Obstacles to businesses’ cross-border operations and expansion constitute a major hurdle to an effective single market. The International Monetary Fund estimates that persistent barriers to the single market represent the equivalent of a 44 % and 110 % tariff on goods and services, respectively. The Letta report emphasised that a single business code would be a ‘game-changer’, making all business procedures – from establishment to end of activity – smoother and more transparent.

To address this issue, the European Commission published a proposal on 18 March 2026 for a regulation establishing the 28th regime corporate legal framework that introduces a new legal entity, EU Inc. Any company would be able to register in any Member State and opt in to the EU Inc. company form. The framework would allow quick, fully digital registration that is automatically valid across the whole EU, thereby benefiting the operations and expansion of EU Inc. businesses. In addition, the proposal provides for a single tax treatment of employee remuneration through stocks and enables employee participation schemes. It also provides for fast-track termination of solvent companies, and a legal framework for winding up insolvent small and young innovative companies, known as start-ups.

Parliament adopted a resolution in January 2026 supporting the approach but remained cautious about its chances of success.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The 28th regime corporate legal framework‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

CONTEXT

Health biotechnologies are increasingly important for public health, innovation, and the European Union’s competitiveness in global research and healthcare markets. They encompass, for example, gene therapies for rare diseases, cell therapies to treat cancer, immunotherapies, bio-artificial skin for burn treatment, and mRNA vaccines. Biotechnology is among the fastest-growing economic sectors in the EU, yet the EU continues to lag behind the United States and China in translating biotech innovation into commercially viable products and large-scale manufacturing. Structural challenges remain, particularly in clinical development, regulatory processes, and manufacturing capacity.
On 16 December 2025, the European Commission proposed a package of measures intended to improve the health of EU citizens, and ensure the long-term resilience and competitiveness of the EU health sector. The package includes a proposal for a ‘European biotech act’ setting out an EU-level framework to strengthen the competitiveness of the health biotechnology and biomanufacturing sector in the EU, by simplifying regulatory processes, promoting innovation, boosting EU-based biomanufacturing with new incentives and support tools, and facilitating access to finance, while maintaining high safety, ethics and sustainability standards.
Following this health-focused initiative, the Commission is expected to propose a second European Biotech Act later in 2026, centred on industrial biotechnologies and biomanufacturing, to ensure a competitive internal market for all biotechnology areas.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0406(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Union’s biotechnology and biomanufacturing sectors particularly in the area of health and amending Regulations (EC) No 178/2002, (EC) No 1394/2007, (EU) No 536/2014, (EU) 2019/6, (EU) 2024/795 and (EU) 2024/1938 (European Biotech Act) – COM(2025) 1022, 16 December 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule:2025/0406(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘European biotech act‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The virtual, online world is a significant part of everyday life. As a reflection of modern society, it features a range of criminal behaviour. The internet is a complex system of interconnected computer networks allowing applications to communicate with one another. Through this complexity, it has a simplistic structure with a visible top layer, a deeper content layer and finally, a small but significant dark layer.
This dark layer, known as the dark web, is a less explored and understood part of the web. It contains content that is not searchable and is accessed using a process to maintain anonymity. There are legitimate and appropriate reasons for accessing the dark web, such as activists and whistleblowers avoiding identification. However, it has a reputation for illicit content and activity. This notoriety can be justified, as the dark web, while not unlawful in itself, does contain websites providing access to illegal content and services such as drugs, firearms, stolen data and child sexual abuse material. This online space is being progressively scrutinised by law enforcement agencies, who have become increasingly specialised in countering certain aspects of the dark web, with some notable successes in dismantling cybercrime infrastructure and bringing criminals to justice

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding the dark web‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

In this article, I examine the European social contract as a political discourse. The concept has emerged as a catchy but politically-laden concept within EU politics during Europe's polycrisis period. It has been employed by practitioners, civil society actors and politicians, with each referring to different kinds of contracts and often mobilising it for different political purposes. Here, I explore the economic, green, progressive and nationalist accounts of the social contract, and suggest that the social contract has proved to be an effective tool for political and social actors to articulate their political visions concerning Europe. Whereas I analyse such discursive accounts of the social contract by resorting to the poststructural discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, I find inspiration in ontological security studies in International Relations to unpack its affective dimension, namely, how it may serve to manage and direct collective anxiety and fear through narratives of continuity, stability and renewal.

This article examines how climate change and climate-related policies can destabilise the EU social contract. The article uses the welfare-state lens that places social protection at the core of a feasible and legitimate green transition to understand this destabilisation. Climate change is understood as both an external stressor, through escalating physical impacts, and an internal disruptor, through mitigation and adaptation policies that reorder labour markets, household budgets and territorial development, thereby generating new social risks, distributive conflicts and constitutional pressures on EU governance and legitimacy. The analysis provided in this article distinguishes between (i) implementation gaps, by which the EU social contract fails to deliver on its own promises of security, prosperity, equity and solidarity and voice and participation under climate stress, and (ii) conceptual gaps, which explain how growth dependence, anthropocentrism, presentism and EU-bounded justice make the current EU social contract ill-suited to the climate challenge. In response, the article outlines how the EU eco-social contract could be operationalised, shifting from growth-dependent welfare to a resilient one and strengthening the Union's commitment of leaving no one behind through more robust, integrated social-protection instruments that can buffer climate shocks while enabling fair structural change.

Overview

On 16 December 2025, the European Commission published the automotive omnibus as part of a broader automotive package aimed at supporting the sector in the transition to clean mobility. The automotive omnibus is the ninth set of simplification measures (also known as ‘omnibus packages’) that have been published by the Commission since 2025. Its purpose is to simplify the rules governing the EU automotive industry and improve coherence and consistency between different regulatory requirements. The two legislative proposals included in the package would amend the EU rules concerning tachograph obligations for electric light commercial vehicles (electric vans) and motor caravans, as well as those applying to speed limitation devices for electric vans. Additionally, the package would introduce a definition of a small electric car in motor vehicle legislation and authorise the Commission to adopt delegated acts to lay down the technical requirements for vehicle interoperability with charging infrastructure and grid. Furthermore, the proposals would simplify the rules for EU type-approval of new motor vehicles in terms of their sound level; remove some low-temperature laboratory tests from the Euro 7 Regulation; simplify Euro 7 rules for heavy-duty vehicles; and empower the Commission to adopt implementing acts on car data management.

Procedural information

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU automotive omnibus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The reintegration of Ukrainian war veterans into civilian life presents both a significant challenge and an opportunity for Ukraine’s economic reconstruction. Veterans are facing various difficulties depending on factors such as their educational background, military role, access to healthcare (including psychological assistance), gender and access to housing, especially for those from territories currently occupied by Russia.

Ukraine recently adopted its veterans policy strategy for 2030, aiming to restore the human capital and wellbeing of veterans and their families. It also seeks to express respect and gratitude towards veterans, commemorate fallen soldiers and define the role of veterans in ensuring Ukraine’s security and defence capabilities.

The European Commission’s Ukraine 2025 enlargement report addresses the situation of veterans in several sections, assessing reforms and providing recommendations for progress on the path to EU membership. These sections concern employment and the rights of people with disabilities.

Implementing the veterans policy for 2030 and various recommendations from the European Commission will require further resources to build a lasting support system for veterans. This issue is expected to be discussed during the Council of the European Union meeting on 21 April 2026.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Ukraine’s veterans policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Introduction

The past few years have seen considerable interest in generative AI, particularly large language models (LLMs). This has translated into massive investment amounting to hundreds of billions of euros per year, especially in the US, in AI data centres designed around Graphics Processing Unit (GPU)-based platforms. Such breakneck expansion is increasingly running into constraints, particularly with regard to electricity availability.

Running AI models requires large amounts of power (as well as water, much of which is used to produce the electricity required), with data centres responsible for 1.5 % of global electricity consumption (2 % in the EU) and growing at 12 % annually. Moreover, they are often geographically concentrated, for example in Ireland, where they account for over 20 % of electricity consumption. Future scenarios suggest that this demand could continue to increase rapidly, although this should be taken with the caveat that investment in AI might be a bubble, LLMs may be supplanted by other models with different compute needs, and chip design innovations beyond GPUs may provide energy efficiency gains.

This situation has given rise to the idea of deploying compute in space to take advantage of the free, abundant solar energy. Originally focused on orbital processing of observational data and space mission support, the concept has rapidly evolved into the deployment of AI data centres in orbit to service ground-based needs. Recently, the strongest push has come from the US, with the merger between SpaceX and xAI linked to a request to put a million satellites in orbit, as well as interest from Google with project Suncatcher, and startups such as Starcloud and Axiom. Meanwhile, China has also launched pilot satellites intended to be the first in a future constellation, and in the EU the Horizon Europe-supported ASCEND project has concluded a feasibility study, aiming towards an operational system from 2030.

Potential impacts and developments

Launch costs represent a key constraint for any orbital infrastructure. The introduction of reusable rockets has led to a considerable decrease in recent times, to around several thousand euros per kilo of payload. This reduction is expected to continue thanks to improved heavy rockets and reusable second stages, with the European Space Agency (ESA) aiming for €280/kg with a new super-heavy lift launcher. Most ideas for future space data centres would involve either large constellations or modular construction, allowing build-up to occur over time. Even so, this would require a very high launch cadence, with a complete data centre likely needing upwards of one hundred launches, followed by a significant proportion yearly to replace satellites at end of life; this compares to around 300 space launches overall in 2025.

The main attraction of placing data centres in space is solar power: for objects located above the atmosphere, insolation (incoming solar radiation) can be several times greater than on the ground. The ideal choice would be a terminator sun-synchronous orbit, allowing satellites to keep pace with the dawn/dusk line and ensuring constant solar exposure on one side, while keeping the other dark to assist with cooling. Solar panels would need to be very large – up to a gargantuan 4 km per side, as envisaged by Starcloud for a 5 GW data centre; a small satellite with the equivalent of a server rack might make do with a more manageable 60 m² and 28 kW, as deployed on the International Space Station (ISS). Newer thin-film solar panel technology may help keep the weight down.

If power is the main advantage, cooling is possibly the major challenge. Although space is cold, it is also a vacuum, meaning cooling can only take place via radiative emission. This can be achieved by coupling a coolant loop (the ISS uses ammonia) with large radiators pointing towards deep space, which would be of comparable size to the solar panels but considerably heavier. The spacecraft’s cooling system is particularly vulnerable: any rupture, for example from a meteoroid strike, can cause coolant loss and damage the electronic systems. Given radiative cooling scales as the fourth power of temperature, further advances may come from lighter radiators running at higher temperatures. The other main concern in orbit is radiation, which can cause random bit flips and whose impact over time can lead to a degradation of performance or malfunction. Recent work from Google and Starcloud, which has deployed a NVIDIA H100 chip in orbit, has given promising indications, but fault tolerance, error correction, redundancy (deliberate duplication of critical components or systems), and shielding are all required.

Any assembly or maintenance would pose a significant challenge. Heavy AI workloads can lead to relatively high chip failure rates, which, added to radiation effects, imply short lifespans of a few years. Depending on the concept, this would require redundancy or satellite replacement, with a weight or cost penalty, or else robotic maintenance in orbit, which still needs further development. Finally, there is the issue of communications. Large amounts of data from the ground, to be used for training, may simply be physically carried by ‘data shuttles‘, while server-side communications, needing high data rates, could use optical communication between satellites, in turn implying close proximity. Google’s plans, for example, envisage satellites hundreds of metres apart. With space debris and collisions being a critical issue, this would represent a major challenge in terms of the coordination of collision avoidance manoeuvres, which may be frequent given the sizes of the constellations being proposed.

Anticipatory policymaking

Deploying data centres in space poses important challenges, but does not appear to face insurmountable technical barriers and might be feasible even with current technology. The main hurdle is rather economic, with a mildly optimistic estimate placing near-future costs around three times those on the ground, although opinions are divided on whether such optimism is justified or not. Further innovation could help, with the evolution of launch costs a key determinant. This may lead to interesting synergies, with further technological and skills development benefiting other potential uses of space such as space-based solar power.

The current legal framework leaves space data centres in a grey zone: the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty establishes no sovereignty in outer space, with launch states (a concept that presents its own issues) instead bearing responsibility and liability for space activities. Drafted in the 1960s, this treaty lacks explicit provisions regarding data. Article VIII of the treaty refers to jurisdiction over a space ‘object, and over any personnel thereof’, which has prompted some stakeholders to urge regulators to explicitly consider the concept of a ‘digital flag state’. Furthermore, relevant laws and treaties relying on the territorial location of data may require clarification. Examples include the GDPR‘s concept of transfers of personal data to third countries and the recently signed UN Convention against Cybercrime, which includes ships and aircraft but not satellites under its jurisdictional provisions. Likewise, legislation dealing with space activities may need to account for considerable processing of data originating from the ground rather than space. Extending the definition of space-based data and primary providers of space-based data in the Space Act, for example, could offer additional clarity. The overall situation is complex, involving potential multiple layers of overlapping jurisdiction. In the future, in-orbit assembly and AI agents risk further increasing this complexity. These issues highlight that extraterritorial application, as conceived in the GDPR or the Space Act, will be a crucial factor in the future regulation of space data centres.

The potential scale of orbital data centres is also important to consider. A 1 GW data centre, similar in scale to the largest under construction on the ground, could require a total payload upwards of 10 000 tons, or over three times the total payload mass launched in 2025. This risks potential infrastructure bottlenecks, such as the limited availability of launch facilities or liquid oxygen. It also raises sustainability questions, given that lifetime emissions may be larger than on the ground. Furthermore, the pollution of the upper atmosphere that would be caused by de-orbiting large numbers of end-of-life satellites is still poorly understood. Finally, it poses a critical, geopolitically relevant question regarding orbital congestion, as international regulation of slots in low Earth orbit is currently only done indirectly through radio spectrum assignment by the International Telecommunications Union, generally on a first-come, first-served basis.

What ifs are two-page-long publications about new or emerging technologies aiming to accurately summarise the scientific state-of-the art in an accessible and engaging manner. They further consider the impacts such technologies may have – on society, the environment and the economy, among others – and how the European Parliament may react to them. As such, they do not aim to be and cannot be prescriptive, but serve primarily as background material for the Members and staff of the European Parliament to assist them in their parliamentary work.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if AI data centres were put in space?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The Roma are Europe’s largest ethnic minority. A significant number of Roma people live in very poor socio-economic conditions. The social exclusion, discrimination and segregation they face are mutually reinforcing. Their restricted access to education and difficulties entering the labour market result in low income and poor health compared with non-Roma people.

Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been stressing the need for better Roma inclusion. In 2011, an EU framework for national Roma integration strategies up to 2020 was launched to tackle their socio-economic exclusion and discrimination. This was followed in October 2020 by the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation 2020-2030, complemented by the Council’s March 2021 recommendation promoting national strategic frameworks and the October 2023 European Council conclusions on desegregated housing and segregated settlements. The EU continues to support Member States through structural and investment funds with the 2021-2027 Common Provisions Regulation emphasising alignment with European Semester recommendations and the European Pillar of Social Rights.

In parallel, the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025, succeeded by the EU anti-racism strategy 2026-2030, strengthened enforcement of anti-discrimination law, while the Fundamental Rights Agency’s Roma survey 2024 confirms modest progress but warns of shortfalls against 2030 targets in poverty, housing, employment, education and discrimination.

Issues relating to the promotion of democratic values and practices, as well as economic, social and cultural rights for Roma people, have received particular attention from civil society organisations. The European Parliament has consistently advocated for Roma inclusion since the 1990s, with recent resolutions and debates targeting implementation gaps, antigypsyism, child segregation, women’s rights and the new anti-racism strategy.

This is a further update of a briefing originally published in May 2021; the previous update was in March 2025.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding EU action on Roma inclusion‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The world has changed since the European Union adopted its first economic security strategy in 2023. An increasingly confrontational geopolitical environment and the possibility of coercive behaviour from both China and the United States require a longer term strategy to reduce dependencies as well as a short-term ability to react swiftly to threats. On 3 December 2025, the European Commission adopted its new communication on economic security aiming to switch up a gear, from finding ad-hoc responses to crises based on risk identification, to proactive risk anticipation and mitigation. This new approach also focuses on providing clarity on the strategic and coherent use of the many instruments already available in the EU toolbox.

Aiming for a safer and more resilient EU economy, the Commission’s communication proposes ways to protect and develop strategic industries and reduce the EU’s vulnerabilities to coercion and other disruption. To build a solid knowledge base for informed decision-making and common understanding of risks and responses, the approach seeks to strengthen data gathering, analysis and overall economic security policy governance, with increased public and private stakeholder participation. To boost coherence, the Commission wants to adapt existing policy tools to deployment with a clear aim of managing economic security risks, taking possible impacts across policies into account. The Commission will seek to close existing security gaps with new instruments, such as the revised Blocking Statute.

The communication met with mixed reactions from the expert community, with both praise for taking the much needed step in the right direction, as well as criticisism for its insufficient response to the stark challenges facing the EU. The European Parliament is preparing its opinion on the role of trade in strengthening the EU’s economic security, to be adopted in the coming months.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Strengthening EU economic security – From crisis response to proactive anticipation: Joining the dots for a resilient economy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

In her foreword to the latest edition of the Index, President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, said ‘a clear understanding of the threats to peace, security and democracy around the world is crucial. This makes the Normandy Index a valuable tool for navigating today’s world’.

The results of the 2025 exercise suggest the level of threats to peace in the world is the highest in the seven years since the index began, confirming declining trends in global security resulting from the war in Ukraine, multiple crises, conflicts and geopolitical rivalry, including those linked to economic, digital and energy dimensions. Among the top three most peaceful countries are Switzerland, Iceland and Norway.

