• Mined and Blockaded: Iran’s Unlawful Mining and the U.S. Port Blockade
  by Mark Nevitt
• The International Legal Consequences and Imprudence of U.S. Assistance to Kurdish Rebels in Iran
  by Sanmay Moitra
• In Response to the Letter by International Law Experts
  by Geoffrey S. Corn, Dick Jackson, Chris Jenks and Michael W. Meier

Sudan War

• The Just Security Podcast: Sudan Enters Its Fourth Year of Civil War 
  Viola Gienger interview with Quscondy Abdulshafi
• Fleeing Sudan’s War: Refugees Detail Three Years of Trauma
  by Jehanne Henry

Series: Syria in Transition

• An Urgent Call to Break the Cycle of Division and Exclusion in Syria
  by Deyaa Alrwishdi

Hungary Election

• The Just Security Podcast: Hungary After Orban
  Viola Gienger interview with Zsuzsanna Végh

FISA Section 702

• Bogus “Antifa” Designations and FBI Warrantless Access to Americans’ Communications
  by Ryan Goodman
• Is the Government Using Counterterrorism Surveillance Tools to Surveil American Companies?
  by Patrick G. Eddington

Tech Governance

• Cisco’s Real Stakes: Digitally Aiding and Abetting Mass Atrocities
  by Harold Hongju Koh
• Africa’s AI Strategies Cannot Say No
  by Samuel W. Ugwumba

Trump Executive Actions

• Some Questions for Congress About Trump’s Request for Funding for the Board of Peace
  by Michael Mattler
• The Trump Administration’s Fraud Problem
  by Reed Shaw
• Separating Fact from Fiction in FACE Act Enforcement
  by Regan Rush and Megan Marks
• Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions (Updated)
  by Just Security

U.S. Military

• The Constitution’s Forgotten Term Limit on Military Power
  by Matthew B. Lawrence and Mark Nevitt

U.S. Boat Strikes

• Timeline of Boat Strikes and Related Actions (Updated)
  by Jeremy Chin, Margaret Lin, Aidan Arasasingham and Marie Miller

Foreign Investment

• The Missing Convener: NSC’s Diminished Role and the Future of U.S. Investment Security
  by Eric S. Johnson

Presidential Records

• The Presidential Records Act is Constitutional
  by Christopher Fonzone

Mexico / Enforced Disappearances

• Widespread and Systematic Disappearances in Mexico: An Urgent Call for UN Action Under the Convention on Enforced Disappearances
  by Hélène Tigroudja

Azerbaijan / Civil Society

• 1,000 Days and Counting: A Father, A Professor, and a Government That Won’t Let Go
  by Emin Bayramli

The post Digest of Recent Articles on Just Security (Apr. 12-17, 2026) appeared first on Just Security.

The National Security Council has been under sustained institutional stress throughout the current Administration. The sidelining of approximately 160 career officials detailed from CIA, FBI, State, DOJ, and other agencies in January, followed by the abrupt mass dismissal of numerous career officials in the spring and the removal of the National Security Adviser — with the post now held concurrently by the Secretary of State — has dispersed the institutional cadre on which the NSC’s coordination function depends. The Financial Times observed in August 2025 that the traditional foreign policy process led by the NSC has “largely broken down.”

The scale of what is at stake is considerable. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is building the Known Investor Program (KIP) to streamline reviews for low-risk investors. Treasury must issue COINS Act regulations by March 2027, expanding the Outbound Investment Security Program to cover new technologies and geographies. The Department of Justice’s Data Security Program (DSP), which functions as export controls for bulk sensitive personal data, entered full enforcement last July. Commerce’s Office of Information and Communications Technology and Services (OICTS) is extending its ICTS supply chain authorities into connected vehicles, drones, and cloud computing. Each initiative requires not just a legal foundation and significant agency focus, but sustained interagency policy coordination — the kind that only a functioning NSC is positioned to provide.

The consequences of the NSC’s diminished role will not be felt primarily through the review of any single transaction. They will be felt in the quality and clarity of the rules themselves, and ultimately in the loss of the predictability that policymakers, aligned governments, and repeat participants require to engage the system with confidence. That loss of predictability itself poses national security risks: fragmented and uncoordinated frameworks invite circumvention, produce uneven enforcement, and corrode the credibility of the overall regime in the eyes of governments whose cooperation the United States is simultaneously seeking.

Two Recent Rulemakings: The Value of an Effective Convener

Before assessing the consequences of NSC’s institutional weakening, it is worth examining what rulemaking looks like when it works. Two recently completed rulemakings — DOJ’s Data Security Program and Commerce’s connected vehicle rule — provide instructive models.

Department of Justice’s Data Security Program

The Data Security Program (DSP) began with Executive Order 14117. Signed in February 2024, DOJ’s National Security Division was directed to issue regulations restricting access to bulk U.S. sensitive personal data by enumerated countries of concern. Rather than proceeding directly to a proposed rule, DOJ published a detailed Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in March 2024 — a comprehensive document that posed specific questions to the public and laid out the contemplated regulatory architecture in its entirety. The ANPRM was not a formality. DOJ received comments from an extraordinarily broad cross-section of stakeholders: the Business Roundtable, the Biotechnology Innovation Organization, the U.S.-China Business Council, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, and dozens of others. Beyond written comments, DOJ — both independently and alongside other executive branch agencies — conducted what the final rule’s preamble describes as “dozens of large-group listening sessions, industry engagements, and one-on-one engagements with hundreds of participants.”

Critically, the rulemaking was not a DOJ effort alone. The Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency developed the technical security requirements for restricted transactions, adapted from NIST cybersecurity and privacy frameworks. Classified threat assessments from the intelligence community informed the designation of countries of concern. These and numerous other interagency inputs were coordinated by NSC. When DOJ published its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in October 2024, it addressed earlier comments, refined key definitions — including the treatment of precise geolocation data and medical research exemptions — and invited a further round of public comment. The final rule, issued in December 2024, was accompanied by a compliance guide, FAQs, and a 90-day grace period.

Department of Commerce’s Connected Vehicle Rule

Commerce followed a similar path. It published an ANPRM in March 2024, receiving comments from OEMs, component suppliers, foreign governments, nonprofit organizations, and private citizens. The process pushed Commerce to refine the rule’s scope: where the ANPRM had identified six vehicle systems as potential targets, the NPRM narrowed focus to two — vehicle connectivity systems and automated driving systems. The final rule reflected both that deliberation and significant stakeholder feedback, including a legacy software exemption and scope narrowing to passenger vehicles, with commercial vehicles addressed in a separate rulemaking. As with the DSP, NSC coordinated the varied interagency inputs that shaped the final product.

Both rulemakings share a common pattern: a genuinely consultative ANPRM; structured interagency participation producing rules informed by perspectives no single agency could supply alone; and multiple rounds of public comment resulting in regulations that were targeted, better defined, and more administrable than their initial proposals. This is what the NSC’s coordination function is designed to produce — and what policymakers and the regulated community have a right to expect as new authorities come online.

Coming Rulemaking: The Absent Convener

Now consider the national security regulatory rulemakings that lie ahead, and the current institutional conditions under which they must be developed.

CFIUS’s Known Investor Program

The Known Investor Program (KIP) would create a standing database of pre-screened foreign investors from allied countries — entities that have demonstrated “verifiable distance” from adversary countries and that can provide detailed governance, compliance, and organizational information in advance of any specific CFIUS filing. The premise is sound: the vast majority of CFIUS-reviewed transactions have cleared, many during the initial review phase, and a pre-clearance mechanism for low-risk, repeat investors could meaningfully reduce overall review periods without compromising national security.

But moving KIP from concept to execution requires answering questions no single agency can or should resolve in isolation. What constitutes “verifiable distance” from an adversary — and how does that standard interact with Commerce’s Entity List, Treasury’s SDN list, and classified intelligence assessments? What happens when a KIP-cleared investor subsequently acquires a U.S. business covered by the DSP — does the KIP clearance address the data security dimension, or must the investor separately satisfy a parallel compliance regime administered by DOJ? These are design parameters, not implementation details, and they are precisely the kind of cross-cutting policy problems that the NSC’s working-level committee bodies — where subject-matter experts from across the executive branch have historically convened — are designed to address.

The COINS Act Implementing Regulations

The COINS Act gives Treasury approximately fifteen months to promulgate regulations expanding the Outbound Investment Security Program’s geographic scope, extending coverage to hypersonic and high-performance computing technologies, and creating a public database of covered foreign persons in coordination with Commerce. That database — a concept Treasury itself previously rejected during the original outbound investment security rulemaking — raises immediate questions about how entities on the Commerce Entity List, OFAC’s SDN list, and the Defense Department’s Section 1260H list of Chinese military companies should relate to the new outbound investment database. The COINS Act also mandates allied coordination on outbound investment frameworks — an obligation requiring not just bilateral diplomacy but an executive branch consensus on what the United States is actually asking its partners and allies to replicate.

The CFIUS Mitigation Overhaul and OICTS Expansion

The America First Investment Policy directs a fundamental shift away from complex, open-ended mitigation agreements with foreign adversaries toward “concrete actions that companies can complete within a specific time” — a directive that requires generalized interagency agreement on when mitigation is appropriate versus when a transaction should be blocked. Meanwhile, Commerce appears to be extending its ICTS authorities into drones and cloud computing, creating additional layers of supply chain regulation that must be reconciled with CFIUS mitigation terms and outbound investment restrictions. These are not self-executing policy directives; they are design problems that require a convener to coordinate the varied and at times competing priorities.

What Happens When the Convener Doesn’t Call

For the rulemaking pipeline, an absent or hobbled NSC presents predictable consequences. Each agency will likely develop its regulations in isolation, applying its own conception of national security risk without a mechanism for ensuring cross-regime consistency. Treasury will build KIP according to its understanding of “verifiable distance.” DOJ will enforce data security regulations without access to the broader interagency’s experience with analogous sanctions programs. Commerce will maintain its entity lists and OICTS prohibitions according to its own criteria. Without a convener, these efforts will drift apart — not because any agency is acting in bad faith, but because agencies without a mechanism to resolve policy tensions will default to their own institutional biases.

One might ask whether the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) can fill the gap. OIRA coordinates interagency review of significant rules under Executive Order 12866, providing a centralized check before major regulations are finalized. But OIRA’s mandate is regulatory efficiency and cost-benefit analysis, not national security policy coherence. OIRA operates at the back end of the rulemaking process, checking the output of agency deliberation rather than shaping it. OIRA lacks routine access to the classified information that drive the most consequential design choices, and it certainly does not convene the working-level interagency committees where subject-matter experts from Treasury, Defense, Commerce, DOJ, and the intelligence community resolve substantive policy tensions. Although the current administration expanded OIRA’s mandate to cover independent regulatory agencies – as part of a broader deregulatory agenda – this expanded mandate compounds the problem: an OIRA oriented toward reducing regulatory burden is poorly positioned to adjudicate whether outbound investment restrictions should be calibrated broadly or narrowly, or whether a “verifiable distance” standard is being applied consistently across diverse foreign investment screening regimes. In its current form, OIRA is not a substitute for NSC coordination; it is an additional variable.

The quality of the rules will also suffer. The DSP and connected vehicle rulemakings succeeded in part because interagency deliberation preceded regulatory commitment. When that process is absent, rulemakings mature within a single agency’s policy silo, producing regulations that create unintended conflicts with other regimes or fail to account for equities that a different agency would have surfaced. And when career subject-matter experts are removed and interagency committees atrophy, the regulatory process becomes susceptible to ad hoc interventions untethered from an evidence-based analytically driven process — an unfortunate dynamic that the “politicization” commentary surrounding CFIUS’s review of the Nippon Steel transaction illustrates.

Consequences of an Absent Convener

The most direct consequence is regulatory fragmentation: overlapping screening regimes operating in parallel, each internally coherent but mutually inconsistent, with no mechanism for resolution at the executive branch level. Foreign governments seeking to understand U.S. investment screening policy — or to develop analogous frameworks the United States is asking them to adopt — confront a system whose component parts do not speak to each other. The “verifiable distance” standard articulated in the America First Investment Policy is a judgment call that implicates equities across Treasury, State, Defense, Commerce, and the intelligence community. Applied without interagency coordination, it will inevitably be inconsistently applied — producing the kind of unpredictability that functions more effectively as a deterrent to legitimate investment than any outright prohibition, and that undermines U.S. credibility in requesting coordination with foreign governments on the same frameworks.

Fragmentation also creates a second-order institutional problem. The DSP and connected vehicle rulemakings succeeded in part because the process structured a genuine accommodation of competing institutional perspectives before the rules were finalized. When that accommodation does not occur within the executive branch, the burden of cross-regime harmonization shifts to outside actors — regulated entities, foreign governments, and trade associations (among others) who are left to flag inconsistencies, identify conflicts across regimes, and propose resolution mechanisms that the interagency process should have worked through first. That is a poor substitute for NSC-led coordination because public comment is neither uniform in quality nor guaranteed to reach the right decision-makers, and it cannot replicate the classified equities that shape the most consequential design choices.

The cumulative effect is degradation of a foundational principle underlying the United States’ investment screening system. The DSP, KIP, COINS Act regulations, and OICTS expansion are each premised on the idea that national security screening can be calibrated — targeted enough to protect genuine interests, predictable enough to attract legitimate capital, and coherent enough to encourage allied participation. Without NSC-led coordination across these authorities, calibration gives way to unguided proliferation, and the regime becomes a collection of agency-specific instruments rather than a system.

The United States has built an investment security architecture of unprecedented breadth. Whether the implementing rules function as a coherent system — or as a collection of agency-specific instruments that policymakers, allied governments, and regulated parties must reconcile on their own — depends on whether the institution designed to hold the interagency together is permitted to do its job.\

The post The Missing Convener: NSC’s Diminished Role and the Future of U.S. Investment Security appeared first on Just Security.

That guarantee, enshrined in the Constitution’s text, is now largely theoretical due to an obscure 1904 Solicitor General opinion that has proven to be a footnote to history — until now. The Framers’ fears are being realized: troops are being deployed in American cities, Congress has not cast a vote on the Iran War authorization, and President Trump signed into law a four-year military and ICE funding package buried in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBA) that insulates militarized immigration enforcement from congressional control. In a forthcoming article in the George Washington Law Review, we argue that it is time for all this to change; it is time to remember and revitalize the Two-Year Clause. Here’s why.

The Constitution Distinguishes the Army from the Navy

The Army has a two-year appropriations limit on “raising and supporting armies,” but none to “provide and maintain a Navy.” This was deliberate. The distinction between the land and naval forces reflected the threat to individual liberties that the Framers saw in a domestic standing army capable of turning inward against a population it was meant to protect. Madison’s argument in Federalist 41 was geographic and structural. America’s ocean separation from European powers meant that foreign threats arrived primarily by sea and a navy, he reasoned, “can never be turned by a perfidious government against our liberties.” Naval power could therefore go unconstrained; it faced outward by design. The Two-Year Clause supplied the complementary check for the land force: the army alone posed the domestic tyranny risk that colonial experience had confirmed. Three delegates declined to sign the Constitution, and all three mentioned the absence of checks against standing armies in their criticisms, with one delegate criticizing the “want of limitation to the standing army.” 

The Two-Year Clause worked as designed for over a century. Early Congresses funded the Army annually, consolidating everything — pay, cannons, clothing, equipment, ordnance, horses — into a single short-term enactment. Long-term military procurement contracts were possible, but the funds to honor them had to be appropriated biennially, as is still routinely done in federal grant administration today. The constitutional architecture was deliberate: born from colonial experience with British standing armies, refined through the near-catastrophe of Shays’s Rebellion, and defended by Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike as the essential safeguard against military tyranny. 

How a Three-Page Opinion Buried the Two-Year Clause

That all changed in 1904 when Solicitor General Henry Hoyt issued a three-page opinion that quietly eviscerated the Clause. Hoyt adopted what he called a “strict” reading of “raise and support,” concluding that appropriations to equip or arm the Army fell outside the two-year limit. Under his interpretation, the Clause applied essentially only to military pay — leaving ammunition, weapons systems, vehicles, construction, fuel, and procurement entirely exempt from the two-year ceiling.

Hoyt’s opinion cited no founding-era dictionaries, no early statutes, and no relevant legislative history. This was a significant omission. It was, in short, constitutional interpretation without the tools constitutional interpretation requires. As a result, the opinion is difficult to reconcile with the Clause’s text, founding-era usage, and early practice.

Take one example. Founding-era dictionaries defined “support” broadly — to “maintain,” to “supply with what is wanted,” to “aid.” The Articles of Confederation used the phrase “raise, clothe, arm, and equip” nearly identically to the Constitution’s “raise and support.” Early Congresses treated the clause as covering all Army-related expenditures, including ordnance and equipment, in consolidated annual appropriations. 

The pre-World War II era Lend-Lease debates of 1941, long misread by the Government Accountability Office as congressional endorsement of Hoyt’s view, actually tell the opposite story. While the majority committee reports invoked Hoyt’s opinion, Republican members filed their own minority report calling the interpretation unconstitutional. The report stated that the “power requested is too much to give any money at a time when the country is at peace,” asserting that the revolving fund violated the Two-Year Clause. They succeeded in securing a floor amendment adding a two-year sunset to the relevant provisions of the Lend-Lease Act — a direct legislative rebuke of Hoyt, not an endorsement of it. Yet an Attorney General opinion ratified Hoyt’s opinion in 1948, dismissing the Two-Year Clause’s application to the newly formed Air Force. The permanent standing army that emerged from World War II entrenched what Hoyt had already enabled. By the time President Eisenhower left the presidency in 1961, he was warning about the military-industrial complex, enabled by congressional interest in military appropriations for their respective districts. 

Why the Clause Is Urgently Relevant Today

For decades after Hoyt, the clause’s near-obsolescence was tolerable. Congress still appropriated the vast majority of military funds annually in connection with the National Defense Authorization Act process. Presidential unilateralism was constrained. Domestic military deployments were rare. The spirit of the clause survived even if the letter did not.

That era is over.

In 2025, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act appropriated $156 billion in four-year military funding — more than doubling the existing stock of constitutionally non-compliant appropriations and reducing the share of compliant funding from roughly 83% to 68% (by our rough estimation). The unprecedented move generated bipartisan tension, but the law passed anyway, largely unnoticed outside the Beltway.

The consequences are concrete. For example, military immigration operations like those at Fort Bliss, where undocumented immigrants are being detained by the thousands, were funded on a four-year runway through September 2029. That means the next House — even one that commands a clear majority opposed to the program — will lack the appropriations lever to shut it down. The Two-Year Clause was designed precisely to prevent this: to ensure that no Congress could bind its successors on the question of whether to maintain a standing army, or to extend military functions into domestic territory.

Meanwhile, the Trump Administration has invoked novel authorities to deploy active-duty troops in California, Oregon, Illinois, and the District of Columbia. Operation Metro Surge — the DHS-led deployment of over 3,000 federal agents into Minneapolis — has prompted 20 state attorneys general to argue that the operation is not ordinary law enforcement but a militarized assault on state sovereignty. The question of whether masked ICE agents, when deployed at this scale and in this manner, function as a constitutional “army” is not frivolous. It is, in fact, precisely the kind of question a revived Two-Year Clause would force courts to confront. Scott Levy and Kevin McNellis have persuasively argued in these pages that the Two-Year Clause remains a forgotten check on ICE, CBP, and the Pentagon. We agree. After all, the Constitution does not define “armies,” and founding-era usage suggests the term encompassed any organized body of armed men under federal command and control deployed for coercive purposes. Whatever it might be labeled by Congress or the President, an operation involving thousands of armed federal agents, with military-style logistics and equipment, under unified command, and exercising detention authority against a civilian population is a close fit with the unchecked federal “armies” the Framers feared.

The Structural Case for Revival

The strongest affirmative case for revival is structural. The Two-Year Clause is unusual among constitutional checks in three respects. First, it runs against the legislature, not the executive — it limits what one Congress may do to its successors. Second, the Two-Year Clause is the only time limit placed on Congress’s appropriation power within the Constitution. Third, the Two-Year Clause is uniquely resistant to “historical gloss” — by its terms, no Congress can surrender the power it confers on future Congresses. A practice of violating the clause cannot constitutionally entrench itself. 

Revival would do several things simultaneously. It would protect the existing norm of annual military appropriations against further erosion — particularly the emerging threat of massive reconciliation packages that bypass the NDAA process entirely. It would eliminate the executive branch’s “slush funds” of long-term and permanent military appropriations that allow presidents to fund disfavored operations even when Congress tries to cut off funding. And it would reinvigorate the Clause’s federalism dimension: forcing periodic congressional votes on domestic military deployments means senators and representatives must defend those deployments to their constituents before the next election.

National security objections have stood in the way of honoring other constitutional checks, like the Declare War Clause, but such objections are inapposite when it comes to the Two Year Clause. The Framers left ample room for Congress to accommodate emergency spending through contingency transfer authorities — appropriating funds in advance for unforeseen emergencies while preserving civilian control in the medium term. Today’s section 8005 transfer authority does exactly that, and it is fully compliant with the Two-Year Clause because it is re-authorized annually. Revival would not touch operational decision-making; it would reshape the political conditions under which that decision-making occurs.

The fiscal costs of revival are real but bounded. Forcing biennial appropriations for procurement would likely impose a “disappropriation premium” — contractors pricing risk into their bids. But programs that operate successfully based either on biennial contracts or long-term contracts dependent on biennial appropriations are to be found across government. Based on these programs, we conservatively estimate that the outer bound of the fiscal cost of revival is roughly $20.3 billion annually, approximately 2.4% of total defense spending. That figure could be substantially offset if revival brought even modest reductions in the well-documented inefficiency and political pork that characterizes long-term defense contracting — including the $2 trillion Joint Strike Fighter program that has delivered aircraft increasingly late while its contractors collected hundreds of millions in incentive fees. 

How Revival Could Happen

Revival will probably not arrive through a single blockbuster ruling. The Roberts Court has shown reluctance to insert itself into fast-moving spending disputes, particularly those implicating military operations. But constitutional safeguards can return through quieter channels.

Several pathways exist. The wave of litigation over the Trump Administration’s termination of defense contracts and grants presents a vehicle for challenging whether damages are properly payable from the permanent Judgment Fund — a permanent, uncapped appropriation Congress created in 1956 to satisfy judgments against the United States without requiring further legislative action. Because the Judgment Fund acts as an indefinite appropriation, it may well violate the Two-Year Clause as applied to Army support contracts.

Environmental citizen suits have had some success in challenging the diversion of already-appropriated funds during the first Trump Administration; a similar challenge could be brought today. Courts considering challenges to large-scale ICE deployments could apply the constitutional avoidance canon, construing the statutes authorizing those operations narrowly, so as to sidestep the serious constitutional question of whether ICE, when deployed at scale, is functioning as an “army” that must be funded within the Two-Year Clause’s limits. Finally, a future president who inherits four-year funding for domestic deployments she opposes could invoke the Two-Year Clause as a legal basis for impoundment — putting the executive branch in the unusual position of defending the clause’s original meaning in court.

The Deeper Stakes

The Framers were not naive about what they were doing. They had lived under British standing armies, declaring Independence precisely because of British military overreach in colonial Boston and beyond. They had watched Shays’s Rebellion expose the dangers of a civilian uprising coupled with a too-powerless Congress to quell the rebellion. They designed the Two-Year Clause not as a technical appropriations rule but as a structural guarantee: that the army of the United States would remain, as one Federalist put it, “the army of the people.” The OBBA’s $156 billion four-year appropriation, the Army’s presence in American cities, the rapid militarization of federal law enforcement, and the emergence of “war without soldiers” have made the Clause’s obsolescence a live constitutional problem, not a historical footnote.

Professors Bruce Ackerman and Oona Hathaway have observed that most constitutional experts have never given the Two-Year Clause a moment’s thought, “consigning it to the junk heap of history.” The circumstances that made that neglect tolerable — congressional dominance of annual military appropriations, restraint in domestic military deployments, legislative-executive cooperation on spending, and the military’s dependence on human soldiers as the core of its land-based fighting force — have now dissolved or are in the process of dissolving. 

The OBBA’s $156 billion four-year appropriation did not happen in secret. It passed in plain sight, debated on the Senate floor, signed by the President, and immediately challenged in the courts — and still the Two-Year Clause went unmentioned. 

The Clause is still there. Its text hasn’t changed. What changed was attention — and attention, unlike doctrine, can be recovered.

The Framers gave Congress not just the power but the obligation to decide, every two years, whether the United States should maintain a standing army, and how it would use that army. That decision has been made silently, by default, by the accretion of long-term appropriations since Hoyt’s 1904 opinion. Immigrants are detained on military bases funded through 2029. Troops are now in American cities. Federal agents deploy at brigade scale against American neighborhoods. The questions the Framers insisted every newly-elected Congress answer out loud — Do we still need this army? For what? For how long? Against whom? — are no longer hypothetical. They are being answered right now — by inertia, by a three-page 1904 opinion, and by a reconciliation bill that most Americans never paid attention to. The Two-Year Clause cannot answer them on its own. But it can force Congress to stop pretending the questions don’t exist. The Framers built that requirement into the Constitution’s text. It is still there. The only thing missing is the will to use it.

The post The Constitution’s Forgotten Term Limit on Military Power appeared first on Just Security.

This pattern is not new. For decades, foreign companies in Africa have extracted resources—minerals, data, labor—under arrangements that the framework of so-called “development” has classified as partnership. Now, AI governance is reproducing the same dynamic at a continental scale, under the guise of development, in a way that portrays extractive relationships as progress—reminiscent of how the original scramble for Africa was legitimized by the language of civilization, and a parallel to other corporate practices on the continent.

Development Cannot Classify

The AU strategy commits to an “Africa-centric, development-oriented and inclusive approach.” In practice, “development” is deployed on both sides of every tension the strategy identifies—and resolves none of them.

The strategy calls on international partners to “support Africa’s effort to accelerate AI use for solving its development challenges” while warning that “external influence from AI technologies developed outside Africa may undermine national sovereignty.” It also acknowledges that “most of the data on the African population is now available to a handful of companies” while promoting policies that “facilitate access and sharing of non-personal data for AI.” On labor, the strategy is silent: no mention of content moderation workers, working conditions for those labeling data, or the risks to workers of psychological harm. As a Strathmore University analysis observed, the strategy “champions the need for global technical and financial partnerships” while acknowledging that “African participation in global policy dialogues is often tokenistic.” Invoking development as a framework does not mediate this asymmetry. It conceals it.

That silence has a human cost. By the time the AU strategy was adopted, over 140 Kenyan workers hired by Sama—a San Francisco company that claimed to have lifted 59,000 people out of poverty—had already been diagnosed with PTSD from labeling traumatic content for OpenAI for as little as $1.32 an hour. Sama has described its operations as “ethical,” “inclusive,” and “socially responsible.” The AU strategy has no vocabulary with which to disagree.

Meanwhile, Zimbabwe’s new strategy reproduces the same pattern with its vision: “inclusive and sustainable AI for Development in Southern Africa.” It simultaneously promises “computational sovereignty” and plans “strategic technology alliances” with foreign partners. It calls for “shared prosperity” at the same time that Zimbabwe ranks 149th of 193 countries in the U.N. E-Government Development Index and 60 percent of its population does not have access to the Internet. The strategy includes no delineated budget or Zimbabwe funding, and was developed with UNESCO technical assistance funded by a U.S. foundation. And it requires “strategic international collaboration” as a core pillar of its AI governance strategy. Utilizing development as a driving framework accommodates both the aspiration of computational sovereignty and the constraint that Zimbabwe cannot build it alone—without specifying how this gap is to be governed. But who bears the risk, who owns the data, and on whose terms it is utilized are all governance questions that have been left unanswered—precisely because the organizing concept of development cannot.

How Development Enables Corporate Capture

Nigeria’s National AI Strategy, launched in April 2025, is perhaps the most instructive case. The strategy calls AI a “developmental equalizer” and insists that “locally developed AI solutions, adapted to local realities, are far better equipped to solve these challenges than externally imposed models”—language that promises to “rebalance power structures.”

But the same document states that it is “consistent with” and “guided” by Google’s “AI Sprinters” corporate report, which recommends “100% adoption of cloud-first policies”—a recommendation that directly benefits the business interests of Google Cloud services. Nigeria’s strategy workshop was co-created with Meta, Microsoft, and Google, the last of which separately committed a $2.1 million fund supporting the strategy’s implementation.

In any other regulatory context, having regulated entities co-author an external framework that will govern them could be identified as a potential conflict of interest, or at the least, be understood as less likely to offer objective, neutral guardrails. It certainly does not look like a “locally-developed” solution rather than an “externally imposed model.” But development discourse conceals this reality. Because AI is framed as a “developmental equalizer,” and Google is donating funds to the strategy, Google’s involvement becomes understood as development assistance rather than market capture. The strategy’s ecosystem map classifies Google, Microsoft, Intel, and Nvidia as “Platform Enablers” and “Support Systems,” but does not properly contextualize them as external entities subject to domestic laws and regulations (for instance, under the Nigeria Data Protection Act, which applies to foreign entities processing data independent of where they are domiciled). The AU strategy does the same at the continental level, creating a formal stakeholder category called “Development Partners” that places foreign tech companies alongside sovereign African governments as co-equal participants, converting what would otherwise be a quasi-regulatory relationship into a partnership.

The concept converts what may be viewed as a structural conflict into a developmental partnership. And the regulatory question—who governs whom, on whose terms, for whose benefit—is not adequately addressed.

This is not a Nigerian anomaly. Rwanda’s National AI Policy, developed with Germany’s development agency, GIZ, and the World Economic Forum, envisions a $589 million AI ecosystem while calling for “partnering with global players while also building local skills.” Ghana’s strategy likewise frames data as a “national asset” and AI as a vehicle for “inclusive social and economic transformation,” while critical analysis notes the country still lacks a robust national data governance framework. In each case, the lens of development absorbs an important contradiction: it frames dependency on the companies extracting data and labor  from the continent as a developmental partnership with them.

The Rights Consequences Are Already Visible

When a governing framework does not overtly classify an arrangement as extractive, that extraction does not need to disguise itself because it has the protective veneer of more palatable classification(s).

Scale AI’s Remotasks platform employed Kenyan and Nigerian data labelers working over 20 hours and earning less than $1 total, then abruptly shut down operations in both countries in March 2024. Meta, after facing lawsuits in Nairobi, secretly relocated its content moderation operations to Accra, recruiting workers to moderate East African language content from the other side of the continent. Kenya’s AI Strategy positions the country as a “leading hub for technology and innovation” aimed at “sustainable development,” while Kenyan data labelers earn $1.32–$2 per hour and have petitioned parliament over working conditions. And African linguistic data—in Wolof, Oromo, Igbo, Swahili—is harvested to train large language models sold back to African markets.

When Kenya’s government views outsourced AI labor as “investors creating jobs for youths,” this is not cynicism. It is the concept of development opening up the same arrangement to both opportunity and exploitation, and providing no basis on which to choose. It is diagnostically agnostic.

This argument goes further than the standard post-development critique. The problem is not that development serves external interests. It is that development provides both the vocabulary through which extraction is legitimized and the vocabulary through which resistance to extraction is articulated—ensuring that contestation occurs within, rather than against, the extractive framework itself. The data-labeling market is projected to reach approximately $29.2 billion by 2032. And the language of development resembles the conditions that characterized European states’ colonial scramble for Africa, precisely because it is too confused and paralyzed to distinguish between exploitation and empowerment. It is this paralysis that permits Western firms to legitimize extraction, including in the context of AI.

This Has Happened Before

The structural failure is not new. South Africa’s Copyright Amendment Bill, trapped in a reform process since 2015, embodies the same classificatory collapse. The bill’s fair-use provisions were simultaneously demanded by “development” as access to knowledge for visually impaired South Africans, who had been denied reading materials for decades. But they were also blocked by “development” when the U.S. Trade Representative threatened to revoke $2.38 billion in preferential trade benefits because South Africa adopted fair-use provisions modeled on U.S. law. Of course, one might insist that this was simply a copyright/intellectual property issue, as U.S. copyright stakeholders were primarily concerned that the South Africa Copyright Amendment Bill would “weaken the adequacy and effectiveness of copyright and related rights protection in South Africa.” But this misses the broader point. The entire rationale of Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs, used in this instance as a “stick,” is developmental: to help developing nations compete in the global market. Also, development, interpreted as concerns for access to knowledge, was the rationale for the South Africa Copyright Amendment Bill (again, modeled on U.S. fair use provisions). Development was simultaneously the rationale for reform, the instrument of punishment, and the framework that could not adequately classify either.

At the multilateral level, when the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 2016 evaluated its Development Agenda after nearly two decades, independent reviewers found that impact “could not be determined.” As the South Centre documented, “conflicting interpretations of development” meant the membership could not agree on what success looked like. A 2025 review confirms implementation has had “limited impact.” Different instruments, but the same organizing failure. If development could not govern African intellectual property—where it has been the organizing concept for decades—then there is little cogent reason to believe that it can govern AI, where the stakes are higher and the arrangements move faster than any regulatory framework can follow.

What Would Actually Protect People

The alternative is not abandoning development as a diplomatic aspiration. It remains valuable for coalition-building at the United Nations and the African Union. But in the spaces where AI governance is actually designed—where data rules are written, procurement decisions are made, and labor protections are legislated—development must give way to disaggregated objectives that name harms and specify remedies. The below recommendations are directed not only at African governments, but at the international organizations and development agencies that fund and co-author African AI strategies:

• “Development-oriented” AI labor governance (as framed in the AU Continental AI Strategy) does not specify who is protected, and how. But requirements for “minimum wage parity between outsourced AI workers and equivalent domestic roles” does. This is the kind of framing that ought to be utilized in African AI governance.
• Similarly, broad language like “development-oriented” data governance creates no specific, testable obligations for AI companies, whereas provisions mandating “data localization requirements specifying where African training data must be stored and processed” would accomplish this.
• “Development,” as invoked in conceptual terms in most African AI strategies, names neither harm nor remedy. But requiring “mandatory mental health provision and independent occupational safety audits for content moderation and data labeling operations” does. Again, framing like this would significantly strengthen African AI governance.

African countries do not need more so-called development-oriented frameworks. They need frameworks that can say no. The proliferation of AI technologies will produce more arrangements like Sama’s, more shutdowns like Remotasks’, more relocations like Meta’s move to Accra.  The frame of development will welcome each one as partnership, opportunity, and progress, unless African policymakers replace this framework with clearly delineated, regulatory-oriented frameworks that demand compliance with appropriate labor and data protections. With Zimbabwe and Ghana currently building their governance architectures, the window for that replacement is now.

The post Africa’s AI Strategies Cannot Say No appeared first on Just Security.

The fall of Bashar Al-Assad on Dec. 8, 2024 is perhaps the most consequential moment in Syria’s modern history. After decades of repression, Syrians earned a long-awaited and rare opportunity to reckon with one another and build their nation. Days after Assad’s fall, Rebecca Hamilton and I advocated for an incremental, locally-led constitutionalism to overcome Syria’s history of constitutional formalism and public distrust of authority. Fifteen months later, the caretaker authority has squandered much of that opportunity and continued down a path of exclusion and division. Analysts have extensively discussed and critiqued the exclusionary nature of the Victory Conference and subsequent National Dialogue Conference, the hyper-presidential system embedded in the Constitutional Declaration, and repeated outbreaks of sectarian violence.

It is important to first examine Syria’s history of communal division and political exclusion, to contextualize the complicated legacy that inescapably affects Syria’s transitional process, and must be accounted for within it. Thus far, the caretaker authority has complicated rather than addressed this legacy, and the viability of the path forward depends on prioritizing genuine reconciliation and engaging the public as authors rather than subjects of Syria’s future. The caretaker authority must use whatever remaining leverage it has to bring about these changes. The question is whether it is willing to do so.

A Country with Unaddressed Grievances and Tradition of Political Exclusion

“We have lived together for millennia” is an assurance those of us from Syria instinctively provide to Western officials and critics who suggest there may be social, ethnic, or sectarian fractures in Syria. Ironically, the sentiment echoes the civic mythology the Ba’thists spread in schools for generations. The claim is not necessarily false, but it is incomplete. What it omits, intentionally or not, is something that could be too sensitive to ask: how, and on what terms, have various groups co-existed in Syria.

Syria is a deeply divided society with compounded and unprocessed grievances that have long been expressed through a sectarian lens. Those grievances have left open wounds, passed down across generations, without an official institution to arbitrate them. As a result, many communities have come to fear other groups as threats and invoke past victimization to justify that perception. Throughout history, from the Ottoman era dominated by a narrow group of urban Sunni notables, through the minority Ba’thists’ takeover of the state and subsequent Alawite monopoly of power, the Arabist suppression of the Kurds, to the hegemony of crony neoliberals under Bashar Al-Assad, each epoch has been defined by one group capturing state power and economic wealth while largely subjugating the rest.

Essentially, Syria’s default power-sharing arrangement has been exclusionary, as loss of political control is perceived as a risk of return to subjugation. Survival has depended on controlling the state apparatus, and maintaining that control requires the suppression of other groups who may otherwise themselves seek exclusive state power. Accordingly, the state has come to be perceived as a protectionary prize to be captured rather than a forum for settling political disagreements and for collective prosperity. Syria’s history is replete with examples.

The Notables’ Capture

For decades, the Ottomans relied upon an intermediary network of urban Sunnis who monopolized state apparatus, wealth, and access to education. Historians call this group “the landowning-bureaucrats” or “the notables.” In contrast to this narrow landowning elite, the majority of Syrians were impoverished non-landowners, many of whom were from rural populations, minority communities, and artisans who lived in dire poverty with no meaningful path to social mobility. In the 1850s and 1860s, in response to European pressure, the Ottomans launched the Tanzimat reforms to guarantee legal equality to non-Muslim subjects. In response, intercommunal violence erupted in Aleppo and Damascus, leaving thousands of Christians dead. For Muslims, particularly the urban Sunni families, these reforms were generally perceived as a threat to their position.

The gap between the notables and the majority of the population was staggering and long-lasting. John McHugo reports that as of 1960, “two thirds of the population over the age of ten … was illiterate.” But even being among the literate third did not necessarily mean attending the formal education system available to the notables; it merely meant being fortunate to learn to read and write, informally. Ultimately, even the eventual anti-Ottoman movement that espoused Pan-Arabism and later produced the ruling class in Syria emerged from within the notables. In short, from the late Ottoman period through the French Mandate that ended in 1946, and into the post-independence era, the so-called notables monopolized Syria’s politics and wealth.

The Rural and Minority Capture and the Alawites’ Monopoly

The French Mandate laid the groundwork for restructuring Syria’s political power dynamic by largely recruiting its local security forces from rural and minority communities (often referred to as the “peasant” class, a term that still today holds a derogatory connotation amongst some Syrians). These groups seized that rare opportunity for social mobility to become intertwined with the state apparatus, constituting a powerful part of the future Syrian army that would, eventually, end the notables’ monopoly on power.

Between 1949 and 1963, Syria underwent an intense period of political upheaval; several military coups and a short-lived union with Egypt paved the way for the Ba’thists to capture the state in a military coup in 1963. Ba’thist pioneers included prominent urban, Sunni figures, but the military wing was largely from rural and minority populations who later consolidated power through the coups of 1966 and 1970. These new leaders promised to rectify decades of deprivation under the so-called notables. They expropriated lands and nationalized factories owned by urban merchants and notables, seemingly motivated by power consolidation rather than retribution. The new leaders expanded the state apparatus and filled it with rural bureaucrats, thereby encouraging migration from the countryside to urban peripheries. These new bureaucrats constructed housing in unregulated zones, towards which the Ba’thist regime turned a blind eye. The message was clear; the rural officers had come to rule, and to rule alone.

Alawites emerged as the greatest beneficiaries of this reordering, particularly after Hafez Al-Assad’s consolidation of power in the 1970 coup. Between 1976 and 1982, the Fighting Vanguard and the Muslim Brotherhood led a rebellion against Al-Assad’s government that sharpened the upheaval’s sectarian edge. The uprising drew on the genuine rage of dispossessed Sunni families, but channeled it through a religious idiom, framing the struggle as resistance to Alawite minority rule. Aware of his own vulnerability as a member of a minority sect, Al-Assad responded by packing the security apparatus with Alawites to insulate his rule, while cosmetically cultivating alliances with Sunni merchant elites and selected religious scholars to maintain a veneer of cross-sectarian legitimacy. Eventually, a group of closely connected Alawite families came to fully capture the state under Hafez Al-Assad’s leadership. Al-Assad ruled with an iron fist and ruthless policies that tolerated no opposition and allowed no participation. Over three decades, he shaped Syria’s new order. But what he designed was not a state with a shared identity, but a “kingdom of silence.”

Al-Assad and His Nouveaux Riches

In 2000, Bashar Al-Assad, Hafez Al-Assad’s son, succeeded his deceased father as president of Syria. The constitution was hastily resized, lowering the minimum age for the Presidential candidate from 40 to 34, to fit the heir. A Western-educated ophthalmologist, Bashar Al-Assad was initially regarded as a hope for political reforms and economic liberalization, but he disappointed on both fronts. His promises of political reform, such as greater freedom and democracy, proved short-lived. After a brief period of tolerance in which he released prisoners and allowed political activities such as the “Damascus Spring,” he reverted to his father’s authoritarian policies by suppressing political opponents. On the economic front, Al-Assad implemented selective liberalization to enrich a narrow circle of nouveaux riches; most notoriously, his cousin Rami Makhlouf gained significant influence over Syria’s economy. The last straw was Al-Assad’s cut of subsidies and abandonment of the rural population, the very base that had supported the Ba’thists and his father. Al-Assad significantly narrowed the circle of beneficiaries of his administration, ruling the country with the support of his economic partners; however, the ultimate word was always his, and his alone.

This (necessarily brief) account helps explain some reasons why the 2011 uprising was long overdue. Millions of Syrians took to the streets to protest decades of exclusion, suppression, and economic deterioration. The movement was a response to a convergence of compounded grievances, which Al-Assad’s violent response deepened and intensified. International reports detailing atrocities committed, primarily by Al-Assad but also by other factions, are ample.

Importantly, Syria’s divisions, while primarily expressed through a sectarian lens, have multifaceted roots. The notable class was not exclusively Arab Sunni; it included Kurdish, Turkmen, and Circassian families as well as tribal leaders who leveraged Ottoman patronage networks. Some Christians, thanks in part to Western consular protection, enjoyed preferential economic treatment under late Ottoman rule. The Ba’athists were not only Alawites but rural communities of diverse backgrounds who had endured generations of deprivation. Bashar Al-Assad’s neoliberal partners were not only Alawites but Sunnis from various social backgrounds. More importantly, the Sunnis, Alawites, and Christians are themselves neither monolithic nor exclusively Arab. The reality is far more complex with significant regional and international involvement, rather than the reductionist sectarian frame suggests. Nevertheless, the sectarian frame persists.

It is against this background that Al-Assad’s escape to Moscow following his December 2024 fall, despite justice unserved, represented a significant and perhaps once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to unpack these legacies.

 Deepening Division and Exclusion

After decades of compounded grievances and rotating political exclusion, Syrians have ultimately earned the rare opportunity to address their differences and chart a new path. However, the caretaker authority has thus far squandered much of this opportunity by persisting along a path of exclusion and deepening societal divisions.

On December 9, one day after Bashar Al-Assad’s escape, a video circulated on social media showing Ahmad Al-Sharaa (then Abu Mohammad Al-Joulani), the leader of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham, meeting with Syria’s outgoing prime minister to arrange a transfer of power. The meeting was something of a theatrical performance of constitutional continuity because the 2012 Syrian Constitution provides no mechanism for such a transfer. The deeper message was political. Al-Sharaa and his group positioned themselves, in coordination with foreign countries rather than domestic constituencies, as the leaders of the transition. What many initially perceived as a pragmatic necessity has proved over time to be a modus operandi. Al-Sharaa effectively captured the state and moved to impose the terms of the transition without adequate representation from Syria’s diverse factions.

Al-Sharaa was uniquely well-positioned to succeed. His journey makes him relatable: a young Sunni dropout who joined al-Qaeda to defend Muslims against the American invasion of Iraq, then returned to Syria to fight what his group used to frame as Alawite apostasy (including during the time when he used the name Abu Muhammad al-Joulani, while leading the al Qaeda affiliate Al-Nusra Front). The United States’ ten-million-dollar bounty on his head made open association with him risky but signaled credibility among those who had long perceived America as waging a crusade against Islam. In other words, Al-Sharaa needed no public relations campaign. In a society historically fractured along class, tribal, and sectarian lines, with no single identity to mobilize broad support, shared grievance was the only available currency. Sunni victimization, which the revolution had made salient, became a singularly mobilizing force, and Al-Sharaa became its symbol.

A lifelong expert in capitalizing on these themes of victimization, Al-Sharaa proceeded without accountability for his past actions while in Al-Qaeda, and without checks on his new role as Syria’s President. On Jan. 29, 2025, various military factions hastily convened at the Syrian Revolution Victory Conference, one day before the visit of the Qatari head of state. The conference was exclusive to select military factions, excluding some military leaders as well as prominent officials in the interim government, effectively attributing Al-Assad’s defeat to a single military campaign led by Al-Sharaa. Even the Syrian civil society organizations that had spent a decade documenting Al-Assad’s atrocities and representing Syria internationally were not invited. At the conference, the participating military factions dissolved a wide sweep of pre-existing Syrian institutions (including the legislative People’s Assembly), abolished the 2012 Syrian Constitution, and appointed Al-Sharaa as interim president. With no governmental institutions and no formal role for civil society, the only remaining power was al-Sharaa’s.

The theatrical process continued without any substantive improvement. Less than a month later, Al-Sharaa initiated the Syrian National Dialogue Conference and appointed a committee to select attendees. The conference appeared formalistic, and offered little to no transparency; there were no public selection criteria for either the organizing committee or the attendees, and the agenda was not consultative. Six hundred invitees were divided into eight working groups over two days, a format that made any meaningful contribution practically unworkable. On March 2, Al-Sharaa appointed seven members to draft a constitutional declaration, and eleven days later, he received and signed their draft. The brief period permitted no consultation, deliberation, or public discussion. The declaration was problematic for many reasons, but most consequentially, it entrenched hyper-presidentialism by empowering Al-Sharaa to directly appoint one-third of the People’s Assembly (the national legislative body) and to select the committee that would choose the remaining two-thirds. This step conferred upon his essentially unilateral executive power the veneer of constitutional legitimacy, while doing very little to address the constitutional fault-lines that helped paved the way for abuses under the Al-Assad government.

Throughout the process, Al-Sharaa has remained largely free from checks. His close circle of social media influencers and TikTokers silenced online critiques and spread sectarian narratives, deepening these sectarian divides in Syria’s digital space. Al-Sharaa has taken no meaningful steps to restrain or discipline his affiliated online network. Criticizing al-Sharaa has evolved into the equivalent of denying Sunni victimization, and participation in public life increasingly requires catering to that narrative.

In this environment, many critics of al-Sharaa have withdrawn, and arguably sectarianism has only intensified. Atrocities against Alawites were overshadowed by retribution-style arguments about provocation and proportionality. The term fulul—originally used to describe remaining armed loyalists of Al-Assad who continued targeting caretaker government forces—has come to colloquially describe, in many circles, the Alawite population at large. Similarly, the massacre against the Druze in Suwayda became mired in disputes over whether government or tribal forces bore more responsibility, and whether the attack was provoked by Druze forces. Al-Sharaa formed investigative committees, but their findings were criticized by activists as inadequate and lacking credibility.

This necessarily brief account does not deny the myriad economic, social, or political challenges faced by the caretaker authority. Nor is it intended to minimize the Al-Assad atrocities that predated it. But it does refuse to ignore the caretaker authority’s failures and to bury past and recent violations of its members under disingenuous realism, or to justify their occurrence by appealing to the inferior normative benchmark of Al-Assad. Al-Sharaa himself does not deny his preoccupation with control, which he often justifies on the grounds of administrative efficiency. His vision of an apolitical citizenry is perhaps best illustrated by an interview with Syria TV in which he selectively invoked the Qur’anic verse “who has fed them against hunger, and made them safe from fear,” which describes God’s benevolence towards the Quraysh tribe, to articulate the state’s obligation to its people: food and security. Participation does not appear in his articulated political lexicon.

Whether Al-Sharaa truly considers himself as the Sunnis’ representative remains an open question. What is clear is that Al-Sharaa, along with his two siblings and close associates, has effectively taken control over the state. He has selectively crafted accountability mechanisms for past atrocities and granted quasi-amnesty to Al-Assad’s nouveaux riches who paid their dues. These policies are likely driven by pragmatism rather than ideology. Yet, they are carefully framed for the public, often indirectly, as necessities, thereby preserving an ideological image that Al-Sharaa seems unable or unwilling to abandon.

In short, the caretaker authority has thus far continued the tradition of treating the state as a prize to be captured, and limiting access to or even directly targeting those deemed to be “threats.” This time, the justification is Sunni victimization under the previous government.

The Way Forward: Breaking the Cycle

The frame of sectarianism in Syria has proven remarkably durable, at least domestically, and the cycle of division it reinforces must be broken. A constitutional process that does not grapple with this complexity will only reinforce it.

Syria is not an anomaly, and divided societies need not be destined to live in a cycle of domination, subjugation, and polarization. Syrians deserve more than a formalistic constitution and theatrical transitional politics. Syrians deserve to heal and convert past division into a success story, and more importantly, replace the dogma of “we have lived together for millennia” with something new, such as “this is how we overcome our differences.” The way forward is known but uneasy: undertaking a genuine reconciliation process and opening a channel for public participation.

Specifically, political scientists and constitutional scholars have long emphasized the role of constitutionalism in accommodating division. Arend Lijphart’s consociational framework, Donald Horowitz’s integrative approach, and the power-sharing models developed by John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary all offer relevant tools for breaking the current cycle of division.  However, theories are only useful if there is political will to apply them. The following five recommendations are neither exhaustive nor a substitute for the deeper structural work outlined in this article. They only offer concrete and initial steps to begin reverse course. Nonetheless, they are worth of consideration.

1. Launch a nation-wide truth and reconciliation process led by independent experts with relevant academic and professional expertise, drawn from Syria’s diverse communities, with a mandate to document grievances, establish a shared historical record, and recommend pathways to acknowledgment and redress.

2. End preferential treatment of social media influencers who propagate sectarianism and spread Sunni domination rhetoric, and establish official channels through which the caretaker authority addresses the public on a regular basis (and is held to account in the public eye for its statements).

3. Form a new constitutional committee of independent experts tasked with developing multiple constitutional designs that prioritize incrementalism and accommodation of division as core design principles.

4. Create immediate checks on executive power through one of two mechanisms: either an executive representative council endowed with veto authority over specific presidential and ministerial decrees over specific thematic domains, or a permanent panel of judges to serve as an active constitutional court with the authority to review presidential and ministerial decrees until a new constitution is enacted.

5. Integrate civil society organizations into the transitional period by granting them formal access to the state institutions and enabling them to serve as grassroots liaisons between the caretaker authority and the Syrian population.

These steps are not sufficient, but they represent what is still possible. Al-Sharaa has the authority to take them. The question is whether he has the will. He implores Syrians to trust him, but does he trust them?

