As Members gather for the last plenary session before the summer recess, their agenda covers enlargement, foreign affairs, competitiveness, the EU budget, agriculture, social security and the environment. On Tuesday morning, a debate will follow a presentation of the programme of activities of the Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, which began on 1 July. On Wednesday morning, Members will hear Council and European Commission statements on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 18‑19 June 2026.
Bilateral relations between the EU and Mexico have been bolstered by the current framework since 2000. On Tuesday, Parliament is due to decide whether to give its consent to the conclusion of two instruments to update this framework, the EU-Mexico Political, Economic and Cooperation Strategic Partnership Agreement (Modernised Global Agreement, MGA) and an interim Trade Agreement (iTA), both of which were signed by the EU and Mexico in May 2026. Parliament remains in favour of modernising the MGA, with a joint report by the International Trade (INTA) and AFET committees welcoming it as a step towards further economic expansion that could benefit EU companies and farmers. The INTA committee is due to vote on a draft recommendation on the conclusion of the iTA before the plenary vote.
Lower ticket prices and a wider choice of routes are not the only results of air transport liberalisation. On Monday, Members are expected to discuss an agreement to revise the air passenger rights framework to better protect passengers during increasingly common travel disruption. Delayed in the Council for over a decade, Parliament has shown consistent support for measures to protect air passengers and their rights. Parliament negotiators reached a political agreement in conciliation with the Council in June 2026. The agreement maintains the three-hour threshold for compensation for flight delays and strengthens passenger rights including on rerouting options, protection for missed connections and reimbursement for unused vouchers.
A reform of EU social security rules aims to help citizens living or working in another EU country and better distribute responsibilities between EU countries. Members are set to vote on a provisional agreement on the move to modernise the rules on Monday. Parliament’s negotiators maintained mandatory prior notifications for the construction sector in the agreed text, meaning that authorities of the home Member State would be notified if someone works in another Member State. Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) confirmed the agreement in April 2026 and Parliament and the Council now need to formally adopt the new social security rules.
The geopolitical situation in East Asia has grown more volatile as the region experiences increased security challenges triggered by authoritarian regimes. On Monday evening, Members are expected to vote on an AFET committee recommendation, which affirms the need to deepen cooperation with partners in the region, including Japan, Korea, ASEAN and Taiwan. Parliament also recommends establishing a comprehensive EU-Taiwan cooperation framework, in addition to strengthening EU engagement with regional security initiatives and diplomatic efforts to prevent further escalation in East Asia.
The crisis in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has caused an increase in fertiliser prices, placing a significant financial burden on farmers. On Tuesday, Members are set to vote on a proposal for a regulation to provide temporary common agricultural policy (CAP) support, which would offer exceptional support to farmers most affected by the soaring prices, including the possibility of increased advances on direct payments through existing CAP envelopes. Given the urgency, Parliament decided to consider the proposal without preparing a report, to enable farmers to make prompt decisions on buying fertilisers for the year ahead.
The EU’s plans to allow companies to register as an ‘EU Inc.’, recognised across all Member States, under a ’28th regime’, are central to its competitiveness agenda, aimed at simplifying rules for companies to scale up in the single market. Complementing the legislative proposal already on the table, Members are expected to vote on an own-initiative report from the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), on Thursday, on the feasibility of a 28th tax regime and its potential to support competitiveness by simplifying and harmonising corporate taxation.
Environmental crimes can have a devastating impact, yet they are difficult to detect and prosecute. Parliament has repeatedly called for measures to combat such crimes. On Wednesday, Parliament is scheduled to vote on endorsement of the EU’s ratification of the Council of Europe’s new Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law. A report from the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee recommends ratification, concluding that the convention is consistent with the EU directive. The new convention establishes minimum requirements for the criminalisation of environmental offences related to activities such as pollution, destruction of biodiversity and improper handling of hazardous waste.
To enter a 2025 budget surplus of €2.1 billion as revenue in the 2026 budget, on Tuesday Parliament is set to consider the Council’s position on draft amending budget No 1/2026 (DAB 1/2026). While endorsing the proposal, a report adopted by the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) welcomes that higher own resources are driving the surplus rather than underspending, but reiterates its long-standing view that revenue from fines and fees should strengthen the EU budget instead of lowering national contributions, and calls for more sustainable EU own resources in the next multiannual financial framework.
Enlargement remains a prominent topic at this plenary session. On Tuesday, Members are expected to debate separately three reports prepared by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), on Ukraine, Moldova and Serbia. The report on Ukraine stresses the need for a ‘sustainable’ ceasefire and a peace agreement reached with the participation of the EU, while also recognising Ukraine’s European integration as a strategic priority for the Union.
AFET’s report on Moldova commends the country’s commitment to EU accession, condemning attempts by Russian efforts to destabilise Moldova’s path to accession through interference campaigns.
As a result of political instability in the country, Serbia’s EU accession process remains at an impasse. The AFET report recalls that accession is conditional on respect for EU values and democracy, reiterating the need for Serbia to affirm its geopolitical orientation towards the EU, particularly in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
Ireland is a parliamentary republic, with a bicameral parliament. The country currently elects 14 Members to the European Parliament. This will be the country’s eighth EU Council presidency. This year, the Irish Presidency’s main political priorities are competitiveness, promoting European values, and security. It will prioritise delivery on simplification, improving the single market, and advancing the energy transition.
Unsurprisingly, digital and prowess in artificial intelligence is also a focus, given that Ireland features in the top five EU Member States on research and innovation. The Irish Presidency will have to formulate a position on several legislative packages in this area, including the Digital Omnibus on data.
Ireland’s high trade in services is also likely to drive continued efforts to build a mutually beneficial EU-US trade and investment relationship during its presidency. Another focus is to boost relationships with other trading partners, including Switzerland and countries in Asia and the Middle East.
Defence and enlargement are also central themes, as Ireland seeks to ‘defend and vindicate’ European values within the EU and globally, with particular emphasis on Ukraine and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, and progressing accession negotiations with Montenegro, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine.
With the aim of reaching an agreement among Member States on the EU’s multiannual financial framework for 2028 to 2034 before the end of the year will mean continued intensive discussions on the EU’s own-resources system to finance the budget.
Preparing the presidency has long been under way, with various Irish delegations coming to Brussels. Most recently, the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, along with political group leaders visited Dublin to meet with leaders including President Catherine Connolly and Taoiseach (prime minister) Micheál Martin.
The session further focused on Europe’s economic independence, digital sovereignty and resilience on artificial intelligence, as well as the EU’s role in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. Members debated the electrification action plan, the resilience of the European transport sector amid ongoing geopolitical challenges ,and posed questions to the European Commission on its pledge to reduce the reporting burden, especially for small companies. Debates also addressed protecting child safety and mental health online and the importance of children’s right to play, and promoting culture through the Joint Declaration on ‘Culture for Europe, Europe for Culture’ .
Finally, Members attended two formal sittings, during which Jakov Milatović, President of Montenegro, and Andrzej Poczobut, 2025 Sakharov Prize laureate, recently released from prison in Belarus, addressed Parliament.
The annex shows the breakdown by political group on the final roll-call votes on the files decided by ordinary legislative procedure during the session.
Members posed questions to European Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis regarding the state of play on the Commission’s pledge to reduce red tape for companies, in particular smaller businesses. To date, ten omnibus packages to simplify EU law have been published, with more scheduled, all currently at different stages of the legislative procedure.
Parliament is committed to ensuring that there are robust legal frameworks to regulate artificial intelligence (AI) in the EU. Members debated and adopted a provisional text on the ‘Digital Omnibus on AI‘, a set of amendments to the AI Act. Parliament favoured fixed deadlines for applying high-risk AI rules, and proposes a ban on AI systems that generate non-consensual sexual content. The agreed text upholds Parliament’s position on the generation of non-consensual sexual content and prohibits AI practices generating child sexual abuse material. The vote postpones application of certain parts of the AI Act, without impacting its core provisions and risk-based approach.