The most fragile countries are the Central African Republic, Afghanistan and Somalia. Geopolitical crisis in the European neighbourhood resulted in a fall in the EU‑27’s overall global ranking of 3 places in 2024. In 2025, the EU‑27 ranking remains the same as the previous year (10th globally). After a slight improvement from 2019 to 2022, the global peace profile (5.74 average in 2023‑2024) has also declined in the past year to 5.79 – unsurprisingly given current geopolitical tensions (10 is the highest mark).

According to the Index’s lead author, Branislav Stanicek, the 2025 edition also reflects the changed dynamics of today’s international conflicts, which particularly affect energy security and fiscal policies. He stresses: ‘International actions such as restrictive measures against Russian Federation clearly affected governmental revenue and suggests a tightening of the Russian government’s fiscal stance’. In 2025, Russia fell 16 positions down the Index, to 124th globally. However, increased sovereign debt, measured by economic indicator, also demonstrates a certain vulnerability within EU‑27 and Western democracies. Nevertheless, Professor Steve Hanke of Johns Hopkins University argues ‘Public debt is just a deferred tax. It will be paid by future taxpayers, either through an explicit tax increase or by inflation’.

Derived from the Index, 63 individual country case studies provide a picture of the state of peace in the world today. An online, interactive version of the Index allows data comparison across countries, regions and timeline. In 2023, the Index won the Forbes Social Communication Award (in the domain of public communication of peace and security).

The Normandy Index differs from other indices in that it adopts an approach tailored by and to EU action. It also defines conflict and the numerous stages between perfect peace and total war as a product of factors linked to the main threats identified by the EU in its external action strategy. The EU global strategy identifies the following 11 threats as the current main challenges to peace and security.  

Trends towards inflation, trade, energy disruption and weaker economies, underway since 2021, continued in 2025. Global GDP growth slowed in 2022 to 3.2 %, more than 1 percentage point less than expected at the end of 2021, mainly weighed down by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. Following 2.6 % growth in 2023 and sub-trend global growth of 2.8 % in 2024, global growth is projected to reach 3.2 % in 2025 and 3.1 % in 2026. At the same time, Kristalina Georgieva, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), issued a stark warning in October 2025 about the mounting risks facing the global economy: ‘buckle up: uncertainty is the new normal’.

Read the complete study on ‘Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide: Normandy Index 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

This article revisits social contract theory through a dialogue between Jule Goikoetxea Mentxaka and Antoni Abat i Ninet, questioning whether classical and contemporary contractarianism can account for structural forms of domination that precede and shape consent. Drawing on feminist, Marxist, decolonial and materialist critiques, it challenges the liberal opposition between rational consent and coercion. Using concepts such as social control, symbolic violence, social reproduction and the sexual and colonial contracts, the article shows how gendered, racialised and class-based power relations condition legal and political obligations beyond the autonomous individual. From a jurisprudential and EU constitutional law perspective, it explores whether an explicit EU social contract could confront, rather than reproduce, these dynamics. The article argues that deliberation structured as critique and counter-critique may provide a more inclusive, transparent and democratically legitimate foundation for rethinking political association in the European Union.

Introduction

Some history

The concept of a regulatory sandbox already existed before the AI Act. According to Arto Lanamäki et al., it first emerged in 2016 with the United Kingdom’s financial technology (fintech) regulation. Studies suggest that regulatory sandboxes have reduced legal uncertainty and raised fintech venture investment. A 2022 EPRS publication also lists other sectors where regulatory sandboxes have emerged as test beds, including transport, energy, telecommunications and health. It adds that the UK and Norway have already established regulatory sandboxes for AI products. It also notes that the European Parliament has called for introducing regulatory sandboxes in several resolutions since 2019.

Definition

AI regulatory sandboxes were first introduced in the proposal for a regulation on artificial intelligence (AI Act) published by the European Commission in April 2021. The final version of the AI Act, adopted in 2024, defines an AI regulatory sandbox as ‘a controlled framework set up by a competent authority which offers providers or prospective providers of AI systems the possibility to develop, train, validate and test, where appropriate in real-world conditions, an innovative AI system, pursuant to a sandbox plan for a limited time under regulatory supervision’.

Benefits and risks

Regulatory sandboxes offer three main benefits: they can help regulators develop better policies, innovators to develop compliant AI products, and consumers by bringing safer products on to the market. In a 2020 report, the OECD found they may facilitate dialogue between authorities and new players entering the market. Another report from the World Bank confirms these benefits based on its study of the fintech sector. However, the World Bank report also warns of implementation risks, where additional administrative burdens and lack of resources could outweigh the benefits.

AI Act regulatory sandboxes

Obligations on Member States

EU Member States are required to ensure their national competent authorities establish, or participate in, at least one AI regulatory sandbox, which should be operational by 2 August 2026. The AI regulatory sandboxes aim to improve legal certainty to achieve regulatory compliance, support sharing of best practices through fostering cooperation, innovation and competitiveness, contribute to evidence-based regulatory learning and speed up access to the single market. They are accessible on a voluntary basis and include specific measures targeted at SMEs and start-ups.

Implementation and coordination

The AI Act established a hybrid enforcement system whereby the Commission and the European AI board assist Member States in setting up their AI regulatory sandboxes. National competent authorities are also obliged to coordinate with and report to EU‑level entities, produce guidance, supervision and support within the sandboxes, and facilitate cross-border cooperation. Meanwhile, the Commission is required to adopt secondary legislation that specifies how the AI Act is to be implemented and gives details of terms and conditions and how to access sandboxes. The European Data Protection Supervisor may also establish an AI regulatory sandbox for EU institutions.

Challenges

Design

Claudio Novelli et al. describe three phases of regulatory sandboxes: pre-testing, testing and post-testing. Designing a sandbox involves defining the variables of each phase, such as the eligibility criteria (pre-testing), the level of realism and replication of oversight (testing), and the exit pathway and streamlined conformity assessments (post-testing). They believe the right balance must be struck between each variable to attract innovators and ensure compliance. For instance, eligibility criteria should permit different situations and lead to a tailored track when using the sandbox, since AI systems in early-stage development do not need the same support as those in late-stage development.

Fragmentation

The rules for AI systems are enforced at Member State level through national authorities. While Member States must ensure that authorities have enough resources to set up and run their sandboxes, fragmented enforcement could result in some authorities receiving more resources than others, leading to uneven capacities. AI providers might therefore intentionally choose less stringent sandboxes, risking inconsistencies in the act’s enforcement.

Time

Challenges related to the design and fragmented implementation are compounded by additional time constraints. The AI Act provisions related to regulatory sandboxes will take effect from 2 August 2026. Since the Commission has not yet adopted any implementing acts providing guidance, Member States have to act independently to design their sandboxes, recruit and train staff, and build capacity.

State of play and next steps

National implementation

In August 2025, Deirdre Ahern noted that out of the 27 Member States, only one – Spain – has an AI regulatory sandbox which is up and running. Five are actively implementing their sandboxes, four have declared their intention to do so and 16 have not yet communicated their plans. Spain seems to be the most advanced Member State currently, as its sandbox opened in 2025 and began hosting 12 high-risk AI systems. This initial experience enabled the Spanish authority, AESIA, to publish guidelines in December 2025 to support the implementation and compliance of systems with the AI Act. The act further obliges the Commission to develop a single, dedicated interface containing all relevant information on AI regulatory sandboxes to allow stakeholders to interact with them.

Secondary legislation and omnibus

Under the AI Act, the Commission must adopt implementing acts specifying how to establish, develop, implement, operate and supervise the sandboxes. In December 2025, the Commission published a draft version and requested feedback by January 2026. In the recitals of the draft, the Commission insists on the need to ensure consistent implementation of the rules. In addition to the implementing acts, a new regulation known as the digital omnibus on AI has been proposed by the Commission to amend the AI Act. The proposal suggests granting the Commission the right to create an EU‑level AI regulatory sandbox for AI systems under its supervision and strengthen coordination between national sandboxes. As of March 2025, the relevant European Parliament committees are engaged in examining the proposal.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘AI regulatory sandboxes: State of play and implementation challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

European political parties (‘europarties’) emerged in the 1970s, preceding the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 granted them legal recognition; however, it was only in 2004 that EU law defined their status, set establishment criteria, and provided independent funding. The most recent regulatory change in 2025 emphasised protecting EU values, strengthening safeguards against foreign interference, and updating transparency and financing requirements. Europarties’ influence depends on balancing European and national interests. Ongoing deliberations seek to enhance europarties’ resilience, and their independence from national politics, reflecting the broader debate on the balance of power between Member States and EU institutions. This search for equilibrium continues to drive significant academic and political discussion.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European political parties‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

European Union–United States trade deal

Against a background of trade tariff instability, and to pave the way for negotiations with the Council on implementing the 2025 framework agreement between the EU and the United States (the ‘Turnberry deal’), Parliament debated and adopted its first-reading position on Committee on International Trade (INTA) reports on the two regulations proposed. The report on the main proposal covers EU industrial tariff liberalisation/agricultural tariff rate quotas, proposing a ‘sunset’ date of 31 March 2028, defensive measures in case of additional demands, and a safeguard clause. The second report, which deals specifically with trade in lobster, proposes a ‘sunset’ date of 31 December 2028, and includes defensive measures in case of US imposition of additional tariffs, breaches of human rights or threats to EU security interests. Both reports propose to evaluate the situation six months after implementation of the EU-US framework agreement.

Deposit protection and early intervention measures

Members remain determined to protect taxpayers from the consequences of failed banking institutions. A joint debate took place on deposit protection and early intervention measures, followed by a vote on agreed texts on a package of proposals that seek to further harmonise the current EU bank crisis management and deposit insurance framework. The agreements would facilitate access to industry support for failing banks, with resort to national deposit guarantee schemes set as a last resort. They also clarify the criteria for choosing whether to liquidate or rescue a bank and retain the current two-tier system for deposit protection.

Combating corruption

Following lengthy negotiations, Members approved a provisional agreement on the proposed directive to combat corruption. Aimed at developing a more robust legal and policy framework, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs’ report on the proposal called for an extended definition of a ‘public official’ potentially subject to criminal proceedings in the case of ‘abuse of function’, and to introduce new categories of offence. It also sought enhanced rights for the public to participate in corruption-related proceedings and called for EU countries to adopt anti-corruption strategies. Parliament’s recommendations shaped the compromise text in this latter respect, but with limited extensions to definitions.

Digital omnibus on artificial intelligence

The development and use of artificial intelligence (AI) is changing many aspects of daily life, and at considerable speed. The EU’s flagship Artificial Intelligence Act introduced measures to encourage development whilst also protecting citizens. However, setting up the governance structure to apply the act takes time. To ensure safe AI development can continue in the interim, Members adopted Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations on proposed measures to simplify application of the AI Act. A report from Parliament’s Committees on Internal Market and Consumer Protection and on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs agrees with the Council position that fixed deadlines should be set for delaying the rules governing high-risk AI systems. The report also introduces a targeted ban on AI generation of non-consensual sexual and intimate content.

Global gateway

The EU’s global gateway strategy seeks to promote clean and secure energy connections by working with international partners worldwide. Members debated and adopted an own-initiative report from the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on Development (DEVE), assessing the first four years of the strategy’s implementation. While noting the funding has been successfully spent on promoting sustainable and inclusive growth in non-EU countries, the report nevertheless proposes improvements. These include moving to a more demand-driven strategy, based on partners’ needs and greater private sector involvement. The committees recommend revising the governance structure for greater democratic legitimacy, and advocate simpler and more predictable financing, as well as avoiding global gateway projects exacerbating debt in third countries.

Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive

In the EU, citizens largely enjoy access to clean water. The EU’s urban wastewater legislation was updated in 2024, to bring it into line with the EU’s climate neutrality targets. The new Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (UWWTD) introduced stricter requirements for urban wastewater treatment, water re-use and sanitation. Members posed an oral question to the Commission on the implementation of this directive, with Members debating how to uphold the ‘polluter pays’ principle without risking production of vital medicines, as the pharmaceutical industry is a major user of water resources. During negotiations on the file, Parliament insisted on measures to avoid unintended consequences for vital products like medicines and to promote the re-use of wastewater and plant modernisation.

European Citizens’ Initiative – ‘Ban on conversion practices in the European Union’

Against the backdrop of several national bans on conversion practices in EU countries, Parliament debated a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), with over one million signatures in support, calling for an EU-wide ban on conversion practices targeting LGBTIQ+ individuals. Conversion practices (also known as conversion ‘therapies’) are widely condemned as constituting torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, resulting in severe physical and psychological harm. The European Parliament firmly opposes conversion practices and has long denounced all forms of LGBTIQ+ discrimination.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on the common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union (Return Regulation), announced on 12 March 2026, was approved by vote.

This ‘at a glance’ note is intended to review some of the highlights of the plenary part-session, and notably to follow up on key dossiers identified by EPRS. It does not aim to be exhaustive. For more detailed information on specific files, please see other EPRS products, notably our ‘EU legislation in progress’ briefings, and the plenary minutes.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – March II 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

This article argues that the proliferation of goals in competition law—from efficiency and consumer welfare to inclusion, transformation and sustainability—cannot be coherently pursued without a guiding normative framework. Using South Africa as a case study, it shows how ambitious statutory objectives, left without such a framework, have produced fragmented jurisprudence: Some decisions retreat to economic orthodoxy, others invoke public interest without principled integration. Drawing on Ronald Dworkin's theory of constructive interpretation, it contends that competition law, like all law, must be interpreted in its best moral light, situated within the constitutional order that gives it purpose. Without this normative anchor, expanded mandates risk incoherence as global regimes seek to move beyond the narrow confines of consumer welfare.

Despite the influence of ordoliberalism in EU law, the mutual feedback between market power and political influence of dominant corporations has not become an explicit consideration in competition law enforcement and has remained rather in the background as an implicit rationale. If the threats to competition posed by regulatory capture are to be addressed, such a mutual feedback loop should become an explicit part of the analysis in competition law cases. This article proposes a factors test in order to determine when the exercise of a company's political rights has degenerated into a scenario of heightened risk of regulatory capture. The factors of the test are drawn from the main tenets of the extant literature on lobbying in the EU that describe the dynamics of how stakeholders gain access to the ears of policymakers. Once a heightened risk of regulatory capture is established, this article argues that specific instances of lobbying for a defined policy proposal can be covered by Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU. The requirement of a heightened risk of regulatory capture is designed to align the prosecution of anticompetitive lobbying with the CJEU's case law on abuse of rights as an abuse of dominance, following from AstraZeneca. When corporations aim to capture areas of public policy, they abuse their political rights and can therefore be subjected to competition law liability. In this way, competition law enforcement can complement other areas of public policy aimed at preventing market distortions caused by political influence, such as transparency obligations of corporate political activity and state aid laws.

Competition law serves not only to regulate markets but also to construct and deepen them, particularly during transitions from centrally planned or heavily regulated to market economies. Its significance is both economic and political: Since its inception, competition law has sought to prevent concentrated economic power from distorting the functioning of democracy. This article explores how competition law shapes democratic transitions and democratic erosion. It puts forward that competition law supports democratisation by constraining powerful economic interests, reinforcing the separation of powers through enforcement and advocacy by independent agencies and strengthening state capacity. Conversely, authoritarian actors may instrumentalise competition law to entrench their power, reward allies and suppress opposition. Democratic erosion, in turn, undermines the autonomy of competition agencies and their enforcement efforts. The article draws on economic and democratic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey and Latin America and charts recent cases of democratic decline in these contexts to illustrate its arguments.

Members gather for their second plenary session in March 2026, to progress decisions on a number of important files. Representatives of the European Council and European Commission are expected to make statements on the conclusion of the leaders’ meeting of 19 March 2026, at which the European Union’s competitiveness and the situation in the Middle East, as well as continued support for Ukraine was discussed. The Council and Commission are also due to make statements on energy security, independence and supply in the current fraught geopolitical context, with a view to ensuring market stability and affordable energy for industry and citizens.

Against a background of trade tariff instability, and to pave the way for  negotiations with the Council on implementing the 2025 framework agreement between the EU and the United States (the ‘Turnberry deal’), Parliament is on Thursday set to consider its first-reading position on Committee on International Trade (INTA) reports on the two regulations proposed. The report on the main proposal covers EU industrial tariff liberalisation/agricultural tariff rate quotas, proposing a ‘sunset’ date of 31 March 2028, defensive measures in case of additional demands, and a safeguard clause. The second report, which deals specifically with trade in lobster, proposes a ‘sunset’ date of 31 December 2028, and includes defensive measures in case of US imposition of additional tariffs, breaches of human rights or threats to EU security interests. Both reports propose to evaluate the situation six months following implementation of the EU-US framework agreement.

Harking back to an earlier, financial, crisis, Members remain determined to protect taxpayers from the consequences of failed banking institutions. A debate is therefore scheduled for Wednesday afternoon on deposit protection and early intervention measures, with a vote scheduled on agreed texts on a package of proposals that seek to further harmonise the current EU bank crisis management and deposit insurance framework. The agreements would facilitate access to industry support for failing banks, with resort to national deposit guarantee schemes set as a last resort. They also clarify the criteria for choosing whether to liquidate or rescue a bank and retain the current two-tier system for deposit protection.

The development and use of artificial intelligence (AI) is changing many aspects of daily life, and at considerable speed. The EU’s flagship Artificial Intelligence Act introduced measures to encourage development whilst also protecting citizens. However, setting up the governance structure to apply the act takes time. To ensure safe AI development can continue in the interim, Members are due to vote on Thursday to set Parliament’s position for negotiations on proposed measures to simplify application of the AI Act. A report from Parliament’s Committees on Internal Market and Consumer Protection and on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs agrees with the Council proposal that fixed deadlines should be set for delaying the rules governing high-risk AI systems. The report also introduces a targeted ban on AI generation of non-consensual sexual and intimate content.

