Bedingung allen Verstehens. Als Befangenheit gilt es erst, wenn man es jemandem ansieht. Miranda Fricker hat für diesen Vorgang einen Begriff geprägt: testimonial injustice, ein Glaubwürdigkeitsdefizit, das einer Person nicht wegen ihrer Argumente zugerechnet wird, sondern wegen dessen, was man in ihr sieht. Das Perfide an dieser Form epistemischer Ungerechtigkeit liegt darin, dass sie ohne Ablehnung auskommt. Abgelehnt zu werden wäre einfacher, gegen Ablehnung kann man argumentieren. Der Text bekommt eine Herkunft, während die Texte der anderen einfach Texte bleiben. Und das Neutralitätspostulat ist der Ort, an dem diese Ungerechtigkeit ihre wissenschaftliche Beglaubigung erhält: Es behauptet einen Standpunkt ohne Standort und übersieht großzügig, dass diesen Standpunkt immer nur diejenigen für sich reklamieren können, deren Standort ohnehin niemand erfragt.

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    So weit, so bekannt. Der Punkt, um den es mir hier geht, liegt eine Drehung weiter, und er ist unangenehmer, weil er von der Anklage ins Geständnis wechselt: Ich habe aufgehört, auf die Markierung zu warten. Ich nehme sie inzwischen selbst vor, und zwar früher und effizienter als jede Gutachterin. Niemand hat mir das befohlen. Ich habe das Urteil internalisiert, und genau das ist es, was epistemische Ungerechtigkeit ausmacht: Sie stellt sich irgendwann selbst her.

    Victor Loxen hat sein Editorial in dieser Reihe mit Vega und Elena Ferrante eröffnet, Maximilian Steinbeis mit Pilzen im Wald, und niemand käme auf die Idee, darin (zu Recht) etwas anderes zu sehen als Belesenheit oder Kreativität. Ich habe mit einem alevitischen Lied in türkischer Sprache eröffnet und dabei die Rechnung im Kopf gehabt, die Ferrante und Pilze nicht kosten: wie viel Argument ich nach einem solchen Anfang brauchen würde, um wieder einzuholen, was der erste Absatz an Kredit verspielt.

    Loxen schreibt, die KI betreibe einen „geistreichen Dilettantismus“. Sie kenne die Anstöße und Widerstände eines Draußen nicht, weil sie nicht selbst, als leibhaftiges Subjekt im Draußen sei, und für sie könne die sprachliche Form nie zum Käfig werden, weil ihr nichts fremd ist, was sie sich nimmt. Er hat mich zu diesem Beitrag inspiriert. Wenn Schreiben davon lebt, an etwas zu scheitern, das nicht aus dem eigenen Text stammt, dann entscheidet sich alles an der Frage, was als solches Scheitern anerkannt wird. Lektüre wird anerkannt, ein Widerspruch in den Quellen, ein Archivfund, ein Urteil, das der eigenen These nicht passt. Die Form von Draußen dagegen, die ich mitbringe, wird als bloße Trübung abgezogen. Das Neutralitätspostulat ist ein Türhüter. Es sortiert die Ideen und Widerstände der Welt danach, wessen sie sind.

    Und seit einiger Zeit gibt es eine Maschine, die den Abzug für mich vornehmen könnte. Der Prompt wäre leicht: „Mach den Text sachlicher. Formuliere den Text so um, dass er absolut unparteiisch wirkt und mir keine eigene Positionierung vorgeworfen werden kann.“

    Der Absatz käme zurück, und alles wäre noch da: Gliederung, Thesen, Belege, größere Namen. Was fehlte, wäre die Stelle, an der man gemerkt hätte, dass da jemand schreibt, den die Sache etwas angeht. Es fehlte nichts, was sich in einem Gutachten beanstanden ließe. Und doch würde der Kern fehlen. Die KI würde dabei nicht zögern. Eine Kollegin, die mir denselben Satz glättet, muss mich dabei ansehen. Sie fragt vielleicht vorsichtiger, ob ich sicher bin, und sie weiß vielleicht, dass sie mir etwas wegnimmt. Die KI hat keine Empathie, um vorsichtig zu fragen, denn sie hat nie einen Kern besessen. Sie ist Söz ohne Öz, Wort ohne Kern, ohne Antlitz, ohne Spur, ohne Glut – und genau deshalb das ideale Instrument für eine Operation, die ich ohnehin an mir selbst durchführe.

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    Sie wollen an der interdisziplinär ausgerichteten Professur für Öffentliches Recht und Europarecht (Jürgen Bast) der JLU Gießen zu Migration und Menschenrechten promovieren?

    Im Teilprojekt „Zugehörigkeit, öffentliche Gewalt und Menschenrechte: Rechtebasierte Mitgliedschaft von Migrant:innen im EU-Recht“ der DFG-Forschungsgruppe MeDiMi ist eine Stelle (65 %, für vier Jahre) zu besetzen.

    ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

    Das ist meine Antwort auf die Frage dieser Reihe. KI spielt in meinem Schreibprozess nicht die Rolle der Ideengeberin und auch nicht die der Konkurrentin. Sie bietet sich als Sachlichkeitsinstanz an. Versachlichen heißt sachlich machen, zur Sache machen. Ein System, das Betroffenheit als Trübung verbucht, verlangt eine Anpassungsleistung. Jetzt gibt es ein Werkzeug dafür. Eine Maschine, die meinen Text bearbeiten und dabei zugleich das an mir abschleifen könnte, was in diesem Betrieb nicht zählt. Überspitzt könnte ich prompten: „Claude, mach mich sachlich. Entmenschliche mich. Radier mein Wesen aus meinen Argumenten und Thesen. Lösch das ungewollte Draußen, das ich in mir trage.“

    Nimri Dede sagt, er ist hier, um ein Mensch zu sein, im Kern und im Wort. KI könnte mir dabei helfen, in die Gegenrichtung zu laufen. Vom positionierten Öz ins geglättete Söz.

    Ich hoffe, dass ich diese Maschine nicht brauchen werde. Dass ich das Draußen, das ich mitbringe, nicht länger selbst als Trübung abziehe, sondern als den Widerstand gelten lasse, von dem Schreiben lebt. Dass ich zum Kern dessen vordringe, was ich sagen will und anerkenne, was ich schon längst weiß: dass niemand von nirgendwo aus schreibt. Und dass ich Texte schreibe, die ich in den Meydan legen kann, weil sie mir gehören, im Kern und im Wort.

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    Editor’s Pick

    von MAXIMILIAN STEINBEIS

    Copyright: Maximilian Steinbeis

    Hat jemand Faschismus gesagt? Ja, es hat jemand Faschismus gesagt, immer mehr tun es, und eine davon ist die Philosophin Eva von Redecker. „Liquidierende Phantombesitzverteidigung“ ist der Begriff, den sie sich vom zeitgenössischen Faschismus macht, inspiriert von einem Fund auf einem Flohmarkt im sachsen-anhaltinischen Havelberg: einem alten Blechschild mit der polizeilichen Aufschrift „Wer plündert, wird erschossen“. Der Faschismus, so ihre These, „wähnt sich im Geltungsbereich einer solchen Verordnung. Die Feindschaft, die er feiert, inszeniert sich als Selbstverteidigung gegen Plünderer“. Überall Leute und Mächte, die einem ans Eigentum wollen: mein Land, meine Frauen, meine Herrschaft – auch und umso wütender, wenn der Besitzanspruch genauso zusammenfantasiert ist wie die Figur dessen, der ihn bedroht. Der Kern des zeitgenössischen Faschismus ist eine Eigentumsordnung, die sich vom Recht und den demokratischen Prozessen, in denen es erzeugt wird, ablöst und sich selbst als absolut und naturgegeben setzt. Das fängt bei der AfD an, hört aber mit ihr noch lange nicht auf. Es gibt in diesem Buch viele Begriffsperlen zu entdecken (mein Liebling: Verflixung), aber diesen Zusammenhang herzustellen, ist der zentrale analytische Mehrwert dieses Buches. Wer es liest, fühlt sich nicht unbedingt wohler, aber sieht dafür umso klarer.

    Eva von Redecker: Dieser Drang nach Härte. Über den neuen Faschismus. S. Fischer 2026, 260 S. 

    *

    Die Woche auf dem Verfassungsblog

    zusammengefasst von EVA MARIA BREDLER

    Monatelang haben wir recherchiert, gewarnt, gehofft, gezittert. Die Szenarien sind jetzt vom Reißbrett in die Tagesschau gewandert: Bei der Landtagswahl in Sachsen-Anhalt hat die AfD über 43 Prozent erzielt. Zwar keine absolute Mehrheit, aber nur haarscharf. Noch ist völlig unklar, wer das Bundesland regieren soll. Niemand will der AfD in die ausgestreckte Hand schlagen.

    Am Sonntagabend wurde darüber lebhaft bei Caren Miosga diskutiert. Ein Politikwissenschaftler wies dabei darauf hin, dass auch völkische Konzepte wie die des „Ethnopluralismus“ oder der „ethnokulturellen Gemeinschaft“ Teil des demokratischen Pluralismus seien. FABIAN MICHL (DE) widerspricht entschieden und nimmt die bei bester Sendezeit geäußerten Thesen zum Anlass, über die Verantwortung der Wissenschaft im demokratischen Verfassungsstaat nachzudenken.

    Inwiefern wird die Wissenschaft diese Verantwortung vor Ort in Sachsen-Anhalt wahrnehmen können? FRIEDRICH ZILLESSEN und LUNA MONO (DE) haben untersucht, wie weitreichend ein autoritär-populistischer Wissenschaftsminister Einfluss nehmen könnte.

    Doch wer welches Ministerium übernehmen wird, ist noch lange nicht geklärt. Zur absoluten Mehrheit fehlen der AfD drei Sitze, das BSW könnte mit fünf Sitzen zum Königsmacher werden (und kokettiert damit). Die übrigen Parteien (CDU, Die Linke, SPD, Grüne) kommen auf 39 Stimmen im Landtag – so viele, wie die AfD hat. So weit, so bekannt. Was bislang kaum diskutiert wird: Die Mehrheitsverhältnisse bedeuten, dass die AfD durchregieren kann, sollten sechs Abgeordnete der anderen Fraktionen fehlen oder sich enthalten. JANOS RICHTER (DE) erklärt, warum das den sachsen-anhaltischen Landtag zum Full House machen könnte.

    Sollte die AfD das Landesinnenministerium übernehmen, würde sie auch das Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz kontrollieren – und könnte dieses rechtmissbräuchlich umbauen. HEIKO MEIERTÖNS (DE) analysiert, welche Grenzen das Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz setzt – und wann der Bund eingreifen kann.

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    xx
    xx

    Nominations and Self-Nominations Sought for the Position of Director at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, Germany

    The MPG and the MPIL invite nominations for a director who will lead a research department.

    Candidates should have a strong record of innovative research in public international law, EU law or comparative public law and be able to devise a long-term strategy for excellent research. Management and leadership skills are required to lead the academic and non-academic staff of over 150 persons.

    Nominations should be sent to nomination@mpil.de until 15/11/2026.

    More information can be found here.

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    Für unser Security & Crime Dossier hat JANA TRAPP mit MARKUS THIEL (DE) darüber gesprochen, welche Hebel einer Landesexekutive ohne parlamentarische Mehrheit tatsächlich zur Verfügung stehen. Das Dossier können Sie hier abonnieren (es lohnt sich, versprochen). Falls die Wahl Sie nicht loslässt, empfehlen wir außerdem unser Spotlight zu Sachsen-Anhalt und Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Was Maximilian Steinbeis oben zu Eva von Redekers neuem Buch sagt, gilt auch hier: „Wer es liest, fühlt sich nicht unbedingt wohler, aber sieht dafür umso klarer.“ Und das schadet nicht. Denn nach einer kurzen Hydration Break geht es am 20. September mit der Wahl in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern weiter.

    Sicherheitsrechtlicher Zündstoff steckt nicht nur in einem AfD-geführten Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz, sondern auch im Entwurf der bundesweiten Nachrichtendienstreform, den das Kabinett Mitte August beschlossen hat. SOFIANE BENAMOR (DE) hat sich die Reform genauer angesehen und meint: „Das BVerfG würde einige dogmatische Pirouetten drehen müssen, um sämtliche verfassungsrechtlichen Probleme aus der Welt zu räumen.“

    Buchstäblichen Zündstoff gab es dagegen in Leipzig: Nach dem Sprengdrohnen-Vorfall am Flughafen kündigte Außenminister Wadephul ein Maßnahmenpaket gegen Russland an – er will unter anderem das Kulturabkommen aufkündigen, das etwa das „Russische Haus“ in Berlin betrifft. Bis zur tatsächlichen Schließung sind allerdings noch einige juristische Gordische Knoten zu durchschlagen, wie BERNHARD KNOLL-TUDOR (EN) analysiert.

    Während die Brücken zu Russland und den USA abbrechen, will die EU neue bauen. Doch meint es die EU wirklich ernst mit der Erweiterung? Bereit ist sie jedenfalls nicht, findet ANDREW DUFF (EN): Die Debatte drehe sich zu sehr um die Anpassungsfähigkeit der Beitrittskandidaten – und zu wenig um die Frage, was die Union ihrerseits leisten muss, um neue Mitglieder aufnehmen zu können.

    Maduros Anwälte fordern vor einem New Yorker Bundesgericht die Einstellung des Verfahrens wegen Drogenterrorismus – ein amtierendes Staatsoberhaupt genieße absolute Immunität. CARLOS MORENO (EN) zeigt: Dass die Entführung ausländischer Machthaber juristisch überhaupt für unproblematisch gehalten wird, geht auf den Fall eines mexikanischen Arztes aus den 1990ern zurück, von dem die meisten noch nie gehört haben.

    Doch was heißt eigentlich Terrorismus? Die USA haben die brasilianischen Organisationen Primeiro Comando da Capital und Comando Vermelho kürzlich als Terrororganisationen eingestuft und damit die Debatte über den Terrorismusbegriff neu entfacht. LUCAS CATIB DE LAURENTIIS und LUIZ GUILHERME ARCARO CONCI (EN) zeichnen nach, wie brasilianische Gesetze drastische Rechtsfolgen mit Terrorismus rechtfertigen, aber immer weiter vom Terrorismusbegriff ablösen – eine Dynamik, die aus anderen Ländern bekannt ist.

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    Der Verfassungsblog sucht Verstärkung: Als Manager*in Fundraising & strategische Partnerschaften arbeitest Du an unserer Fundraisingstrategie, baust die Strukturen und Werkzeuge dafür aus und arbeitest an tragfähigen Partnerschaften, Anträgen und Kampagnen, um sie zu realisieren.

    Du bist interessiert? Dann sollten wir sprechen.

    Bewerbungsfrist: 30. September 2026 | Start: 1. November 2026 |

    Alle Details zur Ausschreibung und zur Bewerbung findest Du hier.

    ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

    Ist also nicht das Recht das Problem, sondern die Politik? Das ist auch im Völkerrecht ein gängiges Narrativ, um die Krisen der Gegenwart zu erklären. In seinem long read hält ITAMAR MANN (EN) dagegen: „If we offload that responsibility and bask in our own legal purity, we do that only at our own expense.“

    Verantwortung kann dabei ganz unterschiedliche Formen annehmen, quite literally. Am 4. September haben 164 UN-Mitgliedstaaten die „Correct the Map“-Resolution beschlossen, die dazu aufruft, die Mercator-Karte durch gerechtere, flächentreue Weltkarten zu ersetzen. LUIS ESLAVA (EN) zeichnet nach, wie Karten unser Weltbild formen – und wie sich dieses Weltbild wiederum kartografisch neu malen lässt.

    Es hat übrigens nur ein Land gegen die „Correct the Map“-Resolution gestimmt. Dreimal dürfen Sie raten, welches? Bingo. Die US-Vertretung tat die Initiative als „ideologisches Projekt“ ab und bestand darauf, Nabel der Mercator-Karte zu bleiben, vollgefressen mit Ressourcen aus der verzwergten Peripherie. Ein guter Anlass, über unsere eigenen „Ways of Seeing“ nachzudenken. Wofür sind wir blind geworden? Welche „mentalen Geografien“ lohnt es sich, neu zu bereisen, wieder zu vermessen? Ich frag nur so, aus (West-)Berlin in Richtung Meck-Pomm, und zurück.

    *

    Das war’s für diese Woche.

    Ihnen alles Gute!

    Ihr Verfassungsblog-Team

     

     

    Wenn Sie das wöchentliche Editorial als E-Mail zugesandt bekommen wollen, können Sie es hier bestellen.

    The post Zum geglätteten Wort appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

    ]]>     2026-09-11T14:24:05+00:00 Büşra Akay http://verfassungsblog.de 2026-09-11T14:24:05+00:00 Verfassungsblog     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298366 Auf dem zweiten Auge blind Die Ergebnisse der juristischen Staatsprüfungen bestimmen den Berufsweg. Wer sie nicht besteht, hat ...

    ]]>     Die Ergebnisse der juristischen Staatsprüfungen bestimmen den Berufsweg. Wer sie nicht besteht, hat keinen Zugang zu den reglementierten Berufen (vgl. §§ 5, 9 Nr. 3 DRiG, 4 Nr. 1 BRAO). Und als zentrales Kriterium der formalen Bestenauslese im Sinne des Art. 33 Abs. 2 GG entscheidet die konkrete Note oft final darüber, wer Staatsanwalt oder Richterin wird.

    Da sollte es selbstverständlich sein, dass das angewendete Prüfungsverfahren zuverlässige Aussagen über die juristischen Kompetenzen der Geprüften erlaubt. Allerdings kam bereits 2013 eine hochschuldidaktische Analyse zu dem Ergebnis, dass nur „sehr eingeschränkt“ von der „Leistungsperformanz“ in den Prüfungen auf die (juristische) Kompetenz geschlossen werden könne.1)

    Der Reformbedarf der juristischen Ausbildung ist seitdem Streitthema geblieben2) und wird auch Gegenstand des Deutschen Juristentags vom 16. bis 18. September in Erfurt sein. Wir möchten deshalb einen Überblick über den bisherigen Forschungsstand zur Qualität und Aussagekraft der juristischen Prüfungspraxis geben. Dabei wird deutlich, dass selbst die Verwaltung derzeit nicht davon ausgeht, in der Forschung etablierte Standards bei den Staatsprüfungen einzuhalten. Wir schlagen daher eine schnell umzusetzende Maßnahme vor, die die Klausurbewertung kurzfristig verbessern dürfte und mittelfristig zusätzliche Erkenntnisse über die Qualität der Bewertung im Staatsexamen unter Realbedingungen ermöglicht: die verdeckte Zweitkorrektur.

    Relevante Maßstäbe

    Zunächst ist zu klären, an welchen Maßstäben das juristische Prüfungsverfahren zu messen ist. Maßgebliche Disziplinen sind hier die Hochschuldidaktik und die pädagogische Diagnostik. Aus deren Sicht stellen Prüfungen sog. psychometrische Tests dar: Sie messen Fähigkeiten bzw. gezeigte Leistungen.3) Mit ihnen soll festgestellt werden, ob Prüflinge vorab definierte Lernziele erreicht haben (näher hierzu: „Constructive Alignment“4)) und wie stark die dahinterliegenden Kompetenzen ausgeprägt sind, die für die berufliche und (fach-)wissenschaftliche Praxis relevant sind5).

    Zu den anerkannten Standards der Hochschulbildung gehört ferner die sog.  Kriteriumsorientierung6): Maßgeblicher Bezugspunkt ist nicht die Leistung anderer Prüflinge (Normorientierung), sondern ein hiervon unabhängiger, inhaltlicher Maßstab.7) Ursprünglich aus der klassischen Testtheorie stammen die Gütekriterien Objektivität, Reliabilität und Validität. Für Objektivität ist auf gleiche Durchführungsbedingungen sowie auf eine stabile Benotung unabhängig von der korrigierenden Person zu achten. 8) Bei der Reliabilität geht es um die Genauigkeit und Zuverlässigkeit der Messung, z.B. über Messzeitpunkte und Teilaufgaben hinweg.9) Die Validität fragt danach, ob tatsächlich diejenigen Kompetenzen geprüft werden, die auch vermittelt wurden und erforderlich sind.10)

    Diese Kriterien werden für den Prüfungskontext adaptiert, häufig erweitert um Chancengerechtigkeit (auch Fairness)11) und Ökonomie12). Als ökonomisch gelten Prüfungen bei angemessenem Aufwand für Prüflinge und Prüfende.13) Die Chancengerechtigkeit (auch Fairness) ist insbesondere dann verletzt, wenn durch die Prüfungsgestaltung bestimmte Gruppen, zum Beispiel weibliche Prüflinge, systematisch schlechter abschneiden, ohne dass dies durch einen Sachgrund in den zu prüfenden Kompetenzen selbst gerechtfertigt ist.14)

    Die hochschuldidaktische Analyse von 2013 zweifelt für gleich mehrere der dargestellten Standards daran, ob die juristische Prüfungskultur diesen tatsächlich gerecht wird. Seitdem erzielte Befunde empirischer Forschung ermöglichen weitere Rückschlüsse auf die Einhaltung der (testtheoretischen) Gütekriterien. Auf diese Weise haben sich über die vergangene Dekade mehrere evidenzbasierte Themen- und Problemcluster herausgebildet, die nachfolgend bloß skizziert werden können.

    Empirischer Forschungsstand zu den Staatsprüfungen

    Bei der Chancengerechtigkeit und Objektivität wurden 2014 in einem Datensatz für das OLG Hamm erstmals systematische Verzerrungen der Bewertung zulasten von weiblichen Prüflingen und solchen mit Migrationshintergrund gefunden, auch bei Kontrolle gegen Abiturnote und universitäre Vornoten (sowie weitere Determinanten).15) Diese Ergebnisse ließen sich 2018 mithilfe einer breiteren Datenbasis für das gesamte Bundesland auf die zweite Staatsprüfung ausweiten.16) Die Geschlechtseffekte im mündlichen und schriftlichen Teil der ersten Staatsprüfung wurden 2016 auch in Baden-Württemberg untersucht und konnten hier ebenfalls bestätigt werden.17) Eine Untersuchung der Prüfungsstatistiken für das gesamte Bundesgebiet stellten Griebel und Schimmel 2025 ebenfalls Geschlechtseffekte fest, die gegenüber älteren Untersuchungen tendenziell zugenommen hätten.18)

    Zwei weitere statistische Analysen der beiden Autoren lassen ferner Erkenntnisse zur Reliabilität und Validität zu, 2023 mit Daten aus Berlin19) und 2025 mit Daten aus Nordrhein-Westfalen20): Dabei sind besonders die teils stark unterschiedlichen Noten eines Prüflings über die verschiedenen Einzelklausuren bemerkenswert. Sind Systemverständnis und grundlegende Methodenkompetenz, mit deren Hilfe sich unterschiedliche Sachverhalte adäquat bewältigen lassen, ausschlaggebend für die Bewertung, müsste ein reliables Messverfahren auch bei verschiedenen Testungen mit unterschiedlichen Sachverhalten zu ähnlichen Ergebnissen führen – zumindest innerhalb einer Fachsäule. Auf dieser Grundlage sprechen die gefundenen Ergebnisse gegen die Reliabilität der Messung.

