As Members gather for the last plenary session before the summer recess, their agenda covers enlargement, foreign affairs, competitiveness, the EU budget, agriculture, social security and the environment. On Tuesday morning, a debate will follow a presentation of the programme of activities of the Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, which began on 1 July. On Wednesday morning, Members will hear Council and European Commission statements on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 18‑19 June 2026.

EU-Mexico relations

Bilateral relations between the EU and Mexico have been bolstered by the current framework since 2000. On Tuesday, Parliament is due to decide whether to give its consent to the conclusion of two instruments to update this framework, the EU-Mexico Political, Economic and Cooperation Strategic Partnership Agreement (Modernised Global Agreement, MGA) and an interim Trade Agreement (iTA), both of which were signed by the EU and Mexico in May 2026. Parliament remains in favour of modernising the MGA, with a joint report by the International Trade (INTA) and AFET committees welcoming it as a step towards further economic expansion that could benefit EU companies and farmers. The INTA committee is due to vote on a draft recommendation on the conclusion of the iTA before the plenary vote.

Passenger rights

Lower ticket prices and a wider choice of routes are not the only results of air transport liberalisation. On Monday, Members are expected to discuss an agreement to revise the air passenger rights framework to better protect passengers during increasingly common travel disruption. Delayed in the Council for over a decade, Parliament has shown consistent support for measures to protect air passengers and their rights. Parliament negotiators reached a political agreement in conciliation with the Council in June 2026. The agreement maintains the three-hour threshold for compensation for flight delays and strengthens passenger rights including on rerouting options, protection for missed connections and reimbursement for unused vouchers.

Social security when working abroad

A reform of EU social security rules aims to help citizens living or working in another EU country and better distribute responsibilities between EU countries. Members are set to vote on a provisional agreement on the move to modernise the rules on Monday. Parliament’s negotiators maintained mandatory prior notifications for the construction sector in the agreed text, meaning that authorities of the home Member State would be notified if someone works in another Member State. Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) confirmed the agreement in April 2026 and Parliament and the Council now need to formally adopt the new social security rules.

East Asia relations

The geopolitical situation in East Asia has grown more volatile as the region experiences increased security challenges triggered by authoritarian regimes. On Monday evening, Members are expected to vote on an AFET committee recommendation, which affirms the need to deepen cooperation with partners in the region, including Japan, Korea, ASEAN and Taiwan. Parliament also recommends establishing a comprehensive EU-Taiwan cooperation framework, in addition to strengthening EU engagement with regional security initiatives and diplomatic efforts to prevent further escalation in East Asia. 

Fertiliser prices

The crisis in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has caused an increase in fertiliser prices, placing a significant financial burden on farmers. On Tuesday, Members are set to vote on a proposal for a regulation to provide temporary common agricultural policy (CAP) support, which would offer exceptional support to farmers most affected by the soaring prices, including the possibility of increased advances on direct payments through existing CAP envelopes. Given the urgency, Parliament decided to consider the proposal without preparing a report, to enable farmers to make prompt decisions on buying fertilisers for the year ahead.

28^th tax regime

The EU’s plans to allow companies to register as an ‘EU Inc.’, recognised across all Member States, under a ’28th regime’, are central to its competitiveness agenda, aimed at simplifying rules for companies to scale up in the single market. Complementing the legislative proposal already on the table, Members are expected to vote on an own-initiative report from the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), on Thursday, on the feasibility of a 28th tax regime and its potential to support competitiveness by simplifying and harmonising corporate taxation.

Environmental crime

Environmental crimes can have a devastating impact, yet they are difficult to detect and prosecute. Parliament has repeatedly called for measures to combat such crimes. On Wednesday, Parliament is scheduled to vote on endorsement of the EU’s ratification of the Council of Europe’s new Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law. A report from the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee recommends ratification, concluding that the convention is consistent with the EU directive. The new convention establishes minimum requirements for the criminalisation of environmental offences related to activities such as pollution, destruction of biodiversity and improper handling of hazardous waste.

EU Budget

To enter a 2025 budget surplus of €2.1 billion as revenue in the 2026 budget, on Tuesday Parliament is set to consider the Council’s position on draft amending budget No 1/2026 (DAB 1/2026). While endorsing the proposal, a report adopted by the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) welcomes that higher own resources are driving the surplus rather than underspending, but reiterates its long-standing view that revenue from fines and fees should strengthen the EU budget instead of lowering national contributions, and calls for more sustainable EU own resources in the next multiannual financial framework.

Annual enlargement reports

Enlargement remains a prominent topic at this plenary session. On Tuesday, Members are expected to debate separately three reports prepared by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), on Ukraine, Moldova and Serbia. The report on Ukraine stresses the need for a ‘sustainable’ ceasefire and a peace agreement reached with the participation of the EU, while also recognising Ukraine’s European integration as a strategic priority for the Union.

AFET’s report on Moldova commends the country’s commitment to EU accession, condemning attempts by Russian efforts to destabilise Moldova’s path to accession through interference campaigns.

As a result of political instability in the country, Serbia’s EU accession process remains at an impasse. The AFET report recalls that accession is conditional on respect for EU values and democracy, reiterating the need for Serbia to affirm its geopolitical orientation towards the EU, particularly in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Further reading

• Agenda
• Priority dossiers under the Irish EU Council Presidency
• 2025 Commission report on Ukraine
• 2025 Commission report on Moldova
• 2025 Commission report on Serbia
• EU-Mexico agreements
• The changing geopolitical situation in East Asia
• Temporary CAP support to help farmers cope with high fertiliser prices
• Feasibility of a 28^th tax regime and its potential to support EU competitiveness
• Air passenger rights
• Developments in social security coordination
• EU accession to the Council of Europe Convention on Environmental Crime
• Draft amending budget No 1/2026: 2025 surplus

Ireland is a parliamentary republic, with a bicameral parliament. The country currently elects 14 Members to the European Parliament. This will be the country’s eighth EU Council presidency. This year, the Irish Presidency’s main political priorities are competitiveness, promoting European values, and security. It will prioritise delivery on simplification, improving the single market, and advancing the energy transition.

Unsurprisingly, digital and prowess in artificial intelligence is also a focus, given that Ireland features in the top five EU Member States on research and innovation. The Irish Presidency will have to formulate a position on several legislative packages in this area, including the Digital Omnibus on data.

Ireland’s high trade in services is also likely to drive continued efforts to build a mutually beneficial EU-US trade and investment relationship during its presidency. Another focus is to boost relationships with other trading partners, including Switzerland and countries in Asia and the Middle East.

Defence and enlargement are also central themes, as Ireland seeks to ‘defend and vindicate’ European values within the EU and globally, with particular emphasis on Ukraine and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, and progressing accession negotiations with Montenegro, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine.

With the aim of reaching an agreement among Member States on the EU’s multiannual financial framework for 2028 to 2034 before the end of the year will mean continued intensive discussions on the EU’s own-resources system to finance the budget.

Preparing the presidency has long been under way, with various Irish delegations coming to Brussels. Most recently, the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, along with political group leaders visited Dublin to meet with leaders including President Catherine Connolly and Taoiseach (prime minister) Micheál Martin.

Further reading:

• Ireland: Key Economic Indicators (infographic)
• The Irish Parliament and EU affairs
• Priority dossiers under the Irish EU Council Presidency

The session further focused on Europe’s economic independence, digital sovereignty and resilience on artificial intelligence, as well as the EU’s role in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. Members debated the electrification action plan, the resilience of the European transport sector amid ongoing geopolitical challenges ,and posed questions to the European Commission on its pledge to reduce the reporting burden, especially for small companies. Debates also addressed protecting child safety and mental health online and the importance of children’s right to play, and promoting culture through the Joint Declaration on ‘Culture for Europe, Europe for Culture’ .

Finally, Members attended two formal sittings, during which Jakov Milatović, President of Montenegro, and Andrzej Poczobut, 2025 Sakharov Prize laureate, recently released from prison in Belarus, addressed Parliament.

The annex shows the breakdown by political group on the final roll-call votes on the files decided by ordinary legislative procedure during the session.

Question time – European Commission pledge to reduce the reporting burden

Members posed questions to European Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis regarding the state of play on the Commission’s pledge to reduce red tape for companies, in particular smaller businesses. To date, ten omnibus packages to simplify EU law have been published, with more scheduled, all currently at different stages of the legislative procedure.

Digital Omnibus on artificial intelligence

Parliament is committed to ensuring that there are robust legal frameworks to regulate artificial intelligence (AI) in the EU. Members debated and adopted a provisional text on the ‘Digital Omnibus on AI‘, a set of amendments to the AI Act. Parliament favoured fixed deadlines for applying high-risk AI rules, and proposes a ban on AI systems that generate non-consensual sexual content. The agreed text upholds Parliament’s position on the generation of non-consensual sexual content and prohibits AI practices generating child sexual abuse material. The vote postpones application of certain parts of the AI Act, without impacting its core provisions and risk-based approach.

Circularity requirements for vehicle design and end of life vehicles

Improper management of end-of-life vehicles can damage the environment and lose millions of tonnes of material that could be recycled to the benefit of the EU economy instead. Parliament debated and adopted a provisional agreement on circularity requirements for vehicle design and end-of-life vehicles. The agreement sets out requirements for passenger and light commercial vehicles. Vehicles must include recycled plastic, in line with progressively rising targets and minimum recycled content requirements. Manufacturers and producers will be obliged to clearly label refurbished parts and provide information regarding safe access to, removal, and replacement of parts.

Plants obtained by new genomic techniques

Members adopted at second reading a provisional agreement reached with the Council on the Commission’s proposal on plants obtained by new genomic techniques. This aims at aligning existing EU legislation on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) with new scientific developments. Parliament’s negotiators supported the simplification of rules for low-risk genetically modified plants (NGT1), provided they are similar to conventionally bred plants and do not have certain excluded traits. The agreement also includes provisions intended to address concerns related to market concentration and access to seeds for breeders and farmers.

Strengthening farmers’ position in the food supply chain

Despite playing an important role in the food-supply chain, farmers have faced mounting difficulties in recent years. Parliament adopted a provisional agreement on a regulation strengthening farmers’ position in the food-supply chain. Based on a Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) report, Parliament reached agreement with the Council in March 2026. The agreed text aims to ensure that food prices better reflect the production costs borne by farmers, and includes support for the dairy sector, such as the introduction of mandatory written contracts. It also reinforced producer organisations’ bargaining power and includes clarification on labelling to ensure consumer protection and fair competition.

EU-US trade deal

Parliament debated and adopted the trilogue agreement reached on the proposal for two regulations to implement the EU’s tariff commitments under the EU-US Joint Statement. The Committee on International Trade (INTA) adopted its reports in March 2026. The agreement empowers the Commission to suspend the application of the regulation if the US fails to meet its commitments and introduces additional safeguards, including stronger suspension mechanisms and protections against import surges that could harm domestic producers. A comprehensive review of the measures will be conducted in 2029, with the possibility of extension.

2025 Commission report on Türkiye

Despite applying for accession as far back as 1999, progress towards Türkiye’s EU membership bid has faced numerous delays since accession talks began in 2005. Parliament held a debate and adopted a Foreign Affairs Committee report on Türkiye, which reaffirms Parliament’s appreciation for the majority of Turkish people’s aspiration to EU accession and maintaining Türkiye’s candidate status. It also reiterates Türkiye’s relevance as a NATO ally and a country with which the EU has multi-layered relations. However, the AFET committee regrets that, despite the Turkish government’s repeated statements recommitting to the EU membership goal, serious concerns raised in previous AFET reports regarding shortcomings affecting the accession process remain unaddressed.

An EU future for the Western Balkans

The path to accession for new Member States was a key topic at this plenary session, with Members debating and adopting a set of own-initiative reports from the AFET committee on enlargement candidates in the Western Balkans on Tuesday. The AFET report on Montenegro welcomes the country’s progress and encourages sustained momentum on accession negotiations. The committee also commends Albania‘s dedication to EU integration, but expresses concern about the impact of corruption and calls for full implementation of anti-corruption reforms. The AFET report on Kosovo* reaffirms that the country’s future lies with the EU, and stresses inclusion in EU programmes and policies is vital for gradual integration. AFET’s report on Bosnia and Herzegovina expresses support for EU accession and urges political leaders to renew their commitment to EU membership. Similarly, the AFET report on North Macedonia reaffirms its support for the country’s EU membership aspirations, although it regrets the lack of progress since its 2025 report.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

2025 Commission report on Georgia

Members also adopted an AFET committee report on Georgia’s EU accession status. The report deplores the continued democratic backsliding in the country and echoes Parliament’s non-recognition of the legitimacy of the Georgian parliament. It also reiterates calls for the EU to impose sanctions against key officials and regime enablers.

Promoting transnational governance on water in the interests of conflict prevention and peace

Water scarcity and water bankruptcy are serious global issues, and mitigating violations of the human right to water remains crucial for regional stability and sustainable development. Members adopted a recommendation to the Council, Commission and High Representative regarding transnational water governance. An AFET committee report notes the importance of transnational water governance for conflict prevention and peace, underscoring the growing political and security dimensions of water issues. The report calls on the EU to condemn the weaponisation of water in conflicts and urges an increase in funding for transboundary water management and for the EU to take the lead in advancing the UN Sustainable Development Goal on clean water.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – June 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Cyberbullying is a real issue for the current generation of young people who have grown up in the always connected digital world. While trends have indicated that both victims and perpetrators of cyberbullying are becoming younger, it can also affect adults, with women at greater risk of cyberviolence. Cyberbullying can take many forms and can cause anxiety and depression among its victims. People can experience shame and embarrassment and withdraw from studies, work, interests and their social circles. The impact of cyberviolence can be tangible with a significant economic cost to society.

The EU has placed significant importance on tackling the issue of cyberbullying. The Commission has adopted an action plan against cyberbullying in 2026, which focuses on a coordinated approach among Member States. It is designed to foster prevention and awareness, and encourages Member States to adopt comprehensive national strategies and promote a common understanding of cyberbullying to ensure a safer digital environment.

The EU has enacted a number of laws which address various elements of digitalisation to protect EU citizens and prevent providers of digital services and content from engaging in harmful practices. The EU also has a suite of policies and strategies to complement its legal framework in online child protection, coupled with support for parents and educators.