Following lengthy negotiations, Members are expected to consider a provisional agreement on the proposed directive to combat corruption on Wednesday. Aimed at developing a more robust legal and policy framework, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs’ report on the proposal called for an extended definition of a ‘public official’ subject to criminal proceedings in the case of ‘abuse of function’, and to introduce new categories of offence. It also sought enhanced rights for the public to participate in corruption-related proceedings and called for  EU countries to adopt anti-corruption strategies. Parliament’s recommendations shaped the compromise text in this latter respect, but with limited extensions to definitions.

In the EU, citizens largely enjoy access to clean water. The EU’s urban wastewater legislation was updated in 2024, to bring it into line with the EU’s climate neutrality targets. The new Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (UWWTD) introduced stricter requirements for urban wastewater treatment, water re-use and sanitation. An oral question to the Commission is tabled for Thursday morning on the implementation of this file. The question is likely to raise debate on how to uphold the ‘polluter pays’ principle without risking production of vital medicines, as the pharmaceutical industry is a major user of water resources. During negotiations on the file, Parliament insisted on measures to avoid unintended consequences for vital products like medicines and to promote the re-use of wastewater and plant modernisation.

The EU’s global gateway strategy seeks to promote clean and secure energy connections by working with international partners worldwide. On Thursday morning, Members are due to consider a report from the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on Development (DEVE), assessing the first four years of the strategy’s implementation. While noting the funding has been successfully spent on promoting sustainable and inclusive growth in non-EU countries, the report nevertheless proposes improvements. These include moving to a more demand-driven strategy, based on partners’ needs and greater private sector involvement. The committees recommend revising the governance structure for greater democratic legitimacy, and advocate simpler and more predictable financing, as well as avoiding global gateway projects exacerbating debt in third countries.

Against the backdrop of several national bans on conversion practices in EU countries, on Wednesday, Parliament is set to discuss a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), with over one million signatures in support, calling for an EU-wide ban on conversion practices targeting LGBTIQ+ individuals. Conversion practices (also known as conversion ‘therapies’) are widely condemned as constituting torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, resulting in severe physical and psychological harm. The European Parliament firmly opposes conversion practices and has long denounced all forms of LGBTIQ+ discrimination.

European Parliament Plenary Session March II 2026 – agenda

• Implementing the EU tariff commitments under the 2025 EU-US Framework Agreement
• Deposit protection and early intervention measures
• Parliament’s emerging position on the Digital Omnibus on AI
• Directive on combating corruption
• Implementation of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive
• Global Gateway – Past impacts, future orientation
• European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Ban on conversion practices in the European Union’

The safe third country (STC) concept is well established in international asylum policies. According to the concept, certain migrants should not be granted protection in the country where they have applied for it. Instead, they may be returned, or transferred, to a country where they could have found, or can find, international protection. Amid ongoing EU-level discussions on safe third country rules, in 2018 the United Nations Refugee Agency developed legal considerations on safe third countries.

Within the framework of the body of EU law on asylum, the STC concept is based on the assumption that certain third (i.e. non-EU) countries can be designated as safe for applicants seeking international protection, under specific conditions. The concept builds on cooperation with third countries in a bid to reduce irregular arrivals and increase return rates. It seeks to speed up the processing of the claims of asylum applicants arriving from safe third countries, to prevent overburdening national asylum systems.

The recently adopted Asylum Procedure Regulation provides for broader applicability of safe country clauses. This concerns, in particular, four aspects: (i) the safety assessment when applying the STC concept; (ii) the interpretation of the ‘connection requirement’, i.e. the connection between an asylum seeker and a third country when readmitting an applicant to a designated STC; (iii) the option to designate a third country as safe with territorial limitations or to exclude certain vulnerable groups from such a designation; and (iv) the creation of a common EU list of STCs in addition to national lists. The regulation was amended in February 2026, modifying rules on applications from STCs.

The success of any STC scheme relies on third countries’ cooperation, something that can be challenging to obtain. To counter criticisms of burden shifting and to boost the viability of STC schemes, the EU must demonstrate solidarity through burden sharing. Furthermore, many potentially safe third countries lack asylum laws and administrative frameworks. Consequently, they would likely require substantial support from external partners.

This is an update of a 2024 EPRS briefing.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Safe third country concept in the EU pact on migration and asylum‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Seeing the EU roughly as a political system designed to remove the most essential political decisions from democratic control, while in a large part abiding by legal frameworks, we could speak about an opposition between technocratic legalism and democracy. At best, the EU offers a democracy of means, with limited capacity to affect the ends of the project. Most recently, even this limited democracy came under attack through a further reduction of transparency, a proliferation of omnibus legislation and constant executive overreach. In its current emanation, ‘integration through law’ aims to shield all aspects of governance not only from democratic but also legal contestation. It thereby structurally prioritises ‘supremacy’, ‘direct effect’, ‘mutual trust’ and other procedural aspects of its own functioning over the essential foundations of justice, democratic citizenship based on equality and dignity and human rights protection. We could thus also speak of ‘supremacy rule of law’, which might or might not be an attack on the essential aspects of legality and justice, removing the added value of the rule of law as such. Consequently, distilling the essence of the ‘social contract’ in Europe today, one arrives at a bundle of oxymorons: The EU's supremacy rule of law is in the service of an ever fading depoliticised democracy of means.

Europe’s key instrument to achieving energy independence and increasing competitiveness lies in the energy transition and, specifically, in boosting the generation capacity of renewable sources of energy. Following the European Green Deal and ‘fit for 55’ initiatives, the EU legislative framework for achieving this is largely in place. Significant progress has been made, in particular since the launch of the REPowerEU initiative in May 2022 in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Member States have increased the share of renewables in their energy mix, and the EU is consistently progressing towards its target of a 42.5 % share of renewables in final energy consumption by 2030. The share of renewables in sectors such as electricity (47.5 % of final energy consumption in this sector), heating and cooling (26.7 %) and transport (11.2 %) is also increasing, although progress has been fastest in terms of electricity. The main challenges to an accelerated deployment of renewables can be identified as the cost of capital, timely development of the grids, and the complex and lengthy permitting procedures both at European and national level.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Renewable energy in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

CONTEXT

Technologies are evolving rapidly, data traffic is growing significantly, and demand for gigabit connectivity is increasing. Modern and sustainable digital infrastructures for connectivity and computing are critical enablers for digitalisation and for both industrial competitiveness and for society. High-quality, secure and resilient connectivity is needed, everywhere and for everybody in the European Union. The EU has set non-binding ‘digital decade’ targets to be reached by 2030. These include providing all EU households with access to a fixed gigabit network (with a capacity of 1 Gigabit per second – Gbps) and ensuring that all populated areas are covered by next-generation, high-speed wireless networks with performance at least equivalent to that of 5G.

On 21 January 2026, the European Commission published a proposal for a digital networks act. The proposed regulation aims to consolidate sector-specific legislation currently set out, inter alia, in the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC), the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) Regulation, the Open Internet Regulation, the ePrivacy Directive and the radio spectrum policy programme. By replacing directives with a regulation, the Commission aims to ensure uniform application of telecoms rules across all Member States.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2026/0013(COD) – Proposal for a regulation on digital networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, Directive 2002/58/EC and Decision No 676/2002/EC and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1971, Directive (EU) 2018/1972 and Decision No 243/2012/EU (Digital Networks Act) – COM(2026) 0016 final, 21.01.2026.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Digital networks act legislation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

AI rules and governance

The AI Act was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2024 to improve the functioning of the internal market, promote the uptake of human-centric and trustworthy AI, ensure a high level of protection against the harmful effects of AI systems and support innovation.

Rules for AI systems and GPAI models

The AI Act regulates AI systems, which are machine-based systems designed to operate with a certain degree of autonomy and generate outputs from the inputs they receive. The regulation applies a risk-based approach to AI systems, differentiating between ‘unacceptable risks’, ‘high risks’, ‘transparency risks’ and ‘minimal risks’. While prohibited AI systems are not allowed in the internal market, providers, deployers, importers and distributors of high-risk AI (HRAI) systems are under certain obligations, including ensuring that systems are compliant and meet particular standards.

The AI Act also regulates general-purpose AI (GPAI) models, which are capable of performing a wide range of tasks and being integrated into a variety of systems or applications. The GPAI definition includes generative AI models, such as OpenAI’s GPT‑5, Google’s Gemini 3 and Mistral Large 3. The AI Act considers that some GPAI models pose systemic risks (such as negative effects on democratic processes or on public and economic security) if they reach a defined level of capability or are designated as such by the European Commission. GPAI models with systemic risks are subject to extra requirements, such as model evaluation and risk assessment.

Governance framework

The AI Act establishes a hybrid enforcement model with a centralised and a decentralised part. The risk-based approach for AI systems is enforced at national level with support and advice from centralised entities, including the European Commission. Conversely, GPAI rules are exclusively supervised and enforced by the Commission. However, researchers note that the decentralised pattern remains dominant in the AI Act, potentially leading to challenges around uneven enforcement in the EU.

This model differs from purely decentralised or other hybrid models. For instance, under the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the data protection rules are in principle subject to decentralised enforcement, but data protection authorities must cooperate in accordance with the ‘one-stop shop mechanism‘ and the new GDPR procedural rules in cross-border cases. Moreover, the European Data Protection Board can issue general guidance and opinions.

Enforcement at national level

The AI Act obliges Member States to designate two types of authority – at least one notifying authority and a market surveillance authority. Both authorities have distinct roles within the enforcement process and its timeline. The national market surveillance authority also functions as the single point of contact at national level. Member States were required to designate their competent authorities and single points of contact by 2 August 2025.

The European Commission maintains a list of single points of contact for all Member States. As of March 2026, the list comprised eight single contact points, out of 27.

Notifying authority, conformity assessment body and notified body

The notifying authority is responsible for setting up and carrying out the necessary ex‑ante procedures for assessing HRAI systems before they enter the EU market. However, the notifying authority does not conduct the assessment itself but instead designates conformity assessment bodies to carry out the task. Notifying authorities must inform the Commission and other Member States once the conformity assessment body has been designated, which then becomes a ‘notified body’. Notified bodies must be independent of the provider and operator of the HRAI system they assess.

Market surveillance authority

The market surveillance authority performs ex‑post checks once AI systems have been placed on the internal market. Its powers include requesting documents, evaluating systems and imposing fines, if needed. However, a separate authority may be in charge of ex‑post checking in certain situations, such as controlling HRAI systems for financial institutions or law enforcement.

Enforcement at EU level

The AI Act has created a number of EU‑level entities to assist, support and advise Member States and the Commission (which runs the AI Office) in their enforcement tasks.

AI Office

The AI Office is defined by the AI Act as the ‘Commission’s function of contributing to the implementation, monitoring and supervision of AI systems and general-purpose AI models, and AI governance’. It has the sole authority to enforce the AI Act provisions on GPAI models. It is also responsible for soft instruments, such as codes of practice, guidelines and communications that shape the regulation’s implementation

Digital omnibus on AI proposal – further centralisation
The digital omnibus on AI, put forward in November 2025 by the Commission, is a set of amendments to the AI Act to further centralise its enforcement. If European co-legislators adopt the proposal in its current state, the AI Office would supervise the compliance of AI systems integrated into very large online platforms (VLOPs) or very large search engines (VLOSEs), as defined under the Digital Services Act, as well as AI systems based on GPAI models where the system and model come from the same provider.

European AI board

The European AI board is composed of one representative per Member State, with the European Data Protection Supervisor and the AI Office as observers. According to researchers, the board’s tasks are limited to advisory and coordinating functions, including ‘facilitating cooperation among national competent authorities, aggregating and disseminating technical and regulatory expertise among Member States, and offering guidance on the AI Act’s implementation’.

Scientific panel of independent experts

The AI Act defines the scientific panel as a panel of experts selected by the Commission on the basis of up-to-date scientific and technical expertise in the field of AI. The panel is aimed at centralising expertise to advise and support the AI Office, as well as national market surveillance authorities at their request.

AI advisory forum

The AI advisory forum comprises stakeholders from industry, start-ups, SMEs, civil society and academia. The AI Act tasks the forum with providing technical expertise, advising the board and the Commission and contributing to their tasks under the regulation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Enforcement of the AI Act‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

This paper argues for the recognition of economic dependence as a relevant concept within EU competition law, moving beyond the traditional—yet limited—dominance-based framework of Article 102 TFEU. Comparative analysis shows that this, or an equivalent concept, is already embedded in the domestic competition regimes of several EU Member States, as well as in Japan and South Korea, to address severe imbalances of bargaining power in vertical commercial relationships that may distort the competitive process below the dominance threshold. Whereas the DMA embodies a regulatory response to forms of collective dependence linked to gatekeepers, its limited scope leaves many problematic scenarios unaddressed. In the context of the ongoing evaluation of Regulation 1/2003, introducing economic dependence at EU level would offer a more comprehensive response to contemporary economic power, in line with EU constitutional values, while enhancing internal coherence and promoting normative convergence with like-minded democracies.

The main aims will now be to overcome the two-country veto on the Ukraine loan, and to define a common approach to a rapidly evolving situation in the Middle East – notably to prevent escalation, promote a diplomatic path to end the crisis and provide support to partner countries in the region, while addressing the possible impact on global energy security. In that context, the European Council will discuss the Middle East as well as multilateralism with the UN Secretary General, António Guterres. However, despite a probable change of focus, competitiveness will feature prominently in the European Council conclusions and provide a high degree of detail, probably going beyond the EU leaders’ role of setting the general priorities. Other topics on the agenda are the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), European security and defence, and migration, which, due to time constraints, are expected to trigger less discussion. Following the European Council meeting, EU leaders will convene for a Euro Summit focusing on the economic situation in the EU, the international role of the euro and the savings and investment union.

1. General

As usual, European political parties will hold pre-summit meetings with their respective affiliated EU leaders. Additionally, a growing group of ‘like-minded’ countries on migration will meet prior to the start of the meeting. Following a similar pattern, a new group of around 20 EU leaders, which first met ahead of the informal retreat of 12 February 2026, had a videoconference on 10 March to discuss rising energy prices and competitiveness. The European Council itself will start with the address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. This meeting will be the first for the new Dutch Prime Minister, Rob Jetten, and for Andrey Gyurov, the caretaker Prime Minister of Bulgaria.

2. European Council meeting

Ukraine

A central topic for discussion at this European Council will be the enactment of the EU’s €90 billion loan to Ukraine, already agreed upon in December 2025, and the adoption of the 20th sanctions package against Russia. Following an exchange of views with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, EU leaders will attempt to persuade the prime ministers of Hungary, Viktor Orbán and Slovakia, Robert Fico to lift their veto on the EU loan. To enable the urgently needed funding for Ukraine to be disbursed, several pieces of legislation, already signed off in Parliament, need to be adopted: 1) a regulation establishing the loan; 2) an amendment to the Ukraine Facility; and 3) a revision to the MFF, which requires a unanimous decision. In a letter to European Council President António Costa, Orbán indicated that his country would oppose the loan until the Druzhba pipeline, which provides Hungary and Slovakia with Russian crude oil and which was damaged by Russian air strikes, is operational again – a potentially dangerous and lengthy process.

Amid criticism of the two countries’ behaviour, which according to Costa does not comply with the principle of sincere cooperation, temporary alternatives were put forward, such as the Adriatic pipeline, an option rejected by Hungary and Slovakia, who cited high prices. Ahead of the meeting, attempts will be made to find a solution, notably in the context of the Paris Nuclear Energy Summit, while Nordic and Baltic countries are considering bilateral loans (not requiring EU approval) to cover Ukraine’s needs until May. Oil supply was also the justification given for vetoing the 20th sanctions package, which was due to mark the fourth anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Moreover, considering Ukraine’s increased financial needs, now estimated at €135 billion for 2026‑2027, EU leaders are likely to call on non-EU partners to cover an additional €30 billion – beyond the €15 billion secured from Western partners. With some fearing that the war in Iran could distract attention from Ukraine, EU leaders are expected to reiterate their unwavering support to the war-torn country – as did the presidents of the three EU institutions in a joint declaration adopted on the fourth anniversary of Russia’s invasion. They are likely to stress the need to ensure that the country has all the necessary military and financial means to continue fighting the aggressor.

Middle East

The concerning developments in Iran, which threaten the stability of the entire Middle East region, as well as the global implications of the conflict in Iran, are likely to be the focus of EU leaders’ attention. Leaders will probably attempt to develop a unified approach beyond the statement issued on behalf of the EU by the High Representative/Vice President, Kaja Kallas, on 1 March, and reaffirm their commitment to dialogue and to a diplomatic path to end the crisis.

Although in contact with countries in the region from day one, the Union has struggled to find a coordinated EU position since the joint Israeli-US attack on Iran on 28 February. Assessments of the situation have varied widely from one Member State to another. Some have criticised Israel and the US for breaching international law, notably Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, who called the military intervention ‘unjustified and dangerous‘, and French President Emmanuel Macron, who stated that the ‘military operations in Iran were conducted outside international law’. Others have shown reluctance to criticise the US-Israeli strikes on Iran, with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz not wanting ‘to lecture our allies’. Even Costa and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who released a joint statement on the day of the joint attack, pointing to the ‘extensive sanctions [adopted by the EU] in response to the actions of Iran’s murderous regime and the Revolutionary Guards’, were, according to some observers, said to be conveying differing messages. In a speech on 6 March, Costa indirectly denounced the joint attacks, stating that, even if Iran ‘bears responsibility for the root causes, … unilateralism can never be the path forward’, while von der Leyen was criticised for stating that a ‘credible transition in Iran is urgently needed’, which hints at regime change and could be understood as approval of the US‑Israeli attacks.