Improper management of end-of-life vehicles can damage the environment and lose millions of tonnes of material that could be recycled to the benefit of the EU economy instead. Parliament debated and adopted a provisional agreement on circularity requirements for vehicle design and end-of-life vehicles. The agreement sets out requirements for passenger and light commercial vehicles. Vehicles must include recycled plastic, in line with progressively rising targets and minimum recycled content requirements. Manufacturers and producers will be obliged to clearly label refurbished parts and provide information regarding safe access to, removal, and replacement of parts.
Members adopted at second reading a provisional agreement reached with the Council on the Commission’s proposal on plants obtained by new genomic techniques. This aims at aligning existing EU legislation on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) with new scientific developments. Parliament’s negotiators supported the simplification of rules for low-risk genetically modified plants (NGT1), provided they are similar to conventionally bred plants and do not have certain excluded traits. The agreement also includes provisions intended to address concerns related to market concentration and access to seeds for breeders and farmers.
Despite playing an important role in the food-supply chain, farmers have faced mounting difficulties in recent years. Parliament adopted a provisional agreement on a regulation strengthening farmers’ position in the food-supply chain. Based on a Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) report, Parliament reached agreement with the Council in March 2026. The agreed text aims to ensure that food prices better reflect the production costs borne by farmers, and includes support for the dairy sector, such as the introduction of mandatory written contracts. It also reinforced producer organisations’ bargaining power and includes clarification on labelling to ensure consumer protection and fair competition.
Parliament debated and adopted the trilogue agreement reached on the proposal for two regulations to implement the EU’s tariff commitments under the EU-US Joint Statement. The Committee on International Trade (INTA) adopted its reports in March 2026. The agreement empowers the Commission to suspend the application of the regulation if the US fails to meet its commitments and introduces additional safeguards, including stronger suspension mechanisms and protections against import surges that could harm domestic producers. A comprehensive review of the measures will be conducted in 2029, with the possibility of extension.
Despite applying for accession as far back as 1999, progress towards Türkiye’s EU membership bid has faced numerous delays since accession talks began in 2005. Parliament held a debate and adopted a Foreign Affairs Committee report on Türkiye, which reaffirms Parliament’s appreciation for the majority of Turkish people’s aspiration to EU accession and maintaining Türkiye’s candidate status. It also reiterates Türkiye’s relevance as a NATO ally and a country with which the EU has multi-layered relations. However, the AFET committee regrets that, despite the Turkish government’s repeated statements recommitting to the EU membership goal, serious concerns raised in previous AFET reports regarding shortcomings affecting the accession process remain unaddressed.
The path to accession for new Member States was a key topic at this plenary session, with Members debating and adopting a set of own-initiative reports from the AFET committee on enlargement candidates in the Western Balkans on Tuesday. The AFET report on Montenegro welcomes the country’s progress and encourages sustained momentum on accession negotiations. The committee also commends Albania‘s dedication to EU integration, but expresses concern about the impact of corruption and calls for full implementation of anti-corruption reforms. The AFET report on Kosovo* reaffirms that the country’s future lies with the EU, and stresses inclusion in EU programmes and policies is vital for gradual integration. AFET’s report on Bosnia and Herzegovina expresses support for EU accession and urges political leaders to renew their commitment to EU membership. Similarly, the AFET report on North Macedonia reaffirms its support for the country’s EU membership aspirations, although it regrets the lack of progress since its 2025 report.
* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.
Members also adopted an AFET committee report on Georgia’s EU accession status. The report deplores the continued democratic backsliding in the country and echoes Parliament’s non-recognition of the legitimacy of the Georgian parliament. It also reiterates calls for the EU to impose sanctions against key officials and regime enablers.
Water scarcity and water bankruptcy are serious global issues, and mitigating violations of the human right to water remains crucial for regional stability and sustainable development. Members adopted a recommendation to the Council, Commission and High Representative regarding transnational water governance. An AFET committee report notes the importance of transnational water governance for conflict prevention and peace, underscoring the growing political and security dimensions of water issues. The report calls on the EU to condemn the weaponisation of water in conflicts and urges an increase in funding for transboundary water management and for the EU to take the lead in advancing the UN Sustainable Development Goal on clean water.
Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – June 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
]]>Cyberbullying is a real issue for the current generation of young people who have grown up in the always connected digital world. While trends have indicated that both victims and perpetrators of cyberbullying are becoming younger, it can also affect adults, with women at greater risk of cyberviolence. Cyberbullying can take many forms and can cause anxiety and depression among its victims. People can experience shame and embarrassment and withdraw from studies, work, interests and their social circles. The impact of cyberviolence can be tangible with a significant economic cost to society.
The EU has placed significant importance on tackling the issue of cyberbullying. The Commission has adopted an action plan against cyberbullying in 2026, which focuses on a coordinated approach among Member States. It is designed to foster prevention and awareness, and encourages Member States to adopt comprehensive national strategies and promote a common understanding of cyberbullying to ensure a safer digital environment.
The EU has enacted a number of laws which address various elements of digitalisation to protect EU citizens and prevent providers of digital services and content from engaging in harmful practices. The EU also has a suite of policies and strategies to complement its legal framework in online child protection, coupled with support for parents and educators.
Risks from cyber-enabled violence continue to be a threat to European society, especially its young people. While advances in digital technology provide many opportunities, these are accompanied by a myriad of dangers. Cyberbullying is one such danger, with real-world consequences for individuals. While Member States across the EU have embarked on multi-faceted responses to the issue, there have been calls for an EU-wide legally binding definition of cyberbullying.
Read the complete briefing on ‘Addressing the gap between cyberbullying, cyberstalking and cyberharassment: Towards a legally binding definition of cyberbullying at EU level‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
]]>The European Council will be preceded by pre-summit meetings of European political parties with their respective affiliated EU leaders. Additionally, a group of ‘like-minded’ countries on migration will also meet prior to the start of the meeting. Following a similar pattern, a new group of 17 leaders, including Germany, Belgium and Italy, met by videoconference on 8 June to discuss competitiveness issues.
As usual, the European Council meeting will start with an address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. For the first time, the report of the rotating Council Presidency on the follow-up to the previous European Council conclusions will be given in the presence of the European Parliament President. This report by Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides will include an overview of the implementation of the ‘One Europe, One Market’ roadmap signed in the margins of the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government in Cyprus in April 2026.
The membership of the European Council has evolved since the last European Council meeting. With the departure of Viktor Orbán, Emmanuel Macron is now the longest serving European Council member continuously in office (since 2017).
The discussion on Ukraine will start with an exchange of views with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who on 4 June 2026 published an open letter to President Vladimir Putin, proposing to end the war through direct engagement between the two leaders. The proposed meeting would take place in a neutral location ‘with active US and European participation’ and ‘the front line today [as] the line from which diplomacy must begin.’. Three days after the letter, President Zelenskyy issued a joint statement with the leaders of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, outlining five conditions for just and lasting peace.Thus, EU leaders may express the EU’s readiness to step up its engagement in peace negotiations.
In his invitation letter to EU leaders, European Council President António Costa underlined the effectiveness of the EU’s ‘two-pronged approach – supporting Ukraine and increasing pressure on Russia’. Concerning support for Ukraine, the European Council is expected to discuss intensifying efforts to rebuild critical energy and civilian infrastructure as well as accelerating the production and delivery of military equipment, notably ammunition, drones and missiles. As regards pressure on Russia, the European Council could reiterate the importance of weakening Russia’s economy and thus its ability to wage war. Following the unveiling of the 21st package of sanctions, which targets heavily the country’s banking system and crypto networks, EU leaders may call for swift adoption of the new package. In parallel, after asking in March 2026 for ‘the potential threat posed to the EU’s internal security by Russian ex-combatants having participated in the aggression against Ukraine to be assessed, the European Council could ask for further work to be carried out to address this threat, and possibly consider banning Russian citizens having served in the country’s armed forces since 2022 from entering EU territory. In addition, the call by 11 Schengen countries for stricter visa rules for all Russian citizens – which follows a surge in visas issued to Russian tourists in 2024 and 2025 – may also be raised.