The post An Urgent Call to Break the Cycle of Division and Exclusion in Syria appeared first on Just Security.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR – LEBANON 

On Thursday, President Donald Trump announced a 10-day ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. It went into effect at midnight in Lebanon and prompted thousands of displaced Lebanese families to return to their homes in southern Lebanon. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun welcomed the announcement from Trump, but the Iranian-back militia Hezbollah, over which the Lebanese government has little control, only acknowledged the truce but “did not directly address whether it would accept” it. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision to accept the ceasefire is facing backlash in Israel, where critics say Netanyahu was unable to resist Trump’s pressure. Meanwhile, Trump said that he was inviting Netanyahu and Aoun to the White House for a summit. The New York Times reports. 

IRAN WAR 

The U.S. military is widening its naval blockade of Iran, announcing on Thursday that it could stop any ship tied to Iran anywhere in the world. Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters at the Pentagon that U.S. forces in other regions “will actively pursue any Iranian-flagged vessel or any vessel attempting to provide material support to Iran.” Konstantin Toropin, Ben Finley, and David Klepper report for AP. 

French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer are hosting a summit today to devise an international plan to secure the Strait of Hormuz after the war ends. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni are also attending. Although no U.S. officials are participating, Trump is expected to be briefed afterward. Many officials view the summit skeptically and have set low expectations for a concrete plan to emerge from it. The Financial Times reports. 

Western military intelligence assessments indicate that Iran has been able to mitigate the impact of U.S. and Israeli strikes thanks to its pre-war planning. Steps the country took before the war began helped it in “preventing the destruction of its missile and drone capabilities as well as maximizing the impact of its military response.” Alex Wickham, Ellen Milligan, and Alberto Nardelli report for Bloomberg. 

Days after the United States and Israel started bombing Iran, U.S. intelligence detected signs that China weighed whether to provide Iran with advanced radar systems, sources told CBS News. Whether China decided to move forward with the transfer is unknown, James LaPorta, Eleanor Watson, Olivia Gazis, Sara Cook, and Margaret Brennan report. The Financial Times previously reported that Iran is using a spy satellite it secretly bought from China in 2024 for targeting in the war. 

In a narrow vote of 214-213, the Republican-led House of Representatives rejected a measure that would block Trump from ordering further strikes on Iran. On Wednesday, a procedural vote on a war powers resolution in the Republican-led Senate also failed, with Republicans again voting against the measure. Mariana Alfaro and Noah Robertson report for The Washington Post. 

The Iran war will likely cause delays in U.S. weapons sales to Europe, sources told Reuters. U.S. officials have started to inform their European counterparts about the potential delays, which will affect previously purchased weapons, including various kinds of ammunition. Gram Slattery and Humeyra Pamuk report for Reuters. 

Journalist Ahmed Shihab-Eldin, a Kuwaiti-American dual national, is being detained in Kuwait after he commented on videos and images related to the war in Iran, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. He was arrested on March 3 when he was in the country to visit family and has not posted online or been seen in public since. “It is understood that authorities have charged him with spreading false information, harming national security and misusing his mobile phone — vague and overly broad accusations that are routinely used to silence independent journalists,” the committee said in a statement. Amelia Nierenberg reports for the New York Times. 

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

The last remaining American troops in Syria left their base on Thursday, ending a 10-year presence in the country. The Syrian government said in a statement that “it welcomed “the completed handover of military sites where United States forces were previously present in Syria to the Syrian government.” The U.S. troops are reported to have exited via Jordan to avoid possible attacks in Iraq. Ragip Soylu reports for the Middle East Eye. 

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

Early Friday morning, the House of Representatives approved a two-week extension of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which is set to expire on Monday. The 10-day extension creates more time for negotiations. Despite Trump’s pressure to reauthorize the surveillance law without any changes, some Republicans (and Democrats) are demanding they be allowed to vote on adding new privacy limits to it. The Senate now needs to vote on the 10-day extension. Charlie Savage reports for the New York Times. 

The Justice Department told Congress on Thursday that it was appealing a ruling from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that “barred national security agencies from using certain tools to process Americans’ data” gathered under Section 702, Charlie Savage reports for the New York Times. In March, the court reauthorized the program for another year, creating a temporary safety net if Congress lets the law lapse, but the court added certain restrictions that the Trump administration opposes. 

Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard raised concerns about FISA’s Section 702 with Trump in February. She told the president that reauthorizing the law should include reforms for protecting American privacy. Trump did not heed her advice and has since urged Republicans to renew the law without any changes. John Sakellariadis reports for POLITICO. 

Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei is scheduled to meet White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles today in an effort to resolve the company’s standoff with the Pentagon. Anthropic is suing the Pentagon after Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth blacklisted the AI company when Amodei refused to back down on two safety restrictions. Mythos, Anthropic’s latest version of Claude, is reportedly more advanced and potentially dangerous, posing serious threats to cyberdefenses. Jim VandeHei and Mike Allen report for Axios. 

The FBI is ramping up its investigation into former CIA Director John Brennan and his involvement in a U.S. intelligence assessment that found ​Russia interfered in the 2016 election to help Trump win. The investigation, which is being run by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Miami, plans to interview “roughly a half-dozen witnesses.” Andrew Goudsward and Jana Winter for Reuters. 

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS 

Local prosecutors in Minneapolis charged an ICE agent with assault on Thursday. According to the criminal complaint, the federal agent pointed a gun at two people in a car as he attempted to pass them in an unmarked vehicle on the shoulder of a highway. The case is “a rare instance of state prosecutors charging a federal agent for on-duty actions,” Sheila M. Eldred and Ernesto Londoño report for the New York Times. 

Senate Republicans said they plan to release a budget resolution next week for immigration enforcement funding, a move aimed at ending the partial shutdown of the Department of Homeland Security. Aidan Quigley and Aris Folley report for Roll Call. 

Todd Lyons, the acting head of ICE, is planning to leave the federal government later this spring, with May 31 being his last official day in government. It is not clear who will replace Lyons, who is expected to join the private sector. Camilo Montoya-Galvez reports for CBS News. 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

At a hearing of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, Republican lawmakers voiced their support for Army Secretary Dan Driscoll, who has clashed with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Driscoll clearly disagreed with Hegseth’s decision to fire Army Chief of State Gen. Randy George in early April. At the hearing on Thursday, Driscoll praised George and said that he was away with his family when he got the news that Hegseth was removing the general. When they returned, he and his family drove straight to George’s house and “we all gave him a hug,” he said. Some House Republicans said they wanted an explanation for George’s firing. Dan Lamothe reports for The Washington Post. 

On Thursday, at a briefing at the Pentagon, Hegseth slammed the U.S. media, calling it “unpatriotic,” and describing its coverage of the Iran war “garbage.” He compared the press to the biblical Pharisees who came into conflict with Jesus. AP reports. 

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Kadugli had been under siege by the RSF for two years, and when supplies ran so low she could not feed the children, they set off on foot and begged a free ride on a tractor to cross into South Sudan, where they made their way to a U.N.-managed refugee transit center. Not only did they lack food and supplies, Aida said, there was a constant threat of drones — in February, a drone hit her neighbor’s house and killed nine people instantly and RSF drone strikes in Dilling, a nearby city that was also under RSF siege, increased this year.

Aida told me her story in a brisk, matter-of-fact voice, but when I asked for her children’s names, her tone changed. She fell silent and tears began to roll down her cheeks. She used a corner of her faded taub [traditional dress] to wipe them away. After a while, she recounted how she lost track of three of her children — two boys and a girl. She worried most about the youngest, an 8-year-old boy, and hoped he was with one of the other two, a 17-year-old girl and a 21-year-old young man, or with her husband, but she wasn’t sure if her husband was alive or dead either.

Aida’s anguish is not unique. This week marks the grim third anniversary of the start of Sudan’s brutal war, when the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) started fighting in the capital Khartoum on April 15, 2023. In many respects, little has changed since last year’s morbid anniversary. The country is roughly divided, with SAF controlling the northern and eastern parts along the Red Sea, and the RSF controlling the western and southern zones from Chad to South Sudan.

Litany of Violations

Since war started, the belligerents and their allied militias have ravaged the country. They have destroyed infrastructure, schools, and hospitals, and severed telecommunications. They have subjected communities to starvation — famine has been declared in several locations — and subjected civilians to a litany of abuses that the U.N. and rights groups have documented extensively: from extrajudicial killings and torture to rape and displacement. Both sides are using drones and weapons purchased on the open market — including from the U.K. and the United Arab Emirates — to target civilians in blatant disregard of the laws of war.

Neither side seems interested in a ceasefire or a political solution. They are fighting each other in the southern regions of Kordofan and Blue Nile, imposing humanitarian blockades in key towns, and engineering drone strikes that kill dozens at a time at weddings and hospitals. Given these conditions, it’s no wonder thousands flee each week across borders, arriving in South Sudan and elsewhere. According to the U.N.’s refugee agency, more than 4 million are refugees in neighboring states.

As war enters its fourth year, it is tempting to take stock of the destruction — to describe it with ever higher numbers in hopes of spurring the world to action. But there is little reliable data to help. Within months of the war starting, Sudan was already the world’s largest displacement crisis. Since 2024, U.N. officials have been calling it the largest humanitarian crisis. Others have described it as the world’s most severe crisis for women and girls.

An Incalculable Toll

But beyond these superlatives, the world’s understanding of the effects of this conflict is impressionistic. For example, we don’t have an accurate death toll. By one estimate,  400,000 may have been killed. Previously, a health study found 60,000 were killed in Khartoum state in the first 14 months alone, and U.N. sanctions monitors estimated as many as 15,000 were killed in the RSF’s attack on El Geneina in West Darfur in 2023, in assaults that “may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.” Between 6,000 and 60,000 were killed in the RSF’s violent takeover of El Fasher in October 2025,with more than 150,000 missing.

No one seems to know how many people are languishing in detention sites run by either of the warring sides or their allies, while authorities deny access to prison monitors. In January 2026, Sudan’s army commander Abdel Fatah al-Burhan released 400 women accused of being RSF collaborators from a prison in Omdurman, and in April Human Rights Watch called on SAF to release scores of others arbitrarily detained. The RSF released more than 200 from a prison in South Darfur in March, but reportedly continues to tolerate, abet, or carry out kidnappings for ransom.

And we don’t know how many men, women and children like Aida’s 8-year-old have gone missing. In careful interviews to document this phenomenon for The Reckoning Project, I heard many stories similar to Aida’s, often told tearfully by women and men whose loved ones went missing, might (or might not) be dead, and whose fates were unknown. The accounts I have heard since the start of the war suggest it is a widespread problem. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) says it has recorded 11,000 people missing. It tries to help families trace and call their lost family members, but many Sudanese have lost their phones and don’t have access to networks.

Haja, a woman from South Darfur, told me a brother was killed in an explosion and she doesn’t know if her two teen-age sons, who were with him, are alive or dead. Kuku, an elderly man who fled his village in Kordofan after a drone strike, said his family scattered and he doesn’t know where they are or if they will ever reunite. “I leave it to God,” he said.

Anwar, a doctor from West Darfur, told me RSF soldiers came looking for him when he wasn’t home, beat up his wife and abducted twin baby boys; he believes they were killed but never saw their bodies.

Too Little International Action

What is certain is that wherever the war goes, suffering follows. Yet the international community has done far too little diplomatically or through sanctions and other pressures to curb the violence. The El Geneina massacres in Darfur in 2023 formed the basis for the U.S. Secretary of State’s determination in January 2025 that the RSF and associated militias had committed genocide, and the U.N. reported in February 2026 that RSF’s attacks on civilians in El Fasher, also in Darfur, bore the “hallmarks” of genocide.

Yet the world’s most powerful states have, quite simply, failed to uphold their agreed obligations to prevent and punish genocide under the widely ratified Genocide Convention. They have failed to stop malign actors like the UAE from supporting the RSF, or to sanction more rigorously the Sudanese who bankroll the violence.

In addition to working more assiduously to create incentives for the warring parties to end their fighting and their atrocities, governments must emphasize justice and accountability as integral to any peace deal, support the International Criminal Court’s investigations into crimes in Darfur and expand its jurisdiction to cover all of Sudan. They should not only meet the dire humanitarian needs, but also work document crimes, collect evidence, and preserve testimonies. When all else fails, the least the world can do is help Sudanese prepare for a time when cooler heads prevail.

The post Fleeing Sudan’s War: Refugees Detail Three Years of Trauma appeared first on Just Security.

In its decision (para. 123), the Committee requested two types of action from the U.N. General Assembly: first, to provide technical assistance to Mexico (party to the CED since 2008) to support the State authorities in searching for the disappeared persons and investigating the alleged enforced disappearances, in particular those involving State agents linked to organized crime groups; and second, to provide support for establishing a mechanism that would allow the access to truth for the relatives of the disappeared persons.

In an April 2 press release, the Mexican authorities indicated that they “reject” the Committee’s report “as biased and dismissive of the observations, analysis, and updates submitted by the Mexican Government. Those submissions show that the Committee’s arguments are inconsistent with both its own definition of enforced disappearance and Mexico’s institutional advances since 2019, and particularly since 2025.” The press release added that Article 34 was misused, the provision being “designed for cases in which enforced disappearances are committed in a widespread and systematic manner by State agents, and authorities refuse to act or cooperate. That does not reflect the reality of today’s Mexico, which has undertaken a structural transformation in this area.”

The steps followed by the Committee to adopt the Article 34 decision (material background here), and the State’s detailed replies to the request for information illustrate the main substantive disagreement between Mexico and the Committee concerns the non-state actors’ involvement in the disappearances and their legal qualification by the CED Committee as “crimes against humanity” under Article 5 of the CED. These are largely technical distinctions, however, and the broader point of the Committee’s report is that the dire situation calls for urgent action coordinated between the U.N. and Mexican authorities.

Background Leading to the Article 34 Decision 

Before digging into the technicalities of the CED, three points are necessary to understand the context in which the Committee’s decision arose.

First, Mexico does not deny the existence or magnitude of the disappearances, including the enforced disappearances on its territory in the past. On the contrary, in their replies (para. 2), the government acknowledges that “disappearances in Mexico were perpetrated with the direct participation of State agents or tolerated by complicit public officials who denied justice and truth to victims and their families, giving rise to impunity. These practices left a deep wound in Mexican society and sowed mistrust of institutions.”

Second, the CED Committee has for years identified grave and massive human rights violations under different legal bases under the Convention, including Mexico’s periodic reviews (Article 29), urgent actions (Article 30), its 2022 country visit (Article 33), and its views on individual cases (Article 31: for illustration, here). Taken together, this record reflects several patterns “in the vast majority of Mexican states” (para. 13 of the country visit findings), such as the direct or indirect involvement of “public officials at the federal, state and municipal levels,” “various forms of collusions and varying degrees of participation” of public officials in disappearances committed by organized crime, a major “forensic crisis” (para. 28 of the country visit findings), structural shortcomings in searching for the disappeared persons, the risk faced with by victims’ families, and “almost absolute impunity” (paras. 25-27 of the country visit findings).

In addition, other human rights bodies such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) have condemned Mexico’s actions and omissions in failing to protect against or investigate disappearances, including in cases considered through a gender perspective (the infamous ‘Cotton Field’  and Garcia Andrade et al. cases) or an indigenous lens (Gonzalez Mendez et al.). The IACHR has also found that Mexico fostered a climate of impunity in favor of perpetrators (Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico), especially where there is a connection with local police officers or prominent officials. In the same vein, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has repeatedly affirmed Mexico’s obligations to fight against impunity and to ensure the right of the relatives to have access to truth under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Therefore, the situation of impunity and lack of access to justice for victims of disappearances is well-documented, well-known, and protracted.

Finally, as the CED Committee acknowledged in its Article 34 decision (para. 67), all the disappearances do not necessarily qualify as enforced disappearances. However, under Article 12(2) of the CED, States’ obligation to investigate apply “where there are reasonable grounds for believing” that a person has been forcibly disappeared.

Civil society organizations previously requested activation of Article 34, but each time, the CED Committee denied the request (CED/C/MEX/A.34/RI/1). However, in its April 2025 28th session, the CED Committee decided to request information from Mexico under Article 34 (CED/C/MEX/A.34/RI/1), based on reports provided by civil society organizations (here and here). After the information provided was “carefully examined” (CED/C/MEX/A.34/RI/1, para. 11), and combined with the absence of significant improvement of the situation despite its multiple interactions with Mexico since 2012, the Committee issued a preliminary determination that the grounds were met to request further information from Mexico under Article 34, which states:

If the Committee receives information which appears to it to contain well-founded indications that enforced disappearance is being practised on a widespread or systematic basis in the territory under the jurisdiction of a State Party, it may, after seeking from the State Party concerned all relevant information on the situation, urgently bring the matter to the attention of the General Assembly of the United Nations, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Since this was the first use of Article 34 in its history, the CED Committee clarified the conditions to be met and in particular the “well-founded indications” criterion. Under Article 34, the Committee explained, it does not act “as a commission of inquiry,” and “[t]herefore, it is not required to apply the standard of proof to determine that events constitute the ‘reasonable grounds’ or ‘substantial reasons to believe’ used by commissions of inquiry or by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in deciding whether to open an investigation” (CED/C/MEX/A.34/RI/1, para. 12). It instead indicated that the “well-founded indications” rule is met when “the information before [the Committee] gives rise to sufficient concern” to call for an urgent action. In the 2026 decision, the CED Committee added that the information was brought in good faith, detailed, and precise, and therefore, sufficient to meet the “prima facie” standard for urgent referral to the UNGA (paras. 53-54).

Mexico’s Replies to the Article 34 Request for Information 

In response to the Committee’s request for information, Mexico submitted an 87-page set of replies, received by the Committee in September 2025 (CED/C/MEX/A.34/RRI/R.1). The most significant point of disagreement between Mexico and the Committee reflected in these replies is whether the “widespread or systematic practice” of enforced disappearances, classified as a crime against humanity under Article 5 of the CED, also covers the disappearances committed by non-state actors without the support, authorization, or acquiescence of the State (CED/C/MEX/A.34/RRI/R.1, paras. 28 et seq.).

Indeed, in its decision to invoke Article 34 in 2025 and in its March 2026 decision to refer the situation to the UNGA, the Committee not only addressed State-led enforced disappearances practice (for instance, during Argentina’s “dirty war”) but also the disappearances committed by non-state actors without State support, authorization, or acquiescence, following its 2023 Statement on non-state actors, which provided an evolutionary interpretation of Article 5 of the CED (CED/C/10, paras. 9 et seq.). Indeed, based on an in-depth analysis of international legal practice, the CED Committee concluded in the 2023 Statement that “disappearance perpetrated by a non-State actor acting without the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State constitutes ‘enforced disappearance’ if committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, in compliance with the definition of crimes against humanity in international criminal law.” In its 2025 report, the Committee cited multiple evidentiary submissions showing “widespread” and/or “systematic” attack, and the 2026 decision devoted considerable analysis to establishing that the standard was met (CED/C/MEX/A.34/D/1, paras. 72-114).

Mexico, in its replies, recalled its repeated objection to the 2023 Statement (CED/C/10) on the grounds that the crime against humanity qualification set out in Article 5 of the CED only applies to enforced disappearances committed by State agents, or with the State’s support, authorization, or acquiescence (Article 2 of the CED) but not to disappearances committed by non-state actors, such as drug cartels. More importantly – and concerningly – Mexico challenged the CED Committee’s “interpretative power” (CED/C/MEX/A.34/RRI/R.1, paras. 71-72). Using the International Law Commission’s draft Conclusions on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties (A/73/10), it endorsed the ILC’s position and affirmed that a “pronouncement of an expert treaty body cannot as such constitute a subsequent agreement or subsequent practice” (CED/C/MEX/A.34/RRI/R.1, para. 73).

This pushback on the Committee’s power to interpret its own treaty, based on the “living instrument” doctrine, is symptomatic of the increasing trend of States, which perceive this method of interpretation as disrespectful of the States’ consent and the drafters’ intention. These States plead for a more “originalist” interpretation of international instruments by their monitoring bodies, which goes beyond the human rights area. The controversy is not new but as analysed by Eirik Bjorge and other scholars writing on the topic, the evolutionary interpretation of an instrument is in practice based on an objective understanding of the Parties’ intention. This applies to the CED Committee’s 2023 Statement. Substantively, evolving international law, and in particular, international criminal law (ICL) and the interpretation given to Article 7 of the International Criminal Court Statute, has shown that non-state actors can commit an enforced disappearance under ICL, fully relevant for the application of Article 5 of the CED. In this respect, the Mexican replies are legally inconsistent: on the one side, they consider that the “extensive” interpretation of crimes against humanity by the CED Committee is overly broad and groundless, and on the other side, the State asks the CED Committee to interpretate the notion “in accordance with the case law of the International Criminal Court and other international or hybrid tribunals, which describe in detail the conditions that must be met to establish the existence of crimes against humanity” (CED/C/MEX/A.34/RRI/R.1, para. 85).

Following Mexico’s replies, the Committee issued its March 2026 decision, taking into account Mexico’s objections, but also reiterating its interpretation of the crimes against humanity applicable to non-state actors. The CED Committee considered that the information brought by the State party was insufficient to rebut the “well-founded indications” that the conditions for making the referral to UNGA were met. Mexico’s allegation of “bias” and legal inconsistencies must therefore be read and understood against this backdrop. The CED Committee’s decision carefully follows the definition of crimes against humanity developed by international criminal courts and tribunals. The Article 34 decision does not affirm the existence of a current State-led practice of enforced disappearances supported by the federal government, but a protracted and structural failure of the State authorities to search for the disappeared persons – a search most of the time left to the relatives – or to conduct proper investigations and bring the perpetrators of such crimes against humanity to justice (CED/C/MEX/A.34/RI/1, para. 19).

The Urgent Call to the UNGA as an Opportunity for Mexico to Address a Systemic Impunity Situation 

The grave situation of disappearances, including enforced disappearances, described by the CED Committee in its April 2025 and March 2026 decisions is not new. The CED Committee has long drawn attention to Mexico, as have other human rights bodies ruling on the question of enforced disappearances under different legal instruments. However, the use of mechanisms tried to date have failed to improve the situation. And in some ways, it is worsening; for example, the involvement of organized crime groups, sometimes with connection with local authorities, is aggravating the “forensics crisis and the climate of impunity” (CED/C/MEX/A.34/RI/1, para. 16). Moreover, credible information reveals the growing challenges and risks faced by searchers – mainly women – which range from criminalization of their search to reprisals, harassment, and threats or use of physical, including sexual, violence. In this regard, the Committee’s urgent call for action can be read as a last attempt to support Mexico in addressing the secondary victimization of relatives of disappeared individuals, including in ways that take into account the unique vulnerabilities of women and girls (for the ongoing work of CED Committee on draft General Comment No. 2 on women, girls and enforced disappearances, see here).

How will the UNGA respond? Since this is the first time the CED Committee refers a situation to the UNGA, it is difficult to predict the outcome of the referral. There is risk that the counter-effect of the Article 34 referral could be the politicization of the matter brought to the attention of the UNGA, and the misuse of the U.S. “fight against drug gangs and cartels” narrative to justify “law enforcement operations” against Mexico.

But if the referral is taken seriously by the UNGA and Mexico, it offers a unique opportunity to achieve the CED object and purpose, to ensure the full realization of the rights of the victims, and in particular, the possibility to offer a worthy burial to the mortal remains of their beloved. As former Judge Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade stated in an Inter-American Court ruling on the remains of the disappeared, “the impossibility of recovering them, in various cases before the Court concerning distinct States, appear to me to configure a malaise of our times, disclosing the appalling spiritual poverty of the dehumanized world in which we live” (individual opinion in Bamaca Velazquez).

The CED Committee call for urgent action must be read as an urgent and long-awaited call for justice, truth, and humanity, and the government of Mexico would do well to embrace the opportunity for international assistance to advance a goal – the reduction of enforced disappearances and justice for those who have already suffered – that it too shares.

The post Widespread and Systematic Disappearances in Mexico: An Urgent Call for UN Action Under the Convention on Enforced Disappearances appeared first on Just Security.

On April 2nd, over 100 U.S.-based international law experts published a Letter expressing “profound concern about serious violations of international law” in the present armed conflict in the Middle East. Section 2 of the Letter asserts that U.S. forces likely violated the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and potentially committed war crimes.

At the outset, we note our agreement with aspects of the Letter, specifically that it is essential U.S. armed forces remain committed to the respect for and good-faith implementation of international legal obligations – most notably those established by the LOAC (international humanitarian law) – during the conduct of military operations. Any suggestion to the contrary is corrosive to the efficacy, discipline, and morality of our armed forces; it also compromises the legitimacy and strategic interests of U.S. military operations.

However, we want to address Section 2’s “[c]oncerns about violations of international humanitarian law” by U.S. armed forces. This should be understandable as each of us have served as the Army’s Senior Law of War Advisor (though we each write here in our individual/personal capacity) and we have spent our careers primarily focused on the study and practice of the LOAC’s provisions during all aspects of U.S. military operations.

In the first half of Section 2, the Letter – without reference to the operational context and targeting rationale – outlines these concerns by highlighting purported strikes against civilians and civilian objects, oil and gas infrastructure, water desalination plants, and energy infrastructure. In the second half of Section 2, the Letter – again absent reference to operational context and targeting rationale – concludes that a U.S. strike which hit the Shajareh Tayyebeh Primary School likely amounted to a LOAC violation and may potentially constitute a war crime.

We find the methodology underlying the Letter’s concerns troubling. At its core, Section 2 reads like a not-so-subtle accusation against unknown, yet very real, U.S. commanders and staff engaged in the immense challenge of selecting and engaging targets in a complex operational environment. We do not believe the Letter’s “concerns” characterization negates this inference, nor does it justify the Letter’s over-reliance on assumptions and sources of limited relevance. We believe that to suggest the serious allegation that U.S. commanders and armed forces have likely violated the LOAC and potentially committed war crimes requires a credible factual foundation derived from rigorous investigation. Unfortunately, we don’t believe the Letter reflects such a foundation.

General to Specific LOAC Violation Concerns

The Letter focuses on purported U.S. attacks on civilians and civilian objects, oil and gas infrastructure, water desalination plants, and energy infrastructure as the basis for its asserted concerns. However, examination of the hyperlinks provided in support of these concerns reveals the flawed foundation upon which they are premised.

For example, the Letter quotes from Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS) damage claims while omitting exponentially different damage statistics from another source, a joint civil society report (JCS report). (The Letter shows awareness of the JCS report by citing it, but for civilian casualty claims.) The ICRS statement claims that over a 17/18 day period (28 Feb – 17 Mar), “67,414 civilian sites have been struck, of which 498 are schools and 236 health facilities.” In contrast, the JCS report asserts that over a longer 23/24 day period (28 Feb – 23 Mar), 129 residential buildings, 44 schools and 60 health facilities were verifiably damaged (neither the statement nor the report discusses which of the attacks were by the United States or Israel). Unlike the IRCS statement, the JCS report explains its methodology and verification process.

News stories provide the basis for the Letter’s concerns regarding attacks on oil production facilities. These stories – including an ABC News story and a New York Times article – also do not indicate whether the United States or Israel conducted the purported attacks. Nor do they provide any operational context – information that is essential to assess the legality of any such attack.

The Letter also relies on a New York Times article to support the assertion of concerns regarding attacks on desalination plants. The article states a desalination plant in Iran was attacked and references the Iranian foreign minister’s claim that U.S. forces were responsible. The article also references a U.S. Central Command spokesperson’s claim that the United States was not responsible for the strike. With no other evidence of a U.S. attack, it seems odd that the Letter would rely on an unverified, Iranian government claim as the basis for concern.

As for strikes on energy infrastructure – which in certain operational contexts may meet the test for lawful attack – the Letter relies on condemnation by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which highlights the adverse impact any such attack may have on the civilian population. But adverse impact on the civilian population alone does not render such an attack unlawful.

We agree that the effects on civilians and civilian objects from an attack during the conduct of hostilities are relevant and appropriate when assessing LOAC compliance. But they are rarely conclusive and must be assessed in the operational context and associated targeting rationale. Relying on sources focused only on attack effects in Section 2 with little to no consideration of the context and rationale distorts the assessment and perception of targeting process and legality.

The Shajareh Tayyebeh Primary School: A Possible War Crime?

The Letter discusses the tragic loss of life that resulted when a U.S. cruise missile apparently struck the Shajareh Tayyebeh Primary School is a “particular concern.” Specifically, the Letter notes:

Based on easily accessible online information and commercially available satellite imagery, it appears the building had been used as a school for a decade. President Trump denied U.S. responsibility, falsely stating that “It was done by Iran.” However, a preliminary investigation by the Department of Defense reportedly determined that the U.S. conducted the strike, and the targeting had been based on outdated intelligence.

The Letter concludes: “[t]he strike likely violates international humanitarian law, and if evidence is found that those responsible were reckless, it could also be a war crime.”

There is no indication the United States intended to attack a girl’s school, nor does the Letter make such an assertion. Instead, the Letter indicates a mistake in target identification apparently resulting from reliance on outdated intelligence likely violated the LOAC.

Mistakes, even tragic mistakes, happen in war. Whether they violate the LOAC depends on whether they were reasonable under the circumstances. Was reliance on the intelligence that informed this attack unreasonable? Perhaps. But that conclusion requires more extensive inquiry and analysis.

The preliminary investigation the Letter relied on reportedly indicates there was a mistake, and that this mistake was based on an intelligence assessment identifying the building as a military objective. What is absent from the Letter’s assertion is any explanation of why those who identified the target or the commander who ordered this attack should have had some reason to distrust or question that intelligence (assuming it erroneously indicated the building was a military objective). Without more information as to if and why the intelligence was erroneous – in other words whether there was some reason for the military planners or attacking commander to question the assessment – it is premature to assert that decision was unreasonable and amounted to a “likely” LOAC violation.

The LOAC does demand a commander gather the best available information before making an attack decision, an obligation that is important to emphasize. But that obligation is informed by the operational situation. As the International Committee of the Red Cross commentary to Additional Protocol I notes, “those who plan or decide upon [a long range] attack will base their decision on information given them, and they cannot be expected to have personal knowledge of the objective to be attacked and of its exact nature.” Any expectation that staff (who plan) or commanders (who decide) can somehow guarantee the accuracy of every intelligence assessment in the context of a large-scale combat operation is obviously unrealistic. What the law demands of military planners and commanders is reasonable judgment, which includes best practices to ensure the accuracy of intelligence. But emphasizing the importance of developing and implementing such best practices is a far cry from alleging a “likely” LOAC violation.

The suggestion the attack may have also constituted a war crime is even more perplexing. The Letter bases this claim on determining whether “those responsible,” presumably including the unknown commander who authorized the attack, were reckless. Recklessness requires proof the commander or some other individual responsible for ordering or planning the attack was consciously aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk yet ignored that risk and launched the attack. The Letter does not mention any information indicating the commander or anyone else involved in this attack decision was alerted to or aware of the possibility the intelligence was invalid and that the building was a school. The fact that the result of the attack did not align with what was intended certainly could not, standing alone, indicate a reckless attack decision. We assume everyone agrees on that legal point.

Who exactly would be the alleged war criminal? The commander who ordered the attack? The staff officer who proposed the target? The intelligence analyst who assessed the building as a target? And a war crime according to the laws of which jurisdiction? Certainly not the International Criminal Court, as neither the United States nor Iran are parties to the Rome Statute and recklessness is arguably not sufficient to establish the crime of launching an attack on civilians or civilian objects or launching an indiscriminate attack under the statute. And, as the experts know, war crimes are not enumerated in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and a reckless attack decision does not seem to fall within the scope of the federal War Crimes Act.

If subsequent investigation indicates the commander or anyone else involved in this attack decision ignored alerts to doubts about the intelligence, or a risk that the nominated target might not be a military objective, a case for recklessness might be viable. But, at this point, it is premature and speculative to make any such assessment now.

Conclusion

As noted above, we share the Letter’s overall goal: to emphasize the critical importance of LOAC compliance by U.S. armed forces in every aspect of this (and all other) conflicts. And we are as ardent in support of this goal as the Letter’s authors and signatories. However, we also believe critiques of the legality of U.S. military operations are most useful and influential when they are premised on solid factual foundations, including operational context and associated targeting rationale.

Based on our collective experience working with U.S. operational commanders, we believe that the vast majority endeavor in good faith to comply with LOAC obligations. Are there occasionally attack mistakes or errors? Of course. It is essential to credibly investigate such incidents, not only to determine whether they resulted from unreasonable decisions, but also to learn how to better avoid them in the future. If that was all the Letter called for, we would be strongly aligned. However, we believe any statement by international law experts that U.S. commanders likely violated the LOAC and may have committed war crimes should be based on a more compelling factual and analytical foundation.

The post In Response to the Letter by International Law Experts appeared first on Just Security.

In this episode, Zsuzsanna Vegh joins Viola Gienger to explore how the opposition achieved its win, what priorities Magyar may set for his government, and how Hungary’s domestic and foreign policies could evolve.

Show Note:

• Zsuzsanna Vegh’s Just Security article before the election, “Hungary’s Election Could End Orbán’s Rule — But Will It End His Power?” April 7, 2026.
• Just Security’s archive of articles related to Hungary.
• Just Security’s archives on Europe, democracy, and authoritarianism.

The post The Just Security Podcast: Hungary After Orban appeared first on Just Security.

On April 28, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear Cisco Systems v. Doe I et al. (Cisco), which asks whether a private U.S. company can ever be sued under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)—and its CEO sued under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)(1992)—for aiding and abetting torture and other gross human rights violations. Practitioners of the spiritual movement known as “Falun Gong” and their families have alleged that the U.S. company Cisco Systems Inc (Cisco) aided and abetted the Chinese Communist Party in subjecting them to torture, detention, extrajudicial execution, and other gross human rights violations. The legal issue before the Court is whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs-respondents, give rise to a cognizable legal action against defendants (who are the petitioners), sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and allow discovery. The Ninth Circuit answered that question yes, and at the Trump Administration’s urging, the Court granted review.

The case’s long history has now been extensively briefed by the parties, Trump’s Solicitor General (SG), and many amici supporting each side. But as too often happens, this flood of briefing obscures as much as it illuminates. This article explains first, why existing precedent makes Cisco a clear case for affirmance (or dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted); second, why the Court has no principled reason to overrule settled precedent and thereby immunize U.S. corporate defendants who actively aid and abet mass governmental surveillance that leads to gross human rights abuses; and third, what Cisco portends: the future path of corporate aiding and abetting of mass atrocities through digital means.

The Straightforward Case for Affirmance or Dismissal

On its face, Cisco calls for straightforward application of the Supreme Court’s decision twenty-two years ago in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. Sosa interpreted the ATS, first enacted in 1789, which states that federal courts shall have original jurisdiction over a tort “committed in violation of the law of nations or of a treaty of the United States.” Writing for a six-justice majority, Justice Souter held that aliens may sue in the United States under the ATS for claims “based on the present-day law of nations,” so long as those claims “rest on a norm of international character” as “specific, universal, and obligatory” as the traditional causes of action with which the First Congress was familiar. As the amicus brief for professors of legal history filed in the Cisco case (Historians’ Brief) explains, the First Congress was certainly familiar with aiding and abetting, both because it understood the “law of nations” to encompass liability of accessories to crimes like piracy, and because the common law at that time included the “tort” of aiding and abetting.

As demonstrated by the Ninth Circuit, Respondents’ brief, and an amicus brief by international law scholars (including myself), Sosa’s modern-day test is clearly met when an ATS defendant is sued for aiding and abetting such gross violations of international law as torture, extrajudicial killing, and religious persecution. As the amicus brief for U.S. ambassadors and prosecutors reviews, the prohibition on aiding and abetting human rights abuses has been a generally accepted norm of international law since Nuremberg. More generally, aiding-and-abetting (or “accessorial”) liability for violations of international law has been extensively litigated before international tribunals and now ranks among the most firmly established norms of international law. Because aiding and abetting a jus cogens violation violates a generally accepted and specifically defined norm of customary international law just as much as direct perpetration of that act, it belongs in the narrow class of federal common law  “torts in violation of the law of nations” that are actionable under the ATS after Sosa. Indeed, the original public meaning of the ATS was that aliens could invoke the statute both to sue pirates directly, as well as those U.S. aiders and abettors who engaged in “furnishing,” “consulting, combining, [or] confederating. . .” with pirates (Blackstone, Commentaries). Holding a U.S. corporation liable in a federal common law action for its domestic collaboration with gross abusers would thus be consistent with the ATS’ common law origins.

But Sosa requires the Court to take a second step as well: to determine whether allowing this case to proceed under the ATS is a “proper exercise of the judicial power.” Here, Cisco, the SG, and their amici warn that hearing such cases would trigger a litany of foreign policy horribles. (12/2025 Brief of SG at 11-12; Petitioners’ Brief at 34-36). But having heard such alarmism for decades—including as the U.S. State Department Legal Adviser and the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights—I find such claims vastly overblown. These claims repeat with little evidence a longstanding tendency to confuse myth and reality regarding the foreign policy interference caused by such corporate responsibility litigation. During three tours in the State Department, I have seen the United States promote aiding-and-abetting liability, as part of consistent U.S. foreign policy, in order to hold perpetrators of international crimes accountable in such far-flung places as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Lebanon, Kosovo, and before the International Criminal Court. Cisco and their allies warn that allowing ATS cases to proceed would hurt U.S. commercial activity, undermine U.S. companies, chill foreign investment, and hinder American competitiveness abroad. But petitioners’ brief cites only four claimed examples of foreign policy harm over twenty-two years (Petitioners’ Brief at 35). Not just were all overstated, in one, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (D.C. Cir. 2011), I filed an expert witness affidavit (nn. 168-69) twenty-five years ago explaining in detail why that claim of harm had no basis.

Exemplifying this overstatement, Cisco and its amici argue that aiding-and-abetting liability will create foreign policy problems, because it requires finding that the Chinese government violated international law (Petitioners’ Brief at 4). But the Chinese government is not a defendant in Cisco. In W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., International (1990), Justice Scalia dispatched a similar claim for a unanimous Court, noting that “[r]egardless of what the court’s factual findings may suggest as to the legality of [the challenged action under local law], its legality is simply not a question to be decided in the present suit….” Even if it were, the U.S. government has been calling China’s repression of Falun Gong illegal for more than twenty-five years.  (See official statements I made more than a quarter-century ago as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights). As Respondents note, “[a]dministrations of both parties have condemned the persecution at the heart of this case [and] the United States raises no foreign-policy concerns specific to this litigation.” (Respondents’ Brief at 1) Indeed, the bipartisan U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom and many NGOs (here, here, here, and here) have long annually tracked the oppressive Chinese government persecution against Falun Gong.

After Sosa, the Court addressed these foreign policy concerns by systematically narrowing the ATS’s territorial reach, holding in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (2013) that corporations may be held liable under the ATS only for extraterritorial actions that “touch and concern” the United States. In Jesner v. Arab Bank (2018), the Court barred the availability of so-called “F-cubed” ATS lawsuits, brought by foreign plaintiffs against foreign corporations for actions occurring in foreign countries. Nestlé v. Doe (2021) then held that even when ATS suits are brought against U.S.-based corporations operating in the United States, allegations of “general corporate activity” or oversight—such as financial decision-making, supervision, or planning—are insufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.

But none of these cases forecloses the suit here. Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint alleges far more than just off-the-shelf sales or general corporate activity in the United States. Instead, plaintiffs allege that a U.S. company and its CEO crossed the line from passive supplier to knowing abettor, by custom-designing and tailoring a surveillance system in California for export to China, knowing that the Chinese Government would use that technology to execute its infamous “Golden Shield” surveillance system now widely used in the world’s most surveilled country. A number of credible observers have reported similar allegations—based on leaked internal Cisco documents—that indicate that Cisco knew Golden Shield was being used to persecute Falun Gong practitioners, yet intentionally continued its marketing (here and here). In January 2011, a Boston-based investment firm sold its stake in Cisco, accusing the company of ignoring concerns that its business practices in China might be leading to human rights violations. Congress has repeatedly held hearings on Cisco’s provision of surveillance technology to the Chinese government (here and here), and an amicus brief of bipartisan members of Congress has made similar allegations. None of this is yet proven, and the Cisco defendants would have ample opportunity in discovery and at trial to rebut such allegations on the merits. But the public record so far would seem to render plaintiffs’ complaint plausible enough to surmount the Court’s Twombly/Iqbal standard of pleading and trigger discovery.

The case for discovery becomes even stronger upon recognizing that Cisco’s motion to dismiss does not turn solely on the ATS action. An amicus brief for bipartisan members of Congress clarifies that when a nearly unanimous Congress passed the TVPA, it intended to create a statutory cause of action against any individual who “‘subjects’ [another] to torture.” As the Respondents’ brief notes, the ordinary meaning of one who “subjects” —i.e. exposes or renders another liable to a condition—naturally includes someone who aids and abets torture and extrajudicial killing. Thus, plaintiffs have stated an independent, specific, statutory TVPA claim against Cisco’s CEO, upon which relief can be granted whether or not the ATS claim against the company is dismissed. As the legislative history states, the TVPA authorizes “lawsuits against persons who ordered, abetted, or assisted in the torture” (emphasis added). By so doing, Congress intended that the TVPA implement the nation’s international legal obligations, including Article 4.1 of the Convention Against Torture, which extends the universal prohibition to any “act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture” (emphasis added). An amicus brief by UN Special Rapporteurs on Torture reminds us (at 12-15), that torture is a collective enterprise, “emerg[ing] from systems involving multiple participants, including interrogators, intelligence agents, medical personnel, and logistical facilitators . . . . [P]rivate entities may provide the surveillance technology . . . [as] essential links in the causal chain of abuse” even if they never physically participate in the abusive act. Imposing aiding and abetting liability on those who knowingly provide assistance to torture thus fosters deterrence, promotes accountability, and helps ensure that perpetrators cannot outsource torture to private actors.

Against this straightforward case, Cisco and its allies offer four disconnected objections. First, because the international community has chosen to enforce the aiding and abetting norm through international criminal tribunals, they suggest, the United States may not also impose civil liability via its domestic law. (Brief of Washington Law Foundation at 6). Yet the ATS jurisprudence reviewed above shows that that U.S. courts have enforced the civil aiding-and-abetting norm for more than two hundred years, even when criminal liability is being adjudicated in other courts. Second, they argue that recognizing aiding and abetting liability under the ATS raises separation of power concerns. (Petitioners’ Brief at 14). In fact, such concerns run the other way: the federal judiciary has a constitutionally prescribed role to play in foreign affairs, and the First Congress plainly intended the courts, through the ATS, to enforce certain core norms of international law. A far greater violation of separation of powers would occur if courts could eviscerate, through interpretation, statutes that Congress enacted expressly to authorize suits against both perpetrators and their collaborators. Third, Cisco and its allies claim that the Court’s cases since Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents (1971) militate against finding a cause of action for aiding and abetting (Petitioners’ Brief at 20). Yet as the amicus brief for federal law scholars shows, the ATS and the TVPA—unlike the Bivens precedents limiting causes of action that are judicially implied from the Constitution—are express congressional grants of authority for courts to recognize claims arising from such universally accepted international law norms as aiding and abetting torture and extrajudicial killing. Fourth and finally, Cisco and the SG repeatedly cite the irrelevant case of Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver (1994) (Petitioners’ Brief at 28), which involved neither statute at issue here. Central Bank declined to extend an implied private right of action under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act to aiding and abetting liability. But no U.S. court has ever accepted the argument that Central Bank categorically precludes aiding-and-abetting claims under either the ATS or the TVPA. As the Ninth Circuit found, aiding and abetting is actionable under the ATS because it is a tort in violation of international, not domestic, law. And Central Bank holds only that each statute must be evaluated on its own terms. Here, the deliberately broader terms of the TVPA (note 2(b)) reach anyone who “subjects [another]… to” torture, thereby signaling Congress’ intent to reach beyond immediate perpetrators of torture to collaborators who knowingly act in a way that causes torture and extrajudicial killing.

Even as the U.S. Supreme Court has sought to limit ATS suits against corporate defendants, our democratic allies have moved in the opposite direction, recognizing the availability of corporate liability for human rights violations against parent companies domiciled in those countries. In its 2020 decision in Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya, the Supreme Court of Canada (Abella, J.) held that international human rights norms may impose domestic corporate tort liability on Canadian corporations for adding and abetting gross human abuses abroad. By so holding, Canada followed the 2019 U.K. Supreme Court ruling in Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe, which allowed claims to go forward against a U.K. corporation and its Zambian subsidiary seeking damages for toxic emissions from a mine in Zambia. A Dutch district court held in Kiobel v. Shell (2017) that it had jurisdiction over claims by widows of activists executed in Nigeria who alleged that Dutch and U.K. parent companies and their Nigerian subsidiary were accessories to unlawful arrests, detentions, and executions. Affirmance in Cisco would align U.S. law with these parallel precedents.

Finally, Cisco and its allies claim that letting this aiding-and-abetting case go forward will open the floodgates of new cases.  But this is just a variant of the “foreign policy horribles” claim described above. As I have long argued (and Respondents’ Brief at 34-35 confirms), the “floodgates” argument is an unsubstantiated myth that corporate defendants have asserted for decades. Given that every court of appeals that has considered the issue of aiding and abetting has found that the ATS permits such claims (D.C., First, Second, Fourth, Ninth and Eleventh), why haven’t the floodgates already opened? U.S. corporations and their officers have faced the threat of ATS accessorial liability for decades, yet there is no credible evidence that such risks have harmed foreign direct investment or corporate plans to do business in developing countries. An Oxfam amicus brief, signed by several Nobel prizewinners in economics (Nobel Prize Winners Brief at 8-36), debunks the claimed detrimental economic impacts from allowing ATS cases for aiding and abetting. The Nobel prizewinners clarify that recognizing tort liability for aiding and abetting creates appropriate incentives that enhance economic efficiencies by empowering victims—who have the greatest incentive to enforce compliance—while encouraging compliance by those corporate actors best able to police their own conduct. As with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, continued U.S. accountability for aiding and abetting would level the playing field for U.S. corporations and promote a “race to the top” promoting better corporate human rights practices. Given that authoritarian foreign governments use systematic human rights violations to suppress domestic wages, the Nobel prizewinners argue that in the long run, imposing aiding-and-abetting liability on U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) and surveillance technology companies will promote better human rights conditions abroad, foster fair trade, and protect U.S. jobs (Nobel Prize Winners Brief at 31-36).

Taken together, all of these considerations should have led the Court to deny certiorari despite the Trump Administration’s suggestion. As the SG acknowledged, five circuits have ruled on aiding and abetting, without creating a circuit split on the core legal issue. (Brief of SG at 2). All parties and the U.S. government condemn Chinese government repression of Falun Gong. The case calls for straightforward interpretation of two extensively litigated statutes, the ATS and the TVPA. The Ninth Circuit correctly applied Sosa’s two-decades-old controlling precedent, which has clarified the legal standard and contained the growth of subsequent litigation. Foreign courts have agreed that aiding-and-abetting liability can be made available, without unleashing a new wave of lawsuits. Non-meritorious cases can be carved out with procedural scalpels—such as personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and misjoinder—rather than applying a premature jurisdictional meat axe to bar all aiding-and-abetting claims forever. On its face, a Court that professes to be committed to textualism, originalism, strict construction, and the passive virtues should either affirm or dismiss cert as improvidently granted.

Applying Stare Decisis

Nor, despite Cisco’s suggestion (Petitioners’ brief at 17-18), does this case provide a vehicle for overruling Sosa. Cisco and its allies urge the view that the ATS is frozen in time, with the list of cognizable “torts in violation of the law of nations” restricted to the three original violations recognized in 1789 (piracy, attacks on diplomats, and violations of safe conduct). But this same construction of the statute was rejected by six justices in Sosa, and the words of the statute have not changed. Under this frozen view, a traveler denied safe conduct could recover under the ATS, but a victim of modern genocide perpetrated from United States territory could not. Even if the Sosa Court had not already rejected this position, the Historians’ brief (at 14-15, 26-31) confirms that the First Congress intended for the ATS to evolve along with the law of nations, not stay fixed only to the law-of-nations violations that existed as of 1789.

Calling it “a jolt to the legal system when you overrule a precedent,” Chief Justice Roberts has cautioned that “[t]he principle of stare decisis has ‘special force’ ‘in respect to statutory interpretation’ because ‘Congress remains free to alter what we have done.’” As an academic, then-Professor Amy Coney Barrett explained the Supreme Court’s two reasons for affording its precedents interpreting statutes (like Sosa) special protection from overruling. First, when as here, congressional silence follows the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a statute, that signals “a refusal to veer from an interpretation that Congress has effectively approved.” Second, if dissenting Justices disagree with a standing Supreme Court precedent, they should refuse to revisit that statutory interpretation to encourage Congress to amend the statute through the democratic process, rather than resolving the interpretive dispute via judicial process.

Here, Cisco and its amici offer no good reason to overcome this super-strong presumption of statutory stare decisis. The statutory standard has not changed since Sosa. Nor, despite some Justices’ claims (here at 1406-07) is there any basis for upsetting settled law by claiming that the Erie doctrine somehow precludes the federal courts from making federal common law to enforce international human rights law. Justice Souter’s majority opinion in Sosa long ago resolved this old academic debate, stating: “Erie did not in terms bar any judicial recognition of new substantive rules, no matter what the circumstances, and post-Erie understanding has identified limited enclaves in which federal courts may derive some substantive law in a common law way.” Despite changes in the Court’s membership, claims under customary international law “arise under” federal law for purposes of Article III of the Constitution.  Since Sosa, the Court has twice decided ATS cases between two aliens on the merits (Jesner and Kiobel), thus confirming that federal courts may exercise Article III jurisdiction over torts in violation of international law as federal questions.

Cisco and its allies thus offer no basis for overruling Sosa, which articulated a stable, well-functioning legal standard that serves the First Congress’s purpose. Sosa has not undermined, but instead reaffirmed, important legislative objectives, such as providing a civil remedy to victims of torture. The unanimous post-Sosa circuit rulings authorizing aiding-and-abetting liability have not created unworkable confusion. Like-minded democratic allies also enforce that norm through civil liability in their domestic courts, even while it is also being enforced by international criminal tribunals. Despite Cisco’s warning, domestic judicial enforcement of this body of law has not unleashed the floodgates of litigation. Judicial enforcement of the ATS and TVPA is not only consistent with the will of Congress, but also with the textualist mode of statutory interpretation endorsed by Justices Gorsuch and Barrett. No judicial or foreign policy “emergency” suddenly warrants the activist step of abruptly reversing the Court’s settled 6-3, decades-old statutory interpretation precedent.

The Real Issue in Cisco

The legal issue in Cisco arises from the disparity between factual allegations in the second amended complaint—which on a motion to dismiss must be accepted as true—and Cisco’s denial of those allegations, which can only be resolved through discovery. Cisco claims (Petitioners’ Brief at 9-10) that “it sold only off-the-shelf networking equipment to the Chinese government, in compliance with United States export regulations, and that it did not customize that equipment.” If proven, such conduct probably would not arise to an actionable claim of “aiding and abetting” under the applicable international law standard, which the amicus brief for international law scholars (at 15) argues would require “(1) assistance that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the principal’s offense (the actus reus); and (2) knowledge that the acts assist the commission of the offense (the mens rea).”

But plaintiffs allege (Respondents’ Brief at 3-7) that Cisco went further: that defendants were fully aware that Chinese security services would use that system to surveil, track, apprehend, and interrogate Falun Gong practitioners to execute arbitrary detention, torture, extrajudicial killings, and forced religious conversion. As evidence of this knowledge, Respondents allege that Cisco prepared marketing materials and internal reports, such as PowerPoints, brochures, and other files demonstrating that Cisco knew about the Chinese government’s persecution and intentionally tailored its technology to aid the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners (see Second Amended complaint at the District Court level, paras. 58-74, 183-195). If proven, such detailed allegations would satisfy the requisite “substantial effect/knowledge” test for aiding and abetting and exceed the level of “general corporate activity in the United States” called for by Nestlé.