However, the extent of Iran’s response – with strikes on neighbouring countries, ‘an unjustifiable violation of their sovereignty’, drones targeting a military base in Cyprus, an EU Member State, and strikes imperilling critical supply chains and energy infrastructure across the Gulf – has highlighted how closely the EU’s security and interests are linked to the region. According to the Cyprus EU Council Presidency, the only way for the EU to address its ‘long-lasting concerns regarding Iran’, is by: 1) preventing the country from acquiring a nuclear weapon; and 2) ending its destabilising activities in the region. To that end, the European Council will aim to revive the diplomatic path to end the crisis and initiate ‘a collective effort, including through sanctions’, to achieve its objectives.

As Costa and von der Leyen did after a videoconference with Middle East Leaders, the European Council is likely to condemn in the strongest terms the ‘indiscriminate attacks by Iran against the countries of the region’, and convey its ‘full solidarity with the people of the region’. They will most certainly also express their ‘deep concern about the consequences of the regional crisis on Lebanon’, which could have a severe impact on civilians, triggering large-scale displacement as Israel is launching an extended military campaign against Hezbollah and has refused to halt its offensive to hold talks. In that context, von der Leyen announced the mobilisation of ReliefEU stocks to support some 130 000 persons in Lebanon, with a first flight on 10 March.

In the meantime, European countries have initiated elements of response and solidarity, individually or jointly. For instance, the E3 countries (France, Germany, and the UK) adopted a joint statement, in which they pledge to ‘work together with the U.S. and allies’ to ‘take steps to defend our interests and those of our allies in the region, potentially by enabling necessary and proportionate defensive action to destroy Iran’s capability to fire missiles and drones at their source’. EU Member States have also coordinated their action at several levels. First, by cooperating on the repatriation of their citizens stranded in the Middle East. Nineteen Member States have activated the rescEU mechanism under the European Civil Protection Mechanism. Second, by dispatching air and naval resources to protect Cyprus, with France, Greece, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands sending vessels. Third, by coordinating the dispatch of military resources to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, while France has taken the lead in building a coalition to secure shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, the EU has announced a reinforcement of its maritime defensive operations ASPIDES and ATALANTA. Originally launched to protect commercial vessels from attacks by Iran-backed Houthis, the operations will now take on a new scope, as confirmed by Costa and von der Leyen.

Finally, the potential consequences on global energy security will be at the centre of discussions. As oil prices surged over US$119 a barrel, reaching levels not seen since 2022 (even if they have stabilised since), this point could be closely linked to the EU competitiveness agenda point (see below). Despite von der Leyen’s message stating that ‘Today, Europe’s energy system is cleaner, much more diverse – and much more stable than a few years ago’, and EU Member States indicating that they saw no immediate risk to supply from the crisis, there are fears that the Iran war could trigger a new energy crisis, raise energy prices and increase inflation. So much so, that G7 finance ministers held an emergency meeting and the International Energy Agency’s 32 members agreed to release 400 million barrels of emergency oil reserves to avoid shortages. Even if the Commission claims that the storage capacity remains stable, some sources point to gas storage levels standing at only 30 %, noting that the upcoming period is crucial for filling up for next winter.

Competitiveness and the single market

‘We are making 2026 the year of European competitiveness’, Costa stated, ‘just as we made 2025 the year of European defence’. Discussions on ways of delivering on this ambition will build heavily on the outcome of the informal competitiveness retreat in Alden Biesen, Belgium, on 12 February 2026. As the informal retreat did not produce conclusions, the results are expected to be formally turned into concrete decisions in the March conclusions.

One of the key instruments will be the ‘one Europe, one market agenda’, which the European Council is expected to launch to further integrate the single market in all its four freedoms. In order to deliver by the end of 2027, the agenda will be accompanied by a ‘one Europe, one market roadmap and action plan’ to be presented by the Commission, with clear goals and timelines. It was suggested that the roadmap be endorsed by the three institutions to showcase the political momentum and sense of urgency behind the project. The priority areas are expected to be: 1) completion of the single market; 2) simplification and reduction of red tape; 3) affordable energy prices and energy union by 2030; 4) industrial renewal and reduced dependencies; 5) a savings and investment union.

Several notable calls for action can be expected at the meeting. EU leaders are likely to discuss the EU-wide legal framework for companies, the 28th regime, due to be issued by the Commission on 18 March, and to call on the co-legislators to adopt the proposal by the end of 2026. They are expected to ask the Commission to conduct an in-depth review of the EU acquis and withdraw outdated provisions. As a contribution to the effort, Finland has sent a letter to the Commission listing possible ways of simplifying more than 40 pieces of EU legislation. EU leaders are also likely to ask the Commission to identify and map dependencies in strategic sectors. On investment, the European Council could mention the digital euro, and call for the co-legislators to conclude their work by the end of 2026.

With the energy transition and energy affordability very high on the EU leaders’ agenda, especially in the current volatile situation, some countries are pushing for a stronger answer to the crisis. While the European Council is expected to call for the swift implementation of the Energy Union 2030 agenda, it will also discuss ways of immediately alleviating the impact of energy prices on businesses and citizens, as outlined in the new citizens’ energy package. Addressing Parliament, von der Leyen mentioned: 1) the options being explored to reduce the impact of gas prices on electricity prices, such as State aid measures, subsidies or even caps on gas prices; 2) the need to improve the productivity of grids to allow more renewables to access them; 3) the room for action on taxes and levies on energy, which is a national competence; and 4) possible modernisation of the ETS.

Next multiannual financial framework

Following a ‘guiding discussion’ in March 2025 and an MFF ‘stocktaking’ in December 2025, EU leaders will have a brief discussion on the ‘horizontal issues’ of the next MFF to provide guidelines to the Council presidency for the preparation of the negotiating package, with indicative figures due by June 2026. Three aspects are likely to be addressed: 1) the MFF’s contribution to EU competitiveness; 2) the funding of EU ambitions; and 3) the new governance framework. The Leaders’ Agenda envisages an MFF agenda point at all four regular European Council meetings in 2026, with the MFF being the exclusive topic at the 26-27 November special meeting.

European defence and security

The European Council is expected to take stock of progress on the European defence readiness 2030 objectives, and possibly invite the Member States to ensure that concrete capability projects can be launched in the coming months. Moreover, EU leaders could invite the Council to update the 2022 threat assessment, based on a 360° analysis of threats to be prepared by the HR/VP.

Migration

EU leaders will take stock of the implementation of its previous conclusions on migration, with a letter from von der Leyen expected to inform the discussions. Leaders are likely to reiterate their call for Member States and EU institutions to intensify work on all strands of the EU’s approach to migration, notably on the external dimension and on comprehensive partnerships. They could also acknowledge the recent agreement in the Council on the EU-wide list of safe countries, or comment on possible migration waves resulting from the situation in the Middle East.

3. Euro Summit

The first Euro Summit meeting in 2026 is expected to focus on economic developments in the EU, the international role of the euro, and the savings and investment union. Ahead of the meeting, presidents Costa and von der Leyen met the European Central Bank President, Christine Lagarde, and the new Eurogroup President, Kyriakos Pierrakakis, the Greek Minister of Economy and Finance, to prepare discussions. Following the Eurogroup meeting on 9 March, Pierrakakis sent a letter to Costa bringing important points to the attention of the Euro Summit.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders, 19-20 March 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Outcome of the association to Horizon Europe

Following the 2021 entry into force of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the UK, on 1 January 2024 the UK became an associated country to Horizon Europe 2021‑2027. The scope of the association covers the whole programme except for the ‘accelerator’ instrument within the European Innovation Council.

According to the Horizon Europe dashboard, as of 9 January 2026, the number of UK projects participating in Horizon activities was 5 970, corresponding to 3 659 grant agreements, with a net contribution from the EU of €1.32 billion. Most UK participation focuses on pillar I of Horizon Europe (‘excellent science’), with 2 420 project entities, and pillar II (‘global challenges and European industrial competitiveness’), with 3 220 projects. Out of the total 5 970 projects, 907 involve a UK-based small or medium-sized enterprise.

The UK is the associated country with the highest number of Horizon Europe involvements, second only to Norway in terms of net EU contribution received.

Upcoming opportunities for cooperation in research and innovation

Against the backdrop of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2028‑2034, the legislative proposals for Horizon Europe and the Euratom training programme both offer relevant opportunities for continuing and strengthening the bilateral cooperation between the Union and the UK on research and innovation. Article 9 of the proposed Horizon Europe 2028‑2034 regulation provides for legal grounds to associate third countries, using a set of rules that largely follow Horizon 2021‑2027’s current guidelines.

However, the unveiling of the proposal on the European competitiveness fund could lead to the UK considering association to this programme under Article 11. This would ensure it remained eligible for the collaborative research activities scheduled under the four policy windows (clean transition and industrial decarbonisation; digital leadership; health, biotech, agriculture and bioeconomy; resilience, security, defence and space). Such activities would be successors to the six clusters that currently make up the second pillar of Horizon Europe. Furthermore, although the UK has chosen not to join the current Euratom training programme, the proposed regulation establishing the Euratom training programme 2028‑2032 includes (in Article 8) a legal ground for association, which would facilitate cooperation on nuclear fission and fusion.

European Parliament’s views on UK association to Horizon Europe

In February 2025, in a resolution on the assessment of the implementation of Horizon Europe, the European Parliament specifically welcomed the association of the UK and Switzerland to Horizon Europe. It recognises that UK and Swiss science and innovation are an integral part of the European science and innovation ecosystem, while also expressing its concern about the automatic rebate for the UK included in the amended protocol in 2023.

Future opportunities in brief

The relevant sectoral proposals in the MFF 2028‑2034 (Horizon Europe, the competitiveness fund and the Euratom training programme) include legal grounds for association tailored to specific countries and relevant joint goals for cooperation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Research and innovation: State of play of EU-UK cooperation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Introduction

Since the United Kingdom’s (UK) withdrawal from the EU in 2020, the parties have continued to cooperate on various digital policy issues. While their regulatory approaches differ in some areas – notably AI – their broader objectives are similar. Both the EU and the UK are pursuing greater digital sovereignty and enhanced global competitiveness, seeking to reduce their strategic dependencies in critical technologies in an increasingly adversarial geopolitical context.

Digital cooperation is evolving alongside efforts to strengthen and formalise the EU-UK partnership. For example, at the first EU-UK summit on 19 May 2025, the parties agreed to establish a new strategic partnership. While digital policy was not explicitly mentioned in the summit’s joint statement, the document outlining the security and defence partnership mentioned further cooperation on cyber issues, countering hybrid threats, strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure, and addressing FIMI, including through coordination in multilateral fora, such as the G7.

Core framework

The EU-UK relationship is governed by the Withdrawal Agreement, the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), and the Windsor Framework. The TCA explicitly recognises the parties’ ‘right to regulate’ in their respective jurisdictions, while also expressing their wish to cooperate in areas of mutual interest. For example, they have committed to ensuring cross-border data flows, facilitating digital trade and holding regular cyber dialogues. According to Article 776 of the TCA, the parties have to review the implementation of the agreement in 2026, five years after its entry into force. Digital trade issues are discussed in the joint Trade Specialised Committee on Services, Investment and Digital Trade.

In accordance with the TCA, the European Parliament and the UK Parliament established a Parliamentary Partnership Assembly (PPA) in 2021 to enable the exchange of views on the implementation of the TCA. Parliamentarians meet twice a year, with the next EU-UK PPA scheduled to take place in Brussels on 16-17 March 2026.

Since 1 January 2024, the UK has been associated to the Horizon Europe programme.

Artificial intelligence

Although the EU and the UK have different approaches to AI regulation, they share the common goal of promoting the responsible development and uptake of AI. The EU has adopted a comprehensive risk-based regulatory framework through the 2024 AI Act, categorising AI systems by risk and imposing strict obligations on high-risk areas such as critical infrastructure, while banning harmful practices. Minimal-risk AI systems remain largely exempt. In November 2025, the Commission proposed a digital omnibus on AI – amendments to the AI Act – on which the Council and Parliament are currently working.

The UK prefers a lighter-touch approach, regulating AI rather in the context in which it is used. It has established an AI Security Institute and adopted an AI opportunities action plan to boost AI investment, uptake and development. In March 2025, a private member’s bill, the Artificial Intelligence (Regulation) Bill, was introduced in the House of Lords, but, it has not made significant progress. If passed, it would create a central AI authority to oversee AI governance.

Both the EU and the UK are pursuing initiatives to strengthen the AI ecosystem. In April 2025, the European Commission published an AI continent action plan to build large-scale AI data and computing infrastructure across Europe, including AI factories and AI gigafactories. The UK is participating in the AI factories initiative and planning to host an AI factory antenna at the University of Edinburgh. The UK is also establishing its own AI Growth Zones – designated sites for AI-enabled data centres and supporting infrastructure.

At the international level, the EU and the UK collaborate on AI safety and security through their respective bodies – the EU’s AI Office and the UK’s AI Security Institute. The EU and the UK have both signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention on AI, adhered to the OECD AI principles, contributed to international AI safety reports, and worked on shared approaches for measuring and evaluating advanced AI capabilities. They also cooperate on AI standards development through CEN and CENELEC (the European Committee for Standardization and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization). However, the UK has not signed some AI declarations, such as the Paris AI Action Summit Declaration.

Data flows

Both the EU and the UK are committed to maintaining seamless cross-border data flows. In December 2025, the Commission renewed the two adequacy decisions originally adopted in 2021, confirming that personal data may continue to move freely and safely between the European Economic Area (EEA) and the UK. The Commission concluded that the UK legal framework contains data protection safeguards essentially equivalent to those in the EU. Unless extended, the decisions will expire on 27 December 2031.

Cyber dialogues

The EU and the UK have been holding regular cyber dialogues, as set out in the TCA. Since December 2023, three formal cyber dialogues have taken place: the first in Brussels in December 2023, the second in London in December 2024 and the third in December 2025 in Brussels. These meetings are used to align positions on international cyber norms, exchange views on cyber threats and coordinate responses to malicious cyber activity. Parties provide updates on policy and regulatory developments. The next dialogue will be held in 2026 in London.

Online platforms and search engines

In May 2024, the European Commission’s DG CNECT signed an administrative arrangement with Ofcom – the UK’s regulator for communications services. The arrangement will support the enforcement of the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) and the UK’s Online Safety Act, which introduce new obligations for online platforms and search engines, including measures to protect users from illegal and harmful content. The two authorities plan joint training, expert dialogues and studies on issues such as protection of minors, age-appropriate design and platform transparency.

European Parliament

The European Parliament has repeatedly encouraged close cooperation with the UK on digital issues. In its resolution of 27 November 2025 on the implementation of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, Parliament welcomed the administrative arrangement signed between the Commission and Ofcom, as well as plans to extend data adequacy decisions. It asked the UK not to go too far from the fundamental principles of the two main EU digital regulations: the Digital Markets Act and the DSA.

Acknowledgements

Any AI-generated content in this text has been reviewed by the author. AI was used to improve the readability of the text.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU-UK digital cooperation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Background

The end of free movement between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) following Brexit has resulted in decreased mobility for EU and UK citizens, particularly for young people. For example, EU and UK touring artists and creative professionals face additional costs and administrative requirements since Brexit, not only for their own mobility, but also for the transport of equipment, which must comply with customs and haulage rules.

The first EU‑UK summit took place in London on 19 May 2025, setting out a new strategic partnership. Both parties agreed to enhance cooperation, sign agreements in several areas and hold an annual summit. Three documents were officially adopted: a joint statement, a common understanding on a renewed EU‑UK agenda and a security and defence partnership. The common understanding outlines commitments from both parties to strengthen bilateral cooperation in policy areas, such as youth, mobility, new technologies and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Further discussions and negotiations are expected to lead to new formal agreements in these areas. The EU will need to adopt negotiating mandates for new agreements, with the European Commission negotiating on behalf of the EU following authorisation from the Council.

Erasmus+, youth mobility and the youth experience scheme (YES)

When the UK formally exited the European Union on 31 January 2020, it chose not to participate in the Erasmus+ programme. EU student applications to UK universities subsequently fell, and data from HESA (the Higher Education Statistics Agency) show that the number of EU students in the UK halved between 2020/2021 and 2023/2024. Reasons include the need for a student visa, a healthcare surcharge and higher tuition fees. UK students coming to the EU also face visa requirements and higher tuition fees. For student exchanges, the UK set up the Turing scheme, which allows UK students to study abroad, including in EU universities.

After the EU‑UK summit, negotiations took place throughout 2025. In December 2025, the Commission and the British government announced the conclusion of negotiations for the UK to rejoin the EU’s Erasmus+ programme in 2027, enabling learners, students, apprentices, teachers and staff in the fields of education, youth and sport from the EU and the UK to once again benefit from opportunities for study, training and work placements. Erasmus+ is one of the best known and most successful EU‑financed programmes and the most popular exchange scheme in Europe. The UK contribution for 2027 will be approximately £570 million and covers the 2027/28 academic year. Any participation in the next multiannual financial framework (2028‑2034) will need to be agreed in the future.

However, EU students who want to study a degree in the UK are still subject to high international tuition fees. The reverse can also be true, depending on where UK‑based students decide to study in the EU.

