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<title>FID Recht - Rechtstheorie</title>
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<updated>2025-06-24T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
<id>https://vifa-recht.de/feed/51</id>
<link href="https://vifa-recht.de/feed/51" rel="self"/>

<link href="https://vifa-recht.de" rel="alternate"/>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-11-20:/305230</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70040?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Robert Alexy (1945–2026): In Memory and Tribute</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
This article pays tribute to Robert Alexy (1945&ndash;2026), examining both his intellectual and...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>This article pays tribute to Robert Alexy (1945&ndash;2026), examining both his intellectual and personal legacy. It traces the development of his philosophical system through his seminal contributions to legal argumentation, constitutional rights, and the nature of law, highlighting their enduring significance for contemporary legal philosophy. Particular attention is devoted to the untapped metaphysical potential of his discourse-theoretical account of law. The article also reflects on Alexy's extraordinary contribution to the international community of legal philosophy, especially through his teaching and mentorship in Kiel. It concludes with the author's personal appreciation of Alexy's intellectual generosity, moral integrity, and unwavering devotion to his students, colleagues, and loved ones.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-11-20T06:54:08+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>George Pavlakos</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-11-20T06:54:08+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="obituary"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-11-14:/304519</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70037?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Owing and Quantification</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
This paper engages with Kramer's provocative analysis of disjunctive quantification. His i...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>This paper engages with Kramer's provocative analysis of disjunctive quantification. His idea is that someone can owe a duty to a disjunction of agents (and some such disjunction can together hold the correlative claim-right). I find this idea very puzzling and I also see more difficulties than Kramer does in the proposition that a disjunction can pass his own test for right-holding. I therefore offer the reader two ways to avoid having to rely on disjunctive quantification. One way distinguishes directed duties from undirected duties, while the other introduces a constructive ambiguity in what it means to owe a duty to someone.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-11-13T13:47:07+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Gopal Sreenivasan</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-11-13T13:47:07+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-11-11:/304402</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70039?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Can a Duty or a Right Be Held Disjunctively?</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
This paper defends Matthew Kramer's novel proposal that sometimes an individually borne du...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>This paper defends Matthew Kramer's novel proposal that sometimes an individually borne duty can be owed to correlative right-holders disjunctively. It extends the proposal, suggesting that sometimes an individually held right entails correlative duties that are borne disjunctively. Drawing on a suggestion from Zofia Stemplowska, the paper argues that this extension of Kramer's proposal can be developed into a new solution to Onora O'Neill's famous claimability objection to natural human rights to goods and services. The idea is that my human right to subsistence supplies&mdash;to take one example&mdash;entails preinstitutional correlative duties borne by a disjunction of the agents who could help me secure subsistence.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-11-11T07:01:53+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Rowan Cruft</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-11-11T07:01:53+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-11-10:/304342</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70035?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Logical Quantification and the Hohfeldian Analysis of Rights</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
Ever since the American legal philosopher Wesley Hohfeld published his analyses of rights ...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>Ever since the American legal philosopher Wesley Hohfeld published his analyses of rights in the second decade of the twentieth century, numerous philosophers and legal theorists have grappled with his matrix of legal positions. Very seldom, however, have the commentators on Hohfeld recognized the importance of logical quantification for any endeavor to elaborate the categories of that matrix fully. This paper will mull over a few of the manifold ways in which quantification is operative in the legal relationships that Hohfeld delineated. After furnishing a short conspectus of the Hohfeldian analytical framework which distills those relationships, this paper will briefly discuss the two most prominent logical quantifiers and will then explore how one's awareness of the workings of those quantifiers can sharpen one's grasp of the Hohfeldian analysis.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-11-10T07:55:20+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Matthew H. Kramer</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-11-10T07:55:20+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-11-10:/304300</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70045?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Choosing a Nursing Home: How Useful Are CMS Star Ratings?</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>ABSTRACT
Quality ratings are useful when they capture important and durable aspects of overall perf...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>ABSTRACT</h2>
<p>Quality ratings are useful when they capture important and durable aspects of overall performance. They are less useful (and can be misleading) when they are excessively volatile, particularly if volatility is not the result of facility-specific performance. We provide a detailed, primarily descriptive study of the nursing home star ratings published monthly by the Centers for Medicare &amp; Medicaid Services (CMS) over 2009&ndash;2024. We present both nationwide and state-specific results. Ratings are quite volatile, even over short time periods. Over longer periods, under 3% of nursing homes consistently maintain the same star rating. We find evidence of both &ldquo;general&rdquo; volatility (i.e., volatility in average ratings, unrelated to individual nursing home performance) and &ldquo;facility-specific&rdquo; volatility (i.e., volatility associated with actual nursing home performance). General volatility, reflects opaque, time-varying internal details of the star rating system. Although the CMS website states that a 3-star nursing home is &ldquo;average,&rdquo; we find that the mean star rating varies widely&mdash;both by state and over time. There is a strong negative correlation between the Overall rating and citations and financial penalties imposed after an inspection, and a strong positive correlation between the Overall star ratings and staffing levels. However, we find no evidence that federal and state minimum staffing rules matter much; most nursing homes have staffing ratios well above statutory minimums. Surprisingly, higher-rated nursing homes exit the market at a higher rate than lower-rated nursing homes, sometimes by converting to other types of facilities. We offer suggestions on reducing general volatility and improving disclosure of whether a particular nursing home is above-average, average, or below-average at any given point in time.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-11-10T07:31:25+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>David A. Hyman, 
Anton Chorniy, 
William M. Sage, 
Bernard Black</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-11-10T07:31:25+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-11-09:/304275</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70036?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">A Response to Kramer on Hohfeld and Quantification</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
This response to Matthew Kramer's article on logical quantification and Hohfeldian analysi...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>This response to Matthew Kramer's article on logical quantification and Hohfeldian analysis commences with reactions to some of his preliminary observations on the Hohfeldian scheme, and on his suggested forms of the universal quantifier: &ldquo;aggregative,&rdquo; &ldquo;distributive,&rdquo; and &ldquo;disjunctive.&rdquo; A detailed discussion then follows of Kramer's notion of a disjunctive universal quantifier, and how he sees this as a threat to Hohfeld's insistence on one-to-one correlation. Kramer's position is criticized both for the incoherence of his approach to universal quantification, and for failing to appreciate the principal application of Hohfeld's scheme of analysis at the level of legal relations between two parties in a dispute before a court. Nevertheless, the issues raised by Kramer are regarded as important in confronting the neglected subject of how Hohfeld's narrow understanding of legal relations can be integrated with other concerns that may legitimately be expressed over the workings of the law, and its implications for how we should see ourselves in relation to others.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-11-09T08:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Andrew Halpin</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-11-09T08:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-11-05:/303853</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70044?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">A New Jury System to Build Legitimacy: The Case of Argentina</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>ABSTRACT
In 2015, the province of Neuqu&eacute;n, Argentina held its first jury trial, inaugurating a comm...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>ABSTRACT</h2>