Risks from cyber-enabled violence continue to be a threat to European society, especially its young people. While advances in digital technology provide many opportunities, these are accompanied by a myriad of dangers. Cyberbullying is one such danger, with real-world consequences for individuals. While Member States across the EU have embarked on multi-faceted responses to the issue, there have been calls for an EU-wide legally binding definition of cyberbullying.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Addressing the gap between cyberbullying, cyberstalking and cyberharassment: Towards a legally binding definition of cyberbullying at EU level‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

General

The European Council will be preceded by pre-summit meetings of European political parties with their respective affiliated EU leaders. Additionally, a group of ‘like-minded’ countries on migration will also meet prior to the start of the meeting. Following a similar pattern, a new group of 17 leaders, including Germany, Belgium and Italy, met by videoconference on 8 June to discuss competitiveness issues.

As usual, the European Council meeting will start with an address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. For the first time, the report of the rotating Council Presidency on the follow-up to the previous European Council conclusions will be given in the presence of the European Parliament President. This report by Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides will include an overview of the implementation of the ‘One Europe, One Market’ roadmap signed in the margins of the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government in Cyprus in April 2026.

The membership of the European Council has evolved since the last European Council meeting. With the departure of Viktor Orbán, Emmanuel Macron is now the longest serving European Council member continuously in office (since 2017).

European Council meeting

Ukraine

The discussion on Ukraine will start with an exchange of views with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who on 4 June 2026 published an open letter to President Vladimir Putin, proposing to end the war through direct engagement between the two leaders. The proposed meeting would take place in a neutral location ‘with active US and European participation’ and ‘the front line today [as] the line from which diplomacy must begin.’. Three days after the letter, President Zelenskyy issued a joint statement with the leaders of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, outlining five conditions for just and lasting peace.Thus, EU leaders may express the EU’s readiness to step up its engagement in peace negotiations.

In his invitation letter to EU leaders, European Council President António Costa underlined the effectiveness of the EU’s ‘two-pronged approach – supporting Ukraine and increasing pressure on Russia’. Concerning support for Ukraine, the European Council is expected to discuss intensifying efforts to rebuild critical energy and civilian infrastructure as well as accelerating the production and delivery of military equipment, notably ammunition, drones and missiles. As regards pressure on Russia, the European Council could reiterate the importance of weakening Russia’s economy and thus its ability to wage war. Following the unveiling of the 21st package of sanctions, which targets heavily the country’s banking system and crypto networks, EU leaders may call for swift adoption of the new package. In parallel, after asking in March 2026 for ‘the potential threat posed to the EU’s internal security by Russian ex-combatants having participated in the aggression against Ukraine to be assessed, the European Council could ask for further work to be carried out to address this threat, and possibly consider banning Russian citizens having served in the country’s armed forces since 2022 from entering EU territory. In addition, the call by 11 Schengen countries for stricter visa rules for all Russian citizens – which follows a surge in visas issued to Russian tourists in 2024 and 2025 – may also be raised.

Although not formally on the agenda, the topic of enlargement could turn out to be the subject of broader discussions. First, because EU leaders are likely to welcome the holding of the Intergovernmental Conference on the accession of Ukraine, and Moldova, to the European Union, and the agreement to open the fundamentals cluster on 15 June 2026. Second, because EU leaders may wish to underline the ‘new impetus’ given to the enlargement process at the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Montenegro on 5 June and reiterate their support for the region’s path to EU membership in line with a merit-based approach. Third, because, after the Franco-German initiative of 4 June 2026 suggesting ways of gradually integrating candidate countries into the EU, the European Council may wish to discuss the ‘new ideas to streamline and accelerate the process,’ which, as President Costa stressed, are currently under consideration. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz had previously addressed a letter to Presidents Costa, von der Leyen, and Christodoulides, proposing to grant Ukraine ‘associate member status’, while offering ‘observer status’ and access to the single market to Western Balkan countries.

Middle East

The European Council is expected to discuss the constantly evolving situation in Iran and the wider Middle East region. After the announced memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States, which envisages an ‘immediate and permanent’ end of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, EU leaders may welcome the peace agreement and the toll-free reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Due to be signed on 19 June, the agreement plans to ease sanctions and begin negotiations over nuclear issues. In a joint statement, the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Cyprus and Greece, as well as Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, expressed their readiness also to lift sanctions imposed on Iran and work ‘with the US, Iran and regional partners to … achieve a long-term diplomatic settlement’. Ahead of the G7 summit in Evian, President Costa signalled the EU’s willingness to contribute to a global strategy for a lasting peace in the Middle East. In that context, EU leaders are likely to discuss preparations under way aimed at guaranteeing the freedom of navigation in the Strait, and consider a possible reinforcement of the mandate of the EU maritime defensive operation, EUNAVFOR ASPIDES.

The European Council will also discuss the situation in Gaza and the West Bank. On Gaza, they may touch upon the preparation of restrictive measures against Israelis due to the treatment of activists who were bringing aid to Gaza. A number of Member States have increasingly become critical of Israel following the interception of the Global Sumud Flotilla in international waters and the mistreatment of those on board, who included a number of EU citizens. As a result of the incident, Italy, which has previously blocked attempts to suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement, called for sanctions against the Israeli Minister of National Security, Ben-Gvir. However, it remains unlikely that EU leaders will reach a unanimous agreement on calling for sanctions against a sitting Israeli Minister ahead of upcoming Israeli elections. Additionally, in the context of the EU leaders’ reiterated condemnation of unilateral Israeli action aimed at further expanding illegal settlements, the concerns expressed by several Member States regarding products from illegal Israeli settlements entering the European market may also be raised.

Next multiannual financial framework

Following a first discussion in April 2026, EU leaders will hold an exchange of views on the 2028-2034 MFF based on a new negotiating box with figures drawn up by the current Cyprus Council Presidency.

On the MFF, the dividing lines in the European Council are normally between the net contributors and the net beneficiaries.[1]The former group includes Denmark, Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden; some of these Member States are known as the ‘frugals‘. The net beneficiaries meet under the name ‘friends of cohesion’ and include Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy,[2] Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia.These two groups meet separately ahead of meetings in the Council, and sometimes the European Council, to coordinate their positions before the main meeting. Cyprus, as the current Council Presidency, and Ireland, which will take over on 1 July, do not formally attend these meetings, in order to remain ‘an honest broker’.

As in negotiations for previous MFFs, the usual dividing lines concern i) the size of the EU budget, ii) the balance between policy areas, iii) the existence and size of rebates, and iv) new own resources. An additional topic is the pace of repayment of the joint debt resulting from the EU recovery plan (i.e. Next Generation EU).

Regarding the size of the EU budget, the European Commission proposed a long-term budget of €1.789 trillion (in commitments over seven years in constant 2025 prices). While the European Parliament suggested in its interim report of 28 April 2026 a nominal increase of €175.11 billion (2025 constant prices) to this proposal, the frugal Member States have demanded to reduce the spending proposed by the Commission. The new negotiating box of the Cyprus Council Presidency, which only suggests an overall reduction of around 2 % of the original Commission MFF proposal, has received substantial criticism by the frugal Member States, the latter even expressing doubt over the Cyprus Presidency’s capacity to act as a ‘true honest broker’.

As regards the balance between policy areas, the friends of cohesion have, in a joint declaration of 25 May 2026, argued that the next MFF needed to provide sufficient resources for the cohesion policy, common agricultural policy and common fisheries policy. While some net contributors like Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden have rejected this proposal, others such as France and Ireland were less opposed. In Chancellor Merz’s view, EU spending must be modernised to focus on investment in defence and competitiveness, with cuts to traditional farming and regional subsidies.

On the third point, the budget correction mechanisms – or ‘rebates’ – have been used in the EU’s long-term budget since the 1980s to compensate certain Member States for their financial contributions to the long-term EU budget. The suggestion to abolish these rebates has been put forward in several previous MFF negotiation rounds but has never been followed up on. In their joint declaration, the friends of cohesion have also called for the abolition of rebates, arguing that ‘there is no political or economic rationale for re-introducing them’.

Finally, on new own resources, the Commission submitted a proposal on 16 July 2025 suggesting new own resources on i) a corporate resource for Europe; ii) a tobacco excise duty own resource; iii) a share of the proceeds of the emissions trading system; iv) the carbon border adjustment mechanism; and v) a contribution on non-collected e-waste. At a discussion of EU finance ministers in October 2025, Ireland, Hungary, Finland and Sweden rejected outright any introduction of new own resources, while others such as Czechia and Poland criticised specific new own resources. In April 2026, the European Parliament put forward proposals on future own resources, suggesting to tax digital services, online gambling and crypto-assets. After the April 2026 informal meeting of EU leaders, President Costa signalled openness to considering the suggestions of Parliament, even if concerns have subsequently been expressed over their technical feasibility.

Closely related to discussions on the revenue side of the MFF are ideas put forward by President Macron and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in favour of new common borrowing and a rollover of the pandemic debt to finance the bloc’s shared priorities.

No decisions are expected at this European Council meeting; President Costa’s objective is to give further guidance to the incoming Irish Council Presidency as to the type of new own resources on which a compromise could be achievable. While President Costa has insisted on EU leaders agreeing by the end of 2026 – a timeline expected to be reflected in the conclusions – many Member States have expressed doubts over the feasibility of this timetable.

Global economic challenges

In an extremely challenging geoeconomic environment, EU leaders will hold a strategic debate over dinner on the global macroeconomic imbalances and their impact on EU competitiveness. Previously, in December 2025, they held a similar discussion on ‘Geoeconomy and competitiveness’. However, in six months, the global environment has altered significantly; as President Costa underlined, the discussion will thus aim to ‘develop a common understanding of the challenges and to provide guidance to the Commission on the way forward’. On the one hand, EU leaders will look at ways of strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy and competitiveness, but at the same time emphasise that fair competition at global level needs to be guaranteed.

In that context, without explicitly mentioning the country, Costa may intend to raise the issue of trade relations with China. Ahead of the European Council meeting, the EU foreign ministers discussed the topic in their meeting on 15 June, while ‘global imbalances’ are also likely to feature on the agenda of the G7 meeting in Evian, France on 15-17 June. The EU has defined China as a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival. China is the EU’s third largest trading partner in goods and services after the US and UK, and the EU and China together account for 29.6 % of global trade. There is a long-standing trade deficit between the EU and China; most recently, the EU has been worried about a possible ‘China Shock 2.0‘, i.e. the large influx of state-subsidised exports of Chinese products such as electric vehicles, batteries and solar panels, as well as steel and chemicals. In March, five EU Member States (France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Lithuania) wrote a joint non-paper calling for tougher measures to counter abusive trade practises, without explicitly mentioning China.

Before dinner, EU leaders are expected to review progress made with the ‘One Europe, One Market’ agenda and the related roadmap, signed on the sidelines of the informal meeting in Cyprus in April. Thus, they will take stock of action aimed at strengthening the single market, enabling Europe’s industrial renewal, simplifying rules, reducing dependencies and encouraging innovation and investment. In the context of ongoing wars in Iran and Ukraine, which have disrupted global supply chains and fundamentally reshaped the EU energy markets, EU leaders envisaged in their March conclusions to return to the issues of affordable energy prices and the Energy Union 2030. They will probably review progress in ‘achieving Europe’s strategic autonomy, strengthening resilience, structurally lowering energy prices, and delivering the clean, abundant and home-grown energy needed to power the economy of the future’.

Although not officially on the agenda, the latest AI models and the challenges they may pose to EU citizens, companies and critical infrastructure may be discussed on the sidelines. US company Anthropic announced in April that it had built a new model, Claude Mythos, which was too powerful to be released to the public due to its extraordinary ability to identify security vulnerabilities in critical software, such as financial and healthcare systems and electricity networks. As a follow-up, the company created Project Glasswing with the aim of securing the most critical software by initially giving some 50 organisations access to the model so that they could identify and fix security problems. The European Commission has been in talks with the company to secure access to EU actors, and especially European banks have been vocal about the topic. On 2 June, the access was expanded to 150 new organisations, including the EU cybersecurity agency ENISA. However, on 12 June, the US administration ordered Anthropic to suspend access to Mythos 5 and Fable 5 models from all foreign nationals, citing national security concerns. This led to Anthropic shutting access to these two models from all customers. Following these developments, there were increasing calls in the EU to speed up the work on technology sovereignty.

European defence and security

Considering ‘Russia’s increasingly reckless and irresponsible behaviour towards EU Member States’, stressed by Costa in his letter to EU leaders, the latter may condemn Russia’s numerous violations of European airspace recently, such as in Romania and Latvia. They are also likely to reiterate the importance of the EU defence readiness agenda, in particular efforts to increase air defence and drone capacity. In that context, EU leaders could welcome the work in the Council on the action plan on drone and counter-drone security.

According to the defence readiness roadmap, the Commission, in cooperation with the lead nations of the capability coalitions, should expand the strategic dialogue with industry, host the first annual Defence Industrial Summit and present an overview of the industrial capacity ramp-up needed to ensure reliable supply for the agreed capability areas by mid-2026. As projects were to be launched in all priority areas within the first half of 2026, EU leaders may evaluate the progress made on these and all other aspects relevant to the defence readiness agenda.

EU leaders may call on the Parliament and Council to make further progress on creating a military mobility area, the AGILE proposal (which seeks to enhance the EU’s capacity to deliver defence innovation more rapidly and effectively), and the defence readiness omnibus.

Migration

Migration has been discussed at every European Council meeting in this institutional cycle, apart from the special European Council on defence in March 2025. EU leaders will again take stock of progress in the implementation of its previous conclusions on migration – this just a few days after the entry into force of the EU migration pact on 12 June. Likewise, EU leaders might welcome the recent provisional agreement of Parliament and Council on changes to EU policy on the return of non-EU nationals staying illegally in the EU.

Fight against illicit drugs

For the first time, the European Council will address challenges linked to the use and trafficking of drugs. While this topic was not mentioned in the European Council’s Strategic Agenda 2024-2029, it features in the European Commission’s political guidelines. EU leaders are expected to provide guidance for the implementation of the EU drugs strategy and the related EU action plan proposed in December 2025 to respond to the growing health, security and societal challenges posed by drug use and trafficking.The EU drugs strategy is based on five pillars: (1) enhancing preparedness and response; (2) protecting public health; (3) improving security and protecting society; (4) addressing risks and harms; and (5) building strong partnerships. On 5 June 2026, Justice and Home Affairs Ministers endorsed the EU drugs strategy and the action plan, adopting conclusions on jointly operationalising them to deliver on the key priorities aimed at reducing drug use and drug-related harm.