In the common understanding from the first EU‑UK summit, the UK and EU shared the view that both parties ‘should work towards a balanced youth experience scheme on terms to be mutually agreed’. Such a scheme should facilitate the participation of young people from the EU and the UK in various activities, such as work, study, au-pairing, volunteering or simply travelling, for a limited period. It should provide a dedicated visa path and ensure that the number of participants is acceptable to both sides, possibly including a cap. Negotiations are currently underway between the European Commission and the UK government. The agreement envisaged would benefit both EU and UK citizens aged 18 to 30. Those eligible would, for example, be able to stay in the destination country for up to two to four years. The EU has also tried to negotiate domestic-level tuition fees for European students in the UK; however, the UK government and UK universities have been against the idea. In a recent joint statement, the EU and the UK expressed their willingness to conclude the negotiations by the next EU‑UK summit (expected to take place in Brussels in 2026). The UK already has similar youth schemes with 13 non‑EU countries and territories.

Culture and touring artists

After Brexit, performing artists can no longer tour and work freely across the EU and the UK. UK artists must comply with the immigration and work permit regulations in each EU Member State, including visa costs. Currently, 24 out of the 27 Member States offer time-limited visa and work permit‑free routes for touring, but the requirements and time limits vary significantly. UK artists touring the EU may also need to hire EU‑registered vehicles to comply with road haulage restrictions and need ATA carnets for going through customs with musical instruments, stage equipment and artworks. Making these kinds of arrangements is particularly challenging for young and lesser-known artists.

EU artists, entertainers or musicians touring in the UK may rely on the UK’s permitted paid engagement scheme, allowing visa‑free travel for one month for paid activities, upon invitation by a UK‑based client. In November 2025, more than 200 cultural organisations from both the EU and the UK signed the EU‑UK policy recommendations, highlighting the importance of culture in political, societal and economic relations. Solutions proposed include an EU‑wide visa waiver agreement for creative industries between the EU and the UK, or a ‘cultural exemption’ from the post-Brexit EU‑UK trade and cooperation agreement (TCA) or from carnet requirements for transporting musical equipment. However, the European Commission and UK government position is that there is no prospect of changing the TCA in the near future.

The UK Musicians’ Union has warned that 75 % of musicians who had previously worked in the EU have experienced a decline in bookings, while a 2025 Best for Britain study showed that the number of artists playing at festivals in the EU had declined by more than a quarter since Brexit. Urged by industry representatives, the UK government has clarified immigration and work permit rules with some individual EU Member States and agreed some easements for touring bilaterally, for example with Spain.

The European Parliament

In its resolution of April 2021 on the outcome of the EU‑UK negotiations, Parliament regretted the lack of ambition of the TCA on mobility policies, and welcomed the mechanism in the TCA allowing the EU and the UK to agree additional arrangements on a case-by-case basis and for specific professions.

On 27 November 2025, Parliament adopted an own-initiative report on the TCA implementation, noting that the EU‑UK summit established key steps for filling the gaps of the TCA. In December 2025, Parliament welcomed the EU‑UK agreement on Erasmus+.

From 16 to 18 February 2026, a delegation from the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education met representatives from the UK government, Parliament, universities, cultural institutions and the creative sector in London to discuss the process of bringing the UK back into EU‑funded programmes, such as Erasmus+, for the post‑2027 period. They discussed barriers to cultural collaboration and practical challenges facing touring artists. The MEPs also took stock of negotiations on the EU‑UK reciprocal youth experience scheme.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU-UK relations: Mobility and youth opportunities‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

New framework agreement on relations between Parliament and Commission

The revised framework agreement on relations between Parliament and the European Commission aims at strengthening Parliament’s prerogatives as regards the Commission’s duties to inform Parliament of its plans. The Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) Committee report emphasises that the new framework agreement retains the institutional balance intended in the Treaties, while also creating a clearer and more accountable relationship between the institutions working in EU citizens’ interests. Members adopted the revised agreement, which will enter into force following a signing ceremony with Presidents Roberta Metsola and Ursula von der Leyen, planned during the March II plenary session (25‑26 March).

Package travel

The EU rules on package travel date back to 2015 and need to be updated to improve passenger protection. Members considered amendments to the Package Travel Directive, following an agreement reached between the co-legislators in December 2025. Parliament’s negotiators succeeded in improving the complaints procedure and consumer information provided on what is included in the ‘package’ they purchase. Parliament adopted the report concluding its first reading on the legislation to amend the Package Travel Directive.

Establishing EU talent pool

A shortage of qualified workers continues to be an issue in many EU countries. While the EU has already provided a platform to match EU jobseekers with employers, the Commission proposed legislation to create an EU talent pool open to non-EU citizens. Faced with international competition for talent, the proposal would allow EU countries to attract workers, without creating an alternative pathway to legal migration. Parliament is keen to ensure that the system is fair, protects against discrimination and is rolled out in all EU countries. Members adopted the text agreed in interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal to establish an EU talent pool.

Guidelines for the 2027 budget – Section III – European Commission

The 2027 annual EU budget will be the last under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), and Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) is calling for a strong focus on delivery for people, the economy, the planet and providing investment for competitiveness. Members debated the committee’s report, which emphasises the EU budget’s role in strengthening the bloc’s cohesion in the face of a difficult geopolitical landscape. BUDG also calls to uphold a strong external policy and underlines the agreement between EU institutions that expenditure covering the financing costs of Next Generation EU must not reduce funding for EU programmes. The vote on the guidelines for the 2027 EU budget sets Parliament’s position for interinstitutional negotiations ahead of the Commission’s draft budget.

Addressing the housing crisis in the EU

Closer to home, many citizens are personally concerned about the EU’s housing crisis. While housing policy remains a national competence, Parliament’s Special Committee on the Housing Crisis in the EU (HOUS) tabled a report recommending action to improve housing affordability. The committee proposes to help tackle the issue through EU rules on short-term rentals, aiming to strike a balance between promoting urban local communities and tourism income. The HOUS committee also proposes action to improve quality in the construction and energy-efficiency sectors and calls on EU governments to support people trying to get into the housing market through tax breaks. Members held a debate and later adopted the recommendations on solutions for affordable housing.

Copyright and generative AI

When using artificial intelligence (AI) to generate text, images or code, many people are unaware of the legal implications of the AI tool’s use of copyrighted material as training data. This can mean that content creators, artists and other rights-holders are neither acknowledged nor paid for their input. Members adopted an own-initiative report from the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee calling for clarification of the legal situation as regards copyright and generative AI.

EU enlargement strategy

Members debated and adopted a Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee report on the European Union’s enlargement strategy. With nine candidate countries and one potential candidate awaiting EU membership, Parliament’s own-initiative report on EU enlargement strategy underlines its support for the process and for reform of the current procedure for admitting new members. The report also emphasises enlargement’s strategic potential to strengthen the wider region in the face of geopolitical uncertainty. Finally, the report underlines the need for a strong merit-based process where alignment with the EU’s core values is an unconditional principle of membership.

2026 World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference

Ahead of the 2026 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference, taking place in Cameroon at the end of the month, Members debated and voted a resolution setting out Parliament’s position on the multilateral negotiations. Global instability and the retreat from global trade rules mean the need to reform the WTO is urgent, not least to replace the long-broken dispute settlement system, promote a global level playing field and make the rules more flexible. Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) underscored Parliament’s support for the multilateral trading system and emphasised the need for greater flexibility. A delegation from the INTA committee is due to attend the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO ahead of the 14th WTO Ministerial Conference.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Five decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations – from the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), on ‘Amending certain Regulations as regards digitalisation and common specifications’ and ‘Amending certain Directives as regards digitalisation and common specifications’; from the Committee on Fisheries (PECH) on ‘Implementation into Union law of measures adopted by several Regional Fisheries Management Organisations’, from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) and Civil Liberties, Justice, Home Affairs (LIBE) committees on ‘Omnibus IV: Amending certain regulations as regards the extension of certain mitigating measures available for small and medium-sized enterprises to small mid-cap enterprises and further simplification measures’, and from the ECON and LIBE committees on ‘Omnibus IV: Amending Directives 2014/65/EU and (EU) 2022/2557 as regards the extension of certain mitigating measures available for small and medium-sized enterprises to small mid-cap enterprises and further simplifying measures’, were approved without a vote.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – March I 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Joint procurement of defence equipment by the EU has gained renewed strategic importance in response to the recent deteriorating security environment and persistent fragmentation within the European defence market. Although the European Defence Agency set a 35 % collaborative procurement benchmark back in 2007, cooperation among Member States remains limited. The 2022 coordinated annual review on defence reported that only 18 % of defence investment took place collaboratively, far below agreed targets. While total EU defence expenditure reached €381 billion in 2025, increased spending has not translated into commensurate growth in joint acquisition. EU institutions continue to highlight duplication issues, capability gaps and over-reliance on non‑EU suppliers.

To address these shortcomings, the Union has expanded financial and regulatory instruments. EDIRPA, EDIP and SAFE provide grants and loans to incentivise joint procurement, while the defence readiness roadmap 2030 raises the ambition to 40 % joint procurement by 2027. Targeted adjustments to the Defence Procurement Directive aim to reduce administrative barriers and facilitate multinational contracting.

Joint procurement offers potential economies of scale, stronger bargaining leverage, greater industrial predictability and enhanced interoperability. Studies indicate that meeting collaborative benchmarks could generate annual savings of several billion euros. Yet significant constraints persist, including differing threat perceptions by national governments, industrial competition that often runs counter to consolidation, governance complexity and risks of cost overruns in multinational programmes.

The European Parliament has consistently supported deeper pooling and interoperability, urging collaborative acquisition to be prioritised in EU instruments while cautioning against incentives that may reinforce national disparities. Sustained progress therefore depends on credible demand aggregation, coherent defence planning and effective coordination across EU and NATO frameworks.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU joint defence procurement‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Europe is one of the world’s primary destinations for international migrants. In 2024, the region hosted approximately 94 million migrants, the highest number of any region in the world. The biggest share enter via legal means. The EU is experiencing skills shortages, which is partly because of its ageing population, and migrants could play a role in helping to plug them. The EU shares competence on migration and asylum policies with its Member States; EU legislation plays a significant role in managing legal migration, although its impact varies by type of migration.

Nonetheless, data consistently show that most EU legal migration tools are under-used. Blue Cards, an EU initiative to attract highly skilled workers, account for only a fraction of permits issued for employment reasons and few EU countries make significant use of them, which would suggest more work is needed to make them an attractive option. Similarly, the Single Permit, which is a combined work and residency permit, is mostly used by just a handful of EU countries. In recent years, the EU has also launched new initiatives with non-EU countries such as Talent Partnerships and a Talent Pool, but it is too early to say anything about their impact. There is also a directive for seasonal workers, but again only a few EU countries make much use of it.

The EU plays an important role when it comes to asylum by setting common standards, clarifying which EU country is responsible for processing an application, and encouraging solidarity. The European Commission has proposed a Return Regulation to make it easer and faster to return non-EU citizens who were unsuccessful in their bid to obtain asylum. It includes the possibility to create return hubs in non-EU countries, which many Member States are interested in. Temporary protection was used for the first time to help Ukrainians after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Legal migration to the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

CONTEXT

On 16 December 2025, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation to simplify the rules governing medical devices in the EU. The proposal forms part of a broader package of measures aimed at improving citizens’ health and strengthening the resilience and competitiveness of the health sector. An evaluation of the current EU regulatory framework for medical devices concluded that it has led to unnecessary costs, administrative bottlenecks, regulatory uncertainty for companies, and delays in patient access to medical devices. The proposed revision seeks to address these challenges while ensuring that patient safety remains the highest priority, with faster access to safe and innovative devices. It also aims to reinforce the EU’s competitiveness in the medical technology sector, by establishing a more coherent framework enabling companies to better respond to evolving market conditions, technological developments and patient needs.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0404(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2017/745 and (EU) 2017/746 as regards simplifying and reducing the burden of the rules on medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices, and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/123 as regards the support of the European Medicines Agency for the expert panels on medical devices and Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 as regards the list of Union harmonisation legislation referred to in its Annex I – COM(2025) 1023, 16 December 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0404(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Medical devices: Simplifying the rules‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Member States’ defence budgets

The 23 EU Member States that are also NATO members have long been guided by NATO’s 2 % of GDP defence spending commitment formalised at the 2014 Wales Summit. Allies agreed to ‘move towards’ the 2 % ‘guideline within a decade’, but in 2021 only seven of the 21 Member States that were then NATO members spent 2 % of GDP on defence. EU Member States participating in permanent structured cooperation (PESCO – all except Malta) also agreed to ‘regularly increase defence budgets in real terms’ under their PESCO commitments.

While defence budgets have increased in real terms since 2018/2019 (previously they had not even reached pre-2008 financial crisis levels), this follows years of chronic under-investment in defence in most Member States. In 2021, their combined defence budgets stood at €218 billion. Meanwhile, strategic rivals such as Russia and China increased their defence budgets by 300 % and 600 % respectively over the last decade, compared to a collective 20 % increase in EU countries (to 2022). The European Commission notes that, if all Member States had spent 2 % of GDP on defence from 2006 to 2020, this would have amounted to an extra €1.1 trillion for defence spending.

Russia’s war on Ukraine was a wake-up call for the EU. At the March 2022 Versailles Summit, EU leaders agreed to spend ‘more and better’ on defence. The Strategic Compass, a concrete plan of action for EU security and defence to 2030, reaffirmed this. The second von der Leyen Commission (2024-2029) has made defence a key EU priority. The first-ever Commissioner for Defence and Space was appointed and the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence was elevated to a full standing committee. The Commission also pledged to advance the European Defence Union, launched significant initiatives to boost the European defence industry (such as the first-ever European defence industrial strategy, EDIS), and a European defence industry programme (EDIP). The EU also legislated to boost ammunition production and incentivise joint procurement of urgent defence equipment. On 4 March 2025, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented the ReArm Europe plan/ Readiness 2030. This aims to leverage €800 billion in defence spending to 2029, including a €150 billion EU-backed loan through the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument and measures to encourage national defence spending by activating the National Escape Clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for an additional 1.5 % of GDP spending on defence, redeployment of EU cohesion funds, European Investment Bank support and private capital mobilisation. On 19 March 2025, the Commission presented its white paper for European defence, outlining a strategic plan to close critical capability gaps, strengthen the defence industry and readiness, support Ukraine, and boost innovation and partnerships to ensure the continent’s long-term security. On 16 October 2025, the Commission and High Representative put forward the European defence readiness roadmap, which sets out clear objectives and milestones to achieve defence readiness by 2030. At the NATO Summit held in The Hague, NATO Allies endorsed a revised defence spending commitment, setting a target of allocating 5 % of GDP to defence by 2035 (3.5 % for core defence expenditure and 1.5 % for broader defence-related expenditure). All Allies, except Spain, have pledged to meet the 5 % defence spending benchmark by 2035. According to the EDA, meeting the 3.5 % of GDP would oblige many Member States to significantly increase spending, amounting to roughly €254 billion and lifting aggregate defence spending to about €635 billion in 2025 and€807 billion in 2035. This does not take into account that 3.5 % does not apply to non-NATO EU Member States. However, a clear distinction exists between political commitments and concrete budgetary planning (see Annex).

Defence spending increases

In 2022, collective annual EU defence budgets had already increased to €240 billion. In 2023, Member States reached a combined €279 billion (1.6 % of GDP) and €343 billion in 2024 (1.9 % of GDP). In 2025, Member States reached an estimated €381 billion (2.1 % of GDP). All EU NATO Allies now spend more than the 2 % defence expenditure benchmark agreed at the 2014 NATO Summit. The four non-NATO EU Member States (Ireland, Malta, Austria and Cyprus) do not. EU defence investment reached €106 billion in 2024 and was set to approach €130 billion in 2025.

Figure 1 – EU Member State defence expenditure, 2025, in % of GDP

Data Source: NATO and IISS, 2025.

However, there are significant regional differences in the EU. Germany’s defence spending rose by 23 % in real terms in 2024 and 18 % in 2025, bringing the 2025 budget to €95 billion, double its 2021 level. Spending increased from 1.27 % of GDP in 2021 to 2.14 % in 2025. Following reform of the constitutional debt brake, Berlin has committed to further increases, with funding projected to reach €117.2 billion in 2026 and €162 billion by 2029, equivalent to 3.2 % of GDP, or 3.5 % when broader defence-related items are included. Northern Europe has also recorded sustained growth. Sweden has enacted major uplifts under its Total Defence 2025 to 2030 framework, prioritising air defence, long range weapons, naval assets and research. Denmark established a DKK50 billion acceleration fund, raising spending to 2.65 % of GDP. Finland has maintained levels above 2 % of GDP and plans to reach 3 % by 2029. The Netherlands has more than doubled its defence budget since 2021, reaching €25.8 billion in 2025, around 2.2 % of GDP. In fiscally constrained states, growth is more calibrated. France increased its 2026 defence allocation to €68.5 billion, or 2.25 % of GDP, despite wider deficit pressures. Spain and Italy have also raised spending to 2 %, though in part by reclassifying security expenditures. Poland and the Baltic States top the ranking in relative terms: Poland records 4.48 %, Lithuania 4.00 %, Latvia 3.73 % and Estonia 3.38 %. According to NATO projections, all EU NATO members reached at least 2 % of GDP on defence spending in 2025 (see Figure 1). By comparison, US defence expenditure (NATO definition) has consistently stayed over 3 %; it was US$935 billion (3.19 % of GDP) in 2024 (≈€868 billion) and an estimated US$980 billion (≈3.2 % of GDP) in 2025 (≈€910 billion).

In aggregate terms, EU defence expenditure exceeds the declared budgets of Russia and China respectively, although both figures warrant caution given limited transparency. Despite lower headline spending, Moscow and Beijing are likely to generate higher cost effectiveness due to lower domestic price levels, integrated planning structures and reduced organisational overhead. Measured in purchasing power parity, Russia’s defence expenditure in 2024 is estimated at €234 billion, around twice the level indicated by market exchange rates, with a similar distortion likely in China. Over the past two decades, defence spending in Russia and China has more than doubled in real terms; Member States’ expenditure has risen by just over 50 % since 2008.