    Allerdings lassen sich die Ergebnisse auch so erklären, dass Detail- und Einzelfallwissen bei der Bewertung eine größere Bedeutung haben als Systemverständnis und Methodenkompetenz. Mit Blick auf den breiten Konsens, dass es in juristischen Prüfungen auf Systemverständnis und methodische Grundlagen ankommen sollte,21) würde in diesem Falle etwas anderes geprüft als geprüft werden soll, was die (Konstrukt-)Validität in Frage stellen würde.

    Ferner auffällig ist der besonders schlechte Notenschnitt in den Rechtswissenschaften, der bereits 2017 in einer fächerübergreifende Langzeituntersuchung verifiziert werden konnte.22) Prüfungswissenschaftlich ist dieser gerade kein Ausweis besonderer Qualität, sondern beeinträchtigt potenziell die (Inhalts-)Validität und Chancengerechtigkeit, da er eine fehlende Abstimmung der Prüfungsinhalte und -anforderungen auf die Lehre anzeigen kann. Überdies begrenze das untere Ende der Notenskala die Streuung und begünstige eine statistisch homogene Notenverteilung.23) Der hiermit beschriebene „Bodeneffekt“ legt ein ungenaues, nicht ausreichend differenzierendes Messverfahren nahe, da unterschiedlich schwache Leistungen zunehmend über denselben Notenwert operationalisiert werden.

    Eine andere Studie kam 2017 zu dem Ergebnis, dass schon der Schwierigkeitsgrad jedenfalls im zweiten Examen zwischen den Bundesländern variiere: So könne der Wechsel von einem in ein anderes Bundesland zwischen den zwei Staatsprüfungen mit einem durchschnittlich zu erwartenden positiven Wechseleffekt von 1,6 Punkten bzw. einem negativen Wechseleffekt von -1,1 Punkten einhergehen, was die Vergleichbarkeit beeinträchtige.24) Wiederum für das erste Examen stellten Hemler und Krukenberg 2025 fest, dass die Schwierigkeit im Zeitverlauf zunimmt.25)

    Die 2017 demonstrierte hohe Erschließbarkeit von Staatsexamensklausuren durch sog. Textvektorisierung wirft die Frage auf, welchen Sinn die juristische Ausbildung künftig noch haben könne.26) Da dieses auf Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung beruhende Verfahren auch Grundlage moderner KI-Anwendungen ist, wachsen Zweifel, ob das bisher dominante Klausurformat diejenigen Kompetenzen prüfen kann, auf die es in Praxis und Wissenschaft künftig ankommen wird (ökologische Validität). Dass im Status quo bereits unklar ist, an welchen Kriterien eine gute juristische Examensleistung überhaupt zu erkennen ist, zeigte sich 2017 durch inhaltsanalytische Auswertung von Prüfervoten aus dem ersten Examen in Hessen27) sowie 2023 beim Vergleich von Lösungsskizzen von universitären Examensvorbereitungskursen aus dem gesamten Bundesgebiet28). Einheitliche Bewertungskriterien bilden allerdings eine notwendige Voraussetzung, um zu gewährleisten, dass dieselbe Leistung durch unterschiedliche Prüfende gleich bewertet wird (Auswertungs- und Interpretationsobjektivität).

    Passend hierzu konnte Hufeld 2024 experimentell bestätigen, dass die Bewertung juristischer Klausuren tatsächlich stark von der korrigierenden Person abhängt: Bei 15 Bewertungen pro Klausurleistung betrug die durchschnittliche Abweichung zwischen niedrigster und höchster gegebener Note 6,47 Punkte (kleinste Abweichung: 4 Punkte / größte Abweichung: 11 Punkte).29) Diese Ergebnisse konnten weitere Autor:innen 2026 reproduzieren: Hier lag die durchschnittliche Abweichung bei 5,25 Punkten (kleinste Abweichung: 2 Punkte / größte Abweichung: 11 Punkte).30)  Wurden die Korrekturen durch ein gemeinsames Rohpunkteschema vorstrukturiert, also unterschiedliche Abschnitte der Lösungsskizze mit einer maximalen Teilpunktzahl und einem Umrechnungsschema versehen, ließ sich die durchschnittliche Abweichung auf 2,94 Punkte reduzieren (kleinste Abweichung: 0 Punkte / größte Abweichung: 6 Punkte).

    Eine Befragung von Prüfungsämtern hatte zudem bereits 2022 ergeben, dass auch für Prüfer:innen der Staatsprüfungen keine verpflichtenden Schulungen vorgesehen sind.31) Unklar bleibt allerdings, ob sich die mangelhafte Qualitätssicherung nur auf den mündlichen oder auch auf den schriftlichen Teil der Staatsprüfungen erstreckt.

    Zwischen Empirie und Selbstbild der Verwaltung

    Die vorhandene Studienlage weist insgesamt darauf hin, dass die juristische Prüfungspraxis wesentlichen Qualitätsstandards nicht gerecht wird – einschließlich der schriftlichen Staatsexamensklausuren. Hierbei scheinen nicht nur die Reliabilität und Validität zweifelhaft, vielmehr stellen gerade die experimentellen Untersuchungen zur Notenvergabe bereits die Objektivität in Frage.

    Auch ein möglicher Erklärungsansatz existiert bereits: Es fehlen einheitliche Bewertungskriterien. Eindrucksvoll untermauert wird dieser empirisch begründete Verdacht durch die persönlichen Ausführungen einer Führungskraft eines Landesjustizprüfungamts:

    „[Zweitprüfer nutzen die Möglichkeit], sich vor allem zur eigenen prüfungsspezifischen Bewertung zu äußern, die dem eigenen, u. U. abweichenden Bewertungsmaßstab folgt. Dieser mag mehr oder weniger Gewicht auf das Ausdrucksvermögen, die gedankliche Struktur, die Qualität der Subsumtion, die praktische Verwertbarkeit etc. legen“.32)

    Fehlt es aber schon an der Objektivität, lassen sich die darauf aufbauenden Gütekriterien der Reliabilität und Validität nicht mehr erfüllen.33) Um dieses fundamentale Defizit im eigentlichen Sinne zu beheben, bedarf es langfristig mehrerer Maßnahmen. Die zu prüfenden Kompetenzen sollten übergeordnet festgelegt, entlang unterschiedlicher Bewertungsstufen ausdifferenziert und schließlich für jede Klausur operationalisiert werden. Dringend erforderlich ist auch eine Schulungspflicht für Prüfende.

    Da ein Einlenken der Justizprüfungsämter ohne Weiteres aber nicht zu erwarten steht, schlagen wir als kurzfristig und bundesweit umzusetzende Maßnahme eine verdeckte Zweitkorrektur vor. Dies würde nicht nur die Objektivität der Bewertung unmittelbar erhöhen, sondern auch eine Datenlage schaffen, die weitere Forschung überhaupt erst möglich macht.

    Verdeckte Zweitkorrekturen als erster Schritt

    Derzeit werden alle Prüfungsarbeiten der Staatsprüfungen zweitkorrigiert. In fast allen Bundesländern wird das Zweitvotum in Kenntnis der Erstkorrektur verfasst („offen“), lediglich Rheinland-Pfalz sieht Zweitvoten ohne Kenntnis der Erstkorrektur vor („verdeckt“, s. § 9 Abs. 1 S. 4 JAPO RLP). Weichen Erst- und Zweitkorrektur dort um 3 Punkte oder weniger voneinander ab, gilt das arithmetische Mittel als Note (§ 9 Abs. 2 JAPO RLP). Daran wird kritisiert, dass eine Verständigung der Korrektoren zu gerechteren Ergebnissen führe als die Bildung eines arithmetischen Mittels.34) Allerdings verbietet die verdeckte Zweitkorrektur eine solche Verständigung nicht.35) Zudem sind die Zweitvoten bei offener Zweitkorrektur oft knapp abgefasst oder gar auf eine bloße Zustimmung zur Erstkorrektur beschränkt,36) sodass eine Verständigung unterbleibt.

    Praktikabilitätsbedenken gegen die „verdeckte“ Zweitkorrektur37) sollten spätestens durch die Verbreitung elektronisch abgefasster Examensklausuren überholt sein. Die Klausuren lassen sich gleichzeitig versenden und korrigieren. Etwaige Abweichungen in der Bewertung fallen in Sekundenschnelle auf, sodass sofort eine arithmetische Mittelung oder eine Verständigung der Korrigierenden erfolgen kann. Prüfungswissenschaftlich ist die „verdeckte“ Zweitkorrektur, wie sie Rheinland-Pfalz eingeführt hat, also zu begrüßen. Die anderen Bundesländer sollten folgen.

    Politik muss handeln, damit weitere Forschung möglich wird

    Dies gilt schon deshalb, weil erst durch diese politische Maßnahme systematisch Daten entstehen, mit denen die Forschung zweifelsfrei feststellen kann, ob die bisher gefundenen Objektivitätsdefizite auch die gesamte Examenspraxis unter Realbedingungen betreffen. Hierfür müssten anonymisierte Daten über die Abweichungen von Erst- und Zweitkorrektur bundeseinheitlich erfasst und für Forschungszwecke zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Im Idealfall zeigt die anschließende Auswertung dieser Daten keine erheblichen Abweichungen. Dann wäre die Objektivität der Korrektur in den Staatsprüfungen gesichert. Das kann das Vertrauen in die Qualität der Bewertung stärken und erlaubt es, sich künftig auf Fragen der Reliabilität und Validität zu konzentrieren.

    Zeigen sich hingegen gewichtige Abweichungen, ist zweifelsfrei geklärt, dass die juristischen Staatsprüfungen derzeit nicht objektiv sind.

    Dann ist es wichtig, dass sich die Bewertungsdifferenzen nach sozioökonomischen Merkmalen bei Prüfenden und Geprüften auswerten lassen, also z. B. nach Alter, Geschlecht, Herkunft, Ausbildungsstätte sowie zusätzlich bei Prüfenden nach eigenen Examensergebnissen und beruflichem Hintergrund. Auf diese Weise lassen sich gegebenenfalls ursächliche Muster für bestimmte Bewertungstendenzen identifizieren.

    Die verdeckte Zweitkorrektur kann nur ein erster Schritt sein, um das juristische Prüfungswesen zu konsolidieren und an den wissenschaftlich anerkannten Standards auszurichten. In der Folge bedarf es dringend weiterer Forschung und hochschulpolitischer Maßnahmen, um das Vertrauen in das juristische Prüfungssystem und dessen Akteur:innen nicht weiter zu beschädigen.

    References[+]

    References
    ↑1 Reis, in: Brockmann/Pilniok (Hrsg.), Prüfen in der Rechtswissenschaft, 2013, S. 29 (52).
    ↑2 Zum Überblick Krüper, Gutachten F zum 75. Deutschen Juristentag, S. F7 ff.
    ↑3 Reinmann, Kompetenzorientierung und Prüfungspraxis an Universitäten, 2014, S. 4.
    ↑4 Einen guten Einstieg bietet Biggs, HERDSA Review of Higher Education 2014, 5.
    ↑5 Vgl. für den Stifterverband für die Wissenschaft Szczyrba, in: Jorzik (Hrsg.), Charta guter Lehre, 2013, S. 10 (12); Hochschulrektorenkonferenz (Hrsg.), Tagungsdokumentation Kompetenzorientiertes Prüfen, 2016.
    ↑6 Schott, Infopool besser lehren (Universität Wien) v. 11.2018, https://infopool.univie.ac.at/startseite/pruefen-beurteilen/beurteilen-von-pruefungen/.
    ↑7 Eugster/Lutz, Leitfaden für das Planen, Durchführen und Auswerten von Prüfungen an der ETHZ, 2003, S. 14.
    ↑8 Stieler, Validität summativer Prüfungen, 2011, S. 33 f.
    ↑9 Ebd., S. 31 f.
    ↑10 Ebd., S. 26 f.
    ↑11 Schaper/Hilkenmeier, Umsetzungshilfen für kompetenzorientiertes Prüfen, 2013, S. 43.
    ↑12 Zu dem sich hieraus ergebenden Dilemma Vrabl, HINT 2022, 71 (72).
    ↑13 Schaper/Hilkenmeier, Umsetzungshilfen für kompetenzorientiertes Prüfen, 2013, S. 42.
    ↑14 Ebd., S. 43.
    ↑15 Towfigh/Traxler/Glöckner, ZDRW 2014, 8.
    ↑16 Towfigh/Traxler/Glöckner, ZDRW 2018, 115.
    ↑17 Hinz/Röhl, JZ 2016, 874.
    ↑18 Griebel/Schimmel, Legal Tribune Online v. 11.04.2025, https://www.lto.de/karriere/jura-studium/stories/detail/frauen-maenner-noten-unterschiede-bewertung-pflichtfachteil-staatsexamen.
    ↑19 Griebel/Schimmel, Jurios v. 14.05.2023, https://jurios.de/2023/05/14/ein-ernuechternder-blick-auf-die-durchschnittlichen-noten-der-ersten-juristischen-pruefung-und-was-sie-vielleicht-zu-erzaehlen-haben/.
    ↑20 Griebel/Schimmel, Legal Tribune Online v. 25.10.2025, https://www.lto.de/karriere/jura-studium/stories/detail/16512-noten-nrw-2022-ausgewertet-examen-klausuren.
    ↑21 Vgl. für den Deutschen Juristenfakultätentag: Beschluss DJFT 2025/II; für den Ausschuss zur Koordinierung der Juristenausbildung: Zukunft der volljuristischen Ausbildung, 2026, S. 40.
    ↑22 Gaens/Müller-Benedict, in: Müller-Benedict/Grözinger (Hrsg.), Noten an Deutschlands Hochschulen, 2017, S. 17 (25). 2025 lag in den Staatsprüfungen bei Betrachtung von über 16.000 Einzelnoten die Durchschnittsnote bei 5,69 Punkten.
    ↑23 Ebd.
    ↑24 Kähler/Engel/Ritter, ZFRSoz 2017, 133.
    ↑25 Hemler/Krukenberg, ZDRW 2025, 153.
    ↑26 Hamann, ZJS 2020, 507 (517).
    ↑27 Läßle, Juristenausbildung auf dem Prüfstand, 2017, S. 91–126.
    ↑28 Czerny, RECHTS|EMPIRIE v. 26.10.2023, DOI 10.25527/re.2023.18.
    ↑29 Hufeld, ZDRW 2024, 59.
    ↑30 Strecker u. a., OdW 2026, 1.
    ↑31 Heppner/Wienfort/Härtel, ZDRW 2022, 23.
    ↑32 Dylla-Krebs, in: FS Dauner-Lieb, 2025, S. 323 (Hervorhebung durch Verfasser).
    ↑33 Stieler, Validität Summativer Prüfungen, 2011, S. 25.
    ↑34 Dylla-Krebs, in: FS Dauner-Lieb, 2025, S. 319 (327).
    ↑35 Die von Dylla-Krebs, in: FS Dauner-Lieb, 2025, S. 319 (329) erhobenen Bedenken gegen die Praktikabilität schlagen bei näherer Betrachtung nicht durch, insbesondere scheinen die Zeitangaben willkürlich gewählt.
    ↑36 Zur Rechtmäßigkeit s. BVerwGE 91, 262 = NVwZ 1993, 677 (679); BVerwG, Beschl. v. 19.5.2016 – 6 B 1/16.
    ↑37 Zu diesen Dylla-Krebs, in: FS Dauner-Lieb, 2025, S. 319 (329).

    The post Auf dem zweiten Auge blind appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

    ]]>     2026-09-11T14:00:17+00:00 Marius Thye http://verfassungsblog.de 2026-09-11T14:00:17+00:00 Verfassungsblog     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298362 Constitutionalism and Its Contents For the Balkinization symposium on Mark Tushnet and Bojan Bugaric, Constitutionalism and Its Discont...

    ]]>     For the Balkinization symposium on Mark Tushnet and Bojan Bugaric, Constitutionalism and Its Discontents (University of Chicago Press, 2026).

     

    Madhav Khosla

     

    In contemporary politics, what we now routinely think of as a crisis of democracy has proceeded alongside a certain crisis of constitutionalism. Our reality isn’t merely one of democratic disenchantment, where we bemoan the electoral victory of disreputable candidates, the incapacity and misgovernance of representative government, or the disharmony between policies and outcomes. Instead, our basic institutions are functioning in tragic ways, public offices are betraying the very logic for their existence, and the constitutional system, as it were, seems to be part of the problem rather than the solution. It is no surprise then that major public law theorists are now “against constitutionalism” and are urging the abandonment of “constitutional structures.” And the electoral arena, in turn, is witnessing a kind of competitive populism where different varieties of populism are challenging one another, with each promising to undo the system in its own way rather than work within it.

     

    Mark Tushnet and Bojan Bugaric’s important new book, Constitutionalism and Its Discontents, is a sober, careful effort at making sense of the various positions on offer in the battle over constitutionalism. The idea of constitution has its critics and advocates, but what precisely are people fighting over? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the differing orientations? Can we do without constitutionalism entirely – or might it be possible to embrace a more sensible version of it than those we’ve often been acquainted with? And perhaps, above all, can constitutionalism save us from authoritarianism – or is it going to carry us there?

     

    In answering such questions, Tushnet and Bugaric are far from dogmatic, but they are clear. Different forms of constitutional design can be helpful, say in empowering voters, controlling the abuse of power, enabling effective decision-making, and so on, but the applicable design strategies can just as easily constrain self-government, permit authoritarian practices, and deactivate politics. As such, constitutionalism can both empower and disable democracy, and the direction it takes depends on a variety of highly contingent factors that operate at the moment. Indeed, “constitutionalism is beset by the paradox that it aims to both empower democratic self-governance and limit the exercises of that power” (p. 2).

     

    For Tushnet and Bugaric, the answer to this paradox lies in a modest form of constitutionalism, one largely focused on procedural rules that avoid thick commitments and major entrenchment. Their reasons are plain. A thicker version of constitutionalism – one more in line with post-war liberalism – may, for instance, reasonably focus on minority oppression, but it ultimately hampers self-government by disabling majorities in crucial ways. It’s better to focus on politics and get the majority you want than hinder majority rule. Our political lives are better served by constitutions as “recommendations” that set up the “initial rules about ruling” (p. 17), rather than devices that chain self-government. The specific illustrations of this logic can be multiplied. Whether one considers militant democracy, restrictions on amendments, or the like, one is confronted with the “false promise of constitutional design” (p. 118) where devices that we think can protect liberty may well fuel and further oppression. As they show us, “every policy that might be useful to slow down democratic decline has the potential to slow down democratic revitalization” (p. 101).

     

    There is much to be said in favor of Tushnet and Bugaric’s account, especially for scholars of American constitutionalism. The veto gates in the existing American system are so severe that one cannot but feel the attraction for a more British-style model of constitutionalism, where the legislature reigns supreme, and where new governments can relatively easily translate popular preferences in political action (with parliamentarism’s legislature-executive fusion). As an empirical matter, Tushnet and Bugaric may well be correct: thin constitutionalism might indeed be a wiser strategy than the alternative. And it is to their credit that they approach the matter with a rare kind of political humility and skepticism. So much of our history is filled with unfreedom laced and unintended consequences that it may be more sensible to conceptualize a form of constitutionalism that permits and facilitates revision, rather than one that locks us in.

     

    Of course, Tushnet and Bugaric aren’t fans of oppressive majoritarian power, but they see the better answer to the worry as lying within the practice of politics, which constitutionalism should limit itself to thinly structuring, than through entrenched, politically immune legal rules and regulations. Treating constitutions like statutes allows them “to be followed when their provisions advance the public good” and “to be displaced when, after reflection and serious political contestation, one or a few provisions seem to stand in the way of adopting important policies” that the people associate with the public good (p. 27). And it is always worth remembering, they stress, that “a structured inability to achieve policy goals for which members of government are elected might be a continuing source of discontent with constitutionalism” (p. 46).

     

    But, in the spirit of a provocative exchange, there is more to the debate over constitutionalism that Tushnet and Bugaric possibly suggest. To point the point sharply, in determining the right balance between thin and thick constitutionalism, at stake is not merely intelligent design but the normative basis for legal authority. We certainly want to adopt a design strategy that can increase the odds of both empowering the people and maintaining equal citizenship. Maybe – on balance, as an empirical matter, as a game theoretic supposition, as a historical fact, etc. – thinner versions of constitutionalism hold this promise more than thicker ones. But, beyond achieving this balance as a matter of realpolitik, what a constitutional order also does is ground the authority of law. It constructs a normative universe, and provides an argument – a justification – for the legitimacy of coercive action.

     

    Indeed, Constitutionalism and Its Discontents says less than might be said about the role of normativity in politics. Whatever its failings, the great achievement of post-war liberal constitutionalism – that is, thicker versions of constitutionalism – was the articulation of the idea that power, even majoritarian power, must always be subject to justification. Through its contents, this version of constitutionalism set the normative baseline for what legitimate power looks like – and, even when it failed, those who violated it still had to speak that language. (A bit like despots on the international arena feeling a need to claim that their actions meet the requirements of international law.)

     

    The post-war thicker versions of liberal constitutionalism underscored the idea that the democratic game of numbers was necessary but not sufficient to legitimize coercion; that the authority of law rests on something beyond mere authorization. The animating theme of liberal constitutionalism has been a dual focus on both how power is sourced and used. And the challenge of authoritarian populism – whether in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, or this country – is not merely that leaders are behaving wantonly. The challenge is far more fundamental for it articulates a new normative basis for the exercise of power.

     

    Authoritarian populism challenges liberal constitutionalism by taking popular authorization as sufficient to warrant all exercises of power. Once the people have spoken, the conversation ends. We are witnessing not only new exercises of power, but a new ideology that redefines legitimate power. For all their brutality, authoritarian regimes do not rest merely on brute power. They rest – as I have suggested in a recent piece, The Authoritarian Argument – on reasons and arguments that underscore their legitimacy. Today, many of such regimes question the liberal idea that politics is a game of constant justification, a space where multiple sites of representation exist, and where legitimacy emerges from a plurality of practices.

     

    Tushnet and Bugaric may well be correct that thin constitutionalism is better overall at preserving liberal values. Perhaps majoritarian power is the best way to prevent majoritarian oppression. But we cannot avoid acknowledging the normative contest at play here; and the importance of the idea that exercises of power must be subject to justification. The question, in other words, is not merely one of finding the right practical balance between thin and thick constitutionalism, but also about finding the right basis for the authority of law and for the exercise of coercion. The forms of thick constitutionalism that are familiar to many of us may have had several flaws, and many an unintended consequence, but thin constitutionalism will have to carry the burden of expressing the sentiment that that might is not right; and that even if the majority has the legal right to do something, it may not be legitimate for them to do so.

     

    If we can agree, in principle, that majoritarian power is not sufficient to legitimize state action – just as minoritarian power is not – then how best to balance majoritarian expression with majoritarian restraint may require different forms of constitutional thickness and thinness in very different settings, depending on a variety of considerations. The real worry for our times is perhaps not the discontent with constitutions because they have constrained majoritarian expression, but the disillusion with the core content of the constitutional post-war imagination, namely that the use of power must always justify itself, however it is sourced. Put differently, we should worry not only about constrains on majoritarian power, but about the possible normative belief that that unconstrained majoritarianism offers a complete basis for the legitimate exercise of power.

     

    Madhav Khosla is Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Professor of Indian Constitutional Law, Columbia Law School. You can reach him by e-mail at madhav.khosla@law.columbia.edu.