Although not formally on the agenda, the topic of enlargement could turn out to be the subject of broader discussions. First, because EU leaders are likely to welcome the holding of the Intergovernmental Conference on the accession of Ukraine, and Moldova, to the European Union, and the agreement to open the fundamentals cluster on 15 June 2026. Second, because EU leaders may wish to underline the ‘new impetus’ given to the enlargement process at the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Montenegro on 5 June and reiterate their support for the region’s path to EU membership in line with a merit-based approach. Third, because, after the Franco-German initiative of 4 June 2026 suggesting ways of gradually integrating candidate countries into the EU, the European Council may wish to discuss the ‘new ideas to streamline and accelerate the process,’ which, as President Costa stressed, are currently under consideration. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz had previously addressed a letter to Presidents Costa, von der Leyen, and Christodoulides, proposing to grant Ukraine ‘associate member status’, while offering ‘observer status’ and access to the single market to Western Balkan countries.
The European Council is expected to discuss the constantly evolving situation in Iran and the wider Middle East region. After the announced memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States, which envisages an ‘immediate and permanent’ end of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, EU leaders may welcome the peace agreement and the toll-free reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Due to be signed on 19 June, the agreement plans to ease sanctions and begin negotiations over nuclear issues. In a joint statement, the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Cyprus and Greece, as well as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, expressed their readiness also to lift sanctions imposed on Iran and work ‘with the US, Iran and regional partners to … achieve a long-term diplomatic settlement’. Ahead of the G7 summit in Evian, President Costa signalled the EU’s willingness to contribute to a global strategy for a lasting peace in the Middle East. In that context, EU leaders are likely to discuss preparations under way aimed at guaranteeing the freedom of navigation in the Strait, and consider a possible reinforcement of the mandate of the EU maritime defensive operation, EUNAVFOR ASPIDES.
The European Council will also discuss the situation in Gaza and the West Bank. On Gaza, they may touch upon the preparation of restrictive measures against Israelis due to the treatment of activists who were bringing aid to Gaza. A number of Member States have increasingly become critical of Israel following the interception of the Global Sumud Flotilla in international waters and the mistreatment of those on board, who included a number of EU citizens. As a result of the incident, Italy, which has previously blocked attempts to suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement, called for sanctions against the Israeli Minister of National Security, Ben-Gvir. However, it remains unlikely that EU leaders will reach a unanimous agreement on calling for sanctions against a sitting Israeli Minister ahead of upcoming Israeli elections. Additionally, in the context of the EU leaders’ reiterated condemnation of unilateral Israeli action aimed at further expanding illegal settlements, the concerns expressed by several Member States regarding products from illegal Israeli settlements entering the European market may also be raised.
Following a first discussion in April 2026, EU leaders will hold an exchange of views on the 2028-2034 MFF based on a new negotiating box with figures drawn up by the current Cyprus Council Presidency.
On the MFF, the dividing lines in the European Council are normally between the net contributors and the net beneficiaries.[1]The former group includes Denmark, Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden; some of these Member States are known as the ‘frugals‘. The net beneficiaries meet under the name ‘friends of cohesion’ and include Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy,[2] Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia.These two groups meet separately ahead of meetings in the Council, and sometimes the European Council, to coordinate their positions before the main meeting. Cyprus, as the current Council Presidency, and Ireland, which will take over on 1 July, do not formally attend these meetings, in order to remain ‘an honest broker’.
As in negotiations for previous MFFs, the usual dividing lines concern i) the size of the EU budget, ii) the balance between policy areas, iii) the existence and size of rebates, and iv) new own resources. An additional topic is the pace of repayment of the joint debt resulting from the EU recovery plan (i.e. Next Generation EU).
Regarding the size of the EU budget, the European Commission proposed a long-term budget of €1.789 trillion (in commitments over seven years in constant 2025 prices). While the European Parliament suggested in its interim report of 28 April 2026 a nominal increase of €175.11 billion (2025 constant prices) to this proposal, the frugal Member States have demanded to reduce the spending proposed by the Commission. The new negotiating box of the Cyprus Council Presidency, which only suggests an overall reduction of around 2 % of the original Commission MFF proposal, has received substantial criticism by the frugal Member States, the latter even expressing doubt over the Cyprus Presidency’s capacity to act as a ‘true honest broker’.
As regards the balance between policy areas, the friends of cohesion have, in a joint declaration of 25 May 2026, argued that the next MFF needed to provide sufficient resources for the cohesion policy, common agricultural policy and common fisheries policy. While some net contributors like Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden have rejected this proposal, others such as France and Ireland were less opposed. In Chancellor Merz’s view, EU spending must be modernised to focus on investment in defence and competitiveness, with cuts to traditional farming and regional subsidies.
On the third point, the budget correction mechanisms – or ‘rebates’ – have been used in the EU’s long-term budget since the 1980s to compensate certain Member States for their financial contributions to the long-term EU budget. The suggestion to abolish these rebates has been put forward in several previous MFF negotiation rounds but has never been followed up on. In their joint declaration, the friends of cohesion have also called for the abolition of rebates, arguing that ‘there is no political or economic rationale for re-introducing them’.
Finally, on new own resources, the Commission submitted a proposal on 16 July 2025 suggesting new own resources on i) a corporate resource for Europe; ii) a tobacco excise duty own resource; iii) a share of the proceeds of the emissions trading system; iv) the carbon border adjustment mechanism; and v) a contribution on non-collected e-waste. At a discussion of EU finance ministers in October 2025, Ireland, Hungary, Finland and Sweden rejected outright any introduction of new own resources, while others such as Czechia and Poland criticised specific new own resources. In April 2026, the European Parliament put forward proposals on future own resources, suggesting to tax digital services, online gambling and crypto-assets. After the April 2026 informal meeting of EU leaders, President Costa signalled openness to considering the suggestions of Parliament, even if concerns have subsequently been expressed over their technical feasibility.
Closely related to discussions on the revenue side of the MFF are ideas put forward by President Macron and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in favour of new common borrowing and a rollover of the pandemic debt to finance the bloc’s shared priorities.
No decisions are expected at this European Council meeting; President Costa’s objective is to give further guidance to the incoming Irish Council Presidency as to the type of new own resources on which a compromise could be achievable. While President Costa has insisted on EU leaders agreeing by the end of 2026 – a timeline expected to be reflected in the conclusions – many Member States have expressed doubts over the feasibility of this timetable.
In an extremely challenging geoeconomic environment, EU leaders will hold a strategic debate over dinner on the global macroeconomic imbalances and their impact on EU competitiveness. Previously, in December 2025, they held a similar discussion on ‘Geoeconomy and competitiveness’. However, in six months, the global environment has altered significantly; as President Costa underlined, the discussion will thus aim to ‘develop a common understanding of the challenges and to provide guidance to the Commission on the way forward’. On the one hand, EU leaders will look at ways of strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy and competitiveness, but at the same time emphasise that fair competition at global level needs to be guaranteed.
In that context, without explicitly mentioning the country, Costa may intend to raise the issue of trade relations with China. Ahead of the European Council meeting, the EU foreign ministers discussed the topic in their meeting on 15 June, while ‘global imbalances’ are also likely to feature on the agenda of the G7 meeting in Evian, France on 15-17 June. The EU has defined China as a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival. China is the EU’s third largest trading partner in goods and services after the US and UK, and the EU and China together account for 29.6 % of global trade. There is a long-standing trade deficit between the EU and China; most recently, the EU has been worried about a possible ‘China Shock 2.0‘, i.e. the large influx of state-subsidised exports of Chinese products such as electric vehicles, batteries and solar panels, as well as steel and chemicals. In March, five EU Member States (France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Lithuania) wrote a joint non-paper calling for tougher measures to counter abusive trade practises, without explicitly mentioning China.
Before dinner, EU leaders are expected to review progress made with the ‘One Europe, One Market’ agenda and the related roadmap, signed on the sidelines of the informal meeting in Cyprus in April. Thus, they will take stock of action aimed at strengthening the single market, enabling Europe’s industrial renewal, simplifying rules, reducing dependencies and encouraging innovation and investment. In the context of ongoing wars in Iran and Ukraine, which have disrupted global supply chains and fundamentally reshaped the EU energy markets, EU leaders envisaged in their March conclusions to return to the issues of affordable energy prices and the Energy Union 2030. They will probably review progress in ‘achieving Europe’s strategic autonomy, strengthening resilience, structurally lowering energy prices, and delivering the clean, abundant and home-grown energy needed to power the economy of the future’.