<p>In 2015, the province of Neuqu&eacute;n, Argentina held its first jury trial, inaugurating a common law-style jury system that has since spread to twelve other provinces. This dramatic innovation in what had been a civil law context was an effort to build the legal system's legitimacy through democratic innovation. To assess the operation of and reactions to this effort, we collected and analyzed posttrial surveys from 433 jurors who served in 37 trials to learn their reactions to being summoned, their comprehension of evidence, their deliberative experiences, and their perceptions of the impact of jury service on their attitudes. In addition, we surveyed 34 judges and 108 lawyers from these same trials to assess how they managed the demands of the new system. Despite worries about citizens' reluctance to participate and concerns about the competence of juries, both jurors and legal professionals favorably evaluated the jury's competence, and jurors' ratings of their service experience correlated positively with their posttrial civic attitudes, confidence in public officials, and intention to participate in public life. The discussion places these results in a broader context.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-11-05T00:11:52+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Valerie P. Hans, 
Aldana Romano, 
Sidonie Porterie, 
Shari Seidman Diamond, 
John Gastil, 
Andrés Harfuch, 
Paula L. Hannaford‐Agor</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-11-05T00:11:52+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-11-02:/303598</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70047?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Attorney Investigation and Discipline Evidence From the State Bar of California</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>ABSTRACT
While most lawyers never face disciplinary action, a fair number are investigated, and in ...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>ABSTRACT</h2>
<p>While most lawyers never face disciplinary action, a fair number are investigated, and in some cases, disciplined for professional misconduct. This study seeks to better understand the factors that give rise to this regulatory scrutiny. Drawing upon unique data provided by the State Bar of California, this article examines the entire population of lawyers admitted to practice in California from 1990 to 2024 to explore who gets investigated and disciplined, and why. Using detailed individual-level data&mdash;much of it non-public&mdash;we find that disciplinary risk is concentrated among lawyers who graduate from less selective law schools and receive the lowest passing bar exam scores. Demographic characteristics such as gender and ethnicity also correlate with regulatory scrutiny. Tightening entry to the profession along these dimensions could reduce the number of investigations and sanctions, holding other factors constant. Relying on these same factors, however, would exclude many more lawyers who never run afoul of the professional rules. We argue that the existing, largely reactive regulatory framework could benefit from a more proactive, evidence-based approach. A more promising approach, we posit, is for regulators to identify lawyers statistically at risk of investigation and discipline, providing them with training and resources to avoid the most common forms of attorney misconduct.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-11-02T03:19:49+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Albert Yoon</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-11-02T03:19:49+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-10-27:/302544</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70041?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Off‐The‐Shelf Large Language Models Are Unreliable Judges</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>ABSTRACT
I conduct large-scale empirical experiments to test the reliability of large language mode...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>ABSTRACT</h2>
<p>I conduct large-scale empirical experiments to test the reliability of large language models (LLMs) as legal interpreters. Combining computational methods with the results of a new survey, I find that LLM judgments are highly sensitive to prompt phrasing, output processing methods, and choice of model. I also find that frontier LLMs do not accurately assess linguistic ordinary meaning, and I provide original evidence that tuning base models into assistant models shifts ordinary-meaning judgments unpredictably and can worsen their alignment with human judgments. These findings undermine LLMs' credibility as legal interpreters and cast doubt on claims that LLMs elucidate ordinary meaning.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-10-27T05:33:17+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Jonathan H. Choi</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-10-27T05:33:17+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-10-26:/302427</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70049?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Foreword to JELS Special Issue</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, EarlyView.</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, EarlyView.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-10-26T01:35:09+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>David A. Hyman, 
Neel U. Sukhatme, 
Joshua C. Teitelbaum</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-10-26T01:35:09+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="foreword"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-10-24:/302281</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70046?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Silicon Formalism: Rules, Standards, and Judge AI</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>ABSTRACT
This paper replicates a judicial experiment originally conducted on 61&thinsp;U.S. federal judges...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>ABSTRACT</h2>
<p>This paper replicates a judicial experiment originally conducted on 61&thinsp;U.S. federal judges, this time with GPT-5 as the decision-maker. The experiment involves a choice-of-law dispute in a hypothetical automobile accident case, where three variables are manipulated: (1) whether the applicable doctrine is a rule or a standard, (2) whether the plaintiff or defendant is portrayed more sympathetically, and (3) the location of the accident, which affects the legal outcome under different states' choice-of-law rules. Consistent with our prior work, we find that the LLM adheres to the legally correct outcome, as determined by the experimental design, significantly more often than human judges. In fact, the LLM makes no errors at all.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-10-23T11:58:57+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Eric A. Posner, 
Shivam Saran</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-10-23T11:58:57+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-10-22:/302157</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70043?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">In This House We Believe in … Empirical Evidence? Power and Knowledge Dynamics in Congressional Hearings</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>ABSTRACT
This study examines the use of empirical discourse in US House of Representatives committe...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>ABSTRACT</h2>
<p>This study examines the use of empirical discourse in US House of Representatives committee hearings (1997&ndash;2016, <i>N</i>&thinsp;=&thinsp;12, 428), analyzing over 5.8&thinsp;million sentences using machine learning classification. We find that empirical discourse has increased over time, not necessarily as a marker of evidence-based policymaking, but driven mainly by the minority. Minority legislators&mdash;both Republican and Democrat&mdash;rely on empirical arguments more than majority legislators, and more so as the majority-minority control gap increases. Senior minority members use substantially more empirical discourse, suggesting that empirical discourse is acquired as a substitute for power. We estimate the effect as ranging between 15% and 40%, depending on seniority. Using an event study design, we find that when power shifts (twice throughout the duration of our study), those who used less empirical discourse subsequently use more of it, and vice versa; this is also true at the individual level for House members who survived reelection but switched from being in the minority to being in the majority or vice versa. Overall, these findings support a &ldquo;Power or Knowledge&rdquo; framework, whereby the majority controls the agenda whereas the minority leverages empirical discourse to assert its voice.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-10-22T00:06:33+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Amit Haim, 
Netta Barak‐Corren</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-10-22T00:06:33+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-10-16:/301422</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70042?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Eviction Reduction Policies: Do More Courts Reduce Defaults in LA County?</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>ABSTRACT
Eviction is a leading cause of California housing instability, making eviction reduction a...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>ABSTRACT</h2>
<p>Eviction is a leading cause of California housing instability, making eviction reduction a policy priority. Yet some strategies to reduce evictions lack an empirical or economic foundation, and the effectiveness of any particular policy is likely to hinge on the mechanisms determining eviction outcomes. Using data on LA County eviction docket records, this paper empirically examines how court-based assignment policy in the largest US trial court jurisdiction impacts eviction outcomes via tenant cost mechanisms. By exploiting a Late 2017 reform in LA Superior Court policy, this paper quantifies the extent to which changing the number of eviction courts causally affects evictions and defaults using induced variation in the cost of getting to court. The paper shows that the reform to the number of courts had bounded, small effects relative to outcome variation. Aggregate treatment effect estimates are sometimes statistically insignificant or do not align with directional expectations but imply small effects in standardized terms across model specifications. Limitations, interpretation, and implications are discussed, including potential long-term strategies to address eviction and housing affordability.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-10-15T10:51:08+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Matthew Estes</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-10-15T10:51:08+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-09-15:/298570</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70034?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">The Invisible Remainders of Lawyers’ Fidelity to the Law</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