     


    ]]>     2026-09-11T13:30:00+00:00 noreply@blogger.com (Guest Blogger) http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-11T13:30:00+00:00 Balkinization     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298360 A Map Is Not a Memorial: Brazil’s Former DOPS and the Legal Content of Non-Recurrence Twenty-six years after Minas Gerais enacted a law creating a Human Rights Memorial in the building t...

    ]]>     Twenty-six years after Minas Gerais enacted a law creating a Human Rights Memorial in the building that housed the state’s Department of Political and Social Order (DOPS), a political police body central to dictatorship-era repression, the site has still not been officially converted into the memorial the law envisaged. In November 2025, the Federal Public Prosecutor filed a civil suit against Minas Gerais and the Federal Government seeking the Memorial’s definitive installation. A dispute that might appear local has now become a useful test of the content of guarantees of non-recurrence under international law.

    On 22 December 2025, three United Nations mandates, concerning truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, cultural rights, and enforced or involuntary disappearances, sent Brazil a joint Communication concerning the alleged failure to implement the law and alleged attempts to suppress contemporary civil society activities at the former DOPS. In February 2026, Brazil responded, describing federal initiatives on memory, archives, and the mapping of fifty former sites in which human rights violations were committed by Brazil’s civil-military dictatorship (1964-1985). On the core questions, however, Brazil’s response stated that explanations about that particular site depended on information from the government of Minas Gerais, which had not yet replied to the federal government’s request for clarification.

    The exchange exposes a recurrent conceptual problem. Non-recurrence is often presented as a portfolio of worthy activities. International standards instead require attention to the relationship between a measure and the risk it is meant to address. Mapping a former torture centre is valuable. It is not the same as transforming that centre.

    A duty of the state as a whole

    The Communication begins with a reference to a rule. Under Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 31, treaty obligations bind every branch and level of government. A federal allocation of competence may determine which authority must act internally, but it cannot fragment Brazil’s international responsibility.

    This does not mean that the federal government must itself operate every local memorial. It means that the state must secure a compliant result. The February response given by Brazil appropriately records national projects, including mapping, signage and support for selected memory sites. Yet aggregate activity cannot answer a site-specific failure. Brazil must show, in order to demonstrate its compliance with its international obligations, how those initiatives preserve the building, secure public access, implement the Minas Gerais law and include victims and civil society in its governance.

    International law does not invariably require a museum in every former detention centre. The DOPS case is narrower. Domestic legislation selected this building; official truth processes supported its conversion; and the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence’s 2025 report on Brazil called for sites of past violations to be preserved, placed under civil jurisdiction, and converted into Memorials. These standards do not prescribe every curatorial choice. Specificity here derives from the site’s direct relationship to the violations, that particular state’s law, the truth commissions’ recommendations, and repeated official recognition of its commemorative purpose. In those circumstances, substituting a map or plaque for the promised institutional transformation requires more than an inventory of other programmes.

    From preservation to participation

    The legal purpose of memorialisation is not exhausted by conserving a building. Principle 3 of the Updated Set of Principles to Combat Impunity connects preservation of memory and archives to protection against revisionism and denial. Principle 22 of the Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law includes commemoration and accurate public education among measures of satisfaction. The Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence’s report on memorialisation processes further treats memory as a process that must transmit accurate accounts to present and future generations and create space for debate about causes, responsibilities and consequences.

    EJIL:Talk! previously asked whether Brazil’s National Truth Commission produced late truth without justice. A recent post on Stones of Memory in Gaza framed memorialisation through truth, remedy and participation. The present situation of the former DOPS site in Minas Gerais adds a further question: can the state claim progress in memorialisation while the people performing that public function at the designated site are treated as an obstacle?

    The Communication records that civil society groups occupied this particular former DOPS building on 1 April 2025 after decades of delay. They organised exhibitions, debates and free guided visits, and received more than 20,000 visitors over eight months. The Communication also records allegations that the state later sought closure of the then occupied building, with an order to remove the participants in the intervention, and authorisation to use force. These remain allegations, and property, safety and administrative concerns can justify proportionate regulation. These concerns, however valid, cannot erase the underlying duty or replace a participatory arrangement with exclusion. Principles 32 and 35 of the Updated Principles make the meaningful role of victims and civil society part of the design and implementation of truth-seeking, reparation and non-recurrence measures.

    A site-specific test for non-recurrence

    The DOPS dispute suggests a practical test, proposed here as an analytical synthesis of the standards above. First, is the material site and its archive preserved and accessible? Second, has control of the site been aligned with its commemorative purpose, including through a secure civilian institutional arrangement? Third, do victims, relatives and civil society have a meaningful role in determining how the site narrates responsibility and harm? Fourth, is implementation protected by a budget, timetable and public monitoring mechanism capable of surviving political change?

    These elements do not turn international law into museum administration. They translate an abstract guarantee into measures responsive to the relevant risk. At the former DOPS, that risk includes not only physical decay, but also institutional continuity, denial and the removal of those who have sustained public memory during state inaction. A national mapping programme can support this work, but cannot substitute for the work itself.

    Brazil’s February response to the UN Mandates’ Communication is expressly incomplete: it awaits information from the state of Minas Gerais on the non-implementation of the law and on the treatment of civil society at the site. A complete response should therefore do more than provide a generic list of federal initiatives. It should identify the authority responsible, set out an enforceable path to implementation, guarantee interim preservation and access to the site, and explain how affected communities will participate in its design.

    The former DOPS building in Minas Gerais presents a simple but demanding question: can a state remember the address of repression without changing the relationship that address embodies? A map records where violence occurred. A memorial changes who may speak there, what public authority acknowledges, and how future generations encounter the past. That transformation is not decorative. It is part of the legal duty to guarantee non-recurrence.

     

    Photo: Memorial dos Direitos Humanos, Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

    ]]>     2026-09-11T13:30:07+00:00 Estéfany Rocha Monteiro https://www.ejiltalk.org 2026-09-11T13:30:07+00:00 EJIL: Talk!     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298358 Ohlmeyer, Ross and Stern on Legal Anglicization in British North America, Ireland and India Jane Ohlmeyer, Trinity College, Dublin, Richard J. Ross, University of Illinois, and Philip Stern, D...

    ]]>     Jane Ohlmeyer, Trinity College, Dublin, Richard J. Ross, University of Illinois, and Philip Stern, Duke University, have posted Anglicization of and through Law: British North America, Ireland, and India Compared, 1540-1800, which also appears in Journal of Modern History 98 (2026): 539-77.

    Historians of British North America, Ireland, and India write, each in their own ways, about the convergence of societies in the English empire towards metropolitan models, a process generally known as “anglicization.” Yet anglicization has never been studied as a feature connecting the global British empire. Scholars typically consider a single region and seldom engage with others. We pursue a comparative approach, using law as our vantage point. Our goal is to explore anglicization of law and through law in British North America, Ireland, and India over the course of the long early modern period from the sixteenth through early nineteenth centuries.  Our article begins with brief histories of anglicization in Ireland, America, and India that establish a foundation for comparison, for identifying commonalities and differences. We describe the “life cycle” or sequence of anglicization taking place upon different timelines in each of the three regions. Lest we overstate the extent of anglicization, we next consider difficulties that arise when deploying the concept. We conclude by suggesting how our project might stimulate comparative imperial history by developing categories that are portable, transferrable across place and time, and useful in studying both British overseas expansion globally and in connecting the British experience to that of other empires. Towards this end, we apply our approach to a contrast case: the Spanish empire’s fraught efforts to construct legal authority over indigenous peoples in New Spain and Peru.

    --Dan Ernst 

    ]]>     2026-09-11T17:00:00+00:00 ernst http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-11T17:00:00+00:00 Legal History Blog     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298359 Duxbury on the "General Law Renaissance" Neil Duxbury, London School of Economics, has posted The General Law Renaissance and the Common...

    ]]>     Neil Duxbury, London School of Economics, has posted The General Law Renaissance and the Common Law, which is forthcoming in the Notre Dame Law Review:

    Of late, there has emerged an important body of legal scholarship sympathetically reassessing the concept of “general law” – unwritten legal norms discoverable by courts. This article shows that these reassessments run up against a problem when the general law in question is common law. The problem arises from a question: what makes common law valid as law in the first place? In England, the answer is that common-law norms are presumed to have governed since the beginning of English legal memory in 1189. That answer is strained, even in England. In the United States, it makes no sense. No American legal custom runs to 1189. The English validity test simply cannot be satisfied here. 

    This doesn’t pose a difficulty at state level, where statutory and other modes of reception supply an alternative, positivist foundation for the common law. The difficulty is federal. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins held that federal courts cannot discover a body of general law and use it to displace state law. General-law revivalists challenge Erie’s premises. This article argues that the challenge underestimates the difficulty. Absent federal-legislative or constitutional adoption, there can be no valid common law as a category of substantive general law, because the test that makes common law authoritative as customary law cannot be met on American soil. 

    Rather than discover common-law rules, federal courts, this article contends, do something significantly different: they extract underlying principles from the common-law tradition and fashion new rules from those principles. That is judicial lawmaking, but lawmaking from principle, not from nothing. Attentiveness to this distinction matters more than ever now that general law is back on the agenda. 

    --Dan Ernst 

    ]]>     2026-09-11T15:00:00+00:00 ernst http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-11T15:00:00+00:00 Legal History Blog     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298354 US arms embargo on Cyprus remains suspended for another year To read this post, please log in at https://globalsanctions.com. Not a member? Join at https://glo...

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    ]]>     2026-09-11T15:15:58+00:00 Michael O'Kane https://globalsanctions.com/ 2026-09-11T15:15:58+00:00 Global Sanctions     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298355 US issues Whistleblower Bulletin on reporting Iran sanctions breaches To read this post, please log in at https://globalsanctions.com. Not a member? Join at https://glo...

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    ]]>     2026-09-11T15:00:39+00:00 Maya Lester KC https://globalsanctions.com/ 2026-09-11T15:00:39+00:00 Global Sanctions     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298356 US settlement agreement with US person for breaching sanctions on Iran To read this post, please log in at https://globalsanctions.com. Not a member? Join at https://glo...

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    ]]>     2026-09-11T14:26:04+00:00 Michael O'Kane https://globalsanctions.com/ 2026-09-11T14:26:04+00:00 Global Sanctions     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298352 Early Edition: September 11, 2026 Sign up to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here. A curated weekday guide to major news and d...

    ]]>     Sign up to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here.

    A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

    IRAN WAR 

    President Trump yesterday said he did not regret going to war against Iran. Trump said that if he had to do it again, “I would do exactly as I did,” and rejected claims some of his supporters were demoralized about the war. Kanishka Singh reports for Reuters.

    The U.S. Treasury Department yesterday announced new sanctions against firms and individuals that it says are aiding Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies in the Middle East. The sanctions targeted entities and individuals in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, and Turkey who the department says support Kata’ib Hezbollah, an Iraqi paramilitary group under the command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent yesterday said the department will also sanction a large bank next week. Bessent said that the United States would “continue with this process until everyone stops dealing with this regime,” but did not name the bank nor its country. Andrea Shalal reports for Reuters; Jasper Ward reports for Reuters.

    IRAN WAR – YEMEN

    Yemen’s Iranian-aligned Houthis today reached the strategic island of Perim in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and took the coastal town of Dhubab, four Yemeni government sources told Reuters. The Houthis yesterday seized the Red Sea port city of Mohka, according to Houthi, Yemeni, and Saudi officials. Yemeni government military sources said the Houthis had gained further leverage over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most important routes for commodity vessels, and had reached the islands of Hanish. Mohammed Ghobari, Eman Abouhassira, and Catherine Cartier report; Summer Said and Saleh al-Batati report for the Wall Street Journal; Enas Alashray, David Brunnstrom, and Jana Choukeir report for Reuters.

    The Houthi’s advance towards the Red Sea coast came with direct guidance from the IRGC seeking to open a new front in the Iran war, according to Yemeni government and Iranian sources. Iran told the Houthis last week to escalate attacks on Saudi Arabia, and promised more funding, weapons, and senior officers to help them do so. Parisa Hafezi, Mohammed Ghobari, and Timour Azhari report for Reuters.

    Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman yesterday called Trump twice urging him to launch strikes against the Houthis, and Trump declined, sources told Axios. The United States is concerned about the escalating fighting in Yemen and is stepping up support for Saudi Arabia while trying to avoid direct military conflict. Barak Ravid reports.

    More than 100 U.S. military advisers are on the ground in Saudi Arabia providing intelligence, sources told CNN. The military personnel are working as part of a newly established joint forces command, and the presence of U.S. troops assisting Saudi Arabia was described by sources. Zachary Cohen, Katie Bo Lillis, and Kylie Atwood report.

    IRAN WAR – LEBANON

    Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz yesterday said the Israeli military destroyed Hezbollah underground infrastructure at the Ali al-Taher ridge in southern Lebanon, and added that Israeli forces would remain in the area to prevent Hezbollah from re-establishing its presence. Yomna Ehab and Enas Alashray report for Reuters.

    IRAN WAR – OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

    Iranian Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Mohsen Rezai yesterday said the International Atomic Energy Agency’s “political moves” will push countries to exit the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, after the U.N. nuclear watchdog passed a resolution reporting Iran to the U.N. Security Council for breaching its non-proliferation obligations. Elwely Elwelly reports for Reuters.

    RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

    Ukrainian officials today said Russian strikes on Kyiv killed two people at a petrol station. Russia targeted two petrol stations, and a rescue worker was among those injured in a double-tap strike on one of them, according to emergency services. Gleb Garanich reports for Reuters.

    Russia’s Tula region Gov. Dmitry Milyayev today said two people were killed and three injured in Ukrainian drone attacks in the region. Russia’s Belgorod regional authorities yesterday said Ukrainian drone attacks killed one person and wounded seven. Gleb Garanich and Jekaterīna Golubkova report for Reuters; Reuters reports.

    Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk region Gov. Oleksandr Hanzha yesterday said Russian drones killed five people in the city of Pavlohrad. Hanzha said Russian strikes in the wider region killed two more people, and injured a total of 76 people, including several children. Pavel Polityuk and Anna Pruchnicka report for Reuters.

    Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney yesterday said Canada has agreed a C$350 million aid package for Kyiv to acquire air defense interceptors after meeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Carney did not give details of which interceptors would be delivered or when the aid would start flowing. Amanda Stephenson reports for Reuters.

    Zelenskyy yesterday said there would be no trilateral meeting on how to end the war before the elections in Russia. Yuliia Dysa reports for Reuters.

    OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

    Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi today began talks in New Delhi. Talks are expected to focus on trade, energy, and defense ties. Saurabh Sharma and Shilpa Jamkhandikar report for Reuters.

    The Algerian Foreign Ministry yesterday severed diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates, citing what it described as a series of “provocative or hostile” actions by the UAE. The ministry said the UAE’s actions had reached a point where they could no longer be considered acceptable, and that it had “exhausted all means of preserving bilateral relations.” The UAE Foreign Ministry said it hoped Algeria’s decision to cut diplomatic ties would be temporary. Jana Choukeir reports for Reuters.

    The U.K. MI5 Director General Ken McCallum today marked the 25th anniversary of 9/11 by stating intelligence services must not dwell on past threats but accept that a new strategic shock along the lines of the 9/11 attacks could already be in preparation where they are not looking. Michael Holden reports for Reuters.

    CLIMATE DEVELOPMENTS

    The International Energy Agency yesterday projected that the world is set to burn record amounts of coal this year, in large part because of the Iran war. The increase in coal use is a major setback for efforts to address climate change, as when burned for fuel, coal produces more planet-warming greenhouse gases than any other energy source. Brad Plumer reports for the New York Times.

    U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

    Secretary of State Marco Rubio yesterday said that the United States would work with recently elected Peruvian President Keiko Fujimori to crack down on organized crime groups in the country. Rubio gave no details on any plans for cooperation. Fujimori said Peru had joined the Shield of Americas, a coalition of Latin American nations mostly led by conservative leaders organized by the Trump administration. Edward Wong and Mitra Taj report for the New York Times.

    U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS

    The City of Denver yesterday asked a federal judge to block the Department of Homeland Security from allowing armed ICE agents to serve warrants at polling sites. The lawsuit asserts Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin and the acting Head of ICE David Venturella are allowing federal agents to enforce civil immigration laws at polling locations as a matter of policy, and argue that the practice violates federal laws protecting free and fair elections. The Department of Homeland Security yesterday stated that any arrests near polling sites would be the result of “intelligence-driven targeted enforcement.” Jazmine Ulloa reports for the New York Times.

    Common Cause, a nonpartisan, grassroots organization, yesterday filed a lawsuit that accuses the Department of Homeland Security, the Justice Department, the FBI, and other federal agencies of violating the First Amendment and privacy rights of observers through intimidation at ICE raids. The lawsuit asks for federal agencies to be barred from intimidating or retaliating against observers, and is the largest observer lawsuit to date, as it includes incidents from multiple states and seeks national relief. Jude Joffe-Block reports for NPR.

    Former immigration judge Chloe Dillon yesterday filed a lawsuit against the Justice Department claiming she was terminated last year in retaliation for “her whistleblowing activity,” in violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act and the First Amendment. Dillon’s lawsuit said she was fired roughly 48 hours after she sent an email to her supervisor flagging “potential violations of statutory law and due process” in the detainment of an unaccompanied minor. Dillon was included in a list that ICE shared with the Justice Department identifying immigration judges the agency believed showed bias in their rulings, according to an administration official. Celine Castronuovo reports for Bloomberg.

    U.S. TECH DEVELOPMENTS

    The Environmental Protection Network yesterday released a report about the health consequences of data centers, and claims that Trump administration plans to speed up approvals of the facilities threatened to exacerbate those health harms. The report listed 30 federal actions taken by the Environmental Protection Agency and other government agencies which could further increase emissions and health risks. Hiroko Tabuchi reports for the New York Times.

    Anthropic yesterday said it had disrupted several potential plots this year by scientists who used its AI models to conduct research that could have helped develop biological weapons. In a report describing misuse of AI models, the company said it could not determine whether the research served a legitimate or nefarious purpose, and erred on the side of caution because the consequences of missing malicious activity could be severe. Dustin Volz reports for the New York Times.

    A Texas judge yesterday ruled TikTok violated the state’s consumer protection law by misleading users about how it filtered content for minors and whether its “Restricted Mode” feature shielded children from inappropriate material. The ruling says TikTok told users it would remove content that violated its Community Guidelines, but internally classified some of the violatory material as “hard to find” rather than “do not allow,” allowing it to remain on the platform. Sathvi G. Bhat reports for Reuters.

    U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

    The Supreme Court yesterday blocked Missouri from using a Republican-drawn congressional map in the midterm elections. The court issued a brief order to end a dispute that spanned three separate courts. Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins (R) yesterday instructed election officials to use prior district lines. The Missouri Supreme Court said Hoskins’ new notice “corrected his contemptuous conduct.” The Missouri Supreme Court yesterday found Hoskin in contempt of court for instructing officials to use the Republican-drawn map on Tuesday. Lydia Wheeler and James Romoser report for the Wall Street Journal.

    McClatchy, whose titles include the Miami Herald, yesterday executed its most severe layoffs in years, cutting newsroom staff at some papers by upwards of 40%. McClatchy Executive Vice President of Local News Greg Farmer said in an email to newsrooms that the company “cannot continue investing where subscriber interest does not support the investment.”  A current employee said at least 90 journalists had been laid off at dozens of publications. Angela Fu reports for Poynter; Katie Robertson reports for the New York Times.

    Trump loyalist and veteran prosecutor Joe diGenova yesterday abruptly resigned from the Russia-related investigation into whether former law enforcement and intelligence officials conspired against Trump. Sources told ABC News that the resignation came amid growing frustrations from Trump and senior Justice Department officials regarding his work on the so-called “grand conspiracy” investigation. DiGenova confirmed his resignation to POLITICO and AP News, but declined to explain his departure. Katherine Faulders, Alexander Mallin, and Luke Barr report; Josh Gerstein reports; Eric Tucker and Alanna Durkin Richer reports.

    Hawaii Gov. Josh Green (D) yesterday asked Trump for help in rebuilding efforts following Hurricane Lowell. Hurricane Lowell was the second hurricane to strike Hawaii in the past few weeks after Hurricane Lala, killing a total of 5 people across the state. Green added that the state had also been battered by another storm and earthquake, and estimates Hurricane Lowell to have done more damage than Hurricane Iniki in 1992, which killed at least 7 people and left $1.8 billion in damage. Christina Morales and Jennifer Sinco Kelleher report for the New York Times.

    California Gov. Gavin Newsom (D) yesterday signed into law restrictions on addictive social media technology and interactions with harmful AI chatbots. The laws are the first of their kind in the country, and are among more than a dozen digital safety laws Newsom signed, saying it was too hard for parents alone to protect their children from powerful algorithms. Cecilia Kang and Laurel Rosenhall report for the New York Times.

    TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTION

    The Department of Homeland Security yesterday proposed eliminating a 60-day grace period that allows certain immigrants, including workers on H-1B visas, to stay in the country and find a new sponsor after losing their job. The department acknowledged companies affected by the change could see some disruption, but said the jobs could go to American workers instead, and added that in some circumstances, people who left could potentially reapply if their employer petitions for them. Susan Heavey reports for Reuters.

    TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION

    An appeals court yesterday declined to lift a federal judge’s injunction that prevented the Postal Service from enforcing a new rule to tighten mail-in voting requirements before the midterm elections. The Trump administration had already asked the Supreme Court to make a decision on the rule without waiting for the appeals court verdict. Nate Raymond reports for Reuters.

    Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions.

    If you enjoy listening, Just Security’s analytic articles are also available in audio form on the justsecurity.org website.

    ICYMI: Yesterday on Just Security

    The Just Security Podcast: 9/11 at 25 Years: The State of U.S. National Security, Intelligence, and Alliances Today

    By Ambassador Daniel Fried, Nicholas Rasmussen, Ryan Goodman, and Tess Bridgeman

    “Can These Bones Live?”: Reflections on the Anniversary of 9/11

    By David Blight

    A Crucial Moment for Persons with Disabilities: The Right to Community Inclusion vs. Institutionalization

    By Matthew “Hezzy” Smith, Michael Ashley Stein, and Janet Lord

    The post Early Edition: September 11, 2026 appeared first on Just Security.

    ]]>     2026-09-11T12:26:35+00:00 Ammanuel Desta https://www.justsecurity.org 2026-09-11T12:26:35+00:00 Just Security     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298353 The Just Security Podcast: 9/11 at 25 Years: The State of U.S. National Security, Intelligence, and Alliances Today Watch the Episode: Co-hosts Ryan Goodman and Tess Bridgeman are joined by Daniel Fried and Nicholas...

    ]]>     Watch the Episode:

    Co-hosts Ryan Goodman and Tess Bridgeman are joined by Daniel Fried and Nicholas Rasmussen to discuss how 9/11 and the United States’ responses to it continue to shape U.S. counterterrorism and foreign policy a quarter century later.

    Show Notes: 

    Recent Episodes:

    The post The Just Security Podcast: 9/11 at 25 Years: The State of U.S. National Security, Intelligence, and Alliances Today appeared first on Just Security.