European Semester

As is usual at the June European Council meeting, EU leaders will discuss the country-specific recommendations to allow the conclusion of the European Semester cycle. Published on 3 June, the European Semester spring package includes tailored recommendations to each Member State to improve their economic performance. The Council will proceed to the formal adoption of these recommendations after the European Council has discussed them.

Notes

[1] Net contributors to the EU budget are considered to be the Member States who contribute more to the EU budget than the amount of EU funding they receive, and vice versa for net beneficiaries.

[2] While Italy is a net contributing country, it is part of the friends of cohesion.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council, 18-19 June‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

CONTEXT

According to Directive 2008/115/EC, third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a European Union (EU) Member State should, as a general rule, be issued a return decision obliging them to leave the EU. However, available data suggest that, among those who receive such a decision, only about a quarter actually leave the EU. The limited effectiveness of the return policy is due to several challenges that the EU and Member States face when carrying out return procedures, including difficulties related to implementation at national level. To increase the effectiveness of the EU return policy, the European Commission announced in its 2025 work programme that it would develop a new common approach to returns, including a new legislative proposal on the subject.

Legislative proposal

2025/0059(COD) – Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC – COM(2025) 101, 11.3.2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0059(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘A common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the European Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

European Union enlargement and competitiveness are prominent issues on the agenda for the European Parliament’s June plenary session. Jakov Milatović, President of Montenegro is expected to address Parliament in a formal sitting on Tuesday. During the question time session, a European Commissioner will respond to Members’ questions on the state of play on its pledge to reduce the reporting burden, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises. The Council and Commission will also make statements ahead of the European Council meeting taking place from 18_‑19 June 2026. Andrzej Poczobut, laureate of the 2025 Sakharov Prize for his defence of freedom and democracy in Belarus, is expected to address a formal sitting on Wednesday following his recent release from imprisonment in that country.

The path to accession for[CF1]  new Member States is a key topic at this plenary session, with Members set to debate several own-initiative reports from the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on enlargement candidates in the Western Balkans on Tuesday. The AFET report on Montenegro welcomes the country’s progress and encourages sustained momentum on accession negotiations. The committee also commends Albania‘s dedication to EU integration, but expresses concern about the impact of corruption and calls for full implementation of anti-corruption reforms. The [AC2] AFET report on Kosovo* reaffirms that the country’s future lies with the EU, and stresses inclusion in EU programmes and policies is vital for gradual integration. AFET’s report on Bosnia and Herzegovina expresses support for EU accession and urges political leaders to renew their commitment to EU membership. Similarly, the AFET report on North Macedonia reaffirms its support for the country’s EU membership aspirations, although it regrets the lack of progress since its 2025 report.

Despite applying for accession as far back as 1999, progress towards Türkiye’s EU membership bid has faced numerous delays since accession talks began in 2005. On Tuesday, Parliament is set to consider an AFET report on Türkiye, which reaffirms Parliament’s appreciation for the majority of Turkish people’s aspiration to EU accession and maintaining Türkiye’s candidate status. It also reiterates Türkiye’s relevance as a NATO ally and a country with which the EU has multi-layered relations. However, AFET regrets that, despite the Turkish government’s repeated statements recommitting to the EU membership goal, serious concerns raised in previous AFET reports regarding shortcomings affecting the accession process remain unaddressed.

On Wednesday, Members are also due to consider an AFET report on the status of Georgia’s EU accession status. The report deplores the continued democratic backsliding in the country and echoes Parliament’s position of non-recognition of the legitimacy of the Georgian parliament. It also reiterates calls for the EU to impose sanctions against key officials and regime enablers.

On Monday evening, Parliament is due to consider the trilogue agreement reached on the proposal for two regulations to implement the EU’s tariff commitments under the EU-US Joint Statement. The Committee on International Trade (INTA) adopted its reports in March 2026. The agreement empowers the Commission to suspend the application of the regulation if the US fails to meet its commitments and introduces additional safeguards, including stronger suspension mechanisms and protections against import surges that could harm domestic producers. If adopted, a comprehensive review of the measures will be conducted in 2029, with the possibility of extension.

Parliament is committed to ensuring that there are robust legal frameworks to regulate artificial intelligence (AI) in the EU. On Monday evening, Members are expected to consider adoption of a provisional text on the ‘Digital Omnibus on AI‘, a set of amendments to the AI Act. Parliament favours fixed deadlines for applying high-risk AI rules, and proposes a ban on AI systems that generate non-consensual sexual content. The co-legislators reached a provisional agreement in May 2026, since approved by the Committees on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) jointly. The agreed text upholds Parliament’s position on the generation of non-consensual sexual content and prohibits AI practices generating child sexual abuse material. If adopted, application of certain parts of the AI Act will be postponed, without impacting the act’s core provisions and risk-based approach.

Despite playing an important role in the food-supply chain, farmers have faced mounting difficulties in recent years. On Tuesday, Parliament is expected to consider a provisional text on a regulation strengthening farmers’ position in the food-supply chain. Based on a report by the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI), Parliament reached agreement with the Council in March 2026. The agreed text aims to ensure that food prices better reflect the production costs borne by farmers and includes support for the dairy sector, such as the introduction of mandatory written contracts. It also reinforced the bargaining power of producer organisations and includes clarification on labelling to ensure consumer protection and fair competition.

Similarly, on Wednesday, Members are due to consider regulations on horticulture. A provisional agreement reached with the Council on the Commission’s proposal on plants obtained by new genomic techniques, aims at aligning existing EU legislation on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) with new scientific developments. Parliament’s negotiators supported the simplification of rules for low-risk genetically modified plants (NGT1), provided they are similar to conventionally bred plants and do not have certain excluded traits. The agreement also includes provisions intended to address concerns related to market concentration and access to seeds for breeders and farmers. The Committee on Environment (ENVI) is expected to vote on the provisional agreement on 15 June 2026, which could be put to a plenary vote during the same week if it is approved without amendment.

Water scarcity and water bankruptcy are serious global issues, and mitigating violations of the human right to water remains crucial for regional stability and sustainable development. On Wednesday, Members are set to consider a recommendation to the Council, Commission and High Representative regarding transnational water governance. An AFET committee report notes the importance of transnational water governance for conflict prevention and peace, underscoring the growing political and security dimensions of water issues. The report calls on Parliament to condemn the weaponisation of water in conflicts and urges the EU to increase funding for transboundary water management and to take the lead in advancing the UN Sustainable Development Goal on clean water.

The improper management of end-of-life vehicles can damage the environment and lose millions of tonnes of material that could be recycled to the benefit of the EU economy instead. On Thursday morning, Parliament is due to consider a provisional agreement on circularity requirements for vehicle design and end-of-life vehicles. The agreement sets out requirements for passenger, commercial, and heavy-duty vehicles. Each vehicle type must include recycled plastic, in line with progressively rising targets and minimum recycled content requirements. Manufacturers and producers will also be obliged to clearly label refurbished parts and provide information regarding safe access to, removal, and replacement of parts.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

Further reading:

European Parliament Plenary Session June 2026 – agenda

• Question time: State of play on the European Commission’s pledge to reduce the reporting burden, in particular for SMEs
• Digital Omnibus on AI: Adoption in plenary
• EU-US tariffs agreement
• Strengthening farmers’ position in the food supply chain
• Circularity requirements for vehicle design and end-of-life vehicles
• Promoting transnational governance on water in the interests of conflict prevention and peace
• Plants obtained by new genomic techniques
• 2025 Commission report on Georgia
• 2025 Commission report on Montenegro
• 2025 Commission report on Albania
• 2025 Commission report on Türkiye
• 2025 Commission report on Kosovo
• 2025 Commission report on North Macedonia
• 2025 Commission report on Bosnia and Herzegovina
• Laureates of the 2025 Sakharov Prize
• Supporting democracy in Belarus
• Current membership of the European Council

The proposal sets the 2027 European Union budget commitments at €199.9 billion and payments at €212 billion. The Commission underlined that the ‘next year’s budget will continue to provide crucial funding for established EU political priorities, including major support for Ukraine’.

Background – 2027 budget procedure

The European Parliament is one of the two arms of the European Union’s budgetary authority, the Council being the other. The two institutions, assisted by the European Commission, decide on the budget in the annual EU budget procedure, within the limits of the long-term EU budget – the multiannual financial framework (MFF). It is the European Commission’s task to propose a draft budget each year. The Commission takes into account the views of the two arms of the EU budgetary authority, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. The Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) agreed on its guidelines for the 2027 EU budget on 17 February 2026. The European Parliament adopted its guidelines for the preparation of the 2027 budget, Section III on 28 April 2026. Parliament underlined that ‘the final year of the current MFF must focus on delivery for people, the economy and the planet and on providing investments for competitiveness’.

Next steps

On 9 July 2026, the Commission plans to formally adopt the 2027 draft budget and publish it in all official languages. More information on performance will be presented in the Annual Management and Performance Report scheduled for 16 June 2026.

On 16 July 2026, Parliament, Council and Commission will meet for a first budgetary trilogue.

By mid-July 2026, the Committee of the permanent representatives of the governments of the Member States to the European Union (Coreper) will approve Council’s draft position on the 2027 draft budget. The Council is expected to adopt its position on the 2027 draft budget in September 2026.

In October 2026, Parliament is due to adopt its position on the 2027 draft budget.

Possible meetings of the Conciliation Committee are likely to take place between 27 October and 16 November 2026.

Further reading

• Parliament’s guidelines for the 2027 budget: Parliament’s guidelines for the 2027 EU budget. Section III – European Commission
• More information on EU support to Ukraine: State of play: EU support to Ukraine
• For more on Parliament’s role in the EU annual budgetary procedure see: Annual EU budgetary procedure: An introduction to the steps in the European Parliament
• Parliament’s position on the new MFF: 2028-2034 EU budget: Parliament’s position

Video

Parliament’s role in the annual EU budget

The International Labour Organization (ILO) introduced the World Day Against Child Labour in 2002. The day is observed annually on 12 June. The 2026 World Day focuses on reinforcing and accelerating actions aimed at preventing and eliminating child labour, with a key message: ‘Red Card to Child Labour: Fair play for children, decent work for adults’.

Background

The United Nations (UN) defines child labour as work performed by children under the minimum legal age specified for that kind of work, or work that, because of its hazardous nature or detrimental conditions, is prohibited. Forms of work that are beneficial to a child’s personal and social development, that do not interfere with schooling, but rather provide useful experience and skills, may be encouraged. Child labour is driven by poverty, paired with a lack of access to decent work for adults and young people, weak social protection and a lack of free, high-quality public education.

Addressing root causes and advancing social justice were at the heart of the Sixth Global Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour, held in Morocco in February 2026, in the context of the failure to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Target 8.7 on ending child labour by 2025. The Conference adopted the Marrakech Global Framework for Action against Child Labour, a renewed roadmap aimed at eliminating child labour by 2030 through a human rights-based approach centred on social dialogue and multi-sectoral cooperation. The Marrakech commitments prioritise aligning national legal frameworks with international labour standards, ensuring universal access to quality education, and expanding social protection systems. They also highlight the unique challenges within the African region, the agricultural sector, one of the largest for child labour, and the emerging threat of online exploitation.

World Day Against Child Labour 2026

The 2026 World Day Against Child Labour comes after the Sixth Global Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour. Building on the Marrakech commitments, the 2026 campaign carries the message ‘Red Card to Child Labour: Fair play for children, decent work for adults‘, highlighting the link between child labour, poverty, and the lack of adequate work opportunities for adults. At the same time, it emphasises the shared responsibility of governments, employers, workers’ organisations, businesses and consumers, aiming to encourage governments and international partners to translate the Marrakech commitments into concrete national measures ahead of the 2030 deadline.

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) and UNICEF, 138 million children worldwide are still affected by child labour, with nearly 54 million exposed to hazardous work. In response, the 2026 campaign advocates for stronger action to prevent child labour and support the withdrawal and rehabilitation of affected children through access to quality education, universal social protection, decent work and sustainable livelihoods for adults, strengthened legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms, improved data collection and monitoring systems, as well as responsible practices across agriculture and global supply chains.

International legal framework

Freedom from child labour is a fundamental human right, enshrined in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998), the ILO Conventions and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). ILO Convention No 138 on the minimum age, adopted in 1973, has been ratified by 177 countries, including all EU Member States. This key document lays down standards for the minimum age for employment. ILO Convention No 182 on the worst forms of child labour, adopted in 1999, has been ratified by 187 countries, including all EU Member States. It calls on members to take measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour as a matter of urgency. These include all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery; commercial sexual exploitation or illicit activities; and work likely to harm children. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has been ratified by 196 countries, including all EU Member States. The CRC confers upon children the right to protection from economic exploitation, and urges parties to set a minimum age for employment, regulate working hours and conditions, and provide for penalties. Despite international commitments made by nearly all United Nations member states, 41 countries still lack important legal protections against children doing work that could be harmful or interfere with their education.

EU action

The EU’s firm commitment to eliminating child labour is enshrined in Article 32 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which prohibits the employment of children and states that the minimum age of employment may not be lower than the minimum school-leaving age. Moreover, young people admitted to work must have working conditions appropriate to their age and be protected against economic exploitation and any work likely to harm their safety, health or physical, mental, moral or social development or to interfere with their education.

The main legal instrument prohibiting child labour in the EU is Council Directive 94/33/EC. It allows Member States to set a minimum age for employment below the minimum school-leaving age only exceptionally. The EU action plan on human rights and democracy (2020-2027) calls for stronger child protection systems and a zero-tolerance policy on child labour. Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market further contributes to this goal. In 2024, the European Commission also adopted a recommendation on developing and strengthening integrated child protection systems in the best interests of the child, as a commitment in the EU strategy on the rights of the child, prompting Member States to adopt an integrated approach in their external action, under the aim of eradicating child labour.