Although not officially on the agenda, the latest AI models and the challenges they may pose to EU citizens, companies and critical infrastructure may be discussed on the sidelines. US company Anthropic announced in April that it had built a new model, Claude Mythos, which was too powerful to be released to the public due to its extraordinary ability to identify security vulnerabilities in critical software, such as financial and healthcare systems and electricity networks. As a follow-up, the company created Project Glasswing with the aim of securing the most critical software by initially giving some 50 organisations access to the model so that they could identify and fix security problems. The European Commission has been in talks with the company to secure access to EU actors, and especially European banks have been vocal about the topic. On 2 June, the access was expanded to 150 new organisations, including the EU cybersecurity agency ENISA. However, on 12 June, the US administration ordered Anthropic to suspend access to Mythos 5 and Fable 5 models from all foreign nationals, citing national security concerns. This led to Anthropic shutting access to these two models from all customers. Following these developments, there were increasing calls in the EU to speed up the work on technology sovereignty.
Considering ‘Russia’s increasingly reckless and irresponsible behaviour towards EU Member States’, stressed by Costa in his letter to EU leaders, the latter may condemn Russia’s numerous violations of European airspace recently, such as in Romania and Latvia. They are also likely to reiterate the importance of the EU defence readiness agenda, in particular efforts to increase air defence and drone capacity. In that context, EU leaders could welcome the work in the Council on the action plan on drone and counter-drone security.
According to the defence readiness roadmap, the Commission, in cooperation with the lead nations of the capability coalitions, should expand the strategic dialogue with industry, host the first annual Defence Industrial Summit and present an overview of the industrial capacity ramp-up needed to ensure reliable supply for the agreed capability areas by mid-2026. As projects were to be launched in all priority areas within the first half of 2026, EU leaders may evaluate the progress made on these and all other aspects relevant to the defence readiness agenda.
EU leaders may call on the Parliament and Council to make further progress on creating a military mobility area, the AGILE proposal (which seeks to enhance the EU’s capacity to deliver defence innovation more rapidly and effectively), and the defence readiness omnibus.
Migration has been discussed at every European Council meeting in this institutional cycle, apart from the special European Council on defence in March 2025. EU leaders will again take stock of progress in the implementation of its previous conclusions on migration – this just a few days after the entry into force of the EU migration pact on 12 June. Likewise, EU leaders might welcome the recent provisional agreement of Parliament and Council on changes to EU policy on the return of non-EU nationals staying illegally in the EU.
For the first time, the European Council will address challenges linked to the use and trafficking of drugs. While this topic was not mentioned in the European Council’s Strategic Agenda 2024-2029, it features in the European Commission’s political guidelines. EU leaders are expected to provide guidance for the implementation of the EU drugs strategy and the related EU action plan proposed in December 2025 to respond to the growing health, security and societal challenges posed by drug use and trafficking.The EU drugs strategy is based on five pillars: (1) enhancing preparedness and response; (2) protecting public health; (3) improving security and protecting society; (4) addressing risks and harms; and (5) building strong partnerships. On 5 June 2026, Justice and Home Affairs Ministers endorsed the EU drugs strategy and the action plan, adopting conclusions on jointly operationalising them to deliver on the key priorities aimed at reducing drug use and drug-related harm.
As is usual at the June European Council meeting, EU leaders will discuss the country-specific recommendations to allow the conclusion of the European Semester cycle. Published on 3 June, the European Semester spring package includes tailored recommendations to each Member State to improve their economic performance. The Council will proceed to the formal adoption of these recommendations after the European Council has discussed them.
[1] Net contributors to the EU budget are considered to be the Member States who contribute more to the EU budget than the amount of EU funding they receive, and vice versa for net beneficiaries.
[2] While Italy is a net contributing country, it is part of the friends of cohesion.
Read the complete briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council, 18-19 June‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
]]>According to Directive 2008/115/EC, third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a European Union (EU) Member State should, as a general rule, be issued a return decision obliging them to leave the EU. However, available data suggest that, among those who receive such a decision, only about a quarter actually leave the EU. The limited effectiveness of the return policy is due to several challenges that the EU and Member States face when carrying out return procedures, including difficulties related to implementation at national level. To increase the effectiveness of the EU return policy, the European Commission announced in its 2025 work programme that it would develop a new common approach to returns, including a new legislative proposal on the subject.
2025/0059(COD) – Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC – COM(2025) 101, 11.3.2025.
For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0059(COD)
Read the complete briefing on ‘A common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the European Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
]]>European Union enlargement and competitiveness are prominent issues on the agenda for the European Parliament’s June plenary session. Jakov Milatović, President of Montenegro is expected to address Parliament in a formal sitting on Tuesday. During the question time session, a European Commissioner will respond to Members’ questions on the state of play on its pledge to reduce the reporting burden, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises. The Council and Commission will also make statements ahead of the European Council meeting taking place from 18‑19 June 2026. Andrzej Poczobut, laureate of the 2025 Sakharov Prize for his defence of freedom and democracy in Belarus, is expected to address a formal sitting on Wednesday following his recent release from imprisonment in that country.
The path to accession for[CF1] new Member States is a key topic at this plenary session, with Members set to debate several own-initiative reports from the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on enlargement candidates in the Western Balkans on Tuesday. The AFET report on Montenegro welcomes the country’s progress and encourages sustained momentum on accession negotiations. The committee also commends Albania‘s dedication to EU integration, but expresses concern about the impact of corruption and calls for full implementation of anti-corruption reforms. The [AC2] AFET report on Kosovo* reaffirms that the country’s future lies with the EU, and stresses inclusion in EU programmes and policies is vital for gradual integration. AFET’s report on Bosnia and Herzegovina expresses support for EU accession and urges political leaders to renew their commitment to EU membership. Similarly, the AFET report on North Macedonia reaffirms its support for the country’s EU membership aspirations, although it regrets the lack of progress since its 2025 report.
Despite applying for accession as far back as 1999, progress towards Türkiye’s EU membership bid has faced numerous delays since accession talks began in 2005. On Tuesday, Parliament is set to consider an AFET report on Türkiye, which reaffirms Parliament’s appreciation for the majority of Turkish people’s aspiration to EU accession and maintaining Türkiye’s candidate status. It also reiterates Türkiye’s relevance as a NATO ally and a country with which the EU has multi-layered relations. However, AFET regrets that, despite the Turkish government’s repeated statements recommitting to the EU membership goal, serious concerns raised in previous AFET reports regarding shortcomings affecting the accession process remain unaddressed.
On Wednesday, Members are also due to consider an AFET report on the status of Georgia’s EU accession status. The report deplores the continued democratic backsliding in the country and echoes Parliament’s position of non-recognition of the legitimacy of the Georgian parliament. It also reiterates calls for the EU to impose sanctions against key officials and regime enablers.
On Monday evening, Parliament is due to consider the trilogue agreement reached on the proposal for two regulations to implement the EU’s tariff commitments under the EU-US Joint Statement. The Committee on International Trade (INTA) adopted its reports in March 2026. The agreement empowers the Commission to suspend the application of the regulation if the US fails to meet its commitments and introduces additional safeguards, including stronger suspension mechanisms and protections against import surges that could harm domestic producers. If adopted, a comprehensive review of the measures will be conducted in 2029, with the possibility of extension.
Parliament is committed to ensuring that there are robust legal frameworks to regulate artificial intelligence (AI) in the EU. On Monday evening, Members are expected to consider adoption of a provisional text on the ‘Digital Omnibus on AI‘, a set of amendments to the AI Act. Parliament favours fixed deadlines for applying high-risk AI rules, and proposes a ban on AI systems that generate non-consensual sexual content. The co-legislators reached a provisional agreement in May 2026, since approved by the Committees on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) jointly. The agreed text upholds Parliament’s position on the generation of non-consensual sexual content and prohibits AI practices generating child sexual abuse material. If adopted, application of certain parts of the AI Act will be postponed, without impacting the act’s core provisions and risk-based approach.