To affirm or dismiss cert would not foreclose whatever meritorious defenses Cisco may have; it would only leave open a door leading to more litigation. In a case that may follow Cisco to the Court, Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., after 17.5 years and five appeals, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a $42 million jury verdict holding a U.S. company liable under the ATS for conspiracy to commit torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. The jury found that a U.S. company had employed interrogators who worked with U.S. military officials to help abuse detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, grossly violating detainees’ human rights by subjecting them to threats, sexual assault, forced nudity, dog attacks, and prolonged stress positions. What Al Shimari shows is that if a meritorious ATS case can clear all procedural hurdles and make it all the way to a jury verdict, the corporations will have more than ample opportunity to defend themselves on the merits.

So Cisco presents an asymmetric choice: between trusting the lower courts to sort out a complex, evolving issue versus premature jurisdictional overkill. If the Court rushes to intervene at this jurisdictional stage—and holds that civil liability is never available against U.S. companies that knowingly provide technology with the substantial effect of aiding and abetting repression achieved through mass surveillance—the only protection left will be corporate self-policing.

In the end, Cisco is not—as petitioners would have the Court believe—just about protecting U.S. corporations from frivolous lawsuits. It really asks whether acknowledged victims of an American company’s knowing aiding and abetting may ever invoke settled precedent to pursue federal recovery for intentional corporate actions taken within the territorial United States that actively assist an intrusive government to commit gross human rights violations. Cisco’s counsel must answer the question: “If victims of torture and other human rights abuse could prove it to a jury, why shouldn’t they be allowed under Sosa to sue an American corporation that knowingly aided and abetted torture and other gross human rights violations abroad?”

Beyond Cisco

Cisco’s implications go far beyond its immediate facts. A momentous issue that all societies now face is the frightening prospect that new technologies will enable highly-effective mass surveillance—and with it, more effective governmental repression. Discouraging technology companies from actively enabling such repression will be key to the future of human liberties, not just abroad, but here in the U.S. as well.

In this regard, the most telling amicus brief in Cisco comes from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), which chronicles how U.S. companies have allegedly provided the tools and technologies to enable the global human rights abuses. Both the first Trump administration and the Biden administration endorsed efforts to stop the use of digital technologies and surveillance to violate human rights. Even beyond Cisco, the EFF brief points out, other U.S. technology companies—including Yahoo!, IBM, Oracle, Dell, HP, ArcGIS, and Microsoft—allegedly pitched their technology as tools for Chinese police to build China’s surveillance state (EFF Brief at 12-14).  Beyond China, EFF charges, U.S. technology companies have contributed to human rights abuses by such diverse regimes as the South African apartheid government and the Belarusian, Egyptian, Emirati, Israeli, Saudi, Syrian, and Tunisian governments (EFF Brief at 15-22). As repressive regimes around the world increasingly apply digital surveillance to unlawfully arrest, detain, torture, disappear, and summarily execute victims, the Justices should wonder whether adopting Cisco’s bright-line exemption of even active aiders and abettors would turn the United States into a safe harbor for digital abusers.

No less urgently, the Justices should ask whether affording such immunity in Cisco would implicitly signal to U.S. companies that they could not be held liable for assisting the U.S. government in committing gross violations. Such violations could include constructing a mass surveillance system that may be used to surveil, persecute, retaliate against, and punish real and perceived opponents and constructing systems that autonomously commit war crimes. Three high-profile Trump Administration episodes suggest that this is no longer a hypothetical concern:

Mass Surveillance in ICE Raids: As the nation’s most heavily funded law enforcement agency, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has substantially expanded its deployment of advanced surveillance technologies to use facial recognition software like Mobile Fortify, biometric trackers, mobile phone location databases, and social media monitoring to promote the Trump Administration’s initiative on mass deportation. According to a complaint recently filed by Illinois and Chicago, ICE has utilized Mobile Fortify in the field more than 100,000 times, constituting a major expansion in the technology’s use (Complaint para. 109). This technological expansion could just as easily be deployed to promote mass surveillance on campuses and workplaces and national protests, raising grave Fourth Amendment concerns regarding individual privacy.

Government Overriding AI Companies’ Restrictions on Mass Surveillance: As the Trump Administration’s current legal battle against the AI company Anthropic shows—and as a bipartisan amicus brief by 16 former senior national security officials (co-authored by myself) argues—Anthropic’s current litigation asks whether the United States may punish an American AI company as a “supply chain risk” for refusing to allow the government to use its AI, inter alia, for such unlawful ends as committing mass atrocities abroad. Should the Administration ultimately prevail in Anthropic—where a California district judge recently granted, and a D.C. Circuit panel denied, a stay to lift the “supply chain risk” designation pending expedited appeal—government mass surveillance by conscripting commercial AI software could proliferate.

Digitally Aiding and Abetting War Crimes: Finally, as I have elsewhere discussed (at 16-19), AI presents the growing possibility that autonomous systems may be used in the future to commit war crimes abroad. The Department of Defense has demanded—as a condition of continuing as a Department contractor—that Anthropic must allow its technology to be used not just for mass surveillance, but to develop fully autonomous lethal weapons. After Anthropic refused to abandon its core principles against such uses, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth not only canceled the Department’s contract with Anthropic, but labeled it as what the D.C. Circuit panel called “an unwanted vendor,” because the company “has now conclusively barred uses that the Department recently deemed essential.” But what law authorizes Hegseth—a Cabinet member sworn to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States—to deem it “essential” that U.S. military software strip out private protections against executing lethal autonomous strikes?

As of November 2024, 57 countries, led by the United States, had endorsed the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy. That Declaration states that “[m]ilitary use of AI must be in compliance with applicable international law [and] use of AI in armed conflict must be in accord with States’ obligations under international humanitarian law, including its fundamental principles.” More than 100 international law experts recently declared that the first weeks of the Trump Administration’s military campaign in Iran exhibited apparent violations of the Geneva Conventions. Even as Hegseth was disparaging Anthropic as an unwanted vendor, his Department was reportedly using its AI program Claude for intelligence assessments, target identification, and simulating battle scenarios in launching its military campaign in Iran.  So yet another question the Justices should ask Cisco’s and the U.S. government’s lawyers is: “If a foreign or U.S. government refuses to obey the Geneva Conventions while enlisting AI technologies in military conflict, does a victim have no civil remedy against an American company that aids and abets the government’s commission of war crimes?”

Conclusion

The Court should not have granted cert in Cisco, because the decision below was correct, and the circuits were not split on the key issues. Affirmance or dismissal of cert would simply allow the lower courts to clarify the nuances of digital aiding and abetting in future cases, depending on the gravity of the atrocities alleged and the technology being deployed.

That outcome would promote corporate social responsibility. Responsible technology companies could mitigate the risk of aiding and abetting lawsuits by, for example, implementing more robust human rights due diligence frameworks that align with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, requiring risk assessments before signing contracts with governments, and (like Anthropic) incorporating human rights considerations into their development of surveillance technologies. But as Anthropic’s litigation shows, governments who seek to enlist private technology to promote mass surveillance—including the U.S. government under this Administration—may seek coercively to override internal corporate ethics, gravely threatening individual privacy and security. Aiding-and-abetting liability is a necessary bulwark to prevent that from happening.

The post <i>Cisco</i>’s Real Stakes: Digitally Aiding and Abetting appeared first on Just Security.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR – NEGOTIATIONS

Senior Pakistani mediators yesterday arrived in Tehran for talks aimed at shoring up the ceasefire between the United States and Iran before it expires next week. A spokesperson for the Iranian foreign ministry said that Iran continues to exchange messages through Pakistan, but the two sides have yet to agree to another round of talks. Two U.S. officials said Trump’s negotiating team – Vice President JD Vance, Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner – continued exchanging draft proposals with the Iranians and mediators on Tuesday. One official said they were getting closer to a deal. The White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt yesterday denied reports that the United States had formally requested a two-week extension of the ceasefire. Aaron Boxerman, Erika Solomon, Tyler Pager, Karoun Demirjian, and Pranav Baskar report for the New York Times; Barak Ravid and Marc Caputo report for Axios.

The Pentagon is sending thousands of additional troops to the Middle East in the coming days, U.S. officials said, adding that the Trump administration is still considering the possibility of additional strikes or ground operations if the ceasefire does not hold. The forces include about 6,000 troops aboard the USS George H.W. Bush aircraft carrier and its escorting warships and about 4,200 others with the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group. Dan Lamothe reports for the Washington Post.

Iran could be willing to allow ships to sail freely through the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz without risk of attack as part of its proposals it has offered to the United States, a source told Reuters. A Western security source said the proposal had been in the works, although it was not clear if there had been any response from Washington yet. Parisa Hafezi and Jonathan Saul report.

IRAN WAR – STRAIT OF HORMUZ

The U.S. blockade appeared to be working yesterday, with no Iranian-linked ships visibly able to leave the region, according to U.S. authorities and vessel-tracking firms. U.S. Central Command said yesterday that ten vessels had complied with directions to turn around and re-enter an Iranian port or coastal area. Kpler said that satellite data showed that two ships with links to Iran and subject to U.S. sanctions appeared to have made U-turns. Eight additional ships that have historically carried Iranian cargo were stationary in the Gulf of Oman or slowing down. Iran’s Fars News Agency said yesterday that an Iranian ⁠supertanker crossed the strait towards Iran’s Imam Khomeini port despite the blockade. Jenny Gross reports for the New York Times; Florence Tan reports for Reuters.

Iranian Maj. Gen. Ali Abdollahi said yesterday that if the U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz continues, “Iran’s powerful armed forces will not allow any exports or imports to continue in the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman, and the Red Sea.” It is unclear how much control Iran can exert over shipping. Aaron Boxerman, Erika Solomon, Tyler Pager, Karoun Demirjian, and Pranav Baskar report for the New York Times.

“China is very happy that I am permanently opening the Strait of Hormuz. I am doing it for them, also — the World,” Trump said on social media yesterday. Trump also claimed that China “agreed not to send weapons to Iran. President Xi will give me a big, fat hug when I get there in a few weeks. We are working together smartly.” The Chinese Embassy in Washington declined to comment on Trump’s post, saying only that Beijing holds an “objective and impartial” stance on the conflict. Cate Cadell reports for the Washington Post.

IRAN WAR – LEBANON OPERATIONS

Israel’s security cabinet convened yesterday to discuss a possible Lebanon ceasefire, a senior Israeli official said. Another senior Israeli official said that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was under heavy pressure from Washington to reach a ceasefire. Other officials told the Financial Times that a truce could come into effect this week, after Israeli forces finish taking the southern Lebanese town of Bint Jbeil. Maayan Lubell, Laila Bassam, and Maya Gebeily report for Reuters; Steve Holland and Maayan Lubell report for Reuters; Raya Jalabi, Adam Chamseddine, Neri Zilber, James Shotter, and Amy Mackinnon report.

The Israeli military yesterday killed four Lebanese rescue workers and wounded six others in three consecutive, targeted strikes. The back-to-back Israeli attacks on the southern village of Mayfadoun hit the first group of medics responding to a distress call from wounded civilians, a second group trying to assist their wounded colleagues, and a third group rushing to aid the first two teams that had been targeted. The Lebanese Health Ministry condemned the attacks as a “blatant violation” of international law. The Israeli military did not respond to a request for comment on the strikes beyond saying it was “looking into” what happened. Malak Harb and Isabel Debre report for AP News.

IRAN WAR – OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 

For the fourth time since the war in Iran began, Republican senators blocked a War Powers resolution aimed at limiting Trump’s authority to continue military operations in Iran. The move to take up the measure failed on a vote of 52 to 47. The vote fell largely along party lines – Republicans and a single Democrat, Sen. John Fetterman (D-PA), opposed, and Democrats joined by a lone Republican, Sen Rand Paul (R-KY) voted in favor. Robert Jimison and Megan Mieniro report for the New York Times.

36 Democratic senators yesterday voted to take up a measure that would block the sale of 1,000-pound bombs to Israel, while 40 voted in favor of a measure to bar the sale of bulldozers that Israel has used to level entire neighborhoods of Gaza and Lebanon. Roughly a dozen more Democrats voted for those measures than have voted for similar ones in the past. Republicans largely opposed the measures, arguing they would weaken an ally and embolden Iran. Megan Mineiro reports for the New York Times.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR 

Russian strikes on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities overnight killed 16 people, officials said today. Anna Voitenko and Anna Pruchnicka report for Reuters.

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

Over 4 million people are set to be newly displaced around the world by the end of the year, the Danish Refugee Council said today. “For families fleeing war with nothing but the clothes on their back, there is little hope: the international safety net that once existed has gaping holes as humanitarian assistance shrinks,” DRC Secretary General Charlotte Slente said. Sudan, where 13.5 million people are already displaced, will see the largest increase with an additional 670,000 people fleeing this year and next. Reuters reports.

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

A State Department cable from Secretary of State Marco Rubio instructs U.S. diplomats to pressure countries into supporting a “trade over aid” U.N. declaration, using formal démarches ahead of a planned signing event at the U.N. The cable frames the initiative as advancing “America First” priorities, promoting private-sector-led development over humanitarian aid. It also directs diplomats to argue that foreign assistance has created dependency while encouraging governments to endorse the U.S.-backed statement. Adam Taylor reports for the Washington Post.

U.S CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

A U.S. military strike on an alleged drug trafficking boat yesterday killed three people. It was the third such strike in three days. Francesca Regalado reports for the New York Times.

Military planning for a possible Pentagon-led operation in Cuba is quietly ramping up, two sources told USA Today. The Pentagon said it plans for a range of contingencies and remains prepared to execute the president’s orders as directed. USA Today reports.

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS 

The House of Representatives yesterday advanced legislation that would restore the legal status to thousands of Haitian immigrants in the United States. A handful of Republicans joined all Democrats in voting for the bill from Rep. Ayanna Pressley (D-MA), who used the discharge petition maneuver to compel a vote on the legislation. The Senate is not expected to pass the bill. Eric Bazail Eimil reports for POLITICO.

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

Republican leaders yesterday postponed a debate and a procedural vote on FISA, as a bloc of conservatives threatened to tank the bill. Kate Santaliz reports for Axios.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

Trump yesterday threatened to fire Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell if he does not leave his role when his term ends. Trump also declined to direct the Justice Department to stand down from its investigation into the Fed’s $2.5 billion office renovation. Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC) is blocking Trump’s Fed nominee Kevin Warsh until the probe is dropped. Andrew Ackerman reports for the Washington Post; Jordain Carney and Jasper Goodman report for POLITICO.

The Trump administration is asking U.S. manufacturers to increase their roles in military production, according to sources. Senior defense officials have held talks about producing weapons and other military supplies with the top executives of several companies, including General Motors and Ford Motor, the sources said. The Pentagon is interested in enlisting the companies as the wars in Ukraine and Iran deplete stocks. Sharon Terlep and Marcus Weisgerber report for the Wall Street Journal.

The Commission of Fine Arts is scheduled today to consider Trump’s plan to build a 250-foot arch on the other side of the Potomac River from the Lincoln Memorial. Trump’s plan to build the giant arch – more than quadrupling its size from original plans – has alienated early proponents of the project, classical architects, and veterans groups who say it will diminish nearby Arlington Cemetery. Luke Broadwater and Zachary Small report for the New York Times.

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions.

If you enjoy listening, Just Security’s analytic articles are also available in audio form on the justsecurity.org website.

ICYMI: Yesterday on Just Security

The post Early Edition: April 16, 2026 appeared first on Just Security.

The problem is that it may never come to light. The evidentiary basis for these enforcement actions is concealed through a practice known as “parallel construction,” in which the true source of evidence is hidden behind an alternative investigative explanation. This means that neither the workers arrested nor the businesses raided may ever have a legal avenue to learn, let alone challenge, how they were identified.

The Surveillance Architecture

Section 702 allows intelligence agencies to collect communications of non-U.S. persons located abroad without a warrant. While the statute prohibits targeting Americans or people in the United States, the very nature of the structure and operation of the global telecommunications system guarantees the “incidental collection” of Americans’ communications when they contact people overseas.

In April 2024, Congress quietly expanded Section 702 through the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act. Tucked into the legislation was a provision requiring intelligence agencies to use Section 702 data to vet “all non-United States persons who are being processed for travel to the United States.” The language is vague. What constitutes “vetting”? Does it extend beyond visa applicants to include identifying people already here?

The expansion came shortly before the Trump administration launched the most aggressive immigration enforcement campaign in decades. Hundreds of thousands of people were deported in 2025. Entire industries—construction, agriculture, meatpacking, hospitality—saw workplace raids that seemed to rely on suspiciously accurate intelligence about the identities and locations of workers illegally in the United States and, in many cases, ostensibly unknown to federal authorities, raising questions about the intelligence basis for those operations.

The Targeting Strategy

A specific, real-world scenario may be instructive.

Many undocumented workers send money back to their families in their country of origin. Imagine a Mexican worker at a Tyson Foods plant in Arkansas who sends money to family in Mexico City every week. He calls them on weekends. His communications traverse international telecommunications networks—the very infrastructure Section 702 was designed to monitor.

Intelligence agencies could justify targeting those family members in Mexico under several rationales: identifying transnational smuggling networks, vetting potential visa applicants, or investigating remittance patterns that might indicate immigration fraud. The family members are non-U.S. persons abroad and thus eligible for targeting under Section 702 for “foreign intelligence” purposes.

Once their communications are collected, FBI agents could query Section 702 databases using the worker’s phone number, email address, or other identifiers. These “backdoor searches” retrieve his incidentally collected communications: his exact location, work schedule, home address, and the names of coworkers who also communicate with family abroad. Intelligence products derived from these queries can then be shared with ICE or other federal agencies.

Now ICE has a target list. But there’s a problem: using foreign intelligence surveillance for routine immigration enforcement likely violates statutory restrictions and perhaps the Fourth Amendment itself. How could government officials avoid a public legal fight over the issue? Never admit where the intelligence came from.

Parallel Construction in Action

Instead of referencing Section 702, ICE agents could construct an alternative investigative narrative — a contested law enforcement practice known as “parallel construction.” Perhaps they claim an “anonymous tip” about the plant. Maybe they cite “routine observations” of workers. They might even conduct surveillance of the facility to “independently verify” information they already obtained through signals intelligence.

When agents raid the plant, they never mention foreign intelligence. The arrest reports cite only the “independent” investigation. The company never learns its workforce was identified through warrantless surveillance. The workers never discover the constitutional violation. And because immigration proceedings are administrative rather than criminal, there’s minimal judicial oversight and no requirement to disclose investigative methods.

This isn’t paranoid speculation. The federal government has done this before.

The Drug Enforcement Administration used exactly this technique for years through its Special Operations Division, which received tips from NSA intercepts and instructed agents to conceal the intelligence source. Reuters exposed the practice in 2013. The only difference now is the target: instead of drug traffickers, it’s undocumented workers and their employers.

The Business Impact

The implications for American businesses are staggering. Industries that employ significant immigrant populations—representing hundreds of billions of dollars in economic activity—may be subject to warrantless government surveillance of their operations, employee rosters, and communications infrastructure.

Were ICE to raid a meatpacking plant based on Section 702 intelligence, the Fourth Amendment rights of the plant owner are violated just as surely as the rights of the workers. The company has a constitutional interest in its operations, its workforce, and its telecommunications. The Supreme Court recognized businesses’ Fourth Amendment protections in Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc. (1978), holding that warrantless government inspections violate the Fourth Amendment absent specific exceptions. Yet because parallel construction hides the surveillance basis, the business never has an opportunity to challenge the search in court.

Consider the due process violation: a company loses dozens or hundreds of workers, suffers severe operational disruption and economic harm, yet never learns the actual basis for the government action and therefore cannot seek judicial review. This isn’t law enforcement—it’s an unreviewable exercise of executive power.

The economic consequences compound the constitutional injury. Meat processing plants operate on thin margins and tight schedules. A single raid can shut down production for days or weeks, costing millions of dollars. Suppliers lose contracts and customers face shortages. Workers—including U.S. citizens and legal residents—lose jobs, all based on surveillance the company never knew occurred and cannot challenge.

The Oversight Vacuum

Where is the check on this potential abuse? The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court reviews procedures, not individual targeting decisions. The Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence have responsibility for ensuring FISA Section 702 queries are compliant with existing law and regulations, but not for determining whether immigration enforcement qualifies as “foreign intelligence.” Congressional oversight requires knowledge that the practice exists.

Most critically, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB)—the independent agency charged with reviewing surveillance programs—was gutted by President Trump in January 2025. He fired the Democratic members, leaving the board without a quorum to conduct investigations precisely when such oversight is most needed. The board’s remaining staff published a report this month finding that the current use of Section 702 data for travel vetting “may not be meeting congressional national security objectives,” a significant concession from an oversight body that itself appears to no longer have the quorum or independence to act on its own findings. Critics, including members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, noted that the report omitted entirely a classified matter concerning a secret interpretation of Section 702 that had been flagged in the board’s 2023 report. 

Section 702 is now scheduled for reauthorization imminently. Congress will debate whether to renew, modify, or allow the authority to sunset. That debate should include hard questions about scope and implementation: Are intelligence agencies interpreting “foreign intelligence” to include routine immigration enforcement? Is Section 702 data being shared with ICE? Are businesses being targeted via warrantless surveillance of their immigrant workforce? And, crucially, are parallel construction techniques being used to conceal the constitutional basis for enforcement actions?

The Path Forward

These questions cannot be answered without transparency. Businesses subjected to workplace enforcement should demand disclosure of the investigative basis. Congressional oversight committees should require intelligence agencies to report on immigration-related uses of Section 702. Civil liberties organizations should seek records through the Freedom of Information Act.

Most importantly, any business that suspects its workforce was identified through surveillance should consider litigation. Discovery in civil cases can penetrate the secrecy that parallel construction is designed to maintain. Carpenter v. United States (2018) established that the government’s acquisition of cell-site location information constitutes a Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant. If ICE cannot explain how agents knew exactly which workers to target without admitting to warrantless surveillance, that silence itself is potential evidence.

The convergence of mass surveillance infrastructure, aggressive immigration enforcement, and deliberate concealment of investigative methods creates a system where constitutional rights—of individuals and businesses alike—can be violated with impunity. Unless Congress, courts, or the public demands accountability, Section 702 may have evolved from a counterterrorism tool into a dragnet for domestic law enforcement, with American businesses caught in the net.

Congress is voting this week on whether to extend a surveillance authority that contains no explicit prohibition on this use, no mandatory disclosure to targets, and no independent oversight body capable of detecting it. The question isn’t whether this could happen. The question is whether it’s already happening—and whether it’s too late to stop it.

The post Is the Government Using Counterterrorism Surveillance Tools to Surveil American Companies? appeared first on Just Security.

I. The PRA: What It Is and Why Congress Enacted It

As the D.C. Circuit recognized decades ago, the PRA attempts to “balance two competing goals.” On the one hand, records of what happened in the White House are an important part of the nation’s history and potentially essential to the present functioning of all three branches of our government. The PRA thus ensures that persons in the White House, including but not limited to Presidents, do not destroy, abscond with, or otherwise fail to preserve, the government’s own records of what occurred in the Executive Office of the President. On the other hand, in crafting the PRA, Congress recognized that the President was the head of a co-equal branch of government with important interests in the proper functioning of the Executive Branch and the confidentiality of his deliberations and personal information. The PRA thus contains a number of provisions designed to “assiduously” protect these important presidential interests.

Specifically, the PRA accomplishes its primary objective—preserving records for the benefits of history and the ongoing functioning of the government—by requiring the President to “take all such steps as may be necessary to assure that the activities, deliberations, decisions, and policies that reflect the performance of the President’s constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties are adequately documented” and “preserved.” The Act then establishes protocols for when and how the former President’s records may be accessed, with the public typically having access to most (but not all) presidential records no later than 12 years after the end of the President’s term in office.

At the same time, the PRA respects the President’s status as the head of the Executive Branch in a number of ways. First, the Act allows Presidents to exercise essentially unreviewable discretion to designate diaries, personal notes, and other documents created in the President’s personal capacity as personal records not subject to the PRA’s preservation and disclosure requirements.

Second, the Act makes clear that the President remains “exclusively responsible” for the “custody” and “control” of, and “access” to, presidential records while he remains in office, and then states that, after the President’s term in office ends, the Archivist of the United States, an Executive Branch official, “shall assume responsibility for the custody, control, and preservation of, and access to” the records. Thus, the PRA does not even require the President to transfer the records outside the control of the Executive Branch, but solely to transfer them to another Executive Branch official.

Third, the PRA does nothing to change a current President’s ability to resist congressional or other requests for access to information; the President remains able today to assert any privilege or other defense to disclosure he could have before the PRA’s enactment. The Act also makes clear that former Presidents can continue indefinitely to assert presidential privileges against the disclosure of any records covered by the Act even after they have left office.

II. All Three Branches Have Long Agreed That the PRA is Constitutional

Given the obvious legitimacy of Congress’s objectives in enacting the PRA, it is unsurprising that all three branches of our government have long agreed that the statute is constitutional:

Congress enacted the statute and did so against the backdrop of a record clearly stating it had the affirmative authority to do so and that the statute did not violate the separation of powers.

Likewise, in Nixon v. Administrator (1977), the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA), a statute Congress enacted to prevent President Nixon from destroying his presidential records after his resignation. The Court held that “Congress can legitimately act” to “protect” the “substantial interests” that the public and future Executive and Legislative Branch officials have in accessing the records “by entrusting [them] to expert handling by trusted and disinterested professionals.” And the Court further rejected President Nixon’s argument that “the disposition of Presidential materials within the Executive Branch” violates the “principle of separation of powers.”

Finally, the Executive Branch has also long agreed. Testifying before Congress in 1978 as it was considering legislation that ultimately became the PRA, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General from OLC—the Executive Branch office delegated the authority to issue definitive interpretations of the law—provided a lengthy statement for the record which concluded “that the subject matter of this bill is well within the province of Congress, that it deals with matters appropriate for congressional concern, and that the underlying purposes may constitutionally be achieved.” The statement further said that, “insofar as declaring the President’s official papers to be public property is concerned, Congress’ action is not subject to serious challenge,” and quoted Justice Powell’s concurrence in Nixon for the proposition that “Congress’ power in this area is ‘unquestionable.’” Consistent with this view, Presidents Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, Obama, Trump (in his first term), and Biden never challenged the facial constitutionality of the PRA and all administrations took steps to comply with the act, even as some instances of noncompliance were documented.

This inter-branch consensus is unsurprising, given the numerous constitutional bases upon which Congress could have enacted the legislation, including at least the following three:

First and foremost, the Property Clause. Article IV of the Constitution expressly grants Congress the “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting” U.S. property. Since the Constitution and Congress create and fund all of the offices in the White House, those offices are unquestionably government offices. As OLC recognized in the 1978 testimony concerning the constitutionality of the PRA, “[i]t is well established that the work product of government employees prepared at the direction of their employer or in the course of their duties is government property.” Thus, Congress may “extend this principle” to require the preservation of “records prepared or received by the President in the course of his duties” and “no substantial separation of powers problems would, in our view, be raised.” (As I discuss below, the April 1, 2026 OLC opinion includes no discussion of the Property Clause.)

Second, and closely related to the first, the Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon v. Administrator suggests that Congress has an inherent authority to require the preservation of the President’s historically valuable papers for the benefit of (as the preamble to the Constitution puts it) “our Posterity.” In upholding the PRMPA, the Court explained it this way:

An incumbent President should not be dependent on happenstance or the whim of a prior President when he seeks access to records of past decisions that define or channel current governmental obligations. Nor should the American people’s ability to reconstruct and come to terms with their history be truncated by an analysis of Presidential privilege that focuses only on the needs of the present.

In fact, it would be an odd Constitution indeed that precluded Congress from taking reasonable steps to protect the nation’s heritage—and its knowledge of how the government has governed. And consistent with this view, to the best of my knowledge, the Supreme Court has never held that a statute like the PRA regulating records of the Government’s inner workings exceeds Congress’s authority.

Third, the Constitution grants Congress the power to legislate on any topic within its enumerated powers and to enact legislation “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” not only those powers, but also “all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” And there are any number of reasons why Congress may deem the preservation of presidential records necessary and proper for carrying out the Executive’s, Legislature’s, and Judiciary’s constitutional powers. For example:

• Given the evergreen nature of policy issues, particularly in the national security and foreign policy context, where foreign regimes often operate on different political clocks than in the United States (e.g., Fidel Castro was the leader of Cuba for nearly half a century), Presidents will often have very good reasons to access their predecessors’ records in order to carry out their responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive;
• As the numerous congressional investigations that sought White House records demonstrate, such records may be relevant to any number of topics on which Congress may legislate;
• As the nominations of James Baker, Ed Meese, Leon Panetta, Alberto Gonzales, John Roberts, Elena Kagan, Brett Kavanaugh, and many, many others demonstrate, White House officials are often nominated for positions requiring Senate confirmation, such that access to their records may be relevant to the Senate’s consideration of their nominations;
• Similarly, as Dick Cheney, Rahm Emanuel, and others demonstrate, White House officials may run for Congress, such that access to the records may be relevant to the Senate’s consideration of their qualifications and whether to expel them;
• Particularly given the Supreme Court’s recent decision on presidential immunity, impeachment may be the only means of accountability for former senior officials, and presidential records clearly could be relevant when the House exercises its sole power to impeach and the Senate tries an impeachment; and
• As United States v. Nixon (1973) demonstrates, courts may subpoena records of meetings occurring or decisions made at the White House because they are relevant to proceedings before them.

It thus seems plain that the PRA is within Congress’s Necessary and Proper authority. To paraphrase Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), the landmark case concerning the scope of Congress’s power to enact legislation, the “end”—ensuring that future Presidents and current and future Congresses (and, ultimately, the American people) have access to important records needed to carry out any number of their constitutional functions—is “legitimate” and “within the scope of the Constitution.” As for the “means”—requiring Presidents to take steps to preserve records describing how they carried out their duties, while providing them with some flexibility in how they perform that obligation and allowing them the ability to protect records as private or privileged—those are “appropriate” and “plainly adapted” to the end and consistent with the “letter and spirit” of the Constitution.

III. So Why Has OLC Concluded to the Contrary?

Against this longstanding consensus as to the PRA’s constitutionality, OLC offers two arguments. Toward the end of its opinion, OLC argues that the PRA impermissibly violates the separation of powers—which requires it to essentially reject the governing Supreme Court precedent and OLC’s own 1978 analysis discussed above. Yet that’s not even the most surprising part of the opinion. In the lengthy analysis proceeding its separation of powers claim, OLC argues that Congress simply does not have any affirmative constitutional authority to enact the PRA. I’ll thus address this “no congressional power” argument first, before turning to the secondary, separation-of-powers argument.

A. The “No Congressional Power” Argument

It is difficult to capture how “astounding” OLC’s “no congressional power” claim is. Indeed, in Nixon v. Administrator, when President Nixon raised a slew of arguments for why the PRA’s predecessor was unconstitutional (each of which the Supreme Court rejected), he did not even claim that Congress lacked the affirmative constitutional authority to enact the statute. And there’s an obvious reason for that: as the analysis in Section II shows, Congress plainly has such authority.

The question thus becomes: how and why did OLC reach its conclusion to the contrary? To be candid, the answer is unclear. OLC spends a substantial portion of its analysis rejecting arguments that are by no means central or even relevant to Congress’s authority to enact the PRA,^[1] and its opinion does little to grapple with the potential bases identified above. The opinion nowhere mentions the Property Clause. It nowhere addresses whether Congress might possess an inherent authority to preserve the government’s records in order to ensure “the American people’s ability to reconstruct and come to terms with their history.” And it nowhere addresses whether the PRA is necessary and proper to the U.S. Government carrying out the broad range of activities described above; indeed, the opinion nowhere cites McCulloch or analyzes its robust theory of the Necessary and Proper power.

Instead, the opinion focuses almost the entirety of its discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause on addressing whether the PRA is necessary and proper to Congress’s funding of the presidency, rejecting “the fallacy that Congress’s power to appropriate funds for executive operations authorizes regulation of how the President exercises his constitutional duties.” Of course, one could object to this conclusion—it is surely far too broad as stated—but it is not even needed to do so to show that OLC’s argument is unavailing.

The opinion’s other discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause dismisses in less than a page the idea that Congress can conclude that the PRA is “necessary and proper” to the Executive Branch carrying out its duties. The opinion supports this determination with what are, at bottom, two assertions, unsupported by citations or significant reasoning: first, that relying on the Necessary and Proper Clause here is “at odds with” the “presumption of regularity”; and, second, that the PRA “burdens rather than facilitates the exercise of executive power” and is thus “not ‘necessary and proper’ to carry that power into execution.”

These claims do not survive serious reflection. With respect to the first, even leaving aside that this is a very odd time for the Executive Branch to be emphasizing the presumption of regularity, the invocation is a category mistake. That presumption is a doctrine that courts apply so that litigants can’t derail litigation by second-guessing executive functioning without support for their assertions. The opinion nowhere addresses why such a judicial creation should apply to legislation, and, indeed, it is difficult to see why it would, as Congress could presumably supersede the presumption by statute.

The problems with the second claim are even more fundamental. The opinion points to not a single case that supports the view that legislation that “burdens rather than facilitates the exercise of executive power” exceeds Congress’s Necessary and Proper Clause; certainly, there is no basis for that claim in McCulloch and its progeny. And this lack of precedential support is unsurprising, for the line between “burdening” and “facilitating” turns out to be far more complicated than the opinion suggests.

For example, President Carter was “especially pleased to sign” the PRA because it “carrie[d] forward [his] commitment to making sure that our Government is not above the law, and merits the trust of the people from whom a President and his Government derive their power.” In other words, President Carter either did not see the PRA as a burden or, more likely, saw it as a “burden” that was eminently worth bearing for the broader benefits it would provide to the public’s trust in the Executive. Some might even say that he was of the view that the statute “facilitates” the exercise of Executive Power.

To be sure, other Presidents may disagree with President Carter’s assessment. But it can’t be that the Constitution grants any future President a veto over enacted legislation previously deemed “necessary and proper” to carry out the Executive Power. Rather, the Constitution is perfectly clear on the matter: it authorizes Congress to enact legislation that it deems necessary and proper to carrying out powers vested in the Executive Branch (and also provides Congress with the power to override a presidential veto if even the sitting President disagrees). Indeed, if accepted, this “burdens rather than facilitates” proposition would threaten to invalidate an enormous range of legislation regulating the Executive Branch.^[2]

B. The Separation of Powers Argument

The opinion’s second argument—that the PRA violates separation of powers principles—fares no better. On this front, the opinion does not even discuss the relevant and on-point Supreme Court precedent it effectively overturns, Nixon v. Administrator, until page 41, and it relegates the discussion of OLC’s testimony defending the constitutionality of the PRA to a footnote on page 43. The opinion’s attempts to address these relevant precedents, moreover, are wholly unpersuasive.

To begin, the opinion attempts to distinguish Nixon on the ground that the PRMPA—which only covered President Nixon’s records, some of which he was expected to destroy, rather than the records of all Presidents—is a narrower statute than the PRA. This is arguably true, although the fact that the PRMPA targeted records known to be of particularly sensitivity and that, unlike President Nixon, future Presidents would have notice of the PRA cuts against the claim. But even if the PRMPA is narrower than the PRA, the implication of OLC’s logic is odd: Requiring Congress to wait for evidence that a President is destroying records seems exceedingly likely to frustrate their ability to stop him from doing so. More fundamentally, the PRMPA plausibly being narrower than the PRA does nothing to change the fact that the Court’s reasoning in Nixon, as discussed above, plainly applies more broadly than to the PRMPA and squarely to the question at hand.

Perhaps recognizing that its attempts to distinguish Nixon are unavailing, OLC turns to the gravamen of its argument: that the Supreme Court’s decision is simply “wrong” because it “reflects the ‘ancien regime’ of the Court’s ‘mid-twentieth century’ approach to separation of powers, not the more thoughtful approach appropriately required by subsequent developments in Supreme Court doctrine.” The opinion similarly rejects OLC’s prior testimony endorsing the constitutionality of the Act on the grounds that it “has not withstood the test of time” and that “intervening developments in the law appear to cast doubt” on its conclusions.

Even if one accepts that the Executive Branch has its own independent authority (and, indeed, responsibility) to interpret the Constitution, the opinion’s rejection of Supreme Court and its own prior precedent is surprisingly cavalier. The opinion nowhere notes that OLC has published at least three formal opinions on the PRA in recent years (in 2004, 2007, and 2021) without questioning the constitutionality of the statute in any of them. And even leaving that omission to the side, the precise intervening legal developments on which the opinion rests its willingness to depart from a half-century old Supreme Court holding and unbroken Executive Branch view of the statute are not precisely clear. The only Supreme Court case that the opinion cites in support of the notion that Nixon does not reflect the Court’s more recent and “thoughtful” approach to the separation of powers is an unrelated Bivens case (Ziglar v. Abbasi (2017)), leaving one with the inevitable conclusion that OLC believes the most important issue is “Congress’s pursuit of information from the President” and that the most important change is thus a recent Supreme Court decision that looms like a brooding omnipresence over the entire opinion and its separation of powers analysis, in particular: Mazars v. United States (2020).

The opinion’s reliance on Mazars reflects another category error, however. In Mazars, the Supreme Court concluded that, while Congress has broad authority to seek information that is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress,” congressional “subpoenas for the President’s personal information implicate weighty concerns regarding the separation of powers” and must thus surmount a heightened burden. In DOJ’s view, this logic applies directly to the PRA, and the PRA does not surmount Mazars’ heightened burden, largely because it does not identify “any contemplated legislation” or other specific legislative activity that Congress “could better evaluate with access to the President’s papers” and because it burdens the presidency by potentially “chill[ing] the President’s advisers from offering candid or unpopular advice,” “risk[ing] [the] inadvertent disclosure of sensitive or privileged information,” and taking up bandwidth so as to potentially “preven[t]” White House personnel “from effectively advising and assisting the President in the performance of his constitutional duties.”

But this train of thought simply replicates the broader error mentioned above and endemic to the opinion: Focusing on Congress’s implied oversight authority as the basis for the Act to the exclusion of Congress’s other relevant powers. Mazars is an oversight opinion about Congress’s authority to issue a specific congressional subpoena, and it is thus a poor fit to the legislative context: For example, in passing framework legislation like the PRA, Congress would never be able to anticipate and articulate the specific legislative reasons it might need access to presidential records many years in the future. Nothing in Mazars even comes close to suggesting that it is addressing the scope of Congress’s legislative ability to ensure that the American people, future Presidents, courts, and Congresses have access to a record of Presidents’ performance of their constitutional duties. Indeed, Mazars does not even mention the PRA, and it is simply inconceivable that the seven Justices who joined that opinion thought that they were de facto disabling Congress from preventing Presidents (and other White House officials) from destroying presidential records.

Moreover, even if one were to assume that Mazars stands for some broader principle that legislation relevant to a President’s papers must show some solicitude for the presidency—which is, at best, a highly debatable proposition—the PRA would clearly surmount such a heightened standard. It grants the President significant discretion on how to meet his preservation obligations, including the ability to exempt personal papers from the Act; it makes an Executive Branch official, the Archivist (who is answerable to the President), the custodian of the records after the President leaves office; it postpones the public release of any records for many years; and, even then, it preserves for the President and the relevant former President the ability to assert relevant privileges over the records.

The parade of horribles the opinion unspools in this regard are singularly unpersuasive. Notwithstanding the fact that the PRA has been on the books for nearly half a century, the opinion cites essentially no evidence for its claims that presidential advisers may be chilled or that sensitive or privileged information may be released inadvertently. For the worry that White House advisers may not be able to effectively advise or assist the President, the opinion merely asserts its “understand[ing] that [the] White House Counsel’s Office spends a considerable amount of time ensuring the President’s compliance with the PRA, which detracts from its capacity to advise the President on sensitive questions of law and policy.” Not very persuasive, particularly since the increasing role Presidents have played in governance and control they have exercised over the Executive Branch in the years since the PRA was enacted would suggest that they and their staffs have been plenty effective. Put simply, these concerns are a shockingly weak basis on which to overturn a half-century old Supreme Court precedent and invalidate important framework legislation.

* * * * *

Overall, then, OLC’s opinion, despite its length, does very little to address, much less cast doubt upon, the most obvious bases upon which Congress could enact the PRA or show that the longstanding Supreme Court and Executive Branch precedents upholding the Act are incorrect. This leaves the unmistakable impression that it is not that the law has changed since the PRA was enacted, but rather that this OLC would simply like the law to return to what it was before the PRA. And this reading of the opinion explains why it recounts at such length the pre-PRA regime regarding presidential records, when Presidents possessed greater control over the ultimate disposition of their files and were not subject to a preservation framework.

But the mere fact that the PRA changed the longstanding way in which Presidents handled presidential records falls far short of showing that Congress should be disabled from changing the pre-PRA equilibrium. To be sure, a so-called “constitutional gloss”—a “systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress”—can be an important interpretive tool, particularly in the separation of powers context. But there are a number of reasons why such a “gloss” does not work here.

First, there’s not just pre-PRA history. The PRA has been in place for nearly half a century, and, as noted above, until OLC’s opinion, Presidents had never challenged the facial constitutionality of the Act and always taken steps to comply with it. Given this, doesn’t “constitutional gloss” cut the other way?

Second, “gloss” is typically most important in the absence of legislative action. Here, President Nixon’s conduct during Watergate, when he threatened to destroy important records relevant to Congress’s and the President’s legitimate interests (and of great historical importance), showed the limits of the existing arrangement. Why should Congress, as a result, be precluded from taking action pursuant to its constitutional powers that would clearly authorize such action?

Third, there is significant reason to question the relevance of the history on which OLC places such weight. For example, the precedents OLC cites overwhelmingly concern presidential resistance to congressional demands for contemporaneous access to documents. But the PRA does not require such access—rather, it allows Presidents to continue to resist congressional requests for information when they are in office in much the same way, while merely requiring Presidents to take steps to preserve important documents, making clear that they have significant discretion on how they do so, and continuing to grant them numerous tools to preserve their confidentiality interests long into the future.

Additionally, throughout much of our nation’s history, the President’s staff was small, and the President largely managed the Executive Branch through the Cabinet. (Congress has preserved documents in agency records through other statutes, and OLC doesn’t claim that those laws are unconstitutional.) Over time, however, the White House’s staff has grown and started to assume more policymaking responsibility; indeed, it was not until FDR’s administration and then the immediate aftermath of World War II that many of the most prominent White House offices—the Chief of Staff, the National Security Advisor, White House Counsel, etc.—were created. It is thus far from clear that historical practice largely developed during the era of “Cabinet Government” is directly applicable during the era of “Presidential Administration.”

In any event, this latter point shows that, even if one somehow concludes that pre-PRA history is analogous to the current day, and that such history should be construed as “constitutional gloss” precluding Congress from exercising its constitutional powers to pass the PRA—two propositions that, as described above, appear to be incorrect—that “gloss” would likely only be relevant to a small subset of the records covered by the PRA, which covers not just the President but the broader White House. Thus, even on the most charitable reading of DOJ’s arguments, it is difficult to see how, on their own terms, they support the opinion’s conclusion that the entire statute is unconstitutional.^[3]

IV. Conclusion

Which leads to a final point. It can be hard to be an Executive Branch lawyer, and I imagine that’s particularly the case when the President has decided to engage in an executive power “moonshot.” You are often asked difficult questions by clients who are under extreme pressure and feel aggrieved by what they perceive as unfair criticisms, restrictions, or obligations. You are typically over-burdened, with much more work than you have time to do it. There is often very little in the way of judicial precedent directly on point, such that you have to rely on less precise sources to address questions for which there is no single dispositive answer. And the advice you provide can have significant consequences, binding Executive Branch employees with your answers—in OLC’s case, binding everyone in the Executive Branch unless OLC itself, the Attorney General, or the President rejects OLC’s views.

This is why, over time, Executive Branch lawyers—and OLC, in particular—have developed a number of rules of thumb designed to make it more likely that they get things right and minimize the costs when they don’t. For example, proceed cautiously, placing significant weight on prior precedents. Be as “attentive to the particular facts and circumstances” implicated by the request as you can be, so that you avoid “issuing advice on abstract questions that lack the concrete grounding that can help focus legal analysis.” And when it is necessary to shift the law, particularly in areas of significant importance to our constitutional government, do so in a manner that allows other institutional actors to “respond appropriately” to—and, if necessary, challenge—the Executive Branch’s actions.

DOJ’s PRA opinion seems to depart from these best practices. Rather than proceeding cautiously, it is a bolt of lightning unanticipated by any Executive Branch or Supreme Court opinion or even contemporary legal scholarship. Rather than hewing to specific facts, it addresses a completely abstract question with no reference to the particular circumstances that led to the request. And rather than providing other actors, such as Congress, with an opportunity to respond to the opinion—for example, by proceeding incrementally—the opinion declares the entirety of an important framework statute unconstitutional.

This has real consequences, as OLC’s PRA opinion effectively frees Executive Branch officials to destroy presidential records. As one commentator has put it:

The documentary trail of executive branch decision-making—the planning documents, targeting analyses, deployment orders, and legal justifications that would ordinarily become the evidentiary record of how power was exercised—can now be destroyed under the legal rationale of the new OLC opinion—and those who destroy them will claim, with at least colorable authority, that they had every right to do so. . . .

If it seems astonishing that the Executive Branch has purported to free itself from the obligation to comply with an important framework statute merely because OLC has concluded that a seemingly binding Supreme Court precedent is “wrong,” that’s because it is. It is not unprecedented for OLC to conclude that a statute is unconstitutional. But it is rare, and I am unaware of any prior OLC opinion that has similarly reached such a broad constitutional conclusion that is contrary to binding Supreme Court and longstanding Executive Branch precedent. The opinion is thus, in many ways, emblematic of an administration that has sought to “so quickly chang[e] so much” with respect to the separation of powers. And like with many other facets of the administration’s executive power play, one is left hoping that the courts, Congress, or a future Executive Branch will be able to clean up the mess.

1. Specifically, DOJ spends over 12 pages rejecting the notion that Congress could rely solely on its implied oversight or preservation authorities to enact the PRA and another 2 pages rejecting the claim that the PRA is a proper exercise of Congress’s authority to regulate federal agencies or offices. It is not obvious that these conclusions are correct—for example, the implied oversight and preservation authorities could be included as among the many constitutional powers the PRA is a necessary and proper means of carrying out—but, even if they are, the important point is that, as the prior section demonstrates, Congress need not rely on any of them alone to enact the PRA. ↑

2. For example, as the Supreme Court noted in Nixon, “there is abundant statutory precedent”—the Court cited the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, the Government in the Sunshine Act, the Federal Records Act, statutes on census data, a statute on tax returns, and more—“for the regulation and mandatory disclosure of documents in the possession of the Executive Branch. Such regulation of material generated in the Executive Branch has never been considered invalid as an invasion of its autonomy.” And the proposition that a statute that “burdens rather than facilitates the exercise of executive power” is unconstitutional could sweep even more broadly, to include statutes like the Ethics in Government Act. ↑

3. In multiple places, the opinion raises the specter of Congress regulating the Supreme Court’s records in order to suggest that the potential existence of such a “Judicial Records Act” must mean that the PRA is unconstitutional. But this passing and abstract reference to a hypothetical statute is more of a rhetorical move than an analytic one. Indeed, it is far from obvious that the same separation of powers principles would be at issue if Congress were to undertake such a purported regulation of Supreme Court records, and the opinion does little to analyze how or why such a hypothetical scenario might be different. Moreover, it is also far from obvious that, if Congress became aware that Supreme Court Justices were destroying important historical documents, it would be without power to require the Court to retain certain records, so long as any legislation appropriately took into account the Court’s status as a co-equal branch of government, just as the PRA appropriately takes into account the President’s. ↑

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In fact, recent reporting seems to confirm that the United States had already been planning to support a Kurdish invasion of Iran to effectuate regime change, with plans in place for “tens of thousands of armed Kurdish fighters … under ‘massive’ US and Israeli air cover.” Trump also recently confirmed that the United States had “sent [the Kurds] a lot of guns.” Though the current state of the relationship between the U.S. and Kurdish forces is not known, Kurdish fighters continue to seek and expect American support in launching a ground insurgency to topple the Islamic Republic. Therefore, whatever the future of American involvement in Iran may be, Washington’s relationship with Kurdish rebel forces may soon become a central feature of U.S. engagement.

Such a relationship with Kurdish forces would, however, not only potentially further compound the illegality of U.S. actions in Iran, but also be unwise and ineffective, as lessons from history demonstrate. Several leading experts and commentators have already explained the illegality of the joint U.S.-Israeli strikes in and against Iran (see here, here, here and here). The United States has already committed serious breaches of international law governing the conduct of hostilities, including the strike that resulted in the deaths of over a hundred schoolgirls. Providing assistance to the Kurds would introduce a new layer of illegality. Specifically, the United States would find itself in a continuing (and yet another) breach of the rules on non-intervention which would persist even beyond and irrespective of the ceasefire or any potential long-term agreement, and could, depending on the facts, also incur State responsibility for violations committed by Kurdish forces. This would depend a great deal on the specific modes, intensity, and nature of the assistance provided and the relationship established between the United States and Kurdish armed opposition forces. It is thus crucial that these facts and specificities are rigorously and continually investigated by Congress to ensure that it does not inadvertently appropriate additional funds for the war in Iran which may be used in a clandestine and illegal manner as the U.S. has done in the past.

The Principle of Non-Intervention and the Nature and Extent of U.S. Assistance to Kurdish Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs)

Customary international law prohibits coercive intervention in the internal affairs (or domaine réservé) of another State. Indeed, the principle of non-intervention is recognized as one “of the most fundamental principles and rules of international law” (Armed Activities, Reparations, para. 65). It is equally well recognized that providing material support to NSAGs and armed insurgents is “an established form of prohibited intervention” (Kriener, para. 24). This is codified in Principle (c) of the Friendly Relations Declaration, expressing “[t]he duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter.” The Declaration further provides that “no State shall organise, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State.” 

While the United States has already violated this principle of non-intervention by engaging in the use of force to attempt regime change, providing assistance to NSAGs in Iran would not only be yet another violation, but also one that will likely outlast the United States’ direct military involvement in Iran. Though direct military action contrary to the rules governing the use of force will always constitute a prohibited intervention, it is not a necessary condition for the violation of the non-intervention principle. As such, the United States may be in a continuing breach of the principle of non-intervention if it is providing assistance to Kurdish NSAGs notwithstanding a ceasefire or a military withdrawal from Iran. 

The analysis with respect to whether U.S. assistance to armed Kurdish groups amounts to a prohibited intervention turns in part on a key set of facts: the nature and extent of support that the United States provides. In Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) characterized assistance as a prohibited intervention when it involves support “either in the direct form of military action, or the indirect form of support for subversive … armed activities” (para. 205). Though the Court did not define the precise standard for what may constitute indirect support, it found that the United States committed a “clear breach” of the principle of non-intervention by providing financial support, training, supply of weapons, intelligence, and logistical support to the contras in Nicaragua (para. 242). 

The extent of support that the United States is either already extending to or planning to extend to Kurdish fighters is unclear. A CNN report suggested on March 4 that the CIA is planning to “arm” and provide “military support” to Kurdish opposition groups. If true, this would clearly be a case of, at the very least, providing a supply of weapons and logistical support that was found to constitute a “clear breach of the principle of non-intervention” in Nicaragua (para. 242). (Following the Court’s judgement in Nicaragua, such support could also constitute a prohibited use of force.) 