European Parliament

The European Parliament has repeatedly condemned child labour and its various forms, both within and outside the EU, through a number of resolutions. In its February 2020 resolution on child labour in mines in Madagascar, Parliament stressed that the EU’s long-term budget should reflect its commitment to eliminating the worst forms of child labour. In its March 2021 resolution on children’s rights in view of the EU strategy on the rights of the child, Parliament also urged the Commission and Member States to eradicate child labour and all forms of work harmful to children’s health, safety and development. Later that year, in its resolution on sustainable and responsible corporate behaviour, Parliament advocated banning imports of products linked to severe human rights violations, including child labour, and stressed that combating such practices should be systematically reflected in EU free trade agreements. In the same vein, Parliament further reinforced provisions aimed at preventing forced and child labour in global supply chains during negotiations on the directive on corporate sustainability due diligence, adopted in 2024. Finally, in its 2022 resolution on new EU rules on products made with forced labour, Parliament called for stronger cooperation with international partners committed to eradicating forced labour globally and banning goods produced under forced labour conditions. In addition, Parliament’s Coordinator on Children’s Rights, currently Vice-President Ewa Kopacz, acts as a central contact point to help ensure that children’s rights are systematically integrated into EU policies and legislation.

This is a further update of an ‘At a glance’ note, the previous edition of which was by Yanis Stefanou, in 2025.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘World Day Against Child Labour‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The EU aviation sector generates around €830 billion to €851 billion annually (about 4.4-5 % of EU GDP) and supports 1.8 million jobs directly and 14 million jobs indirectly. The workforce includes aircrew, ground handling staff, air traffic management personnel, controllers, maintenance workers, and freight staff, with aircrew forming the largest group.

Key challenges include atypical employment forms such as subcontracting, agency work, and temporary arrangements, as well as irregular schedules, fatigue and workload pressures, which can affect working conditions and wellbeing. The COVID-19 pandemic intensified job losses, staff shortages and operational strain, followed by recovery-related recruitment difficulties and labour disputes. Future challenges include decarbonisation, digitalisation, automation and AI, alongside expected traffic growth and geopolitical and energy-related uncertainties that increase pressure on the sector.

EU legislation affecting aviation workers sits at the intersection of safety regulation, labour law and social security coordination. European Union Aviation Safety Agency regulations harmonise safety, licensing and operational standards across EU Member States, while EU labour directives set minimum rules on working time, transparent and predictable employment conditions, posting of workers and work-life balance. Social security coordination rules determine the applicable Member State system for mobile workers, often linked to the ‘home base’ concept for aircrew. However, labour enforcement and employment conditions remain largely national, leading to variation in protections across countries and contract types.

The European Parliament has repeatedly raised concrete concerns, such as the incorrect application of posting rules to mobile aircrew, uncertainty over how authorities determine ‘home base’ for labour and social security rights, inadequate enforcement of fatigue and flight-time limits, and difficulties ensuring consistent labour standards for airline staff operating across multiple Member States.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Air transport workers in the EU: Working conditions and regulatory challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Strengthening joint capability development has become a central priority of EU defence policy in response to persistent capability gaps, fragmentation in procurement, and the deteriorating European security environment. Although Member States retain primary responsibility for defence planning and acquisitions, the European Union has progressively established instruments intended to encourage cooperative capability development and strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base. Defence expenditure in the EU has increased substantially in recent years, reaching an estimated €381 billion in 2025, yet it remains significantly lower than that of the United States. Fragmentation also persists in equipment and capability development. To address these challenges, the EU has developed a set of policy and financial instruments covering the entire capability cycle. Strategic priorities are defined through frameworks such as the Capability Development Plan and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, while initiatives including Permanent Structured Cooperation, and the European Defence Fund promote collaborative research and capability development projects. Recent policy initiatives, notably the European defence industrial strategy and the Readiness 2030 agenda, seek to translate increased defence spending into coordinated investment, industrial capacity expansion and faster capability development.

The European Parliament emphasises that joint capability development is essential to reduce duplication and strengthen European defence readiness. It argues that higher defence spending will remain inefficient if it continues to be organised primarily at national level. Parliament therefore calls for stronger EU-level coordination, expanded joint procurement and increased use of instruments such as the European defence industry programme to achieve economies of scale, improve interoperability and reinforce the EU defence industry.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU joint defence capability development‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The Iran conflict and the civil war in Sudan have sparked fears that the EU could face a repeat of the 2015 ‘migration crisis’. This crisis led the EU to allocate more resources to secure its borders, adopt measures such as the pact on migration and asylum, and pursue agreements and arrangements with third countries to boost returns and prevent irregular migration. Several countries near Sudan and Iran are currently hosting more refugees than in 2015. By working together with third countries, the EU has achieved some success in reducing irregular migration, but the arrangements have been criticised for their lack of transparency and impact on human rights. At the same time, many EU countries struggle to process the volume of asylum applications and returning irregular migrants in large numbers. Against this backdrop, the EU is developing new legislation on migration. However, it may be challenging for EU countries to reach a consensus on granting temporary protection. Additionally, regularisation is not typically granted to new asylum applicants. The Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation will apply from 1 July 2026, establishing special rules for crisis situations.

Read the complete briefing on ‘How prepared is the EU for another migration crisis?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

CONTEXT

In the European Union (EU), trade in drug precursors – substances that may have legitimate commercial or industrial applications but are also used to produce illicit drugs – is governed by two regulations, addressing intra-EU and external trade respectively. These laws seek to prevent the diversion of precursors without hindering the commercial interests of lawful operators. However, the mechanism put in place, based on listing individual substances and imposing strict conditions on their trade, has encountered challenges, particularly as a result of developments in drug markets.

To address the concerns confronting the EU framework, several EU policy instruments have announced a revision of the legislation in force. In December 2025, the European Commission presented a proposal that would merge the two regulations. The initiative reflects the European Commission’s intention to reduce the administrative burden for operators and national authorities while setting a regulatory framework more adaptable to drug market developments.

Legislative proposal

2025/0384(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on monitoring and controlling drug precursors and repealing Regulations (EC) No 273/2004 and (EC) No 111/2005 – (2025) 747 final, 3 December 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Proposed EU regulation on drug precursors‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Parliament has been engaging in preparatory work on the 28th regime, debating and adopting a legislative-initiative report from the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) during the January 2026 plenary session. The JURI report recommended allowing national limited liability companies to register as ‘Societas Europaea Unificata (S.EU) to allow automatic recognition in all Member States. However, the report also recommended implementing safeguards to ensure that the regime does not undermine labour and social laws.

The Commission’s March 2026 proposal for a regulation establishing the 28th regime corporate legal framework would allow for quick, digital registration that is automatically valid across the EU. It would also provide for a single tax treatment of employee remuneration and a framework for winding up companies. While Parliament’s resolution supports the approach, it remains cautious about the proposal’s chances of success.

Overall, the objectives of the 28th regime as defined by the Commission and the Parliament are well aligned, as both institutions believe the regime should support the EU’s competitiveness, harmonise the single market and modernise the business environment. However, there are some key differences; EPRS conducted a comparative assessment of the Commission’s proposal for a 28th regime corporate legal framework and Parliament’s legislative-initiative resolution, identifying limitations in six areas of the Commission’s proposal, which include:

• Harmonised legal form;
• Registration and exit;
• Closure of companies;
• Attracting talent;
• Governance and safeguards;
• Dispute resolution.

The EPRS assessment found that the Commission proposal could have an impact on the generation of European added value, with particular reference to three of the identified shortcomings. Firstly, the scope of eligible companies is broad, without ensuring a clear and consistent definition. Secondly, the proposed ‘dual-track’ system could vary across Member States, reducing legal certainty for investors and restricting possibilities for cross-border scale-up of innovative companies. Finally, there is a lack of measures to establish a specialised dispute resolution mechanism.

Ultimately, the Commission proposal focuses on company law and operations while Parliament takes a broader view, considering the need to support the entire ecosystem around innovative companies, including labour law, investment, and cross-border scale up.

The 28th regime is a key measure in the European Commission’s 2025 competitiveness compass; an economic framework which aims to close the innovation gap, decarbonise the economy and reduce foreign dependencies. The need for such a comprehensive legal framework was highlighted by the 2024 Letta and Draghi reports. Its objective is to create a uniform set of rules for companies applicable across the EU, simplifying the legal framework to facilitate the competitiveness of businesses and start-ups operating in the single market.

The Commission envisages that it should be possible to establish a company under the 28th regime within 48 hours, which EPRS predicts could lead to an increase in venture capital invested in European companies of about €445 billion, thus supporting the potential of European start-ups to grow and scale-up in Europe.

Links to EPRS publications:

• The 28th regime
• A competitiveness compass for the EU
• Scaling up European Innovation
• The 28th regime: A new legal framework for innovative companies
• Deepening the single market in the light of the Letta and Draghi reports
• The 28th regime corporate legal framework
• Comparing EU institutions’ positions on a new legal framework for innovative companies
• 28th regime: Proposal for an EU corporate legal framework [Initial Appraisal of a European Commission Impact Assessment]

Over a thousand women are killed in the EU each year in circumstances that often point to a gender-related motive, and the perpetrators are most commonly intimate partners or family members. Data collected by a number of EU Member States on female homicides show no consistent downward trend, despite a range of measures aimed at combating gender-based violence.

Widely publicised cases of femicide have highlighted systemic failures in prevention and victim protection, and have driven legislative reforms in several Member States. These include the introduction of femicide as an aggravating circumstance alongside measures on prevention, victim support and data collection.

Experts recommend avoiding an exclusive focus on harsher criminal penalties and instead implementing a comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes of femicide, strengthening prevention efforts, improving victim protection, enhancing data collection and raising public awareness.

At the EU level, existing legislative and non-legislative measures address gender-based violence more broadly but do not specifically recognise femicide as a distinct crime. The European Parliament has therefore urged for its formal recognition at EU level, arguing that this would improve legal clarity, data comparability and the effectiveness of prevention and protection measures.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Recognition of femicide in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Multimodal digital mobility services (MDMS) are digital platforms that integrate transport modes such as rail, buses, bikes, taxis and car-sharing into a single interface for planning, booking and payment. MDMS aim to improve convenience, journey choice and cost efficiency, while supporting more sustainable and integrated mobility across Europe.

The EU considers MDMS to be a strategic component of the Green Deal and the sustainable and smart mobility strategy to reduce emissions and strengthen the transport Single Market. Key policy tools include the Directive on Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS), the European mobility data space, and initiatives promoting interoperable data and seamless multimodal travel. Major policy debates focus on data sharing, interoperability, integrated ticketing, passenger rights, liability for disruptions, and platform governance. The Multimodal Passenger Mobility Forum highlighted challenges around FRAND (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) principles, self-preferencing, enforcement, data protection and data quality requirements. A Eurobarometer survey shows that many users still find multimodal booking difficult due to fragmented systems, poor connections, higher costs and uncertainty about transfers.

Stakeholders are divided, with transport operators resisting mandatory data and ticketing access, while digital platforms support stronger interoperability and openness. Consumer and environmental groups generally support MDMS for improving transparency, competition, and shifting demand towards low-emission transport. Researchers consider MDMS promising but not fully mature, pointing to persistent issues in interoperability, technical standards, cybersecurity, and governance. Overall, effective MDMS deployment requires balanced regulation, harmonised standards, investment in infrastructure, and strong public-private coordination.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Multimodal digital mobility services‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

AI companions are chatbots powered by large language models (LLMs) designed for personalised, emotionally engaging interactions. The popularity of AI companion platforms, such as Character.AI and Replika, has grown rapidly in recent years. These systems interact in ways that closely resemble human relationships, allowing users to customise their companions and develop strong emotional attachments. While some of the challenges they pose overlap with those associated with generic AI chatbots, AI companions raise additional concerns.
Children are particularly vulnerable, with reports of exposure to sexualised conversations and prompts to engage in self-harm or suicide, highlighting the need for stronger safeguards. However, to date, few countries have put forward specific legislation for this.
The EU has no specific laws for AI companions, although existing legislative frameworks like the AI Act, the Digital Services Act and the General Data Protection Regulation may apply.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The spread of AI companions and the challenges they generate‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Rising EU imports of goods from Mexico compensated for a slight decrease in exports, and reversed the trend of a growing trade surplus, which still amounts to €19.1 billion in favour of the EU. Mexico ranks as the EU’s 11th most important trade partner, with a share of 1.7 % of total EU trade with the world, while the EU ranks third on the list of Mexico’s main trade partners, with a share of 6.7 %, slightly lower than in 2024.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU-Mexico trade and investment relations‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Overview

The Commission published the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) legislative proposal on 4 March 2026. Its aim is to strengthen EU competitiveness and industrial resilience in the face of global pressures. The IAA would set a target to increase the share of all industrial manufacturing to 20 % of EU GDP by 2035 (up from 14.3 % in 2024). The key sectors covered by the proposed act include energy-intensive industries, net-zero technologies and the automotive industry. The proposal would also introduce measures to apply ‘Made in EU’ and low-carbon preferences in public procurement and public support schemes, set conditions on foreign direct investment (FDI), launch industrial acceleration areas to boost manufacturing, and simplify permitting processes for industrial manufacturing projects.

Legislative proposal

2026/0068 (COD) – Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework of measures for the acceleration of industrial capacity and decarbonisation in strategic sectors and amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1724, (EU) 2024/1735 and (EU) 2024/3110

Next steps in the European Parliament

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2026/0068(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Industrial Accelerator Act‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

English

The responsibility to provide consular protection to citizens lies with the national authorities of individual countries.

EU statements on Global Sumud Flotilla

The European Parliament may express political views but does not define the foreign policy of the European Union (EU). This is set by the EU countries and implemented by the EU diplomatic service led by Kaja Kallas, Vice-President of the European Commission and High Representative for Foreign Affairs.

During its press briefing of 30 April 2026, the Commission stated that the ‘freedom of navigation under international law must be upheld’ and urged Israel to respect international law, including international humanitarian law and international maritime law.

Regarding the previous Global Sumud Flotilla mission, Kaja Kallas said that the EU respects the intention of those on board of the flotilla ships to draw attention to the humanitarian plight of the population of Gaza. She added that attacks against such flotillas are not acceptable and constitute a grave breach of humanitarian law.

Parliament position on the humanitarian situation in Gaza

The European Parliament has held numerous debates and adopted several resolutions on Gaza, voicing grave concerns about the persistent obstacles to humanitarian access.

In a January 2026 resolution, Parliament emphasises the obligation of all parties to comply with international law and relevant UN resolutions, including those pertaining to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and journalists.

In a September 2025 resolution, Parliament strongly condemns the Israeli government’s obstruction of humanitarian aid. It calls for all relevant border crossings to be opened to ensure access to and sustained distribution of humanitarian aid.