This paper builds on Wendel's significant contribution to legal ethics, specifically his c...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>This paper builds on Wendel's significant contribution to legal ethics, specifically his concept of the &ldquo;moral remainders&rdquo; arising from lawyers&rsquo; conduct. Wendel presents his theory using simplified cases, some of which help clarify his thesis, while others leave important complexities unaddressed. The paper has two main goals: First, it expands Wendel's framework to incorporate complex scenarios involving multiple conflicting moral requirements, revealing &ldquo;invisible remainders&rdquo; that simpler cases overlook. Second, it addresses Wendel's omission of situations where conflicting demands of fidelity to the law create distinct &ldquo;legal remainders.&rdquo; By introducing this category, the paper aims to refine and deepen Wendel's theory to better reflect the complexities of legal ethics.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-09-15T06:05:19+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Hugo Omar Seleme</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-09-15T06:05:19+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-08-17:/296041</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70033?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Correction to “A Coherence Theory of Jurisprudence in the Spirit of Jhering: A Restatement, Update, and Defence of Jhering’s Early Methodology”</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Ratio Juris, EarlyView.</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Ratio Juris, EarlyView.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-17T07:12:42+00:00</updated>
	<author><name></name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-08-17T07:12:42+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="correction"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-08-13:/295609</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70019?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Issue Information</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Ratio Juris, Volume 39, Issue 1-2, Page 1-1, July 2026.</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Ratio Juris, Volume 39, Issue 1-2, Page 1-1, July 2026.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
	<author><name></name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="issue information"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-08-13:/295610</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70020?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Issue Information</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Ratio Juris, Volume 39, Issue 1-2, Page 162-165, July 2026.</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Ratio Juris, Volume 39, Issue 1-2, Page 162-165, July 2026.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
	<author><name></name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="issue information"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-08-13:/295611</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70028?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Deconstructing the Dichotomy: A Critical Look at AI&#039;s Place in Law</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
As part this special issue titled &ldquo;Law's Rule and the Rule of Law: Critical Dialogues with...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>As part this special issue titled &ldquo;Law's Rule and the Rule of Law: Critical Dialogues with Gerald J. Postema,&rdquo; this article addresses the argument Postema makes in chapter&nbsp;14 of <i>Law's Rule: The Nature, Value, and Viability of the Rule of Law</i>, with its warning of the risks attendant on replacing legal judgment with artificial intelligence. While affirming Postema's concern that AI threatens the deliberative and participatory dimensions of law, the article challenges his strict dichotomy between human and computational reasoning. Drawing on the work of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and contemporary theorists like Grant and Wischik, it argues that machine learning reflects an inductive model of legal prediction already implicit in legal practice. The article explores whether law's normative authority is inherently human or functionally replicable and calls for a more nuanced inquiry into how AI might be integrated into legal systems without eroding their moral and democratic foundations.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Ahmet Bilal Aytekin</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-08-06:/295096</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70025?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Issue Information</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 289-291, September 2026.</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 289-291, September 2026.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
	<author><name></name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="issue information"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-08-05:/295052</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70031?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">From Sentencing Hearings to Sentencing Conferences</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
This article presents a theoretical case for partial deformalisation of sentencing hearing...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>This article presents a theoretical case for partial deformalisation of sentencing hearings, whereby the offender and the victim would be invited to add their particularistic perspectives on crime and punishment in unmediated nonhierarchical settings. It is argued that partial deformalisation would facilitate the realisation of different aims of criminal punishment, including retribution and appropriate leniency, rehabilitation for offenders, and restoration for victims. To support this argument, the article highlights under-researched aspects of these aims of criminal punishment. It does so with reference to the distinction between general and radically particularistic claims about crime and punishment.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-05T02:44:56+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Liat Levanon</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-08-05T02:44:56+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-08-05:/295053</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70032?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Law as Weak Integrity: Deflating Dworkinianism</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
In this paper, I want to sketch out a conception of law that combines elements of Dworkini...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>In this paper, I want to sketch out a conception of law that combines elements of Dworkinianism, positivism, and realism. I will argue that while Dworkin gets some fundamental things right, he should have stayed closer to the positivists and realists. Above all, he should not have given morality <i>such</i> a prominent role in legal interpretation and adjudication. Instead, he should have accepted that there may be far fewer uniquely correct answers to difficult legal questions (in civil and constitutional law) than his rights thesis suggests.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-05T02:41:08+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Christian Hiebaum</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-08-05T02:41:08+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-07-30:/294676</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70033?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Mobility‐Restricting Covenants in Business Contracts: The Case of Franchising</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>ABSTRACT
Several studies show that restrictive covenants in employment contracts, such as non-compe...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>ABSTRACT</h2>
<p>Several studies show that restrictive covenants in employment contracts, such as non-compete agreements, may affect employees in detrimental ways, including by reducing mobility and suppressing wages. While such concerns are real, these clauses also have the potential to serve legitimate business purposes by helping companies protect valuable information, which can encourage investment and training and enhance social welfare. This paper explores the use of several types of covenants, including non-competes but also confidentiality and post-relationship non-recruitment clauses, in franchise contracts, an important and accessible category of business contracts. Many of these contracts impose restrictive covenants on franchisees but also on other individuals, notably franchisees' business partners and family members, and in some cases, their managers and employees. Patterns in the use of these covenants across these individuals are telling, suggesting that in business contracts, the information-protection role of such clauses may be important.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Francine Lafontaine, 
Lorenzo G. Luisetto, 
J.J. Prescott</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-07-13:/293384</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70030?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Complexities and Vulnerabilities of the Rule of Law: A Response to Comments on Law&#039;s Rule</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
This article explores some complexities of the rule-of-law ideal defended in Law&rsquo;s Rule: T...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>This article explores some complexities of the rule-of-law ideal defended in <i>Law&rsquo;s Rule: The Nature, Value, and Viability of the Rule of Law</i>. It addresses challenges to the rule of law represented by tensions within the prospectivity principle, by worrisome complexity and redundancy of laws (&ldquo;hyperlexis&rdquo;) and the inevitable distance between complex law and the understandings of ordinary citizens, and by the recent ascendency of the use of artificial intelligence in adjudication and governance.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Gerald J. Postema</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-07-13:/293385</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70029?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Chief Justice Robots: Turning the World into a Sci‐Fi Scenario</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