Despite playing an important role in the food-supply chain, farmers have faced mounting difficulties in recent years. On Tuesday, Parliament is expected to consider a provisional text on a regulation strengthening farmers’ position in the food-supply chain. Based on a report by the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI), Parliament reached agreement with the Council in March 2026. The agreed text aims to ensure that food prices better reflect the production costs borne by farmers and includes support for the dairy sector, such as the introduction of mandatory written contracts. It also reinforced the bargaining power of producer organisations and includes clarification on labelling to ensure consumer protection and fair competition.
Similarly, on Wednesday, Members are due to consider regulations on horticulture. A provisional agreement reached with the Council on the Commission’s proposal on plants obtained by new genomic techniques, aims at aligning existing EU legislation on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) with new scientific developments. Parliament’s negotiators supported the simplification of rules for low-risk genetically modified plants (NGT1), provided they are similar to conventionally bred plants and do not have certain excluded traits. The agreement also includes provisions intended to address concerns related to market concentration and access to seeds for breeders and farmers. The Committee on Environment (ENVI) is expected to vote on the provisional agreement on 15 June 2026, which could be put to a plenary vote during the same week if it is approved without amendment.
Water scarcity and water bankruptcy are serious global issues, and mitigating violations of the human right to water remains crucial for regional stability and sustainable development. On Wednesday, Members are set to consider a recommendation to the Council, Commission and High Representative regarding transnational water governance. An AFET committee report notes the importance of transnational water governance for conflict prevention and peace, underscoring the growing political and security dimensions of water issues. The report calls on Parliament to condemn the weaponisation of water in conflicts and urges the EU to increase funding for transboundary water management and to take the lead in advancing the UN Sustainable Development Goal on clean water.
The improper management of end-of-life vehicles can damage the environment and lose millions of tonnes of material that could be recycled to the benefit of the EU economy instead. On Thursday morning, Parliament is due to consider a provisional agreement on circularity requirements for vehicle design and end-of-life vehicles. The agreement sets out requirements for passenger, commercial, and heavy-duty vehicles. Each vehicle type must include recycled plastic, in line with progressively rising targets and minimum recycled content requirements. Manufacturers and producers will also be obliged to clearly label refurbished parts and provide information regarding safe access to, removal, and replacement of parts.
* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.
European Parliament Plenary Session June 2026 – agenda
The proposal sets the 2027 European Union budget commitments at €199.9 billion and payments at €212 billion. The Commission underlined that the ‘next year’s budget will continue to provide crucial funding for established EU political priorities, including major support for Ukraine’.
The European Parliament is one of the two arms of the European Union’s budgetary authority, the Council being the other. The two institutions, assisted by the European Commission, decide on the budget in the annual EU budget procedure, within the limits of the long-term EU budget – the multiannual financial framework (MFF). It is the European Commission’s task to propose a draft budget each year. The Commission takes into account the views of the two arms of the EU budgetary authority, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. The Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) agreed on its guidelines for the 2027 EU budget on 17 February 2026. The European Parliament adopted its guidelines for the preparation of the 2027 budget, Section III on 28 April 2026. Parliament underlined that ‘the final year of the current MFF must focus on delivery for people, the economy and the planet and on providing investments for competitiveness’.
On 9 July 2026, the Commission plans to formally adopt the 2027 draft budget and publish it in all official languages. More information on performance will be presented in the Annual Management and Performance Report scheduled for 16 June 2026.
On 16 July 2026, Parliament, Council and Commission will meet for a first budgetary trilogue.
By mid-July 2026, the Committee of the permanent representatives of the governments of the Member States to the European Union (Coreper) will approve Council’s draft position on the 2027 draft budget. The Council is expected to adopt its position on the 2027 draft budget in September 2026.
In October 2026, Parliament is due to adopt its position on the 2027 draft budget.
Possible meetings of the Conciliation Committee are likely to take place between 27 October and 16 November 2026.
The International Labour Organization (ILO) introduced the World Day Against Child Labour in 2002. The day is observed annually on 12 June. The 2026 World Day focuses on reinforcing and accelerating actions aimed at preventing and eliminating child labour, with a key message: ‘Red Card to Child Labour: Fair play for children, decent work for adults’.
The United Nations (UN) defines child labour as work performed by children under the minimum legal age specified for that kind of work, or work that, because of its hazardous nature or detrimental conditions, is prohibited. Forms of work that are beneficial to a child’s personal and social development, that do not interfere with schooling, but rather provide useful experience and skills, may be encouraged. Child labour is driven by poverty, paired with a lack of access to decent work for adults and young people, weak social protection and a lack of free, high-quality public education.
Addressing root causes and advancing social justice were at the heart of the Sixth Global Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour, held in Morocco in February 2026, in the context of the failure to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Target 8.7 on ending child labour by 2025. The Conference adopted the Marrakech Global Framework for Action against Child Labour, a renewed roadmap aimed at eliminating child labour by 2030 through a human rights-based approach centred on social dialogue and multi-sectoral cooperation. The Marrakech commitments prioritise aligning national legal frameworks with international labour standards, ensuring universal access to quality education, and expanding social protection systems. They also highlight the unique challenges within the African region, the agricultural sector, one of the largest for child labour, and the emerging threat of online exploitation.
The 2026 World Day Against Child Labour comes after the Sixth Global Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour. Building on the Marrakech commitments, the 2026 campaign carries the message ‘Red Card to Child Labour: Fair play for children, decent work for adults‘, highlighting the link between child labour, poverty, and the lack of adequate work opportunities for adults. At the same time, it emphasises the shared responsibility of governments, employers, workers’ organisations, businesses and consumers, aiming to encourage governments and international partners to translate the Marrakech commitments into concrete national measures ahead of the 2030 deadline.
According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) and UNICEF, 138 million children worldwide are still affected by child labour, with nearly 54 million exposed to hazardous work. In response, the 2026 campaign advocates for stronger action to prevent child labour and support the withdrawal and rehabilitation of affected children through access to quality education, universal social protection, decent work and sustainable livelihoods for adults, strengthened legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms, improved data collection and monitoring systems, as well as responsible practices across agriculture and global supply chains.
Freedom from child labour is a fundamental human right, enshrined in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998), the ILO Conventions and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). ILO Convention No 138 on the minimum age, adopted in 1973, has been ratified by 177 countries, including all EU Member States. This key document lays down standards for the minimum age for employment. ILO Convention No 182 on the worst forms of child labour, adopted in 1999, has been ratified by 187 countries, including all EU Member States. It calls on members to take measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour as a matter of urgency. These include all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery; commercial sexual exploitation or illicit activities; and work likely to harm children. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has been ratified by 196 countries, including all EU Member States. The CRC confers upon children the right to protection from economic exploitation, and urges parties to set a minimum age for employment, regulate working hours and conditions, and provide for penalties. Despite international commitments made by nearly all United Nations member states, 41 countries still lack important legal protections against children doing work that could be harmful or interfere with their education.
The EU’s firm commitment to eliminating child labour is enshrined in Article 32 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which prohibits the employment of children and states that the minimum age of employment may not be lower than the minimum school-leaving age. Moreover, young people admitted to work must have working conditions appropriate to their age and be protected against economic exploitation and any work likely to harm their safety, health or physical, mental, moral or social development or to interfere with their education.
The main legal instrument prohibiting child labour in the EU is Council Directive 94/33/EC. It allows Member States to set a minimum age for employment below the minimum school-leaving age only exceptionally. The EU action plan on human rights and democracy (2020-2027) calls for stronger child protection systems and a zero-tolerance policy on child labour. Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market further contributes to this goal. In 2024, the European Commission also adopted a recommendation on developing and strengthening integrated child protection systems in the best interests of the child, as a commitment in the EU strategy on the rights of the child, prompting Member States to adopt an integrated approach in their external action, under the aim of eradicating child labour.