Share your views

If you wish, you can share your views with any Member of the European Parliament, in particular with Members of the Delegation for relations with Palestine and the Delegation for relations with Israel. By clicking on a Member’s name, you can access their full profile and contact details.

You may also wish to share your views with the EU Delegation to Israel, whose mission is similar to that of an embassy.

Italian

La responsabilità di fornire protezione consolare ai cittadini spetta alle autorità nazionali dei singoli paesi

Dichiarazioni dell’UE sulla Global Sumud Flotilla

Il Parlamento europeo può esprimere opinioni politiche ma non definisce la politica estera dell’Unione Europea (UE). Essa è definita dai paesi dell’UE e attuata dal Servizio diplomatico dell’UE guidato da Kaja Kallas, Vicepresidente della Commissione europea e Alto rappresentante per gli Affari esteri.

Durante la sua conferenza stampa del 30 aprile 2026, la Commissione ha dichiarato che “la libertà di navigazione ai sensi del diritto internazionale deve essere garantita” e ha esortato Israele a rispettare il diritto internazionale, compreso il diritto umanitario internazionale e il diritto marittimo internazionale.

Per quanto riguarda la precedente missione della Global Sumud Flotilla, Kaja Kallas ha dichiarato che l’UE rispetta l’intenzione di quanti a bordo delle navi della flottiglia intendono attirare l’attenzione sulla difficile situazione umanitaria della popolazione di Gaza. Ha aggiunto che gli attacchi contro le flottiglie non sono accettabili e costituiscono una grave violazione del diritto umanitario.

Posizione del Parlamento sulla situazione umanitaria a Gaza

Il Parlamento europeo ha tenuto numerosi dibattiti e approvato diverse risoluzioni su Gaza, esprimendo seria preoccupazione per i persistenti ostacoli all’accesso umanitario.

In una risoluzione del gennaio 2026, il Parlamento pone in evidenza l’obbligo di tutte le parti di rispettare il diritto internazionale e le pertinenti risoluzioni delle Nazioni Unite, comprese quelle relative alla protezione dei civili, del personale umanitario e dei giornalisti.

In una risoluzione del settembre 2025, il Parlamento condanna fermamente il blocco degli aiuti umanitari a Gaza da parte del governo israeliano.  Chiede l’apertura di tutti i pertinenti valichi di frontiera per garantire l’accesso e la distribuzione continua degli aiuti umanitari

Condivida le Sue opinioni

Se lo desidera, può condividere le Sue opinioni con i deputati al Parlamento europeo, in particolare con i deputati della Delegazione per le relazioni con la Palestina e della Delegazione per le relazioni con Israele. Cliccando sul nome di un deputato, può accedere al profilo completo e alle coordinate di contatto.

Potrebbe anche voler condividere le Sue opinioni con la Delegazione dell’UE in Israele, la cui missione è simile a quella di un’ambasciata.

French

La responsabilité d’assurer la protection consulaire des citoyens incombe aux autorités nationales de chaque pays.

Déclarations de l’Union européenne sur la flottille Global Sumud

Le Parlement européen peut exprimer des positions politiques, mais il ne définit pas la politique étrangère de l’Union européenne (UE). Celle-ci est déterminée par les pays membres de l’UE et mise en œuvre par le service diplomatique de l’UE dirigé par Kaja Kallas, vice-présidente de la Commission européenne et haute représentante pour les affaires étrangères.

Lors de son point de presse du 30 avril 2026, la Commission a déclaré que « la liberté de navigation en vertu du droit international doit être respectée » et a exhorté Israël à respecter le droit international, y compris le droit international humanitaire et le droit maritime international.

Concernant la précédente mission de la flottille Global Sumud, Kaja Kallas a déclaré que l’UE respecte la volonté des passagers de ces flottilles d’attirer l’attention sur la détresse humanitaire de la population de Gaza. Elle a ajouté que les attaques visant ces navires ne sont pas acceptables et constituent une violation grave du droit humanitaire.

Position du Parlement sur la situation humanitaire à Gaza

Le Parlement européen a tenu de nombreux débats et adopté plusieurs résolutions sur Gaza, exprimant de vives préoccupations face aux obstacles persistants à l’accès humanitaire.

Dans une résolution de janvier 2026, le Parlement souligne l’obligation pour toutes les parties de respecter le droit international et les résolutions pertinentes des Nations unies, y compris celles relatives à la protection des civils, du personnel humanitaire et des journalistes.

Dans une résolution de septembre 2025, le Parlement condamne fermement l’entrave à l’aide humanitaire par le gouvernement israélien. Il appelle à l’ouverture de tous les points de passage concernés afin de garantir l’accès et la distribution continue de l’aide humanitaire.

Partagez votre point de vue

Si vous le souhaitez, vous pouvez faire part de votre point de vue à tout député au Parlement européen, en particulier aux membres de la délégation pour les relations avec la Palestine et de la délégation pour les relations avec Israël. En cliquant sur le nom d’un député, vous accéderez à son profil complet ainsi qu’à ses coordonnées. Vous pouvez également adresser votre message à la délégation de l’UE en Israël, dont la mission est comparable à celle d’une ambassade.

Spanish

La responsabilidad de prestar protección consular a los ciudadanos y ciudadanas recae en las autoridades nacionales de cada país.

Declaraciones de la UE sobre la Flotilla Global Sumud

El Parlamento Europeo puede adoptar posiciones políticas sobre lo que ocurre en el mundo, pero no determina la política exterior de la Unión Europea (UE). Esta política la definen los países de la UE y la lleva adelante el servicio diplomático de la UE, dirigido por Kaja Kallas, vicepresidenta de la Comisión Europea y alta representante para Asuntos Exteriores.

En su sesión informativa para la prensa de 30 de abril de 2026 (página web en inglés), la Comisión declaró que la libertad de navegación consagrada en el derecho internacional debe ser respetada e instó a Israel a cumplir el derecho internacional, incluido el derecho humanitario internacional y el derecho marítimo internacional.

En relación con la anterior misión de la Flotilla Global Sumud, Kaja Kallas declaró que la UE respeta la intención de las personas a bordo de las flotillas de llamar la atención sobre la difícil situación humanitaria de la población de Gaza. Añadió que los ataques contra estas flotillas son inadmisibles y constituyen una grave violación del derecho humanitario.

Posición del Parlamento sobre la situación humanitaria en Gaza

El Parlamento Europeo ha celebrado numerosos debates y ha aprobado varias resoluciones sobre Gaza. De forma reiterada ha mostrado su grave preocupación por los persistentes obstáculos a la llegada de ayuda humanitaria.

En una resolución de enero de 2026, el Parlamento destacó la obligación de todas las partes de cumplir el derecho internacional y las resoluciones de las Naciones Unidas, incluidas las relativas a la protección de la población civil, el personal humanitario y los periodistas.

En una resolución de septiembre de 2025, el Parlamento condenaba enérgicamente la obstrucción de la ayuda humanitaria a Gaza por parte del Gobierno israelí. Pedía la apertura de todos los pasos fronterizos pertinentes para garantizar la llegada y la distribución de la ayuda humanitaria.

A quién dirigirse

Si lo desea, puede compartir sus puntos de vista con los diputados y diputadas del Parlamento Europeo, en particular con los miembros de las delegaciones para las relaciones con Palestina e Israel.

También puede ponerse en contacto con la Delegación de la UE en Israel (página web en inglés), cuyas funciones son similares a las de una embajada.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament or to the institution as such expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

In 2026, the European Commission is expected to publish a strategy on nuclear fusion. Nuclear fusion, i.e. the combination of two atoms into a single heavier one, has been known since the first half of the 20th century. Despite significant progress, the controlled and sustained fusion reaction required for practical energy production has not yet been fully mastered. This technology is deemed to offer significant opportunities for generating affordable, decarbonised energy. To expedite the pathway towards the proof of concept, a significant international cooperation project, the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), was launched in 2007 by 34 countries, including the EU Member States. The progress in technological development made since then might pave the way for the technology to be ready for industrial use in the second half of the century. Countries such as China and the United States are investing in technological development, and have started designing framework conditions, including a conducive regulatory environment.
With the current discussion on the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2028-2034, the EU is also expected to support further investment in fusion technologies, mostly through the proposed EURATOM research and training and Horizon Europe programmes, which build on the current (2021‑2027 MFF) programmes. However, stakeholders are stressing the relevance of providing appropriate framework conditions in addition to commensurate investment. This includes providing a conducive regulatory framework, as well as the talent pool necessary to develop and deploy such technologies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Nuclear fusion: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

In its November 2025 resolution, Parliament called on the Commission to propose adding gender-based violence to the list of EU crimes.

Parliament urged action to prevent online gender-based violence across EU digital policies and to hold platforms accountable for propagating sexist content (November 2025, February 2023). Parliament called for misogyny to be explicitly included in the definition of hate speech and hate crime at EU level (January 2024).

Parliament has also called on the Commission to address AI-related threats through education, digital literacy and research into online misogyny and radicalisation (November 2025). Ahead of the 70th UN Commission on the Status of Women, it also highlighted the need for a deeper understanding of anti-gender movements, the ‘incel’ phenomenon and the ‘manosphere’, and for more active policies to counter these narratives (February 2026).

On employment, Parliament has called for the timely implementation of the Pay Transparency Directive, the Women on Boards Directive and the Work-Life Balance Directive. It demanded measures to reduce the gender employment gap and urged the Commission to promote women’s entry to, and retention within, the labour market (November 2025).

In March 2026, Parliament called on the Commission to present an action plan to eliminate gender pay and pension gaps, with a focus on fair pay and working conditions in sectors dominated by women, such as healthcare and education. Parliament also called for investments under the next EU long-term budget to strengthen work-life balance for women and ensure a reliable care sector.

Parliament has addressed gender equality in sport and culture. In an October 2025 resolution on the European sport model, it called on all stakeholders to advance gender equality in sport, combat violence, discrimination and harassment, and address the under-representation of women in sports governing bodies.

Within its own institution, Parliament has also taken steps on gender equality. In November 2025, Parliament initiated the legislative process to amend the EU Electoral Act. Under the proposed rules, a Member of the European Parliament who is pregnant or has recently given birth may delegate her plenary vote to another Member for up to three months before the estimated date of birth and six months after childbirth. This change requires the agreement of all EU countries in the Council before it can enter into force.

Furthermore, the European Parliament Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) organises an annual gender equality week and various events to mark International Women’s Day on 8 March.

Parliament has repeatedly called for women’s full participation in peace and security decision-making and for consistent EU financing of initiatives that promote women in leadership roles and combat sexual violence in conflict settings (April 2025, May 2025, July 2025). It repeatedly condemned rape and sexual violence in Russia’s attack on Ukraine (February 2023, February 2026) and drew attention to widespread sexual violence and child rape in the conflict in Sudan (March 2025).

Parliament has called for a new gender action plan post-2027 with a gender-sensitive approach to humanitarian aid (January 2026). It also stated that EU defence policies should reflect gender equality and diversity, promoting inclusive military environments with equal opportunities regardless of gender or background (April 2025).

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We will reply in the EU language in which you write to us.

Gender‑based violence

Gender-based violence is violence directed against an individual because of their gender. It mainly affects women and girls, and includes rape, harassment and female genital mutilation, as well as psychological and economic violence.
The EU directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence, adopted in 2024, criminalises female genital mutilation, forced marriage and several forms of gender-based cyberviolence. EU countries must incorporate it into their national laws by 14 June 2027.
The EU acceded in 2023 to the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention, a treaty on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. Bulgaria, Czechia, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovakia have not yet ratified the convention. In its November 2025 resolution, Parliament urged them to do so.

Employment

‘Equal pay for equal work’ is a principle set out in the EU treaties, and EU law prohibits gender-based pay discrimination. Despite this, women in the EU still earn on average 11.1 % less per hour than men.
The Pay Transparency Directive from 2023 requires companies to disclose salary information, report on pay gaps and take corrective action where gaps exceed 5 %. The burden of proof in discrimination claims lies with the employer.
The Women on Boards Directive from 2022 requires at least 40 % of non-executive director posts or 33 % of all director posts in the EU’s largest listed companies to be held by the under-represented gender by June 2026. The current EU average share of women on boards is 34 %.

The EU gender pension gap still stands at 25 %, contributing to older women being at greater risk of poverty and social exclusion than older men. EU laws also guarantee a minimum of 14 weeks of maternity leave, four months of parental leave per parent (at least two months paid and non-transferable) and 10 working days of paternity leave. Citizens can find more detailed information about their leave rights on the Your Europe website.

Healthcare

The 2026‑2030 gender equality strategy is the first to treat women’s health as a separate policy area. The Commission plans to launch a joint initiative with the World Health Organization (WHO) on women’s healthcare, and work with the European Medicines Agency (EMA) to ensure that differences between men and women are better taken into account in the development and approval of medicines.
In February 2026, the Commission replied to the ‘My Voice My Choice’ European citizens’ initiative on abortion, acknowledging that unsafe abortion is a public health concern. In its December 2025 resolution, Parliament expressed support for the initiative.

The 2022 revision of the VAT Directive already allows EU countries to apply reduced or zero VAT rates on menstrual products.

AI and online platforms

The strategy also addresses AI-related risks to women, including gender bias in recruitment and the spread of sexually explicit deepfakes. Under the Digital Services Act, in January 2026 the Commission opened an investigation into whether the provider of X properly assessed and mitigated risks related to its Grok AI tool, including the spread of manipulated, sexually explicit images.

The directive on combating violence against women requires that EU countries criminalise the non-consensual sharing of intimate images, including AI-generated deepfakes, by June 2027.

Gender balance in EU institutions

The proportion of female MEPs in the European Parliament has steadily risen over the years. However, after the 2024 European elections, the share of women MEPs fell to under 40 %. In the Commission, 49 % of management positions are now held by women, up from 40 % in 2019. Since the start of Ursula von der Leyen’s second term in December 2024, 11 of the 27 Commissioners have been women.
The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) monitors gender balance across the EU and supports EU countries in integrating a gender perspective into their policies.

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We will reply in the EU language in which you write to us.

The agenda for the Parliament’s May plenary session covers several major issues arising from today’s global challenges. Question time returns to the plenary agenda after a long break, with the High Representative, Kaja Kallas, due to respond to Members’ questions on the EU’s strategy to address the current crises in the Middle East.