As part this special issue titled &ldquo;Law's Rule and the Rule of Law: Critical Dialogues with...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>As part this special issue titled &ldquo;Law's Rule and the Rule of Law: Critical Dialogues with Gerald J. Postema,&rdquo; this article addresses the argument Professor Postema makes in chapter&nbsp;14 of <i>Law's Rule: The Nature, Value, and Viability of the Rule of Law</i>, namely, whether there is a place for AI in law or whether AI stands in place of law.&nbsp;The article examines how the use of AI, particularly predictive and generative models, challenges the rule of law and its virtues. Through examples looking at the use of predictive software in the justice system, the risks of algorithmic opacity and bias, as well as the risk that legal reasoning may wither away, are highlighted. The article also discusses the concept of &ldquo;Chief Justice Robots&rdquo; and critiques&nbsp;the shift from human reasoning to statistical prediction.&nbsp;A summary table is presented showing how predictive and generative AI models threaten different virtues of the rule of law and what the mitigation strategies might be. The article concludes by going back to Postema's main claim: Although there is a place for AI in law, the cost of AI in the place of law is too dear.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Vladyslava Kaplina</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-07-13:/293386</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70027?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Rule of Law, Fidelity, and Mediated Efficacy: Addressing the Distance Dilemma in Postema&#039;s Theory</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
This article examines the distance dilemma, Gerald Postema's proposed solution, and the ch...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>This article examines the distance dilemma, Gerald Postema's proposed solution, and the challenges it poses for his conception of the rule of law. The dilemma arises from the question of when a legal system can count as being in force. Two unsatisfactory alternatives emerge: requiring that legal subjects comply with the law in full knowledge of it is unrealistic, while reducing the connection to mere behavioural correspondence with legal norms proves insufficient. Postema offers a thought-provoking solution by arguing that the efficacy of law is mediated by informal social customs and practices. While this mediation bridges the gap between legal subjects and the legal system, I argue that it is insufficient to sustain the ethos of fidelity necessary for Postema's conception of the rule of law. This ethos demands reciprocal compliance with legal norms and the existence of a network of mutual accountability, where members of the community are enabled by legal norms to hold each other accountable. This article argues that mediated efficacy cannot sustain such a network.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Diego Almonacid‐Almarza</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-07-13:/293387</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70026?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Introduction to “Law&#039;s Rule and the Rule of Law: Critical Dialogues with Gerald J. Postema”</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Ratio Juris, Volume 39, Issue 1-2, Page 4-6, July 2026.</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Ratio Juris, Volume 39, Issue 1-2, Page 4-6, July 2026.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>David Dyzenhaus</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-07-13:/293388</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70025?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Editorial Note on “Law&#039;s Rule and the Rule of Law: Critical Dialogues with Gerald J. Postema”</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Ratio Juris, Volume 39, Issue 1-2, Page 2-3, July 2026.</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Ratio Juris, Volume 39, Issue 1-2, Page 2-3, July 2026.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Yuneisy Boada Pérez</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-07-13:/293389</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70024?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">The Notion of Excess in Law</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
The aim of this article&mdash;part of this special issue devoted to Gerald J. Postema&rsquo;s Law&rsquo;s Ru...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>The aim of this article&mdash;part of this special issue devoted to Gerald J. Postema&rsquo;s <i>Law&rsquo;s Rule</i>&mdash;is to critically examine certain conceptions of excess in law by offering a conceptual and normative analysis of this notion, taking as a starting point Postema&rsquo;s critique of the unnecessary &ldquo;ubiquity of law&rdquo; in regulating social life. The analysis begins by examining categories in the legal literature associated with this notion, including <i>hyperlexis</i>, and subsequently clarifies the evaluative structure of excess in law by examining its constitutive elements and their implications for legal knowledge.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Yuneisy Boada Pérez</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-07-07:/292817</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70023?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Reprint of Alexy, Robert. 2007. On Two Juxtapositions: Concept and Nature, Law and Philosophy: Some Comments on Joseph Raz’s ‘Can There Be a Theory of Law?’ Ratio Juris 20: 162–9</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
In his article &ldquo;Can There Be a Theory of Law?&rdquo; Joseph Raz maintains, first, that the conce...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>In his article &ldquo;Can There Be a Theory of Law?&rdquo; Joseph Raz maintains, first, that the concept of law is parochial, whereas its nature is universal, and, second, that legal philosophy cannot be part of the law. This author argues that neither the first nor the second claim is true. The first claim fails to do justice to the dual character of concepts that makes it possible for them to be in part parochial and in part universal. The second claim must fail, for courts are not only participants in a parochial enterprise where they have special authority to establish what the law actually is, they are also participants in a universalistic enterprise, where they have no special authority to decide what is legally correct. Law <i>qua</i> universalistic enterprise necessarily comprises philosophical issues.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-07-07T04:50:39+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Robert Alexy</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-07-07T04:50:39+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="translation"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-07-03:/292491</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70038?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Judicial Decision‐Making in Free Exercise Cases: The Effect of Legal Standards, Judge Party, and Shared Religion</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>ABSTRACT
Free Exercise of Religion claims occupy an especially interesting place for those who stud...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>ABSTRACT</h2>
<p>Free Exercise of Religion claims occupy an especially interesting place for those who study judicial decision-making, in that one regularly sees the same or very similar claims judged by significantly different legal standards. An individual who claims their free exercise rights are being violated may claim the protection of the Free Exercise clause, but the Supreme Court's interpretation thereof now provides that a neutral, generally applicable law which burdens free exercise rights does not run afoul of the clause. Many claimants resort to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act or, in the case of prisoners, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. These laws impose a &ldquo;strict scrutiny&rdquo; standard which should make claimants more likely to prevail. This paper seeks to answer a number of research questions about religious freedom claims, while making direct comparisons between how cases are decided using the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA/RLUIPA. I use a dataset of all judicial votes in federal circuit and district court religious freedom claims from 2006 to 2015. I first find that, everything else being equal, judges are more likely to vote in favor of claimants asserting a RFRA or RLUIPA claim than a Free Exercise clause claim. Then, I examine the role of judge party in decision-making. I would expect Republican judges to favor Evangelical Christian and Catholic groups, and Democratic liberal judges to favor minority religions. I also expect judge party to make more of a difference in RFRA/RLUIPA claims, where the strict scrutiny standard allows judges more room to favor claimants. However, I find that judge party has no statistically significant effect on either type of claim. Finally, I confirm previous findings that judges are more likely to vote in favor of claimants from the same religious background, but that this is primarily true for Catholic and some Jewish claimants.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Jonathan Hensley</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-06-20:/290789</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70040?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Expert Asymmetry: Evidence From Securities Litigation</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>ABSTRACT
Modern litigation often involves two separate, extra-legal features: (1) contingency fee a...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>ABSTRACT</h2>
<p>Modern litigation often involves two separate, extra-legal features: (1) contingency fee arrangements with the plaintiff-side attorney, and (2) a &ldquo;battle of the experts&rdquo; where the outcome of the case rests on conflicting expert witness testimony. We construct a model to illustrate that when these features occur simultaneously, in contexts where plaintiff-side attorneys bear the cost of hiring experts upfront, defendants will spend systematically more than plaintiffs on hiring expert witnesses. Our model is motivated by hand-collected data from a decade of securities class action litigation, where we show that experts polarize into almost entirely plaintiff-side versus defense-side experts, that defense-side experts are more &ldquo;prestigious&rdquo; in terms of educational and academic affiliations, and that defense-side experts are at least 36% more expensive in per-hour terms. We argue that expert asymmetry could be closed through optimal contracting in certain individual claims, but it is likely a necessary feature of all class actions, such as toxic torts or consumer protection, in an &ldquo;adversarial&rdquo; litigation system. This defense-side advantage therefore provides a newly identified rationale for &ldquo;inquisitorial&rdquo; litigation systems, including increased use of court-appointed experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and state law analogues.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Adam Callister, 
Andrew Granato, 
Belisa Pang</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-06-18:/290659</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70036?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Ideology and Agenda Setting in the High Court of Australia</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>ABSTRACT
Does judicial ideology affect the process of agenda-setting in the High Court of Australia...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>ABSTRACT</h2>