The European Parliament has repeatedly condemned child labour and its various forms, both within and outside the EU, through a number of resolutions. In its February 2020 resolution on child labour in mines in Madagascar, Parliament stressed that the EU’s long-term budget should reflect its commitment to eliminating the worst forms of child labour. In its March 2021 resolution on children’s rights in view of the EU strategy on the rights of the child, Parliament also urged the Commission and Member States to eradicate child labour and all forms of work harmful to children’s health, safety and development. Later that year, in its resolution on sustainable and responsible corporate behaviour, Parliament advocated banning imports of products linked to severe human rights violations, including child labour, and stressed that combating such practices should be systematically reflected in EU free trade agreements. In the same vein, Parliament further reinforced provisions aimed at preventing forced and child labour in global supply chains during negotiations on the directive on corporate sustainability due diligence, adopted in 2024. Finally, in its 2022 resolution on new EU rules on products made with forced labour, Parliament called for stronger cooperation with international partners committed to eradicating forced labour globally and banning goods produced under forced labour conditions. In addition, Parliament’s Coordinator on Children’s Rights, currently Vice-President Ewa Kopacz, acts as a central contact point to help ensure that children’s rights are systematically integrated into EU policies and legislation.
This is a further update of an ‘At a glance’ note, the previous edition of which was by Yanis Stefanou, in 2025.
Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘World Day Against Child Labour‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
]]>The EU aviation sector generates around €830 billion to €851 billion annually (about 4.4-5 % of EU GDP) and supports 1.8 million jobs directly and 14 million jobs indirectly. The workforce includes aircrew, ground handling staff, air traffic management personnel, controllers, maintenance workers, and freight staff, with aircrew forming the largest group.
Key challenges include atypical employment forms such as subcontracting, agency work, and temporary arrangements, as well as irregular schedules, fatigue and workload pressures, which can affect working conditions and wellbeing. The COVID-19 pandemic intensified job losses, staff shortages and operational strain, followed by recovery-related recruitment difficulties and labour disputes. Future challenges include decarbonisation, digitalisation, automation and AI, alongside expected traffic growth and geopolitical and energy-related uncertainties that increase pressure on the sector.
EU legislation affecting aviation workers sits at the intersection of safety regulation, labour law and social security coordination. European Union Aviation Safety Agency regulations harmonise safety, licensing and operational standards across EU Member States, while EU labour directives set minimum rules on working time, transparent and predictable employment conditions, posting of workers and work-life balance. Social security coordination rules determine the applicable Member State system for mobile workers, often linked to the ‘home base’ concept for aircrew. However, labour enforcement and employment conditions remain largely national, leading to variation in protections across countries and contract types.
The European Parliament has repeatedly raised concrete concerns, such as the incorrect application of posting rules to mobile aircrew, uncertainty over how authorities determine ‘home base’ for labour and social security rights, inadequate enforcement of fatigue and flight-time limits, and difficulties ensuring consistent labour standards for airline staff operating across multiple Member States.
Read the complete briefing on ‘Air transport workers in the EU: Working conditions and regulatory challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
]]>Strengthening joint capability development has become a central priority of EU defence policy in response to persistent capability gaps, fragmentation in procurement, and the deteriorating European security environment. Although Member States retain primary responsibility for defence planning and acquisitions, the European Union has progressively established instruments intended to encourage cooperative capability development and strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base. Defence expenditure in the EU has increased substantially in recent years, reaching an estimated €381 billion in 2025, yet it remains significantly lower than that of the United States. Fragmentation also persists in equipment and capability development. To address these challenges, the EU has developed a set of policy and financial instruments covering the entire capability cycle. Strategic priorities are defined through frameworks such as the Capability Development Plan and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, while initiatives including Permanent Structured Cooperation, and the European Defence Fund promote collaborative research and capability development projects. Recent policy initiatives, notably the European defence industrial strategy and the Readiness 2030 agenda, seek to translate increased defence spending into coordinated investment, industrial capacity expansion and faster capability development.
The European Parliament emphasises that joint capability development is essential to reduce duplication and strengthen European defence readiness. It argues that higher defence spending will remain inefficient if it continues to be organised primarily at national level. Parliament therefore calls for stronger EU-level coordination, expanded joint procurement and increased use of instruments such as the European defence industry programme to achieve economies of scale, improve interoperability and reinforce the EU defence industry.
Read the complete briefing on ‘EU joint defence capability development‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
]]>The Iran conflict and the civil war in Sudan have sparked fears that the EU could face a repeat of the 2015 ‘migration crisis’. This crisis led the EU to allocate more resources to secure its borders, adopt measures such as the pact on migration and asylum, and pursue agreements and arrangements with third countries to boost returns and prevent irregular migration. Several countries near Sudan and Iran are currently hosting more refugees than in 2015. By working together with third countries, the EU has achieved some success in reducing irregular migration, but the arrangements have been criticised for their lack of transparency and impact on human rights. At the same time, many EU countries struggle to process the volume of asylum applications and returning irregular migrants in large numbers. Against this backdrop, the EU is developing new legislation on migration. However, it may be challenging for EU countries to reach a consensus on granting temporary protection. Additionally, regularisation is not typically granted to new asylum applicants. The Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation will apply from 1 July 2026, establishing special rules for crisis situations.
Read the complete briefing on ‘How prepared is the EU for another migration crisis?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
]]>In the European Union (EU), trade in drug precursors – substances that may have legitimate commercial or industrial applications but are also used to produce illicit drugs – is governed by two regulations, addressing intra-EU and external trade respectively. These laws seek to prevent the diversion of precursors without hindering the commercial interests of lawful operators. However, the mechanism put in place, based on listing individual substances and imposing strict conditions on their trade, has encountered challenges, particularly as a result of developments in drug markets.
To address the concerns confronting the EU framework, several EU policy instruments have announced a revision of the legislation in force. In December 2025, the European Commission presented a proposal that would merge the two regulations. The initiative reflects the European Commission’s intention to reduce the administrative burden for operators and national authorities while setting a regulatory framework more adaptable to drug market developments.
2025/0384(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on monitoring and controlling drug precursors and repealing Regulations (EC) No 273/2004 and (EC) No 111/2005 – (2025) 747 final, 3 December 2025.
For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule.
Read the complete briefing on ‘Proposed EU regulation on drug precursors‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
]]>In this article, I examine the European social contract as a political discourse. The concept has emerged as a catchy but politically-laden concept within EU politics during Europe's polycrisis period. It has been employed by practitioners, civil society actors and politicians, with each referring to different kinds of contracts and often mobilising it for different political purposes. Here, I explore the economic, green, progressive and nationalist accounts of the social contract, and suggest that the social contract has proved to be an effective tool for political and social actors to articulate their political visions concerning Europe. Whereas I analyse such discursive accounts of the social contract by resorting to the poststructural discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, I find inspiration in ontological security studies in International Relations to unpack its affective dimension, namely, how it may serve to manage and direct collective anxiety and fear through narratives of continuity, stability and renewal.
]]>This article examines how climate change and climate-related policies can destabilise the EU social contract. The article uses the welfare-state lens that places social protection at the core of a feasible and legitimate green transition to understand this destabilisation. Climate change is understood as both an external stressor, through escalating physical impacts, and an internal disruptor, through mitigation and adaptation policies that reorder labour markets, household budgets and territorial development, thereby generating new social risks, distributive conflicts and constitutional pressures on EU governance and legitimacy. The analysis provided in this article distinguishes between (i) implementation gaps, by which the EU social contract fails to deliver on its own promises of security, prosperity, equity and solidarity and voice and participation under climate stress, and (ii) conceptual gaps, which explain how growth dependence, anthropocentrism, presentism and EU-bounded justice make the current EU social contract ill-suited to the climate challenge. In response, the article outlines how the EU eco-social contract could be operationalised, shifting from growth-dependent welfare to a resilient one and strengthening the Union's commitment of leaving no one behind through more robust, integrated social-protection instruments that can buffer climate shocks while enabling fair structural change.