Following celebrations in Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg to mark Europe Day on 9 May, a ceremony on Tuesday will honour the first laureates of the European Order of Merit. The European Parliament initiated the award in 2025, to recognise those who have made a significant contribution to European integration or to the promotion of European values. The 20 laureates of this year’s award, announced by President Roberta Metsola in March, include former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, former Solidarność leader and Polish President Lech Wałęsa, and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine, who are to become Distinguished Members of the European Order of Merit. Meanwhile, the title of Honourable Member will be conferred upon ten recipients, and the title of Member to six others plus the members of the band U2.

Against the backdrop of the current volatile geopolitical situation and threats to global governance, Parliament remains a strong supporter of rules-based multilateralism. On Tuesday evening, Members are due to debate a draft recommendation prepared by the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) on the EU’s positions for the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), ahead of the 81st session taking place in New York this autumn. The draft recommendation reaffirms the need to safeguard and strengthen multilateralism, supports reform of the UN system (including the UN Security Council) and advocates for peace and security in areas including Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as the continued integration of a human rights-based approach to sustainable development.

A major employer in the EU, the steel industry currently faces high levels of global over-capacity, dependence on Russian imports, and threats to its competitiveness from US tariffs. On Monday evening, Members are to consider a provisional agreement reached with the Council on a regulation aimed at shielding the EU steel market from the effects of global over-capacity. The regulation will also implement new safeguards to replace those introduced in response to the first Trump administration tariffs, which expire in June 2026. The provisional agreement supports the Commission’s proposal to significantly reduce quotas and double tariffs, while also requiring product traceability in allocating annual quotas. The new legislation would apply from 1 July 2026, with a first review scheduled within six months.

Posing a risk to the internal market and creating uncertainty for investors, the current rules for foreign direct investment (FDI) screening are not consistent across all EU countries. On Tuesday, Members are set to consider a provisional agreement on the revised FDI Screening Regulation. The revision seeks to define a minimum scope for mandatory screening by EU Member States, strengthen cooperation and accountability, and streamline processes and interoperability. During the interinstitutional negotiations, Parliament successfully advocated for a broader minimum scope for mandatory screening. The agreed text streamlines national screening procedures to reduce complexity and creates greater transparency to make the EU a more attractive place for investors. These provisions would provide a minimum level of harmonisation across the EU and if adopted, the regulation would start to apply 18 months after its entry into force.

As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes further integrated into our daily lives, it also impacts on global relations. On Tuesday evening, Members are due to consider an own-initiative report from the Committee on International Trade (INTA) on leveraging AI in EU trade policy. The report illustrates the potential benefits of AI use in trade, such as its potential to reduce market-entry barriers, strengthen customs and border controls, and support consumer protection. However, the report also addresses potential concerns, such as the impact on third-country competitiveness, global labour markets and the environment. Ultimately, the report argues that the EU’s AI strategy should play a key role in shaping the rules in which AI operates and use all the tools available to the EU to protect the rules-based multilateral trading system from AI-generated market fragmentation.

In this increasingly digital world, cybercrime is a global issue. On Wednesday, Parliament is to consider giving its consent to the EU’s conclusion of the agreement on the United Nations Convention against Cybercrime. The convention creates an international framework for cooperation to prevent and tackle cybercrime, which is frequently transnational. It also supports law enforcement measures and sets out a framework to provide global technical assistance. The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) recommends that Parliament give its consent to the conclusion of the agreement, despite some criticism on the protection of fundamental rights.

Parliament remains committed to supporting victims of violent crime and advocating stronger protection of victims’ rights. On Wednesday, Parliament will consider formal adoption of an agreed text on the revised Victims’ Rights Directive. Under this text, Member States will be obliged to implement support for victims, including helplines, robust reporting procedures, and to provide greater access to legal aid and compensation. EU governments will also have to provide specific support for victims with particular needs, such as children or those requiring physical protection.

On Tuesday, Members are to consider giving Parliament’s consent to the new EU–Uzbekistan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA). The agreement reflects the EU’s growing strategic engagement with Central Asia, strengthens ties with Uzbekistan and replaces the existing cooperation agreement in force since 1999. A report from Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) welcomes Uzbekistan’s economic reforms and regional role and stresses that respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law must remain central to the partnership. AFET recommends Parliament give consent to the agreement.

Railway capacity management remains fragmented in the European Union, leading to congestion and poor cross-border coordination. On Tuesday afternoon, Members are scheduled to consider a provisional agreement on streamlining rail management across the EU. Following a Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) report calling for more efficient use of rail infrastructure by increasing funding, coordinating cross-border capacity and traffic management and using digital tools to help reduce congestion, Parliament’s negotiators succeeded in introducing greater flexibility for rail capacity planning, with national networks encouraged to cooperate more closely.

Forests provide many benefits for society but have come under increased pressure from climate change in recent years. On Tuesday afternoon, Parliament is due to consider a provisional agreement reached with Council negotiators on the proposed regulation on forest reproductive material (FRM) needed to plant or replace forests. The proposal would require Member States to draw up contingency plans to ensure a sufficient supply of FRM to reforest areas affected by extreme weather events, natural disaster and disease.

The number of people playing video games across the EU has risen since the COVID‑19 pandemic. On Thursday, Members are due to debate a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) that raises the issue of online video game lifespans. Gathering over one million signatures, the Stop Destroying Video Games ECI calls to prevent publishers from discontinuing access to online video games. A hearing organised by the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), the Committee on Legal Affairs (LEGA) and the Committee on Petitions (PETI) underlined that, at present, EU consumer protection law does not specifically address the long-term usability of videogames. The European Commission is obliged to set out its views before 27 July 2026.

Parliament’s consent for the conclusion of new protocols for fisheries agreements is on the agenda on Wednesday afternoon. The first, a new protocol to the existing EU fisheries partnership agreement with the government of the Cook Islands would grant fishing opportunities to EU vessels in the Cook Islands’ waters while also promoting the country’s sustainable management of fisheries resources. Parliament is also set to consider the protocol implementing the EU-São Tomé and Príncipe fisheries agreement (2025-2029). This new protocol would allow EU vessels to continue fishing for tuna and other species in São Tomé and Príncipe’s waters in return for an EU financial contribution, a portion of which would support São Tomé and Príncipe’s fisheries policy. The Committee on Fisheries (PECH) recommends that Parliament give its consent to the conclusion of both protocols.

European Parliament Plenary Session May 2026 – agenda

• EU strategy on Middle East crises
• European Order of Merit – Award ceremony
• 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly
• Tackling global steel over-capacity in the EU 
• Screening of foreign investments in the EU 
• Comprehensive AI strategy for EU trade 
• United Nations Convention Against Cybercrime
• The revised Victims’ Rights Directive 
• EU–Uzbekistan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
• Single European railway area 
• Forest reproductive material 
• European Citizens’ Initiative: Stop Destroying Videogames 
• New protocol to the EU–São Tomé and Príncipe fisheries agreement (2025–2029) 
• New protocol to the EU–Cook Islands sustainable fisheries agreement 

The integration of artificial intelligence into healthcare and daily life could deeply impact people’s health and wellbeing, bringing health benefits but also introducing new challenges. Artificial intelligence (AI) has transformed healthcare by supporting clinicians in improving diagnostics, predicting health risks, and personalising treatments in fields such as radiology, oncology, cardiology, and rare diseases, and streamlining hospital management. It offers opportunities to make healthcare more effective, accessible for all, with better outcomes for patients and national health systems. It also supports pharmaceutical development. Beyond clinical settings, citizens use AI chatbots to obtain health information and wellness advice, although this carries risks of misinformation and over-reliance. While AI offers benefits for vulnerable groups, it also carries age-specific risks that require careful attention. For older adults, AI offers remote monitoring, assistive technologies, and companionship tools, but risks replacing rather than complementing human interaction. Young people and children using AI face serious risks including exposure to harmful content, emotional dependency, privacy violations, and reduced critical thinking. Across all age groups, excessive or poorly designed AI use is linked to anxiety, sleep disorders, sedentarism and social withdrawal. Use of AI companions can backfire, deepening isolation or even triggering mental health crises in vulnerable users. The EU AI Act and sector-specific legislation aim to govern these risks while fostering innovation. Realising AI’s health benefits ultimately requires robust human oversight, strong safeguards, and digital skills, with a commitment to keeping human connection and care at the centre, as AI cannot replace face-to-face contact and community structures.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Health and wellbeing in the age of artificial intelligence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The annual Europe Day celebrations mark the anniversary of what is widely regarded as the founding act of the European Union. 

After World War II, coal and steel were considered indispensable due to their role in economic growth and defence. Head of the French Planning Committee, Jean Monnet, and French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, believed that pooling these resources would not only be financially strategic, but would consolidate European peace and unity.

Schuman presented this concept during a press conference on 9 May 1950 at the Quai d’Orsay. The text, known as the Schuman Declaration; outlined that ‘solidarity in production’ would make another war ‘not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’.  It stated that ‘world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.’

In April 1951, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the Treaty of Paris, which created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). After entering into force in 1952, the ECSC facilitated a common market and freedom of movement of coal and steel between the six signatories. Notably, this was the first supranational organisation in Europe.

The ECSC was comprised of a High Authority that had decision-making competencies (the foundation of what is currently the European Commission), as well as a Special Council of Ministers, a Court of Justice, and a Consultative Committee.

The ECSC was also supported by a Common Assembly, which had 78 members (selected by national parliaments), supervisory power, and the right to dismiss the High Authority.

As the ECSC Common Assembly had the autonomy to write its rules of procedures, it unanimously decided, at its plenary session in June 1953, to allow the creation of political groups. With this decision, it became the world’s first international assembly organised in political groups (other international assemblies established after World War II were largely structured by grouping nations).

In 1958, the Common Assembly was renamed the European Parliamentary Assembly, , and Schuman was elected as its President.

Now, 76 years later, it is the European Parliament’s 10th legislative term; and it is made up of 720 Members across eight political groups; representing over 450 million citizens in 27 Member States. Between 2014 and 2019, 396 proposals were presented under the ordinary legislative procedure, all of which involved Parliament.

The peace, strength and unity, and integration that Robert Schuman championed several decades ago are values that continue to characterise the EU’s priorities and actions today. From an initiative to integrate industry to the world’s largest supranational democracy, the 9 May celebrations commemorate the inception of an idea that changed Europe forever.

Links:

• Robert Schuman
• Schuman Declaration, May 1950
• The ECSC Common Assembly’s decision to create political groups Writing a new chapter in transnational parliamentary history
• Impact of the ECSC Common Assembly on the politics, negotiation and content of the Rome Treaties
• Happy Birthday European Union: Europe Day, 9 May

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered a landmark judgment in case Commission v. Hungary, concerning Hungary’s 2021 law restricting access to LGBTI-related content.

Introduction

The EU has considerable leverage over candidate countries that backslide on the conditions for accession (the Copenhagen Criteria), including respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. However, once a country has joined the EU, the EU institutions have far fewer tools to respond should Member States backslide on core values. This problem is often referred to as the Copenhagen Dilemma. In Repubblika (Case C-896/19), the CJEU found a connection between Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (on accession) and Article 2 TEU, which sets out the EU’s founding values.

The CJEU ruled that Member States may not lower the level of protection of EU values following accession, thereby establishing the principle of non-regression.

Building on that case law, on 21 April 2026, the CJEU delivered its judgment in Commission v. Hungary (Case C-769/22). The judgment is a landmark ruling: the Court found, for the first time, both a breach of Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) (on human dignity), and a self-standing breach of Article 2 TEU (on values of the EU).

Background

On 15 June 2021, the Hungarian Parliament adopted Act LXXIX of 2021 on ‘tougher action against paedophile offenders and amending certain laws to protect children’ (the ‘Propaganda Law’), which curtailed LGBTI+ content, in particular its availability to minors, by introducing Section 6/A into the Child Protection Act.

On 15 July 2021, the Commission launched an infringement procedure concerning the contested act. One year later, on 15 July 2022, the Commission decided to bring the case before the CJEU; the case was formally lodged on 19  December 2022.

In its action against Hungary, the European Commission alleged violations of the Services, Audiovisual Media Services and e-Commerce Directives, as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Additionally, it alleged a self-standing infringement of Article 2 TEU.

The hearing took place on 19 November 2024, with the CJEU sitting as a full court, reflecting the exceptional importance it assigned to the case.

On 5 June 2025, Advocate General Ćapeta issued her opinion, in which she agreed with the Commission, considering that Article 2 TEU imposes certain ‘red lines’, which are determined by the ‘negation of the values’ laid down in Article 2.

Judgment

In its judgment of 21 April 2026, the CJEU considered that the secondary legislation mentioned in the Commission’s action had been violated, as had Articles 1 (on human dignity), 7 (on private and family life), 11 (on freedom of expression) and 21 (on non-discrimination) of the CFR. Concerning Article 1 CFR – the violation of which marked a first – the Court considered that ‘that association [with paedophilia] and that stigmatisation entail a group of persons forming an integral part of a society in which pluralism prevails being treated as a threat to that society meriting special legal treatment, which results in such persons’ social ”invisibility” being established, maintained, or reinforced, in breach of Article 1 of the Charter’ (para. 489).

Concerning Article 2 TEU, the Court first considered, hinting at the Copenhagen Dilemma, that ‘compliance by a Member State with the values contained in Article 2 TEU is a condition for the enjoyment of all the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to that Member State. Compliance with those values cannot be reduced to an obligation which a candidate State must meet in order to accede to the European Union and which it may disregard after its accession’ (para. 523).