The day after the report, however, the Trump administration was quick to walk back its position on providing any form of material support to Kurdish groups. In a press conference, Trump stated that though he “[does not] want the Kurds to go into Iran,” he would “be all for it” should they choose to do so. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth also remarked that “none of [the United States’] objectives are premised on the support of the arming of any particular force.” This, however, does not necessarily absolve the United States from responsibility for prohibited intervention in the event of a Kurdish insurgency for two reasons. 

First, the United States has, in fact, provided a range of support to the Kurds with the aim of fomenting or supporting an insurgency. A Chatham House expert comment noted, for example, that the United States is “aiming to potentially prepare the ground” for a Kurdish offensive by “heavily bombing targets in Kurdish areas in western Iran.” Multiple sources also told CNN that the Trump administration had been in “active discussions with … Kurdish leaders about providing them with military support.” And the three main Kurdish opposition groups formed a coalition to overthrow the Islamic Republic only a week before the Feb. 28 strikes by the United States and Israel. Taken together, these developments suggest that the United States and Kurdish NSAGs have been acting in concert. Though a spokesperson for Iraqi Kurdistan stated that the United States is not arming Kurdish fighters in Iran, this does not entirely rule out some relationship of cooperation and support that would reach the threshold for intervention, given it can be met by supportive acts falling far below the level of providing arms.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, it is likely irrelevant as a matter of law whether or not the United States is providing any material support to the Kurds of the kind that was found to be unlawful in Nicaragua. While such support would be relevant to a use of force analysis, in contrast, the prohibition on intervention includes the “incitement” or “tolerance” of subversive actions by insurgents geared towards achieving regime change. This standard is found squarely within the text of Principle (c) of the Friendly Relations Declaration which is considered to be “declaratory” of customary international law (Armed Activities, Merits, para. 162). For the purposes of a breach of the principle of non-intervention, therefore, it may be enough that the United States merely welcomes or creates conditions conducive to a Kurdish offensive against Iran.

While the precise contours of what it means to “tolerate” – or even “incite” – intervention are not well elaborated, it seems likely that the threshold was already crossed when the United States encouraged the Kurds to overthrow their government. Going further, the United States has already “targeted Iranian military positions along the Iran–Iraq border, degrading command nodes, air defenses, and logistics networks that previously constrained Kurdish insurgent activity,” ostensibly to create “space for Kurdish forces to maneuver” against the Iranian state. Thus, any future Kurdish action would necessarily occur “in an ‘operational environment’ already shaped” by U.S. military action against Iran. In sum, it is highly likely that U.S. support already provided to Kurdish armed groups – material or otherwise – would leave the United States in breach of the principle of non-intervention.

State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts Committed by Kurdish NSAGs

Given the potential for a Kurdish ground operation in Iran, it is also worth considering whether the Kurdish NSAGs’ conduct during these operations may be attributable to the United States. Under Article 8 of the Articles on State Responsibility (ARSIWA), the conduct of a non-state actor may be attributable to a State if it is “in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control” of the State in carrying out its conduct. Unlike for non-intervention, the threshold for State responsibility is one of control over conduct and not mere support or assistance. 

However, there is some academic debate and uncertainty over the correct standard of control. In Nicaragua, the Court adopted a strict standard of “effective control,” which required that the State “directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts” (para. 115). This is generally understood to set a very high bar for attribution and requires either (1) the issuance of specific directions or instructions to carry out specific operations, or (2) the “enforcement … of each specific operation” (Cassese, p. 653). Consequently, the “effective control” test would essentially require a proxy relationship between the State and the NSAG. 

In Tadic, however, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) propounded a lower standard. In that case, the ICTY had to consider whether the Bosnian War was of an international character to determine liability under Article 2 of the ICTY Statute which applied only to international armed conflicts. Here, the ICTY adopted an “overall control” standard in relation to the attributability of group conduct to a State (para. 131). This is a more flexible standard of control under which there is no requirement for the issuance of specific instructions so long as the State “has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group” (para. 137). The ICJ, however, pushed back against this standard strongly in Genocide whilst assessing State responsibility for violations of the Genocide Convention during the Bosnian War, and reasserted the stricter effective control test. 

A choice between these two tests may not matter if the United States is only providing the Kurds with weapons, equipment, logistical, and financial support – as current reporting suggests. Even training Kurdish forces would not necessarily move the needle. This is because even on the more flexible “overall control” test, it is uncontroversial that such forms of material assistance and operational support are not enough for an NSAG’s subsequent conduct to be attributable to the State (Tadic, para. 137). That is also why the ICJ refused to hold the United States responsible for the conduct of the contras in Nicaragua even though the level of cooperation there was manifestly greater than current ties between the United States and Kurdish opposition forces appear. 

Since there must, at the very least, be some State role in organizing, coordinating, or planning military operations, a lot turns on the precise content and nature of the CIA’s reported discussions with the Kurdish forces. Though merely sharing intelligence or acting in concert may not satisfy even the overall control threshold, this changes if the CIA begins providing strategic or tactical assistance or guidance to Kurdish NSAGs. 

Of course, such assistance between allies cannot alone imply any degree of “control” (Tadic, para. 130). What is required is that there be an exercise of control “by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military activities” (Tadic, para. 131). Thus, the relevant question is not just whether there is coordinated planning between the United States and Kurdish NSAGs, but whether the United States is planning and coordinating military operations for the Kurdish NSAGs such that the latter are acting broadly on the directions of the former. The overall control standard may be met only if the United States did or is, in fact, coordinating military activities with Kurdish NSAGs as part of a broader plan which also involves some broad direction of military operations. The United States’ heavy bombardment of certain areas within Iran to clear the way for Kurdish forces may, for example, be indicative of some level of coordinated planning of military operations being undertaken by the United States for Kurdish forces. How much, however, we cannot be certain based on what has been publicly reported to date. 

The attribution of the conduct of Kurdish NSAGs to the United States on the basis of an “effective control” test is even more unlikely. In practice, support by States to NSAGs rarely rises to the level of issuing specific instructions to carry out specific operations. Though rare exceptions exist – such as violent uprisings by pro-Russia groups in Donbas in 2014 (Russian effective control was affirmed by the European Court of Human Rights) and the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba – by and large, the history of internationalized armed conflicts and U.S. cooperation with NSAGs reveals that State-NSAG relations have hardly ever risen to the level of specificity required by the “effective control” test. This is because, while States may provide a great deal of strategic guidance, goal-setting, and material support to NSAGs, the specific targets, means and methods of warfare are generally left to the NSAG so long as there is alignment over broader strategic goals. In Armed Activities, for example, the ICJ declined to attribute the conduct of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (an NSAG) to Uganda despite finding a high, albeit non-specific, level of joint planning and coordination (para. 160). Given that Kurdish NSAGs have long existed and carried out operations independently, they are unlikely to form a true “proxy” type of relationship with the United States.

Concluding Thoughts

The United States’ modus operandi of working in tandem with NSAGs to achieve regime change has always created more problems than it has solved. The complex plan to fund the contras to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, for instance, not only failed to achieve regime change but also brought a panoply of legal consequences and plunged the United States into the deeply damaging Iran-Contra scandal, which involved the Reagan administration selling arms to former Iranian Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini. Similarly, the al-Qaeda terrorist organization was born out of “a network of Arab and other foreign veterans of the US-backed Afghan insurgency” during the Soviet-Afghan war. CIA assistance, funding, and training to mujahideen forces in Afghanistan through the 1980s, therefore, had the devastating “blowback” of giving birth to one of the most significant global terrorist threats in history. 

The American habit of supporting NSAGs to achieve shared strategic objectives while turning a blind eye to ideology and international law has proven to be myopic time and again. This pattern now risks repetition in Iran; though both the United States and Kurdish NSAGs may benefit from seeing the Islamic Republic fall, there seems to be no contemplation of the consequences of a successful Kurdish rebellion for peace, justice, and stability for the Iranian people and in the broader Middle East. In fact, if anything, an effective Kurdish rebellion would be likely to spark a violent civil war – the most devastating costs of which would be borne by the Iranian people. These strategic consequences notwithstanding, of course, providing support to Kurdish forces in Iran would also constitute yet another flagrant violation of international law. The U.S. Congress must learn its lessons from the challenges of uncovering the Iran-Contra affair and take a proactive oversight role in investigating the intelligence community’s activities in Iran, and should not appropriate funds for further violations of international law in Iran. 

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A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR – NEGOTIATIONS

President Trump said yesterday in an interview that a second round of direct negotiations with Iran could take place in Pakistan over the next two days. Trump did not say whether Vice President JD Vance would continue to lead the negotiating team. Trump also said he did not like the reports that the United States had proposed a 20-year suspension of all nuclear activity in Iran, rather than a permanent ban on enrichment. “I’ve been saying they can’t have nuclear weapons,” Trump said. “So I don’t like the 20 years.” Chris Cameron reports for the New York Times; Karen DeYoung reports for the Washington Post.

Israeli intelligence chief David Barnea said yesterday that the war in Iran had delivered a serious blow to the Iranian regime but that Israel’s mission would be complete only once the regime was replaced. Isabel Kershner and Gabby Sobelam report for the New York Times.

IRAN WAR – STRAIT OF HORMUZ

The first full day of the U.S. blockade on vessels calling at Iranian ports made little difference to Strait of Hormuz traffic yesterday, with at least eight ships, including three Iran-linked tankers, crossing the waterway, shipping data showed. “During the first 24 hours, no ships made it past the U.S. blockade,” U.S. Central Command claimed on social media, adding that six vessels complied with direction from U.S. forces to turn around to re-enter an Iranian port. Florence Tan, Mariko Katsumura, and Jonathan Saul report for Reuters.

Iran-linked ships are increasingly using “spoofing” tactics to evade detection in and around the Strait of Hormuz following the U.S. blockade, according to maritime intelligence experts. “Now, we are starting to see vessels going dark or using ‘zombie’ or random identification,” said Windward CEO Ami Daniel.  Ephrat Livni reports for the New York Times.

IRAN WAR – LEBANON OPERATIONS

Secretary of State Marco Rubio yesterday hosted direct talks between Israel and Lebanon in Washington. The talks concluded with encouraging words and talk of further meetings, but no firm commitments and no change in Israel’s refusal to halt its military campaign against Hezbollah. A source said that Lebanese officials reiterated their desire to disarm Hezbollah and asked for U.S. aid for Lebanon’s armed forces to carry out the task. Michael Crowley and Euan Ward report for the New York Times.

Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and six other countries yesterday condemned the killing of U.N. peacekeepers in Lebanon and called for an “urgent end to hostilities.” The joint statement focused on concern around “the worsening humanitarian situation and displacement crisis,” without directly mentioning Israel or Hezbollah. Kanishka Singh reports for Reuters.

IRAN WAR – OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said yesterday that her government had suspended a defense cooperation deal with Israel. “When there are things we don’t agree ⁠with, we act accordingly,” Meloni told reporters. The Israeli foreign ministry said in a statement, “We have no security agreement with Italy. We have a memorandum of understanding from ‌many years ⁠ago that has never contained any substantive content. This will not affect Israel’s security.” Angelo Amante and Alvise Armellini report for Reuters.

Chinese President Xi Jinping said yesterday that the world cannot risk reverting “to the law of the jungle,” in his first public comments on the war. Xi did not mention the United States or Trump directly, but he added that “to maintain the authority of international rule of law, we cannot use it when it suits us and abandon it when it doesn’t.” China’s foreign ministry accused the United States of a “targeted blockade” that “will only aggravate confrontation, escalate tension under the already fragile cease-fire, and further jeopardize safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz.” Lily Kuo reports for the New York Times; David E. Sanger and Tyler Pager report for the New York Times.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps secretly acquired a Chinese spy satellite in 2024, significantly enhancing its ability to monitor and target US military bases across the Middle East during recent strikes, according to a Financial Times investigation. Miles Johnson, Peter Andringa, Alison Killing, Charles Clover, and Demetri Sevastopulo report.

The IMF said yesterday that the Iran war has halted global economic momentum. “Prior to the war, we were poised to upgrade our global growth forecast,” the IMF said yesterday in its latest World Economic Outlook, pointing to a tech investment boom, easing trade tensions, and buoyant financial markets. “War in the Middle East will overwhelm these underlying forces.” Courtenay Brown and Neil Irwin report for Axios.

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR 

Israeli fire yesterday killed at least 11 Palestinians in Gaza, including two children, local health officials said. Nidal Al-Mughrabi and Dawoud Abu Alkas report for Reuters.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR 

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth will again skip the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting this week, with the Pentagon’s policy chief Elbridge Colby attending instead, according to two U.S. officials. Paul McLeary reports for POLITICO.

The Trump administration informed Congress on April 8 that Cuba has contributed up to 5,000 fighters for Russia’s war in Ukraine, while also providing “diplomatic and political support for Moscow,” according to an official transmission from the State Department. “The public record does not prove Havana officially dispatched all Cuban fighters,” the five-page unclassified report states. “However, there are significant indicators that the regime knowingly tolerated, enabled, or selectively facilitated the flow.” Hans Nichols reports for Axios.

SUDANESE CIVIL WAR

Sudan today enters into a fourth year of war. “This grim and chastening anniversary marks another year when the world has failed to meet the test of Sudan,” U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher said. Samy Magdy and Sam Mednick report for AP News.

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

A Milan court yesterday accepted a class action brought by a consumer group against Meta over the theft of personal data involving Facebook users in Italy. According to the court order, the data scraping incident, which took place between Jan. 2018 and Sept. 2019, affected around 35 million Facebook users in Italy and 533 million globally. Reuters reports.

Around 250 people are missing after a boat carrying Rohingya refugees and Bangladeshi nationals capsized in the Andaman Sea last week, UNHCR and the International Organization of Migration said yesterday. Reuters reports.

Serbia will jointly make combat drones with Israel, Serbian President Alexander Vucic said yesterday. Vucic said that “we will have the best drones in this part of the world,” according to the Tanjug news agency. Serbia’s Yugoimport SDPR state arms producer will open a drone plant with Elbit Systems, according to Serbia’s BIRN news service. The report said the Israeli company will own 51% of the future plant. AP News reports.

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Trump administration plans to launch its refund system on April 20 for the $166 billion paid in tariffs that the Supreme Court struck down as unlawful earlier this year. U.S. Customs and Border Protection said in a court filing yesterday that it has completed the development of the initial phase of the system, known as CAPE. The system will consolidate refunds so importers will receive one electronic payment, with interest when applicable. The filing said that as of April 9 some 56,497 importers had completed the process to receive electronic refunds for tariffs, amounting to $127 billion. Tom Hals reports for Reuters.

U.S CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

A U.S. military strike yesterday on an alleged drug trafficking boat in the eastern Pacific killed four people. Eric Schmitt reports for the New York Times.

The Trump administration eased sanctions on Venezuela’s state-run financial system yesterday, allowing banks in Venezuela to begin legally using U.S. currency and directly receiving billions of dollars in oil sales. Marc Caputo reports for Axios.

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS 

ICE deported 442,637 people between October 2024 and September 2025, according to newly released statistics. The figure is about 171,000 people more than the previous fiscal year, but far short of Trump’s campaign promise to deport one million people a year. The figure is the first official deportation statistic released under the Trump administration and was included in a congressional budget justification report. Brittany Gibson reports for Axios.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is set to receive more than 30 deportees from the United States this week, four sources told Reuters. The people being deported are all from countries other than the DRC, with at least some coming from Central and South America, according to one source and court documents. One source said the number was 37, while another put the figure at 45. Clement Bonnerot, Robbie Corey-Boulet, and Giulia Paravicini report.

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

The House of Representatives will vote today on an 18-month renewal of FISA Section 702 under pressure ahead of its April 20, 2026 expiration. Conservative Republican opposition and significant but not unified Democratic resistance threaten the measure’s passage. Briana Reilly, Anthony Adragna, Andrew Desiderio, Laura Weiss, and Jake Sherman report for Punch Bowl News.

Maine lawmakers yesterday approved a bill freezing construction of new data centers until November 2027. The pause would give Maine time to assess the risks to the environment and the electric grid. The bill is headed to Gov. Janet Mills’s (D) desk. Alyssa Lukpat reports for the Wall Street Journal.

Federal Prosecutors from U.S. Attorney Jeanine Pirro’s office made an unannounced visit to the Federal Reserve’s headquarters renovation site yesterday, according to a source and a letter reviewed by the Wall Street Journal. After speaking with construction workers, two prosecutors were advised that they could not access the site without preclearance. An outside lawyer for the Fed objected to the visit in a letter to Pirro’s office, citing a judge’s ruling that the ongoing investigation aimed to pressure Chair Jerome Powell. C. Ryan Barber reports.

Federal prosecutors from Pirro’s office are also seeking to wipe out the seditious conspiracy convictions of 12 members of the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers, who helped plan the Jan. 6 riots, according to court documents filed yesterday. Salvador Rizzo, Jeremy Roebuck, and Perry Stein report for the Washington Post.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

Sebastian Gorka, a national security aide to Trump, is seeking to become the next head of the National Counterterrorism Center, a position that would give him broad powers over the country’s counterterrorism apparatus, according to four sources. Gorka has focused much of his career on a hard-line approach to Islamist extremist and immigration policy. It remains unclear whether the administration intends to nominate Gorka. Noah Robertson, John Hudson, and Dan Lamothe report for the Washington Post.

Staff from at least two federal agencies have reached out to Anthropic in recent days to express interest in integrating Claude Mythos into their cyber defense efforts, according to a former U.S. technology official. The Commerce Department’s Center for AI Standards and Innovation is actively testing Mythos’ hacking prowess, four sources said. John Sakellariadis and Brendan Bordelon report for POLITICO.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION

A federal appeals court yesterday concluded that U.S. District Judge James Boasberg had overstepped his authority by continuing to pursue possible contempt charges against administration officials who signed off on deportations to El Salvador. Kyle Cheney and Josh Gerstein report for POLITICO.

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions.

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ICYMI: Yesterday on Just Security

The post Early Edition: April 15, 2026 appeared first on Just Security.

Quscondy Abdulshafi joins host Viola Gienger to discuss how Sudan got to this point, how the international community has responded, and where to go next. 

Show Notes:

• Quscondy Abdulshafi’s April 2025 article for Just Security, “Two Years of War in Sudan: From Revolution to Ruin and the Fight to Rise Again.”
• Rachel George’s recent article for Just Security, “Amid Shaky Ceasefire, War in Iran Is Starving Sudan.”
• Just Security Podcast episode “Assessing the Origins, Dynamics, and Future of Conflict in Sudan” with Executive Editor Matiangai Sirleaf, and three experts, Laura Nyantung Beny, Nisrin Elamin, Hamid Khalafallah, on Oct. 11, 2024.  
• Just Security’s Sudan Archive

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The report presents itself as an investigation into alleged bias in federal law enforcement and as the basis to terminate career civil servants for doing their job of dutifully enforcing laws passed by Congress to address serious violence. Instead, it cherry picks through hundreds of deliberative internal emails, mischaracterizes the factual record, and disregards multiple court rulings and jury verdicts in districts across the country—all as part of a review led by political actors.

The false and misleading claims are not new. In January 2025, President Trump issued pardons to 24 individuals convicted of criminal FACE Act violations and the Civil Rights Division dismissed pending civil enforcement actions. Department leadership has also adopted a differential enforcement standard, pursuing FACE Act allegations when directed at places of religious worship or crisis pregnancy centers that counsel against abortions, but declining to pursue the same unlawful conduct when directed at clinics that provide abortions. Since then, the Department has enforced the FACE Act pursuant to this two-tiered approach. The report released today seeks to rewrite the historical record in an apparent attempt to justify those actions. 

Taken together, the report’s conclusions rest on six central claims. Each fails when measured against the actual enforcement record.

The Report Portrays Prior FACE Act Prosecutions as Politically Driven

The report wrongly concludes that the increase in prosecutions undertaken during the Biden administration was politically motivated. In fact, the increase reflected a surge in FACE Act violations, not partisan decision-making.

During the campaign to overturn Roe v. Wade and following the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, there was a surge in violence, threats, and blockades directed at clinics providing abortion services. This level of unlawful activity had not been seen in decades. Federal prosecutors, investigators, and law enforcement officers coordinated a response across the Department, guided by a national task force established in 1998 that centralized investigations, tracked trends in clinic violence, and provided security and training assistance to local law enforcement and medical providers. (The current Trump administration has effectively disbanded the task force.) 

FACE Act cases were investigated by the FBI and prosecuted by career civil servants from the Civil Rights Division working alongside Assistant United States Attorneys in the relevant local districts. They presented evidence to federal grand juries that issued indictments, litigated motions before federal judges, and tried cases before juries who unanimously determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants were guilty of the charged crimes. 

By contrast, many of the actions cited in today’s report, including pardons and case dismissals, occurred within days of the administration taking office, without consultation with the career civil servants who had knowledge of the facts and the law in each case. And after one acquitted defendant sued the Department for malicious prosecution—a claim the judge rejected after concluding that his “indignation is not a substitute for plausibility” and noting that his complaint “generates considerably more heat than light”—the Department nonetheless paid him to settle his claims, reportedly over $1 million. And over a month before its release, the Department reportedly gave access to the report and “unredacted material” supporting it to multiple anti-abortion activists. 

Each of these decisions—the pardons, the dismissals, and the early access to the report—occurred through processes that bypassed the career officials with knowledge of the cases. Taken together, these decisions reflect a process driven by political objectives, not the factual record. 

The Report Mischaracterizes Unlawful and Often Violent Conduct as Peaceful Expression

The report claims that individuals motivated by religious beliefs received disproportionate penalties for conduct described as prayer or peaceful protest. But the report’s reliance on selected sentencing outcomes misrepresents the underlying conduct that led to those convictions.

In fact, the overwhelming majority of cases brought between 2021 and 2024 involving clinics that provide abortion services included serious criminal conduct such as firebombing, arson, bomb threats, and coordinated blockades that prevented patients from entering clinics, conduct that federal grand juries repeatedly found sufficient to indict and trial juries unanimously found proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

That violence occurred following decades of attacks on reproductive healthcare providers. The National Abortion Federation, which tracks clinic violence and disruption, reports at least 11 murders and 26 attempted murders of clinic staff, 42 bombings, 203 arsons, and 109 attempted bombings and arsons at clinics since 1977. 

When Congress enacted the FACE Act in 1994, lawmakers were specifically concerned about the violence and “blockades of facility entrances [and] invasions and occupations of the premises” of clinics that resulted in the denial of care to women. While current Department political leadership suggests that blockades can “adequately be addressed under state or local law,” Congress recognized that these tactics could “overwhelm State and local law enforcement authorities and courts.” 

The FACE Act was highly effective at deterring those blockades in the ensuing years, until the Dobbs decision appeared to embolden anti-abortion activists to cross from often lawful protesting to unlawful obstruction. The Department exercised sound prosecutorial discretion in its decision to prosecute the offenders to deter further escalation amidst the documented rise in clinic blockades and obstruction that followed. 

In reality, the cases that the Trump administration cites as “peaceful protest,” for which President Trump later issued pardons, were based on harmful conduct that courts and juries repeatedly found unlawful. These cases involved defendants, often repeat offenders, who physically blocked clinic entrances for extended periods, caused injuries to clinic staff, chained themselves together and used bike locks to hamper law enforcement efforts to disperse the trespassers, explicitly announced that their intent was to violate federal law, ignored repeated police orders, and prevented patients from receiving timely medical care. Juries considered, and unanimously rejected, the defendants’ attempts to characterize their actions as merely “peaceful protests.” 

Falsely portraying FACE Act violations as harmless peaceful expressions of religious faith minimizes the harm. That unlawful conduct has caused injury, death, and fear among medical providers, while denying patients access to routine healthcare, including pregnancy testing, cancer screenings, contraception, prenatal care, and abortion services—often for low-income women with few alternative options.

The FACE Act specifies that it does NOT prohibit expression protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, the National Abortion Federation reports that between 2020 and 2024, there were at least 470,226 incidents of picketing at clinics. Picketing, prayer, and protest are lawful. Violence, threats of violence, and blockades that prevent patients from accessing reproductive healthcare are not.

The Report’s Claim That Crisis Pregnancy Centers Were Largely Ignored Is Contradicted by the Record 

The report falsely claims that from 2021 to 2024, federal prosecutors and law enforcement partners largely ignored FACE Act violations at crisis pregnancy centers. 

Even while most violence, property damage, and blockades during that period were directed at clinics that provide abortion services, the record reveals that federal prosecutors and the FBI vigorously pursued criminal cases targeting crisis pregnancy centers and anti-abortion organizations using multiple federal statutes. These cases included convictions arising from a conspiracy to vandalize crisis pregnancy centers in Florida, vandalism of a crisis pregnancy center in Bowling Green, Ohio, and an arson attack in Madison, Wisconsin involving a Molotov cocktail in which the FBI’s careful forensic investigation—including recovery of DNA evidence from a discarded burrito—led to the identification, arrest, and prosecution of the responsible defendant. 

Much of the unlawful conduct directed at crisis pregnancy centers included property damage after business hours and without witnesses or surveillance, posing significant challenges to identifying suspects. In response, the FBI launched a public awareness campaign and issued public rewards of up to $25,000 in more than a dozen cases involving vandalism and arson targeting crisis pregnancy centers. Similar nighttime attacks against clinics that provide abortion services also lacked witnesses or surveillance, leaving many of those cases unsolved as well. 

Most significantly, the current Trump administration has yet to bring charges in any new FACE Act crisis pregnancy center case, even though many incidents are still within the applicable five-year statute of limitations. If a substantial number of prosecutable cases had truly been ignored, the current administration could have charged them. It has not. That absence speaks for itself.

The Report Equates the Absence of FACE Charges with a Lack of Protection for Religious Institutions

The report characterizes the decision not to use the FACE Act’s place-of-worship provision as evidence of anti-Christian bias. But the absence of charges under that provision reflects sound prosecutorial judgment, not neglect. Far from ignoring attacks on religious institutions, federal prosecutors consistently pursued those cases, often under statutes that are broader, more constitutionally durable, and carry stronger penalties than the FACE Act’s place-of-worship provision—statutes specifically designed for that purpose. In fact, prosecutors historically avoided charging under the FACE Act’s place-of-worship provision out of a professional obligation to select the most appropriate and legally sound tools available. 

The constitutionality of the FACE Act’s place-of-worship provision remains unsettled, creating litigation risk for prosecutions brought under it. By contrast, the statutes prosecutors have typically relied upon, 18 U.S.C. § 247 (damage to religious property and obstruction of religious exercise), 18 U.S.C. § 249 (hate crimes), and 18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy), are constitutionally well established, cover a broader range of conduct and settings than the FACE Act, and often carry more substantial penalties—making them more reliable charging vehicles for the conduct at issue. 

Based on a review of DOJ press releases and charging documents published between January 2021 and January 2025, federal prosecutors charged dozens of cases involving attacks on houses of worship, obstruction of religious exercise, and crimes motivated in whole or in part by religion. These cases included assaults, firearms offenses, mass shootings, church bombings, vandalism, threats, conspiracy, arson, and hate crimes. Many of these prosecutions were brought under 18 U.S.C. § 247, which is specifically designed to address damage to religious property and obstruction of religious exercise, and 18 U.S.C. § 249, the federal hate crime statute that covers violence motivated by religion. This is a record of vigorous prosecution on behalf of victims across faiths and across a range of incident types. The absence of charges under one provision is not the absence of protection—it is the choice of a better tool. 

The Report’s Sentencing Comparison Creates a False Impression of Disparity

The report’s sentencing-disparity chart is similarly misleading because it presents raw sentence lengths without accounting for the legally relevant factors that actually drive sentencing outcomes in federal court. Federal sentences are determined by applying the federal statutory factors and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which require individualized findings regarding the nature of the offense, the resulting harm, and the defendant’s criminal history. The differences in the prosecutor’s sentencing recommendations appropriately reflect those considerations—not bias in enforcement priorities. 

Many of the cases involving clinics that provide abortions cited in the report involved coordinated, multi-defendant conspiracies designed to physically block access to medical facilities. Those schemes disrupted clinic operations for hours, prevented patients from obtaining needed health care, and in some instances resulted in injury to clinic staff. Many of the defendants were repeat offenders who had previously been arrested for similar conduct, used force during the blockade. At least one was previously subjected to a civil injunction obtained by the Department during the first Trump administration. 

By contrast, the prosecutions involving pregnancy centers arose from nighttime vandalism and without direct confrontation. Two of the three crisis pregnancy center cases listed in the report were limited to misdemeanors. This conduct was unlawful and serious, but categorically different from organized, in-person blockades involving multiple offenders repeated across multiple states. By comparing sentence recommendations without acknowledging foundational federal sentencing principles, the report creates a false impression of disparity where the record instead reflects ordinary, legally required sentencing practice.

The Administration’s Own Enforcement Record Reflects the Bias it Claims to Expose 

The report’s attempt to reframe legitimate law enforcement as bias serves an identifiable purpose: to justify sweeping policy changes that have narrowed enforcement protections, weakening protections designed to prevent intimidation, obstruction, and violence affecting access to lawful medical care. Billed as restoring fairness and neutrality, the current administration’s FACE Act enforcement does the opposite. 

On January 24, 2025, the Department’s political leadership imposed strict limitations on “abortion-related” FACE Act cases, permitting cases to proceed only in “extraordinary circumstances,” such as cases involving death, serious bodily harm, or significant property damage. This new policy functions as an asymmetrical standard: directing prosecutors to pursue FACE Act cases involving crisis pregnancy centers while restricting enforcement to “extraordinary circumstances” when the same conduct is directed at clinics that provide abortions. This two-tiered standard has played out in practice. President Trump did not issue any pardons to those convicted of FACE Act violations at crisis pregnancy centers. The Division has also continued to vigorously prosecute Gabriella Oropesa, who was convicted in a December 2024 trial for spray-painting threatening messages on a crisis pregnancy center. 

The report makes clear that the Department will not prosecute physical obstruction of clinics that provide abortions under the FACE Act. Physical obstruction via blockades that prevent women from accessing timely medical care was a central concern that motivated Congress to enact the FACE Act. Such blockades, which surged between 2021 and 2024, are directed at clinics that provide abortion services and rarely, if ever, at crisis pregnancy centers. The current Trump administration has repeatedly invoked the same “physical obstruction” provision in place-of-worship FACE Act cases.

The Gabriella Oropesa case demonstrates another double standard by the current Trump administration: the report appears to criticize prosecutors for using conspiracy charges (18 U.S.C. § 241) in FACE Act cases because such charges carry stronger penalties. Yet the Division has continued to pursue conspiracy charges against Oropesa and Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Harmeet Dhillon personally argued the appeal to defend the Department’s charging decision. The Department also charged 18 U.S.C. § 241 in the Cities Church prosecution, an alleged physical obstruction case involving a protest at a church that included no violence, no injury, and no property damage.

Equal application of the law, irrespective of viewpoint, is a bedrock principle of the criminal justice system. While making unsupported accusations of bias against prior FACE Act enforcement, the current Trump administration’s own enforcement practices reflect the very bias it claims to expose.

***

The report released today claims to expose bias in prior FACE Act enforcement. Relying on selective narratives and incomplete descriptions of the record, the report instead reveals that the true bias lies in its own conclusions in service of a predetermined conclusion. 

The administration’s own report describes the FACE Act as “viewpoint neutral.” The administration’s enforcement of it is not. The Constitution requires government neutrality toward religion and equal treatment under the law. Those principles depend on consistent enforcement decisions grounded in facts and evidence, not ideology. The administration’s selective enforcement of the FACE Act, including pardoning individuals who targeted abortion clinics while pursuing cases against other protesters and removing career prosecutors who enforced the law even-handedly, threatens to undermine the rule of law in the pursuit of political advantage.

The consequences are real. Patients whose access to care was once safeguarded face renewed risk. Medical providers confront uncertainty and fear as they go to work each day. Career prosecutors who enforced the law consistently have been dismissed. When enforcement decisions turn on ideology rather than evidence, equal justice under law is reduced to a hollow promise.

The post Separating Fact from Fiction in FACE Act Enforcement appeared first on Just Security.

That “back door,” allowing access to Americans’ communications, is ripe for abuse especially in the context of the administration’s campaign to paint “antifa” as an international and domestic terrorist threat (see Section II below). Any expert of national security surveillance law following the government’s escalating actions on “antifa” can connect the dots to FISA electronic surveillance and other counterterrorism and intelligence authorities. Very recent reporting by the New York Times and Puck News points in that direction as well.

Because it is amorphous and untethered to the facts, the “antifa” label creates a framework for bringing peaceful civil society organizations and everyday Americans exercising their right to protest into the Section 702 surveillance net. Hence, the question of whether Congress should reauthorize Section 702 but with a requirement that the FBI obtain a warrant from a federal judge to look at Americans’ communications.

In 2024, the last time Congress faced the same choice in reauthorizing the program, a bipartisan proposal — to require intelligence agencies to get a warrant before accessing Americans’ communications — missed passing by a single vote in the House (212-212 split).

Public and private debates over whether to add a warrant requirement to Section 702 have raged over many years and can, at times, appear repetitive. This year is different. Congress’s decision whether to renew Section 702 comes at a moment when the Trump administration appears poised to expand the database with new collection priorities and to seek Americans’ communications for reasons that are illegitimate and could jeopardize the program as a whole.

How could it imperil Section 702, including the program’s beneficial uses? Americans simply may not tolerate entrusting the government with such powers if those powers are easily and shockingly abused. Preventing government misusage may be critical to sustaining public support for the program writ large and over the long term.

Failure to maintain Section 702 would be a tragic outcome. Specifically, the loss of the core surveillance program – the interception of communications of foreign actors abroad who pose real threats – would amount to “the worst intelligence failures of our time,” as the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) explained in 2023.

In this article, I will explain risks that the Trump administration will more systematically turn the FISA tool inward to go after Americans. It cannot go unnoticed that these concerns arise when internal executive branch structures for checking government abuse have been eroded, if not decimated. And federal courts have found the administration systematically violating Americans’ First and Fourth Amendment rights in related domains.

The upshot of these converging factors is, with “antifa” designations in hand, the FBI having the ability to abuse exceptional national security powers to access peaceful and law-abiding Americans’ email, text, and phone conversations without a warrant.

A solution that fits the problem is to require the Justice Department to obtain a judge’s approval for the FBI to read Americans’ communications. That may be good policy regardless of presidential administrations and whatever one thinks the Fourth Amendment demands. National security experts have long worried about the tradeoffs in having such a procedure in place. However, the conditions for obtaining a warrant can be modified in several ways, as outlined below, to meet those concerns.

Some good news is that after Congress, in 2024, enacted restrictions and better procedures for the FBI to access the 702 database for Americans’ communications, those reforms appear to be working (see April 2026 PCLOB staff report and Department of Justice Inspector General report). But those reforms are incomplete and do not address the risks discussed here.

I. Abuses of Domestic Intelligence Surveillance and the Value of a Judicial Warrant

At different moments in American history, the highest levels of the U.S. government have given into the temptation to use surveillance tools to spy on fellow citizens. Uncovering decades of abuses under Republican and Democratic administrations, the Church Committee reported: “The targets of intelligence activity have included political adherents of the right and the left, ranging from activists to casual supporters.”

Indeed, one of the revelations showed FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover’s use of surveillance to spy on perceived political enemies as well as on other individuals to make sure of their loyalties. An example of the scope of abuses included Hoover’s keeping records on several Supreme Court Justices.

In short, all Americans, regardless of their politics, have an intrinsic interest in guarding against the abuse of domestic surveillance powers.

In a landmark Supreme Court opinion (the Keith Case) in 1972, the Justices unanimously struck down the government’s warrantless electronic surveillance of Americans for domestic national security purposes. Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. wrote about the risks of electronic surveillance when connected to the “inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept.” He outlined the need for a warrant to manage such risks. Writing for the Court in Keith, he said:

Security surveillances are especially sensitive because of the inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the necessarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee political dissent. We recognize, as we have before, the constitutional basis of the President’s domestic security role, but we think it must be exercised in a manner compatible with the Fourth Amendment. In this case, we hold that this requires an appropriate prior warrant procedure.

Courts have been grappling with whether the Fourth Amendment also requires a warrant before the government can query the Section 702 database for Americans’ communications. A federal district court, implementing guidance from a unanimous decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, recently held that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applies. FISA court decisions have rejected such a warrant requirement. However, those decisions also recognize that the Fourth Amendment applies to the Section 702 program and have held that querying of Americans’ communications in compliance with existing statutory and regulatory standards satisfied the Fourth Amendment. In a 2025 decision, Judge Anthony Trenga, serving as a FISC judge, explained:

[T]he government contends that queries do not qualify as “searches” under the Fourth Amendment because U.S. persons do not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in communications incidentally acquired pursuant to Section 702. The government’s contentions assume too much. Section 702 acquisitions are only lawful if the procedures adequately protect the privacy interests of U.S. persons whose communications are acquired. Indeed, if the U.S. persons whose communications are incidentally acquired did not maintain Fourth Amendment-protected interests in those communications, no foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement would be necessary.

The two sides are not that far apart on whether the Fourth Amendment applies. Even if they were, as the Congressional Research Service recently explained, “The Fourth Amendment operates as a floor for protecting individual rights. Congress cannot override Fourth Amendment requirements, but it can legislate more robust protections.”

II. The Trump Administration’s New Foreign Intelligence Priority: “Antifa”

The timeline below shows the escalating series of administrative actions trying to create the figment of antifa as a foreign and domestic intelligence threat:

Jan. 5, 2021: The outgoing Trump administration issues an immigration-related Executive Order on “Memorandum on Inadmissibility of Persons Affiliated With Antifa Based on Organized Criminal Activity”

Sept. 22, 2025: The White House issues Executive Order on “Designating Antifa as a Domestic Terrorist Organization”

Sept. 25, 2025: The White House issues National Security Presidential Memorandum 7 (NSPM-7) on “Countering Domestic Terrorism and Organized Political Violence” (with an expansive scope and First Amendment implications)

NSPM-7 states: “Common threads animating this violent conduct include anti-Americanism, anti-capitalism, and anti-Christianity; support for the overthrow of the United States Government; extremism on migration, race, and gender; and hostility towards those who hold traditional American views on family, religion, and morality.”

Key action: Nov. 13-20, 2025: The State Department designates four “antifa groups” as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs)

Dec. 4, 2026: Attorney General Bondi issues a Memorandum on “Implementing National Security Presidential Memorandum-7: Countering Domestic Terrorism and Organized Political Violence”

The memo states: “These domestic terrorists use violence or the threat of violence to advance political and social agendas, including opposition to law and immigration enforcement; extreme views in favor of mass migration and open borders; adherence to radical gender ideology, anti-Americanism, anti-capitalism, or anti-Christianity,”

March 2026: The FBI and IRS reportedly form a “mission control command center” to investigate nonprofit organizations

March 2026: The administration’s FY 2027 FBI Budget Request to Congress refers to establishment of a NSPM-7 Joint Mission Center (JMC) intended to “investigate, prosecute, and disrupt entities and individuals engaged in acts of political violence and intimidation designed to suppress lawful political activity or obstruct the rule of law” and to proactively identify networks and prosecute domestic terrorist and related criminal actors” (emphasis added).

Key action: By April 2026: “Antifa” reportedly added to the National Intelligence Priorities Framework

May 2026: The State Department is reportedly planning a workshop in May for foreign law-enforcement officials in The Hague

July 2026: The State Department is reportedly planning an “antifa” summit on the topic in Washington in July for foreign government officials.

Key to unlocking foreign intelligence surveillance authorities is the global-to-domestic nexus. Among the most important mechanisms is the FTO designations of “antifa groups.” As Thomas Brzozowski, the Justice Department’s former Counsel for Domestic Terrorism in the Counterterrorism Section, warned in October 2025:

“An FTO designation would also seamlessly integrate Antifa into America’s most sophisticated surveillance infrastructure. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the government may conduct electronic surveillance of ‘agents of foreign powers,’ including ‘groups engaged in international terrorism.’”

Among other consequences, FBI agents would be able to claim that queries of Section 702 data for the communications of Americans suspected of involvement with “antifa” are permissible because such queries are designed to return “foreign intelligence” (a requirement under current law).

Another important mechanism for unlocking Section 702 surveillance powers is listing “antifa” in the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). The U.S. intelligence community’s Booklet on Section 702 states:

HOW DOES THE IC DETERMINE WHOM TO TARGET?

The National Intelligence Priorities Framework guides the IC’s efforts to collect foreign intelligence insights most relevant to the needs of the President and other senior policymakers.

Thus, the recent inclusion of “antifa” in the NIPF is a potential game changer for the government’s use of FISA.

What about the nexus to violence?

First, in the administration’s own policy framework, violence is not an essential element. NSPM-7, for example, conspicuously targets individuals and organizations on the basis of ideology and not only lists crimes of violence but also lists conspiracy against rights under 18 U.S.C. 241. The Attorney General’s implementing memorandum of Dec. 4, 2025 also targets ideology, and lists non-violent offenses such as conspiracy against rights, major fraud, mail and wire fraud. It also creates a potential fishing expedition for tax offenses: “In addition, federal law enforcement and federal prosecutors should consider any applicable tax crimes in cases in which extremist groups are suspected of defrauding the Internal Revenue Service.”

Second, the administration has asserted a baseless definition of “force” in related contexts. In immigration enforcement – which is a centerpiece for NSPM-7 and its notion of anti-fascist resistance – federal courts have repeatedly rejected the Justice Department’s bogus criminal charges of forcible interference with federal agents. While judges have generally been doing their job in checking unsustainable government claims of violence in those domains, in the surveillance context – where First and Fourth Amendment rights are also at stake – the federal courts have no equivalent role to play.

Is there any basis for designating “antifa” as a foreign intelligence threat?

Tom Joscelyn expertly demonstrated the bogus nature of the State Department’s November 2025 designations. The New York Times’ recent reporting shows that European governments, including in the very countries that the State Department has designated such groups, find the U.S. government’s claims about “antifa” baseless and baffling.

Does it stop with antifa?

If history is any guide (think: the Church Committee revelations), “antifa” will not be the end of the matter for this administration’s use of national security surveillance powers. The Times reports that Sebastian Gorka, the senior counterterrorism director on the National Security Council, is leading the initiative to deploy global counterterrorism machinery against “antifa.” What may come next for him? According to the Times:

“For months, Mr. Gorka has led a regular counterterrorism meeting with dozens of officials from U.S. security agencies. In those meetings, he has pushed for more attention on antifa, as well as other groups, like transgender activists and undocumented migrants.”

Another area of concern may be the use of Section 702 for Americans’ communications concerning illicit drugs. In 2024, Congress added counter narcotics as a new category of “foreign intelligence information” for purposes of Section 702 surveillance, but without any warrant requirement for judicial oversight.

III. The Solution: A Modified Warrant Requirement

As mentioned at the start, the House narrowly failed to add a warrant requirement the last time Congress reauthorized Section 702. There are several modifications to the warrant requirement that would reduce the burden on the administration while maintaining an institutional check in line with the Supreme Court’s decision in Keith – thus potentially striking an appropriate balance between important privacy concerns and the collection of evidence about real national security threats.

Indeed, in 2023, senior national security officials told Congress that “imposing a warrant requirement for all such queries” of U.S. persons’ (USP) data would “imperil U.S. national security.” The options below do not impose such a requirement for all such queries; and a lot may turn on whether the court review can, at least in emergencies, be retrospective.

Potential modifications (several of which are already in proposed bipartisan legislation) include:

Option 1. Allow the FBI to query the database for USP info, and seek a warrant from the FISC only if the query results in a “hit” telling the user there is responsive information (see PCLOB Recommendation 3);

Option 2. Allow the FBI to query and obtain USP metadata information without a warrant;

Option 3: Allow the FBI to query the database without a warrant to identify targets of cyber attacks;

Option 4: Allow the FBI to query the database without a warrant if the subject consents (e.g., victims of foreign plots);

Option 5. Allow the FISA court to approve a warrant if there’s a reasonable likelihood (lower than probable cause) the result will return foreign intelligence information (see PCLOB Recommendation 3);

Option 6. Allow the FBI to query and obtain USP communications in an emergency and obtain FISA court approval soon afterwards;

Some experts would note that the emergency exception (option 6) may eat the rule. In other words, in general and on average, FBI agents may consider querying the database an urgent national security measure, and then seek approval only after the fact. Even if that were the case, it would still ensure a judicial check on such actions. Indeed, one might even draft legislation to allow the FBI to retroactively obtain court approval in batches of queries on a weekly basis, if also assured the FISC would use that option to put a stop to future infractions as well. That option could still inject an institutional check and monitoring for potential systematic or individual abuses of the Section 702 database.

Other congressional action could also potentially help guard against abuse such as immediate notification requirements to Congress and clear restrictions on use of Section 702 against organizations and individuals involved in First Amendment activities.

* * *

Debates over whether to require the FBI to obtain a warrant to access Americans’ communications in the Section 702 database often involve a false dichotomy – curtailing the usefulness of the 702 program for national security purposes versus protecting privacy and First Amendment interests. That’s not a proper way of understanding the choice at hand.

Section 702 is a vital national security tool, and providing checks against its abuse – a modified warrant requirement – may be the best way to sustain public trust in the program across administrations.

The post Bogus “Antifa” Designations and FBI Warrantless Access to Americans’ Communications appeared first on Just Security.

While evidence shows some amount of fraud in federal programs—a problem that administrations across time have taken steps to address—there are a lot of reasons to be skeptical that the Trump administration is earnest in its recent efforts. For one thing, President Trump has pardoned major fraudsters who bilked taxpayers and consumers out of billions. For another, the administration has dismantled the parts of the federal government best-equipped to root out fraud; for example, the twenty inspectors general that President Trump has fired or demoted identified more than $50 billion in waste and abuse in the 2024 fiscal year alone.

Most importantly, the president has wielded the power of the federal government to punish his perceived political opponents. But when the government has been as candid as the president about targeting political opponents, courts have intervened. So the administration has turned to a new approach: invoke “fraud” as grounds for freezing an entire state’s Medicaid funds, redesigning SNAP recertification in the middle of a benefit cycle, and withholding cash assistance for low-income families with children only in Democrat-led states, all while claiming responsible stewardship rather than political retaliation. Hundreds of billions in federal funding for Medicaid, SNAP, and family assistance programs flow annually to state and local budgets and, most importantly, to the individuals and families that rely on the programs for food, healthcare, and shelter. The administration’s effort to use these funds as a political weapon should fail.

Fraud is a genuine problem in federal programs, but invoking it does not suspend the statutory procedures that govern how agencies must investigate, document, and remedy it. Federal law has well-developed procedures for how agencies must address fraud. They require evidence, process, and proportionate remedies. These include requirements that agencies identify a credible basis for suspecting fraud before pausing funds, provide notice and an opportunity to respond, and impose penalties proportionate to findings, not blanket freezes. They are tools that administrations of both parties have used effectively. For example: the Medicare Fraud Strike Force, launched under President George W. Bush, has charged thousands of defendants and recovered tens of billions of dollars doing it the right way: working across government agencies and with state counterparts to mine claims data, name bad actors, and identify and prosecute fraudsters. The Trump administration, too, has produced record-breaking results using that model.  And Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche also recently announced the creation of DOJ’s new Fraud Division, and called it a necessary effort to “zealously investigate and prosecute” fraud and better coordinate enforcement across agencies. But the vice president made plain that the White House will exert unprecedented political control over the division and recent administration actions reflect a different pattern: limited evidentiary grounds for actions, unequal application, and broad funding freezes as a go-to bludgeon.

Fraud as Purported Justification

In 2026 the Trump administration has accelerated its strategy of claiming that fraud justifies administrative action. On March 16, 2026, President Trump issued an executive order creating the “Task Force to Eliminate Fraud” and appointed Vice President Vance to lead it. As relevant here, the order’s key provision encourages federal agencies to “develop appropriate controls that operate before funds are obligated or disbursed to prevent improper payments in Federal benefits programs, including by coordinating agency action to determine when ongoing fraud or potential fraud require proactively pausing certain types of funding until such controls can be established.”

The order directs agencies to develop fraud-detection controls before disbursing funds — a facially legitimate objective that prior administrations have pursued through the Inspector General system and interagency coordination mechanisms. But the order’s authorization for agencies to “proactively pause” funding based on “potential fraud,” with no evidentiary threshold specified, creates the same procedural opening the administration has already exploited in targeted actions against Minnesota and Colorado. The order feints at process, but it does not require it where a funding pause would have the administration’s intended retributive effect.

Although tangible results from the order remain to be seen (the Task Force’s plan is due in June), the policy directives in the order echo actions that the administration has already taken to target its political adversaries and cut benefits to eligible recipients in the name of fraud prevention. For example, after months of public disputes between federal and state officials about immigration enforcement, in January 2026 the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services notified Minnesota that it intended to withhold roughly $2 billion in future Medicaid funding due to alleged fraud in the program. In February, the agency paused an additional $259.5 million in 2025 reimbursements.

Reportedly in an effort to punish Colorado’s governor for not pardoning a prominent election denier, in December 2025, the Trump administration enrolled the state in a “pilot project” related to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), without the state’s consent. Citing unevidenced concerns about nationwide benefits fraud, the administration’s brief letter to the state directed it to recertify, through an extensive process that could include in-person interviews of more than 100,000 households, the eligibility of SNAP recipients in its five most populous counties. The deadline for compliance was 30 days and the administration threatened “Colorado’s continued participation in SNAP” if the state failed to comply. And in January 2026, the administration attempted a similar freeze with respect to childcare funding programs in five Democratic-led states to address “potential” fraud in the programs. A federal district court subsequently blocked the pilot project, finding the administration had violated SNAP’s substantive statutory requirements and that the retaliatory context “gives the game away.”

How Litigants are Pushing Back

As the Trump administration invokes fraud to justify administrative actions, litigants — especially state attorneys general — are challenging those actions in court and finding early success on several legal theories. The fundamental theme connecting them all is that the administration has bypassed established procedures precisely because they require producing evidence the administration appears to lack. (It’s no wonder why the administration is attracted to fraud as a rationale: sometimes the threat or initiation of a fraud investigation can have its intended retributive effect without requiring the administration to provide substantiating evidence, especially if funds are paused in the meantime.)

Contrary to procedural statutes. Congress has specified procedures for combatting fraud that the Trump administration is ignoring. Whatever deference courts might extend to an agency’s factual findings concerning fraud, a threshold question is whether the agency followed statutory procedures for making those findings in the first place.

When the Trump administration bypasses those mechanisms it is vulnerable to a claim that its actions are contrary to law. For example, the statute creating the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program outlines an extensive set of procedures for investigating fraud and, if it is found, imposing proportionate punishments on states. But when the Trump administration sought to target “Democrat-led” states for punishment, it ignored those statutory procedures and instead announced that it would immediately freeze $10 billion in funding, including for TANF, across five states. After receiving boilerplate letters from the administration, the states quickly filed suit, alleging among other things that the administration did “not even purport … to be attempting to follow” the “complex statutory and regulatory scheme that provides specific processes for” seeking remedies. A federal district court in New York agreed and granted a preliminary injunction against the administration’s freeze, explaining that “[i]n imposing what was essentially a punishment” against the states, the administration “took none of the required steps mandated under statutes and regulations.”