<p>Does judicial ideology affect the process of agenda-setting in the High Court of Australia? Applications for &ldquo;special leave&rdquo; to appeal are the primary method through which the High Court manages its caseload, analogous to certiorari at the U.S. Supreme Court. Acceptance rates are low (10%&ndash;15%) and the consequences of rejection for litigants are high, since the Court rules as the final court of appeal in all areas of Australian law, including constitutional matters. To process special leave applications, the Court selects small, variably sized, panels of justices to adjudicate, deciding cases primarily via oral argument or summary disposition. However, the specific criteria for panel selection are nowhere explicitly documented, and by practice, the Chief Justice chooses the size and composition of the special leave panels. We argue this creates clear potential for ideological bias to impact case outcomes. Applying novel methods, we demonstrate that, despite substantial variability in the ideological composition of special leave panels, there is very limited evidence that panels are selected strategically to limit the success of applications in particular areas of law, and that there is no evidence that ideological composition has any impact on the success of special leave applications. Our findings contribute to a growing literature on the politics of judicial agenda setting outside the United States.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Pat Leslie, 
Tonja Jacobi, 
Zoe Robinson, 
Russell Smyth</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-06-08:/289843</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70034?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Sentencing in the Shadow of Promotion: The Impacts of Circuit Court Nomination on Federal Judges</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>ABSTRACT
Judges seek to maximize their own utility, like everyone else. Their goals include job sec...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>ABSTRACT</h2>
<p>Judges seek to maximize their own utility, like everyone else. Their goals include job security and promotion. Federal judges lack the electoral incentives that often drive state judges, but they could audition for promotion. I test whether they audition for promotion in their criminal sentencing. Using criminal sentences imposed in the federal courts from 2006 to 2023, I find that federal judges who are eventually nominated to a higher court hand down longer sentences than their other &ldquo;contender&rdquo; peers, though this effect is moderated by the judicial district. This effect is a mixture of judicial behavior and a selection effect&mdash;judges are promoted for a variety of other reasons, many of which may be correlated with criminal sentencing. While there is no across-the-board evidence of judicial auditioning during vacancies, there is evidence of judicial auditioning for some judges under some presidents. This behavior, though, ends at nomination: an event-study design finds that the announcement of a nomination has no substantive effect on the nominee's sentencing. These results show that, despite the different structure of the federal judiciary from state courts, strategic rationality on the part of judges may also shape federal criminal sentencing.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Nicholas Goldrosen</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-06-06:/289649</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70035?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">A New Source of Data on Class Action Settlements: The Department of Justice&#039;s Class Action Fairness Act Log</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>ABSTRACT
Studies of class action settlements have been notoriously difficult because of the logisti...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>ABSTRACT</h2>
<p>Studies of class action settlements have been notoriously difficult because of the logistical burden of assembling datasets from district court orders. This is especially true for non-securities settlements. Moreover, even when they have been undertaken, they have been of unknown representativeness. Yet, since the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (&ldquo;CAFA&rdquo;), defendants have been required to send a notice to the United States Department of Justice every time they settled a class action, lest the settlement not be binding. These notices therefore have the potential to overcome many of the challenges and limitations of past catalogs of settlements. This paper is the first to assess the efficacy of the Department's CAFA notices to study class action settlements. Using Freedom of Information Act requests, I obtained a log the Department keeps of CAFA notices. Although the log contains thousands of entries and many more settlements per year than any prior dataset, I find that the log is unpredictably incomplete. This is especially apparent for securities class actions, but appears to be true of non-securities class actions as well. As such, the log will not improve the representativeness of class action settlement studies. But the log will mitigate the logistical burden of creating datasets and therefore should improve the frequency of settlement studies.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Brian T. Fitzpatrick</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="research notes and databases"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-06-02:/289356</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70039?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Randomly Albright: The End of Judge Shopping in the Western District of Texas?</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>ABSTRACT
Because judges exercise discretion in how they handle and decide cases, heterogeneity acro...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>ABSTRACT</h2>
<p>Because judges exercise discretion in how they handle and decide cases, heterogeneity across judges can affect case outcomes and, thus, preferences among litigants for particular judges. However, selection obscures the causal mechanisms that drive these preferences. We overcome this challenge by studying the introduction of random case assignment in a venue (the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas) that previously experienced a high degree of case concentration before one judge (Alan Albright), whom litigants could select with virtual certainty. To assess Albright's importance to patent enforcers, we examine how case filing patterns changed following the adoption of random case allocation and show that case filings in the Western District of Texas decreased significantly at both the intensive and extensive margins. Moreover, to shed light on why litigants prefer Judge Albright, we compare case management metrics and motions practice across randomly assigned cases and show that cases assigned to Albright received relatively early trial dates and generated fewer motions to stay pending parallel administrative invalidity proceedings and fewer motions to invalidate patents on subject matter eligibility grounds.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Christian Helmers, 
Bernhard Ganglmair, 
Brian J. Love</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-06-01:/289252</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jels.70037?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">In Memoriam: Marc Galanter</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 292-292, September 2026.</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 292-292, September 2026.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Jeffrey Rachlinski</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291740-1461"/>
		<updated>2026-08-06T00:49:23+00:00</updated>
		<title>Journal of Empirical Legal Studies</title></source>

	<category term="foreword"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-05-14:/287696</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70015?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Raz on Legal Theory: Comments on Raz&#039;s “Can There Be a Theory of Law?”</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
This paper (appearing here for the first time in English) is part of a debate between Jose...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>This paper (appearing here for the first time in English) is part of a debate between Joseph Raz, Robert Alexy, and Eugenio Bulygin previously published in 2007 in Spanish by Marcial Pons and now featured in this special issue of <i>Ratio Juris</i>. In responding to Raz, Bulygin sets out his main points of disagreement with Raz on the question, Can there be a theory of law? Bulygin challenges Raz's view of legal theory as consisting of necessarily true propositions that explain the nature of law by picking out a set of essential properties independent of the concepts used to identify law. He argues, on the contrary, that the necessary or essential properties of a thing (and so of law) depend on the concept we use to refer to this thing (law), suggesting that legal theories accordingly yield a plurality of concepts rather than uncovering a single privileged concept of law.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-05-14T04:50:28+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Eugenio Bulygin</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-05-14T04:50:28+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-05-01:/286681</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70017?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Legal Certainty and Social Expectations: A Model Proposal</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
This article develops an expectation-centred concept of legal certainty. It first reconstr...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>This article develops an expectation-centred concept of legal certainty. It first reconstructs the notion of social expectation, distinguishing empirical from normative types and analysing their sources, reasonableness, and postdictive assessment. It defines legal certainty as the conformity of judicial decisions with the normative expectations shared by the majority of a relevant reference network; disappointment of those expectations generates legal uncertainty, while contexts lacking shared expectations remain indeterminate. The model isolates four analytic variables&mdash;(i) object of evaluation (single ruling or body of case law), (ii) the operative reference network, (iii) temporal standpoint (<i>ex&thinsp;ante</i> or <i>ex&thinsp;post</i>), and (iv) admissible content of expectations (formalistic versus informal). Combining these variables yields tailored submodels and measurable indicators. By mapping degrees of conformity rather than a binary state, the framework explains why observers anchored in different networks can reach divergent certainty judgments while remaining internally coherent.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Víctor García‐Yzaguirre</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-04-30:/286568</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70018?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Contextualising Hohfeld&#039;s Analysis of Rights: Legal Relations and the Rule of Law</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