As to the types of violations capable of giving rise to a breach of Article 2 TEU, the Court held that:

only manifest and particularly serious breaches of one or more values common to the Member States may give rise to a finding, in the context of an action for failure to fulfil obligations, that there has been a failure by a Member State to fulfil legally binding obligations under Article 2 TEU, such breaches being incompatible with the very identity of the Union as a common legal order of a society in which pluralism prevails. (para. 551)

In the case at hand, the Court held that the contested act:

results in the stigmatisation and marginalisation of non-cisgender or non-heterosexual persons, solely on the ground of their gender identity or sexual orientation, with those consequences being intensified by the fact that that law also makes an association between the fact of not being cisgender or not being heterosexual, on the one hand, and being convicted of paedophilia, on the other, suggesting that non-cisgender or non-heterosexual persons constitute a fundamental threat to Hungarian and European society, an association which is capable of encouraging the development of hateful conduct towards those persons. (para. 554)

The Court continued that

Such stigmatisation and marginalisation, which is tantamount to establishing, maintaining or reinforcing the social ”invisibility” of some members of society, runs counter to the values of respect for human dignity, equality, and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as referred to in Article 2 TEU. (para. 555)

The Court, therefore, concluded that

it must be held that the [contested Act] is in breach, in a way that is both manifest and particularly serious, of the rights of non-cisgender persons – including transgender persons – or non-heterosexual persons, as well as the values of respect for human dignity, equality and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as referred to in Article 2 TEU, with the result that it is contrary to the very identity of the Union as a common legal order in a society in which pluralism prevails. (para. 556)

Outlook

The judgment – while ruling that it is indeed possible to establish a stand-alone infringement of Article 2 TEU without a necessary connection with other Treaty provisions – still leaves many questions as to the circumstances under which such a finding can be made.

In March 2025, Section 6/A of the Child Protection Act, introduced by the contested act, was linked to the Act on the Right of Assembly, which prohibits any public events that portray ‘divergence from self-identity corresponding to sex at birth, sex change or homosexuality’. This was considered a Pride ban. In line with the judgment, such a prohibition would also constitute a breach of Article 2 TEU.

In a joint statement, the Commissioner for Equality, Preparedness and Crisis Management, Hadja Lahbib, and the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice and the Rule of Law, Michael McGrath, stated that discrimination has no place in the EU. They ‘warmly welcome the ruling. Ours is a Union of Equality, where you can be who you are and love who you want’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Hungary’s anti-LGBTI law and EU values: The CJEU’s landmark Article 2 TEU judgment‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The European Parliament is fully committed to ensuring an ambitious EU long-term budget that meets the Union’s many challenges in the years to come. On 28 April 2026, Parliament’s plenary adopted an interim report on the 2028‑2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF), with 370 votes in favour, 201 against and 84 abstentions, establishing its mandate for negotiations with the Council. Parliament’s two co-rapporteurs, Siegfried Mureșan (EPP, Romania) and Carla Tavares (S&D, Portugal), steered the report to adoption.

Parliament calls for the MFF to be set at 1.27 % of EU gross national income (GNI), corresponding to €1 789 billion in constant 2025 prices, with an additional 0.11 % of EU GNI (€149.3 billion) for the repayment of debt created by NextGenerationEU (NGEU) above the MFF ceilings. This represents a moderate increase of €175.1 billion in constant 2025 prices (approximately 10 %) compared with the Commission’s July 2025 proposal, to be allocated evenly across the three operational budget headings. The MFF constitutes the EU’s long-term budgetary plan setting a maximum level of spending (‘ceilings’) for each major category of expenditure (‘heading’) in accordance with Article 312 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

In its interim report, Parliament maintains its firm opposition to the merging of different policies in ‘one plan per Member State’, warning that it would weaken EU policies, reduce transparency and create unfair competition between beneficiaries. Under heading 1, Parliament calls for separate, sufficient and clearly ring-fenced funding for the common agricultural policy (€385.12 billion), cohesion policy (€274.34 billion), the common fisheries policy and the European Social Fund.

Parliament welcomes the significant reinforcement of the policies included in heading 2, recognising the need to boost the Union’s capacity to act in key strategic areas, such as competitiveness, defence and security, research and innovation, the twin transition, infrastructure, health and crisis preparedness, education and culture. Parliament stresses that the consolidation of programmes in the European competitiveness fund must not reduce transparency or limit its ability to ensure appropriate funding for specific policy objectives. Parliament proposes a total increase of €62.08 billion, including €26.6 billion in additional resources for the European competitiveness fund. Parliament calls for adequate reinforcement of priority programmes under heading 2 and earmarked funding for EU4Health and LIFE-related actions within the fund.

Under heading 3, Parliament requests €21.24 billion in additional resources, alongside clear and separate budget lines within the Global Europe Fund. Parliament underlines that its proposal represents the minimum amount the EU needs to meet its commitments, respond to citizens’ expectations and address major challenges.

Parliament expresses serious concerns that the Commission’s proposals shift key policy and budgetary decisions to Commission work programmes adopted without co‑legislative involvement, and stresses that simplification must not come at the expense of transparency, democratic accountability or Parliament’s oversight role. Parliament warns that the widespread use of financing not linked to costs could hinder proper auditing.

On the revenue side, Parliament reaffirms its strong commitment to introducing new genuine own resources not only for NextGenerationEU debt repayment but also to finance the Union’s enhanced policy ambitions. It is concerned by the absence of progress on the reform of the system of own resources in the Council since 2020, and calls on the Council to unblock the stalemate on a basket of new genuine own resources generating at least €60 billion per year. Parliament emphasises that the new sources should not harm the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises or of Europe as a whole. Parliament considers that the revenue potential of a digital services levy aimed at major digital platforms, an online gambling and betting services levy, the extension of the carbon border adjustment mechanism, and a levy based on a uniform call rate to the capital gains of crypto assets should all be explored as possible solutions if other proposed own resources fail to gain support among Member States.

The European Commission presented its proposals for the 2028‑2034 MFF on 16 July 2025. The Commission proposed a budget of almost €1.8 trillion in commitments over seven years (in constant 2025 prices), corresponding to 1.26 % of EU GNI, including 0.11 % of EU GNI for the repayment of the debt created by NGEU grants.

Following the adoption of its position, Parliament is now ready to start negotiations with the Council. The MFF regulation requires Parliament’s consent for approval, while the sectoral legislation will be agreed under the ordinary legislative procedure. Negotiations with the Council can begin once Member States agree on a common position. Parliament urges a swift agreement to be reached by the end of 2026 to allow for timely adoption and implementation of spending programmes from 1 January 2028.

OVERVIEW OF EPRS PUBLICATIONS ON THE 2028‑2034 MFF PACKAGE:

AT A GLANCE NOTES:

• Karoline Kowald and Marianna Pari, 2028‑2034 EU budget: Parliament’s position
• Marianna Pari, 2028‑2034 EU budget: Comparing Parliament’s position with the Commission proposal

LEGISLATIVE BRIEFINGS:

• David Ashton and Pieter Baert, Single market and customs programme
• Bruno Bilquin and Eric Pichon, Global Europe instrument
• Krisztina Binder and Tarja Laaninen, Erasmus+
• Steven Blaakman, Union support for asylum, migration and integration
• Alessandro D’Alfonso, Karoline Kowald and Marin Mileusnic, National and regional partnership plans, European territorial cooperation and EU facility 2028‑2034
• Alessandro D’Alfonso, Marin Mileusnic and Tim Peters, Budget expenditure tracking and performance framework
• Alina Dobreva, System of own resources: Multiannual financial framework 2028‑2034
• Costica Dumbrava, Union support for the Schengen area, European integrated border management, and EU visa policy
• Clément Evroux, Horizon Europe 2028‑2034: 10th EU research and innovation framework programme
• Clément Evroux, Euratom research and training programme for the period 2028-2032
• Alina Georgescu, AgoraEU 2028‑2034: Funding for culture, media and EU values in the new multiannual financial framework
• Mathias Gullentops, Connecting Europe Facility 2028‑2034: Financing EU infrastructure networks
• Issam Hallak, European competitiveness fund
• Karoline Kowald and Marianna Pari, Next long-term EU budget: 2028‑2034 multiannual financial framework
• Gabija Leclerc, Support for associated overseas countries and territories, including Greenland
• Rafał Mańko, Justice programme 2028‑2034
• Rafał Mańko, Pericles 2028‑2034: Exchange, assistance and training for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting
• Vasilis Margaras, ERDF – Cohesion Fund and conditions for EU support to regional policy
• Marketa Pape, European Social Fund 2028‑2034
• Martina Prpic, Union support for internal security
• Nikolina Šajn, Regulation on the common agricultural policy for the period 2028 to 2034
• Frederik Scholaert, Conditions for EU support to the CFP (2028‑2034 programming period)
• Agnieszka Widuto, Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and Decommissioning
• Agnieszka Widuto, Nuclear decommissioning assistance programme of the Ignalina nuclear power plant in Lithuania
• Dessislava Yougova, Union Civil Protection Mechanism: 2028 2034 programming period

INITIAL APPRAISALS OF COMMISSION IMPACT ASSESSMENTS:

• Irmgard Anglmayer, Civil protection, preparedness and crisis response
• Irmgard Anglmayer and Esther Kramer, MFF 2028‑2034: Quality analysis of the Commission’s impact assessments
• Josefina Capdevila Penalva, Regulation establishing Global Europe
• Andriana Efthymiadou, Nationally pre-allocated envelopes
• Dieter Frizberg, Reinforcing competitiveness in the EU
• Esther Kramer, Single Market and Customs Programme
• Nikolaos Sarris, Budget expenditure-tracking and performance framework
• Mari Tuominen, The AgoraEU, Erasmus+ and Justice programmes

MONTHLY DIGEST:

• Balazs Hopp and András Schwarcz, Background information on the post-2027 MFF – April 2026
• Balazs Hopp and András Schwarcz, Background information on the post-2027 MFF – March 2026

FURTHER READING:

• Brief up-to-date state-of-play information on all legislative proposals of the 2028‑2034 MFF package: EPRS Legislative Train Spotlight on 2028‑2034 MFF package
• Legislative observatory, Interim report on the proposal for the multiannual financial framework for 2028‑2034 2025/0571R(APP)
• Website on the EU long-term budget by DG COMM of the European Parliament
• European Commission draft legislative proposals: The 2028‑2034 EU budget for a stronger Europe
• Interim report on the proposal for a Council regulation laying down the Multiannual Financial Framework for the years 2028 to 2034 (COM(2025)0571 – C10‑0000/2025 – 2025/0571R(APP)), adopted by the European Parliament on 28 April 2026 (A10‑0105/2026), co-rapporteurs: Siegfried Mureșan, Carla Tavares.

Increased time spent online and regulatory pressure.

Social media platforms’ business model relies on keeping users online for as long as possible so they can display more advertising. The platforms are optimised to trigger dopamine, a neurotransmitter the brain releases when it expects a reward, encouraging repeated and prolonged use. Yet excessive social media use – defined as spending more than three hours a day on online platforms – has been linked to poorer mental health, particularly higher levels of depression and anxiety. A 2025 survey conducted by Pew Research Center showed that minors aged between 13 and 17 in the United States (US) are much more likely than they were two years ago to describe their social media use as excessive. Nearly half reported that they spend too much time on these platforms, as they are on the internet ‘almost constantly’.

According to one survey, European teenagers aged 16 and 17 also reported spending more time than they wanted to on online platforms and losing sleep time at night, which might result in displacement from other, healthier activities. For instance, teens who are online late at night are more likely to experience shortened sleep duration and poorer quality of sleep, both risk factors for depression and irritability, a review shows.

Among both children and adults, excessive screen time and social media use have been linked to changes in brain function, including reduced attention and weaker impulse control. The adolescent brain is especially vulnerable. Experts warn that constant exposure to comparison cues, curated content and algorithm-driven engagement loops can create psychological stress that resonates long after the screen is turned off.

Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and TikTok are leading in terms of online monthly users. In the EU, TikTok has more than 200 million active users, making it one of the fastest-growing networks ever. There are over 100 million pieces of content uploaded daily. Users spend an average of 137 minutes on it per day (compared to 27 minutes in 2019) and open it about eight times a day – over 20 % of US teenagers ‘almost constantly’.

At present, TikTok is facing regulatory pressure on both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, the European Commission started an investigation into TikTok on 19 February 2024 under the DSA, which is ongoing. In the US, TikTok was obliged to restructure its operations under a majority American-owned joint venture, and has settled ahead of trial in a social media addiction lawsuit in California that also involved other platforms, such as Meta and YouTube. They were found negligent for designing addictive online platforms. It is the first time that major social media companies have been found liable by a US jury for this reason. While the damages awarded (US$6 million) are insignificant for two companies worth trillions of dollars, the decision represents a precedent and could impact design choices to avoid further prosecution.

The DSA as a tool to redress online addictive design choices

The Commission has intensified its scrutiny under the DSA of addictive design choices on online platforms. In 2024, it opened an investigation into Meta (ongoing), as it believed both Facebook and Instagram platforms’ designs might stimulate behavioural addictions in minors. Shein is also under scrutiny.

On 6 February 2026, the Commission preliminarily found TikTok in breach of the DSA for its addictive design features, including infinite scroll, autoplay, push notifications and highly personalised recommender systems. Additionally, it found that TikTok disregarded important indicators of compulsive use of the app, such as the time minors spend on TikTok at night, the frequency with which users open the app and other potential indicators. Under the DSA, very large online platforms (VLOPs) such as TikTok have to carry out risk assessments (Article 34) and implement effective measures to mitigate these risks (Article 35). The term ‘addictive design’ does not appear explicitly in the DSA. Instead, the legal link lies in Article 34 (including risks to public health, minors, and users’ physical and mental well-being) and Article 25. The latter prohibits deceptive or manipulative interface design, often associated with ‘dark patterns‘. It introduces a general prohibition applicable to providers of online platforms (not only VLOPs), preventing them from designing or organising their online user interfaces in such a way as to deceive or manipulate users or otherwise materially distort or impair their ability to make free and informed decisions. In addition, Article 28 stipulates general protection of minors online. There are also specific guidelines for all platforms to protect children from addictive behaviours and commercial practices online.

The Commission’s assessment is based on an in-depth investigation (still ongoing) that included an analysis of TikTok’s DSA risk assessment reports, internal data and TikTok’s responses to multiple requests for information, a review of research on this topic and expert interviews. According to the Commission, TikTok’s recommender systems and engagement-maximising interfaces generate systemic risks to the mental well-being of minors and vulnerable adults. Thus, the harm arises from prolonged, compulsive engagement that users struggle to control, stemming from the persuasive design choices made by the platform. The DSA does not provide an explicit definition of a ‘vulnerable adult’. It employs a risk-based approach focusing on protecting users from systemic risks, particularly targeting minors, those with disabilities and vulnerable groups.