Contrary to substantive statutes. Beyond whatever procedural statutes an agency might violate when manipulating federal programs to punish its opponents, it may also violate the substantive statutes authorizing the programs in the first place. For example, the statute establishing SNAP tasks the Department of Agriculture with “providing food assistance to raise levels of nutrition among low-income individuals” and “provid[ing] timely, accurate, and fair service” to SNAP participants. It also allows the Department to create voluntary pilot projects for states to participate in so long as any waivers of SNAP’s requirements in the program do not “den[y] assistance to an otherwise eligible household or individual.” But when the administration enrolled Colorado in the mandatory “pilot project,” a district court found that the administration had violated each of the substantive statutory provisions described above. The “pilot” would have made it impossible for Colorado to comply with the administration’s demands while maintaining access to the SNAP program for eligible residents.

Arbitrary-and-capricious decisionmaking: pretextual reasoning. Courts have concluded that the administration’s claims of fraud in state programs or other noncompliance are pretext for political and personal retribution campaigns. As the federal district judge in the Colorado SNAP “pilot project” case explained, “[t]he larger context,” including “taunting social media posts” and threats toward a state’s leaders “gives the game away.” A federal judge in Illinois suspected pretext where the administration “retroactively applied” a particular regulation “only to entities related to the City of Chicago and the City of New York” without “a justification for targeted enforcement of what should otherwise be a policy applicable to all … grants nationwide.”

As Governing for Impact has written elsewhere, the Administrative Procedure Act’s ban on “arbitrary” or “capricious” agency action prohibits pretext. The administration might claim it is combating fraud, but judges are “not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free,” so litigants might continue to highlight instances where the government offers contrived reasons to distract from its actual agenda—penalizing its opponents. Official statements about the administration’s actual motives can be useful evidence in pretext litigation, and the president has been unusually forthcoming. Just recently, President Trump announced Vice President JD Vance as the “‘FRAUD CZAR’” and charged him with tackling “‘FRAUD’ in the United States” (the scare quotes are the President’s), asserting that it is prevalent “primarily in those Blue States” led by “CROOKED DEMOCRAT POLITICIANS.” Courts have also been especially skeptical of the government’s official fraud rationale where it lacks substantial evidence for its claim.

Of course, alleging and ultimately proving pretext can be difficult. A district court in Minnesota recently declined to grant that state’s request for a preliminary injunction against the Trump administration’s deferral of Medicaid funds during a fraud investigation, rejecting—at least at this preliminary stage—each of the state’s arguments why the administration’s fraud rationale is contrived.

Other APA claims. Litigants have also successfully invoked the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard when the administration has failed to offer reasons for suspecting fraud, evidence for its claims, justification for imposing a draconian punishment, or consideration of serious reliance interests engendered by the agency’s prior approach. With respect to that last requirement, states and program beneficiaries have made decisions in reliance on funding they had every reason to expect would continue, and the administration must account for the disruption its freezes would cause. Separately, the administration’s announcement of new policies and severe sanctions may be the kind of substantive legal changes that require notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA.

Constitutional claims. Litigants have brought constitutional claims, some of which might be available especially where litigants can demonstrate that the administration’s fraud rationale is pretextual. The Spending Clause, for example, prohibits the federal government from “surprising [s]tates with postacceptance or retroactive conditions” on their participation in federal spending programs. In the Colorado SNAP case, the judge found that the state was not on notice that it would be forced to participate in pilot projects when it accepted SNAP funds. In addition, equal protection principles might apply where the federal government targets some program participants and not others, and the only plausible explanation for that line-drawing is political animus. Finally, the First Amendment’s protections could ground a challenge to the administration’s efforts to retaliate against protected speech or political association.

* * *

The administration’s fraud task force is set to deliver its action plan in June, and the pattern of justifying actions with claims of fraud is likely to continue. Litigants should not be deterred. The administration’s legal exposure is not incidental: it flows directly from its decision to bypass the statutory and administrative procedures that fraud claims require. Those procedures exist precisely to distinguish genuine enforcement from pretext and invoking fraud does not obviate these bedrock requirements. Courts have already identified the gap between the administration’s stated rationale and its chosen methods, and that gap is not closing.

Litigation against insincere claims of fraud and corruption also matters beyond individual cases. The administration’s actions reveal an approach that treats fraud not as a governance problem to be solved through evidence and process, but as a political instrument invoked against adversaries and abandoned when it would implicate allies. The stakes extend beyond any individual program or state. Americans who rely on federal programs to survive and thrive are left in the crossfire.

The post The Trump Administration’s Fraud Problem appeared first on Just Security.

He has not been convicted of anything. He has not had a fair trial. He has simply been held, first in a detention center, now under house arrest, while his health deteriorates.

And when the regime could not break my father, they reached for the people he loves. A year ago, the government lodged bogus charges against my father’s younger brother, Galib Bayramov, too. He is chairman of a prominent economic think tank in Azerbaijan, and his next hearing – as in my father’s case, one of many in a never-ending effort to break or exhaust him – is scheduled for April 15.

The two cases are among a range of actions by the Azerbaijani government led by President Ilham Aliyev to suppress any opposition and, for that matter, any civil society that seeks to organize, however benignly, independent of the regime.

A Teacher Who Cannot Teach

To understand what these nearly 1,000 days since my father’s detention have meant, you have to understand who he is. He is not simply a political figure or an academic name on an international petition. He is a man who came from a family of teachers, who believed to his core that the greatest thing a person could do was to gather and share knowledge. That belief took him from Azerbaijan to research fellowships in Poland, Hungary, and in 2008, at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He returned to Azerbaijan, then later won a Fulbright Scholarship for Duke University in North Carolina, returning home again before a stint at Princeton University, then later going on to Rutgers University in New Jersey, and most recently the London School of Economics and Political Science. At each step, he built a life and a career dedicated to exposing corruption and advocating for transparency, especially in Azerbaijan’s oil and gas sector. After Azerbaijan’s civil society crackdown in 2014, he became more involved in promoting the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) at the national, regional, and global levels. He represented civil society in the Eurasian region on the EITI Global Board from 2012 to 2019. In the meantime, he became the first chairperson of the Azerbaijan Democracy and Prosperity Movement, founded in 2015.

During his Rutgers days, I studied there, and I recall walking with my father from Highland Park across the bridge into New Brunswick and onto campus, sometimes with me skateboarding while he walked alongside me. Those were our moments. Even though I have lived in the United States since 2015, I miss Azerbaijan. Nobody thinks about moments like that until they are gone.

They have been gone since July 23, 2023.

In Legal Limbo, With a 17-Year Sword Hanging Over Him

On that day, approximately 20 plainclothes Azerbaijani police officers ran my father’s car off the road outside of Azerbaijan’s capital Baku. They physically assaulted him and my mother, Irada Bayramova, and arrested him on charges of counterfeit currency production and extremism charges that the U.S. State Department and human rights organizations across the world have called fabricated and politically motivated.

My mother was released. But my father was held for nine months in a pretrial detention facility, after which he was transferred to house arrest in July 2024, just 21 days before the expiration of the maximum time Azerbaijan’s authorities are allowed to hold someone in pretrial detention. His movement outside his home is severely restricted. As he told German diplomats at one point: “Since then, I have remained in legal limbo without a timely or fair trial. If convicted, I face up to 17 years in prison.”

No credible evidence has ever been presented against him. The European Parliament has passed multiple resolutions demanding his release. In April 2024, then-Secretary of State Antony Blinken personally called Aliyev, pressing for my father’s “full, expeditious release.” Human Rights Watch has documented his case extensively. Bipartisan members of the U.S. Congress — including Senators Chris Coons (D-DE) and Thom Tillis (R-NC), and later Senators Tillis and Richard Durbin (D-IL) with Senate Resolution 398, and the similar House Resolution 120 — have all called for his release. The calls have gone unanswered.

A Life at Risk

What has changed most urgently in recent months is the state of my father’s health. He has long been denied adequate medical treatment for high blood pressure and diabetes. Now, he is suffering from a rapidly enlarging aortic root aneurysm accompanied by valve damage, a life-threatening cardiovascular condition that requires urgent surgical intervention. In his own words, “my life is at serious risk.”

The cruelty is in the details. Adequate treatment is not available to him inside Azerbaijan. Yet he remains under a strict travel ban and has been stripped of valid identity documents, cutting him off from banking services, medical insurance, and the ability to seek care abroad. He is required to report to a police station twice a week — a station located 35 kilometers from his home — simply to prove he has not left the country. He is not allowed to attend public gatherings. With few exceptions, he is not allowed to speak to the press. Visitors to his home are monitored and pressured.

The Azerbaijani government has not jailed him. It has constructed a cage around his entire life.

When One Man Won’t Break, They Go After His Brother

My father did not break. And so the government went after his family.

The beating during the original arrest left my mother with 30 percent of the right side of her body non-functional. The government responded with a statement claiming she had simply fallen. My family’s property, registered in my mother’s name, has since been confiscated.

And then came Galib. In March 2025, my father’s brother was summoned for questioning. On April 10, 2025, he was formally charged with money laundering and abuse of power, charges that carry 8 to 12 years in prison if convicted. The heart of the indictment? His organization’s cooperation with a German development program, between 2013 and 2021 — 13 years ago. It’s all part of a wider crackdown on international donors and their onetime grantees in Azerbaijan, as Human Rights Watch has documented.

Like my father, Galib, too, is under house arrest. Since October 2025, Galib has appeared before the Baku Court on Grave Crimes at hearing after hearing — October, November, December, January, February, March, now April. Sometimes hearings have had to be rescheduled because the prosecutors didn’t show up. Yet, every defense motion has been denied. The next hearing is scheduled for three days before the 1,000th day of my father’s detention, and we believe the timing is not a coincidence.

What the World Has Done – and What It Must Still Do

The international response to my father’s case has been, at times, genuinely encouraging — and ultimately insufficient.

The U.S. Senate introduced Senate Resolution 616 in March 2024, and then the above-referenced bipartisan statement in July 2024, followed by House Resolution 120 in February 2025 and Senate Resolution 398 in September 2025, each condemning my father’s treatment and urging his immediate release. Just this February, the Virginia congressional delegation wrote directly to Vice President JD Vance ahead of his trip to Azerbaijan, urging him to raise my father’s case with Aliyev’s government. The European Parliament’s multiple resolutions mentioned above called for his release and urged EU sanctions against Azerbaijani officials responsible for human rights violations, including the widespread repression of civil society.

Such statements are commendable, and my family and I are grateful for the moral support. Still, none of this activity has produced freedom.

What is needed now is consequences. Specifically, with President Donald Trump championing a peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia and cultivating a relationship with Aliyev, that could present an opening to press for my father’s medical access and release in bilateral engagements. The EU should follow through on its repeated calls for sanctions under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against the officials responsible. And both the United States and the EU should make clear that Azerbaijan’s international standing — its energy partnerships, its diplomatic relationships, its aspirations on the world stage (it hosted the annual global United Nations Climate Change Conference in November 2024, to the consternation of human rights activists) — cannot be decoupled from how it treats the people within its borders.

A Family’s Demand

I have spent almost 1,000 days navigating embassies, congressional offices, international courts, and newsrooms to raise awareness of my father’s case and press for his release. I have not stopped. I will not stop.

My father spoke the truth about corruption. He carried a pen, not a weapon. He just wanted to teach, to be able to conduct research freely and to speak freely in the classroom. After 1,000 days, that is still all he has ever wanted.

On this milestone, our demand is simple and non-negotiable: release Dr. Gubad Ibadoghlu immediately and unconditionally. Allow him to travel abroad to receive the urgent medical care his life depends on. Drop all charges against him and his brother Galib. And to the international community — and Azerbaijan’s people — hold the Azerbaijani government accountable for what it has done to this family, and to the hundreds of other political prisoners it continues to hold behind the walls of a system designed to punish the truth.

The post 1,000 Days and Counting: A Father, A Professor, and a Government That Won’t Let Go appeared first on Just Security.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR – NEGOTIATIONS

During weekend negotiations in Islamabad, the United States proposed a 20-year “suspension” on all nuclear activity, to which Iran responded that it would suspend nuclear activity for up to five years, according to two senior Iranian officials and one U.S. official. Pakistani, Egyptian and Turkish mediators are trying to bridge the gap and reach a deal before the ceasefire ends on April 21. David E. Sanger and Tyler Page report for the New York Times; Barak Ravid reports for Axios.

“The Iranians were pissed off about that press conference,” a source told Axios, referring to Vice President JD Vance’s announcement on Sunday morning that the United States and Iran had not reached an agreement. The source added that the Iranians thought they were close to an initial agreement and were caught off guard by Vance’s press conference. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Vance called him on his way back to Washington to say the main sticking point was removing all enriched material from Iran and ensuring no enrichment in the coming years. A member of Iran’s negotiating team confirmed that the two U.S. demands on the nuclear issue were the reason no deal was reached. Barak Ravid reports.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot yesterday that Washington’s “excessive” and continually changing demands thwarted an agreement during negotiations over the weekend. But Aragchi also said there was “progress on many issues discussed.” Ephrat Livni reports for the New York Times.

White House officials said yesterday that another round of in-person negotiations was being discussed. An official at the Iranian embassy in Pakistan said, “The coming rounds ​of talks can come sometime later this week or earlier next week [in Islamabad].” Another Iranian source said that “no firm date has been set, with the delegations keeping Friday through Sunday open.” David E. Sanger and Tyler Page report for the New York Times; Ariba Shahid and Mubasher Bukhari report for Reuters.

IRAN WAR – STRAIT OF HORMUZ

The United States blockade of the Strait of Hormuz began yesterday. Trump said on Sunday that “numerous countries” would be helping with the blockade, but so far only Israel has publicly supported the idea. NATO allies have said they would not be drawn into the conflict by taking part in the blockade. Tyler Pager, Peter Eavis, Jenny Gross, and Thomas Fuller report for the New York Times; Michel Rose and John Irish report for Reuters.

An Iran-linked tanker appeared to travel through the Strait of Hormuz yesterday after the U.S. blockade was imposed, according to tracking data from MarineTraffic. Two tankers traveling to and from the United Arab Emirates also crossed the strait safely yesterday, and a Guyanese-flagged tanker operated by a Chinese shipping company crossed this morning, according to Kpler. Peter Eavis reports for the New York Times; Francesca Regalado reports for the New York Times.

Saudi Arabia is pressing the United States to drop its blockade and return to the negotiating table, fearing Iran could retaliate by disrupting the Bab al-Mandeb shipping route in the Red Sea, Arab officials said. Summer Said and Jared Malsin report for the Wall Street Journal.

IRAN WAR – LEBANON OPERATIONS 

Israeli troops launched an attack yesterday to seize Bint Jbeil, a town in southern Lebanon, from Hezbollah fighters. An Israeli military official said that full operational control of Bint Jbeil would be achieved within days. The town has symbolic and strategic significance as a Hezbollah stronghold, provincial capital, and gateway to surrounding villages. Laila Bassam, Steven Scheer, and Jana Choukeir report for Reuters.

The International Committee of the Red Cross said yesterday that a strike on a Red Cross Centre in southern Lebanon’s Tyre had killed one person. Israel’s military said it carried out a strike on a “Hezbollah terrorist” in Tyre and ​was investigating reports that the strike had caused damage to a Red Cross centre. Laila Bassam, Steven Scheer, and Jana Choukeir report for Reuters.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio will host a meeting today between Israeli and Lebanese ambassadors in Washington to launch direct negotiations between the countries. The talks are set to focus on the possibility of a ceasefire, longer-term disarmament of Hezbollah, and a peace deal between the countries, sources say. A senior Hezbollah official said yesterday that Hezbollah will not abide by any agreements that may result from the direct Lebanon-Israel talks this week. Barak Ravid reports for Axios; Abby Sewell reports for AP News.

IRAN WAR – OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

House Republicans postponed a scheduled hearing with senior Pentagon commanders about the war in Iran from April to late May. A spokeswoman for Rep. Mike Rogers (R-MI) said the delay was to ensure Adm. Brad Cooper, head of U.S. Central Command, could attend. “We are six weeks into this conflict. And we still haven’t gotten a public briefing from anyone in the administration about the war,” Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) said yesterday when asked about the delay. Megan Mineiro reports for the New York Times.

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR 

Israeli airstrikes killed at least four Palestinians in Gaza yesterday, according to health officials. Medics said the strike hit a group of men outside a school in Deir al-Balah in central Gaza, killing three. Separately, another strike killed one person and injured another at a cafe in Gaza City. The violence comes as leaders from Hamas and other Palestinian factions have been meeting since Saturday in Cairo with mediators from Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar to discuss implementing the second phase of the Gaza deal. Nidal al-Mughrabi and Mahmoud Issa report for Reuters.

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has secured a majority government in Canada after new by-election wins and recent defections pushed his Liberal Party to 173 of 343 seats. Paul Vieira reports for the Wall Street Journal.

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

A man was arrested and accused of damaging a U.S. military plane at Shannon Airport in Ireland on Saturday, Irish and U.S. officials said. The incident briefly disrupted airport operations and comes amid ongoing scrutiny in Ireland over the airport’s long-standing role as a transit hub for U.S. military activity. Ali Watkins reports for the New York Times.

Vance said yesterday that he was “sad” but not surprised that Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban had lost the election on Sunday. “We didn’t go [to Hungary] because we expected Viktor Orban to cruise to an election victory,” Vance said during an interview. “We went because it was the right thing to do to stand behind a person who had stood by us for a very long time.” Eli Stokols reports for POLITICO.

“I find President Trump’s words towards the Holy Father unacceptable,” Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said yesterday in a statement. “The Pope is the head of the Catholic Church, and it is right and normal that he calls for peace and condemns every form of war.” Meloni’s statement followed Trump’s attack on Pope Leo XIV on Sunday night. Max Rego reports for the Hill.

U.S CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

The U.S. military said yesterday that it carried out a strike on a boat in the eastern Pacific Ocean, killing two people, claiming the targets were involved in “narco-trafficking operations.” The Hill reports.

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS 

Local prosecutors in Minnesota yesterday announced that they are investigating whether federal immigration agents should face criminal charges, including kidnapping, burglary, and false imprisonment, over the wrongful detention of a U.S. citizen during a raid in January. ChongLy Scott Thao was forcibly taken from his home in freezing conditions before being released. Ernesto Londono reports for the New York Times.

Gov. Greg Abbot (R-TX) said yesterday that he will cut $110 million in public safety funding for Houston unless Mayor John Whitmire vows to stop enforcing a new ordinance that limits how police cooperate with ICE during immigration related stops. J. David Goodman reports for the New York Times.

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

A federal judge yesterday dismissed Trump’s lawsuit against the Wall Street Journal for reporting on a letter he purportedly wrote to commemorate Epstein’s 50th birthday in 2003. The judge concluded that Trump came “nowhere close” to asserting that the newspaper’s actions revealing the existence and contents of the note amounted to the “actual malice” needed for Trump to prevail in a defamation case. Kyle Cheney and Josh Gerstein report for POLITICO.

Rep. Eric Swalwell (D-CA) announced yesterday that he is resigning from Congress after allegations that he sexually assaulted a former staff member and engaged in misconduct with other women. Swalwell’s resignation followed an announcement from the House Ethics Committee that it would investigate the allegations. Michael Gold, Jill Cowan, and Emily Cochrane report for the New York Times.

Rep. Tony Gonzales (R-TX) announced late last night that he is resigning from Congress after allegations of sexual misconduct. The House Ethics Committee formally launched an investigation into Gonzales last month. After initially denying the allegations, Gonzales admitted to having an affair with his former staffer in March, calling it a “lapse in judgment.” Kate Santaliz reports for Axios.

“Our bipartisan subpoena was very clear: Pam Bondi is supposed to testify tomorrow, whether she’s the AG or not,” Rep. Robert Garcia (D-CA) said yesterday. “If she doesn’t show up, she will face contempt.” Garcia and other Democrats on the House Oversight Committee have argued that, since Bondi was subpoenaed by name, she must appear for the deposition on Tuesday regarding her handling of the Epstein files. Max Rego reports for the Hill.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

Trump yesterday deleted an AI-generated image he posted on social media depicting himself in a Christ-like healing pose, following widespread backlash from Christian commentators. When asked about the post, Trump said, “I did post it, and I thought it was me as a doctor, and had to do with Red Cross.” Finya Swai reports for POLITICO.

The Justice Department released a report today accusing the Biden administration of unfairly using a federal law meant to protect access to abortion clinics to go after anti-abortion protesters. The report is the first product from the DOJ’s “Weaponization Working Group.” Paula Reid and Casey Gannon report for CNN.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION

The Trump administration yesterday reversed its earlier decision and will allow the Pride flag to be displayed again at New York’s Stonewall National Museum, according to a court filing. The flag will be reinstated within seven days and will not be removed save for maintenance or other practical purposes. It remains unclear why the administration reversed its course on the flag. Victoria Albert reports for the Wall Street Journal.

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions.

If you enjoy listening, Just Security’s analytic articles are also available in audio form on the justsecurity.org website.

ICYMI: Yesterday on Just Security

Mined and Blockaded: Iran’s Unlawful Mining and the U.S. Port Blockade

By Mark Nevitt

The post Early Edition: April 14, 2026 appeared first on Just Security.

As negotiations collapsed, the U.S. made its own strategic blunder when President Trump announced that the U.S. Navy would begin “blockading any and all ships trying to enter or leave the Strait of Hormuz” and would “seek and interdict every vessel in international waters that has paid a toll to Iran.” Thankfully, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) walked back that announcement, clarifying Sunday night that the U.S. Navy is not blockading the Strait, but is intending to block all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports, a restriction that begins Monday morning (10 a.m. ET).

Iran’s unlawful mining and other unlawful conduct created the crisis in the Strait. The U.S. blockade of Iranian ports, the operative action after CENTCOM’s correction, effectively ends the ceasefire.  After all, a blockade is, by definition, an action taken by a belligerent State; it is not a peacetime operation. The ceasefire is over.

As I discuss below, whether the United States carries out the blockade in a legal manner will affect, among other things, allied States’ willingness to participate and the overall effectiveness of the blockade.

The stakes couldn’t be higher. Over 80% of global trade by volume moves by sea. The Strait of Hormuz alone accounts for 11% of global maritime trade and one-third of all seaborne oil. Transit passage is not a legal abstraction.  It serves as the legal architecture that keeps the global economy functioning. Iran’s attempt to convert that right into a managed, tolled, IRGC-controlled corridor is not merely a violation of international law. It is a frontal assault on the legal order that has governed global commerce for decades. The consequences extend well beyond the Strait. If transit passage rights wither away in the Strait of Hormuz, then every chokepoint in the world is potentially exposed.

Uncontrolled Naval Mining and the Breakdown of Legal Compliance

New reporting suggests that Iran mined the Strait haphazardly, failed to record mine locations, and lacks the capacity to conduct effective clearance operations. Until those mines are found and removed, the Strait is practically closed.

While it is unclear how many mines, exactly, Iran has positioned in the Strait, just the threat of a naval mine strike is enough to shut down Strait traffic for the foreseeable future.  At the start of the war, Iran reportedly possessed between 2,000 and 6,000 naval mines in its total inventory, though the number deployed in the Strait remains unknown.  According to U.S. officials, Iran used small, fast boats to lay mines at the conflict’s outset.  The boats appeared to have operated in the dark, without mapping the mine placement, and in ways that allowed some to drift from their original positions.

Since the conflict began, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has issued warnings that “ships could collide with sea mines,” and transit passage through the Strait has come to a standstill.   What little traffic that has made its way through has been diverted north through Iranian waters, and away from the 3-mile shipping lane in the middle of the Strait.  Meanwhile, Iran has declared that vessels seeking to transit the Strait must do so in “coordination” with Iranian armed forces, subject to unspecified “technical limitations.” The result is a mined international strait, the full extent of which is unknown to anyone — including the very State that mined it.  This is not merely a tactical failure. It is a compounding international law violation with consequences that will far outlast any ceasefire and complicate ongoing negotiations in Pakistan.

Naval mining in an international strait is not unlawful per se, but placing mines in a manner that effectively denies transit passage to neutral shipping violates both the law of naval warfare and the law of the sea. The 1907 Hague VIII Convention, one of the earliest codified rules of naval warfare, imposes specific obligations on States that lay mines.  States must take all possible precautions for the security of peaceful shipping, notify mariners of hazardous zones, and take active steps to render mines harmless once their military purpose has passed.  None of that occurred here.

Furthermore, Hague VIII requires that certain unanchored contact mines be rendered harmless within one hour of losing control of them. Legal prohibitions on mining international straits are reinforced in both the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea and the Newport Manual on the Law of Naval Warfare.

First, Iran cannot locate all the mines that it laid in the Strait—a reckless, decentralized operation conducted without systematic tracking. This does not look like the conduct of a State taking “feasible precautions” to safeguard civilians during an armed conflict. Iran appears to have treated a globally critical international waterway as an expendable tactical asset.

Second, rather than notifying mariners of hazardous zones as international law requires, Iran compounded the danger. The IRGC warned any vessel attempting to transit without express authorization that it would be “targeted and destroyed.” Iran did not merely mine the Strait; it weaponized the uncertainty around the mines to consolidate control over maritime access. The IRGC has since published navigational charts designating narrow corridors through Iranian-controlled waters.  But these corridors route ships under direct IRGC surveillance, and Iran’s planned operations include charging a $2 million toll per vessel to use those routes.  This is neither a safety measure nor navigation management; it is coercive extraction enabled by unlawful conduct.

On advance notification of mining operations, the International Court of Justice reached a similar conclusion regarding U.S. mining of Nicaraguan harbors in 1986, finding the U.S. failure to give notice of the mining was a violation of customary international law.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, Iran cannot comply with its legal obligation to render mines harmless.  Iranian officials have pointed to vague “technical limitations” to restrict traffic through the Strait.  Reference to “technical limitations” might be an acknowledgement that Tehran lacks both the situational awareness and the specialized capability to conduct rapid mine clearance operations. A State that lays mines without tracking their locations, in a 21-mile-wide international Strait through which 20 percent of the world’s oil transits, and then cannot remove them, has created a humanitarian and environmental hazard of its own making that it cannot undo.  Of all the violations, this is the one that continues to metastasize and compound over time. A mine that cannot be found cannot be rendered harmless. Every moment the Strait remains mined is a continuing legal breach.

Finally, the IRGC’s declaration that the Strait will “never return to its previous status” should be understood for what it is: a formal repudiation of the transit passage regime under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and customary international law.  Iran does not own the Strait of Hormuz.  No nation does.  The right of transit passage belongs to the world, and no State may extinguish it through mining, coercion, or toll collection.  Remarkably, rather than rejecting Iran’s toll regime outright, the Trump Administration has floated the idea of sharing in the proceeds. Hence, any U.S. statements of a possible “Joint Venture” should be a non-starter.

The free and open passage of the Strait should be the starting and ending point of all future negotiations.  Iran and the United States cannot negotiate on this or otherwise agree to limit access; transit passage is a right enjoyed by the entire world.   Indeed, Article 44 of UNCLOS clarifies that States bordering straits cannot hamper or suspend transit passage rights, rights that are enjoyed by all other States.

Imposing a permanent access fee on vessels exercising a right they already possess under international law is similarly unlawful. Converting an international strait into a controlled chokepoint through unlawful mining is itself unlawful.  And declaring that a waterway carrying one-fifth of the world’s oil supply will never return to its prior legal status is not a strategic posture — it is a confession of ongoing violation. All three actions violate binding rules of international law that Iran, as a State bordering the Strait, is legally obligated to respect.

Why the Strait Cannot Reopen Easily

The inability to account for the mines has become a factor in Tehran’s failure to meet Trump administration demands and has complicated already tense negotiations. Removing naval mines is significantly more difficult than laying them.  The United States faces its own minesweeping deficit, the product of short-sighted decisions that expose a gap in a core capability for the world’s most powerful Navy.  One month before the conflict began, four Avenger-class minesweepers left their home port in Bahrain to be decommissioned.  The U.S. military lacks robust mine-removal capabilities, relying on Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) equipped with mine-sweeping equipment.  By its very words, the U.S. Navy acknowledges that without dedicated minesweepers, “LCS will always struggle to achieve the same level of Mine Countermeasure proficiency.”

That gap has a solution if allies are willing to provide it.  It is also why Iran’s legal exposure grows with every passing day, and other nations with comparably stronger minesweeping capabilities—such as NATO members and Japan—may have to play a role in opening the Strait of Hormuz.  By one estimate, Europe has between 150 and 170 active minesweepers and minehunters, and Japan has 20 dedicated mine countermeasure vessels as part of its Maritime Self-Defense Force.  With the United States scrapping its dedicated minesweepers, Japanese and European support will likely be crucial to open the Strait.  The United States finds itself relearning Winston Churchill’s warning the hard way: “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” Nowhere is that lesson more concrete than in mine countermeasures, a specialized, unglamorous capability that the United States has systematically dismantled while European navies and Japan have preserved and expanded it.

The U.S. Blockade Ends the Ceasefire and Creates Enormous Operational Risks

CENTCOM has clarified that the U.S. blockade targets Iranian ports along the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman — not the Strait itself. That distinction matters legally, but the blockade remains an act of war.  Further, CENTCOM stated that “forces will not impede freedom of navigation for vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz to and from non-Iranian ports.”  CENTCOM’s clarification appears to supersede President Trump’s earlier social media post announcing a blockade of the Strait itself.  The blockade announced in specific terms by CENTCOM ratchets up pressure on Iran while creating enormous operational risks.

For a blockade to be legally valid, it must meet certain criteria.

First, the blockade can be established only by the government of a belligerent State. Blockade is not a peacetime operation. By establishing the blockade, the United States is exercising a belligerent right under the laws of war, effectively ending the ceasefire.

Second, it is customary for the State establishing the blockade to notify all affected States of its imposition. The form of the notification is not material, so long as it is effective. CENTCOM has announced the blockade via social media and has stated that “[a]dditional information will be provided to commercial mariners through a formal notice before the start of the blockade.”

Third, to be valid, the blockade must be effective. This means that blockading forces must exert force to render ingress or egress of the blockaded area dangerous. While the Commander’s Handbook on Naval Warfare states that “effectiveness does not require every possible avenue of approach to the blockaded area be covered,” an ineffective blockade is an illegal blockade under the law of naval warfare and the San Remo Manual. This will be challenging.  This blockade is a massive undertaking for the U.S. Navy, which appears to be operating without naval partners.  After all, the Iranian coastline stretches roughly the coastal distance from Boston to Savannah  —about 1,100 miles.

At the time President Trump’s version of the blockade had been announced (not the modified CENTCOM version), Admiral James Stavridis, former head of European Command, estimated that an effective blockade would require two full aircraft carrier strike groups as well as a dozen destroyers. That would represent a substantial commitment of naval firepower, and even then, effectiveness would not be guaranteed — a threshold that matters legally, not just operationally.  It’s fair to assume the scope of the blockade announced by CENTCOM will also require a very substantial force. These operational realities bear directly on whether the blockade can satisfy the legal effectiveness requirement under the law of naval warfare — a threshold that, if not met, renders the blockade itself unlawful.

Further complicating matters, warships may have to position themselves along the Iranian coastline.  If so, that will require several ships to navigate the Strait of Hormuz itself, a risky proposition made even riskier with the ceasefire ending and unaccounted-for mines lurking about.

Fourth, a blockade must be applied impartially to the vessels and aircraft of all States.

Finally, the blockade must not bar access to or departure from neutral ports and coasts. This requirement may become salient if the blockade has the practical effect of restricting neutral access to regional ports.

During the ceasefire, two U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class destroyers reportedly transited the Strait of Hormuz on April 11. This transit reinforced the importance of transit passage rights through international straits under UNCLOS.  U.S. Central Command stated that the transit was part of a broader mission to clear mines and establish a safe passage for commercial shipping. Whether the destroyer transit constitutes mine clearance, freedom of navigation, or blockade enforcement may ultimately turn on how the United States operationalizes its Strait posture in the coming days — but the legal distinction matters enormously.  The United States’ own legal characterization of its operations will matter for how neutral third States respond and whether allied naval forces can participate.

From Mining to Targeting:  Escalating Violations Against Neutral Shipping

Iran’s mining campaign must be understood in conjunction with its sustained attacks on neutral merchant vessels. Since Feb. 28, 2026, the IRGC has launched 21 confirmed attacks on merchant ships, which were non-belligerents to the armed conflict, according to the United Nations’ International Maritime Organization. These vessels – flagged to Thailand, Japan, the Marshall Islands, and others – are neutral parties to the conflict. Attacks on neutral civilian shipping are not collateral damage. They are violations of the foundational principle of distinction under international humanitarian law. The law of armed conflict prohibits targeting civilian objects, and neutral merchant vessels do not become military objectives simply because they transit a contested strait.

Iran has offered no clear legal justification for these strikes, and none is apparent.  These vessels were not carrying contraband, were not bound for belligerent ports, and were not supporting military operations.  The destruction of neutral commercial shipping produces no cognizable military advantage, let alone one that would justify the harm to civilian mariners as a legal matter or to the global economy as a policy matter.  Iran’s attacks on neutral shipping compound its legal exposure and underscore why a negotiated resolution, absent mine clearance, cannot alone restore lawful conditions in the Strait.

Conclusion

The ceasefire’s central condition, as President Trump has framed it, is the “complete, immediate, and safe” reopening of the Strait.  Under international law, it is what Iran was legally obligated to provide from the moment it laid the first mine.  Instead,  Iran has placed itself in a diplomatic cul-de-sac of its own making:  it mined an international strait, lost control of the hazard it created, and cannot now restore the transit passage rights it was legally bound to preserve.

The United States has responded with a port blockade of Iran that ratchets up the risk while ending the ceasefire. Blockade is a legally cognizable belligerent act under the law of naval warfare, but one that formally ends the ceasefire and creates its own operational risks.  Whether the blockade satisfies the effectiveness requirement will be tested quickly.  An ineffective blockade fails militarily and legally.

Minefields do not disappear through diplomacy, and transit passage rights cannot be negotiated away by the States that happen to border a strait. The legal architecture that keeps 11 percent of the global maritime trade flowing cannot be rebuilt alone with just two belligerent powers negotiating.  What is required is a coordinated, multinational mine clearance operation at scale. That is the only path back to a Strait that is free, open, and lawful.

The post Mined and Blockaded: Iran’s Unlawful Mining and the U.S. Port Blockade appeared first on Just Security.

A U.S. financial contribution to the Board of Peace will require engagement with Congress. The Trump administration’s budget request to Congress for the Department of State for Fiscal Year 2027, which was submitted to Congress on April 3, includes requests for funding that the document says could be used to make contributions to the Board, though does not specify proposed amounts of such contributions (see pages 91 and 96 of the budget request). Separately, a published report indicates that the Trump administration is seeking to reallocate $1.25 billion in funds previously appropriated for other purposes to be used for contribution to the Board.

Congress has historically given close scrutiny to requests for funding for assistance to Gaza and to requests for funding for contributions to international organizations. In addition, considerations specific to the Board of Peace suggest a further need for close scrutiny of the administration’s request. The Board is in its infancy and thus has no track record of designing and implementing effective programs or managing donor funds, which are factors Congress would typically consider when deciding whether to appropriate federal funding for a particular organization or initiative. And the high degree of control that Donald Trump exercises in his personal capacity over the Board’s activities and operations, pursuant to the Board’s Charter, creates the potential for conflicts of interest and other concerns for donors.

Close scrutiny of the administration’s plans for contributions to the Board of Peace is also warranted in light of the large dollar amounts involved. For context, the initial $1.25 billion the administration is reportedly seeking to reallocate from previously appropriated funds for a contribution to the Board of Peace would, by itself, nearly equal the total amount of money Congress appropriated for U.S. assessed contributions to all other international organizations worldwide in 2026, and would make the Board one of the two or three largest institutional recipients of U.S. humanitarian assistance funding in the world.

Against this background, below are some questions Congress should consider in connection with the Trump administration’s requests for funding to be provided to the Board of Peace.

1. How much federal funding is the administration proposing to provide to the Board and what impact will it have on other funding priorities?

While Trump has publicly announced a $10 billion U.S. pledge to the Board of Peace, the administration has not clearly indicated how much money it is currently proposing to provide to the Board. 

According to a media report, it is apparently seeking to provide at least $1.25 billion, to be taken from funds previously appropriated for international disaster assistance, peacekeeping operations, and international organizations and programs.

In addition, its budget request to Congress for Fiscal Year 2027 seeks appropriations that could be used for additional contributions to the Board. The budget request identifies two accounts from which it proposes such contributions could be provided: the International Humanitarian Assistance account and the America First Opportunity Fund account. In both cases, the budget request says only that funds from these accounts may be used “for potential contributions to the Board of Peace.” 

The total amount requested for these two accounts in Fiscal Year 2027 is $9 billion, but these accounts are also proposed to be used to fund a range of programs aside from the Board of Peace. As noted in the budget request, the International Humanitarian Assistance account funds “life-saving aid to people globally in the case of a natural or human-made disaster or a protracted emergency,” and “support[s] efforts to reduce mass and illegal immigration.” The request also indicates that the America First Opportunity Fund “will target initiatives that strengthen U.S. competitiveness and global leadership, including diversifying critical minerals supply chains to advance the administration’s reindustrialization agenda, expanding opportunities for American companies through infrastructure; addressing illegal and destabilizing migration; and maintaining global and regional balances of power by countering the influence of adversaries in the telecommunications, technology, and energy industries, including through the Countering PRC Influence Fund (CPIF).”

Congress should seek a clearer understanding of the total amount of money the administration intends to contribute to the Board of Peace across its various proposals, and what impact such funding would have on other programs funded by the accounts that would be used for such contributions.

2. How would the Board of Peace spend money contributed by the United States? What programs does it plan for Gaza reconstruction and how will it implement them?

The Board of Peace has said little to date about its plans for carrying out reconstruction activities in Gaza. In part this may reflect the Board’s initial focus on securing agreement to a process for the disarmament of Hamas. But, as a result, there is little clarity about how U.S. funds contributed to the Board of Peace would be spent, and little basis for Congress to assess how effective the Board’s programs are likely to be in promoting stability and reconstruction in Gaza.

It is also unclear how programs funded by the Board of Peace will be implemented. The Board has not indicated whether it intends to establish its own independent capabilities to directly implement programs on the ground in Gaza, or whether it intends to use implementing partners to carry out its programs. In either case, the effectiveness of its programs will depend significantly on the capacity and expertise of its implementers.

Congress has historically scrutinized U.S. assistance programs for Gaza closely. This has included enacting requirements for oversight mechanisms to prevent the diversion of assistance funds to Hamas; requirements for quarterly reporting on implementation of Gaza assistance programs, including identification of the specific entities implementing assistance; and requirements for annual audits of all contractors and grantees under assistance programs for Gaza.

Congress should seek a clearer understanding of the specific programs the Board of Peace intends to undertake in Gaza, how they will be implemented, and by whom. It should also consider whether oversight requirements it has historically established regarding the implementation of Gaza assistance programs should also apply to assistance provided via the Board of Peace (and if not, why this assistance ought to be treated differently).

3. What financial oversight mechanisms will exist to ensure that funds provided to the Board of Peace are used for their intended purposes and not mismanaged or wasted?

The Board of Peace is in its infancy as an international organization, and thus has not had an opportunity to establish a track record regarding the responsible management of funds and accountability to its donors. The Board’s Charter contemplates that the Board will need to put financial management rules in place, including “controls and oversight mechanisms with respect to budgets, financial accounts, and disbursements, as necessary or appropriate to ensure their integrity.” 

At the Board’s Feb. 19 meeting, World Bank President Ajay Banga announced the creation of a dedicated Gaza Reconstruction and Development Fund at the World Bank that would receive contributions of funds on behalf of the Board of Peace. He said that such funds would be disbursed for Gaza reconstruction efforts in accordance with decisions of the Board of Peace. He also indicated that the World Bank would second a financial controller to the Board of Peace to help the Board establish financial, legal, and oversight mechanisms for its work. But the Board has not released details of any such mechanisms or rules, and it is not clear whether it has yet adopted any.

In other contexts, both the Trump administration and Congress have expressed a need for careful oversight of U.S. funds contributed to international organizations. Secretary of State Marco Rubio cited “poor financial and ethical governance” by international organizations as among the reasons for President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from a number of existing organizations this past January. And Congress has passed legislation directing the Secretary of State to seek to enter into written agreements with each international organization that receives funding from the United States to provide timely access to the State Department’s Inspector General and the U.S. Comptroller General to such organization’s financial data and other information relevant to United States contributions to such organization (see section 7048(i) of the FY26 National Security, Department of State and Related Programs Appropriations Act).

Congress should seek a clearer understanding of the financial management mechanisms the Board of Peace will put in place, including the details of any arrangements the Board has made with the World Bank in this regard, and whether the Board will employ an Inspector General. It should also seek to understand what arrangements will be made for independent audits of the Board’s accounts, and what information about such audits will be available to donors and the public. 

4. What conflict of interest rules will the Board of Peace put in place to address potential concerns created by its unique governance structure?

Under the Board’s governance structure established in its Charter, Donald Trump serves as the Board’s Chairman in his personal capacity and, through that role, exercises significant control over the Board’s activities. He has the power to select both the members of the Board and the individuals who will serve on its executive board. No decision of the Board may be made without his approval, and he may adopt, on his own initiative and without approval of other Board members, resolutions or other directives, to implement the Board’s mission. He is also the final authority regarding the meaning, interpretation, and application of the Board’s Charter, giving him the power to resolve any interpretive questions or disputes regarding authorities of the Board’s various bodies, including regarding the extent of his own power as Chairman. Because the Charter designates Trump in his personal capacity as the Board’s Chairman, he would continue to exercise these powers even after his term as U.S. President has concluded. The Charter also gives Trump the power to designate his successor as Chairman.

These aspects of the Board’s governance structure create the potential for conflicts of interest, as situations may arise in which the interests of the Board as an organization and the personal interests of Trump as the Board’s Chairman may not align. In addition, Trump and members of his family have a range of business interests that could potentially intersect with peace-building activities pursued by the Board of Peace, which also create the potential for conflict of interest concerns.

Other international organizations address potential conflict of interest concerns through the establishment of ethics rules and oversight mechanisms, such as those promulgated by the United Nations and by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. These often include rules designed to prevent conflicts of interest in procurement actions and in hiring and contracting decisions, limitations on receipt of gifts by the organization’s officers and employees, and financial disclosure requirements for certain categories of officers and employees to allow the identification of potential conflicts and a process for them to be appropriately addressed.

Congress should seek a clearer understanding of what rules and mechanisms the Board of Peace will put in place to identify and address potential conflicts of interest that may arise in the conduct of its work. This should include an understanding of what financial disclosure rules will apply to officers and employees of the Board; what rules will apply to the use of Board funds to procure goods and services from, or to make other payments to, entities in which a Board officer or employee has a substantial financial interest; and what conflict of interest rules will apply to the Board’s hiring and recruitment processes for employment. 

5. What is the legal basis for the Board to enjoy immunities from lawsuits in the United States?

In January, President Trump issued an executive order purporting to extend the Board of Peace privileges and immunities under U.S. law, including immunity from lawsuits in U.S. courts. Such immunities are comparable to those that foreign states enjoy, and have been similarly extended to certain international organizations to facilitate their work in the United States and to insulate them from potential politically motivated interference.

Trump’s executive order indicated that it was relying on a statute, the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA), as the legal basis for extending privileges and immunities to the Board of Peace. But, as explained in more detail here, that statute only allows the President to provide privileges and immunities to international organizations in which the United States participates “pursuant to any treaty or under the authority of any Act of Congress authorizing such participation or making an appropriation for such participation.” Since the Senate has not provided advice and consent to ratification of a treaty providing for U.S. participation in the Board of Peace, and Congress has not previously enacted a statute for this purpose, the IOIA does not appear to provide authority for the President to extend privileges and immunities to the Board. If the Board’s privileges and immunities prove not to be legally effective, the Board’s funds in the United States, including any funds contributed from money appropriated by Congress, could be subject to attachment to satisfy any claims against the Board that are successfully pursued in U.S. courts. Uncertainty about the Board’s privileges and immunities may also dissuade implementing partners from being willing to enter into contracts with the Board to assist in its work.

Congress should seek a clearer understanding of the legal basis on which the administration believes it has provided privileges and immunities to the Board, and should assess the extent to which it believes the administration’s action is legally effective. Congress should also consider whether it believes that the Board should receive such privileges and immunities in the United States, including whether the traditional justifications for providing privileges and immunities to international organizations should apply with equal force to the Board given the extent to which its activities and operations are controlled by a private individual. If Congress believes the Board should enjoy privileges and immunities, it could clarify matters by passing legislation clearly providing them to the Board.

6. What will happen if the Board of Peace is dissolved?

Under the terms of the Board of Peace Charter, Donald Trump, as Chairman, may dissolve the Board of Peace at any time, and the Board will dissolve automatically every two years unless the Chairman acts to renew the Board for a further two-year period. In the event of the Board’s dissolution, the Charter says that “the Executive Board shall provide for the rules and procedures with respect to the settling of all assets, liabilities, and obligations upon dissolution.”

Given the large sums of U.S. funds the Trump administration proposes to contribute to the Board, and the uncertainty about the duration of the Board’s operations created by the terms of its Charter, Congress should seek to understand what would happen to U.S. contributions to the Board of Peace in the event of the Board’s dissolution. In particular, Congress should seek to understand what mechanisms would be available to oversee any further use of funds distributed by the Board of Peace upon its dissolution and to ensure that any funds contributed by the United States are used only for the purposes originally intended.

The post Some Questions for Congress About Trump’s Request for Funding for the Board of Peace appeared first on Just Security.

A curated guide to major news and developments over the weekend. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR – ISLAMABAD NEGOTIATIONS

Vice President JD Vance led high-stakes U.S.-Iran peace talks in Islamabad over the weekend but failed to secure any agreement after 16 hours of closed-door meetings, blaming Iran’s refusal to commit to abandoning nuclear ambitions. Vance did not say whether this meant the United States and Israel would resume their attacks on Iran or escalate them. Details remain scarce and disputed. Some Iranian officials told media outlets that the United States had agreed to unfreeze Iranian assets held in Qatar and foreign banks before the meetings began as a sign of good faith. The United States said those reports were false. A U.S. official said that despite Vance’s departure from Islamabad, the U.S. deal is still on the table, and it is up to the Iranians if they choose to take it. President Trump told reporters last night that the two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran is “holding well.” Tyler Pager reports for the New York Times; Dan Goldberg reports for POLITICO; Megan Messerly reports for POLITICO.

Iranian parliamentary speaker and top negotiator Mohammah Bagher Ghalibaf said in a statement yesterday that Iran had approached the negotiations in Islamabad in good faith, but the U.S. team had failed to “gain the trust of the Iranian delegation.” Ghalibaf indicated that future talks were possible, adding that now is the time for Washington “to decide whether it can earn our trust or not.” His statement followed JD Vance’s comments before he departed Islamabad that the United States had put out its “final and best offer”, but Iran had “chosen not to accept our terms.” Anushka Patil reports for the New York Times.

IRAN WAR – STRAIT OF HORMUZ

U.S. Central Command announced on Saturday that two U.S. destroyers transited the strait as part of a mine-clearing mission. Several U.S. officials added that the U.S. military had destroyed an Iranian surveillance drone approaching one of the ships. Iran declared the move a ceasefire violation. Megan Messerly reports for POLITICO; Michael Crowley, Julian E. Barnes, Adam Rasgon, and Tyler Pager report for the New York Times.

President Trump yesterday announced that a U.S. naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would begin from today and threatened to destroy “the little that is left of Iran,” following the talks in Islamabad. U.S. Central Command said the blockade would begin at 10 a.m. ET and would be “enforced impartially against all vessels of all nations entering or departing Iranian ports.” Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned today that “no port in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman will be safe” if its own ports are threatened. Oil prices have again topped $100 a barrel, and stock markets fell as talks collapsed and the imminent blockade threatened to disrupt the global economy further. Megan Messerly reports for POLITICO; Billy Stockwell reports for CNN; Samy Magdy reports for AP News.

U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer said this morning that Britain will not be part of the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports, adding that Britain is “not getting dragged into war.” France and the U.K. plan to organize a conference in the coming days with countries willing to contribute to a “peaceful, multinational mission” aimed at restoring free transit through the strait, French President Emmanuel Macron said today. Reuters reports; James Regan reports for Bloomberg.

IRAN WAR – LEBANON OPERATIONS 

An Israeli airstrike on a Lebanese government building killed 13 state security personnel last week, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said on Friday Reuters.

Israeli warplanes struck two Lebanese towns over the weekend, while a third came under artillery fire. Iranian state media said a fourth strike on a house in the town of Maaroub “targeted a family of more than seven members,” resulting in deaths and injuries. A strike also killed a Red Cross paramedic and injured an emergency worker. Lebanese health authorities say at least 2,055 people have been killed, with more than 6,500 wounded since the beginning of March. Xiaoqian Lin reports for CNN.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu entered southern Lebanon yesterday to conduct a situational assessment in territory seized by Israel, according to an Israeli official. Tal Shalev and Oren Liebermann report for CNN.

Netanyahu on Friday asked to postpone giving testimony in his corruption trial that was set to resume this week, citing the ongoing security situation in the region, according to a court filing. It said that a sealed envelope detailing the classified ‌reasons ⁠was delivered to the court, which will rule once the prosecution submits its response. Steven Scheer reports for Reuters.

IRAN WAR – OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

U.S. intelligence agencies have obtained information that China, in recent weeks, may have sent a shipment of shoulder-fired missiles to Iran, according to U.S. officials. The officials said the intelligence is not definitive that the shipment was sent, and there is no evidence that Chinese missiles have been used against Israel or the United States during the conflict. A spokesman for China’s embassy to the United States strongly denied that his government had shipped missiles to Iran. A CNN report on Saturday said that China was preparing to send a shipment of shoulder-fired missiles to Iran in the coming weeks. Two sources said there are indications that Beijing is working to route the shipments through third countries to mask their true origin. Mark Mazzetti, Erich Schmitt, and Julian E. Barnes report for the New York Times; Natasha Bertrand, Haley Britzky, and Zachary Cohen report.

A new visual analysis by the New York Times and munitions experts has uncovered additional evidence showing that the weapons that struck a sports hall, a school, and two residential areas in the Iranian city of Lamerd on Feb. 28 were U.S.-made Precision Strike Missiles. The strikes killed 21 people, according to Iranian officials. The Times was able to independently verify the identities of the victims. Christiaan Triebert, John Ismay, Alexander Cardia, Leanne Abraham, and Azmat Khan report.

Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is still recovering from severe facial and leg injuries suffered in the U.S.-Israeli airstrike on Feb. 28, three people told Reuters. The sources said Khamenei is recovering and remains mentally sharp. He is taking part in meetings with senior officials via audio conferencing and is engaged in decision-making on major issues, two sources said. Parisa Hafezi and Angus McDowall report.

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR 

Two Israeli airstrikes hit Gaza on Saturday, killing at least seven people and injuring others, Gaza health ministry officials said. Israeli strikes killed at least 25 people in Gaza last week. Reuters reports.

Trump’s “Board of Peace” has received only a small fraction of the $17 billion pledged for Gaza, sources told Reuters. One of the sources said that out of ten countries that pledged funds, only three – the United Arab ​Emirates, Morocco, and the U.S. itself – had contributed funding. The source said funding so far was under $1 billion. The Iran war “has affected everything,” exacerbating previous funding difficulties, the source said. The board denied in a statement on Friday, after the Reuters story was published, that it had funding problems. Pesha Magid and Nidal al-Mughrabi report.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

Russia and Ukraine yesterday accused each other of breaching the 32-hour ceasefire, reporting more than a thousand drone and shelling attacks just hours after the truce began to mark Orthodox Easter. The General Staff of Ukraine’s military, in a late evening report issued as the end of the truce ​was approaching, said it had compiled a total of 7,696 Russian violations over the course of the ​truce. The Russian defence ministry said it recorded 1,971 ceasefire violations overnight into Sunday. Reuters reports.