]]>This article revisits social contract theory through a dialogue between Jule Goikoetxea Mentxaka and Antoni Abat i Ninet, questioning whether classical and contemporary contractarianism can account for structural forms of domination that precede and shape consent. Drawing on feminist, Marxist, decolonial and materialist critiques, it challenges the liberal opposition between rational consent and coercion. Using concepts such as social control, symbolic violence, social reproduction and the sexual and colonial contracts, the article shows how gendered, racialised and class-based power relations condition legal and political obligations beyond the autonomous individual. From a jurisprudential and EU constitutional law perspective, it explores whether an explicit EU social contract could confront, rather than reproduce, these dynamics. The article argues that deliberation structured as critique and counter-critique may provide a more inclusive, transparent and democratically legitimate foundation for rethinking political association in the European Union.
]]>This article argues that the proliferation of goals in competition law—from efficiency and consumer welfare to inclusion, transformation and sustainability—cannot be coherently pursued without a guiding normative framework. Using South Africa as a case study, it shows how ambitious statutory objectives, left without such a framework, have produced fragmented jurisprudence: Some decisions retreat to economic orthodoxy, others invoke public interest without principled integration. Drawing on Ronald Dworkin's theory of constructive interpretation, it contends that competition law, like all law, must be interpreted in its best moral light, situated within the constitutional order that gives it purpose. Without this normative anchor, expanded mandates risk incoherence as global regimes seek to move beyond the narrow confines of consumer welfare.
]]>Despite the influence of ordoliberalism in EU law, the mutual feedback between market power and political influence of dominant corporations has not become an explicit consideration in competition law enforcement and has remained rather in the background as an implicit rationale. If the threats to competition posed by regulatory capture are to be addressed, such a mutual feedback loop should become an explicit part of the analysis in competition law cases. This article proposes a factors test in order to determine when the exercise of a company's political rights has degenerated into a scenario of heightened risk of regulatory capture. The factors of the test are drawn from the main tenets of the extant literature on lobbying in the EU that describe the dynamics of how stakeholders gain access to the ears of policymakers. Once a heightened risk of regulatory capture is established, this article argues that specific instances of lobbying for a defined policy proposal can be covered by Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU. The requirement of a heightened risk of regulatory capture is designed to align the prosecution of anticompetitive lobbying with the CJEU's case law on abuse of rights as an abuse of dominance, following from AstraZeneca. When corporations aim to capture areas of public policy, they abuse their political rights and can therefore be subjected to competition law liability. In this way, competition law enforcement can complement other areas of public policy aimed at preventing market distortions caused by political influence, such as transparency obligations of corporate political activity and state aid laws.
]]>Competition law serves not only to regulate markets but also to construct and deepen them, particularly during transitions from centrally planned or heavily regulated to market economies. Its significance is both economic and political: Since its inception, competition law has sought to prevent concentrated economic power from distorting the functioning of democracy. This article explores how competition law shapes democratic transitions and democratic erosion. It puts forward that competition law supports democratisation by constraining powerful economic interests, reinforcing the separation of powers through enforcement and advocacy by independent agencies and strengthening state capacity. Conversely, authoritarian actors may instrumentalise competition law to entrench their power, reward allies and suppress opposition. Democratic erosion, in turn, undermines the autonomy of competition agencies and their enforcement efforts. The article draws on economic and democratic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey and Latin America and charts recent cases of democratic decline in these contexts to illustrate its arguments.
]]>Seeing the EU roughly as a political system designed to remove the most essential political decisions from democratic control, while in a large part abiding by legal frameworks, we could speak about an opposition between technocratic legalism and democracy. At best, the EU offers a democracy of means, with limited capacity to affect the ends of the project. Most recently, even this limited democracy came under attack through a further reduction of transparency, a proliferation of omnibus legislation and constant executive overreach. In its current emanation, ‘integration through law’ aims to shield all aspects of governance not only from democratic but also legal contestation. It thereby structurally prioritises ‘supremacy’, ‘direct effect’, ‘mutual trust’ and other procedural aspects of its own functioning over the essential foundations of justice, democratic citizenship based on equality and dignity and human rights protection. We could thus also speak of ‘supremacy rule of law’, which might or might not be an attack on the essential aspects of legality and justice, removing the added value of the rule of law as such. Consequently, distilling the essence of the ‘social contract’ in Europe today, one arrives at a bundle of oxymorons: The EU's supremacy rule of law is in the service of an ever fading depoliticised democracy of means.
]]>This paper argues for the recognition of economic dependence as a relevant concept within EU competition law, moving beyond the traditional—yet limited—dominance-based framework of Article 102 TFEU. Comparative analysis shows that this, or an equivalent concept, is already embedded in the domestic competition regimes of several EU Member States, as well as in Japan and South Korea, to address severe imbalances of bargaining power in vertical commercial relationships that may distort the competitive process below the dominance threshold. Whereas the DMA embodies a regulatory response to forms of collective dependence linked to gatekeepers, its limited scope leaves many problematic scenarios unaddressed. In the context of the ongoing evaluation of Regulation 1/2003, introducing economic dependence at EU level would offer a more comprehensive response to contemporary economic power, in line with EU constitutional values, while enhancing internal coherence and promoting normative convergence with like-minded democracies.
]]>Academic research is increasingly questioning whether the goals of competition law should extend beyond the traditional focus on economic efficiency and consumer welfare to include non-economic issues such as social justice, democracy, environmental sustainability and equality. In this regard, the African experience is particularly valuable since public interest considerations (PICs) are a feature of merger control regimes in many African countries. After an analysis of PICs in Africa, the paper zooms in on South Africa's extensive experience in the field, particularly its legal test for determining when PICs are justified in merger assessment and offers recommendations that could inform other countries. Drawing on the South Africa merger assessment, this paper recommends that PICs and the competition standard be analysed separately but in an interrelated manner, as they complement each other. The likely effect of the merger on specific public interests must be identified and considered only when it is substantial and linked to the merger. Additionally, a merger should be prohibited only if the proposed remedies seeking to address the negative effects on the specific PIC are inadequate, inappropriate, disproportionate or unenforceable. Importantly, when PICs collide, competition agencies should balance each public interest against the others, focusing on whether the likely effect is substantial or whether the remedies are inadequate. In sum, competition agencies should adopt public-interest merger guidelines that provide businesses with the necessary guidance on the legal test and procedures, enhancing legal certainty and attracting investment.
]]>This introductory article sets competition law in the transformative context. It explains that competition law is not only something that is transformed but is also transformative in its own right. A twofold argument is advanced: first, that competition law has an important role to play in ensuring that the wide range of transitions in play today (i.e., green, digital and industrial) are both just and enduring, and second, that there are significant lessons to be learnt from economic transformations that have already taken place in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and countries from the Global South. To this end, the article explains that the manner in which CEE and select Global South countries designed and enforced their competition laws has allowed competition law to play a meaningful role not only as an instrument but also as an architect of their economic transformations. Against this background, the article argues that the EU's openness to these transitional experiences is desirable not only because it would supplement the transitions within the EU but also because it will facilitate the pathway to similar transitions in other non-European jurisdictions that look to the EU for guidance. In terms of structure, first, the article examines the possible role of competition law in the course of transitions. Second, it examines the possibilities and limitations of the role competition law has already played in the transitions in CEE and Global South countries. The article concludes with an invitation to all readers to engage with this kaleidescope to gain a deeper insight into these issues.
]]>This paper engages with the increasing concern that competition law can no longer concentrate exclusively on a narrow focus on price increases and output diminution. Within the context of growing global inequality and the exponential increase in economic power in the hands of a few, there is a need to develop a coherent jurisprudence capable of addressing manifest abuses of economic power. These challenges are not confined to any single jurisdiction. One particularly instructive response can be found in South Africa. Faced with an Apartheid-shaped economy that reflected this global problem, South Africa responded with legislation that expanded the scope of competition law to embrace a range of defined public interest concerns. In analysing the key developments of the public interest jurisprudence that has emerged in response to this legislation, this paper draws on the South African experience as a source of insight for other jurisdictions—including the European Union—seeking to develop a coherent, yet expansive, competition law for the 21st century.