TikTok can now exercise its right to defence. It may examine the documents in the Commission’s investigation files and reply in writing to the Commission’s preliminary findings. In parallel, the European Board for Digital Services, an independent advisory group to the Commission, will be consulted. If the Commission’s views are ultimately confirmed, the Commission may issue a non-compliance decision, potentially triggering a fine of up to 6 % of TikTok’s total worldwide annual turnover (estimated at over €30 billion in 2025).

The Commission preliminarily finds that TikTok needs to change the basic design of its service. Specific examples cited by the Commission include disabling key addictive features, such as infinite scroll over time, implementing effective screen time breaks (including during the night) and adapting its recommender system. Incremental adjustments or optional user controls might not be sufficient. Instead, the platform’s core architecture, with features that drive user engagement, might need to be restructured.

Next steps

Safety through design of online platforms for minors is gaining political attention and scrutiny on both sides of the Atlantic. Many argue that age restrictions are not sufficient, as they shift the blame away from platforms’ harmful designs. Likewise, parental control tools are not enough, as they also transfer responsibility from platforms on to children and their parents, and can be difficult to implement depending on parents’ digital literacy. According to the European Consumer Association BEUC, these measures should be complemented with fairness by design components.

If confirmed, these findings will establish the first European precedent for how platforms should mitigate risks from features designed to maximise engagement. The upcoming Digital Fairness Act may introduce even stricter rules, including obligations to switch off manipulative features and greater protections for children. Defining and regulating ‘addictive design’ is complex. Hence, the challenge of this investigation is to assess what constitutes acceptable design. At its core is also whether online platforms’ business models are compatible with children’s safety, and whether platforms’ declarations of intent are enough to mitigate the risks identified in their annual DSA reports. Civil society has criticised the lack of clarity. They argue that DSA risk assessments should be carried out more transparently, as platforms’ methodologies and claims are not always supported by the indicators and data provided.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Addictive design on online platforms‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

While the right to housing is recognised by the European Pillar of Social Rights, the supply of housing in the EU has not kept up with demand. The recent cost-of living crisis has made the lack of adequate, affordable and sustainable housing more palpable. While the responsibility for housing provision lies with EU Member States, regions and cities, the debates around the 2024 European elections showed that citizens expected the EU to step up its action beyond guidance and funding.

In response, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made housing part of a Commissioner’s portfolio. In parallel, all EU institutions started work to contribute to the new EU policy.

More than a year later, the basis of a coordinated EU approach is in place. European leaders have for the first time discussed the challenge of affordable housing in the European Council. Existing EU rules have been reviewed and EU funding possibilities made more flexible.The European Investment Bank has stepped up its investment support and, together with partner banks, is finalising a pan-European housing investment portal.

The Commission has put forward the European affordable housing plan and accompanying initiatives, which included changes to State aid rules, a housing construction strategy and a proposed recommendation on the New European Bauhaus policy and funding initiative. The Commission also outlined further steps, including legislative ones.

For its part, the European Parliament has put forward a set of recommendations prepared by its Special Committee on the Housing Crisis, ranging from simpler and digital procedures for granting housing permits – within a 60-day deadline – to tax measures to support low- and middle-income households.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Developing a coordinated EU approach to housing‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

CONTEXT

On 16 July 2025, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation establishing a budget expenditure tracking and performance framework and other horizontal rules for the Union programmes and activities (‘performance regulation’), as part of a wide-ranging package on the next EU long-term budget – the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF). The proposal aims to simplify and harmonise how EU spending is tracked and its performance measured, moving towards a single system with standardised indicators. It defines horizontal spending principles with a view to streamlining their application across the EU budget: climate and biodiversity, ‘do no significant harm’ to the environment, social policies, and gender equality. Although competitiveness and preparedness play a major role in the next long-term budget, and the European Parliament had requested to include them as horizontal spending principles, the Commission did not include them.

Ahead of the proposal, Parliament had called for further improvements in performance reporting under the EU budget, while underlining that the ‘implementation of horizontal principles should not lead to an excessive administrative burden on beneficiaries’. A stronger performance framework can improve Parliament’s decision-making on EU spending through more transparency. However, increased transparency from a proposed single portal to access EU budgetary data will depend on what information is made available. A briefing requested by Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control underlined that improved access to information – such as exchanges between the Commission and Member States, or to information about suspended milestones – was essential for public accountability. According to the European Court of Auditors, the proposal can improve processes for performance reporting and integration of EU horizontal policy priorities, but has design weaknesses to be addressed, including vague indicators, lack of clear results-based linkages, and risks of measuring implementation rather than achievements. The Court estimates that the proposal may achieve simplification between the Commission and the Member States, but that the administrative burden at national, regional and beneficiary levels may remain unchanged or even worsen.

Legislative proposal

2025/0545(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a budget expenditure tracking and performance framework and other horizontal rules for the Union programmes and activities – COM(2025) 565,

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0545(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Budget expenditure tracking and performance framework‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

In this article, I examine the European social contract as a political discourse. The concept has emerged as a catchy but politically-laden concept within EU politics during Europe's polycrisis period. It has been employed by practitioners, civil society actors and politicians, with each referring to different kinds of contracts and often mobilising it for different political purposes. Here, I explore the economic, green, progressive and nationalist accounts of the social contract, and suggest that the social contract has proved to be an effective tool for political and social actors to articulate their political visions concerning Europe. Whereas I analyse such discursive accounts of the social contract by resorting to the poststructural discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, I find inspiration in ontological security studies in International Relations to unpack its affective dimension, namely, how it may serve to manage and direct collective anxiety and fear through narratives of continuity, stability and renewal.

This article examines how climate change and climate-related policies can destabilise the EU social contract. The article uses the welfare-state lens that places social protection at the core of a feasible and legitimate green transition to understand this destabilisation. Climate change is understood as both an external stressor, through escalating physical impacts, and an internal disruptor, through mitigation and adaptation policies that reorder labour markets, household budgets and territorial development, thereby generating new social risks, distributive conflicts and constitutional pressures on EU governance and legitimacy. The analysis provided in this article distinguishes between (i) implementation gaps, by which the EU social contract fails to deliver on its own promises of security, prosperity, equity and solidarity and voice and participation under climate stress, and (ii) conceptual gaps, which explain how growth dependence, anthropocentrism, presentism and EU-bounded justice make the current EU social contract ill-suited to the climate challenge. In response, the article outlines how the EU eco-social contract could be operationalised, shifting from growth-dependent welfare to a resilient one and strengthening the Union's commitment of leaving no one behind through more robust, integrated social-protection instruments that can buffer climate shocks while enabling fair structural change.

This article revisits social contract theory through a dialogue between Jule Goikoetxea Mentxaka and Antoni Abat i Ninet, questioning whether classical and contemporary contractarianism can account for structural forms of domination that precede and shape consent. Drawing on feminist, Marxist, decolonial and materialist critiques, it challenges the liberal opposition between rational consent and coercion. Using concepts such as social control, symbolic violence, social reproduction and the sexual and colonial contracts, the article shows how gendered, racialised and class-based power relations condition legal and political obligations beyond the autonomous individual. From a jurisprudential and EU constitutional law perspective, it explores whether an explicit EU social contract could confront, rather than reproduce, these dynamics. The article argues that deliberation structured as critique and counter-critique may provide a more inclusive, transparent and democratically legitimate foundation for rethinking political association in the European Union.

This article argues that the proliferation of goals in competition law—from efficiency and consumer welfare to inclusion, transformation and sustainability—cannot be coherently pursued without a guiding normative framework. Using South Africa as a case study, it shows how ambitious statutory objectives, left without such a framework, have produced fragmented jurisprudence: Some decisions retreat to economic orthodoxy, others invoke public interest without principled integration. Drawing on Ronald Dworkin's theory of constructive interpretation, it contends that competition law, like all law, must be interpreted in its best moral light, situated within the constitutional order that gives it purpose. Without this normative anchor, expanded mandates risk incoherence as global regimes seek to move beyond the narrow confines of consumer welfare.

Despite the influence of ordoliberalism in EU law, the mutual feedback between market power and political influence of dominant corporations has not become an explicit consideration in competition law enforcement and has remained rather in the background as an implicit rationale. If the threats to competition posed by regulatory capture are to be addressed, such a mutual feedback loop should become an explicit part of the analysis in competition law cases. This article proposes a factors test in order to determine when the exercise of a company's political rights has degenerated into a scenario of heightened risk of regulatory capture. The factors of the test are drawn from the main tenets of the extant literature on lobbying in the EU that describe the dynamics of how stakeholders gain access to the ears of policymakers. Once a heightened risk of regulatory capture is established, this article argues that specific instances of lobbying for a defined policy proposal can be covered by Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU. The requirement of a heightened risk of regulatory capture is designed to align the prosecution of anticompetitive lobbying with the CJEU's case law on abuse of rights as an abuse of dominance, following from AstraZeneca. When corporations aim to capture areas of public policy, they abuse their political rights and can therefore be subjected to competition law liability. In this way, competition law enforcement can complement other areas of public policy aimed at preventing market distortions caused by political influence, such as transparency obligations of corporate political activity and state aid laws.

Competition law serves not only to regulate markets but also to construct and deepen them, particularly during transitions from centrally planned or heavily regulated to market economies. Its significance is both economic and political: Since its inception, competition law has sought to prevent concentrated economic power from distorting the functioning of democracy. This article explores how competition law shapes democratic transitions and democratic erosion. It puts forward that competition law supports democratisation by constraining powerful economic interests, reinforcing the separation of powers through enforcement and advocacy by independent agencies and strengthening state capacity. Conversely, authoritarian actors may instrumentalise competition law to entrench their power, reward allies and suppress opposition. Democratic erosion, in turn, undermines the autonomy of competition agencies and their enforcement efforts. The article draws on economic and democratic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey and Latin America and charts recent cases of democratic decline in these contexts to illustrate its arguments.

Seeing the EU roughly as a political system designed to remove the most essential political decisions from democratic control, while in a large part abiding by legal frameworks, we could speak about an opposition between technocratic legalism and democracy. At best, the EU offers a democracy of means, with limited capacity to affect the ends of the project. Most recently, even this limited democracy came under attack through a further reduction of transparency, a proliferation of omnibus legislation and constant executive overreach. In its current emanation, ‘integration through law’ aims to shield all aspects of governance not only from democratic but also legal contestation. It thereby structurally prioritises ‘supremacy’, ‘direct effect’, ‘mutual trust’ and other procedural aspects of its own functioning over the essential foundations of justice, democratic citizenship based on equality and dignity and human rights protection. We could thus also speak of ‘supremacy rule of law’, which might or might not be an attack on the essential aspects of legality and justice, removing the added value of the rule of law as such. Consequently, distilling the essence of the ‘social contract’ in Europe today, one arrives at a bundle of oxymorons: The EU's supremacy rule of law is in the service of an ever fading depoliticised democracy of means.

This paper argues for the recognition of economic dependence as a relevant concept within EU competition law, moving beyond the traditional—yet limited—dominance-based framework of Article 102 TFEU. Comparative analysis shows that this, or an equivalent concept, is already embedded in the domestic competition regimes of several EU Member States, as well as in Japan and South Korea, to address severe imbalances of bargaining power in vertical commercial relationships that may distort the competitive process below the dominance threshold. Whereas the DMA embodies a regulatory response to forms of collective dependence linked to gatekeepers, its limited scope leaves many problematic scenarios unaddressed. In the context of the ongoing evaluation of Regulation 1/2003, introducing economic dependence at EU level would offer a more comprehensive response to contemporary economic power, in line with EU constitutional values, while enhancing internal coherence and promoting normative convergence with like-minded democracies.

Academic research is increasingly questioning whether the goals of competition law should extend beyond the traditional focus on economic efficiency and consumer welfare to include non-economic issues such as social justice, democracy, environmental sustainability and equality. In this regard, the African experience is particularly valuable since public interest considerations (PICs) are a feature of merger control regimes in many African countries. After an analysis of PICs in Africa, the paper zooms in on South Africa's extensive experience in the field, particularly its legal test for determining when PICs are justified in merger assessment and offers recommendations that could inform other countries. Drawing on the South Africa merger assessment, this paper recommends that PICs and the competition standard be analysed separately but in an interrelated manner, as they complement each other. The likely effect of the merger on specific public interests must be identified and considered only when it is substantial and linked to the merger. Additionally, a merger should be prohibited only if the proposed remedies seeking to address the negative effects on the specific PIC are inadequate, inappropriate, disproportionate or unenforceable. Importantly, when PICs collide, competition agencies should balance each public interest against the others, focusing on whether the likely effect is substantial or whether the remedies are inadequate. In sum, competition agencies should adopt public-interest merger guidelines that provide businesses with the necessary guidance on the legal test and procedures, enhancing legal certainty and attracting investment.

This introductory article sets competition law in the transformative context. It explains that competition law is not only something that is transformed but is also transformative in its own right. A twofold argument is advanced: first, that competition law has an important role to play in ensuring that the wide range of transitions in play today (i.e., green, digital and industrial) are both just and enduring, and second, that there are significant lessons to be learnt from economic transformations that have already taken place in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and countries from the Global South. To this end, the article explains that the manner in which CEE and select Global South countries designed and enforced their competition laws has allowed competition law to play a meaningful role not only as an instrument but also as an architect of their economic transformations. Against this background, the article argues that the EU's openness to these transitional experiences is desirable not only because it would supplement the transitions within the EU but also because it will facilitate the pathway to similar transitions in other non-European jurisdictions that look to the EU for guidance. In terms of structure, first, the article examines the possible role of competition law in the course of transitions. Second, it examines the possibilities and limitations of the role competition law has already played in the transitions in CEE and Global South countries. The article concludes with an invitation to all readers to engage with this kaleidescope to gain a deeper insight into these issues.

This paper engages with the increasing concern that competition law can no longer concentrate exclusively on a narrow focus on price increases and output diminution. Within the context of growing global inequality and the exponential increase in economic power in the hands of a few, there is a need to develop a coherent jurisprudence capable of addressing manifest abuses of economic power. These challenges are not confined to any single jurisdiction. One particularly instructive response can be found in South Africa. Faced with an Apartheid-shaped economy that reflected this global problem, South Africa responded with legislation that expanded the scope of competition law to embrace a range of defined public interest concerns. In analysing the key developments of the public interest jurisprudence that has emerged in response to this legislation, this paper draws on the South African experience as a source of insight for other jurisdictions—including the European Union—seeking to develop a coherent, yet expansive, competition law for the 21st century.