European Parliament position

Parliament has consistently called for an increase in defence spending. In its annual report on the implementation of the common security and defence policy 2025, MEPs welcome rising national defence spending but urge deeper European cooperation to prevent market fragmentation. They warn of persistent deterrence gaps and call for doctrinal adaptation, expanded industrial output and greater interoperability.

Read the complete At a glace note on ‘EU Member States’ defence budgets‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Academic research is increasingly questioning whether the goals of competition law should extend beyond the traditional focus on economic efficiency and consumer welfare to include non-economic issues such as social justice, democracy, environmental sustainability and equality. In this regard, the African experience is particularly valuable since public interest considerations (PICs) are a feature of merger control regimes in many African countries. After an analysis of PICs in Africa, the paper zooms in on South Africa's extensive experience in the field, particularly its legal test for determining when PICs are justified in merger assessment and offers recommendations that could inform other countries. Drawing on the South Africa merger assessment, this paper recommends that PICs and the competition standard be analysed separately but in an interrelated manner, as they complement each other. The likely effect of the merger on specific public interests must be identified and considered only when it is substantial and linked to the merger. Additionally, a merger should be prohibited only if the proposed remedies seeking to address the negative effects on the specific PIC are inadequate, inappropriate, disproportionate or unenforceable. Importantly, when PICs collide, competition agencies should balance each public interest against the others, focusing on whether the likely effect is substantial or whether the remedies are inadequate. In sum, competition agencies should adopt public-interest merger guidelines that provide businesses with the necessary guidance on the legal test and procedures, enhancing legal certainty and attracting investment.

This introductory article sets competition law in the transformative context. It explains that competition law is not only something that is transformed but is also transformative in its own right. A twofold argument is advanced: first, that competition law has an important role to play in ensuring that the wide range of transitions in play today (i.e., green, digital and industrial) are both just and enduring, and second, that there are significant lessons to be learnt from economic transformations that have already taken place in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and countries from the Global South. To this end, the article explains that the manner in which CEE and select Global South countries designed and enforced their competition laws has allowed competition law to play a meaningful role not only as an instrument but also as an architect of their economic transformations. Against this background, the article argues that the EU's openness to these transitional experiences is desirable not only because it would supplement the transitions within the EU but also because it will facilitate the pathway to similar transitions in other non-European jurisdictions that look to the EU for guidance. In terms of structure, first, the article examines the possible role of competition law in the course of transitions. Second, it examines the possibilities and limitations of the role competition law has already played in the transitions in CEE and Global South countries. The article concludes with an invitation to all readers to engage with this kaleidescope to gain a deeper insight into these issues.

The EU has made closing the gender gap in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) a priority in its education, research and employment policies. This answers to legal requirements to pursue gender equality through any EU action, as well as to practical imperatives to address a shortage of specialists that limits the EU’s ability to compete in the global technological race. Moreover, existing data show that many young women today have strong maths and science skills but are still largely absent from careers in engineering and information and communications technology (ICT).

Research shows that the under-representation of women in STEM has many causes, including: unwelcoming work environments in STEM jobs, family caring responsibilities, and social norms that discourage girls from pursuing these fields. Tackling these issues requires a combined approach including: challenging rigid gender stereotypes, using gender-sensitive teaching methods in schools, encouraging girls to choose STEM careers, and removing barriers to employment.

The EU pursues gender equality as a cross-cutting priority in various policies that cover STEM, and has adopted specific initiatives to promote women in STEM. In education, it uses a range of measures to support women at all levels, from schools to universities. In research, EU funding now depends on programmes promoting gender equality. In employment, EU laws help remove obstacles that might put women off STEM careers.

The EU also funds projects that support women’s innovation, entrepreneurship, networking and mentoring. The European Parliament strongly backs these efforts, and has called for wider action by the EU and its Member States.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women in STEM in the EU: How to close the gender gap‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

More than one year into the second von der Leyen Commission and six months after her first State of the Union address in this mandate, the Members’ Research Service of the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) presents its twice-yearly monitoring of the Commission’s delivery. This paper analyses in which areas the Commission has focused its efforts, how much it has achieved against its commitments – primarily set out in the State of the Union address and the 2026 Commission work programme – and how its priorities are articulated.

In terms of announcements, initiatives tabled, and texts adopted, the Commission’s main focus has been on competitiveness. To meet the objectives of the Letta and Draghi reports – quoted as the foundations of this policy – much effort will still be needed, as was confirmed by Mario Draghi soon after the 2025 State of the Union address. This priority underpinned the European Council’s 12 February 2026 competitiveness retreat.

The ‘new era for European defence and security‘ comes next. The mainly non-legislative nature of the second Commission priority translates differently, with initiatives far fewer in number but of high political prominence. This policy area is at the forefront in the interinstitutional joint declaration on the EU’s legislative priorities for 2026.

Read the complete Study on ‘The policy priorities of the von der Leyen II Commission: State of play in March 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The following debate will see Commission and Council statements on the situation in Iran following the US-Israel military operation, including the need to support the Iranian people. On Tuesday lunchtime, Parliament will celebrate International Women’s Day, with the focus this year on gender stereotypes, disinformation and violence, all of which weaken women’s participation in democracy. Nikol Pashinyan, Prime Minister of Armenia, is expected to address Parliament in a formal sitting on Wednesday.

The 2027 annual EU budget will be the last one under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), and Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) is calling for a strong focus on delivery for people, the economy, the planet and providing investments for competitiveness. On Tuesday, Members are set to debate the committee’s report, which emphasises the EU budget’s role in strengthening the bloc’s cohesion in the face of a difficult geopolitical landscape. BUDG also calls to uphold a strong external policy and underlines the agreement between EU institutions that expenditure covering the financing costs of Next Generation EU must not reduce funding for EU programmes. The vote on the guidelines for the 2027 EU budget will set Parliament’s position for the forthcoming interinstitutional negotiations.

On Tuesday, Members are due to debate a Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee report on the European Union’s enlargement strategy. To date, merit-based EU enlargement has had a largely positive effect, bringing peace and prosperity to countries joining the bloc. With nine candidate countries and one potential candidate awaiting EU membership, Parliament’s own-initiative report on EU enlargement strategy underlines its support for the process and for reform of the current procedure for admitting new members. The report also emphasises enlargement’s strategic potential to strengthen the wider region in the face of geopolitical uncertainty. Finally, the report underlines the need for a strong merit-based process where alignment with the EU’s core values is an unconditional principle of membership.

Under the Treaties, Parliament’s role is to scrutinise proposed EU legislation – and also international agreements – on behalf of European citizens. The revised framework agreement on relations between Parliament and the European Commission aims at strengthening Parliament’s prerogatives as regards the Commission’s duties to inform Parliament of its plans. On Monday, Members will discuss a report prepared by the Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) Committee. The report emphasises that the new framework agreement retains the institutional balance intended in the Treaties, while also creating a clearer and more accountable relationship between the institutions, working in EU citizens’ interests.

Ahead of the 2026 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference, taking place in Cameroon at the end of the month, Members are due to debate a resolution setting out Parliament’s position on the multilateral negotiations, on Wednesday afternoon. Here again, global instability and the retreat from global trade rules mean the need to reform the WTO is urgent, not least to replace the long-broken dispute settlement system, promote a global level playing field and make the rules more flexible. Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) has tabled a motion for a resolution underscoring Parliament’s support for the multilateral trading system and emphasising the need for greater flexibility. A delegation from the INTA committee is due to attend the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO ahead of the 14th WTO Ministerial Conference.

Closer to home, many citizens are personally concerned about the EU’s housing crisis. While housing policy remains a national competence, Parliament’s Special Committee on the Housing Crisis in the EU (HOUS) has tabled a report recommending action to improve housing affordability. The committee proposes to help tackle the issue through EU rules on short-term rentals, aiming to strike a balance between promoting urban local communities and tourism income. The HOUS committee also proposes action to improve quality in the construction and energy-efficiency sectors and calls on EU governments to support people trying to get into the housing market through tax breaks. Members are due to debate the recommendations on solutions for affordable housing on Tuesday morning.

A shortage of qualified workers in various sectors continues to be an issue in many EU countries. While the EU has already provided a platform to match EU jobseekers with employers, the European Commission is proposing to introduce legislation to create an EU talent pool which would be open to non-EU citizens. Faced with international competition for talent, the proposal would allow EU countries to attract workers, while guarding against creating an alternative pathway to legal migration. Parliament is keen to ensure that the system is fair, protects against discrimination and is rolled out in all EU countries. On Tuesday, Members are set to vote on a text agreed in interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal to establish an EU talent pool.

When using artificial intelligence (AI) to generate text, images or code, many people are unaware of the legal implications of the AI tool’s use of copyrighted material as training data. This can mean that content creators, artists and other rights-holders are neither acknowledged nor paid for their input. On Tuesday, Members are therefore due to vote on an own-initiative report from the Legal Affairs Committee calling for clarification of the legal situation as regards copyright and generative AI.

The EU rules on package travel date back to 2015 and need to be updated to improve passenger protection. Members are therefore due to consider amendments to the Package Travel Directive, following an agreement reached between the co-legislators in December 2025. Parliament’s negotiators succeeded in improving the complaints procedure and consumer information provided on what is included in the ‘package’ they purchase. Parliament is scheduled to vote to conclude its first reading on the legislation to amend the Package Travel Directive on Wednesday.

Quick links to all our publications for this plenary session:

European Parliament Plenary Session March 2026 – agenda

• Parliament’s guidelines for the 2027 EU budget: Section III – European Commission
• Parliament’s own-initiative report on EU enlargement strategy
• New framework agreement on relations between Parliament and Commission
• Towards the 2026 WTO Ministerial Conference
• Addressing the housing crisis in the EU
• Proposal for a regulation establishing an EU talent pool
• Copyright and generative artificial intelligence – Opportunities and challenges
• Package travel: Improved protection for travellers

Application and accession requirements

Any European country can apply for EU membership if it respects and undertakes to promote the values common to all EU countries, as defined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

Candidate countries must meet specific political and economic criteria, known as the Copenhagen criteria. These include:

• stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and the protection of minorities;
• a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU;
• the ability to take on the obligations that come with EU membership and a commitment to the aims of the political, economic and monetary union.

Accession process

Application stage: A country that wishes to join the EU sends its application to the Council of the European Union, which asks the European Commission to submit an opinion.

Candidate status: If the Commission’s opinion is favourable, the Council may decide to grant the country candidate status. The Council must agree this unanimously.

Negotiations: The Commission carries out a detailed examination of 35 different policy fields (negotiating chapters), together with the candidate country, and either recommends opening negotiations immediately or asks for certain conditions to be met first. The Council then decides (by unanimity) to open negotiations, which take place between the governments of EU countries and the candidate country. Candidate countries may need to undergo a rigorous reform process, with a focus on the functioning of democratic institutions, judicial independence, media pluralism and the fight against corruption and organised crime.

Accession treaty: Once negotiations have been closed, an accession treaty containing the conditions and deadlines of membership is formally drawn up. The treaty is subsequently submitted to the Commission, the Parliament and the Council for approval. Each EU country and the candidate country must ratify (sign)  the accession treaty according to their own procedures.

European Parliament’s role

Parliament monitors the accession process throughout the negotiations with candidate countries. Specifically, the Committee on Foreign Affairs is responsible for coordinating the work on enlargement. The committee regularly exchanges views with the Commissioner responsible for enlargement negotiations, government representatives, experts and civil society actors.

Parliament gives its opinion on the annual Commission reports on individual candidate countries. It adopts resolutions on the accession process and comments on the progress of countries’ reforms.

Parliament also maintains bilateral relations with the parliaments of candidate and potential candidate countries through joint parliamentary committees and inter‑parliamentary meetings which take place once or twice per year.

Parliament’s budgetary powers give it direct influence over the financial aspects of accession, such as the EU funds allocated to support reforms in candidate countries (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance).

Finally, Parliament must give its consent, by an absolute majority vote of more than half of all Members, before a country can join the EU (Article 49 TEU).

EU enlargement developments

As of early 2026, there are nine candidate countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.

Albania and Montenegro have made significant progress on the EU accession path by closing certain negotiating chapters and promoting an anti‑corruption and reform agenda.

In the case of North Macedonia, the opening of the first negotiating chapter depends on constitutional reform, progress on the anti‑corruption agenda and improved relations with neighbouring Bulgaria and Greece.

Ukraine and Moldova were granted candidate status in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine and Moldova successfully completed the examination of their alignment with EU law in 2025. Once all EU countries agree, the negotiating chapters can be opened.

As regards Serbia, political turmoil and reform stagnation have slowed down the negotiations on matters that remained unresolved.

Accession negotiations with Turkey have been on hold since 2018, as the Turkish government has failed to address backsliding on democracy and the rule of law. In May 2025, Parliament said that Turkey’s accession process could not be re-started under the current circumstances as the accession process requires the fundamental values of the Union to be fully respected.

Political instability and institutional challenges inBosnia and Herzegovina have halted the opening of formal negotiations.

In 2024, the EU found that Georgia was backsliding on the rule of law and fundamental rights and therefore conditions to open negotiations had not been met.

Kosovo applied to join the EU in December 2022 but has not been granted candidate status. In May 2025, Parliament called on the five EU countries [CJ1] (Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia) that have not yet recognised Kosovo to do so, so that Kosovo can progress its accession process.

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We will reply in the EU language in which you write to us.

New digital technologies are a mixed blessing for women’s rights and representation in the information sphere in general, and in the democratic debate in particular. Innovative digital tools often promise to make public debates more inclusive, for women too. In practice, recent AI-enabled technology – including deepfake tools – appears to facilitate an increasingly hostile information environment for women, with repercussions for their democratic participation both online and offline. 

At the same time, the ongoing global wave of autocratisation goes hand in hand with a backlash against women’s rights and gender equality. Authoritarian regimes have strategic reasons for suppressing women, and often use gendered disinformation to undermine women opposition leaders, as well as to erode confidence in democratic values and rights.

In the European Union, equality between men and women is a fundamental right and a founding value enshrined in the Treaties. Over the past decades, the EU has worked to increase gender equality at home, and used its global influence to support women’s rights abroad. At the same time, its evolving digital regulatory framework aims to make the digital space safe for all, including by protecting the rights of women online.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women in the age of AI-enabled disinformation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

CONTEXT

On 16 July 2025, the European Commission adopted its proposal for the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF), which was completed on 3 September with the adoption of a second package. The own resources part of the proposal is intended to equip the EU with a diversified revenue stream and sufficient means for delivering on EU priorities, as well as for the repayment of the debt created by Next Generation EU.

Legislative proposal

2025/0574 (CNS) – Proposal for a Council decision on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 – COM(2025) 574, 16.7.2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0574 (CNS)

Read the complete briefing on ‘System of own resources: Multiannual financial framework 2028-2034‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Despite strong political commitments to gender equality at EU and national level, women still remain politically under-represented at all levels of political power. In the European Parliament, as well as in national parliaments, governments and local assemblies, their share most often is under the symbolic 40 % mark. Moreover, after successive electoral cycles in which women’s share in representative assemblies had increased, this trend has slowed down or come to a halt. Progress has also been uneven among Member States, with women remaining markedly under-represented in some Member States.

Gender-balanced political representation is not only important for women and female politicians but also for political parties themselves and the rest of society. It increases trust in the political system and strengthens economic and political governance.

The EU has committed to achieving gender balance in political representation and participation in the EU; however, except for the European elections, its powers in the area remain limited mainly to soft action. It can support the specific actions to be taken by the EU institutions, national governments, political parties, civil society and the media, by issuing recommendations, facilitating the exchange of good practice or funding projects.

There is substantial evidence of the obstacles to women’s political participation and the means to overcome it. This picture is nevertheless not static, as new challenges emerge, particularly from mounting opposition to gender equality, as well as from digital technologies, most recently artificial intelligence, which can both empower women and discourage them.

This updates a March 2024 briefing by Ionel Zamfir.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women in politics in the EU: State of play in 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Food contact materials (FCMs) include all materials that come into physical contact with food during its production, processing, packaging and storage. They contain thousands of chemicals, some of which can migrate into food, especially at high temperatures, during long contact times or with certain food types.

Scientific evidence shows that such migration is common and may contribute to human exposure to hazardous substances, including endocrine disruptors, carcinogens and reproductive toxicants. Well-known examples include phthalates, bisphenols and PFAS, which remain authorised in some applications despite links to adverse health effects. Current risk assessments often consider substances individually and may underestimate combined or cumulative exposure.

The EU’s core legislation is Regulation (EC) 1935/2004, which sets out general safety and labelling rules, supported by the Good Manufacturing Practice Regulation (EC) 2023/2006. However, only four material types – plastics, ceramics, regenerated cellulose film and active/intelligent materials – are subject to fully harmonised EU rules. The remaining materials (paper, inks, coatings, rubber, metal, etc.) rely mostly on national rules, leading to regulatory fragmentation, uneven safety standards and unclear requirements for industry. In addition, existing rules focus largely on known intentionally added substances, while non‑intentionally added substances (NIAS), impurities and degradation products remain insufficiently addressed.

A 2022 Commission evaluation found the framework only partially effective, with gaps in enforcement, control of NIAS and harmonisation. The Commission has recently reiterated its commitment to further harmonising EU legislation on FCMs.

The European Parliament has pushed for stronger rules, contributing to recent EU‑wide bans on BPA and PFAS in food packaging.