    ]]>     2026-09-11T12:07:21+00:00 Ambassador Daniel Fried https://www.justsecurity.org 2026-09-11T12:07:21+00:00 Just Security     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298351 Das Unbehagen am Recht Der nordrhein-westfälische Landtag beschloss am 15. Juli 2026 das Hochschulstärkungsgesetz. Mit ihm ...

    ]]>     Der nordrhein-westfälische Landtag beschloss am 15. Juli 2026 das Hochschulstärkungsgesetz. Mit ihm kommt jener seit Ende 2024 erbittert umstrittene Teil 10 in das Hochschulgesetz, der Machtmissbrauch und wissenschaftlicher Unredlichkeit mit den Mitteln des Rechts begegnen soll. Der Kritik an dem Vorhaben ist der Gesetzgeber damit im Grundsatz nicht gefolgt. Das war richtig. Denn wer die Wissenschaftsfreiheit gegen rechtsförmige Verfahren in Stellung bringt, die geltenden Rechten und Pflichten zur Durchsetzung verhelfen sollen, verteidigt nicht die Freiheit der Wissenschaft, sondern die Folgenlosigkeit wissenschaftlichen und dienstrechtlichen Fehlverhaltens.

    Trotz Kritik beschlossen

    Der neue Teil 10 des Hochschulgesetzes NRW gibt den Hochschulen nun erstmals umfassende Instrumente gegen Fehlverhalten ihrer Mitglieder an die Hand. Die Novelle adressiert damit Verstöße gegen die wissenschaftliche Redlichkeit, also etwa Plagiate oder manipulierte Daten, und Übergriffe auf andere Hochschulmitglieder, vom Machtmissbrauch im Vorgesetzten- oder Betreuungsverhältnis bis hin zu sexueller Belästigung. Bislang blieben den Hochschulleitungen dafür kaum mehr als das Hausrecht und das allgemeine Disziplinarrecht.

    Der Referentenentwurf vom September 2024 stieß allerdings auf kategorische Ablehnung. Im Dezember 2024 veröffentlichten auf diesem Blog Rechtswissenschaftlerinnen und Rechtswissenschaftler einen Appell, der inzwischen 235 Unterschriften trägt und Ministerin Ina Brandes persönlich aufforderte, den Entwurf zurückzuziehen, da er gegen die Wissenschaftsfreiheit verstoße. Dem war am 6. Dezember 2024 Julian Krüpers kritischer Beitrag „Brandes’ Verdacht“vorausgegangen: Der Entwurf führe einen antidiskriminierungsrechtlichen Subjektivismus in das Hochschulrecht ein. Seine Formel „Diskriminiert ist, wer sich diskriminiert fühlt“ machte die WELT zur Schlagzeile. In der FAZ wurde gestritten, ob hier eine „Paralleljustiz“ entstehe. Die Bochumer Philosophieprofessorin Maria-Sibylla Lotter warnte in NZZ und Rheinischer Post vor einer Atmosphäre, „wie man sie in der DDR kannte“.

    Umso interessanter ist, wie das Gesetzesvorhaben gleichwohl beschlossen wurde. Denn nicht nur die Mehrheit der regierenden Parteien, also CDU und Grüne, stimmte dem Gesetz zu. Die oppositionelle SPD-Fraktion wollte gesondert über die Einfügung von Teil 10 abstimmen, um diesem Abschnitt des Gesetzes zustimmen zu können (PlPr 18/127, S. 121 f.). Ausgerechnet der Teil, von dem mehr als zweihundert Rechtswissenschaftlerinnen und Rechtswissenschaftler behaupteten, er sei verfassungswidrig, fand nun Zustimmung über die Regierungsmehrheit hinaus.

    Abschied von der Sicherheitssemantik

    Was hat der Landtag also beschlossen? Gegenüber dem Referentenentwurf hat sich zunächst die Sprache geändert. Das war politisch klug, denn ein Großteil der Kritik entzündete sich an Begrifflichkeiten, an der angekündigten Einführung eines „Hochschulsicherheitsrechts“ ebenso wie an dem dazugehörigen Vokabular. Krüper etwa erkannte darin den Versuch, unter dem „trügerischen Label eines ‚Sicherheitsrechts‘“ eine „Verdachts- und Akkusationskultur“ an den Hochschulen zu etablieren.

    Im Gesetz ist von diesem Wortlaut wenig geblieben. Von „Hochschulsicherheitsrecht“ ist keine Rede mehr, von „Sicherheit“ sprechen nur noch Überschriften und die Zielbestimmung des § 84. Aus „Sicherheitsverstößen“ und „Sicherungsmaßnahmen“ sind „Integritätsverstöße“ und „Integritätsmaßnahmen“ geworden, aus dem „Sicherungsgegner“ ein „Maßnahmenadressat“. Auch die Systematik wurde neu geordnet. Teil 10 gliedert sich jetzt in vier Kapitel: allgemeine Bestimmungen (§§ 84–85), das Redlichkeits- und Integritätsrecht (§§ 86–93), disziplinarrechtliche Sonderregelungen (§§ 94–97) und ein Kapitel zur Gefahrenabwehr im Hochschulraum (§§ 98–100).

    Ziel bleibt, bei aller semantischen Entschärfung, der „sichere Hochschulraum“ (§ 84 Abs. 1). Geschützt werden die Hochschulmitglieder, der Sache nach wie schon im Referentenentwurf, vor Diskriminierung sowie vor Beeinträchtigungen ihrer körperlichen Unversehrtheit, ihrer sexuellen Selbstbestimmung, ihres Persönlichkeitsrechts und sonstiger personaler Rechte durch andere (§ 84 Abs. 1 S. 3).

    Ein hochschulisches Gefahrenabwehrrecht

    Das hochschulische Gefahrenabwehrrecht betrifft die präventive Seite des Gesetzes. Es erlaubt, einen Teil der Integritätsmaßnahmen unabhängig von einem Integritätsverfahren anzuordnen. Dazu zählen Betretungs- und Kontaktverbote, der Entzug der Weisungsbefugnis gegenüber Beschäftigten sowie der Entzug der Lehr- und Prüfungsbefugnis (§ 98 Abs. 1 i. V. m. § 87 Abs. 3 S. 2 Nr. 1 bis 4). Voraussetzung ist, dass zureichende tatsächliche Anhaltspunkte für einen Integritätsverstoß die konkrete Gefahr begründen, jemand werde „in Studium oder hochschulischer Tätigkeit erheblich behindert“. Welche Gestalt eine solche Behinderung annehmen kann, zeigen die anonymisierten Fälle, die das Netzwerk gegen Machtmissbrauch in der Wissenschaft veröffentlicht. Im Kern geht es darum, dass Betroffene den Kontakt zu der Person, von der die Gefahr ausgeht, nicht abbrechen können, ohne Studium, Promotion oder Stelle aufs Spiel zu setzen. Die Gesetzesbegründung fasst dies nun in die negativ-freiheitliche Formel einer „Übergriffsfreiheit des Lehrangebots“ (LT-Drs. 18/16798, S. 485).

    Nachgewiesen sein muss der Integritätsverstoß für die gefahrenabwehrrechtliche Maßnahme nicht. Das entspricht ihrem präventiven Zweck. Die Erheblichkeitsschwelle schließt allerdings Bagatellen aus und verpflichtet die Hochschule, die Grundrechte beider Seiten gegeneinander abzuwägen. Generell unterwirft das Gesetz Maßnahmen der hochschulischen Gefahrenabwehr ausdrücklich dem Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip (§ 100). Und Studierende, die durch unwahre Tatsachen ein Integritätsverfahren auslösen, begehen damit ihrerseits einen Ordnungsverstoß (§ 51a Abs. 1 Nr. 5).

    Drei Änderungen gegenüber dem ursprünglichen Referentenentwurf sind hervorzuheben. So gilt das Integritätsrecht nur noch für Hochschullehrerinnen und Hochschullehrer (§ 87 Abs. 1). Für die übrigen Beschäftigten bleibt es beim allgemeinen Dienstrecht und dem Hausrecht; für Studierende gilt zudem das Ordnungsrecht, das es schon seit 2019 gibt. Explizite Voraussetzung ist nun außerdem eine schuldhafte Verletzung dienstrechtlicher Pflichten (§ 87 Abs. 2). Und gestrichen wurde die Ermächtigung des Senats, Verhaltensregeln in einer hochschuleigenen Ordnung niederzulegen.

    Stärkung der Selbstkontrolle der Wissenschaft

    Die wissenschaftsrechtliche Neuerung ist das Redlichkeitsrecht. Anders als das Integritätsrecht erfasst es alle Mitglieder der Hochschule und knüpft nicht an dienstrechtliche Pflichten an, sondern unmittelbar an die wissenschaftliche Redlichkeitspflicht (§ 86 Abs. 1). Mit ihm können die Hochschulen zum ersten Mal in verschiedenen Abstufungen auf wissenschaftliches Fehlverhalten reagieren (§ 86). Schon 2012 bezeichnete Helmuth Schulze-Fielitz die Sanktionierung wissenschaftlichen Fehlverhaltens als die eigentliche „Achillesferse“ der Selbstkontrolle im Wissenschaftsbetrieb. Unterhalb des Gradentzugs fehle es „weithin an einem differenzierten Katalog“ von Reaktionen (WissR Beiheft 21 [2012], 1 [49]).

    Der neue Katalog der Redlichkeitsmaßnahmen beginnt mit der bloßen Feststellung eines Verstoßes, einer Rüge oder der Korrektur betroffener Publikationen (§ 86 Abs. 2 S. 2 Nr. 1 bis 3), reicht über den Widerruf von Ausstattungszusagen (Nr. 9) und endet beim Entzug des Hochschulgrades oder der Lehrbefähigung (Nr. 10). Über verhängte Maßnahmen unterrichtet die Hochschule Verlage, Fachgesellschaften und Forschungsförderer sowie im Regelfall auch die wissenschaftliche Öffentlichkeit (§ 86 Abs. 6). Die Hochschulen sollen damit den wissenschaftlichen Diskurs vor Unredlichkeit schützen. Dafür besteht durchaus Anlass, wie beispielsweise eine Auswertung biomedizinischer Veröffentlichungen zeigt. Rücknahmen haben dort seit den 1970er Jahren stark zugenommen, und gut zwei Drittel beruhen auf wissenschaftlichem Fehlverhalten (Fang/Steen/Casadevall, PNAS 109 [2012], 17028).

    Schließlich soll die Bewertung von Dissertationen unabhängiger werden. Schon 2011 hatte der Wissenschaftsrat empfohlen, Betreuung und Bewertung der Dissertation zu trennen (Drs. 1704-11, S. 24). Das Gesetz macht die Trennung nun zur Regel, von der aber abzuweichen ist, wenn die Doktorandin oder der Doktorand dies schriftlich wünscht, wofür es keiner Begründung bedarf (§ 67 Abs. 3 S. 7 und 8). Auch die Zweitbegutachtung soll ohne Kenntnis des Erstgutachtens erfolgen, allerdings nur „in der Regel“ und „unter Berücksichtigung der Fachkultur“ (§ 67 Abs. 3 S. 6). Beide Regelungen kommen der Kritik entgegen. Der Referentenentwurf hatte die unabhängige Zweitbegutachtung noch ausnahmslos vorgeschrieben. Und wer den Betreuer als Gutachter behalten wollte, musste einen „besonders begründeten Ausnahmefall“ darlegen.

    Überschießende Rechtsskepsis der Kritik

    Zurück zur Debatte. Diese verrät schließlich weniger über das Gesetz als über das Verhältnis seiner Kritikerinnen und Kritiker zum Recht. So bezweifelten sie nicht nur die Verfassungsmäßigkeit des Entwurfs (über einzelne Normen lässt sich streiten, und darüber werden Gerichte entscheiden). Mehr noch galten ihre grundsätzlichen Einwände der Verrechtlichung des Wissenschaftsbetriebs überhaupt. Der Appell an Ministerin Brandes beklagte die „Umwidmung der Hochschulen von Orten des gemeinsamen Wagnisses auf der Suche nach Wahrheit zu Orten des Verdachts und der Disziplinierung“. In Forschung & Lehre war vom „Ausdruck eines umfassenden Misstrauens gegenüber uns allen“ die Rede und von einem „bürokratischen Monstrum“, das die Atmosphäre an den Hochschulen „nachhaltig zu vergiften droht“. Die Kritik war von der Sorge bestimmt, an der Universität lasse sich mit dem Gesetz künftig kaum noch frei sprechen. Darüber ging beinahe verloren, dass hier ein Entwurf verhandelt wurde, der von Übergriffen auf persönliche Rechte und von wissenschaftlicher Redlichkeit handelt und nicht von Zensur oder moralischen Haltungen.

    Unglücklich ist insoweit schon, wie das Grundrecht auf Wissenschaftsfreiheit in dieser Debatte zu einer „akademischen Meinungsfreiheit verzwergt“ wurde (vgl. Gärditz, APuZ 46/2021). Von der Wissenschaftsfreiheit geschützt ist nämlich nicht das subjektive Dafürhalten, auch nicht eine bestimmte Moral oder eine gute Stimmung im Betrieb, sondern der ernsthafte und planmäßige Versuch, Wahrheit zu ermitteln (und mit ihm die Ordnung, die diesen Versuch erst möglich macht) (BVerfGE 35, 79 [113, 116]).

    Dem Recht selbst trauten die Kritikerinnen und Kritiker denn auch wenig zu. Recht, so die Annahme, helfe hier nicht weiter, schade oder widerspreche dem Wissenschaftssystem. Musterhaft ist die Stellungnahme Hinnerk Wißmanns im Gesetzgebungsverfahren. Die Wissenschaftsfreiheit sei „kein Argument für missbräuchliches Verhalten – wer wollte das auch ernsthaft behaupten“ (Stellungnahme 18/3546, S. 9). Nur bedürfe es gegen solches Verhalten auch keiner neuen Instrumente. Hausrecht und Dienstrecht gäben den Hochschulleitungen schon heute das Nötige an die Hand, und am Ende werde ohnehin „sogar weniger statt mehr Opferschutz produziert“ (OdW 2025, 65 [74]). In der Anhörung sah Wißmann zudem die Handlungsfähigkeit der Hochschulen bedroht. Es bestehe „die echte Gefahr, dass funktionierende Personalgovernance abgeschnitten wird“ (APr 18/1177, S. 13). Die bisherige, stark informell geprägte Form der Personalführung gilt in dieser Lesart nicht als Mangel, sondern als Freiheitsgewinn der Selbstverwaltung.

    Der Deutsche Hochschulverband bestritt in seiner Stellungnahme schon den Ausgangsbefund. Das Vorhaben behaupte zu Unrecht eine dienstrechtliche „Leerstelle“, denn das Fehlen eines fachlich weisungsbefugten Vorgesetzten auf Ebene der Professuren sei „Funktionsvoraussetzung inhaltlich freier Wissenschaft“ (Stellungnahme 18/3523, S. 4). Richtig ist insoweit, dass das Hochschulurteil von 1973 den Hochschullehrern eine „herausgehobene Stellung“ zuweist. Danach ist Hochschullehrer, wer „mit der selbständigen Vertretung eines wissenschaftlichen Faches in Forschung und Lehre betraut ist“ (BVerfGE 35, 79 [126 f.]). Ein solches Amt verträgt keine Fachaufsicht. Nur stand dies nie in Frage. Der Gesetzgeber ging durchweg davon aus, dass das professorale Personal von Grundrechts wegen „in keine fachliche Hierarchie eingebunden“ ist (LT-Drs. 18/16798, S. 469).

    Die Organisation von Freiheit

    Anders argumentierte die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in ihrer Stellungnahme. Sie verwies auf den Kodex „Leitlinien zur Sicherung guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis“ und dessen rechtsverbindliche Umsetzung durch die Hochschulen. Die „im Kodex beschriebenen und von den Hochschulen umgesetzten Appelle schaffen aufgrund des Prinzips der Gesetzmäßigkeit der Verwaltung keine Ermächtigungsgrundlagen, sondern machen diese in besonderem Maße erforderlich“ (Stellungnahme 18/3494, S. 4). Kurz: Rechte und Pflichten verlangen nach Verrechtlichung. Formalisierung ist ein Gebot der Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Daran schließt sich ein praktischer Befund an: Ob ein Verstoß Folgen hat, hängt bisher entscheidend davon ab, wie jemand beschäftigt ist und woher die Fördermittel kommen. Wissenschaftlich betrachtet sind das „Zufälligkeiten ohne epistemische Funktion“ (Gärditz, WissR 57 [2024], 36 [52]). Wenn Maßnahmen verhängt werden, scheinen sie sich eher nach Reputation als nach dem Gewicht des Verstoßes zu richten (Schulze-Fielitz, WissR Beiheft 21 [2012], 1 [49]). Und wo es zu Übergriffen auf persönliche Rechte kommt, wird den Betroffenen bisher kaum geholfen (May, WissR 56 [2023], 210 [232 f.]). Mit dem Freiheitsgewinn informeller Personalführung lässt sich das nicht rechtfertigen.

    Es geht bei dem Streit letztlich um die Frage, wie eine wissenschaftsadäquate Hochschulorganisation aussehen sollte. Hier zeigt sich ein grundlegendes Missverständnis auf Seiten der Kritik. Das Ziel der Hochschulorganisation kann nicht darin liegen, Konflikte derart zu vermeiden, dass „Verdacht“ und „Misstrauen“ keinen Ort der Artikulation haben. Vielmehr ist die Ermöglichung ihrer Austragung, mit einer Formulierung von Klaus Ferdinand Gärditz, ein „Gebot struktureller Konfliktchancenerhaltung“ (Hochschulorganisation und verwaltungsrechtliche Systembildung, 2009, S. 359). Hinzu kommt, dass „in Bereichen autonomer Herrschaftsausübung (wie in staatlichen Hochschulen) die Freiheitsrechte des Einzelnen gerade durch Formalisierung der Entscheidungsverfahren gegen eine Kollektivierung geschützt werden müssen“ (ebd., S. 209 f.). Umgekehrt sind es informelle Verfahren, die den Einzelnen dem Kollektiv ausliefern. Wenn der Appell aus den Rechtsfakultäten die Hochschulen also als einen „Ort des Mutes, des Zutrauens, der freien Rede, des gemeinsamen Wagnisses“ beschwört, dann spricht dieses Ideal für das Gesetz, nicht gegen es.

    NRW als Testfall

    Das Gesetz könnte zum Vorbild eines Wissenschaftsrechts werden, das Rechte und Pflichten nicht nur postuliert, sondern mittels Verfahren und Ermächtigungsgrundlagen justiziabel macht. Die „Leerstelle des fehlenden Fachvorgesetzten“ füllt es „durch ein korporationsrechtliches Integritätsrecht“ (LT-Drs. 18/16798, S. 469). Die Antwort auf Fehlverhalten bleibt also bei der Hochschule selbst.

    Im bevölkerungsreichsten Bundesland studieren mit rund 707.000 Menschen fast ein Viertel aller Studierenden in Deutschland. Was sich hier bewährt oder scheitert, wird man in den anderen Ländern beobachten. Innerhalb von drei Jahren soll der umstrittene Teil 10 evaluiert werden (§ 116 Abs. 9 S. 4). Bis dahin lohnt es sich, die Debatte nochmals daraufhin zu lesen, welche – genauer: wessen – Wissenschaftsfreiheit in ihr eigentlich verhandelt wurde. Wer das tut, wird den Eindruck schwer los, dass die kategorische Kritik einen Begriff der Wissenschaftsfreiheit zugrunde gelegt hat, der sich kaum aus dem Grundgesetz ableiten lässt. Denn eine Wissenschaftsfreiheit, die allergisch gegen Rechte, Pflichten und Verfahren ist, unterläuft sich selbst. Dass die Politik sich von dieser Auslegung nicht hat beeindrucken lassen, ist ein Lichtblick.

    The post Das Unbehagen am Recht appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

    ]]>     2026-09-11T11:59:29+00:00 Fabian Endemann http://verfassungsblog.de 2026-09-11T11:59:29+00:00 Verfassungsblog     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298350 CfP: Association of Law and Political Economy Conference The Association of Law and Political Economy (ALPE) invites proposals for its second annual meeting,...

    ]]>     The Association of Law and Political Economy (ALPE) invites proposals for its second annual meeting, to be held on June 9-10, 2027, in Boston, MA. Panels, roundtables, and individual paper proposals are welcome. ALPE encourages submissions by academics, organizers, practitioners, policy professionals, and others engaged in work on the…

    The post CfP: Association of Law and Political Economy Conference appeared first on Critical Legal Thinking.

    ]]>     2026-09-11T10:55:16+00:00 Admin http://criticallegalthinking.com 2026-09-11T10:55:16+00:00 Critical Legal Thinking     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298347 New book: Droit International Privé by Marc Fallon, Jean-Yves Carlier and Stéphanie Francq The standard textbook of Belgian Private International Law in French has just been published in its ...

    ]]>     The standard textbook of Belgian Private International Law in French has just been published in its fourth edition (by Larcier Intersentia). The great scholar François Rigaux published the first version of this précis in 1977-1979 (in two volumes). The second edition followed in 1987-1993, and the third in 2005. While the third edition comprised a single volume, it comes as no surprise that the number of legislative texts and court decisions have obliged the authors to return to the two-volume format. Printed in small typeset and on thin paper, the entire work surpasses 2000 pages. The book forms part of the series Precis de la faculté de droit et de criminologie de l’UCLouvain. The two volumes are truly a “travail de moine” (a very detailed and painstaking work that requires much time and patience).

    The authors are all professors or emeritus-professors at the UCLouvain, as was the initial author François Rigaux. He involved Marc Fallon in the second and third editions, and Marc Fallon invided Jean-Yves Carlier and Stéphanie Francq to join for the latest edition.

    Volume I contains the general part, discussing the history and method of private international law, as well as general approaches to jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement and procedure. Volume II covers specific topics.

    The authors aim to provide students with both solutions and tools to learn methods of finding solutions. They state this approach in their preface, and remain faithful to it. The book is not restricted to students, but aimed at practitioners, lawyers, judges, notaries, civil servants, legal advisors and researchers alike. Each of these groups will use the book with a slightly different expectation – to find the correct approach, the learn about the law as it is, where it comes from and why it is the way it is. The book offers all of this, at the same time bringing together national, EU and international law, as is indispensable in current-day private international law. The book is therefore not limited to Belgian private international law. As the authors have a deep foundation in EU law, their discussions of private international law are grounded in this broader context. And as Marc Fallon states in the preface, EU law has become “omnipresent” next to the conventions of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. He adds that EU law is now covering a major part of private international law, and that even the parts that are not yet the subject of EU legislation are heavily influenced by primary EU law. Therefore the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU is now a major source of private international law.

    The approach is not article-by-article but a coherent discussion of the legal domains of private international law. It contains a thorough explanation of the particular terminology as well as the links to substantive law. It is balanced, providing on the one hand a global analysis of the real complexities of the discipline, and on the other hand clear and precise information and illustrations from case law. Each chapter or section starts with an extensive bibliography of Belgian and international legal literature and websites, divided into the categories relevant for the chapter or section that follows.

    The first volume is dedicated to the general part of private international law. Its first chapter sets private international law in the context of international law, international human rights protection, EU law, and transnational legal orders such as religious laws and acts by sports federations. The authors discuss the place of state law in this plurality of legal orders, and the method of private international law to solve system conflicts. It is didactic in its explanation of core notions such as State jurisdiction and sovereignty, spatial limits of State law, territoriality, and nationality.