SUDANESE CIVIL WAR 

“In the two areas ​worst hit by the conflict [in Sudan] – North Darfur and South Kordofan – millions of families can ​only access one meal a day,” according to a report published today by Action Against Hunger, CARE International, International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, and the Norwegian Refugee Council. “Often, they miss ​meals for entire days,” the report stated, adding that many people have resorted to eating leaves ​and animal feed to survive. Olivia Le Poidevin reports for Reuters.

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

Hungarian voters yesterday ousted Prime Minister Viktor Orbán after 16 years in power. Election winner Péter Magyar, a former Orbán loyalist who campaigned against corruption and on everyday issues like health care and public transport, has pledged to rebuild Hungary’s relationships with the European Union and NATO. Justin Spike and Sam McNeil report AP News.

Nigerian military airstrikes on Saturday killed at least 50 people and injured many others in northeastern Nigeria, according to residents and local authorities. A Nigerian military spokesman said the strikes hit what he called a terrorist enclave and logistics hub near Jilli, in what he said was an abandoned village. The local authorities and human rights groups said the bombs struck a weekly market that attracts hundreds of people. They said the number of dead, mostly civilians, was much higher than reported. “I spoke to the hospital authorities, and they confirmed that at least 100 have been killed,” said Isa Sanusi, the executive director of Amnesty International in Nigeria. Saikou Jammeh and Eric Schmitt report for the New York Times.

Nearly 400 people have been sentenced in Nigeria for links with militant Islamic groups following mass trials last week. Farouk Chothia reports for BBC News.

A Paris court ruled today that cement conglomerate Lafarge was guilty of paying protection money to the Islamic State group and other jihadists to maintain its business in Syria in 2013 and 2014. “This method of financing terrorist organizations, and primarily IS, was essential in enabling the terrorist organization to gain control of Syria’s natural resources, allowing it to finance terrorist acts within the region and those planned abroad, particularly in Europe,” the judge said. Le Monde reports.

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Trump attacked Pope Leo XIV on social media this morning, calling him “WEAK on crime, and terrible for Foreign Policy. “Leo should get his act together as Pope, use Common Sense, stop catering to the Radical Left, and focus on being a Great Pope, not a Politician,” Trump added. Pope Leo responded by telling reporters this morning that he has “no fear of the Trump administration” and will continue to speak out. Ali Walker reports for POLITICO.

The United Kingdom said on Saturday that it was suspending its plan to give up sovereignty of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius as it could not proceed without Washington’s support. Stephen Castle reports for the New York Times.

U.S CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

U.S. military strikes killed five people on boats alleged to be trafficking drugs in the eastern Pacific on Saturday, U.S Southern Command said yesterday, with one person surviving the strikes. CBS News reports.

[Editor’s note: See Timeline on Just Security for more information about the total number of strikes and casualties to date.]

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS 

The Trump administration fired several immigration judges on Friday, including two who had blocked deportations of pro-Palestinian international students. Hamed Aleaziz, Nicholas Nehamas, and Steven Rich report for the New York Times.

A Venezuelan doctor, Rubeliz Bolivar, was detained by immigration agents in South Texas on Saturday after checking into a flight to California. She had planned to join her husband for their asylum interview scheduled for this week. Another Venezuelan physician was detained last week by Border Patrol agents at a checkpoint in South Texas while driving to Houston. Miriam Jordan reports for the New York Times.

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

A 20-year-old man was arrested on Friday after throwing a Molotov cocktail at OpenAI CEO Sam Altman’s home, according to the company and the police. The suspect had fled on foot but was found an hour later at the OpenAI headquarters, where he was threatening to burn down the building, the San Francisco Police Department said. Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Kalley Huang, and Heather Knight report for the New York Times.

Rep. Eric Swalwell (D-CA) yesterday announced that he was suspending his campaign for California governor amid sexual assault and misconduct allegations. Jeremy B. White reports for POLITICO.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services agency has referred allegations of Swalwell illegally employing a Brazilian nanny several years ago to law enforcement officials at the Department of Homeland Security for investigation, a DHS spokesperson told POLITICO. Daniel Lippman reports.

First lady Melania Trump’s public remarks last week distancing herself from Jeffrey Epstein were driven by her monthslong fixation on press coverage and internet speculation about her ties to him, two sources told CNN. A senior White House official said that Trump had informed West Wing officials that Melania planned to make a statement, but gave no indication what it was about. On Friday, Trump said that Melania had a “right to talk about it” even if he personally questioned whether he would have gone about it a different way. Adam Cancryn and Kristen Holmes report.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

The Trump administration has terminated all six board members of the federal agency that oversees the Presidio, a San Francisco park at the base of the Golden Gate Bridge. All of the board members, appointed by former President Joe Biden, were fired last Wednesday, and new members have not been installed, a Presidio Trust spokesperson said on Saturday. New York Times.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell summoned bank executives for a meeting this week where they encouraged the executives to use Anthropic’s new Mythos model to detect vulnerabilities, according to Bloomberg. JPMorgan Chase was the only bank listed as one of the initial partner organizations with access to the model, but sources said that Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Bank of America, and Morgan Stanley are testing Mythos as well. Anthony Ha reports for TechCrunch.

The Federal Aviation Administration said on Friday that the U.S. military can use high-energy lasers to shoot down suspected drones in U.S. airspace. This ends a two-month standoff over whether the weapons endangered the airspace. Karoun Demirjian reports for the New York Times.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION

A federal appeals court ruled in a 2-1 decision on Saturday that construction on Trump’s new White House ballroom can continue until at least April 17, temporarily staying a lower court injunction. Gregory Svirnovskiy reports for POLITICO.

A federal judge on Friday declined to block the Trump administration from rushing deportations of Somali migrants, despite finding the administration had most likely singled out the community for quicker removal hearings. The judge said it was not clear whether the organizations that sued could prevail in the case because they had not been directly affected by the new policy. Zach Montague reports for the New York Times.

The post Early Edition: April 13, 2026 appeared first on Just Security.

• How Good is Our Intelligence on Iran?
  By Marc Polymeropoulos and Jeremy Hurewitz
• When War Crimes Rhetoric Becomes Battlefield Reality: The Slippery Slope to Total War on Iran
  by Margaret Donovan and Rachel VanLandingham, Lt Col, USAF (Ret.)
• The Dangers of Hegseth’s “Warfighter” Ethos
  by Allison McManus
• Reprisals and the Paradox of Trust: Why Threats of Retaliation in the Iran War are Unlikely to Work
  by Eliav Lieblich
• Continuing Crisis in Strait of Hormuz: Why Iran’s Hold is Illegal and U.S. Military Force Alone Fails
  by Mark Nevitt
• Amid Shaky Ceasefire, War in Iran Is Starving Sudan
  by Rachel George

Crimes Against Humanity

• Codifying Forced Marriage in the Crimes Against Humanity Convention: From Jurisprudence to Treaty Text
  by Elise Keppler and Maryanne Koussa

Extremism

• Global Crises, Local Impacts: How Mayors Need to Prepare
  by William Peduto and Nancy Rodkin Rotering
• No, There Isn’t a Trans Shooter Problem
  by Luke Baumgartner

Congress

• The Anti-Stonewalling Playbook: How Congress Can Plan Now to Counter Executive Branch Obstruction Next Term
  by Sara Zdeb

Tech Governance

• The Tightrope Walk of Democratic Defense: Lessons from Taiwan’s Platform Governance Challenge
  by You-Hao Lai

FISA Section 702

• Myths and Facts About Section 702 Backdoor Searches: A Reply to George Croner
  by Elizabeth Goitein and Hannah James

Hungary / Elections

• Hungary’s Election Could End Orbán’s Rule — But Will It End His Power?
  by Zsuzsanna Végh

South Korea / Accountability

• The Judicial Reckoning for the Abuse of Presidential Power in Korea
  by Eungi Hong

Trump Executive Actions

• Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions (Updated)
  by Just Security

The post Digest of Recent Articles on Just Security (Apr. 4-10, 2026) appeared first on Just Security.

On Monday, Feb. 16, Robert Dorgan, who also went by Roberta Esposito, shot and killed their ex-wife and teenage son at a high school hockey game in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, before turning the gun on themself; three bystanders were also injured in the shooting. Shortly after news broke that the shooter was identified as transgender, a chorus of influencers and political commentators sang in unison. Podcast host Matt Walsh posted to his 4 million followers on X: “Any adult man with a wife and children who ‘transitions’ to a ‘woman’ is automatically a threat to his family and the public. All of them should be looked at with suspicion and extreme wariness.” Another influencer, Branton Tatum, with nearly 1 million followers on X, wrote: “Transgenderism is a sickness that is spreading rapidly.”

The tragedy in Rhode Island and the transphobic rhetoric that followed came on the heels of another deadly mass shooting in Tumbler Ridge, British Columbia, Canada that left nine people dead and more than 25 injured—the deadliest Canadian mass shooting since the Nova Scotia attacks in 2020. Like the Pawtucket incident, the Tumbler Ridge perpetrator, later identified by authorities as 18-year-old Jesse Van Rootselaar, was also transgender.

Despite the disproportionate attention given to the shooters’ gender identities by some of the loudest voices online, the perpetrators’ connections to extremist ideologies and subcultures were widely ignored. Photos posted to social media show Dorgan sporting several tattoos connected to Nazi ideology, such as the “Totenkopf,” or “death’s head,” used by the 3rd SS Panzer Division in World War II, as well as a pair of SS bolts. A preliminary investigation by the ADL’s Center on Extremism (COE) revealed that Van Rootselaar “followed a troubling pattern of online radicalization marked by engagement with violence and gore content.”

As with any public tragedy, especially acts of violence such as mass shootings, the subsequent media and social commentary firestorm seeks to place blame on a vulnerable scapegoat. Instead of taking the opportunity to discuss practical solutions to gun violence, loud social media personalities selectively focus on a perpetrator’s gender identity. As a result, the transgender community has become the target of smear campaigns designed to further isolate them from mainstream society and desensitize the greater public to acts of retribution against an imagined enemy.

The data and the evolving nature of extremism show that such scapegoating is grossly misplaced.

What the Data Show

For all of America’s cultural exports, mass shootings rank near the top, with deleterious effects. Despite representing only 5 percent of the world’s population, the United States accounts for nearly one third of the world’s mass shooters and 73 percent of all mass shootings in developed countries. Since 2015, mass shootings, which the Gun Violence Archive (GVA) defines as an event in which “a minimum of four victims shot, either injured or killed,” excluding the perpetrator, have trended upwards, reaching a peak of 690 victims in 2021. Alternatively, the Violence Prevention Project (VPV), which uses the Congressional Research Service’s standard of four or more victims murdered in a single event, excluding any underlying criminal activity, reaches similar conclusions, tracking an all-time high of 36 shootings between 2015 and 2019. The period of 2020 to 2024 fared slightly better, but just barely, with 28 mass shootings.

Despite the differences in definitions and methodology, the data bear unmistakable truths: mass shootings carried out by transgender individuals are exceedingly rare. Following the August 2025 mass shooting at the Annunciation Catholic Church in Minneapolis, Minnesota, by Robin Westman—who was transgender—rumors and misinformation regarding the frequency of similar events ran rampant.

However, in an email to Factcheck.org, the GVA’s founding executive director, Mark Bryant, clarified that between January 1, 2013, and September 15, 2025 just five of the 5,748 mass shootings recorded during that time were confirmed to have been carried out by transgender shooters. This represents less than 0.01 percent of the sample. Operating within even more restrictive inclusion criteria, the VPV’s co-founder and deputy director, James Densley, identified just one of 201 mass shooters as transgender, or approximately 0.5 percent. The remaining 200 shooters in VPV’s data consisted of 196 cisgender men and four cisgender women, demonstrating what Densley described as a “vanishingly small proportion of perpetrators.” Densely further confirmed that the hysteria directed at transgender individuals is misplaced by pointing out that they are, in fact, underrepresented in the data proportionate to their share of the population in the United States, which is estimated at one percent.

The Real Patterns: Diffuse and Overlapping Motives in Mass Violence 

Irrespective of the disproportionate attention paid to a shooter’s alleged or confirmed gender identity, ideological drivers behind a perpetrator’s violent act often take center stage. The truth of the matter is that violent actors have grown increasingly diffuse in their ideologies and motivations. In some cases, no motive can be identified.

For instance, 64-year-old Stephen Paddock, who carried out the deadliest mass shooting in American history in Las Vegas, Nevada, in October 2017, when he killed 60 and injured nearly 900 more, had no official motive. Separate investigations by the Clark County Sheriff and the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit concluded that there was no conspiracy or second shooter, and no “single or clear motivating factor” for the shooting, respectively.

Even outside of mass shootings, recent instances of social violence seem to defy traditional classification and do not immediately present clearly articulated motives or ideologies. One such example can be found in the case of Thomas Matthew Crooks, the attempted assassin of then-candidate Donald Trump, whose internet search history revealed a year-long plan to commit an act of violence, but with no clear ideological motive. In another case, 29-year-old Joshua Jahn, who opened fire on an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facility in Dallas, Texas, in September 2025, was described by his friends in an interview with journalist Ken Klippenstein as someone who was “never really into politics,” but was instead an “edgelord” and “irony guy.”

To further fan the flames of confusion, the recent rise in Nihilistic Violent Extremists, or NVEs, adds yet another layer to an already complex landscape. Adjacent to, or even within, these NVE communities lies the True Crime Community subculture (TCC). The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) describes the TCC as an online fandom dedicated to obsessing over high-profile killers, including mass murderers such as the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooter, Adam Lanza, and Dylann Roof, who killed nine Black worshippers at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, in 2015. Several recent school shootings have since been connected to the TCC, including those in Madison, Wisconsin, Antioch, Tennessee, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Evergreen, Colorado. The Tumbler Ridge shootings in February appear to fit this pattern as well.

While two of the aforementioned shooters connected to the TCC were identified as transgender, their identity as such is statistically insignificant when compared to the hundreds—if not thousands—of previous cisgender shooters. But that hasn’t stopped a moral panic from spreading across social media.

Tragedy and Moral Panic: Scapegoating on Social Media

As a result of today’s highly decentralized media landscape, where the once-storied legacy outlets no longer serve as the primary source of information for most Americans, opportunities for spinning and amplifying baseless conspiracy theories to gain notoriety or make a quick buck are virtually limitless. In the immediate aftermath of a tragedy, some commentators work to ensure that their version of events or analysis of the situation come to the forefront of social discourse. This pattern rings especially true when it comes to acts of violence, where the perpetrator’s gender identity, whether real or imagined, takes precedence.

After the Tumbler Ridge shooting, other acts of violence carried out by transgender individuals have resurfaced on social media, particularly X, where previous attacks are highlighted in an attempt to paint trans people, and the broader LGBTQ+ community in general, as mentally unstable and therefore inherently prone to violence. Incidents like the September 2018 Aberbeed, Maryland, shooting at a Rite Aid distribution center, a May 2019 charter school shooting in Highlands Ranch, Colorado, and the March 2023 shooting at The Covenant School in Nashville, Tennessee, are just a few examples that commentators with millions of followers use to vilify their targets.

Beyond the fact that some of these shooters were indeed transgender, the rampant speculation that any mass shooter may be either non-cisgender, or heterosexual sets a dangerous precedent. It opens the door to more violence directed at a community that is more likely to be the victims of gun violence than perpetrators. To make matters worse, high-ranking government officials are also guilty of perpetuating outright lies or inaccurate statistics. The peddling of such falsehoods has led to multiple troubling developments, including the potential to strip transgender people of their right to bear arms and the push to designate “Transgender Ideology-Inspired Violent Extremism” as a new form of domestic terrorism by the Heritage Foundation’s Oversight Project.

But for those pushing a hate-fueled agenda, the facts and statistics proving them incorrect are irrelevant.

Conclusion

As gun violence continues to plague the United States, familiar patterns of blame resurface. Rather than confronting well-established risk factors of gun violence—easy access to weapons, possession by prohibited individuals, domestic violence, and mental health crises—some commentators turn isolated incidents into broad, damning indictments. In recent years, transgender identity has increasingly been used as a causal explanation for mass violence, despite clear evidence pointing to the contrary. Time and again, the data remain unambiguous in their conclusions: the overwhelming majority of mass shootings are committed by cisgender men, most often motivated by personal grievance, interpersonal conflict, ideological extremism, or some unstable combination of them. Transgender perpetrators represent a statistically inconsequential share of these attacks. As such, rare and tragic cases do little to constitute a trend.

Mass shooter motivations are evolving to become more diffuse and difficult to categorize, and the temptation to superimpose simple narratives to explain the reasoning behind them becomes almost insatiable. Scholars, journalists, and public officials have a responsibility to resist the urge to feed moral panic and correct hateful misinformation, not only to preserve the integrity of legitimate research but also to prevent already marginalized communities from becoming convenient stand-ins for explanations of a crisis that has largely been settled.

The post No, There Isn’t a Trans Shooter Problem appeared first on Just Security.

At the same time as the RedNote ban, the United States was brokering a historic deal to keep TikTok alive while addressing the security risks of Chinese ownership. Can democracies like Taiwan learn anything from the U.S. experience? The answer lies not in the ownership-driven model underpinning the TikTok legislation—which middle powers cannot replicate—but in the operational safeguards embedded in the subsequent deal. Making this path work will require coordinated action between middle and major democracies.

The Structural Risks of Chinese-Operated Platforms

Chinese foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) targeting Taiwan is not new, but it is rapidly evolving. Leaked internal documents have revealed that GoLaxy, a Chinese company with ties to the PRC’s military and intelligence apparatus, is actively developing an AI-powered FIMI system that can build detailed profiles of key figures, detect political trends and societal vulnerabilities in target countries through massive data analysis, generate tailored propaganda, and deploy and amplify it through thousands of realistic AI personas.

These operations can be carried out across all major social media platforms. But platforms operated by Chinese companies present a distinct, structural layer of risk. Consider RedNote. After Taiwan’s ban last year, the company migrated its overseas users to a version registered in Singapore. Yet RedNote’s privacy policy still permits user data to be processed in mainland China, and data is explicitly shared with its Shanghai-based operator. This means that overseas users’ data remains subject to PRC national security laws that grant the government sweeping access without meaningful independent judicial review. Additionally, China’s algorithm regulations require recommendation services to actively promote “positive energy” and prohibit content deemed a threat to national security—defined so expansively in President Xi Jinping’s comprehensive security framework that it extends to virtually every sphere of political and social life. In the short term, this creates a ready-made channel for propaganda amplification; over time, it risks shaping Taiwanese users’ worldviews in ways favorable to Beijing—for instance, normalizing the prospect of unification and eroding confidence in Taiwan’s own democratic system.

Taiwan’s Governance Trilemma

Taiwan’s vibrant civil society and fact-checking ecosystem have earned it a strong reputation for democratic resilience. But beyond this civic layer, the country faces a severe governance trilemma. Institutionally, the criminal penalties Taiwan primarily relies on (such as election laws targeting deepfake disinformation) cannot keep pace with viral manipulation, nor can they reach the upstream authoritarian regime that orchestrates it. Politically, Taiwan’s parties are deeply divided along national identity lines and China policy—a fault line visible in disputes ranging from U.S. arms procurement to cross-strait economic engagement. As a result, any legislation specifically targeting Chinese platforms faces structural opposition. And the island’s four decades of martial law—during which the authoritarian government exercised pervasive control over expression and the flow of information—have left a lasting reflex: any state action that touches content regulation triggers fears of democratic backsliding. This fear has concrete policy consequences. In 2022, the government proposed the Digital Intermediary Services Act, modeled on the European Union’s Digital Services Act, aimed at platform accountability. It was withdrawn within months after opposition parties equated its emergency content restriction provisions with state censorship.

Economically, Taiwan’s limited market size makes policymakers reluctant to impose regulations on transnational platforms without overwhelming public consensus. And China-focused regulation, as the political dynamics above make clear, lacks precisely that consensus. As a result, the only tool the government has reached for was the 2024 Fraud Crime Hazard Prevention Act, which empowers authorities to order the blocking of fraudulent websites, but was never designed to address FIMI.

The Limits of the Ownership-Driven Model

Against this backdrop, the U.S. approach to TikTok offers a natural point of comparison. The 2024 Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act required ByteDance to divest TikTok from Chinese control or face a ban—an ownership-driven approach under which any qualifying restructuring must preclude all operational ties with the former parent company. But this model faces two barriers in Taiwan. First, the bipartisan consensus that enabled passage in the U.S. Congress does not exist. Taiwan’s parties are too divided on China policy to rally behind such legislation. Second, the model rests on a precondition that does not apply in the Taiwanese context: ByteDance had a U.S. subsidiary, making divestiture at least structurally possible. By contrast, Taiwanese users access Chinese platforms like TikTok through Singapore-registered entities that serve multiple Asian markets. Taiwan simply lacks the leverage to demand that a Singapore-based company divest from its Chinese parent.

But the TikTok story does not end with the 2024 act. The Trump administration’s TikTok deal went beyond ownership restructuring and developed a set of concrete operational safeguards—and these elements hold vital lessons for middle powers like Taiwan. Under the deal, a majority American-owned joint venture now operates TikTok’s U.S. security infrastructure under defined safeguards: U.S. user data is stored in Oracle’s U.S. cloud environment with comprehensive privacy and cybersecurity protections; the content recommendation algorithm is retrained on U.S. user data; the joint venture holds decision-making authority over trust and safety policies and content moderation; and continuous accountability is ensured through transparency reporting and third-party certifications.

To be sure, the deal is far from perfect. Critics have rightly pointed out that ByteDance retains the intellectual property rights to TikTok’s recommendation algorithm. The U.S. entity operates it under license and retrains it on American user data, but the underlying model remains in China. Whether this arrangement truly severs the operational ties as required by the 2024 act, and whether retraining alone can strip out ideologically-embedded biases, are open questions. Transparency around the licensing terms and the platform’s ongoing operations also remains insufficient to verify that the safeguards are working as intended. And more fundamentally, comprehensive privacy legislation is needed to anchor any credible data governance framework. Yet despite these shortcomings, critics are not calling for a retreat from operational safeguards. They are calling for stronger ones.

Crucially, any operations-driven framework must be grounded in clear legal authority, due process, independent judicial review, and proportionality. Without these safeguards, measures designed to defend open societies risk becoming instruments of unchecked state power. And that is precisely the direction that Taiwan and other democratic middle powers lacking the conditions for ownership restructuring should explore.

From Ownership to Operation: A Path for Democratic Middle Powers

An operations-driven approach will not fully neutralize all of the risks that authoritarian digital infrastructure poses to open societies, but expecting a silver bullet would be the wrong starting point. In an era of digital sovereignty competition, authoritarian regimes are unlikely to relinquish control over the data, algorithms, and platforms they command. The risks can only be managed, not eliminated. The key to proportionate regulation is a stronger evidence base. Governments must be able to demonstrate, with rigor, what the risks are and why specific measures are justified.

With that foundation, democratic middle powers like Taiwan should condition market access for transnational platforms such as RedNote on compliance with baseline requirements—including data protection and cross-border transfer safeguards, algorithm safety and transparency, and obligations to detect and mitigate coordinated manipulative behavior on their platforms. For platforms subject to authoritarian legal frameworks that create demonstrated structural risks, enhanced obligations are warranted. This approach echoes the European Union’s evolving FIMI framework, which shifts regulatory focus from the truthfulness of content to the detection of manipulative behavioral patterns. And because no single middle power commands sufficient market leverage alone, major democracies should coordinate these standards to prevent forum shopping.

The need for such coordination is concrete. For example, my own research has found that many Chinese digital services register in jurisdictions such as Singapore and the United States, while their privacy policies retain provisions channeling user data back to China—through server storage in mainland China, intra-group sharing with Chinese parent entities, and legal clauses enabling government access. Without aligned standards across democracies, jurisdictions with weaker regulatory frameworks risk becoming gaps through which authoritarian practices operate unchecked. The United States itself is navigating this challenge: critics of the TikTok deal have called not for abandoning operational safeguards, but for strengthening them, and middle powers developing their own regulatory responses can contribute comparative insights to that effort. Multilateral mechanisms already provide a foundation: the Global Cross-Border Privacy Rules Forum, of which both Taiwan and the United States are founding members, offers a ready-made platform for coordinating the kind of cross-border data governance standards this challenge demands.

Governing the digital information environment against authoritarian influence is a tightrope walk between democratic defense and erosion. Taiwan’s experience with the RedNote ban illustrates the costs of a mismatch between governance tools and structural risks. The U.S. TikTok saga shows that even the world’s most powerful democracies are still searching for the right approach. Yet the operational safeguards emerging from that search offer democracies a compass to navigate the uncertainty that openness inevitably brings.

The post The Tightrope Walk of Democratic Defense: Lessons from Taiwan’s Platform Governance Challenge appeared first on Just Security.

We have both received these phone calls. The first came in October 2018, after 11 people were killed in a Pittsburgh synagogue. The second was in the summer of 2022, after a young man opened fire on the July 4th parade in Highland Park. The mayor on the other end of such calls is kind, empathetic. They, too, have grappled with the unimaginable. They offer advice and promise that you and your community “will get through this.” As we learned, they will be proven right. But we still must do more to prepare for such a tragedy.

In mid-March, a phone undoubtedly rang in the office of Mo Baydoun, the mayor of Dearborn Heights, after a man from his city drove a truck laden with explosives into Temple Israel in West Bloomfield. Only the attacker was killed, but it left the town shaken to its core. Press reports indicate that the attacker was inspired by the ongoing violence in the Middle East and his brother, a Hezbollah commander, was killed in an Israeli airstrike just days beforehand.

“The tensions we see across the world too often find their way into our own neighborhoods, reminding us how deeply connected our shared safety is,” Baydoun wrote in a statement following the attack.

Baydoun is correct. From Tehran to Tempe, global tensions are now, more than ever, impacting local communities.

Researchers at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue have documented how the muddied information environment created by global conflicts exacerbates local polarization and amplifies extremism at home. Mayors are uniquely positioned to counter these threats, but their role begins long before an attack occurs, lives are lost and the trauma has been inflicted.

After such attacks, attention typically focuses on how we can improve the security of public spaces so people can go on with their daily lives. While this is an important piece to the puzzle, the conversation needs to go further than that. While security can protect a community, a strong, resilient social fabric is what holds a city together in its darkest moments. There are simple, straightforward steps that can be taken. While these steps are relatively inexpensive, they take time, effort, and buy-in. We recommend every mayor start building today, before their city is in the news as the site of the next tragic act of violence.

First, mayors need to look holistically at the resources they already have—faith communities, hospitals, cultural centers, libraries, schools, and community-based organizations—and leverage them. Mayors can develop relationships with the leaders of their neighborhood communities and sister governments through regular meetings.

Second, mayors should issue a clear values statement that rejects hate, well before a crisis ever happens, and defines what the community stands for and what it will not tolerate.

Third, local agencies should be included in public safety tabletop exercises, which establish clear protocols to deal with any emergency.

Fourth, mayors can work with schools and libraries to promote media literacy, explaining how to identify reliable as well as questionable sources of information.

We know from experience that such steps can work.

The Welcoming Pittsburgh Initiative engaged 40 community leaders and more than 3,000 concerned citizens to create a roadmap for a more connected city. After a white nationalist walked into the Tree of Life synagogue and took 11 of our fellow citizens from us, we leaned into the connections developed through the initiative to help create a city-wide approach for dealing with the fallout from the shooting. We countered hate with a strong response from the interfaith community, including a Muslim-led fundraiser that raised $150,000 for the funerals of the victims.

In Highland Park, our long-standing partnerships with sister governments and local agencies created the space and personnel to quickly serve thousands across a traumatized community.  Having locations immediately available to provide trauma-informed therapy to over 1,200 people at day, access to free legal counsel and medical care for undocumented victims of a mass crime, and ongoing, long-term services for a traumatized community, helped us rebuild, reconnect and strengthen our relationships. Additionally, the provision of mutual aid, not only via public safety personnel but also in the form of municipal administration, gave much needed support and respite to the first responders and city management who had been in the hot zone and needed time for their own recoveries.

These are just some of the benefits of widescale efforts from stakeholders across our cities working to strengthen the social fabric of our communities. The help we received on our worst days as mayors was the result of bonds built beforehand. The relationships we fostered, the communities we invested in, and the values we made clear were the vital foundations of resiliency.

Through our work as mayoral advisers for Strong Cities, an independent global network of 290+ cities dedicated to addressing all forms of hate, extremism and polarization, we have heard from local leaders around the globe who, like us, have led their cities in the aftermath of targeted violence.  Each has shared how the partnerships they invested in before the attack proved invaluable in helping them maintain social cohesion in the days that followed. Like us, their advice to their fellow mayors is to take preventative action now—alongside enhanced security measures—and not wait for tragedy to strike.

As polarization intensifies, and cities across our country continue to deal with the unpredictable ripple effects of global crises, more mayors will likely be forced to deal with sudden violence. We urge mayors to do the resiliency-building work now, so when their phone rings during one of their city’s darkest moments, they’ll be ready for what’s next.

The post Global Crises, Local Impacts: How Mayors Need to Prepare appeared first on Just Security.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR: U.S. DEFENSES AND VULNERABILITIES

Survivors of the deadliest Iranian attack on U.S. forces since the war began disputed the Pentagon’s account, telling CBS News that the Army unit hit in Kuwait on March 1 was “unprepared to provide any defense for itself” and not in a fortified position. The soldiers said six service members were killed and more than 20 wounded when a drone struck the Port of Shuaiba facility, undercutting Pete Hegseth’s description of a single drone slipping through defenses at a fortified site; the Pentagon declined comment, citing an active investigation. Jonah Kaplan and Michael Kaplan report for CBS News.

The Trump administration did not warn U.S.-flagged commercial vessels tied to the military before bombing Iran, leaving Merchant Marine Academy cadets aboard some of the ships stranded in the Persian Gulf for weeks, NOTUS reported, adding that about half a dozen cadets were on two of five such vessels in the region and that, without advance notice, there was no clear way to evacuate them once the war began, Anna Kramer, Jasmine Wright, and Joe Gould report.

Rebuilding U.S. missile defenses damaged during the Middle East war will require going through China, which dominates processing of gallium and other critical minerals used in interceptors, POLITICO reports. China also controls more than 90 percent of heavy rare earth processing, giving Beijing added leverage as Washington tries to restock, Daniel Desrochers writes.

IRAN WAR: ISLAMABAD NEGOTIATIONS

Iran’s delegation was expected in the capital on Thursday night, led by chief negotiator and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, alongside Iran’s foreign minister and other officials. Al Jazeera reports.

Pakistani authorities imposed tight security in Islamabad ahead of Saturday’s first U.S.-Iran peace talks, sealing off areas around the Serena Hotel, requisitioning the property through Sunday, and spreading military personnel and checkpoints across the Red Zone. Al Jazeera reporting; Saad Sayeed and Ariba Shahid report for Reuters.

Security officials said the precautions went beyond routine arrangements for a high-profile visit, underscoring fears that any disruption could derail the fragile U.S.-Iran diplomatic opening. Reuters reported that Pakistani authorities enhanced airspace surveillance and placed emergency services on standby ahead of Saturday’s talks. Reuters reports.

IRAN WAR: LEBANON-CEASEFIRE SCOPE

The U.S.-Iran ceasefire was initially understood to include Lebanon, including by President Donald Trump, before Washington shifted position after a call between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, CBS News reports. Trump had been told the truce would apply across the region and agreed that it included Lebanon, mediators believed the same, and Pakistan publicly said Lebanon was covered, Margaret Brennan, Olivia Gazis, Jennifer Jacobs, and Michal Ben-Gal report.

Iran’s parliamentary speaker and lead negotiator in truce talks on Thursday rejected U.S. and Israeli assertions that Lebanon was excluded from the two-week truce, saying Pakistan, a key mediator, had “publicly and clearly stressed the Lebanon issue.” He said the first point of Iran’s 10-point framework treated Lebanon and Iran’s allies as an “inseparable part of the ceasefire” and added that “there is no room for denial and backtracking.” Financial Times reports.

Lebanon’s prime minister asked his Pakistani counterpart in a call Thursday to confirm that Lebanon is covered by the U.S.-Iran ceasefire, after renewed Israeli attacks deepened the dispute over the truce’s scope. Financial Times reports.

Israeli attacks on Lebanon are a “clear violation” of the ceasefire and would “render negotiations meaningless,” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated early Thursday. Reuters reports.

Pakistan’s U.N. envoy said Thursday that Lebanon’s inclusion in the ceasefire deal was clear to all sides and should not distract from planned talks in Islamabad this weekend. Asim Iftikhar Ahmad said he did not understand the confusion because Lebanon had been “clearly” included in the prime minister’s statement announcing the agreement. Associated Press reporting.

European politicians pressed Thursday for Lebanon to be included in the truce after Israel’s mass bombardment of Beirut further strained the U.S.-Iran deal. The calls underscored widening international resistance to Washington and Israel’s position that the ceasefire does not extend to Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah. Financial Times reports.

IRAN WAR: LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS

The State Department will host Israel-Lebanon talks in Washington next week aimed at ending the current hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, a U.S. official confirmed. A person familiar with the planning said the talks are expected to be led on the U.S. side by Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa and on the Israeli side by Ambassador Yechiel Leiter. Matthew Lee reports for Associated Press; Lex Harvey reports for CNN; Reuters reporting.

Israel will open direct talks with Lebanon but will not halt attacks on Hezbollah, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Thursday, pairing a diplomatic opening with an insistence that the military campaign will continue, in a shift from earlier Israeli statements that negotiations would proceed only “under fire.” Netanyahu said the talks would focus on disarming Hezbollah and formalizing peaceful relations, while the Washington Post reports that a Lebanese official said a temporary truce would be needed for negotiations to proceed. Reuters reports; Sammy Westfall, Suzan Haidamous, Mohamad El Chamaa and Lior Soroka report for the Washington Post.

Lebanon’s president said he was pursuing a diplomatic track “to achieve a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, followed by direct negotiations between them,” an approach he said was beginning to be viewed “positively” by international actors. Lebanon had spent the previous day pressing for a temporary halt in hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah to open space for broader talks, according to a senior Lebanese official describing the effort to Reuters as “a separate track but the same model” as the U.S.-Iran truce. Reuters reports.

Hezbollah lawmaker Ali Fayyad said Thursday that the group rejects direct negotiations with Israel and that Lebanon’s government should first secure a ceasefire before taking any further steps. The statement appeared to be Hezbollah’s first public response since Netanyahu said Israel was ready to begin talks immediately. Reuters reports.

A Pakistani source said Islamabad was also working on ceasefires for Lebanon and Yemen, where Israel has struck Iran-aligned forces. “It will be discussed during the talks and we will settle it,” the source said, according to Reuters.

IRAN WAR: LEBANON OPERATIONS 

Lebanon’s Health Ministry said Thursday that Israel’s Wednesday strikes across Lebanon killed at least 303 people, up from its previous count of 254 deaths, and wounded 1,150, raising the overall death toll since the March 2 assault to 1,888, and those injured to over 6,000, while warning that the figures remained preliminary. Financial Times reports.

President Donald Trump said Thursday that he had asked Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to scale back Israeli strikes in Lebanon, adding that the prime minister agreed to “low-key it” ahead of talks in Pakistan. The comments came a day after the deadliest Israeli strikes in Lebanon since the war began, even as Netanyahu said Israel would keep hitting Hezbollah and had approved direct negotiations with Lebanon. Associated Press reporting.

Netanyahu said Thursday that Israel “will continue to strike Hezbollah wherever required.” In a social media post, he warned that “whoever acts against Israeli civilians — will be struck” and tied continued military action to restoring “full security to the residents of the north.” Financial Times reports; Haley Ott reports for CBS News.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said Israel would press ahead with its offensive against Hezbollah, arguing that Iran was seeking a Lebanon ceasefire because it feared Israel would “crush” the group. He said the IDF was ready to respond in force if Tehran resumed missile fire, that strikes would continue “throughout Lebanon” wherever Hezbollah launched rockets, and that the ground campaign aimed to create four control lines south of the Litani River. Financial Times reports.

The head of Israel’s military said Thursday that the army’s mission in Lebanon is to keep “deepening the damage” and weakening Hezbollah. Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, speaking to troops inside Lebanon, said the objective was to remove the direct threat to residents of northern Israel. Associated Press reporting.

A senior Israeli official said Thursday that the IDF was preparing to scale down its attacks in Lebanon. Reuters reports.

Israeli forces struck roughly 10 launchers in Lebanon on Thursday after Hezbollah fired rockets toward northern Israel, according to the IDF. Sirens sounded repeatedly in communities near the Lebanese border throughout the day as the Israeli military said it was continuing to locate and dismantle additional launchers. Associated Press reporting.

An IDF strike on a residential building in the southern village of Zrariyeh killed multiple people, while a separate airstrike in Beirut’s southern Chiyah neighborhood heavily damaged three residential buildings, Lebanon’s state news agency reported. Financial Times reports.

The Israeli military said Thursday that it had struck Hezbollah launch sites in Lebanon, and Hezbollah said it responded Friday with a rocket barrage. Victoria Craw reports for the Washington Post.

At least 400 Hezbollah fighters have been killed, Reuters reported, citing sources familiar with the group, which has also fired hundreds of rockets and drones at Israel. Reuters reports.

Hezbollah said it carried out at least 20 military operations against Israel and its forces on Thursday, including attacks on Israeli vehicles inside Lebanese territory and rocket fire into northern Israel. Reuters reports.

IRAN WAR: LEBANON EVACUATIONS

Israel issued a sweeping evacuation order for Beirut’s southern suburbs and warned of more strikes early Thursday. The IDF’s “latest [evacuation] post included a map that marked the southern part of the capital in red, including an area between the airport’s runways. Previous orders have not listed the seaside Jnah district, although it has been bombed,” the Financial Times reported.

The World Health Organization chief “urge[d] Israel to reverse” its evacuation order for Beirut’s Jnah area, saying the directive covers two major referral hospitals and renders evacuation “operationally unfeasible.” In a post on X, WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said the hospitals are full, including with patients wounded in Wednesday’s strikes, and that about 450 patients and five shelters housing more than 5,000 people are affected. The Associated Press reports; Joel Gunter reports for BBC News.

IRAN WAR: INSIDE LEBANON

The Lebanese government instructed the army to strengthen its control over Beirut and secure a state monopoly on weapons in the capital, a move that points to renewed pressure on Hezbollah’s weapons. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said the move came after Israel’s heaviest strikes yet on Beirut and was designed “to protect citizens,” amid a fraught push to harden the government’s stance without triggering civil strife. Financial Times reports.

Lebanese officials declared a day of mourning after Wednesday’s attacks on densely populated areas, which they described on Thursday as a “massacre.” Reuters reports.

IRAN WAR: STRAIT OF HORMUZ

Iran appeared to retain a chokehold on traffic through the Strait of Hormuz on Thursday night, according to ship-tracking data. The Botswana-flagged LNG tanker Nidi turned back early Friday after attempting to exit the Gulf via a route ordered by the Revolutionary Guard, and Kpler recorded only four tankers and three bulk carriers passing through on Thursday. Associated Press reporting.

The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively choked off, with traffic still about 90 per cent below normal and roughly 600 cargo vessels trapped, Lloyd’s List Intelligence says. According to the firm’s Thursday briefing, every ship that had transited since Monday had an Iranian nexus through trade, ownership, or sanctions links. Victoria Craw reports for the Washington Post.

The head of Abu Dhabi’s state oil company said Thursday that the Strait of Hormuz is “not open,” warning that access is being “restricted, conditioned and controlled” by Iran. Sultan Al Jaber said passage through the waterway remains subject to “conditions and political leverage.” Laura Sharman reports for CNN.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said the alliance could “play a role” in a U.K.-led coalition planning to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. He said the effort would likely involve practical support such as minehunters, frigates, and radar technology. Financial Times reports.

President Donald Trump pressed NATO allies on Wednesday to spell out within days how they would support a military mission to secure shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Bloomberg and the Financial Times report that he renewed the demand in talks with Mark Rutte, though European governments involved in U.K.-led planning have so far resisted any deployment while the fighting is ongoing. Financial Times reports.

Reuters reported Thursday that TASS, citing an unnamed senior Iranian source, said Iran would permit no more than 15 vessels a day to pass through the Strait of Hormuz under the U.S.-Iran ceasefire, signaling a limited reopening of the strait rather than a full restoration of shipping.

The European Commission urged Iran to abandon its new toll on ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz, saying international law guarantees free navigation through the waterway. The Commission said that means “no payment or toll whatsoever,” though it added that any decision on whether to pay Tehran’s $1-a-barrel charge rests with shipping companies. Financial Times reports.

In the first 24 hours of the ceasefire, only one oil-products tanker and five dry bulk carriers sailed through a strait that had typically handled around 140 ships a day before the war. Reuters reports.

Trump said Thursday that Iran’s leadership must not impose fees on tankers crossing the Strait of Hormuz, as shipping through the chokepoint remained largely frozen. Writing on Truth Social, he warned Tehran to stop if it was charging vessels and said Iran was doing a “very poor job” of allowing oil traffic to resume. Donald Judd reports for CNN.

Trump publicly cast doubt on the ceasefire’s effectiveness Thursday, accusing Iran of failing to allow oil to move through the Strait of Hormuz as agreed. In two Truth Social posts, he objected both to continued restrictions on shipping and to reports that Iran may be charging fees on vessels using the waterway. Associated Press reporting.

The British prime minister spoke with Trump about reopening the Strait of Hormuz as he continued a Gulf trip focused on restoring tanker traffic through the waterway. Downing Street said Starmer was in Qatar when the two spoke, after stops in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. Associated Press reporting.

IRAN WAR: STRIKES IN THE GULF 

Drone strikes hit Kuwait late Thursday, including “vital facilities” and a National Guard base, the Gulf state said, accusing Iran and its proxies of the attacks. Associated Press reporting.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard later denied launching any attacks on Gulf states Thursday, saying that if the reports were true, the attacks were “without a doubt” the work of Israel or the United States. Associated Press reporting.

The Saudi Energy Ministry on Thursday issued its first public accounting of broad wartime damage to the kingdom’s energy sector, saying strikes hit oil, petrochemical, and power facilities across multiple regions. The ministry said a pumping station on the East-West Pipeline was among the hardest hit, cutting throughput by about 700,000 barrels per day, while disruptions at Manifa and Khurais reduced output by a further 600,000 barrels per day; it also gave the kingdom’s first publicly acknowledged casualty toll, reporting that one industrial security guard was killed and seven others were wounded. Associated Press reporting; Financial Times reports.

The UAE later said it was reassessing which regional partners it can depend on after the Gulf region bore the brunt of Iranian attacks. Presidential adviser Anwar Gargash said the government would scrutinize its international relationships and bolster economic and financial resilience, while seeking clarification from Tehran on the truce and the Strait of Hormuz. Adam Pourahmadi reports for CNN.

IRAN WAR: CEASEFIRE 

Iran has not yet begun direct talks with the United States despite this week’s two-week ceasefire, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told his Saudi counterpart, according to the Financial Times, citing an Iranian readout of the call. Saudi Arabia’s foreign ministry said Araghchi and Prince Faisal bin Farhan reviewed the latest developments and discussed ways to reduce tensions and restore regional security and stability. Financial Times reports.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei said in a statement read on state television Thursday that Tehran is not seeking war but will not relinquish its rights. Khamenei, who has not been seen in public since replacing his father after he was killed on the first day of the war, also pledged revenge for attacks on Iran, vowed to avenge his father and Iran’s “martyrs,” and said the Strait of Hormuz would enter “a new phase.” Reuters reports. “All must know that, by Almighty God’s will, we definitely won’t allow the criminal aggressors who attacked our country to go unpunished,” a post on his X account said.

South Korea will send a senior diplomat to Iran to press for the safety of its citizens and freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, Seoul said Friday. The Foreign Ministry said special envoy Chung Byung-ha will soon depart after Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi welcomed the plan in a call with South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun on Thursday. Associated Press reporting; Yoonjung Seo reports for CNN.

China used its leverage as Iran’s biggest oil customer to urge Tehran to accept the Pakistan-brokered ceasefire, diplomats told the Associated Press, as Beijing weighs whether the truce may strengthen its hand with Trump ahead of next month’s summit. China helped press for the temporary deal but remains reluctant to provide the long-term security guarantees Iran wants, with the Washington Post reporting that Beijing privately balked when asked to act as a guarantor. Didi Tang, Aamer Madhani, and Farnoush Amiri report for Associated Press; Cate Cadell reports for the Washington Post.

Australia will not take an offensive role in the Iran war, Acting Prime Minister Richard Marles said, distancing Canberra from proposals to provide combat support to the United States. Marles said Australia was “not part of this conflict against Iran” and dismissed former Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s argument that it should have offered the U.S. Air Force support including strike fighters. Associated Press reporting

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said progress on the ceasefire should be judged over the coming days, not on “day 1 or day 2,” as he called for toll-free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and said Israel was “wrong” to continue attacking Lebanon. Speaking in the Gulf, Starmer said his recent discussions with regional leaders and industry executives had focused on what happens in the next “2, 3, 4 days.” Financial Times reports.

IRAN WAR: U.S.-RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

House Democrats failed Thursday to force a vote on a resolution that would require President Donald Trump to obtain congressional approval before launching further attacks on Iran. During a brief pro forma session, Rep. Glenn Ivey tried to bring the measure up, but Rep. Christopher Smith declared the House adjourned before any vote could occur. Associated Press reporting.

The State Department summoned Iraq’s ambassador to protest Iran-backed militia attacks, including what it described as an “ambush” of U.S. diplomats, and warned that Baghdad has not done enough to stop them. In a statement Thursday, Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau said Iraqi authorities had taken some responsive steps but cautioned that support for militias by elements tied to the Iraqi government is damaging bilateral relations. Jennifer Hansler reports for CNN; Associated Press reporting.

Pro-Iran groups have used artificial intelligence-generated memes to “troll” Trump and “shape the narrative” around the war, the Associated Press reports. Analysts said the posts, which depict Trump as old, isolated, and out of step and have drawn millions of views across social platforms, appear linked to Tehran-backed actors seeking to stir enough discontent to weaken Western resolve. Sam McNeil reports.

IRAN WAR: OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

A former Iranian foreign minister, Kamal Kharazi, died late Thursday after being wounded in an airstrike last week, according to Iranian state television. Kharazi previously served in Mohammad Khatami’s government and later as a foreign affairs adviser to the late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Associated Press reporting.

The United Nations stepped up its engagement Thursday, with the secretary-general’s envoy meeting Iranian officials and humanitarian representatives in Tehran as the organization discussed what role it might play in ending the conflict. In a separate statement, the U.N. warned that the fighting in Lebanon poses a “grave risk” to the ceasefire, said there is “no military solution” to the conflict, and noted that Israeli evacuation orders in Beirut’s southern suburbs cover U.N. sites and 13 shelters housing more than 6,000 displaced people. Associated Press reporting.

Differences between the English and Persian versions of Iran’s 10-point plan underscore how unsettled the parties remain on Tehran’s right to enrich uranium, Al Jazeera writes in an explainer on the competing U.S. and Iranian proposals.

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

Britain said Thursday that a Russian Akula-class attack submarine and two GUGI deep-sea vessels conducted a month-long covert operation near undersea cables and pipelines north of the U.K. Defence Secretary John Healey said British and allied forces, including Norway, tracked the vessels and forced them to retreat, adding there was no evidence of damage to underwater infrastructure. Reuters reports; BBC News reports.

The U.K. said it responded by deploying HMS St Albans, RFA Tidespring, Merlin helicopters, RAF P-8 aircraft, and sonobuoys in an overt operation meant to show Moscow it had been detected. Healey warned Putin that “we see you,” while the government also pointed to an additional £100 million for P-8 submarine-hunting aircraft and the Atlantic Bastion program to bolster protection of critical undersea infrastructure. The Guardian reports.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s long-running corruption trial will resume on Sunday after Israel lifted the state of emergency imposed during the war with Iran on Wednesday evening, a court spokesperson said. Hearings will proceed “as usual,” with sessions scheduled from Sunday through Wednesday. Steven Scheer reports for Reuters

ICE SHOOTING: RENEE GOOD

A federal judge in Minnesota ordered the government to turn over a broad set of unredacted records related to Jonathan Ross’s killing of Renee Good for in camera review, including Ross’s personnel and training files, witness statements, cellphone data, body-camera and vehicle footage, and medical and fitness-for-duty records. Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan said Thursday that the material, which must be provided by May 1, could be relevant to sentencing in the separate Muñoz-Guatemala case because Ross’s conduct may bear on mitigation, with disclosures to the defense to be determined later by a magistrate judge. Jeff Day reports for the Minnesota Star Tribune; Noah Hurowitz and Austin Campbell report for The Intercept.

WIRED reported that Minnesota investigators’ attempts to obtain access to evidence in Good’s killing were ignored by the FBI for at least two days, offering new detail on the breakdown that later led Minnesota officials to sue for access to federal shooting records. BCA Superintendent Drew Evans repeatedly texted an FBI official on Jan. 7 seeking inclusion in interviews and coordination over evidence, shortly before the FBI told the agency it would lead the case alone and the BCA would lose access to case materials and interviews, Caroline Haskins reports for WIRED.

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS

The Justice Department has closed more than 23,000 criminal cases since President Donald Trump returned to office, redirecting resources toward immigration enforcement, according to a ProPublica analysis. The report says the department filed around 32,000 new immigration cases in its first six months, even as it declined unusually large numbers of cases involving drugs, white-collar crime, labor corruption, and national security. Ken B. Morales and David Armstrong report.

Rep. Angie Craig (D-MN) said ICE allowed her to inspect the Bishop Henry Whipple Federal Building in Minneapolis during an unannounced oversight visit Thursday, and that the holding area appeared in “fairly decent order.” The visit followed a recent court ruling on lawmakers’ access to immigration facilities; Craig said she faced a delay before being allowed in and was not permitted to speak with the one detainee she was told was being held there. Max Nesterak reports for the Minnesota Reformer.

ICE agents have begun leaving some U.S. airport security checkpoints after helping TSA manage long lines during the partial government shutdown, CNN reports. The pullback began last week at some of the 14 airports where Trump deployed ICE on March 23, after TSA callout rates fell once the administration moved to pay workers. Alexandra Skores reports.

OTHER U.S.-RELATED DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

A Chinese pharmaceutical firm hired lobbyists tied to Donald Trump Jr. and then won a rare victory before the U.S. national security panel that reviews foreign investments, Reuters reports. Public filings and documents reviewed by Reuters show that Grand Pharmaceutical Group hired Checkmate, a firm led by Trump Jr. associate Ches McDowell, before CFIUS rejected a U.S. startup’s bid to force a review of Grand Pharma’s stake in a laser-device company with possible military uses. Alexandra Alper reports for Reuters.

Florida officials have opened an investigation into OpenAI and ChatGPT over their alleged role in the 2025 Florida State University shooting. NBC News reports that court documents indicate the accused shooter exchanged more than 200 messages with ChatGPT, including questions about mass shootings and the FSU student union, while OpenAI said it would cooperate with the inquiry. Doha Madani reports.