Citizens and stakeholders broadly support a comprehensive revision establishing clearer standards, harmonised testing and stronger consumer protection.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Food contact materials in the EU: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

CONTEXT

The carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) is being implemented to create a level playing field on carbon pricing of specific goods within the EU single market. For CBAM-covered goods, free allowances under the EU′s emissions trading system (ETS) will be progressively phased out by 2034.

With the phase-out of free allowances in CBAM-covered goods, EU operators producing goods for export will be at a disadvantage in markets without similar carbon pricing.

The European Commission is proposing a temporary decarbonisation fund to support certain goods in the aluminium, fertilisers, iron and steel sectors. Other energy-intensive industries at continued risk of carbon leakage could also benefit. The fund would provide short-term support as a temporary bridge solution, pending a review in the context of the forthcoming revision of the EU ETS due in 2026.

Legislative proposal

2025/0418(COD) – Proposal for a regulation establishing the temporary decarbonisation fund – COM(2025) 990, 17 December 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0418(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Temporary decarbonisation fund‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

This paper engages with the increasing concern that competition law can no longer concentrate exclusively on a narrow focus on price increases and output diminution. Within the context of growing global inequality and the exponential increase in economic power in the hands of a few, there is a need to develop a coherent jurisprudence capable of addressing manifest abuses of economic power. These challenges are not confined to any single jurisdiction. One particularly instructive response can be found in South Africa. Faced with an Apartheid-shaped economy that reflected this global problem, South Africa responded with legislation that expanded the scope of competition law to embrace a range of defined public interest concerns. In analysing the key developments of the public interest jurisprudence that has emerged in response to this legislation, this paper draws on the South African experience as a source of insight for other jurisdictions—including the European Union—seeking to develop a coherent, yet expansive, competition law for the 21st century.

Background

Since his return to the White House in January 2025 until 20 February 2026, President Trump imposed unilateral tariffs on US trading partners after declaring several national emergencies under IEEPA on the grounds of the ‘influx of illegal aliens and illicit drugs‘ into the US and the persistent annual US trade in goods deficit. Trump declared Brazil’s actions against former Brazilian president Bolsonaro a national emergency under IEEPA to impose tariffs on Brazil. He also invoked IEEPA, on the grounds of Russian threats to the US, to impose tariffs against US imports from India because of India’s purchases of Russian oil.

The US Supreme Court tariff ruling

On 20 February 2026, a six to three majority of the nine US Supreme Court judges, including two Republican judges nominated during President Trump’s first term – in Learning Resources, Inc., versus Trump, President of the United States – ruled that, although IEEPA provides the US president with far-reaching powers, these do not include the authority to impose tariffs. They therefore ruled that President Trump’s use of IEEPA as an authority to levy tariffs on US trading partners is inconsistent with the US Constitution. The latter grants the power to impose tariffs solely to the US Congress, which, whenever it decided in the past to delegate tariff authority to the US president, stipulated that expressly in the respective legal act.

The Supreme Court ruling does not order the refunding of import tariffs already paid to the US government and thus does not impose an obligation on the US government to refund automatically the tariff revenue it has already collected. To be refunded, US importers will likely be compelled to take legal action individually against the US government at the US Court of International Trade. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), Ranking Member of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, stated that there is ‘no legal mechanism for consumers and many small businesses to recoup the money they have already paid’.

Implications of the US Supreme Court ruling for US tariff policy

As a result of the ruling, President Trump can no longer use IEEPA’s emergency authority to levy tariffs and is thus deprived of using the swiftest and most flexible tool in his tariff policy toolbox. IEEPA tariffs levied in 2025 are estimated at US$142 billion, with most of the tariff cost borne by US businesses and consumers.

However, the US Congress delegated the power to levy tariffs to the US president under alternative US legal bases, some of which President Trump has used during his first and second terms. The country-specific tariffs levied against China under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act and the national security-based sector-specific tariffs imposed on imports of aluminium, steel and other items under Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act have not been challenged by the Court and will remain in place.

Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act authorises the US president to take ‘all appropriate action’, including tariffs, against trading partners engaging in unfair trade practices that cause harm to US trade. While the imposition of Section 301 tariffs and new investigations have focused on China, in July 2025 the US initiated investigations against Brazil and the first Trump Administration used Section 301 to investigate the use of digital services taxes by a number of countries, including EU Member States.

Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act authorises the President to impose tariffs or other restrictions on imports if they are considered a threat to national security. President Trump imposed steel and aluminium tariffs under Section 232 during his first term. In 2025, this legal basis was used for probes into items including cars, pharmaceuticals, trucks, robotics, drones, aircraft, medical equipment and chips.

The US strategy is to shift to the use of another untested legal basis under Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act that allows the President to move fast to impose a blanket tariff of 15 % for a maximum of 150 days, unless Congress extends it or President Trump restarts the clock, to tackle a ‘large and serious’ US balance-of-payments deficit, that, experts argue, does not exist, and to a greater use of the tested legal bases above.

The Section 122 tariff of 15 %, effective from 24 February 2026, will allow the US government to bridge the time needed for more tariffs to be activated under legal bases that require several months of investigations. According to a Global Trade Alert estimate, the Section 122 tariff would lower the tariff burden on Brazil, China and India, but would increase it on the EU by 0.8 % to 12.5 % (US trade-weighted average: 13.2 %).

Table 1 – The shift in legal bases for US tariff policy in President Trump’s second term

Another alternative legal basis, as untested as Section 122, is Section 338 of the 1930 Tariff Act (Smoot-Hawley Act) that allows the President to levy tariffs up to 50 % for discrimination against US commerce.

The change of the US legal basis is unlikely to alleviate the economic impact of the tariffs on businesses and consumers. US tariffs, uncertainty and unpredictability in trade with the US are here to stay.

Early reactions to the Supreme Court ruling

The Court ruling had been expected for a long time and the oral argument of 5 November 2025 already suggested scepticism among both Democratic and Republican Supreme Court judges as to whether President Trump’s use of IEEPA was consistent with the US Constitution. The Court decision was welcomed by Democrats, with California Governor Newsom, Illinois Governor Pritzker and Senator Cantwell calling for refunds, and by several Republicans who praised free trade or the separation of powers and had voted for bills to repeal tariffs. By contrast, it drew criticism from the US government and many other Republicans.

EU leaders have cautiously welcomed the ruling. A Commission spokesperson stated that the US Supreme Court ruling is being carefully analysed and that the EU remains in close contact with the US administration: ‘We therefore continue to advocate for low tariffs and to work towards reducing them.’ A later Commission statement called on the US to provide clarity on the next steps.

European businesses have reacted in a muted way, remaining clear-eyed that the ruling will merely lead to different US tools being applied and that it is unlikely to reduce the level of US import tariffs. It is seen as a new source of unpredictability, after European exporters had started to adjust to the US tariff policy before the judgment.

Several governments have signalled their interest in renegotiating past tariff arrangements with the Trump Administration, while the US has stated that the tariff deals negotiated under IEEPA remain in force.

Impact on the tariff provisions of the 2025 EU-US framework agreement

On 24 February 2026, Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) was set to adopt two legislative reports, drafted by the standing rapporteur for the US and INTA chair, Bernd Lange (S&D, Germany). These reports would feed into Parliament’s first reading position, which was originally due to be adopted during the March 2026 plenary, on two Commission proposals for implementing the EU’s tariff commitments under the 2025 EU-US framework agreement. Following the Supreme Court ruling, on 23 February 2026 Bernd Lange stated – after a meeting with the INTA shadow rapporteurs – that, given the new circumstances, a majority of political group representatives has agreed that the two legislative files ‘should be put on hold until clarity, stability and legal certainty in EU-US trade relations are re-established.’

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What to expect after the landmark United States Supreme Court tariff ruling?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

CONTEXT

The Commission is proposing to revise CO₂ emission performance standards for new cars and vans. The amendments aim to introduce flexibilities and enhance technology neutrality to achieve the related targets. The proposal also establishes a new labelling system based on CO₂ emission performance classes, with the aim of facilitating the purchase of electric vehicles and harmonising labelling across the EU. The proposal builds on feedback from the 2025 strategic dialogue on the future of the automotive industry, which sought to address challenges in the sector. It forms part of the automotive package for a clean and competitive European automotive sector.

Legislative proposal

2025/0420(COD) – Proposal for a Regulation of the of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/631 as regards CO₂ emission performance standards for new light duty vehicles and vehicle labelling and repealing Directive 1999/94/EC – COM(2025)995 final, 16.12.2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The latest developments in the legislative procedure can be followed via the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0420 (COD).

Read the complete briefing on ‘Revision of CO2 emission performance standards for new light-duty vehicles and vehicle labelling‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

English

EU-Mercosur agreements

In December 2025, the European Union (EU) and the Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) finished negotiating a partnership agreement. The agreement covers trade and also political dialogue and cooperation in matters such as the environment and human rights.

On 9 January 2026, the Council of the European Union (the governments of EU countries) authorised the European Commission to sign the agreement. The agreement was signed on 17 January.

For the agreement to enter into force, the European Parliament must vote on it. Parliament must either approve or reject the deal, but it cannot change it. All EU countries will also have to approve it.

The EU and Mercosur also signed an interim agreement. This will allow the trade aspects of the deal to be implemented before the partnership agreement as a whole enters into force, which could take several years. Since trade policy is exclusively an EU competence, the interim agreement does not need approval from individual EU countries. It only needs approval from the European Parliament.

Parliament’s position on the EU-Mercosur agreement

On 21 January 2026, Parliament decided to ask the EU Court of Justice to review the agreements’ compatibility with EU Treaties. Parliament will have to wait for the Court of Justice’s decision before taking a final vote on the agreements. The Court of Justice could take over a year to deliver an opinion.

In an October 2025 resolution, the European Parliament highlighted that the agreement would strengthen EU-Mercosur cooperation on common challenges, while counteracting the growing influence of authoritarian actors in the region. Parliament also considered that the agreement would help the EU diversify its supply of critical raw materials.

In a previous resolution in April 2025, the European Parliament expressed concern over the agreement’s potentially negative impact on EU sustainability and safety standards, as well as on the EU agricultural and food sector’s competitiveness.

Provisional application of the partnership and interim agreements

Under the EU Treaties, the Council can decide on the provisional application of international treaties before Parliament approves them.

Before now, Parliament has regretted the Council’s decision to allow the provisional application of international agreements in areas which are subject to Parliament’s consent, such as trade.

Safeguard clause

The European Parliament and the Council have agreed on rules for applying the safeguard clause included in the partnership agreement. This clause allows the EU to suspend trade preferences on imports of agricultural products from Mercosur countries if such imports harm EU producers.

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Accords UE-Mercosur

En décembre 2025, l’UE et les pays du Mercosur (Argentine, Brésil, Paraguay et Uruguay) ont achevé la négociation d’un accord de partenariat. L’accord couvre non seulement le commerce, mais aussi le dialogue politique et la coopération dans des domaines tels que l’environnement et les droits de l’homme.

Le 9 janvier 2026, le Conseil de l’UE (les gouvernements des pays de l’UE) a autorisé la Commission européenne à signer l’accord. La signature a eu lieu le 17 janvier.

Cependant, pour que l’accord entre en vigueur, le Parlement européen doit se prononcer par un vote. Il doit soit approuver soit rejeter l’accord, mais il ne peut pas le modifier. Tous les pays de l’UE devront également l’approuver.

L’UE et le Mercosur ont signé également un accord intérimaire. Celui-ci permettra de mettre en œuvre les aspects commerciaux de l’accord avant l’entrée en vigueur de l’accord de partenariat dans son ensemble, ce qui pourrait prendre plusieurs années. Étant donné que la politique commerciale relève exclusivement de la compétence de l’UE, l’accord intérimaire n’a pas besoin de l’approbation de chaque pays membre. Il requiert seulement l’approbation du Parlement européen.

Position du Parlement sur les accords UE-Mercosur

Le 21 janvier 2026, le Parlement a décidé de demander à la Cour de justice de l’UE d’examiner la compatibilité des accords UE-Mercosur avec les traités de l’Union. Le Parlement doit maintenant attendre la décision de la Cour de justice avant de procéder au vote final sur les accords. La procédure devant la Cour de Justice pourrait durer plus d’un an.

Dans une résolution d’octobre 2025, le Parlement européen a souligné qu’un accord renforcerait la coopération UE-Mercosur face aux défis communs, tout en contrant l’influence croissante des acteurs autoritaires dans la région. Le Parlement a également estimé qu’un accord aiderait l’Union à diversifier ses sources d’approvisionnement en matières premières critiques.

Dans une résolution précédente d’avril 2025, le Parlement européen s’est dit préoccupé par les conséquences potentiellement négatives de cet accord sur les normes de durabilité et de sécurité de l’UE et sur la compétitivité du secteur agricole et alimentaire de l’UE.

Application provisoire des accords de partenariat et intérimaire

En vertu des traités de l’UE, le Conseil peut décider d’appliquer provisoirement des traités internationaux avant que le Parlement ne les approuve.

Par le passé, le Parlement a regretté la décision du Conseil d’autoriser l’application provisoire d’accords internationaux dans des domaines qui sont soumis à l’approbation du Parlement, tels que le commerce.

Clause de sauvegarde

Le Parlement européen et le Conseil se sont mis d’accord sur les règles d’application de la clause de sauvegarde figurant dans l’accord de partenariat. Cette clause permet à l’UE de suspendre les préférences commerciales sur les importations de produits agricoles en provenance des pays du Mercosur si ces importations nuisent aux producteurs de l’UE.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Lasers have a wide range of current applications, in manufacturing, medicine or communications. Their characteristics vary across different fields and they remain under continuous development, with the academic sector pushing the limits of the technology. One field of interest is laser pulse time acontrol and questions about the shortest processes in nature. These ultrashort processes govern our lives and happen all around us: biological processes are driven by protein folding and enzymatic reactions, the movements of molecules and bond breaking create chemical reactions, and the interaction with light leads to different radiation processes. Most of these can be observed in the ‘femtosecond’ regime. One femtosecond is 10^‑15 seconds – if a second was as long as the distance from earth to the sun, we would measure at the scale of a hairs’ width – which would be a single femtosecond.

Huge progress has been made in observing this timescale with ultrashort pulses of light, creating snapshots, or even movies of hitherto unseen processes. The light sources behind such discoveries are often particle accelerators such as synchrotrons or newer XFELs. The latter are very long accelerators that are used to bring free electrons close to the speed of light; these then undulate as they go through an array of magnets, causing them to emit, high-energy light pulses in the form of X-rays. Some of these state-of-the-art facilities are European, such as the European XFEL (EuXFEL, which opened at the Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron (DESY) in Hamburg in 2017). XFEL is 3.4 km long and incorporates superconducting accelerator technology. This is a key example of European cooperation hosting a world-leading science centre and connecting scientists across nationalities and disciplines.

Future development could lead to interesting possibilities: chemical reactions and the movement of molecules are still much slower than the electronic processes underlying them – their natural timescale is in the attosecond range (a thousandth of a femtosecond – 10^-18s). If we return to our metaphor of a second being equal to the distance of the earth to the sun, we are now considering an entity the size of a microscopic virus. This timescale can be reached with methods such as high-harmonic generation (HHG), which led to Agostini, Krausz and L’Huillier’s award of the 2023 Nobel prize for physics for their work on methods to resolve electron dynamics. However, these are limited to lower intensity pulses, achieving this timescale only at ‘small scale’ (tabletop) and under technical compromises. Theoretical studies on these timescales continue, but experimental limits make a direct comparison quite difficult.

Potential impacts and developments

The idea behind investigating any dynamic is most often to make a video of the action. For extremely fast processes, this becomes very difficult, as it is like repeated stop-motion photography using a long-exposure camera and imperfect timing. An investigation is therefore significantly easier with improved camera timing.

To reach the attosecond scale, with high-intensity, high-quality light pulses, several new technological ideas exist, which promise to improve XFELs. These include wakefield acceleration, which accelerates the electrons initially with an additional laser or plasma, reaching high speeds at short length, and technologies that improve the properties and intensity of the resulting laser, such as self-/laser-seeding or enhanced self-amplified spontaneous emission (ESASE). These are already partially implemented in existing and new facilities, such as the Chinese SHINE facility (expected to open in 2026), or the Compact XFEL being built in the United States. Europe relies on existing facilities and established strengths, with plans to improve and upgrade them including an improved electron beam at DESY.

Combining several of these next-generation technologies may allow science to attain the ambitious goal of achieving a reliable resolution of significantly below 100 attoseconds, which could compete with HHG. This would be enough, for example, to precisely track the steps of an electron within a molecule, giving us insight into electronic movements and transitions. This could allow scientists to observe the key steps in light absorption and conversion, charge migration, or chemical reactions. Better understanding of these processes could unlock a range of scientific applications, such as tracing the light-driven path of electrons in photosynthesis, or establishing a new conceptual basis for chemistry by naturally linking structure and dynamics. It could also help drive innovation by, for example, allowing the development of more powerful and energy efficient optoelectronic components, helping overcome production barriers to unlock the potential of quantum device technologies, or a deeper understanding of the charge transfer mechanisms in batteries.

This positions XFELs as a classic example of a research infrastructure which, even if not geared towards immediate innovation outcomes, can be leveraged to progress a wide range of research, which could have a significant potential economic impact. Furthermore, new developments in compact XFELs, which may ultimately allow them to be shrunk to tabletop size, may open the door to direct commercial application in chip manufacturing. Such development would be particularly relevant for EU competitiveness, given the current European monopoly on high-end chip lithography machines through ASML.