More than a century ago, W. N. Hohfeld offered the most influential analysis of rights to ...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>More than a century ago, W. N. Hohfeld offered the most influential analysis of rights to date. However, his classification has rarely been received without criticism. Many of the objections to his framework stem from the longstanding debate between interest and will theories of rights. In this paper, I present an interpretation of Hohfeld's analysis that emphasises the institutional requirements necessary for it to be fully operative. I also argue that this alternative interpretation avoids the traditional objections raised within the interest vs. will theory debate. Finally, I examine the scope of application of Hohfeld's classification according to my institutional interpretation and discuss the functions it can effectively perform, particularly in light of legal certainty and the demands of the rule of law.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Paulo Baptista Caruso MacDonald</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-04-29:/286473</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70022?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Constitutional Amendments, Democracy, and the Risk of Substantive Overdose</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
This article critically examines the tendency to settle political disagreements through co...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>This article critically examines the tendency to settle political disagreements through constitutional amendments rather than through majoritarian legislative processes. The analysis argues that this trend triggers a &ldquo;substantive overdose,&rdquo; that is, the weakening of democracy as a process that legitimizes substantive decisions through the participation of citizens as free and equal decision-makers. This difficulty has two prongs: the first concerning legitimacy, the second agency. Constitutional amendments with substantive functions expand democracy's substantive core, compromising its ability to operate as a &ldquo;procedural pact&rdquo; that generates legitimate decisions protecting citizens&rsquo; equal liberty in the face of disagreement. Moreover, the judiciary's countermajoritarian power weakens citizens&rsquo; agency by reformulating their role from active decision-makers to passive claimants and jeopardizes majority rule as a distinctive trait of democratic decision-making. The article concludes by advocating for constitutional amendments that protect democracy's procedural core rather than enshrining substantive policy positions.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Paolo Bodini</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-04-15:/285403</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70011?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Legal Theory and Conceptual Analysis</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
This article introduces the current special issue on legal theory and conceptual analysis,...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>This article introduces the current special issue on legal theory and conceptual analysis, a topic explored through the lens of a debate that in 2007 engaged Joseph Raz, Robert Alexy, and Eugenio Bulygin on the question of the relation between the concept and the nature of law. We set the stage for this debate by outlining a history of conceptual analysis around the question of what is meant by an idea or concept and what could count as an analysis of a concept, and whether the structure of concepts is definitional or paradigmatic. This overview draws a map of the methodological disputes which have shaped modern legal theory, and within which we can situate the debate among Raz, Alexy, and Bulygin. We conclude by noting that, despite their disagreements, these three thinkers all view conceptual analysis (and specifically the analysis of the concept of law) as central to the issue of the proper object of the theory of law.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-04-14T07:49:15+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Hernán G. Bouvier, 
Paula Gaido, 
Rodrigo E. Sánchez Brígido</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-04-14T07:49:15+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-04-09:/284914</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70016?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">What Is an Inquiry into the Nature of Law? A Debate on Raz&#039;s Metaphysical Approach</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
In 2007 Marcial Pons published in Spanish a debate between Joseph Raz, Robert Alexy, and E...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>In 2007 Marcial Pons published in Spanish a debate between Joseph Raz, Robert Alexy, and Eugenio Bulygin that is now being made available in English in this special issue of <i>Ratio Juris</i>. This article revisits that debate by unpacking the way Raz conceives of the relation between a concept and the nature of a thing, on the premise that this is key to understanding what is here characterised as his &ldquo;metaphysical proposal,&rdquo; meaning the priority of metaphysical inquiry into the nature of law: We can only identify a concept as a concept of law by reference to law's essential properties. The explanatory direction runs from nature to concept, and in this sense Raz can be understood as rejecting the idea that an inquiry into the nature of law reduces to conceptual analysis.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-04-09T02:28:35+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Maria Cristina Redondo</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-04-09T02:28:35+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-04-08:/284847</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70010?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Revisiting the Debate between Joseph Raz, Robert Alexy, and Eugenio Bulygin</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
Ratio Juris is making available the English translation of a debate between Joseph Raz, Ro...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p><i>Ratio Juris</i> is making available the English translation of a debate between Joseph Raz, Robert Alexy, and Eugenio Bulygin that had been previously published by Marcial Pons in Spanish in 2007. The debates focus on Raz's distinctive view of conceptual analysis and his argument that it is central to theories about the nature of law. The exchanges with Alexy and Bulygin focus on how open and &ldquo;parochial&rdquo; our concepts, including our concept of law, really are, and the connections between legal theory and legal practice.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-04-07T07:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Brian H. Bix</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-04-07T07:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-03-19:/283077</id>
	<link href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/raju.70012?af=R" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">The Lisbon Way: An Alternative View on the Alexy‐Ratti Debate</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Abstract
The recent debate between Alexy and Ratti provides an excellent opportunity to discuss pro...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>The recent debate between Alexy and Ratti provides an excellent opportunity to discuss proportionality, balancing, and their substantive ramifications. In addition to critically analysing this debate, we take the opportunity to sustain several propositions that challenge the foundational pillars of Alexy's &ldquo;principles theory&rdquo; and Ratti's criticisms. Among other points, we argue crucially that (i) proportionality should not be confused with balancing, as the former imposes limits on the discretion of decision-makers, while the latter is an intellectual operation employed to solve normative conflicts; (ii) the structural difference between principles and rules lies in the indeterminacy of the regulated action-type, which explains the symptoms that have been correctly identified thus far; and (iii) neither balancing nor proportionality are conceptually linked to principles (just as rules are not to subsumption), though the structure of principles explains why they are more likely to be involved in conflicts that can only be solved through balancing.</p>]]></content>
	<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>David Duarte, 
Jorge Silva Sampaio</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337</id>
		<link rel="self" href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/resolve/doi?DOI=10.1111%2F%28ISSN%291467-9337"/>
		<updated>2026-08-13T00:31:18+00:00</updated>
		<title>Ratio Juris</title></source>

	<category term="original article"/>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2025-08-26:/263260</id>
	<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1352325225100694?rft_dat=source%3Ddrss" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Weakening the Plaintiff’s Case Without Strengthening the Defendant’s</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>The reason model of precedential constraint is supposed to generate a stricter doctrine than the min...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<div><p>The reason model of precedential constraint is supposed to generate a stricter doctrine than the minimalist result model. In the standard setting in which these models were originally formalized, that is exactly what we find. Surprisingly, however, in the more complex dimensional setting, the models become indistinguishable. In this paper, we provide an illuminating explanation of the collapse. We also shed light on recent proposals to modify the reason model, or the underlying dimensional setting, in order to avoid it. Finally, we show how the models can be made to collapse even in the simpler standard setting.</p></div>]]></content>
	<updated>2025-08-26T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Broughton, Gabe</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/latest-issue</id>
		<link rel="self" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/latest-issue"/>
		<updated>2025-08-26T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>Legal Theory</title></source>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2025-08-26:/263263</id>
	<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1352325225100724?rft_dat=source%3Ddrss" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">LEG volume 31 issue 2 Cover and Front matter</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[]]></content>
	<updated>2025-08-26T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name></name></author>
	<source>