A federal judge granted President Donald Trump more time to pursue jurisdictional discovery before responding to the BBC’s motion to dismiss his libel suit. In a April 9 order, Judge Roy Altman said it was reasonable to allow discovery into the BBC’s jurisdictional ties before further briefing, extending Trump’s deadline to June 1 and the BBC’s reply deadline to June 15. Josh Gerstein reports.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

A White House official told Reuters that President Donald Trump is considering withdrawing some U.S. troops from Europe. Gram Slattery and Steve Holland report for Reuters.

Trump officials are redirecting U.S. counterterrorism efforts toward antifa and other far-left groups and pressing allies abroad to do the same, a New York Times investigation revealed. The Times says the administration is planning international meetings on the issue even as some officials worry the shift is drawing attention and resources away from more immediate threats, including those related to Iran. Jack Nicas, Alan Feuer, Matina Stevis-Gridneff, Edward Wong, and Jim Tankersley report.

The Trump administration has pressured immigration judges to speed deportations, threatening discipline and firing judges seen as out of step with its enforcement agenda, a New York Times investigation found. Since Trump returned to office, more than 100 immigration judges have been dismissed and 143 replacements installed, as deportation orders rose and asylum grants fell below 10 per cent. It said the drop reflected more than tougher rulings on Biden-era arrivals: fired judges tended to be more immigrant-friendly, the administration targeted courts seen that way, and a June 2025 memo threatened discipline for perceived “bias” against DHS, Nicholas Nehamas, Allison McCann, Steven Rich, Jazmine Ulloa, and Hamed Aleaziz report.

Federal prosecutors’ effort to directly search devices seized from Washington Post reporter Hannah Natanson appeared to face fresh hurdles Thursday as a federal judge seemed skeptical that an earlier ruling had actually impeded the Justice Department’s investigation, while a magistrate judge later continued building a court-led review of materials that Natanson and The Post say include years of reporting files and more than 1,200 confidential sources. The magistrate judge also refused prosecutors’ request to pause the process, allowed the FBI to resume processing accessible data, and said he would keep moving forward “until someone tells me to stop.” Perry Stein reports for the Washington Post.

Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. has rewritten the charter governing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s vaccine advisory committee, expanding the panel’s remit after a federal judge temporarily blocked an earlier overhaul of federal vaccine policy. The new rules direct the committee to examine alleged gaps in vaccine-safety research, cumulative effects of the childhood schedule, ingredients such as aluminum, mRNA platforms, and foreign vaccine schedules, while also adding non-voting liaison roles for vaccine-skeptic groups. Brenda Goodman reports for CNN; Sophie Gardner and Lauren Gardner report for POLITICO.

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT TRANSITION

On his first official day as acting attorney general, Todd Blanche issued a series of memos to Justice Department staff outlining his initial priorities and announcing senior staffing moves. Thursday’s memos reiterated President Donald Trump’s pledge to protect America, thanked the department’s former head, Pam Bondi, and named Trent McCotter principal associate deputy attorney general, while saying Colin McDonald would continue assisting the deputy attorney general’s office alongside his role leading the department’s new fraud division. Paula Reid reports for CNN.

A fierce struggle is underway over who will lead the Department after Bondi’s ouster, with POLITICO reporting that the fight has become a broader battle over control of a department already under strain from internal conflict, veteran departures, and credibility problems in the courts. Harmeet Dhillon and Blanche appear to be central contenders, while Jeanine Pirro, Lee Zeldin, Ed Martin, and Stanley Woodward are also described as key players in the succession fight. Myah Ward, Kyle Cheney, and Josh Gerstein report.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION

A federal judge ruled Thursday that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s second attempt to restrict reporters’ access to the Pentagon “failed to comply” with his recent ruling that the earlier policy violated the First and Fifth Amendments. In The New York Times’ ongoing suit, Judge Paul Friedman said the Defense Department had attempted an “end-run around” his March 20 ruling by issuing an “interim” policy that used “slightly different language to achieve that same unconstitutional result,” and ordered the restoration of the same Pentagon access reporters had before the new restrictions. Erik Wemple reports for the New York Times; Jacob Rosen reports for CBS News; Scott Nover reports for the Washington Post.

The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by the full court of its 2-1 decision upholding the Trump administration’s mandatory-detention policy, leaving Supreme Court review as the likeliest next step. The panel’s February ruling in the consolidated Buenrostro-Mendez and Covarrubias cases held that certain noncitizens present in the United States without lawful admission can be subjected to mandatory detention without bond, and Thursday’s order noted that no active judge requested a poll of the full court.

A federal judge in Boston issued a preliminary injunction blocking the Education Department from compelling public universities in 17 states to submit broad data on race and admissions practices. Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV said the Education Department had statutory authority to seek the information but faulted the “rushed and chaotic manner” in which it imposed the new reporting requirements, including inadequate engagement with universities, Reuters reported.

A unanimous Third Circuit panel stayed most of the federal court’s order requiring restoration and maintenance of the President’s House site near Independence Hall, pending appeal. The panel’s Thursday order put on hold Judge Cynthia Rufe’s restoration, maintenance, and public-access requirements, while leaving intact provisions barring further changes, requiring preservation of removed items, and directing the government to preserve the status quo. 6abc reports.

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions.

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ICYMI: Yesterday on Just Security

Amid Shaky Ceasefire, War in Iran Is Starving Sudan

By Rachel George

Codifying Forced Marriage in the Crimes Against Humanity Convention: From Jurisprudence to Treaty Text

By Elise Keppler and Maryanne Koussa

The post Early Edition: April 10, 2026 appeared first on Just Security.

Since the United States and Israeli forces launched strikes on Iran on Feb. 28 and Iran began retaliating with attacks across the region, the world’s attention has been fixed largely on oil markets, regional escalation, and geopolitical realignment. Those are vital concerns, to be sure. But a quieter catastrophe has been unfolding in the interim, one measured not in barrels of crude oil, but in metric tons of food stuck in shipping containers in Dubai, and in pharmaceutical shipments rerouted around South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, and in the slow strangulation of a weakened global humanitarian system at the exact moment when aid is needed most in conflict and disaster zones around the globe.

The Strait of Hormuz accounts for more than 20 percent of the global maritime oil trade, but it also is a critical thoroughfare for humanitarian logistics and supplies. That includes fertilizers, food aid, and medical supplies required for life-saving care and fundamental food security, supplies that fell sharply in early March with the waterway’s effective closure.

So decision-making surrounding military action in the Middle East, including recent efforts to draw down conflict, cannot afford to consider questions of legality and “lethality” without simultaneous and serious attention to the knock-on effects, given the implications of humanitarian catastrophe and hunger for broader security outcomes.

When a Humanitarian Logistics Hub Becomes a Liability

The global aid system has long been under strain, driving an already brewing crisis that was compounded by deep cuts in international humanitarian aid spending of about 30 percent between 2024 and 2025 alone. The precipitous spending drop has hit some of the world’s most devastated conflict zones, including Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The Middle East and the Persian Gulf, so severely impacted by the Iran war, served a central role in the teetering aid system. Over two decades, an International Humanitarian City in Dubai became the linchpin of global humanitarian logistics, coordinating crisis response while keeping costs low. Today, as conflict spreads and millions of people face hunger — with food insecurity especially high in areas of East, West, and southern Africa — the humanitarian assistance community fears Dubai could become its Achilles heel. With container terminals disrupted, the United Nations’ International Organization for Migration reported that shipping firms were demanding a $3,000 emergency surcharge per container to move through the Dubai hub to recoup rising costs and uncertainty.

The fertilizer shock is particularly alarming for food security timelines. Nearly one-third of the world’s seaborne fertilizer trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz. The U.N.’s Food and Agriculture Organization predicts no more than a three-month window for action before risks escalate significantly, affecting global planting decisions for 2026 and beyond. Meanwhile, the Houthi movement in Yemen threatened attacks on additional shipping lanes such as the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden as potential leverage against the United States and Israel. While follow-through attacks have been limited so far, rising threats and uncertainty essentially shut down every viable route.

The oil price spike compounds everything. For humanitarian organizations, price increases translate directly into higher operating costs at every step, including transporting medicines by road and running diesel generators in health clinics. The International Rescue Committee reports that operational costs are up by as much as 30 percent in some areas, further limiting aid delivery. All of this compounds earlier budget hits. Income for the U.N.’s World Food Program dropped by more than half over just three years, to about $6.4 billion in 2025 from more than $14 billion in 2022. The system was already running on fumes when bombs began to fall on Tehran.

The Crisis for Sudan

Sudan was already neglected — despite being the world’s worst humanitarian crisis — before the world’s attention turned to Iran in February. U.N. agencies estimate that about 33.7 million people — two-thirds of Sudan’s population — will need humanitarian assistance this year, with more than 20 million requiring health assistance and 21 million facing acute food insecurity. The World Food Programme has confirmed famine conditions in western Al Fasher, the capital city of North Darfur State and southern Kadugli, the capital city of South Kordofan State, two key military flashpoints in the country. And 20 additional areas across Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan are at risk of famine.

The Iran war has made this worse in both direct and structural ways. Sudan imports more than 50 percent of its fertilizer from the Persian Gulf region, meaning that the Strait closure has not only disrupted the delivery of existing humanitarian aid, but also is undermining the very agricultural foundation that Sudanese families depend on to feed themselves. Humanitarian shipments intended for Sudan have been rerouted as far as the Cape of Good Hope — a 6,000-mile, three-week extension in travel time.

The International Rescue Committee warned in March that pharmaceutical supplies worth $130,000 intended to support about 20,000 people in Sudan were stuck in Dubai, as disruptions to shipping routes delayed deliveries. Save the Children told the Council on Foreign Relations’ Think Global Health that almost $600,000 worth of essential medicines intended for 90 primary care facilities in Sudan were stuck in their Dubai shipping hub.

The Sudanese people are paying the cost, including the country’s women, who for years have been at the forefront of efforts to promote democracy and human rights. In the face of recent hunger and health crises, and increases in gender-based violence, they have helped lead the humanitarian response in Sudan’s volunteer, grassroots mutual aid and emergency-response networks, which have provided vital food aid and medical support. But women in Sudan have lamented that the soaring humanitarian need has not been met with commensurate international support, and that it also has diverted foundational investments in their advocacy for the political mobilization and inclusion of women.

The political attention deficit makes this even harder. Sudan has struggled for years to compete for international focus against higher-profile conflicts. Now, with the Middle East consuming diplomatic bandwidth and media oxygen, the risk is that Sudan disappears from view entirely — even as the material conditions driving its crisis are actively worsened by the same war that has dominated the headlines.

Limiting the Iran War’s Fallout for Sudan

Once the world’s largest humanitarian and foreign aid donor, U.S. cutbacks in assistance last year are weakening the whole system. Then, in December, the U.S. government committed $2 billion in humanitarian finance mainly to be channeled through the U.N. system, but conditions placed on the aid immediately raised concerns about how meaningful that pledge will be. Furthermore, a year after gutting — and later shuttering — the U.S. Agency for International Development, which once channeled and coordinated most U.S. aid (though U.S. foreign aid still made up only 1.2 percent of the federal budget before those cuts), the Trump administration is still working to establish a new State Department humanitarian bureau. Decision-making about that initiative remains opaque. Without an established humanitarian bureau in place at the onset of the war, the U.S. was underprepared and poorly positioned to respond to the cascading global humanitarian impacts of the conflict. Urgent investment and capacity-building within the new bureau are needed to prevent further escalation of crises in Sudan and beyond.

Prioritizing the re-opening of the Strait of Hormuz is crucial for humanitarian aid, given that it is likely to be a “monthslong” endeavor, with Iran still holding control of the waterway and the global humanitarian system already straining. The U.N. has established some expert working groups focused on the passage of certain commodities and supplies, but specialists warn these activities have failed to consider a holistic view of humanitarian needs beyond particular supplies that have thus far garnered the most attention, such as fertilizer, at the expense of other urgent needs, such as immediate food aid. One step that might help would be establishing a separate humanitarian task force led by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to monitor and advise on the reopening of the Strait for humanitarian supplies, enabling, as two Council on Foreign Relations experts suggested, “direct coordination by famine response experts.”

Countries could also work to establish global humanitarian air bridges similar to those deployed during the COVID-19 pandemic through the World Food Programme with support from the United States, the European Union, and other partners. That could help channel emergency funding toward the costs of transporting critical supplies.

Furthermore, donors must understand the need to dramatically increase flexible humanitarian funding as a critical component of global security efforts, including to reach women and girls who are facing dramatic resource cuts. In addition to the humanitarian considerations of such aid, the foundational well-being of women and girls is linked to improved security outcomes.

And Sudan cannot be allowed to drop from the agenda simply because the news cycle has moved to Tehran. Last year was the first time in the 21^st century that two famines — in Gaza and Sudan — occurred in the same year. The number of people in catastrophic food insecurity is rising. According to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, an initiative of food aid organizations, Sudan’s humanitarian response plan for 2026 needs $2.9 billion and has so far received only 5.5 percent of the necessary funds. That gap existed before the Iran war; it is now functionally unbridgeable without emergency action.

The Iran war did not create Sudan’s crisis. But it is accelerating it, deepening it, and narrowing the window to stop it.

The post Amid Shaky Ceasefire, War in Iran Is Starving Sudan appeared first on Just Security.

As states now develop proposals for concrete amendments to the Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity (Draft Articles) by an April 30 deadline, it will be important for those supporting such a provision to proactively propose such amendments. While there has been almost no articulated specific opposition, most states have not yet expressed a position, perhaps because the issue is not a priority, or because they may, as some countries have articulated, favor keeping the existing draft text mostly as is. Still others may oppose any measure aimed at gender justice. All the more important, then, to reflect the cross-regional support that has already emerged through written proposals.

A Treaty Decades in the Making

The PrepCom marked a major step forward in efforts to close a persistent gap in the international legal framework: the lack of a specific treaty establishing states’ obligations to prevent, punish, and cooperate in addressing crimes against humanity. (In contrast, treaties establishing state responsibilities with regards to other core international crimes, such as genocide and war crimes, have long been in force). The current treaty process builds on years of academic, diplomatic, and civil society engagement. In 2019, the U.N. International Law Commission (ILC) adopted the Draft Articles and recommended negotiating a convention. After years of stagnation, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a breakthrough Resolution 79/122 in December 2024, deciding to convene a Conference of Plenipotentiaries on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity in 2028 and 2029 and establishing a Preparatory Committee and Working Group to facilitate consultations and the submission of formal amendment proposals.

That resolution invited governments to submit written proposals for amendments by April 30, 2026. Those amendments will then be consolidated into a compiled text with the Draft Articles, alongside the records of past discussions in the U.N. General Assembly’s Sixth (Legal) Committee on the Draft Articles, to serve as the basis for negotiations.

Importance of Codifying Forced Marriage

The ILC Draft Articles carried over the definitions of crimes against humanity found in Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which do not include forced marriage as an enumerated act. In practice, forced marriage as a crime against humanity has been recognized by multiple international tribunals, including the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Prosecutor v. Ongwen. Across these decisions, courts have articulated core elements of this crime, focusing on the coercive imposition of a conjugal union and the denial of relational autonomy, which are distinct from, though often accompanied by, sexual slavery, rape, forced labor, or other forms of violence.

During the U.N. PrepCom, the Kingdom of the Netherlands mission hosted a side event on Jan. 22, co-sponsored by Canada and Mexico and the Global Justice Center (where one of us, Elise, is executive director) amid the Working Group deliberations on Article 2 of the Draft Articles. The  article as it stands outlines specific covered crimes as well as one category of “other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” None refer specifically to forced marriage. The side event offered the opportunity to examine forced marriage in greater depth, connecting jurisprudence, survivor experience, and treaty-drafting considerations.

There have been repeated arguments over whether the conduct is criminal at all and claims that it constitutes a “cultural” practice beyond the reach of international criminal law. Yet international law has long rejected such claims, recognizing that certain practices defended as cultural, including slavery and apartheid, constitute serious international crimes.

By recognizing the gravity of the harm and identifying the nature of the harm specifically, codification would be in line with the criminal law principles of fair labeling and legality, which require that criminal offenses be named and defined in a way that accurately reflects the distinct conduct and harm involved. This ensures that victims receive specific recognition for their suffering and perpetrators are on notice that their conduct is prohibited. In this context, explicitly enumerating forced marriage in the Crimes Against Humanity Convention would ensure that its unique elements are properly captured, rather than subsumed under a residual category, and would more clearly convey the seriousness of the crime itself. Codification would, moreover, ensure that the full scope of this conduct is recognized by societies and international institutions, and that victims receive appropriate redress.

As emphasized during the side event, codifying forced marriage would consolidate existing jurisprudence rather than alter the current legal framework, while clarifying its status and reducing persistent challenges to its recognition. Experts further noted that the Rome Statute was conceived as a foundational framework rather than an exhaustive list, allowing for the continued development of international criminal law in response to evolving understandings of harm and accountability.

Reflecting these considerations, civil society organizations and experts have proposed amendments to the list of prohibited acts in the draft Crimes Against Humanity Convention, including, but not limited to, adding forced marriage as an enumerated crime. The proposals are part of a broader effort to achieve a treaty-making process and text that ensures that gender-based harms are fully recognized, that the law reflects how harms affect different groups in distinct ways, and that victims’ experiences guide both the substance and implementation of the convention.

Increasing State Support

Over the course of the PrepCom, a number of States newly or more explicitly expressed support for, or openness to, codifying forced marriage in Article 2 of the draft convention. Together, the discussions in January reveal both continuity among those already on board and expansion of support to other states.

Among those newly weighing in were Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, France, Iceland, and Portugal. During the Working Group discussion on Article 2, France for the first time indicated openness to revisiting the list of prohibited acts in light of legal developments, and specifically identified forced marriage for potential inclusion, noting in a published statement that it “has notably been enshrined in the jurisprudence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers within the Cambodian courts and the International Criminal Court.” Representatives of Portugal and others also expressed openness to including forced marriage for the first time as part of the conceptual evolution of crimes against humanity since the adoption of the Rome Statute.

At the Jan. 22 side event, Iceland and Costa Rica expressed openness and support for the codification of forced marriage for the first time. Costa Rica has taken the view that forced marriage is already recognized by international tribunals, including the SCSL and the ICC, and identified the harm forced marriage causes as a form of gender-based violence.

New expressions built upon already articulated support or openness in previous Sixth Committee debates by Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Mexico, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and the United Kingdom, many of whom reiterated that position during this session. Mexico, for example, has repeatedly called for the treaty to include forced marriage, framing it as part of a comprehensive understanding of how crimes against humanity are committed today, identifying it alongside gender apartheid as conduct warranting explicit inclusion.

Canada also has consistently indicated that the convention presents an opportunity to codify forced marriage as a standalone prohibited act within the definition of crimes against humanity. During the Working Group discussion on Article 2, Canada stated: “We believe the time may be ripe for codifying forced marriage as a standalone prohibited act within the definition of crimes against humanity. We have heard various proposals made by States to add to the list of acts under draft article 2, paragraph 1. We note that some have been recognized as ‘other inhuman acts’.” Colombia also reiterated its position: “Colombia is open to the possibility of including new acts such as slave trade, forced marriage, or reproductive violence.”

Australia had indicated during the 2024 Sixth Committee session that it sees merit in considering codifying forced marriage as a distinct crime against humanity. Brazil has indicated that the new convention offers an opportunity to incorporate crimes relating to sexual and gender-based violence, including forced marriage, in line with the principle of strict legality, which requires that crimes be clearly defined in law. The United Kingdom has repeatedly emphasized that international criminal law already recognizes forced marriage as a crime against humanity, indicating that its explicit inclusion in the convention would align with established jurisprudence.

While Sierra Leone did not intervene on forced marriage during the PrepCom, it has previously emphasized the need to address such conduct within the Draft Articles, drawing on its experience during its civil conflict, in which women and girls were abducted, forced to ‘marry’ specific fighters, and repeatedly traded among the men as ‘bush wives.’ Sierra Leone has pointed to this conduct as one form of slavery and the slave trade, and argued for the explicit codification of the slave trade in response. Sierra Leone has not explicitly commented on whether it would support codification of forced marriage separate from the slave trade. Given the distinct violation of relational autonomy and imposition of the status of ‘spouse’ that these forced marriages entailed, experts have supported codification of both slave trade and forced marriage to reflect the full scope of harm. South Africa likewise did not speak on forced marriage during this session, but has in earlier discussions specified that it “supports calls for the inclusion of forced marriage as a crime against humanity.”

From Support to Codification

As States prepare written proposals ahead of the April 30 deadline, the question is whether codification of forced marriage will be reflected in the compiled text that is sent on to the negotiations. States should seize this moment by offering amendments to include forced marriage as an enumerated crime under Article 2. Such proposals should reflect existing jurisprudence and should ensure that the convention encompasses the lived realities of victims and survivors of crimes against humanity. Their experiences have already shaped international criminal law, and they remain at the heart of the convention’s purpose. That should be expressly recognized in the text.

(Authors’ note: The USC International Human Rights Clinic is conducting a project with the Global Justice Center tracking state discussions related to gender justice and the proposed Crimes Against Humanity Convention.)

The post Codifying Forced Marriage in the Crimes Against Humanity Convention: From Jurisprudence to Treaty Text appeared first on Just Security.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

U.S.-IRAN MEETING IN ISLAMABAD

The White House said Vice President JD Vance will lead the U.S. negotiating team to Islamabad this weekend for talks with Iran, alongside special envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said the first round is set for Saturday morning local time in Pakistan and added that senior U.S. officials had also held conversations with China as part of efforts to secure the ceasefire. Kit Maher reports for CNN.

Iran’s envoy to Pakistan briefly signaled that Tehran would send negotiators to Islamabad on Thursday night for “serious talks” with Washington, before the post appeared to be taken down. The post read: “Despite skepticism of Iranian public opinion due to repeated ceasefire violations by Israeli regime to sabotage the diplomatic initiative, invited by Hon. PM Shehbaz Sharif, Iranian delegation arrives tonight in Islamabad for serious talks based on 10 points proposed by Iran.” Golnar Motevalli reports for Bloomberg; Lex Harvey reports for CNN.

U.S.-IRAN CEASEFIRE

President Donald Trump said on Wednesday that U.S. military assets will remain “in, and around, Iran” until “the REAL AGREEMENT” is ⁠reached and threatened renewed attacks if Tehran does not fully honor the two-week ceasefire deal reached the day earlier. “All U.S. Ships, Aircraft, and Military Personnel, with additional Ammunition, ​Weaponry … will remain in place in, and around, ​Iran, until such time as the REAL AGREEMENT ⁠reached is fully complied with,” the president posted on Truth Social, adding, “If ​for any reason it is not, which is highly unlikely, ​then the ‘Shootin’ Starts,’ bigger, and better, and stronger than anyone has ever seen before.” Reuters reporting.

Vice President JD Vance said Wednesday that confusion over the Iran negotiations stems in part from three different “10-point” proposals circulating at different stages. He said the first proposal, “probably written by ChatGPT,” was sent to Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner and “immediately went in the garbage.” Vance said Trump was instead referring to a second, “much more reasonable” version developed through U.S., Pakistani, and Iranian exchanges, and dismissed a third proposal circulating online as “even more maximalist” and the work of “little more than a random yahoo in Iran.” Donald Judd reports for CNN.

Iran’s lead negotiator accused Washington and Israel on Wednesday of violating three clauses of Iran’s proposed 10-point framework for talks with the United States, warning that “bilateral ceasefire or negotiations” would be “unreasonable.” Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Tehran’s principal negotiator, pointed to intensified Israeli strikes in Lebanon, an alleged drone incursion into Iranian airspace, and continuing disagreement over Iran’s nuclear program. Parisa Hafezi, Alexander Cornwell, Maya Gebeily, and Humeyra Pamuk report for Reuters. Michael Rios and Mohammed Tawfeeq report for CNN.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that Israel had its “finger on the trigger” and could return to full fighting “at any moment,” amid a fraying ceasefire, continued fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and further Iranian strikes elsewhere in the region. Reuters reported.

The United Arab Emirates declined to fully welcome the temporary U.S.-Iran ceasefire, instead demanding further clarification on Tehran’s compliance and the “unconditional reopening” of the Strait of Hormuz. In a statement Wednesday, the UAE foreign ministry said Iran should be held accountable for damage caused during the war and pressed for a broader strategy covering Tehran’s nuclear and missile programs, proxy networks, and wider regional threats. Mostafa Salem reports for CNN.

Washington and Tehran publicly diverged on Wednesday over whether the new deal requires Iran to stop enriching uranium. Trump said Iran had agreed to end enrichment, while Ghalibaf said the agreement still permits it, underscoring that the sides remain far apart on the deal’s core nuclear terms, Reuters reported.

Conflicting accounts over whether Lebanon is included in the U.S.-Iran ceasefire have quickly emerged as a sticking point in the fragile deal. Iran and Pakistani mediators said the truce covers Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah, but the White House and Israel said Lebanon is outside its scope. Al Jazeera, AFP, and Reuters report; Mariah Timms reports for Wall Street Journal; Mariah Timms reports for Wall Street Journal; Angus Berwick reports for the Wall Street Journal.

Vance warned Iran must reopen the Strait of Hormuz for the ceasefire to last, warning of “serious consequences” if Tehran fails to meet its side of the bargain. He said the truce remains “in a good spot,” but stressed that the Trump administration would not abide by its terms if Iran does not do the same. Riane Lumer reports for CNN.

ISRAELI STRIKES-LEBANON 

As part of its ongoing “Operation Beepers,” Israel carried out a concentrated, coordinated 10-minute wave of strikes across Lebanon on Wednesday, killing around 200 people and injuring about 1,000. Al Jazeera, AFP, and Reuters report; Mohamad El Chamaa and Ellen Francis report for the Washington Post; Hugo Bachega reports for BBC.

Preliminary Lebanese casualty tolls from Wednesday’s Israeli airstrikes ranged from more than 180 to over 250 killed, with around 900 to 1,000 others injured. Lebanon’s Health Ministry reported 182 deaths, while the civil defense service put the toll at 254; the two authorities reported roughly 890 to 1,000 wounded. USA TODAY and Reuters report.

Beirut saw the highest reported death toll, with 91 people killed, while the airstrikes also hit the Bekaa Valley, Mount Lebanon, Sidon, and several villages in southern Lebanon. Al Jazeera, AFP, and Reuters report

As of Tuesday, at least 1,530 people had been killed and 4,812 wounded in Lebanon since the start of the war, according to Health Ministry figures. Lauren Said-Moorhouse reports for CNN. Lauren Said-Moorhouse reports for CNN.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz described Wednesday’s strikes as the “largest concentrated” military operation in Lebanon since opening a new campaign on March 2, adding that Israel had carried out “surprise attacks” on over 100 “command centres and military sites” across Lebanon. Al Jazeera, AFP, and Reuters report; Mohamad El Chamaa and Ellen Francis report for the Washington Post.

Katz added that Israel has “insisted on differentiating the arenas between Iran and Lebanon in order to change the reality in Lebanon,” Mohamad El Chamaa and Ellen Francis reported for the Washington Post.

Katz also said approximately 600,000 displaced residents of southern Lebanon “will not be allowed to return until the security of northern residents” can be guaranteed, underscoring Israel’s intention to keep pressure on Hezbollah in the south. Washington Post reporting.

The IDF admitted the strikes mostly targeted infrastructure “located within the heart of the civilian population,” accusing Hezbollah of using civilian areas to shield its operations. It added that the strikes were “planned meticulously over weeks” to “deepen the damage” and that “steps were taken to mitigate harm to uninvolved individuals as much as possible.” Yuliya Talmazan reports for NBC News; Al Jazeera, AFP, and Reuters report.

Lebanon’s prime minister said Israeli attacks had “targeted densely populated residential areas and claimed the lives of innocent civilians throughout Lebanon, particularly in Beirut.” Prime Minister Nawaf Salam called on allies to “help us stop these attacks by all available means.” Washington Post reporting.

Some Israeli strikes hit without the usual prior warnings for civilians to evacuate, Reuters reported, citing residents.

The Israeli military said Thursday that an overnight strike on Beirut killed Ali Yusuf Harshi, the personal secretary and nephew of Hezbollah chief Naim Qassem. Reuters said Israel described the strike as hitting the Beirut area and separately noted a correction clarifying that Harshi, not Qassem, was the person killed. Tal Shalev and Eugenia Yosef report for CNN.

The scale of the strikes quickly strained Lebanon’s medical system. Elias Chlela, head of Lebanon’s syndicate of doctors, urged “all physicians from all specialities” to report to any hospital where they could help, while one of Beirut’s biggest hospitals called for donations of all blood types, Al Jazeera, AFP, and Reuters reported.

The Lebanese Red Cross said 100 of its ambulances were responding to the attacks as teams worked to transport the injured to hospitals. Al Jazeera, AFP, and Reuters report.

LEBANON STRIKES–POLITICAL RESPONSE

Vice President JD Vance said Israel may “check themselves a little bit” in Lebanon during the two-week ceasefire, though he insisted any restraint would reflect Israeli “good faith” toward the United States rather than a condition of the deal. Vance told reporters late on Wednesday that Iran had wrongly assumed Lebanon was covered and that Washington “never once said” it was part of the ceasefire. Kit Maher reports for CNN; Barak Ravid reports for Axios.

Governments and international organizations sharply criticized Israel’s attacks on Lebanon, describing them as an aggressive escalation that demanded an immediate halt. From Qatar, Egypt, and Türkiye to Spain, Italy, France, and officials at the United Nations and Red Cross, a range of international voices warned of severe civilian harm and condemned the strikes as unlawful, brutal, or intolerable. Al Jazeera, AFP, and Reuters report; Reuters reports;  Lex Harvey reports for CNN.

U.N. Special Coordinator for Lebanon Jeanine Hennis said on X that Israeli attacks “cannot go on” and urged “a halt to all hostilities, direct talks and a clear roadmap” under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. Al Jazeera, AFP, and Reuters report

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk condemned Israel’s strikes across Lebanon on Wednesday, saying the scale of the killing and destruction was “nothing short of horrific” and that such carnage “defies belief.” He warned that the attacks were placing enormous pressure on a fragile peace “so desperately needed by civilians.” Lauren Said-Moorhouse reports for CNN.

IRANIAN STRIKES-GULF ENERGY

Public reporting from Gulf defense ministries suggested an overnight lull in Iranian missile and drone attacks, the first such pause since the conflict began. By Thursday, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman had all gone hours without announcing new incidents after reporting multiple interceptions the previous day. Laura Sharman reports for CNN.

The apparent pause followed a wave of Iranian missile and drone attacks across Gulf states on Wednesday, many targeting vital energy and other key infrastructure. Iranian state television said the strikes were in retaliation for attacks on Iranian oil facilities earlier that day. Al Jazeera, AFP, AP, and Reuters report.

Saudi oil infrastructure was struck, including the East-West pipeline, now the Kingdom’s main export route around the blocked Strait of Hormuz, which was hit at about 1 p.m. local time. Verity Ratcliffe, Rachel Millard and Chris Cook report for the Financial Times.

Crude flows were affected by a partial shutdown at the Kingdom’s East-West pipeline, while damage to other facilities was still being assessed. Summer Said reports for the Wall Street Journal.

Saudi air defenses intercepted nine drones over several hours, the Kingdom’s defense ministry said in a post on X. Al Jazeera, AFP, AP, and Reuters report.

Satellite imagery showed smoke and fire at Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq oil-processing facility hours after President Donald Trump announced a two-week U.S.-Iran ceasefire. Abqaiq, at the eastern end of the East-West pipeline and described by Aramco as the world’s largest crude stabilization plant, handles about 5 per cent of global oil supplies; NASA satellites detected a 125-megawatt fire there, while European Space Agency imagery showed thick black smoke at around 10 a.m. local time on Wednesday. Isaac Yee reports for CNN; Financial Times reporting.

The United Arab Emirates’ air defenses were also “actively engaging” Iranian attacks on Wednesday, including up to 17 ballistic and cruise missiles and 35 drones since the ceasefire began, the UAE’s Defense Ministry said. Financial Times reporting; Al Jazeera, AFP, AP, and Reuters report.

Operations at Abu Dhabi’s Habshan gas complex were temporarily suspended after falling debris from an interception sparked a fire early Wednesday, injuring two Emiratis and one Indian national, the Abu Dhabi Media Office said. Al Jazeera, AFP, AP, and Reuters report.

Kuwait’s defense systems responded to an “intense wave” of “hostile Iranian attacks,” intercepting 28 drones as strikes targeted energy infrastructure and power stations in the south of the country from 8 a.m. local time, the Defense Ministry said. Financial Times reporting; Al Jazeera, AFP, AP, and Reuters report.

Kuwait oil facilities and desalination plants have faced “significant damages,” including “severe material damage” at several vital facilities run by Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, the Defense Ministry said. Financial Times reporting; Al Jazeera, AFP, AP, and Reuters report.

Bahrain also intercepted Iranian missile and drone attacks, with two people injured and homes damaged in Sitra Island after shrapnel fell from an intercepted drone. The Interior Ministry said the incident occurred hours after the United States announced its ceasefire with Iran. Al Jazeera, AFP, AP, and Reuters report.

Smoke rose over Sitra Island after explosions were heard in Manama, AFP reported, in an apparent strike near Bahrain’s main energy infrastructure. Bahrain’s Interior Ministry said civil defense crews extinguished a fire at a facility it said had been targeted by Iran, without giving further details. Al Jazeera, AFP, AP, and Reuters report.

Qatar “successfully intercepted” at least seven ballistic missiles and several drones launched from Iran on Wednesday, the Ministry of Defense reported. Al Jazeera, AFP, AP, and Reuters report.

STRAIT OF HORMUZ

Iran said later Wednesday that it was again halting oil tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz in response to Israel’s attacks on Lebanon, according to state-run media cited by the Associated Press. The move cast fresh doubt on the already fragile U.S.-Iran ceasefire, which had been expected to help reopen the strategic waterway.

Citing possible anti-ship mines, Iran’s navy advised commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz to coordinate with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and follow alternative routes until further notice. In guidance shared by Iran’s consulate in Mumbai, the navy directed inbound ships to enter north of Larak Island into the Persian Gulf and outbound vessels to pass south of the island toward the Gulf of Oman. Suha Ma’ayeh reports for the Wall Street Journal.

Vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained near a standstill on Thursday, more than a day after President Donald Trump announced a two-week U.S.-Iran ceasefire and said in a Truth Social post on Wednesday night that the strait would be “OPEN & SAFE.” MarineTraffic data showed large clusters of ships still anchored in the Persian Gulf, including more than 400 tankers, 34 LPG tankers, and 19 LNG vessels. Isaac Yee reports for CNN.

INSIDE IRAN

Large crowds gathered in Tehran on Wednesday to mark the 40th day since Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in U.S.-Israeli strikes. Reuters reported that the memorial came as Iranian officials continued highly visible public appearances aimed at projecting resilience and control. Parisa Hafezi reports for Reuters; Sophie Tanno reports for CNN.

Spain will reopen its embassy in Tehran while “there’s a window for peace,” Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares said Thursday, positioning Madrid as one of the first Western governments to restore a diplomatic presence there, CNN reported. Spain, a sharp critic of U.S. military action, evacuated its embassy staff in March amid the conflict and as the ceasefire between Washington and Tehran remains fragile. Issy Ronald and Magdalena Sofia Vitores Moreno report.

OTHER IRAN WAR DEVELOPMENTS

Hackers believed to be linked to Iran claimed to have breached devices and accounts belonging to former Israeli military chief of staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi and published photos and identification documents they said came from the intrusion. The group, Handala, said it extracted more than 19,000 images and videos, while CNN reported that an Israeli source familiar with the matter confirmed the authenticity of the leaked photos. Tal Shalev reports for CNN.

Iran said its Lavan Oil Refinery came under attack on Wednesday, which the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company described as an act of aggression by hostile forces. The Financial Times reported that NASA satellites detected a 233-megawatt blaze on Lavan Island.

Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militant group in Lebanon, fired rockets into northern Israel early Thursday in response to what it called Israeli “ceasefire violations,” Reuters reported.

Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, an Iranian-backed militia in Iraq, threatened renewed action against Israel, saying Israeli strikes in Lebanon had breached prior pledges and targeted civilians. The warning came after the U.S.-Iran ceasefire took effect, with the group’s leader, Akram al-Kaabi, saying the “Resistance Front” would again “discipline” Israel “with force.” Mohammed Tawfeeq reports for CNN.

Iran’s foreign minister and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, spoke by phone on Wednesday, Iran’s foreign ministry said early Thursday, adding only that they discussed bilateral relations and regional developments. Saudi state media later reported that bin Farhan had spoken with the foreign ministers of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Türkiye, but did not mention a call with Iran. Lex Harvey reports for CNN.

Three crew members aboard a Thai-flagged vessel attacked in the Strait of Hormuz last month have been confirmed dead, Thailand’s foreign minister said. The Mayuree Naree, a 180-meter bulk carrier, was struck on March 11 with 23 people on board, and Omani authorities rescued the remaining 20 crew. Chris Lau and Kocha Olarn report for CNN.

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

Three organizations said Wednesday that an apparent hack-for-hire campaign linked to actors with suspected Indian government connections targeted journalists and activists in the Middle East and North Africa. CyberScoop reported that researchers at Access Now, Lookout, and SMEX tied the activity to infrastructure associated with the Bitter threat group and the Android spyware ProSpy, while Access Now said the campaign targeted at least two Egyptian journalists and a Lebanese journalist. Tim Starks reports.

TECH DEVELOPMENTS 

OpenAI is finalizing an advanced cybersecurity model that it plans to release only to a small group of companies, Axios reports, underscoring growing concern inside the industry about the offensive potential of frontier AI tools.The move would mirror Anthropic’s limited rollout of Mythos and reflects concerns that increasingly autonomous systems with hacking capabilities could cause serious real-world harm if broadly released. Sam Sabin reports.

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte met President Donald Trump in Washington on Wednesday in a high-stakes bid to soothe tensions, acknowledging afterward that Trump was “clearly disappointed with many NATO allies” but pointing to European assistance in the Iran war. Trump later wrote on Truth Social that “NATO wasn’t there when we needed them, and they won’t be there if we need them again.” Alyssa Lukpat reports for the Wall Street Journal; Michael Rios reports for CNN; Alyssa Lukpat reports for the Wall Street Journal.

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS

The account of Tuesday’s ICE shooting in Patterson, California, is now sharply disputed, with federal officials and the man’s lawyer offering conflicting narratives of what happened. DHS said Carlos Ivan Mendoza Hernandez tried to use his vehicle to run over an agent and described him as an 18th Street gang member wanted for questioning in El Salvador, but AP reported that his attorney denies both claims and says the FBI is investigating the shooting. Lauren Mascarenhas, Danya Gainor, Taylor Galgano report for CNN; Soumya Karlamangla reports for the New York Times.

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

The House Oversight Committee said Wednesday it will continue pursuing sworn testimony from Pam Bondi on the Epstein case after her removal as attorney general. Republicans said Bondi, who had been subpoenaed in her official capacity for an April 14 deposition, will not appear next week as scheduled, but that the committee will now work with her personal counsel to arrange a new date for her testimony. Michael Gold reports for the New York Times; Hailey Fuchs reports for POLITICO.

An Ohio man became the first person convicted under the federal Take It Down Act, after pleading guilty to cyberstalking, producing obscene visual representations of child sexual abuse, and publishing digital forgeries. The Justice Department said James Strahler II of Columbus used more than 24 AI platforms and 100 web-based models to target at least six adult women, while also generating obscene material involving minors. Rylee Kirk reports for the New York Times.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

The Trump administration has opened an investigation into Los Angeles Unified’s policy allowing schools discretion over whether to disclose students’ gender identities to parents. The probe, according to reporting on documents reviewed by the New York Times, was prompted by a lawsuit from parents who say the policy contributed to their child’s suicide and comes amid a broader federal rollback of transgender student protections. Michael C. Bender reports.

The California Supreme Court moved Wednesday to freeze Sheriff Chad Bianco’s investigation into last year’s special election, intervening after the Riverside County sheriff seized more than 650,000 ballots. Bianco, who is running for governor, opened the probe after activists alleged vote-count irregularities that local election officials said were baseless; the court’s order leaves the materials preserved while the case proceeds. Nick Corasaniti reports for the New York Times.

The White House has secured tens of millions of dollars’ worth of European steel for Trump’s new ballroom project, even as the president continues to champion tariffs on foreign metals. According to the New York Times, ArcelorMittal, a Luxembourg-based steelmaker, is donating the material, which Trump said last year had been valued at $37 million. Ana Swanson and Luke Broadwater report for the New York Times.

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ICYMI: Yesterday on Just Security

Continuing Crisis in Strait of Hormuz: Why Iran’s Hold is Illegal and U.S. Military Force Alone Fails

By Mark Nevitt

The post Early Edition: April 9, 2026 appeared first on Just Security.

The United States must define the operational scope of its naval commitment in the Strait. And Iran’s self-declared “technical limitations” must be rejected outright by the international community and not be made permanent. Limiting transit passage through the Strait of Hormuz is inconsistent with the freedom of navigation guaranteed under international law.

At the outset of the conflict, I analyzed the key legal and operational issues in the Strait of Hormuz, assessing that the Strait’s closure would provide Iran with enormous strategic leverage. One month in, that assessment has grown considerably darker. Iran has proven it can deny transit at an acceptable cost to itself—and no plausible U.S. military option can reliably reverse that in the near term. Iran has been weakened militarily, but remains far from defeated. Indeed, Iran has demonstrated the capacity to launch strikes hundreds of miles from its territory while shooting down a U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle, one of the most sophisticated aircraft in the American arsenal.

The logical takeaway is uncomfortable: Iran has established the capacity to control the Strait of Hormuz, perhaps indefinitely. Overwhelming military force alone is unlikely to change that reality. What is needed is both a sustained multinational effort to keep the Strait open and a diplomatic solution to restore transit passage rights and freedom of navigation. Tragically, neither appears achievable at this moment, and the U.N. Security Council just rejected a Resolution aimed at compelling Iran to open the Strait. We are witnessing a fundamental miscalculation of Iran’s leverage and the limits of U.S. military power to achieve broader strategic objectives.

The Trump administration has remained focused almost exclusively on military force, threatening to bomb Iran “back into the Stone Age” and “wipe out a whole civilization” while demanding that other nations take responsibility for reopening the Strait. Call it the anti-Pottery Barn rule: we broke it, you fix it. But that rhetoric and those military means have proven an ill fit for the task. In the meantime, Iran has a new source of revenue and an upper hand in the Strait ¾an illegal one ¾ never seen in the region.

The Strait’s Closure Has Produced a Cascading Energy Crisis

The economic consequences have been severe. The Strait of Hormuz accounts for approximately 20 percent of the world’s oil supply, and many Asian nations are wholly dependent on Middle Eastern energy sources. Only six or fewer ships are now transiting daily, with Iran controlling access on a selective basis. Some European and Asian refiners are paying nearly $150 a barrel for certain crude grades. The head of the International Energy Agency has described the blockade as more consequential than the disruptions of 1973, 1979, and 2022 combined. The disruptions have cascaded well beyond energy markets: fertilizer shipments are blocked, food insecurity concerns are mounting, and aluminum and helium markets have been severely affected.

Iran’s Demand: Treat the Strait of Hormuz as the Turkish Straits or Suez Canal

Iran has drawn explicit lessons from this disruption and is now seeking to institutionalize its control. Rather than closing the Strait to all traffic indiscriminately, Tehran has weaponized access selectively. Iran’s Foreign Minister announced that ships from China, Russia, India, Iraq, and Pakistan would be permitted to transit freely, while Iranian lawmakers have moved to formally codify Iran’s sovereignty and control over the Strait — creating a toll-collection regime that the Gulf Cooperation Council has confirmed is already operational, in flagrant violation of the law of the sea. Of note, Russia and China vetoed the Security Council Resolution, not an unsurprising outcome considering that Iran is favoring Russian and Chinese vessels.

Iran appears to be seeking legal authorities analogous to those Turkey holds over the Turkish Straits under the Montreux Convention of 1936, or those Egypt exercises in charging tolls to transit the Suez Canal. The Montreux Convention empowers Turkey to regulate the passage of warships through the Straits during wartime — an authority Turkey invoked at the outset of the Russia-Ukraine War.

The Strait of Hormuz operates under an entirely different legal regime. It is an international strait governed by Article 37 of UNCLOS, which establishes a non-negotiable right of transit passage. Tehran has gone further: among its stated conditions for ending the conflict is explicit recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait, with pending legislation to “formally codify Iran’s sovereignty, control and oversight over the Strait of Hormuz” and create a permanent revenue stream through the collection of fees — an arrangement Iran has characterized as “entirely natural.” Iran is using the crisis to attempt a wholesale rewrite of the foundational rules governing transit passage. The rewrite goes far beyond anything the U.S. could legally accede to or reasonably agree to. In the interim, every effort must be made to resist that attempt; military force alone will not reopen the Strait.

Iran’s Actions Violate the Law of the Sea

Iran and the United States have longstanding disagreements about the applicability of UNCLOS to the Strait of Hormuz, a dispute that my colleague James Kraska described as a “Legal Vortex.” Still, the better reading is that transit passage is a foundational right under customary international law and UNCLOS. It is not a privilege that Tehran may selectively grant or monetize. Although neither Iran nor the United States is a party to UNCLOS, the transit passage regime for international straits is widely regarded as reflecting customary international law binding on all states regardless of ratification status. Iran’s closure violates those obligations in at least three respects.

First, the Strait of Hormuz is a “strait used for international navigation” within the meaning of Article 37 of UNCLOS, connecting one part of the exclusive economic zone to another. International straits under the law of the sea make clear that all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, “which shall not be impeded.” That right is not suspended by armed conflict — UNCLOS does not provide for its automatic termination in wartime.

Second, Iran’s $2 million transit fee violates the prohibition on charges levied upon foreign ships by reason of passage alone. Under Article 26 of UNCLOS, charges may be levied only as payment for specific services rendered to the transiting vessel, applied without discrimination. Tehran’s fee is neither linked to any service nor applied without discrimination — it is a selective toll imposed for purely coercive purposes.

Third, Iran’s attempt to claim Montreux-style authority over the Strait has no legal foundation. The Montreux Convention predates UNCLOS by decades, and Article 35 of UNCLOS explicitly preserves “long-standing international conventions in force.” This carve-out reflects the specific historical bargain Turkey struck in 1936, not a template available to other straits states by analogy. There is no “Strait of Hormuz Convention,” and Iran cannot conjure one through unilateral assertion.

Iran may argue that the war itself—which 100 international law scholars and analysts, including Tess Bridgeman, Mike Schmitt, and Ryan Goodman, have assessed as resting on an exceptionally weak legal foundation—justifies extraordinary measures. But a questionable jus ad bellum basis for the conflict does not trigger suspension of transit passage rights that affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The world’s shipping does not lose its rights because the United States launched a legally contested war.

Of course, legal correctness and strategic leverage are not the same thing. Iran has correctly diagnosed the Strait’s strategic importance and converted geography into coercive power in a way that neither airstrikes nor elite ground forces have yet been able to answer.

Overwhelming Military Power Will Not, by Itself, Open the Strait

The Trump administration has responded to the strategic stalemate by deploying its most visible military assets. The Pentagon has ordered roughly 2,000 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne’s Immediate Response Force to the region, supplementing several thousand Marines. The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit arrived on March 27 with amphibious assault assets and strike aircraft. The visible mission under discussion is the seizure of Kharg Island — a five-mile landmass in the northern Persian Gulf handling roughly 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports — on the theory that controlling Tehran’s primary revenue source would compel it to reopen the Strait. Reports indicate the U.S. is already striking targets on Kharg Island, potentially as a precursor to a broader amphibious operation.

The theory is superficially compelling. The operational reality is far more treacherous.

Retired Admiral James Stavridis, the former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, has warned that the first challenge for any force targeting Kharg is simply reaching it. That means transiting a Strait where massive drone swarms, explosive-laden small boats, and anti-ship missiles will be directed at any amphibious ready group. Even assuming the force gets through, the island itself presents the next problem. Iran has emplaced new air defenses and possibly naval mines around Kharg and reinforced its garrison specifically in anticipation of a U.S. assault. Stavridis has stated flatly that Iran has “already set numerous traps” on the island and has done everything to prepare for the destruction of American forces there.

Even assuming tactical success, the operation collapses at the strategic level. A Marine garrison on Kharg becomes the most predictable target in the theater. Iran does not need to defeat all U.S. forces to neutralize the operation — it needs only to strike the oil terminal’s storage infrastructure once. Tehran has explicitly threatened to reduce U.S.-linked oil facilities to “a pile of ashes” if targeted.

There is a much deeper structural problem. Even if the United States seizes Kharg, Iran has demonstrated the ability to sustain operations without the roughly one million barrels per day the island represents in export revenue. More critically, Iran’s arsenal of low-cost Shaheed drones—each costing thousands of dollars—can disrupt maritime shipping worth billions, damage energy infrastructure throughout the Gulf, and impose a de facto blockade through the threat of attack alone. One month into the conflict, Iran struck U.S. forces hundreds of miles away at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. The risk of attack, even without sustained execution, is sufficient to keep insurance rates prohibitive and shipping minimal.

Oil analysts and executives warn that the Strait must reopen by mid-April or supply disruptions will grow significantly worse. This mid-April timing reflects the normal journey time for tankers transiting from the Persian Gulf to Australia and Asian markets. Yet the window for a military solution is narrowing at exactly the moment the military option looks least promising. While President Donald Trump has already twice extended his deadline for Iran to reopen the Strait, Trump’s latest, expletive-ridden threats have a far more menacing and unhinged quality.

Where Do We Go from Here?

The United States retains overwhelming military superiority in conventional terms. But this crisis has not been a test of conventional dominance. It has been a test of whether that dominance can translate into control over a contested maritime chokepoint in the face of asymmetric, persistent denial. So far, it has not.

Iran has shown that it does not need to defeat U.S. forces to achieve its objectives. It needs only to make transit through the Strait sufficiently dangerous, unpredictable, and expensive that global shipping grinds to a halt or submits to its terms. That is a considerably lower bar—and one Iran appears capable of sustaining.

This is the central strategic reality: when Iran clamps down, the Strait of Hormuz cannot be reliably reopened by force alone. Not quickly, not cheaply, and not without unacceptable risk of escalation and broader regional disruption. Even successful tactical operations—whether strikes on Kharg Island or limited maritime engagements—do not resolve the underlying problem of persistent, low-cost maritime denial across a vast and heavily contested coastline.

If the Strait is to truly reopen, it will require more than demonstrations of military power. It will require a coordinated multinational effort to restore confidence in maritime transit, likely including naval escorts, insurance backstops, and sustained diplomatic engagement with regional actors. Ideally, the United States would lead this effort, but the Trump administration has isolated NATO and other core Allies with threats to attack Greenland, imposing massive tariffs, and insulting nations with ad hominem attacks. Never has the United States been so isolated. In a promising sign, last week Britain organized 40 foreign ministers to discuss ways to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, an important first step that should be built upon. All options should be on the table, including reflagging tankers and conducting convoy operations that were used with some success in the 1988 Tanker Wars. Tragically, none of that appears to be on the horizon. Just incendiary Truth Social posts without sustained diplomatic engagement and U.S. leadership as we lurch from one crisis to another. And it is simply too dangerous to transit the Strait with Iranian military opposition and the threat of a missile or drone strike on a tanker. Most importantly, opening the Strait requires a negotiated outcome that preserves the legal regime of transit passage without conceding to Iran’s attempt to rewrite it.