    A rich account of the historical foundations of private international law and different schools make up Chapter 2. The following Chapters, 3 to 7, discuss the connecting factor, its applicability, application, and operation. Chapter 6 dedicates its full 93 pages to the determination of foreign law, including internal conflicts and temporal issues. Renvoi is set out in 23 pages, which explain meticulously the various forms and effects of this technique, and offering an evaluation from various perspectives. This analysis allows the reader to understand the technique, and invites us to view it in all its nuances, for all its advantages, vices and practical value. The Chapter also reviews various methods, such as the method of recognition, and complications such as the preliminary question. It investigates how foreign law must be applied – ex officio or invoked by the parties, and how a court should find such foreign law. The reader encounters again an admirable combination of theory and practice. On the fiction of jura novit curia the authors showcase the different approaches on determining foreign law, and they link this to the nature of the connecting factor (multilateral or unilateral).

    Chapter 8 turns to the sources of international procedural law, including the methods to interpret these sources. It covers sources of the EU, international law as well as bilateral treaties. Chapter 9 is a general chapter on civil jurisdiction for international cases. Chapter 10 is the same for recognition and enforcement, called the “effect” of foreign judgments and authentic instruments. The name simultaneously indicates the breadth and depth – the authors cover the many potential effects, and again in detail. They for example delve into the evidentiary effect of foreign acts, a matter that is causing jurists and negotiators headaches during discussions of the EU’s parenthood proposal that is currently on the drawing table. They discuss the external and internal effects, and the factual effects of foreign decisions and authentic acts. The lucidity they bring is welcome in current private international law. Placing this discussion in the general part of their book allows them to draw from various of the so-called third generation private international law Regulations in the EU, i.e. the Regulations that cover jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement, and cross-border cooperation.

    Volume II, the thicker of the two, approaches the various domains of private law step by step. It contains chapters on the law of persons and family (including marriage, divorce, registered partners, cohabitants, matrimonial property, filiation, the protection of children and of adults, and maintenance obligations), property law (including trusts, intellectual property, insolvency, succession), contracts (general and specific contracts), tort (general and specific). Each of these sections discuss jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, and where relevant enforcement. The authors include the specificities of each domain of the law, covering international conventions, EU legislation and its Belgian implementation, Belgian legislation, and case law of EU and Belgian courts. They showcase where mandatory laws, EU primary law (such as free movement), public policy or other exceptions or peculiarities come at play. Old law that could still extend to current situations is also included, for instance with respect to matrimonial property.

    The structure of the two books is to a large extent in line with the Belgian Private International Law Code of 2004 (and the Swiss code). But perhaps it is the other way around: perhaps the code followed the initial Rigaux and Fallon structure, with all its didactic qualities. Yet, the Private International Law Code is now full of large holes, eaten out by EU law. The same cannot be said of this Précis.

    My copy, which initially served for this book review, is already filled with post-its for my own teaching and research.

    Thalia Kruger

    ]]>     2026-09-11T10:52:40+00:00 Thalia Kruger http://conflictoflaws.net 2026-09-11T10:52:40+00:00 Conflict of Laws     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298348 Conference Report ‘Digitalisation of Justice: Perspectives from Germany and the Netherlands’ (University of Groningen, 29 May 2026) This report was written by Josephine Götze, LL.M.-student at the University of Groningen. An extende...

    ]]>     This report was written by Josephine Götze, LL.M.-student at the University of Groningen. An extended version will appear in a forthcoming edited volume published by Springer.

    On 29 May 2026, the WEAKER PIL research line at the Faculty of Law of the University of Groningen hosted the symposium ‘Digitalisation of Justice: Perspectives from Germany and the Netherlands’ at the House of Connections in Groningen. The symposium brought together scholars from both jurisdictions across four fields of law: private international law, civil procedure, criminal procedure, and administrative procedural law. They were joined by practitioners, emerging scholars, and more than 40 participants.

    The symposium was guided by the central research question of the legal and institutional conditions under which the digitalisation of justice in Germany and the Netherlands can contribute to improved access to justice and to the quality of judicial decision-making, without undermining minimum standards of the rule of law and procedural guarantees.

    The choice of a bilateral, cross-doctrinal design was deliberate: national legislators and courts are responding to digital transformation at remarkably different speeds, and innovative solutions to shared problems have often already emerged in the other legal system or in a neighbouring field of law. This report focusses on the conference’s discussions around private international law, summarizing the cross-cutting themes that emerged over the course of the day. A full report will be published in the Springer-volume ‘Digitalisation of Justice: Perspectives from Germany and the Netherlands’ in the course of 2027.

     

    Opening and Keynote

    The symposium was opened by Dr. Benedikt Schmitz (University of Groningen), who described the critical crossroads at which the ongoing digitalisation and our legal system find themselves, with the latter lagging behind when it comes to adjusting existing norms to changing realities. He raised central questions about the use of AI in the legal field and its relation to the rule of law and the principle of fairness. His opening was followed by welcome addresses by Prof. Dr. Wilbert Kolkman, Dean of the Faculty of Law, and Prof. Dr. Jouke de Vries, President of the University Board. In a humorous way, Kolkman criticised what the support of AI has done to the quality of academic legal papers by describing the evolution from the printing press, to pressing print on a computer, to the ‘depressing print’ that he called the papers of students, who are not the only ones handing in AI-generated texts that lack the meaning human-produced work entails. De Vries emphasised the importance of cross-border cooperation to tackle complex societal issues that cannot be approached from one discipline or jurisdiction alone. He further encouraged incorporating the knowledge of civil society organisations into academic debate through transdisciplinary research.

    In his keynote address, Dr. Benjamin Grimm (Minister of Justice and for Digitalisation, Federal State of Brandenburg, Germany) offered the perspective of a Land justice ministry engaged in the practical implementation of digital justice. Even in an integrated European Union, he observed, judicial matters continue to reflect national traditions. Precisely for that reason it is necessary to look across borders and learn from one another. Brandenburg was the first German Land to combine the portfolios of justice and digitalisation in a single ministry – a deliberate pairing of a traditionally conservative judiciary with a policy field associated with progress, modernity and new ideas, a combination for which Estonia in particular served as a point of reference. In Brandenburg, responsibilities for digitalisation projects, including their funding, have been consolidated centrally – a choice Grimm defended while acknowledging the tension it creates with Germany’s federal structure.

    Grimm placed these institutional choices in a sobering context: in a recent survey, only 15 per cent of citizens said that their expectations of the modern, digital administration were met, and only one in three people expressed trust in their government. Digitalisation, he argued, is therefore not merely a matter of efficient administration but of countering fears and proving that the State remains capable of being future-proof. The State, he insisted, must meet the expectations citizens bring from a world in which goods ordered online arrive the next day. This idea, however, would require central coordination beyond Brandenburg to ensure successful implementation.

    For the judiciary, Grimm identified the digital availability of files as the indispensable foundation: the use of AI cannot be accepted, let alone succeed, while courts remain stuck with analogue files. The introduction of the electronic case file, imposed on a sometimes reluctant judiciary, is in his words not even digitalisation but ‘merely electrification’ and thus a first, but certainly not a last, step.

    Grimm closed with a plea for coordination: the tools currently in use across the federal states are outdated and scattered, and all ministers of justice are working together towards a uniform software solution and unified architectural standards to fundamentally reform the judiciary’s use of digitalisation. The judiciary, he said, is standing at the dawn of a digital revolution. Several of his themes – the loss of citizens’ trust in a slow-moving administration and the question of how much decision-making may be delegated to machines – returned throughout the day, most directly in Panel 4 and in the closing plenary discussion.

    First panel: Private International Law

    The first panel, moderated by Benedikt Schmitz (Groningen) and sponsored by the Royal Netherlands Society of International Law, addressed the digitalisation of cross-border civil justice. Susanne Lilian Gössl (Bonn) opened with an assessment of digital justice and cross-border proceedings in Germany, where the progress of digitalisation is slow (and slower still in cross-border cases), marked by general scepticism and uncertainty. Alongside structural features of the field – the applicable law follows the lex fori, the strongest impulses come from EU law (which is nonetheless cautious to interfere with Member States’ procedural law), and the eCodex system provides decentralised, interoperable communication between Member State courts – she pointed to concrete hurdles such as the beA special electronic mailbox, which makes it difficult for foreign attorneys to file cases in Germany, and to courts’ initial resistance to online participation of parties abroad. However, what was once regarded as an affront to the other State’s sovereignty is now increasingly accepted if parties voluntarily participate. Gössl ended by briefly touching upon enforceable and non-enforceable mediation and arbitration agreements and the challenges Germany’s paper-based approaches pose in international settings.

    Kirsten Henckel (Groningen) asked whether we can really digitalise justice – and whether courts can actually use the new technologies. EU digitalisation efforts, she argued, largely digitise existing processes while creating problems of their own, relating to, inter alia, privacy, AI, and non-EU service providers. Presenting collective actions as a Dutch tradition of forty years, most recently under the 2020 WAMCA (Dutch Act on the resolution of mass damages in collective actions), she made the Netherlands a case study for access to justice in a digitised world, and raised the question which law prevails when jurisdiction must be established under both the Brussels Ia Regulation and the GDPR as lex specialis.

    Frederick Rieländer (Bremen) began his presentation from a comparative perspective: the most technologically advanced countries were at the forefront of digitalising justice, and the EU is now committed to digitalising cross-border proceedings, with the Commission wanting all relevant processes to be digital by the end of the decade. He emphasised that digital tools can reshape the handling and administration of cross-border litigation in the EU, but the legal framework needs to be refined through uniform European standards to unlock these transformative abilities without undermining the procedural rights of users. Rieländer distinguished between German pilot projects of organisational assistance systems, decision-support systems and (semi-)automated ‘case deciders’, the former two already in use, as illustrated by a tool that helps judges detect hallucinated citations in lengthy party submissions. He extended his analysis to immersive technologies (virtual, augmented and mixed reality) as new evidentiary possibilities across borders, not yet employed in most EU Member States. As a way forward, Rieländer pointed to the European Law Institute and UNIDROIT as potential drafters of a soft-law instrument to create rules on the use of AI that can set minimum standard while the digitalisation within the EU continues to move forward.

    The ensuing discussion turned to international arbitration, which in some respects has moved faster than the courts: the Dutch Arbitration Act, it was noted, already allowed for digital hearings during the COVID-19 pandemic. On the use of AI in arbitration, a consensus emerged to remain cautious: because AI can never be impartial, decision-making should not be entrusted to it. As a tool, however, it is of great value and may eventually enable arbitrators to draw on more information than any human could; provided its (confirmation) bias is overcome. Two practical constraints were added: AI will only be integrated into practice if it is simple to use, whereas practitioners currently face a difficult choice between too many confusing tools. Moreover, most Member States are too small to gather sufficient data to train large language models on their own – an observation that led back to the panel’s emphasis on common standards within a European legal framework.

    Second panel: Civil Procedure

    The second panel, moderated by Patrick Koerts (Groningen), turned to domestic civil procedure. Gralf-Peter Calliess (Bremen) traced Germany’s history of digital false starts – from a digital signature too secure ever to be affordable to the repeatedly postponed electronic case file – and remained sceptical of the online-procedure pilots introduced in December 2025 in the new Book 12 of the German Code of Civil Procedure: digitalisation, he argued, requires a change of mindset from adjudication as an exercise of sovereign power (Hoheit) to adjudication as a judicial service (Dienstleistung). Pauline Ernste (Nijmegen) examined judicial fact-finding via Google and ChatGPT under Dutch procedural law: LLM-derived facts cannot qualify as facts of common knowledge, the duty to tell the truth requires parties to disclose their own use of AI, and AI literacy must be structurally embedded in legal training.

    Third panel: Criminal Procedure

    In the third panel, moderated by Glenn Thodé (Groningen), Hannah Ofterdinger (Hamburg) took stock of the digitalisation of German criminal procedure and its obstacles, concluding that the question is not whether, but how we digitalise. Dorris de Vocht (Tilburg) asked why the Netherlands treats remote hearings as a last resort and argued that the assumption that meaningful participation requires physical presence should itself be questioned: procedural fairness should not – and does not have to – depend on whether a hearing is physical or remote. Laura Peters (Groningen) presented the AIWITNESS project and the FAIR method, contending that criminal procedural principles must guide the design of AI systems from the outset She concluded that criminal procedural law is moving from ex post review to procedural design.

    Fourth panel: Administrative Procedure

    The fourth panel, moderated by Ida Varosanec (Groningen), addressed administrative procedural law. Sarah Rachut (Braunschweig) mapped Germany’s asymmetric regulation of administrative authorities and courts, presented survey evidence from the TITAN project on the use of AI within the administration, and identified a regulatory gap: fully automated administrative acts are regulated, AI-assisted decision preparation is not. Sofia Ranchordás (Tilburg/Rome) argued that the procedural safeguards of administrative law – the right to be heard, the duty to state reasons, the right of access, and judicial review – are built on the paper logic of the file, which digital transformation dissolves. She noted how discretion migrates from the decision to the design, and the task is not to retrofit, but to rethink. The following lively discussion closed on a question that hung over much of the day: what do we do with the law that was not made for digitalisation?

    Closing Session and Outlook

    The closing session opened with elevator pitches by five emerging scholars. Of most direct interest to readers of this blog, Mustafa Can (Groningen) turned to the law applicable to civil liability in EU token markets, contrasting public money with digital assets issued by private institutions. Individual proceedings are possible, but the cross-border setting creates an inherent foreign element, leading him to emphasise the importance of simplification. The remaining pitches ranged from a digital ‘zeroth instance’ for German civil proceedings and its constitutional tensions (Noelle Frick, Speyer), via automation bias and the limits of human oversight in AI-based evidence verification (Sabrina Pölle, Passau) and the missing mechanisms for reviewing the decision logic of administrative tools (Constanze Rothermel, Berlin), to algorithm-driven benefit sanctioning in Denmark and the Netherlands (Anne Spijkstra, Tilburg).

    In the plenary discussion that followed, the threads of the day converged on a recurring theme: humans in the judiciary were not perfect before AI either. The discussion cautioned against measuring machines by a standard of perfection that humans have never met. A second observation reached back to the fourth panel: the digital is built on top of a long paper trail, and digital justice inherits the logic, and the legacy, of the file.

    Viewed across the four panels, the relevant divide did not always run between Germany and the Netherlands, but frequently between fields of law: Germany’s infrastructure-first trajectory has repeatedly stumbled over its own thoroughness, while in the Netherlands the frontline questions lie further downstream: judges googling and parties submitting ChatGPT-written claims. The tension between efficiency gains and procedural guarantees returned in each panel in different ways. For private international law, it took the form of the question whether cross-border digitalisation can proceed without uniform European standards protecting the procedural rights of users – standards all the more necessary because most Member States are too small to develop trustworthy systems alone.

    How much of legal decision-making can be left to AI was answered formally (any final decisions must remain human) but not substantively. Finally, the question what we do with the law that was not made for digitalisation remained open. Perhaps the day’s most consistent answer was voiced almost identically at its beginning and its end: the electronic case file is ‘merely electrification’, a first step but not a last (Grimm). Now, the task is not to retrofit, but to rethink (Ranchordás). An edited volume with contributions by the panellists and emerging scholars, taking up these questions in greater depth, will be published by Springer in the course of 2027 under the title ‘Digitalisation of Justice: Perspectives from Germany and the Netherlands’.

    ]]>     2026-09-11T09:49:26+00:00 Susanne Gössl http://conflictoflaws.net 2026-09-11T09:49:26+00:00 Conflict of Laws     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298339 Lawfare Daily: Sept. 11, 2001, 25 Years Later The Lawfare team talks about how Sept. 11 shaped the U.S. national security apparatus and the guests...

    ]]>     The Lawfare team talks about how Sept. 11 shaped the U.S. national security apparatus and the guests’ careers. 

    ]]>     2026-09-11T11:00:06+00:00 Katherine Pompilio, Julia Curlee, Michael Feinberg, Natalie Orpett, Loren Voss, Benjamin Wittes https://www.lawfaremedia.org/resources/lawfare-news 2026-09-11T11:00:06+00:00 Lawfare - Hard National Security Choices     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298340 Homeland Security 25 Years Later: Time to Rethink and Rebuild? The DHS constructed by Congress in 2002 is now outdated, reviled by many, and was flawed from the st...

    ]]>     The DHS constructed by Congress in 2002 is now outdated, reviled by many, and was flawed from the start. Time to rethink and rebuild.

    ]]>     2026-09-11T08:55:14+00:00 Jeh Johnson https://www.lawfaremedia.org/resources/lawfare-news 2026-09-11T08:55:14+00:00 Lawfare - Hard National Security Choices     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298341 The Changing Face of the Department of Homeland Security From hunting al-Qaeda to hunting immigrants.

    ]]>     From hunting al-Qaeda to hunting immigrants.

    ]]>     2026-09-11T08:55:12+00:00 Paul Rosenzweig https://www.lawfaremedia.org/resources/lawfare-news 2026-09-11T08:55:12+00:00 Lawfare - Hard National Security Choices     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298342 Justice in the 9/11 Case is Long Overdue Political decisions across five administrations have paralyzed the 9/11 cases for 25 years. The Supr...

    ]]>     Political decisions across five administrations have paralyzed the 9/11 cases for 25 years. The Supreme Court can finally help deliver justice.

    ]]>     2026-09-11T08:55:12+00:00 Michel Paradis, Nick Lewin https://www.lawfaremedia.org/resources/lawfare-news 2026-09-11T08:55:12+00:00 Lawfare - Hard National Security Choices     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298343 Ordinary Origins: How 9/11 Built Today's Immigration Enforcement Machine Post-9/11 data-sharing systems built for security quietly became the infrastructure for today’...

    ]]>     Post-9/11 data-sharing systems built for security quietly became the infrastructure for today’s automated immigration enforcement.

    ]]>     2026-09-11T08:55:12+00:00 Chinmayi Sharma https://www.lawfaremedia.org/resources/lawfare-news 2026-09-11T08:55:12+00:00 Lawfare - Hard National Security Choices     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298344 The Unexpected Emergence of the EU as a U.S. Counterterrorism Partner How the U.S. and the EU built law enforcement and counterterrorism information sharing in the wake o...

    ]]>     How the U.S. and the EU built law enforcement and counterterrorism information sharing in the wake of 9/11

    ]]>     2026-09-11T08:55:12+00:00 Kenneth Propp https://www.lawfaremedia.org/resources/lawfare-news 2026-09-11T08:55:12+00:00 Lawfare - Hard National Security Choices     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298337 Bank of Italy communication reminds payment service and cryptocurrency providers to comply with EU sanctions To read this post, please log in at https://globalsanctions.com. Not a member? Join at https://glo...

    ]]>     To read this post, please log in at https://globalsanctions.com. Not a member? Join at https://globalsanctions.com/subscribe.

    ]]>     2026-09-11T10:56:52+00:00 Maya Lester KC https://globalsanctions.com/ 2026-09-11T10:56:52+00:00 Global Sanctions     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298332 ESIL IG HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL AWARDS 2025 ARTICLE PRIZE TO NICCOLO RIDI & THOMAS SCHULTZ   In April 2025, the ESIL IG History of International Law announced the inaugural edition ...

    ]]>       

    In April 2025, the ESIL IG History of International Law announced the inaugural edition of its annual article prize (link). With the prize, the ESIL IG History of International Law seeks to further its mission to promote and celebrate the history of international law as a vibrant and active (sub)field of international law scholarship.

    After careful deliberation following the procedure outlined in the Call for Nominations, the Evaluation Committee has decided to award the 2025 Article Prize to:

    Niccolò Ridi & Thomas Schultz (King's College London & University of Geneva)

    for their article published in Volume 36 (1) of the European Journal of International Law, entitled

    Distantly Reading the Recueil des Cours: Authority and Authorities in the History of the Hague Academy of International Law

    The Evaluation Committee would like to congratulate the authors on the award.

    An honourable mention goes to:

    Léon-Castellanos Jankiewicz

    for his article published in Volume 26 (2) of the Journal of the History of International Law, entitled

    A New History for Human Rights: Conflict of Laws as Adjacent Possibility

    The ESIL IG History of International Law Coordinating Committee would also like to thank its members for their active participation in the nomination process and warmly invites its members to participate again in the 2026 edition.

    List of Article Prize Recipients

    2024: Hanna Eklund (University of Copenhagen) - Peoples, Inhabitants and Workers: Colonialism in the Treaty of Rome

    2025: Niccolò Ridi & Thomas Schultz (King's College London & University of Geneva) - Distantly Reading the Recueil des Cours: Authority and Authorities in the History of the Hague Academy of International Law

    Anastasia Hammerschmied - Florenz Volkaert - Monica Garcia-Salmones - Sze Hong Lam

    Fr

    ]]>     2026-09-11T11:14:52+00:00 Florenz Volkaert http://esilhil.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-11T11:14:52+00:00 ESIL Interest Group History of International Law     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298330 Constitutional Reform in Ethiopia: Challenges, Options, and Pathways Forward –Mesenbet A. Tadeg (Ph.D.), Chrystal Visiting Assistant Professor, Grinnell College, Departme...

    ]]>     –Mesenbet A. Tadeg (Ph.D.), Chrystal Visiting Assistant Professor, Grinnell College, Department of Political Science

    Introduction

    Ethiopia is in a critical constitutional moment. The political change in 2018 and the rise of the Prosperity Party, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, have precipitated constitutional shifts in the country. The Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission (ENDC) was created in 2021 and given the mandate to resolve deep-rooted political divisions in the country and chart a viable constitutional path. While the purpose of the ENDC seems much wider, its key role will be to provide a roadmap on areas of consensus for constitutional reform.

    The idea of constitutional reform started early during the transition period in 2019. A national committee, largely composed of independent researchers representing different political views, was loosely formed under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice. The committee held a series of consultations on the key features of the reform, including the potential restructuring of the current 1995 ethnic federal constitution. The committee’s deliberations and resources were supposed to serve as inputs for constitutional reform, but its mandate ended with no meaningful output.

    As the ENDC continues its final phase of deliberations, speculation remains over what key issues a new Constitution of Ethiopia will address. The Commission has tried to galvanize public support through grassroots community dialogues and discussions with political parties, civil society organizations, academics, and several other groups. However, the exclusion of key political actors—including armed groups and influential opposition parties—has raised serious questions over its credibility. The proposed ideas for constitutional reform considered briefly in this article are based on the preliminary deliberations of the ENDC and my observations of the ongoing political debates in Ethiopia.

    1. Modifying the Ethnic Federal State Arrangement

    The 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia represents one of the final constitutional frameworks influenced by the post-Soviet era. Emerging after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it was heavily shaped by the Marxist-Leninist political thought of the then-ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The political architecture of the 1995 text directly reflects this ideology. Rather than opening with the standard democratic invocation of “We the people,” the preamble begins with “We the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia,” explicitly establishing these ethnic groups as the ultimate sovereigns. Consequently, the 12 regional states within the Ethiopian federation are organized along strict ethnic lines. As political scientist Francis Fukuyama has noted, while political tribalism remains an enduring organizing principle, it raises serious questions about whether such a model can effectively sustain constitutional democracy.