Anticipatory policymaking

X-ray free electron lasers demonstrate the challenges involved in closely tracking the shortest processes in nature: it is difficult, but possible. Better control of the attosecond regime is in reach with existing technology but requires upgrading existing facilities (affecting operation) or creating new ones. The high investment required for such projects makes XFELs a poster case for the need for a European strategy on research and technology infrastructures, as recently launched by the European Commission. Cutting-edge infrastructures like this are attractive sites for research: congregating skills and talent, offering unique opportunities, making such centres the first address for EU scientific cooperation, and not only help promote European researcher mobility, but also attract researchers currently based elsewhere.

Given a renewed European focus on competitiveness, it makes sense to design such projects as cross-cutting initiatives, and to seek opportunities to involve the private sector. An ambitious effort to attain high attosecond precision could develop the EU high-tech supply chain (in fields such as electron sources, superconductor technology, or detectors), helping to secure a leading role for Europe in these sectors, as in the case of projects such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Combining both attractive centres of excellence and scientific fields and more investment in high-tech industry could also be a potential idea for a moonshot project under the next Horizon Europe programme. This could advance research in a plethora of scientific fields, from quantum science over chemistry to biology. In addition, the potential direct commercial viability of this technology, such as in semiconductor manufacturing, could attract innovative funding. This would perpetuate the tradition of European excellence in this field and enable development of a next-generation technology industry in Europe.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘What if we could track an electron’s every step?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Quantum technologies have transformative potential and are already exerting a significant impact on global economies and society. The European Union (EU) supports the development of these technologies through initiatives such as the Quantum Flagship and Horizon Europe, as well as through national initiatives and programmes. However, the specific role of quantum technologies in supporting the EU’s energy and climate goals has so far received limited and fragmented policy attention. This briefing explores how the emerging quantum ecosystem could help accelerate decarbonisation and address the existing innovation gap that must be bridged to achieve climate neutrality (i.e. net-zero emissions) by 2050. Achieving this goal requires technological breakthroughs in sectors that are currently difficult to decarbonise.

Quantum computing has the potential to transform these areas by, for example, simulating complex molecular interactions that classical computers cannot handle efficiently. Such capabilities could fast-track the development of more efficient batteries, green hydrogen catalysts and carbon capture materials. Quantum sensing is already providing precise tools for monitoring greenhouse gas emissions, and quantum communication has the potential to secure the critical digital infrastructure of future electricity grids. Available evidence indicates that, while the EU is investing seriously in quantum research, it currently lacks a coordinated strategy linking these technologies explicitly to decarbonisation. With the European Commission expected to adopt a quantum act in 2026, policymakers have a unique window of opportunity to address this gap. By integrating long-term decarbonisation objectives into the research and innovation framework, the EU can leverage its scientific leadership to drive the next generation of clean technologies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Quantum technologies: Can they boost Europe’s decarbonisation?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Main elements of our reply

Violence in north‑east Syria may amount to war crimes

In its resolution of 12 February 2026 on the situation in north‑east Syria, the European Parliament expresses concern over credible reports of human rights violations, particularly against the Kurdish population – which may constitute war crimes.

Parliament calls for swift investigations into crimes against civilians by government forces and militias, and urges the Syrian authorities to grant full access to UN bodies.

The European Parliament welcomes the agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government, calling on all parties to respect the ceasefire. It denounces Turkey’s continued military intervention in north‑east Syria.

Parliament recalls the decisive contribution of Kurdish forces against Daesh and expresses grave concern over Daesh fighters who have escaped from detention.

It calls on Syrian authorities to protect all ethnic and religious communities, ensuring full recognition, participation and rights for Kurds.

A press release about this resolution is available on the European Parliament’s website. Parliament also adopted resolutions on Syria and the Kurdish community in May 2025, July 2025 and January 2026, during its current mandate.

European Union foreign policy

Although the European Parliament takes political positions on world developments, it is the governments of EU countries that decide the EU’s common foreign and security policy in both the European Council (heads of government) and the Council of the EU (government ministers). The European External Action Service, led by High Representative Kaja Kallas, implements the EU’s foreign and security policy.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin has been President of the Russian Federation since 31 December 1999, except for a brief four-year interlude from 2008 to 2012 during which he held the office of prime minister but effectively maintained his political authority.

During Putin’s 26-year rule, Russia has been at war, overtly or covertly, for 21 years. Putin’s first term coincided with the launching of the Second Chechen War, intended to be brief but which lasted for 10 violent years. In 2014, during Putin’s third term, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, and the initially covert support to the separatist forces in eastern Ukraine gradually became overt, leading up to the full-scale invasion of February 2022. Overlapping with these two armed conflicts, the Russo-Georgian War took place in 2008, and since 2015 Russia has deployed military forces in Syria. Russian paramilitary groups have also expanded operations in Africa.

The transformation of Russia over these 26 years has been fundamental. A series of indicators can help measure its economic evolution, the surge in military expenditure, its demographic decline, the worsening of various freedom and governance rankings, and growing inequality. In a shift towards the east, China has become, by far, Russia’s main trading partner, providing it with a crucial economic and diplomatic lifeline since 2022.

Putin, now 73 years old, was proclaimed President of the Russian Federation for his fifth term in 2024, after obtaining over 88 % of the votes in what was broadly seen as yet another ritual electoral performance. In line with the constitutional reforms introduced in 2020, he can remain in power until 2036.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Russia under Vladimir Putin: His 26-year rule in facts and figures‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

CONTEXT

The European Union’s competitiveness and prosperity depends on an optimal allocation of resources, particularly savings, within the single market, yet EU capital markets remain fragmented. EU rules are mostly set out through directives, leaving Member States’ supervisory authorities latitude in their interpretation and application of the rules. Therefore, although rules are enacted at EU level, the resulting uneven supervisory environment is considered a major cause of fragmentation of EU capital markets. EU-level supervision and regulation thus constitute instruments to ‘de-fragment’ – i.e. ‘integrate’ – the EU’s capital markets.

On 4 December 2025, the European Commission issued a package of three proposals to address this situation (the ‘Market integration package’), as part of its savings and investments union strategy. The proposal to amend 14 regulations – entitled the ‘Master regulation’ by the Commission – would primarily transfer supervisory powers to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in some specific markets and areas, strengthen its coordination instruments, and modify its governance. This proposal also aims at removing barriers to cross-border activities and trading.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0383 (COD) – Proposal for amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, No 648/2012, No 600/2014, No 909/2014, 2015/2365, 2019/1156, 2021/23, 2022/858, 2023/1114, No 1060/2009, 2016/1011, 2017/2402, 2023/2631 and 2024/3005 as regards the further development of capital market integration and supervision within the Union – COM(2025) 943, 4 December 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0383 (COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Capital markets integration and supervision: Master regulation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Members debated several Commission and Council statements, including on the European response to extreme weather events, particularly in Portugal, southern Italy, Malta and Greece; building a stronger European defence in an increasingly volatile international environment; as well as urgent action to revive EU competitiveness, deepen the single market and reduce the cost of living, following up on the Draghi report. Debates also covered the rule of law, fundamental rights and the misuse of EU funds in Slovakia, and Spain’s large-scale regularisation policy and its impact on the Schengen Area and EU migration policy. Further debates concerned the presentation of the action plan against cyberbullying, the International Day of Education and the fight against inequalities in access to education, as well as the need to tackle economic inequalities within the EU and globally. Members also adopted a Parliament statement to mark World Cancer Day.

Parliament held several debates on external relations, in particular on the European response to the attacks on the Ukrainian energy system and the resulting humanitarian crisis; the situation in north-east Syria, including violence against civilians and the need to maintain a sustainable ceasefire; the urgent need to address the humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan and achieve lasting peace; and the violence in the Great Lakes Region, particularly in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Finally, Members heard a formal address by Annalena Baerbock, President of the United Nations General Assembly.

EU-Mercosur Agreement: Bilateral safeguard clause

Members adopted a provisional agreement on a regulation implementing the bilateral safeguard clause for agricultural products incorporated into the trade pillar of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement. The safeguard clause allows the EU to temporarily suspend Mercosur agreement tariff preferences and reinstate most-favoured nation duties under stricter and faster procedures should imports undercut EU prices or represent a danger to EU producers. In the provisional text, Parliament succeeded in lowering the thresholds for triggering a safeguard investigation from 10 % to 5 % and extending the reference period to three years. The Commission may also, upon a request from EU industry, extend monitoring to products or sectors not listed in the regulation.

European Climate Law

Parliament adopted a provisional agreement reached between Parliament and the Council on proposals to amend the European Climate Law, introducing an intermediate climate target for 2040. The amendment would include a binding 90 % net emissions reduction target for 2040, compared to 1990, and a capped potential contribution of international carbon credits towards meeting this target.

Cross-border enforcement of rules on unfair trading practices in the agri-food supply chain

Late payment, last-minute order cancellations, and unilateral contract changes on the part of large buyers in a different country can considerably harm EU farmers’ businesses. While the Unfair Trading Practices (UTP) Directive seeks to protect farmers from such activities, Parliament proposed extending the rules to operators based outside the EU whose commercial activities target the EU internal market. It also suggested establishing alerts on cross-border UTPs. Members adopted a provisional agreement on strengthening the directive. National authorities will be required to act on their own initiative to stop cross-border UTPs, even in the absence of a formal complaint.

Wine sector package

The EU wine sector is facing change, both in growing conditions and drinking habits, leading to a risk of surplus production. Parliament calls for a higher EU co-financing rate for vineyard restructuring. Members adopted a provisional agreement reached with the Council on amending several EU rules governing the sector. The provisional agreement will harmonise labelling, particularly regarding alcohol content and increase EU and national support to promote high-quality European wines outside the EU.

New EU anti-poverty strategy

With a Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) report calling for stronger EU coordination, Members debated the development of the EU’s first-ever anti-poverty strategy, calling for greater effort to eradicate poverty, particularly for children. The report highlights the multidimensional nature of poverty, particularly among children, people with disabilities, older people and those in precarious employment. It also stresses the need to improve minimum income schemes, and the importance of quality jobs, effective social protection and access to public services. Finally, the report calls for adequate funding, including through the 2028–2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF), to support implementation of the strategy, improve coherence across existing initiatives and contribute to the goal of eradicating poverty by 2035.

Protecting workers’ rights

Workplace incidents remain a significant challenge in the EU, particularly in the construction, transport, and manufacturing sectors. Parliament has urged action, particularly on contractor and subcontractor liability, and Members debated and adopted an EMPL committee own-initiative report reiterating this call. The report calls for a comprehensive strategy against labour exploitation, including tackling illegal work, organised crime and abusive business practices such as some subcontracting activities. It highlights the need for effective enforcement through closer cooperation between the European Labour Authority, Europol, national authorities and social partners.

Action plan against cyberbullying

Members held a debate on the cyberbullying action plan, following a Commission statement. Parliament has consistently highlighted the need to protect children online, addressing issues such as cyberbullying, hate speech, child sexual abuse and mental health risks. The Commission’s EU action plan against cyberbullying aims at protecting children, young adults and others at particular risk online. The plan addresses the lack of a common definition of cyberbullying along with proposals for prevention and awareness-raising measures.

EU priorities for the 70th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women

The 70th session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (UNCSW) in March is expected to focus on access to justice for women and girls. Parliament adopted recommendations to the Council on the EU’s priorities for the 70th session. An own-initiative report from the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) urges the Council to lead efforts against the global backlash on gender rights and calls on the EU to defend diversity, equality and inclusion, safeguard the UNCSW‘s mandate, and address funding shortfalls.

Accession of third countries to Hague conventions

Members debated the accession of third countries (in this case Albania and Montenegro) to the Hague conventions (specifically the Hague Judgments Convention). There are various procedures for handling the effects of ratification of an acceding state on existing parties in Hague Conventions. In one scenario, if existing parties do not oppose the accession by submitting a declaration within a set time limit, their agreement to the accession is tacit. However, when the Commission raises no objection to a third country’s accession and does not submit a declaration of opposition, the Council and Parliament cannot give their consent. Parliament’s position is therefore that the Commission must present a proposal for acceptance in such cases, even where not required by the convention itself. Members adopted two resolutions on the matter.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations from Parliament’s International Trade (INTA) Committee on the negative trade-related effects of global overcapacity on the Union steel market was approved without vote.

This ‘at a glance’ note is intended to review some of the highlights of the plenary part-session, and notably to follow up on key dossiers identified by EPRS. It does not aim to be exhaustive. For more detailed information on specific files, please see other EPRS products, notably our ‘EU legislation in progress’ briefings, and the plenary minutes.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – February 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

English

Current EU legislation

A 2023 European Union (EU) law ensures that products containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are clearly labelled.

Agreement on new genomic techniques

On 4 December 2025, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU reached an agreement on the European law governing products derived from new genomic techniques (NGTs).

The agreement stipulates that products derived from plants considered comparable to natural or conventional plants (known as NGT1) will be exempt from the GMO labelling requirements for consumers. However, labelling will remain mandatory for seeds, allowing farmers to make an informed choice.

Plants with more complex modifications (referred to as NGT2) will remain subject to the existing GMO legislation requirements, including mandatory labelling for all derived products.

Plants that have been modified to tolerate herbicides or produce an insecticidal substance will be classified as NGT2. No NGTs will be allowed in organic production.

The agreement allows NGTs to be patented, except for traits or sequences that already occur in nature or are produced organically. Safeguards will be put in place to prevent the market from being dominated by a few firms and keep seeds affordable and accessible to farmers.

Next steps

The law will enter into force after formal approval by the Parliament and the Council (representing the governments of EU countries).

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Législation européenne en vigueur

Une loi de l’Union européenne (UE) de 2003 assure que les produits contenant des organismes génétiquement modifiés (OGM) soient clairement étiquetés.

Accord sur les nouvelles techniques génomiques

Le 4 décembre 2025, le Parlement européen et le Conseil de l’UE sont parvenus à un accord sur la loi européenne qui régira les produits dérivés des nouvelles techniques génomiques (NTG).

L’accord prévoit que les produits dérivés des plantes considérées comparables à des plantes naturelles ou conventionnelles (dénommées NTG 1) seront exemptés de l’obligation d’étiquetage des OGM pour les consommateurs. Cependant, l’étiquetage restera obligatoire pour les semences, afin de permettre aux agriculteurs de faire un choix éclairé.

Les plantes dont les modifications sont plus complexes (dénommées NTG 2) resteront régies par les règles actuelles applicables aux OGM, ce qui implique un étiquetage obligatoire pour tous les produits dérivés.

Les plantes modifiées pour tolérer les herbicides ou produire une substance insecticide seront considérées NTG 2. Aucune NTG ne sera autorisée dans la production biologique.

L’accord autorise les brevets pour les NTG, à l’exception des caractères ou séquences présents dans la nature ou produits par des moyens biologiques. Des garanties sont prévues pour empêcher la concentration du marché et pour garantir que les semences restent abordables et accessibles aux agriculteurs.

Prochaines étapes

La loi entrera en vigueur après l’approbation formel du Parlement et du Conseil (représentant les gouvernements des pays de l’UE).

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

CONTEXT

On 19 November 2025, the Commission published a proposal for a Digital Omnibus on AI: a set of amendments to the Artificial Intelligence Act (in force since 1 August 2024) and to Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 on common rules for civil aviation (in force since 11 September 2018). These amendments seek to address specific implementation issues and to reduce the regulatory burden arising from the AI Act; the timely application of the AI Act has faced some delays, particularly regarding the designation of national competent authorities and the publication of harmonised standards and compliance tools for high-risk AI requirements. The minor amendments to Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 aim to ensure the consistent application of the AI Act’s high-risk requirements in civil aviation.

The Digital Omnibus on AI is part of a broader digital package published on 19 November 2025, which includes two digital omnibus proposals (henceforth referred to as ‘the digital omnibus’: one amending personal and non-personal data and cybersecurity rules, and another – the Digital Omnibus on AI – amending AI rules), the European data union strategy and a proposed regulation on European business wallets. The digital package aims to simplify and enhance the effectiveness of the EU’s digital laws, and help EU businesses to innovate, scale, and save on administrative costs. While the digital package has been welcomed by most stakeholders, the digital omnibus has raised concerns about achieving simplification while ensuring fundamental rights. It also entails a risk that simplification could upset the fragile equilibrium achieved during the initial trilogue negotiations.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0359(COD) – Proposal for a regulation amending Regulations (EU) 2024/1689 and (EU) 2018/1139 as regards the simplification of the implementation of harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Digital Omnibus on AI) – COM(2025) 836 final, 19.11.2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments regarding this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Digital Omnibus on AI‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Enhancing the EU’s competitiveness is a key priority for the European Council in the current legislative cycle. In a complex geopolitical environment, in which the international rules-based order is increasingly undermined and core alliances are questioned, it is essential for Europe to be able to stand firmly on its own feet. Strengthening the single market and the EU economic base is ‘an urgent strategic imperative’ in the words of European Council President António Costa, to improve the EU’s competitiveness and develop its strategic autonomy.

On 12 February 2026, EU leaders will meet for an informal leaders’ retreat – ‘a strategic brainstorming session’, according to President Costa – in Alden Biesen, Belgium, to discuss EU competitiveness. This meeting, which 19 EU leaders requested in a letter in October 2025, builds on previous discussions on the topic, notably 1) the informal meeting of 22 January 2026 on transatlantic relations and trade, 2) the strategic discussion on geoeconomy and competitiveness at the December 2025 European Council meeting, and 3) the October 2025 regular meeting on simplification and twin transition. Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta have been invited to join the retreat to share their visions and highlight developments since their groundbreaking reports. European Parliament President Roberta Metsola will also address the meeting; President Costa has met Parliament’s Conference of Presidents ahead of the retreat. No formal conclusions are expected from the strategic debate, but the reflections are likely to feed into the March 2026 European Council conclusions.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outlook for the 12 February 2026 retreat: Work on competitiveness in the European Council‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.