		<id>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/latest-issue</id>
		<link rel="self" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/latest-issue"/>
		<updated>2025-08-26T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>Legal Theory</title></source>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2025-08-26:/263264</id>
	<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1352325225100736?rft_dat=source%3Ddrss" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">LEG volume 31 issue 2 Cover and Back matter</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[]]></content>
	<updated>2025-08-26T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name></name></author>
	<source>
		<id>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/latest-issue</id>
		<link rel="self" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/latest-issue"/>
		<updated>2025-08-26T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>Legal Theory</title></source>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2025-08-26:/263261</id>
	<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1352325225100682?rft_dat=source%3Ddrss" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Intergenerational Subjection</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Can the dead subject later generations to their will? Legal and political philosophers have long wor...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<div><p>Can the dead subject later generations to their will? Legal and political philosophers have long worried about this question. But some have recently argued that subjection between generations that do not overlap is impossible. Against these views, we offer an account of this kind of subjection and the conditions under which it may occur&mdash;the Mediated Subjection View. On this view, legal subjection between nonoverlapping generations occurs when past generations seek to guide the future&rsquo;s behavior, <span>and</span> legal officials in the future deem the norms and legal frameworks inherited from the past as reason-giving and action-guiding, and have the effective power to enforce them. Under these circumstances, we argue, future legal officials act as <span>intermediaries</span> of the past, enabling past generations to subject later ones to their laws. We first inspect the normative significance of subjection and introduce and motivate the Mediated Subjection View. We next scrutinize four objections to the possibility of legal subjection between nonoverlapping generations and show how our view can answer them.</p></div>]]></content>
	<updated>2025-08-20T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Magaña, Pablo, González-Ricoy, Iñigo</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/latest-issue</id>
		<link rel="self" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/latest-issue"/>
		<updated>2025-08-20T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>Legal Theory</title></source>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2025-08-26:/263262</id>
	<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1352325225100670?rft_dat=source%3Ddrss" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Legal Perspectivalism and Hartian Orthodoxy</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Take two positions, both of which we take to be popular ways of thinking about law. First, some norm...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<div><p>Take two positions, both of which we take to be popular ways of thinking about law. First, some norm N is part of the law only if, and in virtue of, N being ultimately recognized or validated by the rule of recognition. Call this Hartian Orthodoxy. Second, statements about legal rights are best understood as claims about the existence of moral rights according to law. Call this legal perspectivalism. Here we show that the two are incompatible. Our argument is that, to account for certain arguments that mix legal and factual claims, perspectivalism must close the legal perspective according to some inference rule. As it happens, however, the only defensible candidates render perspectivalism incompatible with Hartian Orthodoxy.</p></div>]]></content>
	<updated>2025-07-30T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Ryu, Angelo, Sewell, Trenton</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/latest-issue</id>
		<link rel="self" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/latest-issue"/>
		<updated>2025-07-30T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>Legal Theory</title></source>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2025-08-11:/261582</id>
	<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744552325100062?rft_dat=source%3Ddrss" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Assembling global security law and the politics of scale-making: the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>This article rethinks &lsquo;the global&rsquo; by analysing the emergence and growth of the Global Counterterror...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<div><p>This article rethinks &lsquo;the global&rsquo; by analysing the emergence and growth of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), an&nbsp;informal platform of multilateral counterterrorism co-operation which has been instrumental in the making of post-9/11 global security law and governance. It problematises and empirically analyses how global scale is enacted through the socio-material practices of translation and assemblage that have been deployed in the construction, maintenance and extension of the GCTF governance network. Drawing from interviews with policy experts and GCTF members, and from participant-observation in GCTF and UN events, the article contributes to the theme of the Special Issue and wider legal debates about the spatiotemporal dynamics of global law and governance by critically analysing how global scale is fabricated in practice and unpacking the politics of GCTF&rsquo;s global scale-making processes. Focusing on specific techniques and norm-creation processes of the GCTF, like watch-listing toolkits and &lsquo;good-practice&rsquo;&nbsp;documents on foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and countering violent extremism (CVE), the article analyses how translation, problematisation and enrolment practices have assembled the GCTF as an &lsquo;apolitical&rsquo; global security governance body. Our approach opens novel possibilities for socio-legal research on the politics of scale-making and critiquing global security power in action through empirical attention to its assemblage practices.</p></div>]]></content>
	<updated>2025-08-11T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Rodiles, Alejandro, Sullivan, Gavin</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context</id>
		<link rel="self" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context"/>
		<updated>2025-08-11T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>International Journal of Law in Context</title></source>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2025-08-11:/261579</id>
	<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744552325100037?rft_dat=source%3Ddrss" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Of continents and Großräume: the production and persistence of continentality</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>This paper renews the contemporary and enduring salience of archaic and discredited concepts of spat...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<div><p>This paper renews the contemporary and enduring salience of archaic and discredited concepts of spatiality and physical geographic determinism, but historicises, repurposes and reworks them: it is an essay in critical and decolonial palaeo-territorialisation. Concreteness may well have been misplaced, but place &ndash; and space &ndash; might not have been altogether mis-concretised. Rethinking the global is an opportunity to step back and think about macro-scales and macro-scalarity more broadly. This paper exhumes and decolonially/critically reappropriates Carl Schmitt&rsquo;s <span>Gro&szlig;raum</span> concept (re-examining, along the way, if not quite rehabilitating the Meer und Land thesis and Mackinder&rsquo;s &lsquo;geographical pivot&rsquo; (Mackinder 1904)) as a heuristic device to explore the overlooked scales of continents and continentality in the genealogy of a global geographic imaginary that is as much geotectonic as geo-historical. &lsquo;The Global&rsquo; would then come to signify pre-eminently &ndash; or perhaps has always signified &ndash; as the intercontinental rather than the international: a space or set of spaces in some ultimate sense conditioned by the configuration of the planetary crust yet nonetheless produced through historical processes. We may never have been global, but we have been (inter)continental for the last half-millennium. State sovereignty, (racial) capitalism, colonialism, imperialism, public international law, fascism, communism and neoliberal globalisation have all been projects or formations &ndash; directly or indirectly, by design or accident &ndash; producing, pursuing, exploiting, organising and ordering continental <span>Gro&szlig;r&auml;ume</span>. Contemporary regional trade blocs, regional international governmental organisations, regional human rights systems, military alliances and even putative civilisational divides all reflect the perdurable continental horizons of our ostensibly global imaginary.</p></div>]]></content>
	<updated>2025-07-23T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Newton, Scott</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context</id>
		<link rel="self" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context"/>
		<updated>2025-07-23T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>International Journal of Law in Context</title></source>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2025-08-11:/261584</id>
	<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744552325100086?rft_dat=source%3Ddrss" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Complex Earth–outer space systems and new spacetime for international law</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Earth&ndash;outer space interactions challenge conventional legal structures through dynamics that transce...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<div><p>Earth&ndash;outer space interactions challenge conventional legal structures through dynamics that transcend jurisdictional boundaries and temporal scales. International law historically operates through specific spatiotemporal assumptions: geometric space, chronometric time, and cartographic politics. These elements structure how legal authority is conceptualised and enacted.&nbsp;This study recognizes the interconnectedness between Earth and outer space, positioning legal thought and practice within planetary and cosmic contexts. This integrative framework moves beyond anthropocentric and state-centric paradigms to address the indeterminate nature of multifaceted systems. The research employs an interdisciplinary methodology that integrates legal theory and doctrine, systems engineering, and systems science to analyse emergent phenomena such as orbital debris dynamics. The study concludes that addressing Earth&ndash;outer space interactions effectively requires not merely integrating existing legal regimes but reconceptualizing core legal concepts to align better with complex, multi-scalar and emergent dynamics.</p></div>]]></content>