    It is undeniable that the current Constitution has achieved some measure of progress in fostering a multinational federal state by granting explicit recognition to linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity. However, this ethnic-based federation suffers from deep flaws. By recognizing political units almost exclusively through the lens of language, the framework undermines constitutional safeguards for minority groups, as well as political or cultural entities that do not share a single language as their defining political identity. Moreover, the entrenchment of this ethnic arrangement has grown increasingly detrimental to Ethiopia’s national unity, social cohesion, peaceful coexistence, and territorial integrity. Ethnicity has come to dominate public life, reinforcing authoritarian political practices rather than consolidating the democratic trajectory of the state.  A new Constitution of Ethiopia must address these structural challenges by allowing greater flexibility in how regional states are designated and formed, which would go a long way toward mitigating these tensions. Furthermore, the status of Addis Ababa and highly diverse regions like Dire Dawa must be accommodated within this framework and administrative arrangements that are not exclusively tied to language or ethnicity should be envisaged. Ultimate success hinges on a robust debate regarding these federal structures within the ENDC, requiring political actors across the country to compromise and build a genuine national consensus.

    2. Revising the Right to Secession

    Perhaps one of the most unique aspects of the Ethiopian Constitution is its explicit recognition of the right to secession in Article 39 of the Constitution. It provides that “every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession.” The requirements for cession are not, in fact, too cumbersome. They only require a 2/3s supermajority vote from the state council of the region requesting secession and a majority popular vote in a regional referendum. In theory, subject to the fulfillment of these conditions, any region has the right to secede from the federation.

    The text of the right to secession in the 1995 constitution is a direct extension of its Marxist-Leninist historical roots, drawing inspiration from the Soviet constitutional model. In contemporary constitutional design, such a stipulation is exceedingly rare. The danger that this unhinged right to secession poses to a fragile polity like Ethiopia is clear; it consistently undermines territorial integrity and risks the total political fragmentation of the state. Emerging comparative experiences show a distinct shift away from secession clauses, relying instead on the robust protection of individual and group rights and basic freedoms.

    A new constitution for Ethiopia should pivot toward providing constitutional guarantees that secure the rights of minority ethnic groups to practice their language and preserve their culture, without tying those rights to state dissolution. The political realities of Ethiopia’s 30-year constitutional experiment have proven that the right to secession is practically unrealizable. The more plausible approach for the new constitution should be a more pragmatic one focused on the constitutional recognition and integration of ethnic groups rather than their separation. Many democratic states grappling with deep societal diversity, such as Canada and South Africa, successfully rely on the constitutional principles of diversity, equality, and human dignity as their foundational guarantees, offering a viable blueprint for Ethiopia’s future.

    3. A New Constitutional Court for a New Constitution

    The current 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia envisages for a constitutional review process under the House of Federation, the upper house of the parliament in Ethiopia. Unlike the lower house, the House of Peoples Representatives, which has legislative powers, the upper house has the power to interpret the constitution and invalidate unconstitutional laws. But for many Constitutional lawyers in Ethiopia, the House of Federation is seen as a political organ established for solely political purposes of managing and resolving disputes among the federal units. Its structure and functions are inaccessible and completely different from a constitutional court. A new constitution that formally embraces a constitutional court will go a long way in making constitutional protections accessible for human rights litigation and ensuring the basic and fundamental rights of individuals and groups.  While the Current Supreme Court of Ethiopia does have the expertise and experience required to do the job, the fact that the Court is already overwhelmed by several cases that do not involve constitutional issues makes the prospect of a new Constitutional Court more plausible.

    4. Explicit Recognition of Justiciable Human Rights

    One of the positive aspects and manifestations of the current Constitution of Ethiopia is its generous provision of human rights. A significant portion of the Constitution (1/3) covers the protection of fundamental human rights. But the actual application of these rights in the domestic courts of Ethiopia has been a major challenge. One of the key challenges to the justiciability of human rights in the Constitution is the lack of clear constitutional clause to this effect in the Constitution. Moreover, the fact that the Constitution mandates the House of Federation with the power to interpret the Constitution has undermined the inherent power of ordinary courts for judicial review. The practice of courts in this regard, including in strategic human rights litigation cases, shows that a lack of clear mandate to the courts to adjudicate human rights provisions in the Constitution has made the judicial review power of courts ambiguous and unpredictable. The new Constitution of Ethiopia should address this by providing a clear constitutional mandate for courts to adjudicate disputes involving human rights issues. This will have the potential to consolidate the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.

    5. Reforming Land Ownership

    Article 40 of the Constitution of Ethiopia places land under public ownership of the state. This is also another manifestation of the leftist feature of the current Constitution. The issue of land ownership has been a thorny issue in Ethiopia that has triggered a significant amount of debate. But questions remain if this is a viable path for a constitutional democratic republic that aspires to protect private property and basic economic freedoms of individuals.  Critics also argue that the current public ownership of land has created deeper land use fairness and mismanagement issues that fuels corrupt practices by state officials. This has become rampant in many regions in the country, especially in the capital, Addis Ababa. Moreover, it is believed that the lack of productivity in the agricultural sector has been attributed to the inherent flaws of the lack of land ownership that disincentivizes local farmers to produce.  While the economic virtue of private ownership of land is something that needs to be debated, a constitutional reform should envision the possibility of private ownership of land either through a referendum or some form of direct participation of the public.

    6. Introducing a Presidential System

    Recent reports have indicated that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is in favor of a Presidential system of government rather than the parliamentary system of government that the current constitution envisages.  It is unclear what the objective of adopting a new Constitution with a presidential system as opposed to a parliamentary system of government would achieve for the consolidation of constitutional democracy in Ethiopia. One of the issues that was often raised is the need to have more direct access for citizens to elect the head of government, which may mitigate the highly party-oriented and ethncized political landscape in Ethiopia. Another issue that could have more significance is the idea of providing term limits, which is more often associated with the Presidential system of government. The downside of this prospect of a presidential system under the new Constitution is the fear that more concentration of power on the executive could be counterproductive to the prospect of the consolidation of constitutional democracy in the country. Any prospect of a new constitution in Ethiopia should anticipate and balance these constitutional outcomes.

    To conclude, the political outcome of the national dialogue process, with all is limits, can provide a significant constitutional foundation for Ethiopia’s democratic trajectory. But it can do so when there is a political will to address the pitfalls of the leftist ideological roots of the Constitution and integrate basic and fundamental principles of a constitutional democracy. Ethiopia should seize this constitutional moment to lay down solid foundation for upholding fundamental human rights and basic democratic principles.

    Suggested citation: Mesenbet A. Tadeg, Constitutional Reform in Ethiopia: Challenges, Options, and Pathways Forward, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Sept. 11, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/constitutional-reform-in-ethiopia-challenges-options-and-pathways-forward/

    The post Constitutional Reform in Ethiopia: Challenges, Options, and Pathways Forward appeared first on www.iconnectblog.com.

    ]]>     2026-09-11T06:00:00+00:00 I•CONnect https://www.iconnectblog.com 2026-09-11T06:00:00+00:00 I·CONnect     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298329 BOOK REVIEW: James J. SHEEHAN, Shifting sovereignties: a global history of a concept in practice, by Moritz Mihatsch and Michael Mulligan [Berlin and Boston: Walther de Gruyter, 2025]; Sovereignty: European and global histories, 1400-1800, by Cornel Zwierlein and Daniel Lee [Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2025] (Comparative Legal History, XIV (2026), nr. 1 (June), pp. 140-145) (image source: Taylor&Francis)On June 28, 2004, during a meeting of the NATO alliance in Istanbu...

    ]]>
    (image source: Taylor&Francis)

    On June 28, 2004, during a meeting of the NATO alliance in Istanbul, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice slipped the following handwritten note to President George W Bush: 'Iraq is sovereign. Letter was passed from Bremer, 10.26 am Iraq time. Condi.' The president replied by writing in bold letters, 'Let Freedom Reign.' In retrospect, this exchange is one more example of the false hopes and genuine disappointments that attended the United States' misadventure in Iraq. It also shows just how elusive the concept of sovereignty turns out to be. After all, what could sovereignty possibly mean for Iraq in 2004, a state occupied by foreign troops and without a government that could control most of its divided and contested territory?  

    For more than a century, scholars have complained about the concept of sovereignty. Some thought it would eventually collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. In 1919, for example, Harold Laski wrote that 'when we examine the historic perspective of sovereignty, it becomes sufficiently obvious that its association with the modern state is no more than the expression of a particular environment which is already passing away.' Eight decades later, Hans Lindahl remarked that 'while not yet completely routed, the concept of sovereignty certainly seems on the retreat. Sovereignty, of course, has not passed away. Some observers remain convinced that it should. Jacques Maritain, for example, insisted in 1950 that political philosophy must eliminate sovereignty both as a word and as a concept.' More recently, in a book appropriately entitled Sovereignty RIP, legal scholar Don Herzog provided what might be called a […]


    To read the full review, please click here. Online access is free for members of the European Society for Comparative Legal History.


    DOI: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2049677X.2026.2648456

    ]]>     2026-09-11T07:46:30+00:00 Fuad-Meša Čičić http://esclh.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-11T07:46:30+00:00 EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298328 BOOK: Maximilian MAYER, Die Südseeblase und der Bubble Act aus dem Jahr 1720 als Beginn einer gesellschaftsrechtlichen und kapitalmarktrechtlichen Regulierung [Schriften zur Rechtsgeschichte; 236] (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2026), 256 p., ISBN ISBN 978-3-428-19764-4  ABOUT THE BOOK:Spekulationsblasen sind seit Jahrhunderten ein fester Bestandteil der Wirtscha...

    ]]>     Cover: Die Südseeblase und der Bubble Act aus dem Jahr 1720 als Beginn einer gesellschaftsrechtlichen und kapitalmarktrechtlichen Regulierung 

    ABOUT THE BOOK:

    Spekulationsblasen sind seit Jahrhunderten ein fester Bestandteil der Wirtschafts- und Finanzgeschichte. Beginnend mit der Tulpenblase über die Südseeblase und den Gründerkrach bis hin zur Dotcom- und Kryptoblase lassen sich immer wieder vergleichbare Marktphasen erkennen. Die Südseeblase sticht hierbei besonders hervor, steht jedoch bis heute – zu Unrecht, wie die vorliegende Arbeit darlegt – sowohl in der Wissenschaft als auch in der breiten Öffentlichkeit im Schatten der bekannteren Tulpenblase. Die Südseeblase stellt nicht nur ein einschneidendes Ereignis für die gesellschaftsrechtliche und kapitalmarktrechtliche Entwicklung in Großbritannien dar, sondern ist auch ein Paradebeispiel für die Gier und menschliche Psychologie im Wirtschaftssystem. Daneben lässt sich an der Südseeblase in beeindruckender Weise die politische Lage der damaligen Zeit sowie die Herausforderungen der noch jungen parlamentarischen Monarchie nachzeichnen – es verwundert insoweit nicht, dass mit Robert Walpole der erste Premierminister Großbritanniens aus der Südseeblase hervorgegangen ist. Die vorliegende Arbeit versucht dabei die Vorgänge um die Südseeblase in einen juristischen, aber auch interdisziplinären Kontext zu setzen, ohne dabei aktuelle Bezüge – die es reichlich gibt – zu vernachlässigen.

    TABLE OF CONTENT:

    1. Einleitung

    2. Definition und interdisziplinäre Betrachtung von Spekulationsblasen

    3. Die wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen als Wegbereiter der Südseeblase

    4. Englisches Kapitalgesellschaftsrecht und Kapitalmarktrecht vor der Südseeblase

    5. Die Südseegesellschaft und ihre Blase

    6. Gesellschaftsrechtliche Regulierung durch den Bubble Act 1720

    7. Kapitalmarktrecht während und nach der Südseeblase

    8. Langfristige gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Folgen der Südseeblase

    9. Fazit

    Find more here. 

    ]]>     2026-09-11T07:00:00+00:00 Michael Reichenthaler http://esclh.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-11T07:00:00+00:00 EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298327 Murphy on Lay Legal Advocates in the Farm Crisis Ellen Murphy, Wake Forest University School of Law, has posted Farm Advocates: Unearthing an Access ...

    ]]>     Ellen Murphy, Wake Forest University School of Law, has posted Farm Advocates: Unearthing an Access to Justice Success Story, which is forthcoming in the Nebraska Law Review: 

    This is the untold story of a grassroots group of lay legal advocates who – in defiance of unauthorized practice of law restrictions – provided legal assistance to countless farmers and farm families during the 1980s Farm Crisis. The Farm Crisis followed a period of unprecedented prosperity in farm country. But when the boom ended, many farmers were saddled with unmanageable debt. Farm country and much of rural America faced catastrophic loss of people, community, and institutions. Pressured by class actions against government lending agencies, Congress (eventually) responded with statutory relief for the farmers. However, obtaining the relief was legally complex and, as remains true today, farm country faced a simultaneous crisis: access to justice. Farmers needed legal assistance, but lawyers were scarce, cost-prohibitive, and unfamiliar with agriculture’s legal complexities and cultural norms. The farm advocates stepped up to provide the legal services that farmers needed.

    These self-organized groups of neighbors helping neighbors morphed into a sophisticated system of legal service providers who were trained and supported – but not supervised – by legal service agencies and nonprofits. Some states, like Minnesota, funded farm advocate programs. The advocates, operating in plain sight, counseled, advised, and assisted distressed farmers and farm families in exercising their legal rights. The farm advocates were not lawyers but nevertheless, they engaged in the practice of law. And they did so without evidence of harm and without drawing the ire of the bench and bar.

    The farm advocates’ legal work saved countless farms and restored hope to rural communities. Analyzing hundreds of pages of training materials and oral histories, this article unearths their contribution to access to justice. The farm advocates were a small but mighty force in the history of access to justice. Their story challenges the foundational premise of lawyer regulation: that legal services can be competently provided only by lawyers and that law practice by unlicensed practitioners invariably harms the public. The farm advocates' story shows, to the contrary, that legal services can thrive outside of the lawyer monopoly, and that strict enforcement of unauthorized practice of law restrictions can deprive people of help that is essential to their lives and livelihoods.
    --Dan Ernst

    ]]>     2026-09-11T04:30:00+00:00 ernst http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-11T04:30:00+00:00 Legal History Blog     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298318 Der andere 11. September: Pinochets Putsch in Chile 1973 (mit Erhard Stackl) von der Monroe- zur Donroe-Doktrin Am 11. September denken die meisten an die Terroranschlä...

    ]]>     von der Monroe- zur Donroe-Doktrin

    Am 11. September denken die meisten an die Terroranschläge 2001. An diesem Datum kam es aber auch zu einem anderen weltpolitischen Ereignis, das bis heute nachwirkt: Dem von den USA unterstützen Putsch der Regierung von Salvador Allende, der Beginn einer 16 Jahre andauernden Diktatur unter Augusto Pinochet. Ich habe diesen Jahrestag zum Anlass genommen, um mit dem Journalisten Erhard Stackl, der sich schon lange mit Chile befasst, über den Putsch, seine Auswirkungen und auch die aktuelle Lage in Lateinamerika zu sprechen.

    Quellen/Links:

    Zitate:

    ]]>     2026-09-11T04:00:00+00:00 Ralph Janik https://www.ralphjanik.com/ 2026-09-11T04:00:00+00:00 Recht politisch     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298317 Civil Justice Conversations – starting 11 September Following an

    ]]>     Following an earlier call on this blog, the Civil Justice Conversations Series organised by the European Civil Justice Centre will kick off on 11 September at 10 am CEST. At this first session Benedikt Schmitz (Assistant Professor of Private International Law and Comparative Contract Law, University of Groningen) will present on ‘ Cross-Border Disputes Under the Revised Consumer ADR Directive: A Renaissance?’. After initial comments by discussant Emma van Gelder (Assistant Professor of Private Law at Utrecht University), the floor is open for discussion and exchange.

    Registration link available here.

    Further information on the series is available here: Civil Justice Conversations Planning

    ]]>     2026-09-10T22:15:21+00:00 Xandra Kramer http://conflictoflaws.net 2026-09-10T22:15:21+00:00 Conflict of Laws     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-11:/298316 Vincent Gautrais, «Usages», dans Vincent Gautrais (dir.), Dictionnaire de la norme: formaliser l'informel, (2024) 29-3 Lex electronica 1-23 (août 2026).  [1] Plan. Dans la mesure où notre propos tend à se centrer sur cette quête définitionnelle, nos nomb...

    ]]>     [1] Plan. Dans la mesure où notre propos tend à se centrer sur cette quête définitionnelle, nos nombreuses lectures, issues de différentes disciplines juridiques et provenant de plusieurs juridictions, à plusieurs époques, nous permettent de dégager trois grandes questions autour de la notion d’usage. En premier lieu, nous nous devons de faire mention d’un état des lieux où cette notion, pourtant essentielle, a toujours pâti d’une complexité d’analyse, que ce soit dans la doctrine ou la jurisprudence. En deuxième lieu, cette indéfinition s’est traduite sur le plan plus conceptuel, plus théorique, dans la difficulté à déterminer la force obligatoire des usages, oscillant entre contrat et norme. En troisième lieu, et de façon plus pratique cette fois, il est étonnant de constater certaines carences à identifier les critères de reconnaissance des usages. Trois points donc : le premier tient lieu du constat chagrin de ces variantes multiples de perspectives. Les deux suivants sont davantage un choix éditorial de deux questionnements centraux qui demandent à être appréhendés.

     

    ]]>     2026-09-10T22:22:37+00:00 Vincent Gautrais https://www.gautrais.com 2026-09-10T22:22:37+00:00 Vincent Gautrais     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298147 L’archéologie au-delà des frontières: Sur les pas de Nathalie Buchez L’archéologie au-delà des frontières: Sur les pas de Nathalie Buchezédité par Jade Bajeot,...

    ]]>     L’archéologie au-delà des frontières: Sur les pas de Nathalie Buchez
    édité par Jade Bajeot, Samuel Guérin, Mathilde Minotti
    Accès à la publication L’archéologie au-delà des frontières. Sur les pas de Nathalie Buchez, édité par Jade Bajeot, Samuel Guérin, Mathilde Minotti 

    Les Mélanges offerts à Nathalie Buchez par ses collègues et amis réunissent dix-huit contributions dans lesquelles trente-sept auteurs abordent trois grandes thématiques développées par Nathalie au cours de sa carrière d’archéologue et céramologue d’abord à l’AFAN, puis à l’Inrap.

    Ainsi, la première nous amène dans le quart nord-est de la France (Hauts-de-France et Île-de-France) jusqu’en Belgique pour aborder la Protohistoire ancienne à travers sa céramique et ses rites funéraires. La seconde nous transporte de l’autre côté de la Méditerranée : du Soudan à l’Égypte, du Néolithique à l’époque Prédynastique et, dans une moindre mesure, aux premières dynasties pharaoniques. Il est question d’architecture et de structures en terre crue, de modes de subsistance, de contextes funéraires, de lamelles en silex et une nouvelle fois de céramique.

    Enfin, la céramique dans tous ses états et comme fil rouge dans cet ouvrage revient dans l’ultime thématique, à savoir les méthodes appliquées en archéologie. Sont alors abordés la technologie céramique, l’usage de la photogrammétrie, ou encore l’archéologie de l’apparence à l’époque pré-pharaonique.

    DANA_14
    Livre
    Posté le 15/12/2025
    EAN html : 9782356136633
    ISBN html : 978-2-35613-663-3
    ISBN pdf : 978-2-35613-664-0
    ISSN : 2741-1508
    292 p.
    Code CLIL : 4117; 3494;
    licence CC by SA
    Licence ouverte Etalab
    1• Introduction : une archéologue sans frontières ?
    Jade Bajeot, Samuel Guérin, Mathilde Minotti
    Marges septentrionales :
    à l’ère du Bronze
    2• Préface
    Pascal Depaepe
    3• Préface
    Richard Rougier
    4• Cul par-dessus tête : les urnes retournées de l’âge du Bronze dans les Hauts-de-France
    Emmanuelle Leroy-Langelin, Ghislaine Billand, Alain Henton,
    Marie Lebrun, Isabelle Le Goff, Yann Lorin, Marc Talon
    5• Fields of fire : la nécropole de l’âge du Bronze de Bussy-Saint-Georges (Seine-et-Marne)
    dans un contexte archéologique renouvelé
    Rebecca Peake, Valérie Delattre, Claude Mordant
    6• Un bilan de la céramique du Bronze ancien et moyen en Belgique
    Guy De Mulder
    7• Au temps du pharaon bâtisseur, Ramsès II ! L’Europe barbare du XIIIe s. a.C.
    Emmanuelle Leroy-Langelin, Cyril Marcigny, Vincent Riquier
    Marges méridionales :
    de l’ère prédynastique aux temps pharaoniques
    8• Préface
    Béatrix Midant-Reynes
    9• Si “la Femme couve tous les feux, pour que d’autres en vivent” (K. Chakor),
    que nous apportent les structures de combustion prédynastiques de Tell el-Iswid (Égypte) ?
    Samuel Guérin
    10• Le site Néolithique de Kadruka en Haute Nubie. Résultats des analyses paléobotaniques
    dans les sépultures et l’habitat
    Aline Emery-Barbier
    11• Continuity of the Early Dynastic and Old Kingdom plant economy in Egypt?
    A comparison of the archaeobotanical assemblages of Tell el-Iswid, Deir el-Bersha and el-Sheikh Sa’id/Wādī Zabayda
    Elena Marinova, Sidonie Preiss, Bart Vanthuyne, Marleen De Meyer,
    Lucia Kuijper, Harco Willems
    12• Some thoughts on an abandoned early Naqada III household
    on the Eastern Kom at Tell el-Farkha
    Marek Chłodnicki, Agnieszka Mączyńska
    13• Intentional perforation and the “killing” of pots in the predynastic settlement of Maadi
    Rita Hartmann
    14• Return to Nag el-Qarmila and Lower Nubia for some considerations
    about Early Predynastic chronology
    Jade Bajeot, Maria Carmela Gatto
    15• The Italian Archaeological Mission (M.A.I.) at Hemamieh (1905):
    a preliminary re-contextualisation of past excavations
    Federica Ugliano
    16• Les lamelles des sables d’Adaïma.
    Si vous passez par Tell el-Iswid, rapportez-moi des lamelles !
    Béatrix Midant-Reynes, François Briois
    17• Child burials at Turah in the Late Predynastic and Early Dynastic Period
    Vera Müller
    18• Possible interpretations of non-anatomical graves from Tell el-Farkha.
    Are they examples of deviant burials?
    Joanna Dębowska-Ludwin
    19• Entre contrainte et violence : thèmes abstraits et stratégies de représentation
    du pouvoir dans l’iconographie nagadienne
    Julie Villaeys Le Galic
    Questions de méthode
    20• Des céramiques et des céramologues : quelle place pour l’approche technologique
    des assemblages céramiques en contexte d’archéologie préventive ?
    Émilie Louesdon
    21• Archaeology of appearance in pre pharaonic period in Egypt.
    Method at the boundaries of disciplines
    Mathilde Minotti
    22• Introduction de la photogrammétrie sur la fouille de Tell el-Iswid
    Rachid El hajaoui
    23• Conclusion
    Jade Bajeot, Samuel Guérin, Mathilde Minotti
    24• Bibliographie de Nathalie Buchez

     


     



     
    ]]>     2026-09-10T19:11:02+00:00 Chuck Jones http://ancientworldonline.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-10T19:11:02+00:00 The Ancient World Online: Law     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298148 Épidémies antiques en Méditerranée et au-delà Épidémies antiques en Méditerranée et au-delàsous la direction de Dominique Castex, Nicolas Lau...