]]>Over the last two decades, Marxism has experienced a significant revival, including in the discipline of law. The 2003 Iraq War and, perhaps more obviously, the 2008 financial crisis posed questions about the relationship between law, capitalism and imperialism that mainstream legal scholarship had difficulty answering. One marked exception to this revival has been in the field of European Union (EU) law. EU law scholarship, perhaps understandably given that few Member States participated in the invasion, had little to say about the Iraq War. For its part, the 2008 financial crisis and its manifestation in Europe as the ‘Euro-Crisis’ prompted a ‘critical turn’ in EU legal studies.1 However, these two movements – the Marxist tradition and critical EU law scholarship – have largely failed to meet. Marxist analyses of EU law, let alone the development of a full-blown Marxist theory of EU law, remain almost non-existent.
]]>This article establishes a foundation for the development of Marxist approaches to European Union (EU) law. While Marxist scholarship has engaged with European integration throughout its history, it has largely overlooked the legal architecture of the EU. Conversely, EU legal studies have remained largely insulated from Marxist thought, even as critical approaches have begun to gain traction. Bridging this mutual neglect, the article argues that EU law must be understood not as a neutral or technocratic system, but as a central element of capitalist social relations both in Europe, and in terms of Europe’s wider integration in the global market. In this way, EU law is bound up with processes of accumulation, imperialism, and racialised social reproduction. Drawing on key currents within Marxist theory, the article situates EU law within the historical dynamics of capitalist development, demonstrating how a materialist legal analysis can deepen and enrich existing critiques of European integration.
]]>The European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS) is the cornerstone of the EU’s attempt to decarbonise economic production in Europe. This paper questions the power and class relations that are built into the EU’s choice to address the climate crisis through the legal construction of emissions trading. Drawing on Marxist theory, the paper argues that the cost of emission allowances imposed by the ETS is a form of climate rent. In both the choice of this system and its implementation, the EU prioritises capital accumulation in order to protect the competitiveness of EU firms on the global market. This paper argues that the ETS thus jeopardises the progress of decarbonisation on two grounds. First, the EU’s implementation of the ETS has tended to increase the economic wealth of capital by redistributing economic value away from workers and towards the capitalist class. By raising the cost of essential goods, the ETS will likely damage the reputation of climate action and thus jeopardise public support for decarbonisation. Second, the ETS is part of the EU’s indirect approach to climate policy, which seeks to shape the actions of private capital in the direction of climate objectives. However, the severity of climate change calls instead for the use of law and public power to directly and consciously shape the rapid decarbonisation of society.
]]>The EU’s 2022 Digital Services Act (DSA) requires large online platforms to assess and mitigate risks to various vaguely-defined and contestable values, including fundamental rights; public health and security; civic discourse; and people’s mental and physical wellbeing. The scope of these provisions is thus incredibly broad and they have unsurprisingly attracted significant academic interest. So far, most scholarship has taken a broadly functionalist approach: it accepts the basic premise that certain social impacts of platforms constitute risks which must be managed, and evaluates the DSA’s capacity to achieve this ‘effectively’.
In contrast, this article aims to step back and critically reflect on the underlying conceptual and institutional framework of systemic risk management, based on an explicitly social constructionist understanding of risk as a technology of governance shaped by competing political agendas. Drawing on critical literature on risk regulation from various disciplines and regulatory fields, it identifies two key themes. First, discursively framing political problems as risks tends to exclude issues less amenable to the ‘risk’ framing; to privilege technocratic expertise; and to depoliticise distributive and ideological conflicts. Second, the DSA’s institutional approach to risk regulation delegates primary responsibility for identifying and managing risks to regulated companies, creating well-documented risks of capture. Overall, both themes point to similar conclusions: the systemic risk framework will be highly favourable to the interests of the powerful multinational corporations it seeks to regulate.
In conclusion, however, the article notes that platform regulation may pose distinctive challenges that are not well illuminated by scholarship on risk regulation in other fields – notably because of the widely-recognised possibilities for political abuse of more prescriptive regulation of online media. It suggests some avenues for further research into risk politics in the specific context of online media platforms, in particular drawing on scholarship on risk management in critical security studies.
]]>How has the European Union been integrated in the past? Legal academics have traditionally pointed to the Court of Justice and to the broader idea of an ‘integration-through-law’. Through its supranational jurisprudence, the Court – not the EU legislature – was thus placed at the centre of the European integration project. The underlying reasons for this dominance of constitutional ‘law’ over legislative ‘politics’ have thereby been the subject of three famous explanations: the ‘equilibrium theory’ (Weiler), the ‘asymmetry theory’ (Scharpf) and the ‘over-constitutionalisation theory’ (Grimm). What are the merits of these grand theories of European integration when measured against the historical record? This article hopes to explore this question in the context of the internal market. Its historical revision begins with an analysis of the respective spheres of normative and decisional supranationalism during and after a foundational period (Sections 2 and 3). This is followed by an examination of the meaning and significance of the Cassis de Dijon judgment in the late 1970s. Through this revolutionary case, a dialectical relationship between the EU Court (‘law’) and the EU legislator (‘politics’) emerges (Section 4) that ultimately leads to the spectacular rise of EU legislation (Section 5) after the SEA. This transformational relationship will provide the critical lens for a historical revaluation of the three grand theories of legal integration (Section 6).
]]>This article approaches the issue of the European Union’s (EU) democratic deficit from a Marxist perspective. This issue has been central to the exponential rise of Euroscepticism that influenced processes like Brexit and Grexit (despite the latter’s frustration), as well as the rise of explicitly anti-EU national governments in European countries. This article shows that critiques of the EU’s democratic deficit (even cutting-edge ones, like the one placing emphasis on the notion of the ‘economic constitution’) are inadequate because the debate is already embedded in ideological compromise. Offering a brief exposition of the Marxist approach to the democratic form of the capitalist state, it attempts to show the limitations of critical approaches which overlook the issue of class rule and state power in their calls for democratisation. To do so, the article outlines the structural function and class character of the EU, as well as its role as a (supra-)state formation in the process of capital accumulation. Ultimately, it offers a Janus-faced critique of democratic deficit in Europe, one the one hand arguing that the critique of the EU economic constitution as neoliberal is limited because it fails to account for the scope of reform that the EU allows to respond to the challenges of the process of capital accumulation, while on the other concluding that the solution to the democratic deficit cannot simply be a return to nation-state democracy which is equidistant from actual self-government of the popular strata as its EU counterpart.
]]>In this contribution we ask how Přibáň’s theoretical choices shape the capacity of ‘European constitutional imaginaries’ to account for the ever more necessary work of recognition and redistribution within European society. While ‘European constitutional imaginaries’ reveal the intricate ideologies at play within European law and politics, as well as their power in motivating dominant currents of European political life, the project remains limited in that it accepts essential tenets of functional differentiation in society, obscuring the conditions of possibility for the formation of differentiated systems. Put differently, ‘European constitutional imaginaries’, both as forms of life and analytic concepts, have difficulty in conceiving the frontiers of imaginaries, their beginning and end, their formation and transformation—and in so doing, risk naturalizing their initial differentiation as a priori excluded from political contestation.
]]>Jiří Přibáň’s work deals with constitutional imaginaries, starting from the concept of social imaginaries as entities describing functionally differentiated modern society as one polity. Přibáň’s conception perceives constitutional imaginaries in terms of social systems, representing a socio-legal paradox, since constitutional imaginaries express both the constitution of social unity and its pluralism of values. The aim of this contribution is to explore the link between Přibáň’s work and some aspects of Luhmann and Teubner’s contributions to the theory of social systems. By highlighting these features, the Author tries to argue that contemporary imaginaries can work as constitutional forces that drive contemporary legal pluralistic regimes, including the European one, to the societal unity by warranting a systemic difference.
]]>In this paper we identify and discuss three different strategies for taking up intersectionality in the space of European private law, ie, liberal ideal theories of social and private law justice, liberal nonideal theories of reparation, and private law abolition. While we caution for how intersectionality is taken up in the European space of private law, these strategies yield insights about how intersectionality may recast (European) private law’s role as a potential site to advance, or thwart, pursuits of justice. The three strategies imply (potentially radical) shifts in how legal scholars may understand private law justice. We suggest that (European) private law abolition might be the most promising starting point to think intersectionality’s significance for recasting dominant understandings of private law’s relation to (in)justice in the EU context.
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