	<updated>2025-06-20T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Cirkovic, Elena E., Wood, Danielle R.</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context</id>
		<link rel="self" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context"/>
		<updated>2025-06-20T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>International Journal of Law in Context</title></source>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2025-08-11:/261580</id>
	<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744552325100049?rft_dat=source%3Ddrss" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Redefining the mobility paradigm in international law</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>From global tourism and free movement to refugees and climate-related displacement, human mobility i...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<div><p>From global tourism and free movement to refugees and climate-related displacement, human mobility is both a driver and an effect of what we think of as globalisation. Yet, the role of international law in constituting human mobility remains critically undervalued. In this contribution, we call for a radical rethinking of the role of international law in shaping our globe through the tenets of the mobilities paradigm in the social sciences. More specifically, we argue for the adoption of a mobile ontology of international law, which pits the constant flow of persons, goods and capital against dominant globalisation narratives predicting the end of place to take a focus on re-territorialisations of power. Taking human mobility as our starting point, we first show how mobility has been central to the foundation of key building blocks of international law. Second, we turn to the example of the global tourism regime to explore how law recursively disperses mobility around the world. Third and finally, we argue that the relationship between international law and human mobility is co-constitutive, as constant shifts in mobilities create unexpected effects, which in turn prompt further evolutions in law. We conclude by reflecting on the space for empirical and critical investigation that may open up by re-imaging (international) law as quintessentially mobile.</p></div>]]></content>
	<updated>2025-06-19T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Byrne, William Hamilton, Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context</id>
		<link rel="self" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context"/>
		<updated>2025-06-19T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>International Journal of Law in Context</title></source>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2025-08-11:/261581</id>
	<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744552325100050?rft_dat=source%3Ddrss" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Contracts: reterritorialising the (global) exercise of authority</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>Contemporary practices of authority by states and non-state actors alike are at odds with internatio...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<div><p>Contemporary practices of authority by states and non-state actors alike are at odds with international law&rsquo;s orthodox time-spaces, causing disciplinary anxiety. As a result, although there is a sense of the importance of global value chains (GVCs), these are invisible to the disciplinary gaze. This is not limited to international law; neo-formalist contract law and private international law suffer the same fate. There is for some a turn to &lsquo;the global&rsquo; to understand alterity. In this paper, I argue that understanding the time-spaces created by the practice of contracting can offer important reflection on, among other things, what &lsquo;the global&rsquo; is. The paper explores the practice of exercising authority through contractual relations at the level of the individual contract, the chain as a whole, and the use of standardised contractual clauses and model contracts. The article suggests these contractual relations are constitutive not only of spatiality but of territoriality. As such, it is possible to reterritorialise global phenomena, and &lsquo;the global&rsquo;, that have until now been understood to have deterritorialised from state or international legal orders.</p></div>]]></content>
	<updated>2025-06-11T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Lythgoe, Gail</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context</id>
		<link rel="self" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context"/>
		<updated>2025-06-11T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>International Journal of Law in Context</title></source>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2025-08-11:/261583</id>
	<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744552325100074?rft_dat=source%3Ddrss" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Against temporal abstractions: the battle for colonial and climate reparations in international law</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[<p>This article brings together different strands of literature to explore how time operates in interna...</p>]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[<div><p>This article brings together different strands of literature to explore how time operates in international law as a technique of inclusion and exclusion. The question of reparations for enduring colonial and ecological injustices provides a useful entry point to examine, at a more granular level, the temporal foundations of the field and their distributive outcomes. Concepts of restitution, compensation, satisfaction as well as the doctrine of causation in the law of state responsibility, encode a specific understanding of time. This understanding, I argue, is embedded in a modernist worldview characterised by linear, abstract and universal notions of time. Calls for reparatory justice for colonial and climate wrongs attempt to defy and interrupt law&rsquo;s forward motion by binding together interconnected (though unequal) pasts, presents and futures. In examining how international law reacts to those claims, and manages the conflict between law&rsquo;s temporal abstractions and the concrete tempos of those seeking redress, this article reinvigorates the conversation on the politics of time in international law.</p></div>]]></content>
	<updated>2025-05-30T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Cusato, Eliana</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context</id>
		<link rel="self" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context"/>
		<updated>2025-05-30T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>International Journal of Law in Context</title></source>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2025-08-11:/261586</id>
	<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744552325000023?rft_dat=source%3Ddrss" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Poetry and the Built Environment: a Theory of the Flesh of Art By Elizabeth Fowler, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024, 269 pp. ISBN: 9780192888990 £80.00 (hardback)</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[]]></content>
	<updated>2025-02-10T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Del Mar, Maksymilian</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context</id>
		<link rel="self" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context"/>
		<updated>2025-02-10T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>International Journal of Law in Context</title></source>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2025-08-11:/261585</id>
	<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744552325000035?rft_dat=source%3Ddrss" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Crude Capitalism: Oil, Corporate Power, and the Making of the World Market By Adam Hanieh , London &amp; New York: Verso, 2024. 336 pp. ISBN: 9781839763427 £17.31 (hardback)</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[]]></content>
	<updated>2025-02-07T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name>Tzouvala, Ntina</name></author>
	<source>
		<id>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context</id>
		<link rel="self" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context"/>
		<updated>2025-02-07T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>International Journal of Law in Context</title></source>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2025-06-24:/256248</id>
	<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1352325225100645?rft_dat=source%3Ddrss" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">Introduction</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[]]></content>
	<updated>2025-06-24T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name></name></author>
	<source>
		<id>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/latest-issue</id>
		<link rel="self" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/latest-issue"/>
		<updated>2025-06-24T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>Legal Theory</title></source>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2025-06-24:/256255</id>
	<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1352325225100657?rft_dat=source%3Ddrss" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">LEG volume 31 issue 1 Cover and Front matter</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[]]></content>
	<updated>2025-06-24T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name></name></author>
	<source>
		<id>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/latest-issue</id>
		<link rel="self" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/latest-issue"/>
		<updated>2025-06-24T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>Legal Theory</title></source>


</entry>

<entry>
	<id>tag:vifa-recht.de,2025-06-24:/256256</id>
	<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1352325225100669?rft_dat=source%3Ddrss" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
	<title type="html">LEG volume 31 issue 1 Cover and Back matter</title>
	<summary type="html"><![CDATA[]]></summary>
	<content type="html"><![CDATA[]]></content>
	<updated>2025-06-24T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
	<author><name></name></author>
	<source>
		<id>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/latest-issue</id>
		<link rel="self" href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/latest-issue"/>
		<updated>2025-06-24T00:00:00+00:00</updated>
		<title>Legal Theory</title></source>


</entry>


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