    ]]>     Épidémies antiques en Méditerranée et au-delà
    sous la direction de Dominique Castex, Nicolas Laubry, Benoît Rossignol
    Accès à l'ouvrage Epidémies antiques en Méditerranée et au-delà 

    Cet ouvrage rassemble des textes dédiés aux épidémies anciennes en Europe et en Méditerranée. Rédigés par un groupe international de chercheurs, ils illustrent l’ensemble des disciplines aujourd’hui impliquées dans l’histoire des maladies infectieuses, c’est-à-dire à l’interface d’une part, des sciences humaines et sociales, telles l’histoire et l’archéologie, et d’autre part, de la biologie. L’ouvrage souligne d’abord la contribution devenue essentielle de l’archéologie dans la reconstruction de l’histoire ancienne des maladies pestilentielles et de leurs répercussions sociales et culturelles, tout en faisant le point sur certains aspects de la paléopathologie et sur les analyses de paléobiochimie concernant la détection des agents pathogènes.

    Plusieurs études posent en outre les jalons d’un corpus historique des crises épidémiques antiques en se fondant sur différents types de sources (textes littéraires, écrits médicaux et juridiques, documentation papyrologique etc.) et offrant ainsi la possibilité d’esquisser un bilan chronologique. Enfin certaines contributions offrent des études ciblées permettant de faire le point sur nos connaissances et de retrouver la perception, la conception et la narration des faits épidémiques anciens dans toute leur diversité. Outre les grandes épidémies (antonine, de Cyprien et de Justinien), une attention particulière a été portée à des épisodes moins connus relevant de la littérature historique, d’ouvrages savants, de la poésie et de la philosophie. L’ouvrage s’inscrit dans le cadre d’un programme ANR « Pestes et sociétés humaines : émergence, évolution et transformations bio-culturelles (PSCHEET) ».

     

    Primalun@_26
    Pessac
    Livre
    EAN html : 9782356134455
    ISBN html : 978-2-35613-445-5
    ISBN pdf : 978-2-35613-447-9
    Volume : 26
    ISSN : 2741-1818
    Posté le 27/02/2026
    436 p.
    Code CLIL : 3112; 4117;
    licence CC by SA
    Licence ouverte Etalab
    1• Aux sources des épidémies antiques : une approche interdisciplinaire et ses enjeux,
    par Dominique Castex, Nicolas Laubry, Benoît Rossignol
    2• De quoi la “peste” dite antonine est-elle le nom ? Épidémie, endémie, pandémie et pestilence dans la littérature médicale antique,
    par Véronique Boudon-Millot
    3• Les références à des maladies pestilentielles dans la documentation papyrologique grecque de l’Égypte romaine et byzantine,
    par Antonio Ricciardetto
    4• Le silence des médecins anciens face à l’éléphantiasis et à l’hydrophobie : les maladies émergentes dans le discours médical ancien,
    par Divna Stevanović-Soleil
    5• La patocenosi nella Roma antica: un percorso medico integrato,
    da Paola Catalano, Marco Cilione, Flavio de Angelis, Valentina Gazzaniga
    6• Archaeological and biological evidences for the Justinianic plague: the “garage Lux” in Alexandria?,
    by Lauriane Lequette, Pascal Sellier, Marie-Dominique Nenna, Dominique Castex
    7• À qui profite l’épidémie ? Maladies pestilentielles et crimes de poison dans la Rome républicaine,
    par Diane Ruiz-Moiret 
    8• L’amour est-il une maladie contagieuse ? Le savoir médical du romancier Héliodore d’Émèse d’après Les Éthiopiques 3.7.1-3.8.2,
    par Sophie Lalanne
    9• Les réactions religieuses chrétiennes à la peste de Justinien,
    par Claire Sotinel
    10• Dépôts de restes humains au sein du sanctuaire antique de Saint-Martin-au-Val à Chartres : unicum du IIIe siècle p.C. ?,
    par Géraldine Sachau-Carcel, Stéphane Hérouin, Bruno Bazin, Dominique Castex
    11• Paléopathologie des maladies infectieuses chroniques dans l’Antiquité : lèpre, phtisie et autres affections au long cours dans l’enregistrement ostéo-archéologique,
    par Sacha Kacki, Yann Ardagna
    12• Six pattes sous terre : contribution de l’archéoentomologie à l’étude des sépultures multiples de la catacombe romaine des saints Pierre et Marcellin (Rome, fin Ier-IIIe s.),
    par Jean-Bernard Huchet, Dominique Castex
    13• “Hélas, hélas ! Un mal puissant envahit la Terre”. L’apport de la documentation oraculaire à l’étude des épidémies anciennes,
    par Kevin Bouillot
    14• The study of the Antonine Plague and other Roman pandemics between traditional sources and the natural sciences,
    by Christer Bruun
    15• L’épidémie annuelle dans l’Égypte ancienne,
    par Thierry Bardinet
    16• Entre Néron et les Flaviens : les pestilences à Rome et dans l’Empire,
    par Benoît Rossignol
    17• Imaginaires de la maladie, de la contagion et du soin dans le judaïsme ancien,
    par David Hamidović
    18• Entre la peste et nous. Postface,
    par Patrick Boucheron


     

     
    ]]>     2026-09-10T19:05:20+00:00 Chuck Jones http://ancientworldonline.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-10T19:05:20+00:00 The Ancient World Online: Law     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298149 Travail et labeur dans l’Antiquité grecque et romaine Travail et labeur dans l’Antiquité grecque et romainesous la direction de Maria Cecilia D'Ercol...

    ]]>     Travail et labeur dans l’Antiquité grecque et romaine
    sous la direction de Maria Cecilia D'Ercole
     accès au pdf de l'ouvrage Travail et labeur dans l'Antiquité grecque et romaine

    Pourquoi revenir parler aujourd’hui de “travail” dans les sociétés anciennes, au prix d’un certain anachronisme ? Tout d’abord, parce que la notion de travail demeure un outil heuristique toujours stimulant et essentiel pour retracer, sur les temps longs, les lignes de force économiques, sociales et symboliques, agissant dans les mondes anciens. Ensuite, parce que cet intérêt répond aux mutations profondes de notre époque et à l’exigence réflexive de l’historien qui ne saurait jamais faire abstraction du présent. Face aux changements soudains et sans doute irréversibles des innovations contemporaines, la réflexion sur les sociétés anciennes, grecques et romaines, avec leur “étrange familiarité”, dévoile nos propres trajectoires et peut éclairer non seulement des aspects essentiels du passé, mais aussi de notre présent. À partir de différentes thématiques et approches, les essais réunis dans ce volume visent à apporter leur contribution au débat en cours. 

     
    PrimaLun@37
    Pessac
    Livre
    EAN html : 9782356136732
    ISBN html : 978-2-35613-673-2
    ISBN pdf : 978-2-35613-674-9
    Volume : 37
    ISSN : 2741-1818
    Posté le 20/02/2026
    180 p.
    Code CLIL : 3377; 3385;
    licence CC by SA
    Licence ouverte Etalab
    1. Le travail des Anciens, en guise d’introduction
    Définitions, statuts
    1. Le travail et la cité grecque : essai d’une histoire
    2. Statuts personnels, mise au travail et contrôle de la main-d’œuvre en Méditerranée hellénistique
    3. Le travail, la terre et le temps. Quelques observations sur les formes du droit entre l’Antiquité et le Moyen Âge
    Espaces, temps, liens sociaux
    1. Le travail libre dans les sociétés anciennes : nouvelles observations
    2. Travailleurs et commanditaires sur les chantiers de construction en Grèce classique et hellénistique
    3. Les associations ‘’professionnelles” à Rome : panorama historiographique et problématiques actuelles
    Les transformations du travail
    1. Les développements de la technologie antique : le cas romain
    2. Le travail des Anciens et des Modernes


    ]]>     2026-09-10T19:01:40+00:00 Chuck Jones http://ancientworldonline.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-10T19:01:40+00:00 The Ancient World Online: Law     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298150 Territoires multiples: Espaces, définitions, expériences dans le monde grec : VIIe-Ier siècle a.C. Territoires multiples: Espaces, définitions, expériences dans le monde grec : VIIe-Ier siècle a.C. ...

    ]]>     Territoires multiples: Espaces, définitions, expériences dans le monde grec : VIIe-Ier siècle a.C.
    Accès à la publication Territoires multiples. Espaces, définitions, expériences dans le monde grec : VIIe-Ier siècle av. J.-C. (TeMAES I) 

    TeMAES I

    Ce volume propose une première réflexion exploratoire sur les principes et les enjeux du projet TeMAES (Territoire multiples : agentivité et environnements socio-économiques). Pour étudier les territoires antiques on se fonde ici sur une démarche qui met l’accent sur deux aspects, l’un géographique et l’autre social. Ils constituent les principaux axes de recherche pour cerner l’évolution de l’espace urbain et de la topographie d’une cité ou d’un réseau de cités, les relations avec le territoire ainsi que le paysage social.
    La réflexion proposée se nourrit de l’expérience d’une démarche résolument intra- et interdisciplinaire, mobilisant différents types de sources pour aborder les dimensions politique, juridique, économique d’un territoire et ses interconnexions. 
    Nemesis_5
    Pessac
    Livre
    EAN html : 9782356136602
    ISBN html : 978-2-35613-660-2
    ISBN pdf : 978-2-35613-661-9
    Volume : 5
    ISSN : 3040-3065
    Posté le 24/06/2026
    163 p.
    Code CLIL : 4117
    licence CC by SA
    Licence ouverte Etalab

     

     
  • Pour l’étude des territoires multiples : les enjeux d’une approche interdisciplinaire et multiscalaire
  • Grenzen Denken. Zu Grenzkonzeptionen in der (Gedanken-)Welt griechischer Philosophen
  • Lo spazio dei porti nella Grecia arcaica e classica: definizioni e realtà
  • Protezioni legali sulla terra nelle clausole di accesso alla cittadinanza: osservazioni preliminari
  • Thyrea(i) and Thyreatis. The alternating centrality of a contested border zone and its settlements
  • I toponimi nello studio del territorio antico: il caso del demo attico di Halai Aixonides
  • Polis et chôra à Cos : territoires pluriels et pluralité de la dénomination du territoire civique
  • La définition du territoire à travers les lieux de culte : le système des Athénaia dans la Campanie du Sud
  • L’exploitation des terres de la chôra de Crotone et l’implication politique des Pythagoriciens
  • Where is ancient Lucania? On the difficulties of naming and researching the mountainous inland of south Italy: An archaeological perspective
  • Conclusioni/Final Remarks/Épilogue


    • ]]>     2026-09-10T18:57:59+00:00 Chuck Jones http://ancientworldonline.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-10T18:57:59+00:00 The Ancient World Online: Law     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298146 Assessing the Legal Bases for the Defense Department’s Equity Stakes The Pentagon has taken equity stakes in key suppliers without ever stating a legal basis—and i...

    ]]>     The Pentagon has taken equity stakes in key suppliers without ever stating a legal basis—and its likely justifications don’t hold up.

    ]]>     2026-09-10T18:19:57+00:00 Benjamin Press https://www.lawfaremedia.org/resources/lawfare-news 2026-09-10T18:19:57+00:00 Lawfare - Hard National Security Choices     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298145 In Legal Terms: In the News 2026 We like to schedule an “In the News” episode every so often so Liz can get her questions answered. H...

    ]]>


    We like to schedule an “In the News” episode every so often so Liz can get her questions answered. Have you listened to the news or read a phrase and wondered – “what’s that about”? Liz will get her questions answered and so will listeners from our guest: attorney Francis Springer from Springer Law Firm.


    Do you think it’s too early to start thinking about the next election? Voting starts in eleven days. Absentee voting begins Monday, September 21st. Monday, October 5th is the voter registration deadline. Absentee ballots that are returned by mail must be postmarked on or before election day: November 3rd 2026.

    According to NPR as heard on our station this morning:

    At the Republican midterm convention in Dallas, President Trump made a stunning and implausible pledge: to send every American adult a $5,000 cash dividend. But only if his party maintains control of the House and the Senate in November's midterms. . . .

    Quick math puts the bill for this proposed "dividend" at more than $1 trillion. Plus, it's illegal to pay or be paid to influence voting.


    Francis was an inspiration for a segment of our show! One day on social media, Francis mentioned: the Posse Commitatus Act. Liz had no idea what that was. No clue. So, we started: Legal Terms on In Legal Terms. And we made a little YouTube short when Francis was on the show when we talked about “what’s in the news” That is the most watched short video on MPB’s YouTube Channel.


    In Legal Terms, the show where we break down the law, explain how it works, and help make it a little less intimidating for everyday Mississippians is hosted by attorney Adam Kilgore (usually). legalterms@mbponline.org


    If you enjoyed listening to this podcast, please consider contributing to MPB: https://donate.mpbfoundation.org/mspb/podcast


    You can listen LIVE to us from the MPB Public Media app or from MPBonline.org/radio


    Thursdays, following our over-the-air broadcast, you can hear Next Stop Mississippi on MPB Think Radio at 4pm Central.

    Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

    ]]>     2026-09-10T21:49:56+00:00 http://inlegalterms.mpbonline.org 2026-09-10T21:49:56+00:00 In Legal Terms     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298144 Federal Circuit Leaves Untouched Its Unjust Enrichment Holding in Versata v. Ford Last May, I published a post on Versata Software, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., a case in which a panel of ...

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    Last May, I published a post on Versata Software, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., a case in which a panel of the Federal Circuit held that, under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) and the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act, a plaintiff is entitled to recover “unjust enrichment” damages as a matter of statutory right.  The panel issued a modified opinion today, though only in respect of correcting its previous statement that Ford did not “claim” that certain costs should have been deducted from the breach of contract damages the plaintiff also sought (see p.15).  The holdings with regard to trade secret law therefore remain intact, in particular the panel’s conclusion that unjust enrichment is a remedy available at the plaintiff’s option (a position that, as noted in my previous post, some other courts have endorsed, while others have rejected it); and that an unjust enrichment award can exceed the royalty the parties would have negotiated, based on their licensing history.  (Compare this with the outcome of the recent Lucent v. Astronics case in the U.K., as discussed here.)  For now, I remain somewhat skeptical that disgorgement of profits or avoided costs should be available as a matter of course in trade secret litigation, but I am still thinking through the issues in anticipation of writing a paper on trade secret remedies sometime next year.  I'll just note, as I did in May, that U.S. courts are somewhat divided on the relevant issues, and that approaches to unjust enrichment outside the U.S. also reflect a range of perspectives.

    ]]>     2026-09-10T21:54:29+00:00 Thomas Cotter http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-10T21:54:29+00:00 Comparative Patent Remedies     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298142 Correcting the Map, as We Must, and Yet Still “A fair world begins with a fair map”. This is how Togo’s Foreign Minister Robert Dussey introduced ...

    ]]>     “A fair world begins with a fair map”. This is how Togo’s Foreign Minister Robert Dussey introduced the African-led “Correct the Map” Resolution (A/RES/80/297) to the General Assembly. The Resolution seeks to change the Mercator map – the world’s most widely used map – and encourages governments, schools, international organisations and technology companies to use more equal-area representations of the world instead, such as Equal Earth.  On 4 September 2026, 164 UN Member States adopted the resolution, only one voted against (guess who!).

    The resolution matters because inherited representations organise how the world becomes visible to us – a planetary “us”, the offspring of the Eurocentric modern project. Correcting the map is therefore a matter of justice: recognising and contesting inherited ways of seeing, while cultivating other ways of seeing and inhabiting a world in which those inheritances, like empire itself, refuse to disappear.

    Correcting the World

    Led by Togo on behalf of the African Group, the initiative builds on a wider African Union campaign against the persistence of a projection that systematically exaggerates the size of territories towards the poles. The effects are familiar. Europe and North America acquire a visual prominence bearing little relationship to their actual territorial dimensions. Greenland, for example, appears comparable in size to Africa – although Africa is around fourteen times larger. South America appears smaller than Europe, although it is almost twice its size.

    There are technical reasons – or rather a colonial reason – for this. Flemish cosmographer and cartographer Gerardus Mercator (1512-1594) developed his projection in 1569 for navigation. It preserves angles and allows constant compass bearings to appear as straight lines. The distortion of area is partly the consequence of doing something else particularly well: making navigation easier.

    Fig. 1. Gerardus Mercator, by Frans Hogenberg (1574).

    Mercator helped, in this manner, to midwife a particular global socio-economic and political order. Europe sits towards its visual centre, at the map’s belly button, surrounded by the routes, encounters, mis-encounters, asymmetries and upheavals through which the modern world was made. Cartography and empire travelled together.

    Fig. 2. Mercator projection between 85°3’4″S and 85°3’4″N. Courtesy: Daniel R. Strebe (2011).  CC BY–SA 3.0. 

    There is no perfectly neutral map waiting to be discovered behind Mercator, though. To map a spherical earth is necessarily to choose what will be preserved and what will be distorted. Every projection involves decisions about how the world is to become visible.

    Cartographers have long agreed that no flat projection can preserve area, shape, distance and direction at the same time. Each projection depends on what it is intended to show.

    Where the relative size of territories matters, however, “equal-area projections” offer the clearest answer: they preserve proportional area while accepting distortions elsewhere. The Equal Earth map – an equal-area pseudocylindrical projection jointly developed by Bojan Šavrič (Esri), Tom Patterson (US National Park Service), and Bernhard Jenny (Monash University) in 2018, does precisely this.

    So every projection involves decisions about how the world is to become visible. But some representations are fairer than others. This makes the politics of the “Correct the Map” resolution both relevant and interesting.

    Fig. 3. The Equal Earth Map. Available on equal-earth.com.

    As Togo’s Foreign Minister Robert Dussey told the General Assembly, the issue concerns spatial representation, but above all “cognitive justice”: access to geographical knowledge, dignity and historical memory.

    Maps become part of our mental geography: they teach us where places are, how large they are, what lies at the centre and what appears at the edges. For children repeatedly encountering Africa or South America diminished beside an enlarged Europe or North America, those proportions become part of how the world is intuitively imagined, and what is more or less important, more or less central to global affairs. Cognitive justice reaches into the infrastructures through which we learn to picture the world.

    Belly Button, Mine

    The 164–to–one vote on the “Correct the Map” resolution offers its own striking picture of the politics of representation.

    The United States, asserting its position as today’s guardian of the belly button of the world described above, cast the only vote against the resolution. US representatives dismissed the initiative as an “ideological project”. For the US, what had been presented as an “anodyne effort to update cartographic proportions” was bound up with a wider agenda of reparations. Questions of “cognitive justice” and cartographic representation became, in this account, a distraction from the “genuine problems” with which the United Nations should concern itself.

    There is a wonderful irony here, though. The US response denounces ideology in the attempt to challenge an inherited representation, while treating the inherited representation as a simple map – one that, by the way, makes the United States look bigger and more central.

    Mercator’s own politics then become harder to see precisely because its representation of the world has become so familiar, and so fitting for a particular kind of international order. A map – a “re” + “presentation” of the world – that has hung on classroom walls, appeared in atlases and migrated onto digital screens has gradually ceased to look like one map among many possible maps. It has become the world. And to question it is then to question the world itself – and that, apparently, is ideological.

    Ways of Seeing

    Martin Jay’s idea of “scopic regimes” is helpful here. A scopic regime names a historically constituted way of seeing: a set of visual conventions and practices through which the world becomes apprehensible. For Jay, modernity contains several such regimes, which coexist and compete with each other. Cartesian perspectivalism, however, came to occupy a hegemonic position within Western modernity.

    The “Correct the Map” resolution can be understood within this contested field. Mercator is one historically situated way of picturing global space whose institutional repetition and usefulness within a particular modern project have given it extraordinary authority. Its organisation of scale, centre and periphery has become part of our visual common sense. The present dispute concerns that inherited authority.

    I have been thinking about this problem recently in terms of the socio-technical cognitive infrastructures of international law. Maps sit alongside graphs, indicators, categories and institutional images as devices through which international institutions make a world legible. They establish relations of proximity and distance, centre and periphery, importance and marginality. In other words, how international law sees becomes part of how international law governs.

    Timothy Mitchell takes this question into the terrain of colonial power and political economy, an approach I have found very helpful in the past. Drawing on Heidegger’s ideas of the world as picture and enframing, Mitchell describes the emergence of a “world-as-exhibition”: a world increasingly laid out before an observer, organised into objects that could be seen, classified and known. He traces this way of seeing and ordering across colonial exhibitions and travel, and into the late colonial and later postcolonial reorganisation of cities, agriculture, education, communication and other techniques of rule, including economics.

    Representations are thus entangled with the material making and governing of our post/colonial world. Maps – especially maps backed by power – participate in this large work of worldmaking. So they too need to be open to contestation: for the worlds they help produce, and for the forms of representation through which they do so.

    Living with the Map

    Yet there is something uncomfortable about turning to Jay, Mitchell and Heidegger – a white male theoretical conga line – to explain an African–led challenge to a European cartographic inheritance.

    Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui’s work, emerging from the contested colonial and Indigenous histories of the Andes, offers another way into the problem. Her work is particularly helpful for thinking about what it means to contest an inherited world from within a present in which that inheritance remains very much alive – and sometimes reasserts itself with renewed vengeance, as marginalised populations across the world know well.

    Rivera Cusicanqui uses the Aymara idea of ch’ixi to think about how such a world is inhabited. Ch’ixi describes the coexistence of histories and forms of life that encounter, contradict and transform each other without resolving themselves into a purified whole. Colonial relations persist within modern institutions, identities and everyday practices. Indigenous worlds and practices also persist, carrying their own memories and possibilities. Decolonisation therefore takes place within this messy and contradictory world, without waiting for colonial inheritances to disappear (because they won’t).

    This is where practice becomes so important for Rivera Cusicanqui. A state can speak the language of equality, multiculturalism and Indigenous recognition and continue practices of land dispossession, racial hierarchy and “conditional inclusion”. There can be, as she puts it, “no theory of decolonisation without a decolonising practice”; or, for purposes here, there can be no decolonised map without a decolonising practice.

    This should help us reflect on what changing the Mercator map might mean. The General Assembly resolution has limited legal force. It encourages governments, international organisations and technology companies to use equal-area projections where relative territorial size matters. Its effects will depend on what those institutions actually do. Equal Earth maps may soon hang on more classroom walls. But Mercator will remain sedimented in institutional routines, archives and generations of mental maps.

    This is the “yet still” of correcting the map: cultivating other ways of seeing and living in a world where inherited maps – and the colonial relations sedimented through them – stubbornly remain.

    Turning the Map Around

    In 1943, the Uruguayan-Spanish artist Joaquín Torres García drew América Invertida, turning South America upside down. At the top sits the southern cone. Beneath it, the continent stretches northwards. “Our North is the South”, Torres García declared.

    Fig. 4. Inverted America (América Invertida). Museo Juan Manuel Blanes, Montevideo.

    The force of Torres García’s inversion comes precisely from the fact that the old map remains present. We know that Mercator’s South America has been turned “upside down”, only because another orientation has become so deeply sedimented that North feels naturally like up.

    América Invertida makes orientation itself visible as convention – and convention as conviction. The old cognitive map remains recognisable inside the act of turning it around. And in turning it around, contestation begins.

    This is why the “Correct the Map” resolution matters. There is something hopeful in an African-led initiative bringing 164 states together to do, through international law and multilateralism, something akin to Torres García’s gesture: to expose an inherited orientation and begin turning it around, knowing that the old map – and much of the world it helped to organise – will remain for a long time to come.

    At a moment when so much ink is spent on the crisis of international law, this reminds us that international law can still be a site where deeply asymmetrical ways of organising the world are brought into view and contested. There is some critical hope in that. More often than not, justice begins by challenging settled cognitive maps. And turning maps around, whenever the chance appears.

    The post Correcting the Map, as We Must, and Yet Still appeared first on Verfassungsblog.

    ]]>     2026-09-10T13:34:31+00:00 Luis Eslava http://verfassungsblog.de 2026-09-10T13:34:31+00:00 Verfassungsblog     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298143 Letting Go of Faith in Constitutionalism For the Balkinization symposium on Mark Tushnet and Bojan Bugaric, Constitutionalism and Its Discont...

    ]]>     For the Balkinization symposium on Mark Tushnet and Bojan Bugaric, Constitutionalism and Its Discontents (University of Chicago Press, 2026).

    Colm O’Cinneide, UCL

    Introduction - Keeping the Constitutional Flame?

    On the very first page of Constitutionalism and its Discontents, Mark Tushnet and Bojan Bugaric provide a wonderfully succinct summary of constitutionalism’s current ‘discontents’. Across the democratic world, constitutional controls are crumbling, exposed as lacking in effectiveness, and/or becoming the focus of sustained and divisive political controversy. As Mark and Bojan point this, the latter is a particularly corrosive problem: ‘it runs up against one of the hopes held out by constitutionalism’s proponents, that it provides a neutral framework for the resolution of partisan conflicts’ (p. 1). In general, the constitutionalist cart seems to be overloaded: courts and other guarantor institutions are constantly accused of both over- and under-reaching, even as their authority is increasingly contested.

    And yet faith in constitutionalism persists. If anything, it tends to be professed with extra vigour and devotion. We hear calls all the time for renewed fidelity to rule of law, separation of powers and other core constitutional principles - and for associated mechanisms such as judicial review to be reinforced and strengthened in the face of Trumpism, Orbanism etc. (The USA is perhaps something of an outlier here: looking in from the outside, the Supreme Court’s legitimacy crisis seems to have dampened faith in constitutionalism to a degree that is (yet?) to be matched elsewhere in the democratic world.)

    Is this devotion justified? Is the solution to the crisis of constitutionalism really to double down on constitutionalism? Mark and Bojan say no. They have come to cast cold water on the fervour of the constitutionally devout; to demonstrate the hollowness of constitutional doctrine and the infeasibility of the hopes invested in it; and to disenchant the true believers. Revivalism, like that offered up in recent work by Fishkin and Forbath, does not interest them. Instead, they argue that we should abandon belief in the virtues of embedded constitutionalism - and liberate political contestation from the dead hand of democracy-constraining constitutionalist legalism.

    Similar arguments have been made over the years, by commentators such as Unger, Loughlin, Bellamy, Moyn and Doerfler and the authors themselves – not to mention proponents of British-style ‘political constitutionalism’. (Which has regained its orthodox status in the UK in recent years: something which may be at best a mixed blessing for Mark and Bojan’s line of argumentation, as discussed briefly below.) This line of critique is increasingly vigorous, and attracting attention. It taps into concerns about depoliticisation and the shrinking space afforded to democratic decision-making. And it offers an alternative to the increasingly hollowed out promises of constitutionalism.  

    Constitutionalism and its Discontents adds another entry to this gradually accumulating charge sheet. However, it stands out in several ways. First of all, it is written with real style, concision and verve – making it a pleasure to read. Secondly, it uses comparative evidence from a wide range of jurisdictions to build up its core arguments in pointillist fashion, instead of just relying on broad normative brush strokes (although they play a significant role at various stages of the analysis). Thirdly, it takes the supranational dimension to constitutional governance seriously, making particular reference to ‘programmatic’ aspects of EU constitutionalism – something that is often awkwardly ignored or glossed over in academic argumentation that has a similar ‘political constitutionalist’ stamp, which has a tendency to stick its metaphorical fingers in its ears and refuse to engage with the necessary complexity of supranational governance structures like the EU.[1] Fourthly, it critiques constitutionalism in terms of its own professed aims and ambitions, in particular the aspiration to protect democracy from abusive political overreach -  and shows that it is struggling to deliver.

    The Case for Constitutional Disenchantment

    Mark and Bojan’s arguments particularly resonate when they discuss what they call the ‘paradox of constitutionalism’, i.e. how it ‘aims to both empower democratic self-governance and limit the exercises of that power’ (p. 2). As they note, this is an inherently slippery and unstable ambition. It ensures that courts are constantly forced to navigate between the twin perils of judicial over-reach and judicial self-abnegation. It exposes them to the charge of being anti-democratic. It can stoke popular discontent, by limiting how governments can respond to shifts in public opinion. And all this can expose courts to political pressure, while also incentivising governments to find a way around such controls by e.g. manipulating the judicial appointments process.

    The authors back up this structural analysis with a comparative analysis of how these tensions play out in the context of (i) general controls on executive power; (i) the application of ‘programmatic’ controls on the trajectory of national economic policy; and (iii) attempts to use constitutionalist tools to tackle the problem of ‘democratic decay’. This latter part of their analysis – developed in Part III of the book – is particularly well done. Drawing on evidence from the US, Hungary and elsewhere, Mark and Bojan suggest that constitutional responses to genuine authoritarian threats often suffer from a ‘Goldilocks’ problem: constitutional courts tend to be unsure when they should intervene to combat such threats, and end up waiting for a ‘just right’ moment which never comes until autocratic capture is complete. They also suggest attempts to deploy constitutionalism against populist parties often seem to be motivated by a vague and inchoate ‘liberalism of anxiety’, rather than a genuine desire to push back against fundamental threats to democracy and human rights. And they highlight how the invocation of constitutionalism as a buffer against populism often discredits it in the eyes of substantial chunks of the citizenry.

    No Salvation in Constitutionalism

    Some evidence offered up by Mark and Bojan in support of this analysis can be contested, or nuanced. For example, courts in some states have played an effective role in conjunction with other legal and political actors in shoring up democratic resilience, without alienating popular majorities – with e.g. Italy offering up an interesting case study in this regard. And, while the book’s discussion of programmatic controls in the context of EU constitutionalism is highly impressive, I am not convinced that it sets out a comprehensive indictment of such controls more generally. (Indeed, if anything, I would argue that the EU experience shows that it is possible to combine programmatic controls with democratic input. But this is perhaps a discussion for another day.)

    These quibbles aside, I find Mark and Bojan’s diagnosis to be broadly convincing. Constitutionalism is prone to oscillating between over-rigidity and over-permissiveness: between being too controlling and too accommodating of political power, both in terms of public perception and the reality of public governance. By extension, it struggles to deliver on its own promises, i.e. to protect minorities, limit executive over-reach and the like, while also satisfying critics of judicial over-reach. And this inherent instability is contributing to the erosion of public confidence in the functioning of liberal democratic states.

    But No Salvation in Majoritarianism Either

    However, if constitutionalism will not save us, to paraphrase Mark and Bojan – if the Emperor turns out to be not wearing very many clothes at all, so to speak - then should we abjure our constitutionalist faith and seek salvation in other doctrines? This is what Mark and Bojan suggest, while acknowledging that different responses may be appropriate in different states depending on context.

    More specifically, they argue that we should ‘scale back our expectations’ in relation to constitutional form and process. Instead, we should embrace mostly procedural and ‘thin’ approach to constitutionalism - whose provisions can be amended or displaced through standard legislative procedures, if ‘after reflection and serious political contestation’ (p. 27) they are deemed to be dispensable. In other words, Mark and Bojan recommend that we consider ditching the idea that constitutions should be treated as sacred text, and replace it with faith in the integrity and sufficiency of the political process as channelled through the electoral system.

    Now, this is where I begin to part ways with Mark and Bojan’s analysis. Or at least to wonder whether their cold-eyed disenchantment with constitutionalism gives way to an overly idealised view of the dynamics of party political contestation as it plays out within the atomised conditions of modern life.  

    The book acknowledges that campaign financing and donor interests exert a huge influence over political agendas, and that political parties have in general lost the mass popular base they once enjoyed in the post-1945 period.[2] However, in the final chapter Mark and Bojan offer suggestions as to how these flaws can be partially remedied, by electoral law reform, greater use of citizen assemblies and other incremental adjustments to the status quo. And they make the case that party political contestation remains the most authentically democratic route through which majority will formation takes place – while also being sufficiently competitive, ‘reflective’ and robust as to minimise the possibility that governing parties will take abusive advantage of an easily revisable ‘thin’ constitutional framework.

    However, I do not share their idealism. First of all, the political process in most liberal democracies is increasingly lacking in ‘reflectiveness’, being replaced by eyeball-attracting rhetoric and targeted appeals to particular special interests or demographic segments. Secondly, increasingly large segments of the population are not well represented – especially non-citizens and the socially marginalised, who also happen to be the groups most vulnerable to abuse of government power. And then there is the clear evidence, building day by day, that big chunks of the electorate in many different democracies are not especially motivated by concern to maintain basic rights protection, or meaningful cross-branch constitutional ‘collaboration’, or to punish corruption – making it less likely that changes to constitutional ground rules will attract the sort of ‘serious political contestation’ that Mark and Bojan would favour before they are adjusted to suit the political agenda of a ruling party.[3]

    Constitutional Tempering

    There is also a wider problem here. Mark and Bojan passionately argue for the establishment of a true ‘constitution of equals’, which should preclude the legal elitism associated with embedded constitutionalism. But as Roberto Gargarella has recently pointed out, the concept of a ‘constitution of equals’ could be viewed as having three pillars: public debate, social inclusion, and ‘common equality’, i.e. a commitment to ensuring certain structural conditions are in place to facilitate equal democratic participation. And, for all its many flaws, contradictions and inadequacies, the idea of constitutionalism as it has evolved over the last 150 years or so makes room for this wider commitment, which extends beyond the formal equality of the franchise.

    Now, Mark and Bojan are right to question whether embedded constitutionalism in its various facets is delivering on this commitment. But there are grounds to be concerned that treating majoritarian views as the sole and ultimate determinant of what should qualify as a core constitutional norm may result in this wider, more structural concept of democratic equality being lost in political churn. Especially at the current moment, when political parties committed to magnifying social exclusion on race and religious grounds are thriving at the ballot box.

    I should emphasise this is not an argument for clinging to the constitutionalist faith as currently preached, or investing futile hope in judicial review and other mechanisms. However it is a reason to be wary of making majoritarian will the sole reference point for defining what we consider to be constitutional behaviour – both as a matter of legal interpretation and in political debates. Various institutional methods can be used to bring justificatory pressure to bear on elected governments invoking the popular will to do constitutionally controversial things: ordinary legislation, fourth branch bodies, international law norms and political accountability mechanisms all have a role to play in this regard. The final say on a disputed issue might remain with the legislative majority – but at least a legal and political contestatory space should exist, making it possible to distinguish the concept of what is ‘constitutional’ from the concept of the ‘popular will’. And we should be aware of the threat of democratic monism, i.e. the danger that all aspects of state functioning will be expected to fall into line with current government policy, including human rights and anti-discrimination law controls that are expressly designed to operate with a robust degree of autonomy in this regard.

    The British constitution is sometimes cited as a functioning model of the type of majoritarian-based political constitution favoured by Mark and Bojan. However, during what are widely regarded to be the golden years of this constitutional model, i.e. in the democratising post-1945 period, there was a reasonably robust sense of shared constitutional values and the need to avoid democratic monism. It was not a perfect system: for example, it failed utterly to handle the deep political, religious and socio-economic divides of Northern Irish society. But the concept of the ‘constitutional’ exercised a tempering effect on majority will. Now, in the UK, we see majoritarian will increasingly invoked to justify more and more extreme measures directed against migrants, environmental protestors and other unpopular groups – and tempering mechanisms such as the Human Rights Act 1998 coming under constant attack, precisely because they limit political freedom of action.

    Now, once again, none of this invalidates Mark and Bojan’s scorching dissection of constitutionalism and its many discontents. But it perhaps does suggest that some scepticism is also warranted when it comes to faith in the dynaimcs of party political contestation. It would have been interesting to hear more from Mark and Bojan about where ‘weaker’ forms of constitutional tempering fit within their vision of democracy freed from the rigid structures of embedded constitutionalism. It would also have been interesting to see more discussion of the extent to which constitutionalism is a necessary element of any serious supranational socio-economic integration project, such as the EU – and how much political/majoritarian choice can be infused within such mechanisms, given the need for sustained cross-national cohesion over time. But that is all potential material for a sequel, if Mark and Bojan choose to treat us with another book as rich, incisive and thought-provoking as this one.  

    Conclusion – Political Ids and Constitutional Superegos

    Drawing this overly long blogpost to a close, it is good to return to the discontents of constitutionalism as dissected by this masterful book. Mark and Bojan are right to argue that the constitutional faith cannot deliver the redemption it promises, and thus we should view the reality of its functioning with a sceptical and disenchanted eye. However, they go on to argue (citing Freud) that jettisoning this faith and embracing another gospel - trust in political contestation - will help us convert the misery of our present constitutional discontents into a less pressing ‘ordinary unhappiness’. In response, I think they should also cast more of a cold eye on this alternative faith and the alleviatory promises it makes.  

    More specifically, picking up their Freudian theme, I think Mark and Bojan are too quick to overlook the problems of the political id, as shaped, structured and expressed in our contemporary liberal democratic societies, and how this is intimately bound up with the all-consuming nature of the political ego. My sense is that some element of constitutionalist superego is still needed, if reconfigured and deployed with suitable care and modesty of ambition. However, even my points of disagreement should be read as reflecting deep admiration for the tensile strength of Mark and Bojan’s argumentation - and the fundamental challenge it poses to believers in the constitutional creed.

    Colm O’Cinneide is Professor of Constitutional and Human Rights Law at University College London (UCL). He is contactable at c.o’cinneide@ucl.ac.uk or uctlcoc@ucl.ac.uk. 

     


    [1] See also the way in which confused appeals to the concept of national sovereignty wreaked havoc with the Brexit process in the UK.

    [2] For an excellent exploration of this shift, see A. Jäger, Hyperpolitics: Extreme Politicization without Political Consequences (Verso, 2026.)

    [3] If looking for evidence to support this point, please note current political developments with e.g. the Trump administration in the US and the success of the Reform Party in the UK. 


    ]]>     2026-09-10T13:30:00+00:00 noreply@blogger.com (Guest Blogger) http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-10T13:30:00+00:00 Balkinization     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298141 BOOK: Romy ROOMIANY, Das Recht auf Bildung in Deutschland seit 1919 [Schriften zur Rechtsgeschichte; 237] (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2026), 148 p., ISBN 978-3-428-19689-0  ABOUT THE BOOK:Ein allgemeines Grundrecht auf Bildung ist im Grundgesetz nach wie vor nicht v...

    ]]>     Cover: Das Recht auf Bildung in Deutschland seit 1919 

    ABOUT THE BOOK:

    Ein allgemeines Grundrecht auf Bildung ist im Grundgesetz nach wie vor nicht verankert. Dies wirft die rechtshistorische Frage auf, ob und in welchem Umfang bildungsbezogene Grundrechte in Deutschland bestanden. Dazu werden die entsprechenden verfassungsrechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen in den fünf verschiedenen politischen Systemen in Deutschland seit 1919 untersucht: Dies sind die »Weimarer Republik«, der Nationalsozialismus, die Phase der fehlenden Souveränität (1945–1949), die Deutsche Demokratische Republik und die Bundesrepublik. In jedem System wird bezüglich der einzelnen Bildungsstationen (Familie, vorschulische Bildung, Schule, akademische Bildung, Berufsbildung und Erwachsenenbildung) dargelegt, ob und inwiefern ein verfassungsrechtlich fundiertes Recht auf Bildung bestand. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass Umfang und Inhalt der bildungsbezogenen Grundrechte in Deutschland vom jeweiligen politischen System abhingen. Eine entsprechende Rechtstradition besteht somit nicht.

    TABLE OF CONTENT:

    A. Einführung: das Recht auf Bildung

    B. Weimarer Republik
    Einführung – Allgemeines Recht auf Bildung – Bildung und Erziehung in der Familie – Vorschulische Bildung – Schulische Bildung – Akademische Bildung – Berufliche Bildung – Erwachsenenbildung (Art. 148 IV WRV)

    C. Nationalsozialismus
    Einführung – Allgemeines Recht auf Bildung – Bildung und Erziehung in der Familie – Vorschulische Bildung – Schulische Bildung – Akademische Bildung – Berufliche Bildung – Erwachsenenbildung

    D. Phase der fehlenden Souveränität (1945–1949)
    Einführung – Allgemeines Recht auf Bildung

    E. Deutsche Demokratische Republik
    Einführung – Allgemeines Recht auf Bildung – Bildung und Erziehung in der Familie – Vorschulische Bildung – Schulische Bildung – Akademische Bildung – Berufliche Bildung – Erwachsenenbildung

    F. Bundesrepublik Deutschland
    Einleitung – Völkerrechtliche Grundlagen – Bundesrecht

    G. Fazit

    Find more here. 

     

    ]]>     2026-09-10T12:28:00+00:00 Michael Reichenthaler http://esclh.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-10T12:28:00+00:00 EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298140 Maynooth's Research Centre for Legal History Launch We have word of the launch of the newly established Research Centre for Legal History at the Maynoot...

    ]]>     We have word of the launch of the newly established Research Centre for Legal History at the Maynooth University School of Law and Criminology at the National University of Ireland, 49 Merrion Square East, Dublin, on Wednesday, September 16, 10 AM - 4 PM.

    10am  Registration

    10:10 Introductory remarks by the Chief Justice of Ireland, Donal O’Donnell

    10:30-11:50

    David Doyle, Maynooth University, ‘Revolting that police officers and Irishmen have to be employed in detecting such crimes': Sexual Offences against Young Boys, 1923-35’

    Lynsey Black, Maynooth University, ‘Constructing Evil – The Trial of Mamie Cadden’

    12:00-13:20

    Sarah Hamill, Trinity College Dublin, ‘Rent Control in the 1970s and the origins of Blake v Attorney General’

    Niamh Howlin, University College Dublin, ‘Legal History as a Tool for Righting Historic Wrongs?’

    12:30-14:15 Lunch

    14:15-15:45

    Norma Dawson, Queen’s University Belfast, ‘Lord Talbot de Malahide (1805-1883) and the first treasure trove bill in the common law world’

    Heikki Pihlajamäki, University of Helsinki, ‘Writing national legal histories: why and how?’

    15:45-16:00 Concluding remarks

    ]]>     2026-09-10T13:36:45+00:00 ernst http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/ 2026-09-10T13:36:45+00:00 Legal History Blog     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298137 Rational Security: The “Fifth Anniversary Hot Take Takedown” Edition Scott Anderson celebrated the fifth anniversary of Rational Security 2.0 with the return of co-hosts...

    ]]>     Scott Anderson celebrated the fifth anniversary of Rational Security 2.0 with the return of co-hosts emeriti Shane Harris, Quinta Jurecic, and Benjamin Wittes.

    ]]>     2026-09-10T16:30:06+00:00 Scott Anderson, Shane Harris, Quinta Jurecic, Benjamin Wittes, Julia Curlee, Michael Feinberg, Molly Roberts https://www.lawfaremedia.org/resources/lawfare-news 2026-09-10T16:30:06+00:00 Lawfare - Hard National Security Choices     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298138 Lawfare Live: The Trials of the Trump Administration, September 11 Join the Lawfare team at 4 pm ET for a discussion of the litigation surrounding the Trump administra...

    ]]>     Join the Lawfare team at 4 pm ET for a discussion of the litigation surrounding the Trump administration.

    ]]>     2026-09-10T16:00:08+00:00 Benjamin Wittes, Anna Bower, Eric Columbus, Roger Parloff, Molly Roberts https://www.lawfaremedia.org/resources/lawfare-news 2026-09-10T16:00:08+00:00 Lawfare - Hard National Security Choices     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298139 The Global Data Center Boom Is a Gift to Spies A Chinese company doesn’t need to hack Silicon Valley; it can simply rent the server next door...

    ]]>     A Chinese company doesn’t need to hack Silicon Valley; it can simply rent the server next door.

    ]]>     2026-09-10T13:57:13+00:00 Sara Shah, Tal Feldman https://www.lawfaremedia.org/resources/lawfare-news 2026-09-10T13:57:13+00:00 Lawfare - Hard National Security Choices     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298127 European Commission consultation on dual use regulation: 15 October 2026 call for evidence deadline To read this post, please log in at https://globalsanctions.com. Not a member? Join at https://glo...

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    ]]>     2026-09-10T16:40:11+00:00 Michael O'Kane https://globalsanctions.com/ 2026-09-10T16:40:11+00:00 Global Sanctions     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298128 US adds Xinbi Guarantee to transnational criminal organisations sanctions list To read this post, please log in at https://globalsanctions.com. Not a member? Join at https://glo...

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    ]]>     2026-09-10T16:30:00+00:00 Maya Lester KC https://globalsanctions.com/ 2026-09-10T16:30:00+00:00 Global Sanctions     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298129 US publishes 2 sanctions FAQs and updates FAQ guidance – including new risk-based framework for assessing name matches To read this post, please log in at https://globalsanctions.com. Not a member? Join at https://glo...

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    ]]>     2026-09-10T16:20:16+00:00 Michael O'Kane https://globalsanctions.com/ 2026-09-10T16:20:16+00:00 Global Sanctions     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298130 Advocate General’s opinion in Grixta says Maltese preliminary reference inadmissible because Malta could not order return of Gaddafi’s frozen assets to Libya To read this post, please log in at https://globalsanctions.com. Not a member? Join at https://glo...

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    ]]>     2026-09-10T16:10:16+00:00 Maya Lester KC https://globalsanctions.com/ 2026-09-10T16:10:16+00:00 Global Sanctions     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298131 US adds Los Tiguerones to global terrorist & foreign terrorist organisation lists To read this post, please log in at https://globalsanctions.com. Not a member? Join at https://glo...

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    ]]>     2026-09-10T16:00:15+00:00 Michael O'Kane https://globalsanctions.com/ 2026-09-10T16:00:15+00:00 Global Sanctions     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298132 US countermeasures in response to Canada tariffs To read this post, please log in at https://globalsanctions.com. Not a member? Join at https://glo...

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    ]]>     2026-09-10T15:30:51+00:00 Maya Lester KC https://globalsanctions.com/ 2026-09-10T15:30:51+00:00 Global Sanctions     tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-10:/298133 New UK guidance on export licence applications under the Agreement on Defence Export Controls To read this post, please log in at https://globalsanctions.com. Not a member? Join at https://glo...

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    ]]>     2026-09-10T14:30:59+00:00 Maya Lester KC https://globalsanctions.com/ 2026-09-10T14:30:59+00:00 Global Sanctions