In sum, the U.S. appears to be solving the wrong problem. The United States has been applying force to defeat Iranian capabilities, when the actual problem is Iran’s ability to impose risk at scale. Until a real resolution is reached, the uncomfortable truth remains: geography, not firepower, is dictating outcomes in the Strait of Hormuz—and Iran is exploiting that reality with increasing effectiveness.

The post Continuing Crisis in Strait of Hormuz: Why Iran’s Hold is Illegal and U.S. Military Force Alone Fails appeared first on Just Security.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR 

“A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again,” President Trump said yesterday morning. “I don’t want that to happen, but it probably will.” At 6.32 pm ET, Trump lifted this threat, saying that an intervention by the Pakistani government had led to a two-week ceasefire between the United States, Israel, and Iran. Trump added, “We received a 10-point proposal from Iran, and believe it is a workable basis on which to negotiate.” Shortly after, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in a statement that “safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz will be possible via coordination with Iran’s Armed Forces and with due consideration of technical limitations.” A regional official said today that the ceasefire plan includes allowing Iran and Oman to charge fees on ships transiting through the strait. David E. Sanger reports for the New York Times; AP News reports; Jacob Wendler and Paul McLeary report for POLITICO.

Two sources told Axios that a first round of negotiations between the United States and Iran on an agreement to end the war is planned for Friday in Islamabad. Barak Ravid and Marc Caputo report.

Israel said today that it supports the suspension of attacks against Iran for two weeks, but added that the deal does not extend to Lebanon. Israeli strikes in Lebanon continued today. Three Lebanese sources told Reuters that Hezbollah halted fire on northern Israel and on Israeli troops in Lebanon early this morning as part of the U.S.-Iran ceasefire. Hezbollah is likely to issue a statement outlining its formal position on the ceasefire and on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s position that Lebanon is not included, the sources added. Euan Ward and Francesco Regalado report for the New York Times; Reuters reports.

U.S. forces in the Middle East and officials in the Pentagon “had no idea what was going to happen,” a defense official said, adding that preparations for a massive bombing campaign on Iranian infrastructure continued right up until Trump announced the ceasefire. For those involved in negotiations, sources said there was a general understanding by around noon ET yesterday that the parties were converging on a two-week ceasefire. Two Iranian sources said the “breakthrough” occurred when Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei gave negotiators his blessing to cut a deal. Such was the confusion around Trump’s thinking that multiple people who had spoken to him early yesterday evening still believed he would reject the ceasefire offer. Barak Ravid, Dave Lawler, and Marc Caputo report for Axios.

The United States, Israel, and Iran accelerated strikes yesterday ahead of Trump’s deadline. Vice President JD Vance said yesterday that strikes on Iran’s Kharg Island overnight did not include oil infrastructure, adding that there had been no change in U.S. strategy. “The president’s deadline…has been followed by us and everybody else,” he said. “And he said very clearly, we’re not going to strike energy and infrastructure targets until the Iranians either make a proposal we can get behind or don’t make a proposal.” Gregory Svirnovskiy reports for POLITICO; Max Bearak reports for the New York Times.

U.S. journalist Shelly Kittleson, who was kidnapped in Iraq by Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah last week, has been released, the State Department said yesterday. Jacob Wendler and Daniella Cheslow report for POLITICO.

Iranian hackers are exploiting cyber vulnerabilities in key software systems at U.S. water and energy providers, according to a new advisory released by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency yesterday. Programmable logic controllers developed by software manufacturer Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley are actively being exploited, and PLCs from other companies are potentially being targeted as well, the advisory said. Dana Nickel and Maggie Miller report for POLITICO.

The FBI warned U.S. state and local law enforcement of an elevated threat posed by Iran’s government to targets in the United States, including military and government personnel, Jewish and Israeli institutions, and Iranian dissidents in the United States, in a report dated March 20. The FBI and National Counterterrorism Center had not identified broad threats to the American public, the report said. Kristina Cooke and Ted Hesson report for Reuters.

IRAN WAR – POLITICAL RESPONSE 

China and Russia vetoed a Bahrain-led resolution at the U.N. yesterday aimed at reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Bahrain, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia, Liberia, Panama, Somalia, the United Kingdom, and the United States voted in favor of the resolution. Sophie Brams reports for the Hill.

“About 15 countries ​are currently mobilised and are participating in ​the planning… to enable the implementation of this strictly defensive mission… to facilitate the ​resumption of traffic” through the Strait of Hormuz, French President Emmanuel Macron said this morning in a meeting with French defense advisers. Macron also welcomed the ceasefire between Iran and the United States, but called for Lebanon to be included in the deal. Reuters reports.

More than 70 U.S. Democratic lawmakers yesterday called for Trump to be removed from office and questioned his mental fitness for the presidency after he threatened to destroy “a whole civilization” in Iran. Sen. Jack Reed (D-RI) said that Trump’s threat was “comparable to genocide” and a “criminal act,” adding that Trump “seems to have lost control” and “become as fanatical as the regime leaders in Tehran.” Megan Mineiro and Michael Gold report for the New York Times.

More than two dozen Senate Democrats yesterday demanded that the Armed Services Committee open its own bipartisan investigation into the Feb. 28 strike on an Iranian girls’ elementary school that killed at least 175 people. Megan Mineiro reports for the New York Times.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR 

Cameroon said on Monday that Russia confirmed the deaths of 16 Cameroonian soldiers in Ukraine, according to a memo addressed to the Russian Embassy in Cameroon. Nalova Akua reports for AP News.

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

North Korea fired multiple ballistic missiles today, adding to a launch a day earlier, according to South Korea’s military. The incidents mark North Korea’s fourth, fifth, and sixth ballistic missile launches this year, following two launches in January and a third in March. South Korea typically ​announces North Korean ballistic missile launches promptly, as such tests violate U.N. Security Council resolutions against the North’s missile programme. Kyu-Seok Shim reports for Reuters.

The International Organization for Migration said yesterday that more than 80 migrants are missing after a boat that departed from Libya on Sunday capsized in the central Mediterranean. Of the estimated 120 people on board, 32 were rescued by a merchant vessel and a tugboat. Fatma Khaled reports for AP News.

TECH DEVELOPMENTS 

Anthropic said yesterday that its new AI model, Claude Mythos Preview, is so powerful at finding and exploiting software vulnerabilities that it could pose major cybersecurity risks and so will not be released publicly. Instead, access is being restricted to around 40 tech and cybersecurity companies, including Apple, Amazon, and Microsoft, which will use it to detect and fix security vulnerabilities in software programs. Kevin Roose reports for the New York Times.

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Trump and Vance yesterday offered their support for Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban at a rally five days before the election. Vance cheered Orban on in person, while Trump offered his praise by telephone to a stadium in Budapest packed with supporters of Hungary’s Fidesz party. “I love Hungary, and I love Viktor. I’m telling you he’s a fantastic man,” Trump said by phone. Andrew Higgins and Lili Rutai report for the New York Times.

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS

ICE officers yesterday shot and injured a man named Carlos Ivan Mendoza in Northern California. The Department of Homeland Security said ICE fired defensive shots at Mendoza after he “weaponized his vehicle” during a targeted vehicle stop. DHS also said that Mendoza has a history of gang involvement and was wanted for questioning in El Salvador about a murder. Gov. Gavin Newsom (D-CA) said he had been briefed on the incident and expected federal authorities to cooperate with state and local officials during the investigation. Alyssa Lukpat reports for the Wall Street Journal.

ICE arrested more than 800 people following tips shared by Transportation Security Administration officials from the beginning of Trump’s presidency to February 2026, according to internal ICE data reviewed by Reuters. Ted Hesson and Kristina Cooke report.

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

The Justice Department has assigned its civil rights divsion, led by Harmeet Dhillon, to investigate Cassidy Hutchinson, a former White House aide, over alleged lying to Congress about events on Jan. 6, 2021. Alan Feuer and Michael S. Schmidt report for the New York Times.

Bill Gates is scheduled to appear before the House Oversight Committee for a transcribed interview about his relationship with Jeffrey Epstein on June 10. Cheyanne M. Daniels and Hailey Fuchs report for POLITICO.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

“Nobody has any idea why the attorney general is no longer the attorney general… except for President Trump,” acting Attorney General Todd Blanche told reporters yesterday. Blanche said he was not taking any particular lesson from Pam Bondi’s removal nor planning any course correction for the DOJ. “I grow tired of people in the media saying why President Trump did or did not do something, because President Trump’s the only one that knows that,” Blanche added. Josh Gerstein reports for POLITICO.

Army Secretary Dan Driscoll told the Washington Post yesterday that he has no plans to resign from his role at the Pentagon, after a series of internal clashes with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Hegseth and Driscoll have disagreed on several issues, including Hegseth’s moves to block the promotions of several Army officers, officials said, adding that tensions between the two date back at least a year. Dan Lamothe reports.

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ICYMI: Yesterday on Just Security

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If we were to put this into a legal framework, one might think that all parties are engaging in actions that are tantamount to reprisals. Reprisals, in the narrow legal sense, are counter-violations of the law meant to induce the other party to comply with its own legal obligations. Reprisals of this type have a long history in international law. The notion exists on the level of jus ad bellum (the law on resort to war), but has been clearly outlawed with the prohibition on non-defensive force and punitive wars, as entrenched in the UN Charter. On the level of jus in bello, international humanitarian law has gradually narrowed down the scope of permitted reprisals, to the point where they are arguably prohibited altogether. In this piece, however, I do not discuss reprisals in this narrow sense, or focus on their legality. It should be emphasized that no party in the war actually made a case that it engages in “reprisals” in the legal sense. Crucially, they are not even claiming that they are acting to counter violations of the law. Rather, they aim to coerce one another regardless of issues of legality.

For this reason, I use the term “reprisals” as an analytical model of coercive signaling, rather than as a doctrinal legal category, and argue that reprisals are highly unlikely to work in the majority of wartime scenarios. The reason is that there is an acute paradox in the underlying structure of reprisals. Simply put, reprisals require trust, precisely between parties that fundamentally do not trust each other. For this reason, the fact that international law prohibits reprisals is not only justified morally, but also makes sense on the practical level: rather than inducing the other party to cease problematic behavior, they are much more likely to cause uncontrollable escalation.

Counterintuitively, a reprisal in any form requires that opposing parties have a shared perception of reality. Specifically, it requires a common understanding of the causal chain of events, as well as a belief that the adversary’s use of force is genuinely and strictly intended to induce a change in the identified behavior. At its most basic level, a reprisal is a form of communication. As a communicative signal, a reprisal must convince the opponent that three things are true: (a) you, the opponent, have done X; (b) because you have done so, I will do Y to you; (c) I will stop doing Y should you stop doing X. Now, this signal could have been fairly easy to communicate credibly between generals commanding professional armies, engaging in limited warfare, and willing to acknowledge the other’s equal rational agency. However, this is less the case in conditions of noisy communication – as is often  the case today – and where parties view the other as inherently evil and fundamentally different from themselves. Furthermore, in modern wars, there is often an assumption that the effectiveness of reprisals lies in their capacity to pressure the broader public to act, so that it, in turn, forces its leadership to cease the unwanted behavior. This requires another condition (d): that the signal is communicated effectively to the opponent’s public, and that not only the leadership, but also the public, believes (a), (b), and (c). Plus the assumption that the public can shape leaders’ warfighting decisions in real time.

Quite clearly, these conditions cannot be fulfilled, at least in relation to Iran and Israel, and quite possibly among other involved States. Importantly, the argument here does not depend on accepting any of these narratives as true. The key point is that once these narratives are in place, reprisals simply cannot work. First of all, in all likelihood, Iran does not accept that its actions in Hormuz are anything but responsive to previous acts by the United States and Israel themselves, so in its view, the reprisal cycle has begun earlier. What the United States is portraying as point (a) (i.e., the closure of Hormuz), Iran perceives as its own act (b) (taken in response to attacks against it). So Iranian belief in point (a) cannot exist. Furthermore, Iran does not believe that the force used against it is causally linked to the behavior identified in the U.S. threat to attack its power plants, as required by (b). Whether because of the unclear objectives of the war, Trump’s erratic behavior, Netanyahu’s character, the history between the parties, or any other reason, Iran likely feels that the attacks against it are unrelated to its actual conduct, or at least the conduct stated as a reason for them. For the same reason, condition (c) cannot be fulfilled: Iran probably believes that it would eventually be attacked in such a way regardless of what it does, or at least as long as the regime continues to stand (which to the regime’s elites is existential). Furthermore, the signal in condition (d) probably cannot be communicated effectively, because of the tight control over information in Iran, internet blackout, and regime propaganda. This, in addition to those in Iran that genuinely share the regime’s ideology and are thus more inclined to share its views regarding (a), (b) and (c). 

Israel is a mirror image of these assumptions. Israel does not accept that it is acting in the manner characterized by Iran in relation to point (a); rather, it feels that it is responding to Iran’s “ongoing hostilities” against it, whether these are conducted directly or indirectly. Owing to the annihilationist discourse of the Iranian regime against Israel, Israel likely does not think that the way Iran uses force against it is related in any way to Israel’s own actions, in relation to point (b); and it certainly does not believe that Iran would stop attacking certain targets if Israel does not do so, eroding point (c). And last, Iran’s arguments about retaliation are certainly not communicated effectively or credibly to the Israeli public. There is absolutely no perception in Israel that this or that missile attack can be traced to this or that previous Israeli attack. Thus condition (d) likely does not exist either. In fact, both in Iran and Israel, it is close to impossible – except in the very broad sense –  for the public to connect between a supposed “retaliation” to a specific previous behavior by their State.

The idea of reprisals seems to rest on an archetypical picture of opposing generals, meeting under a flag of truce and duly communicating their demands. This, however, does not reflect the information environment of modern wars, and specifically those which are based on the perception of an enemy that has to be eliminated as a political entity altogether. Indeed, it is plain to see that the level of mutual trust required between the adversaries for reprisals to work is staggering. And the paradox is that if such a level of trust could be achieved, the parties would likely not be engaged in this kind of war in the first place.

The post Reprisals and the Paradox of Trust: Why Threats of Retaliation in the Iran War are Unlikely to Work appeared first on Just Security.

Hungary thus stands at a critical juncture: this election is not simply a contest between parties, but a test of whether political turnover can bring meaningful democratic change after prolonged state capture. It offers a rare real-world stress test of how resilient entrenched illiberal systems are when unexpectedly confronted with electoral vulnerability. The trajectory is being watched closely by Orbán’s allies abroad, not the least of which are Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump.

Hungary as a Laboratory of Illiberalism

After 2010, Fidesz transformed Hungary from a liberal democracy into an electoral autocracy by using the party’s parliamentary supermajority to reshape the political system in ways that preserve the outward appearance of democracy while systematically undermining it.

The erosion of democracy has rested on several mutually reinforcing pillars. First, institutional capture has ensured political control over key state bodies, including the Constitutional Court, the public prosecutor’s office, and regulatory authorities. Second, the electoral system has been redesigned to favor the largest party, combining first-past-the-post single-member districts with a compensatory system that amplifies the winner’s advantage — particularly when contested by a fragmented opposition. Third, media capture has reshaped the information environment: the public media fell under party control, private media are dominated by pro-government outlets, while independent outlets face financial challenges and political pressure.

These structural changes have been accompanied by a political strategy of sustained polarization. The government has framed politics in existential terms, mobilizing voters through narratives of external threat — whether from migrants, the European Union institutions in Brussels, or more recently, Ukraine, which the government accuses of interfering in the Hungarian election in support of the opposition and posing a direct threat to Hungary’s energy security. Unlike most of its EU allies, the Hungarian government has been actively opposing help to Ukraine while maintaining its close ties with Russia even after the 2022 launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In parallel, Orbán and his government have long been portrayed domestic opponents as illegitimate or outright threats to national sovereignty. This narrative is especially strong today, when the Tisza party is accused of conspiring with Ukraine to oust Fidesz.

The Rise of a Challenger

Against this backdrop, the emergence of Tisza as a serious electoral contender is striking. Until recently, Hungary’s opposition remained fragmented and largely reactive, unable to overcome Fidesz’s dominance. Péter Magyar, an insider-turned-critic, has altered that dynamic. Magyar turned his back on Fidesz in early 2024 following a scandal that saw his former wife, Fidesz’s Minister of Justice Judit Varga, resign over the pardoning of a convicted helper of a pedophile. Riding the public outrage sparked by the scandal, Magyar set out to mobilize people against the governing party. Within a few months, his brand-new party gathered enough support to score 33 percent in the European parliamentary election as runner-up to Fidesz.

Rather than engaging on terrain set by the government, Magyar has pursued an autonomous political strategy. He has avoided being drawn into the polarizing narratives the government employs to direct Hungarian political discourse and instead focused on exposing the corruption and hypocrisy of the ruling elite. Over time, this approach has helped erode Fidesz’s thus-far unparalleled ability to dominate the political agenda.

Equally important has been Tisza’s organizational strategy. Magyar has invested heavily in building a nationwide political presence, developing active local groups — so-called Tisza Islands — capable of mobilizing against Fidesz across the 106 single-member districts. This footwork has been critical in turning Tisza into a credible political alternative.

As Tisza’s support grew with the approaching election, several smaller parties of the “old” opposition have stepped aside, allowing for an unprecedented degree of voter mobilization behind a single challenger. Ultimately, Tisza has succeeded in attracting a broad coalition of voters spanning ideological divides, united by dissatisfaction with the Orbán regime but also drawn by a forward-looking, hopeful message the party put forward.

The combination of these factors helped Tisza to hack the system and make it competitive against all odds. Through adaptation to it, rather than mere protest against, the party managed to circumvent the structural constraints of the uneven playing field Fidesz had created.

What to Watch on Election Day

Despite the increased competitiveness of the race, the conditions under which the election will take place remain deeply uneven. Hungary has not held a fully free and fair election since 2010; elections since have been conducted within a media and institutional environment that systematically favors the incumbent.

Public media continues to function as a government communication channel, offering favorable coverage of Fidesz while excluding opposition voices. At the same time, the boundary between state communication and party campaigning has become blurred, with public resources deployed to reinforce the governing party’s messaging.

The current campaign, too, reflects these longstanding patterns. Fidesz has relied heavily on negative campaigning and has declined to participate in any public debates. Meanwhile, the opposition operates in a constrained information environment, particularly in rural areas where access to independent media is limited.

On election day itself, attention will focus on the scale and distribution of irregularities. Past elections have seen reports of a wide range of manipulation. Instances of vote buying, voter intimidation, organized transportation of voters, and other modes of manipulation are detailed in a recent documentary, revealing that such practices may affect as many as 600,000 voters, which would be almost 10 percent of the expected turnout. Such practices are localized and difficult to document systematically, but they can be decisive in closely contested districts.

International election observers, particularly of the internationally well-regarded mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE-ODIHR), will play an important role in monitoring the process, potentially deterring more blatant forms of manipulation. However, their capacity is inherently limited, and many forms of irregularity remain hard to detect. The ODIHR mission, however, is not the only one to be present in the country. Concerns were raised about the impartiality of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s mission, in which a former interpreter for Russia’s Putin, Daria Boyarskaya, fills a key coordinating role. Furthermore, Fidesz-friendly organizations Ordo Iuris and the Edmund Burke Foundation, are also planning to send observers. The presence of both independent and government-friendly observers forecasts a battle of narratives regarding the conduct of the election.

The key question is not whether irregularities will occur, but whether they will be widespread and coordinated enough to alter the overall result in Fidesz’s favor, and whether under such circumstances the election can still be considered free. While concerns about extreme scenarios — such as outright annulment of the election result or refusal to transfer power — pop up in public discourse, such moves would carry immediate and harsh political and economic risks for the government and the country as such. EU member states would be forced to condemn and punish a stolen election, while markets would react harshly to the legal uncertainty such a move would trigger. If one or the other party’s lead — based on the polls, that of Tisza — is not clear and significant, a more plausible scenario is one in which the election remains formally free but is contested in specific districts, potentially leading to extended disputes in its aftermath and delays in the formation of a new government.

Winning Office. Gaining Power?

If current trends hold, Tisza could emerge with a parliamentary majority. The extent of that majority, however, will be decisive. A two-thirds supermajority would not only dispel doubts about the results but also enable constitutional and institutional reforms necessary to begin to dismantle Fidesz’s entrenched system and perhaps allow for a relatively rapid restoration of democratic institutions.

Absent such a mandate, however, a new government would face a far more constrained environment. Over the past 16 years, Fidesz has embedded loyalists across a wide array of institutions, many with terms that extend beyond electoral cycles. These include the presidency, the Constitutional Court, the highest court of the judiciary, the public prosecutor’s office, and the national bank.

These actors could function as veto players, limiting the government’s ability to implement reforms or pursue accountability. Even routine governance could become difficult, as institutional resistance and legal challenges could slow or block legislation.

Access to European funds represents a particularly important dimension. Like other EU member states that are less developed, Hungary is a net beneficiary of financial transfers supporting its economy. Significant portions of Hungary’s EU funding, however, were frozen in 2022 due to concerns over corruption and violations of judicial independence. Tisza has pledged to unlock these resources by implementing reforms, but doing so would require navigating precisely those institutional constraints that Fidesz has entrenched.

The experience of Poland following its 2023 parliamentary election offers a relevant comparison. Even faced with less extensive state capture, the new government of Donald Tusk has encountered significant obstacles in reversing the illiberal measures of the previous government of the Law and Justice party, including on judicial independence. Hungary’s deeper level of institutional capture suggests that the challenges would be even more pronounced.

Moreover, political instability cannot be ruled out and may evolve into a crisis by next spring. The new government will need the green light of the Fiscal Council — a monitoring body made up of Fidesz-loyalists, namely the presidents of the national bank, the State Audit Office, and the Fiscal Council itself — to adopt the country’s next annual budget by March 2027. If the Council withholds its support, the president may dissolve the parliament and call early elections. This possibility increases the urgency of meaningful restoration and revival of democratic institutions.

The Message Beyond Hungary

Hungary’s trajectory over the past decade and a half has made it a global poster case of democratic backsliding driven by executive aggrandizement. The system constructed by Orbán retains the facade of democracy while in effect becoming progressively radicalized and serving only the interests of a single political force and its associated business networks.

Hungary’s model has resonated beyond its borders. Orbán has positioned himself as a leading figure within transnational far-right networks, cultivating ties with actors especially in Europe and the United States. An ally not only of Putin but also of Trump and his administration, Orbán’s model of governance has become a reference point among those seeking to capture power while still claiming a popular mandate through election.

After 16 years, the tide now may be turning as the April 12 election nears. The rise of Tisza demonstrates that even heavily skewed systems can produce openings for opposition forces capable of adapting strategically. But electoral victory alone does not suffice to dismantle entrenched power structures. Hungary’s experience underscores that once democratic institutions have been systematically hollowed out, restoring them is far more difficult than dismantling them was in the first place.

The post Hungary’s Election Could End Orbán’s Rule — But Will It End His Power? appeared first on Just Security.

The evidence clearly shows the United States carried out the attack. But how it happened is less clear. Tomahawk missiles are sophisticated, precise weapons, and reporting from The New York Times suggests outdated intelligence misidentified the school—which was located next to a military installation—as a target. This horrible tragedy may not have been deliberate, but it was preventable. The school was clearly labeled in maps, and a children’s sports field was visible in satellite imagery—raising serious questions about U.S. and Israeli targeting decisions.

That the strike occurred under the command of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth raises even graver concerns. In both rhetoric and action, Hegseth has sought to erode the U.S. military’s adherence to the laws that govern warfare. His disregard for the laws of war also comes at a time when he is encouraging rapid integration of artificial intelligence to speed up targeting decisions. Hegseth’s attempts to dismantle existing Pentagon efforts to mitigate civilian harm belie a troubling reality: he is creating the conditions whereby incidents like the elementary school strike, even if accidental, may be permissible.

Opening the Door to Error

Hegseth’s antipathy toward the laws of war predates his tenure as secretary of defense. In his 2024 book The War on Warriors, Hegseth describes military Judge Advocates General—the military lawyers responsible for advising battlefield commanders on the laws and rules of engagement—as impediments. He brags about calling them “JAG-offs” to his unit when he served in the Army. In one of his first acts as secretary, he purged the top ranks of the JAG corps. Earlier this March, he directed an overhaul of the military’s legal offices, which has raised alarms about the potential to further undercut necessary legal oversight while the United States is using force (much of it illegal) in multiple theaters.

Hegseth’s disdain for the laws of war mirrors his singular, bizarre obsession with “maximum lethality.” In multiple instances, he has suggested that the laws of war serve only to bind the hands of the “warfighter,” who Hegseth encourages to “hunt, dismantle, demoralize, destroy” and, of course, kill the enemy.

The Pentagon is also under pressure to carry out the war in Iran at massive speed and scale, and it is increasingly relying on AI to do so. Through its “Project Maven” initiative, the Department of Defense has integrated AI throughout its intelligence collection and mission planning. Earlier this year, Hegseth unrolled policies encouraging the accelerated use of AI, with an intent to compress the speed at which targeting decisions are made. These policies appear to have had an impact: Over the first 10 days of the war in Iran, the Pentagon claims to have struck 5,000 targets, a massive scale of operations. And although AI has great potential to assist the U.S. military in achieving greater precision in wartime—and thereby reducing civilian casualties—it requires proper integration and oversight. It is unclear the degree to which this is happening.

Hegseth’s recent conflict with the AI company Anthropic over concerns that its technology could be used for autonomous lethal weapons or mass domestic surveillance sent a message that he would be unlikely to prioritize restraint or oversight when deploying AI systems. At the same time that it is accelerating AI utilization, the Department of Defense has also seen an approximate 10 percent reduction in force over the last year. Of note, Hegseth gutted the offices mainly responsible for civilian harm mitigation efforts. In this environment, accelerating the speed and scale of the department’s operations—whether from command pressure or AI utilization or both—clearly raises the risk of error.

As the days and weeks progress, the culture Hegseth seeks to instill at the Pentagon will continue to create more unnecessary pain for innocent families around the world and generate more anger toward the United States. Already, the Iranian Red Crescent has reported over 67,000 civilian facilities have been struck in three weeks of war, including hundreds of schools, hundreds of health facilities, water desalination plants, and residential areas. As many as 3 million Iranians have been displaced. While it is unclear which of these strikes may be attributed to U.S. or to Israeli forces, it is difficult to see the overwhelming pattern as anything more than a disregard for humanitarian law and innocent human life.

A military culture that disregards civilian harm doesn’t just impact civilians in combat zones. It also puts service members at risk of violating the oaths they swore or becoming complicit in war crimes—which carries with it deep psychological and moral harms. This possibility is not an abstract concern: the Department of Veterans Affairs has cited exposure to “morally injurious events” as a risk factor for suicidality. Increasing this risk is particularly alarming at a time when a suicide crisis plagues the U.S. military, with over 17 veterans taking their own lives each day.

Disregard for civilian harm carries security implications as well, potentially undermining the reputation of the U.S. military. Already allies and partners are limiting cooperation with the U.S. military over concerns that they may be enabling war crimes or extrajudicial killings. The culture Hegseth has established at the DOD is actively eroding the longstanding partnerships that keep U.S. troops—and the American people—safe. Undermining the laws of war also sends the message to any belligerents – including U.S. adversaries – that these laws are optional. Finally, discarding these laws provides no strategic battlefield advantage. While they have fallen short in practice, from Vietnam to Iraq, military commanders have recognized that strategic success cannot be achieved through brute force alone, but rests on gaining the trust and confidence of the civilian population.

Undoing History

Hegseth loves to conjure history to support his vision of the “warrior ethos.” In his speech to military leaders in Quantico last September, he harkened to Rome in the fourth century and to George Washington and Thomas Jefferson in the 1700s. Throughout this speech and others, he has claimed he is leading a “restoration”: restoration of lethality and the ability of the warfighter to operate outside the bounds of the law.

But, at least as far as modern military practice is concerned, Hegseth is an aberration, not an exemplar. By 1949, the United States had signed the four Geneva Conventions that form the backbone of the binding laws of war. Of course, the United States has an imperfect record of adhering to these laws, with dark records in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere. But, aside from President Donald Trump and Hegseth, successive U.S. presidents and secretaries of defense have sought to strengthen civilian protection and harm mitigation efforts.

In 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis ordered the DOD to review civilian casualties in counter-ISIS operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, work that Secretary Mark Esper continued during his tenure. In 2021, responding to the results of that review, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made civilian harm mitigation efforts a focus, launching the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan and, as part of this effort, created a Civilian Protection Center of Excellence at the Pentagon. Hegseth effectively dissolved it.

Since the strike on Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School, 46 senators and 121 members of Congress have demanded that the Pentagon provide answers regarding its investigation into the tragedy. The Trump administration has not meaningfully responded. It has failed to acknowledge its role in the strike, let alone apologize to the affected families. Congress should continue to exercise its oversight authority and demand that Hegseth and others provide a public accounting for the errors that led to the strike and outline efforts to ensure similar mistakes won’t happen again. Congress can also ensure civilian harm mitigation efforts are not subject to the whim of any future secretary of defense by seeking to codify these practices into law and properly resource them.

Hegseth may present his version of a warfighter focused on “maximum lethality, not tepid legality” as the paragon of American military power, but for all his tough talk, he fails to recognize the true strengths of the U.S. armed forces. The U.S. military has become the most effective and powerful fighting presence in the world not because of brute lethal force, but because of its professionalism and precision. Fostering these qualities requires a leader to recognize that the loss of innocent life demands deep reflection, learning, and resolve not to repeat mistakes. It also requires approaching the laws that bind U.S. armed forces as moral and strategic imperatives. Tragically, it’s too late for more than a hundred families in Iran who will never have the chance to see their precious children grow up, but it is not too late for others like them.

The post The Dangers of Hegseth’s “Warfighter” Ethos appeared first on Just Security.

More than a matter of political conflict, the episode was a test of whether the separation of powers and the democratic safeguards embedded in the country’s constitution would function in a moment of crisis. The principal issues addressed in the first-instance criminal judgment offer a compelling case study of how the South Korean judicial system served as a bulwark of democratic resilience in the face of a crisis. It should be made clear, however, that the judgment is not yet final, and that appellate proceedings are currently underway following appeals by both the defendant and the prosecution.

Insurrection and Criminal Responsibility

What the trial court regarded as central to the criminal conduct was not simply the president’s verbal declaration of martial law itself, but a series of concrete acts carried out with the aim of substantially paralyzing the functions of the National Assembly for a considerable period by sending troops there. These acts included the blockade of the National Assembly, attempts to arrest major political figures, and attempts to secure control of the National Election Commission. The court held that the deployment of armed military personnel to the National Assembly, the resulting physical clashes, and the mobilization of equipment and vehicles for arrests were themselves sufficient to satisfy the “riot” element of the crime of insurrection. In other words, the absence of prolonged armed conflict or large-scale bloodshed did not preclude the establishment of insurrection.

During the trial, Yoon argued that the repeated impeachment attempts by the opposition-controlled National Assembly and sweeping budget cuts had rendered the government impossible to run, and that the declaration of martial law was not a means of seizing power but an unavoidable emergency measure intended to break a prolonged state of governmental paralysis. Paradoxically, that argument raises a broader question as to whether Korea’s constitutional system contains adequate mechanisms to defuse or mediate extreme conflict between the legislative and executive branches before it escalates. The court, however, held that problems between the two branches of government must be resolved strictly through the procedures contemplated by the Constitution and laws, and cannot be addressed by using force to block the exercise of authority by constitutional institutions. Ultimately, the court treated as decisive not the president’s political motives or sense of crisis as such, but whether his conduct crossed constitutional limits and moved toward altering the legal order by force.

Two legal holdings of particular importance emerged from the judgment. First, even a president may be the subject of the crime of insurrection. The court reasoned that the purpose of subverting the constitutional order includes not only the formal abolition of constitutional institutions, but also rendering them unable to exercise their powers for a substantial period. Accordingly, the fact that martial law is a constitutionally recognized power does not itself provide immunity. If martial law was used as a means of infringing the essential functions of the National Assembly, then it was not a constitutionally contemplated exercise of power but a destruction of the constitutional order by force. Second, because insurrection is a collective offense, the leader may bear responsibility for the entirety of the enterprise even if he did not personally direct every individual act of execution or participate in every scene, so long as he led the overall plan and implementation under a common purpose.

The criminal judgments against related actors reinforce this point. In the same trial, former Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-hyun was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment; former Defense Intelligence Commander Noh Sang-won to 18 years; former Commissioner General of the Korean National Police Agency Cho Ji-ho to 12 years; former Seoul Metropolitan Police Commissioner Kim Bong-sik to 10 years; and former head of the National Assembly Security Guard Mok Hyun-tae to three years. By contrast, Kim Yong-gun, a retired colonel and former commander in the military police, and Yoon Seung-young, Chief of Investigation Planning and Coordination at the National Police Agency, were acquitted on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to establish that they recognized and agreed to the purpose of subverting the constitutional order. This shows that the court did not simply emphasize the gravity of the incident in the abstract, but individually examined whether each defendant had in fact shared the unconstitutional objective.

In sentencing, the court combined symbolism with specificity. It began from the premise that insurrection is an offense of danger that inherently carries an exceptionally high degree of risk because it threatens the very existence of the state and its constitutional functions. The court further observed that the acts in this case damaged the political neutrality of the military and police, diminished Korea’s standing and international credibility, drove society into extreme polarization, and imposed enormous social costs. As for Yoon personally, the court treated as aggravating factors that he had led the offense, involved numerous others in its execution, failed to apologize for the consequences, and even refused to appear during parts of the proceedings. At the same time, the court took into account that the plan could not be regarded as highly sophisticated, that there had been efforts to restrain the possession of live ammunition and the use of direct physical force, and that Yoon had no prior criminal record and had served in public office for many years. For those reasons, the court-imposed life imprisonment rather than the death penalty.

Democratic Resilience and Constitutional Vulnerability

This judgment should be understood from the perspective of how a democratic state articulates legal responsibility for the abuse of power by the head of the executive branch. In this case, the Korean judiciary did not attempt to resolve the underlying political controversy itself. Rather, it examined as a legal matter whether the attempt to suspend the functions of the legislature and arrest political figures through the mobilization of military and police power constituted a destruction of the constitutional order, and to what extent responsibility for that conduct could be attributed to an individual. In that sense, the judgment may be read not as an example of the judicialization of politics, but as an instance in which the judiciary served as the final brake against the exercise of raw power outside the Constitution.

At the same time, the judgment also exposes the vulnerabilities of Korea’s constitutional system. The court noted that in advanced democracies it is rare for a president, after reaching an extreme conflict with the legislature, to mobilize the military, precisely because those systems have more refined mechanisms to prevent such conflict from escalating to that stage. This suggests that while Korea ultimately managed to control the crisis after the fact, it lacked sufficient institutional devices to alleviate conflict between the legislative and executive branches at an earlier stage. In the end, the judgment demonstrates both that the courts functioned as the last safeguard of constitutional democracy and that there remains a pressing need for institutional buffers capable of operating before a crisis reaches the point where that final safeguard must be invoked.

***

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the official position of the Korean judiciary.

The post The Judicial Reckoning for the Abuse of Presidential Power in Korea appeared first on Just Security.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR 

Iran yesterday sent a 10-point response to the proposals under discussion with the United States for ending the war, according to Iranian state news agency IRNA and U.S. officials. IRNA reported that the Iranian response was discussed internally for two weeks and sent to Pakistani mediators yesterday. It emphasizes the need for a permanent end to the war, not just a temporary ceasefire, calls for an end to Israeli strikes against Lebanon, and the lifting of all sanctions, according to two Iranian officials. A U.S. official who saw the Iranian response called it “maximalist.” President Trump told reporters that Iran’s response was “significant” but “not good enough,” keeping his Tuesday deadline in place. Barak Ravid reports for Axios; Max Bearak, Farnaz Fassihi, Shirin Hakim, and Erika Solomon report for the New York Times; Reuters reports.

Trump said yesterday that “every bridge in Iran will be decimated” by midnight ET on Wednesday and “every power plant in Iran will be out of business, burning, exploding, and never to be used again.” An Iranian military spokesperson warned that Iranian operations would be “carried out much more crushingly and extensively” if attacks on “civilian targets are repeated.” Iranian officials today have called on “all young people, athletes, artists, students, and university students and their professors” to form human chains around power plants. Barak Ravid reports for Axios; Ephrat Livni reports for the New York Times; Bassem Mroue, Jon Gambrell, David Rising, and Samy Magdy report for AP News.

Trump yesterday threatened to force a news organization to turn over the name of an anonymous source who revealed details about the U.S. airman who went missing in Iran last week. “[Iran] didn’t know there was somebody missing until this leaker gave the information,” Trump said yesterday. “So whoever it was, we think we’ll be able to find it out because we’re going to go to the media company that released it, and we’re going to say, national security, give it up or go to jail.” Scott Nover reports for the Washington Post.

The U.N. Security Council is expected to vote today on a resolution led by Bahrain to protect commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, diplomats said. The latest iteration of the resolution, seen by Reuters, drops any explicit authorization of the use of force, following opposition from China, Russia, and others. Instead, the current text “strongly encourages States interested in the use of commercial maritime routes in the Strait of Hormuz to coordinate efforts, ​defensive in nature, commensurate to the circumstances, to contribute to ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz.” David Brunnstrom and John Irish report.

The Pentagon is expanding a list of Iranian energy sites it can target for attacks to include ones that provide fuel and power to both civilians and the military, two defense officials said, adding that this is likely a workaround if the Trump administration is accused of war crimes for striking basic infrastructure. The dual-use nature of the targets would make them legitimate, the officials said. A third source said Pentagon officials have debated where to draw the line between military and civilian targets, such as water desalination plants. Trump said yesterday that the Iranian people would welcome strikes on energy infrastructure. They “would be willing to suffer that in order to have freedom,” he said. “They want us to keep bombing.” Paul McLeary and Leo Shane III report for POLITICO.

Russian satellites have made at least 24 surveys of areas in 11 Middle Eastern countries from March 21 to 31, covering 36 “objects”, including U.S. and other military bases and sites, according to an undated Ukrainian intelligence assessment reviewed by Reuters. Within days of being surveyed, military bases and headquarters were targeted by Iranian ballistic missiles, the assessment said. The conclusions also found that Russian and Iranian hackers are collaborating in the cyber domain. Tom Balmforth and John Irish report.

ISRAEL-GAZA WAR 

An Israeli airstrike yesterday killed at least 10 people and wounded several others outside a school housing displaced Palestinians in Gaza, health officials said. Earlier on Monday, an Israeli airstrike killed one Palestinian and wounded a child as they traveled on a motorbike in ​Gaza City, medics said, adding that Israeli forces killed another Palestinian when they opened fire on a vehicle in central Gaza. Nidal al-Mughrabi and Mahmoud Issa report for Reuters.

World Health Organization Director General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said yesterday that a contractor in Gaza was killed during a security incident, prompting the organization to suspend medical evacuations from Gaza via Rafah to Egypt until further notice. Nidal al-Mughrabi and Mahmoud Issa report for Reuters.

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

Taiwanese opposition leader Cheng Li-wun is heading to China today at the invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping, in what she has called a “journey for peace.” The visit is the first by a Taiwanese opposition leader in a decade. AP News reports.

Burkina Faso on Sunday rejected a Human Rights Watch report that said around 1,255 civilians have been killed by the military and allied militias in acts amounting to “crimes against humanity” in the three years since Ibrahim Traoré seized power. Basillioh Rukanga reports for the BBC News.

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Despite pledges to shift U.S. foreign aid toward smaller, local organizations, the Trump administration’s 2025 overhaul ended up sending significantly more funding to large U.S.-based contractors, according to an analysis from the Health Security Policy Academy. Stephanie Nolen reports for the New York Times.

Vice President JD Vance arrived in Hungary today for a two day trip, where he is scheduled to hold an official visit with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán ahead of Sunday’s election. Justin Spike reports for AP News.

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS

Video footage obtained by the New York Times contradicts federal claims that two Venezuelan men, Julio C. Sosa-Celis and Alfredo A. Ajorna, assaulted an ICE agent with a snow shovel before an agent shot one of them during Operation Metro Surge in Minnesota. The federal government had access to the video within hours of the Jan. 14 shooting, the Minneapolis police said. Yet, prosecutors did not watch the footage until nearly three weeks after they filed charges against the two men, an official said. Those charges were later dropped as the footage and other evidence undermined the government’s account. Ernesto Londoño, Mitch Smith, Haley Willis, and Robin Stein.

Five Pennsylvania counties billed the federal government over $21 million in recent years to detain immigrants in their jails, through agreements that predate the Trump administration, according to a Spotlight PA review. Kate Hunagpu and Dnielle Ohl report for AP News.

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

Scammers posing as government officials cost people in the United States almost $800 million last year, according to a report from the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center. The FBI received more than 32,000 reports of the government impersonation scheme in 2025 – a nearly 50 percent spike compared to 2024. Dana Nickel reports for POLITICO.

Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick will sit for a transcribed interview on his dealings with Jeffrey Epstein with the House Oversight Committee on May 6, three sources told Axios. Andrew Solender reports.

The Supreme Court yesterday vacated a judgment by a federal appeals court upholding Steve Bannon’s conviction for defying a congressional subpoena related to Jan. 6, 2021. The Court has sent the case back for reconsideration in light of a motion to dismiss filed by the Justice Department two months ago. Julian Mark and Jeremy Roebuck report for the Washington Post.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

The Trump administration yesterday terminated multiple civil rights settlements aimed at ensuring transgender students’ rights to equal opportunity to an education. The terminations rescinded all or portions of six settlements negotiated under the Obama or Biden administrations. Education Department officials said there was no precedent for the federal government terminating previously negotiated civil rights settlements with schools. Michael C. Bender reports for the New York Times.

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions.

If you enjoy listening, Just Security’s analytic articles are also available in audio form on the justsecurity.org website.

ICYMI: Yesterday on Just Security

The post Early Edition: April 7, 2026 appeared first on Just Security.

George Croner, a longtime opponent of this reform, responded to the Brennan Center’s Myths and Facts document in a lengthy Just Security piece that took issue with several of our points. For the most part, his piece retreads well-worn ground—e.g., claiming that warrantless backdoor searches are needed for national security when an 18-year track record says otherwise. We write here simply to highlight four places where his analysis is inaccurate or incomplete.

Are backdoor searches constitutional?

The Brennan Center’s brief document mentioned one 2024 district court case (United States v. Hasbajrami) holding that the government must obtain a warrant or cite an applicable exception to the warrant requirement to conduct backdoor searches. Croner responds that this case is an “outlier” and that “one district court’s (faulty) ruling cannot displace nearly two decades of review by the FISC and FISCR.”

To start, this statement leaves out important context. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) and its appellate body, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (“FISCR”) (collectively, the “FISA Court”), are not regular courts. They normally hear only from one party: the government. Even when amici curiae participate, they are limited in their access to materials and cannot appeal adverse rulings by the FISC. The government attorneys who appear before the courts are a small cadre of repeat players who are routinely in contact with the court staff over substantive matters. The rulings of these specialized courts are rarely tested outside of this closed system.

It should be no surprise that this legal echo chamber tends to produce rulings in the government’s favor. Notably, the FISC also signed off — multiple times — on the NSA’s bulk collection of Americans’ phone records; once that program became public, the three regular federal courts that reviewed it all parted ways with the FISC, with two holding that the program was unlawful (one of these decisions was later reversed on standing grounds) and one expressing doubt about its lawfulness.

Unfortunately, regular courts have had extremely few opportunities to weigh in on Section 702, and even fewer to address backdoor searches. That is in large part because the government for years violated a statutory requirement to notify criminal defendants when using evidence derived from Section 702 collection.

Among the few regular federal courts that have confronted backdoor searches, the district court in Hasbajrami is not an “outlier.” In fact, that decision followed a unanimous ruling by a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals — the only regular federal appellate court that has squarely ruled on the issue — rejecting the FISA Court’s rationale, i.e., that backdoor searches are not separate Fourth Amendment events from the initial collection and therefore do not trigger an independent Fourth Amendment analysis. In another case, a judge on a three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit that querying constitutes a separate Fourth Amendment event that must be independently evaluated. (The majority in that case acknowledged that querying “might raise difficult Fourth Amendment questions,” but it did not reach them, accepting the government’s assertion — over the dissent’s objection — that the evidence in the case was not obtained through backdoor searches.)

The Supreme Court has consistently admonished that, where the Fourth Amendment is implicated, warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Accordingly, if backdoor searches require a separate Fourth Amendment analysis, it follows — and the district court in Hasbajrami ultimately held — that the government must either obtain a warrant or cite an applicable exception to the warrant requirement to conduct them. Although the district court also held that a so-called “foreign intelligence exception” would authorize some backdoor searches (albeit not the ones in that case), this aspect of the court’s analysis was flawed for reasons one of us explained here. (To the extent Croner suggests that the FISA Court has relied on the foreign intelligence exception to uphold backdoor searches, that is incorrect; because the FISA Court does not treat backdoor searches as separate Fourth Amendment events, it has concluded that they need not qualify for any exception to the warrant requirement.)

In short, of the four regular federal appellate court judges to address backdoor searches, all four have rejected the FISA Court’s approach. True, an equal number of district court judges reached the opposite conclusion (with most relying heavily on a misrepresentation by the Department of Justice about how minimization works, as one of us explained here). But in the regular court system — unlike the FISA Court mechanism — there are 94 district courts and 14 appellate courts (including the Supreme Court), with appeals generally available to both parties. This system ensures that errors made by district courts can be corrected as cases wend their way upwards.

Did RISAA solve the problem?

Opponents of a warrant requirement suggest that the reforms included in the 2024 Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (“RISAA”) are sufficient because the government has reported a steep decline in the FBI’s backdoor searches and an increased rate of compliance with internal standards. Even if these statistics were complete and accurate, they would not obviate the need for a warrant. As Chief Justice Roberts wrote in a seminal privacy case, “The founders did not fight a revolution to gain the right to government agency protocols.”

In any event, the statistics for 2024 rely on incomplete data, as the Brennan Center pointed out in its Myths and Facts document. That is because the FBI did not track or audit queries that agents performed using a querying tool known as an “advanced filter function.” Indeed, the government acknowledged that the FBI likely did not follow any of RISAA’s procedural requirements for U.S. person queries when using this tool. This systemic violation of multiple provisions of RISAA on its own rebuts any claim that RISAA solved the FBI’s compliance problems. (We discuss this issue further in our recent Just Security post.)

The government recently reported that the FBI conducted 7,413 searches in 2025. Croner asserts that this number — which is also markedly lower than numbers in previous years — was “largely unaffected” by the FBI’s violations because the advanced filter function was discontinued in “early 2025.” But the government’s reporting periods cover December through November, and “early 2025” does not necessarily mean January 1. The actual number of queries in 2025 could be significantly higher than the reported number of 7,413.

The more fundamental question is whether the government’s reporting for 2025 can be trusted. The FBI already operated one querying tool under the radar, and the transgression was reported to the FISC only because the Justice Department’s National Security Division (“NSD”) discovered it. The FBI had to engage in serious interpretive gymnastics to justify its position that searches using the advanced filter function fell outside the statutory definition of “queries.” It would be willful blindness not to consider the possibility that the FBI has developed other, similarly creative workarounds that the NSD has yet to discover or report — such as using artificial intelligence to analyze U.S. person communications.

More broadly, to rely on the government’s statistics or compliance reports for 2025, one must assume that the current Department of Justice (including both NSD and FBI) is scrupulously tracking and auditing queries and accurately reporting the results to facilitate oversight by Congress and the courts. There is ample reason to question this assumption. The administration has gutted the main oversight mechanisms for Section 702, dismantling the Office of Internal Auditing (the office established in 2020 to improve compliance with Section 702), firing all three Democratic appointees on the five-member Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (thus undermining both its effectiveness and its independence), and apparently cowing DOJ’s Inspector General into inactivity. And dozens of courts across the country have admonished DOJ for providing inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading information.

Would a warrant requirement create an unworkable burden on the courts?

Croner calculates that a warrant requirement might require the FBI to seek more than 2,000 warrants each year. He bases this number on the fact that the FBI reported 7,413 backdoor searches in 2025, 28% of which returned either metadata or communications content. (The leading reform proposals would require the government to obtain a warrant after performing the query but before reviewing any returned content.) If the actual number of queries in 2025 was higher than 7,413, as it almost certainly was due to the use of the advanced filter function, the number of queries leading to warrant applications could in theory be larger.

In practice, however, the number would almost certainly be much lower. According to the former head of NSD, “[i]n most cases, the government is conducting queries in the earliest moments of an investigation, reviewing the data in its possession at a time when there may be little available information about a potential threat.” The existence of a warrant requirement would put an end to such fishing expeditions, as the government would not seek a warrant in cases where it had little to no evidence of wrongdoing.

That is a feature of the reform, not a bug. The government should not be attempting to access Americans’ private communications with nothing close to probable cause. The FBI has plenty of less intrusive investigative tools at its disposal to build a case and obtain the evidence necessary to support a warrant application.

If Section 702 were to expire temporarily while Congress is considering reforms, would Section 702 surveillance be hindered?

Section 702 operates under year-long “certifications” that authorize surveillance to acquire broad categories of foreign intelligence. Croner acknowledges that the government would be legally authorized to continue Section 702 surveillance under existing certifications (which will remain in force until spring of 2027) even if the underlying law were to expire. However, he raises the specter that companies might nonetheless “stop complying with Section 702 directives.”

Companies do not choose whether to assist the government with Section 702 surveillance. A company that defies a valid directive faces fines of $250,000 per day. And the validity of a directive is determined by the FISC, not the company. In 2008, Yahoo refused to comply with a directive during a brief lapse between the expiration of Section 702’s predecessor and the enactment of Section 702. The FISC confirmed that the directive remained valid and ordered Yahoo to comply. Congress subsequently strengthened the language of the grandfathering provision to ensure that there would be no repeat of this incident.

While Croner is correct that the government would not be able to obtain new certifications during this period, he is off base in claiming that “it is very easy to imagine a severe need for a new certification.” Croner doesn’t cite a single historical example of a severe need arising outside of the annual certification process, and we are not aware of one. (The government sought new certifications after RISAA’s passage because RISAA required them.) Existing certifications are used to combat terrorism, foil malicious cyberactivity, disrupt international drug trafficking, counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and conduct surveillance of foreign governments and related entities. Indeed, as Croner observes, existing certifications allow surveillance for every single NSA-reported topic in the president’s intelligence priorities. It is a challenge, to say the least, to imagine the “severe new need” Croner posits.

***

Pending judicial resolution of the Fourth Amendment issues at stake, Congress faces a choice about whether to require warrants for backdoor searches. Members will have different views on this matter. But those views should be rooted in a shared, accurate understanding of the facts — not the pervasive myths that have too often clouded the debate.

The post Myths and Facts About Section 702 Backdoor Searches: A Reply to George Croner appeared first on Just Security.

Congressional Democrats are reportedly clear-eyed about the difficulties they will encounter trying to pry information loose from the Trump administration. Their realism is warranted, for multiple reasons. First, under the time-worn principle that possession is nine-tenths of the law, Congress starts every investigation at a disadvantage: the executive branch possesses the information Congress wants, generally knows more about it, and can control the pace and substance of what Congress receives. Second, if the first Trump administration is any indication, committees should expect muscular assertions of executive privilege, testimonial immunity, and other theories for withholding information from Congress.  

Congressional Democrats can’t eliminate the executive branch’s structural advantage or prevent it from asserting executive privilege. Nevertheless, the choices Congress makes when deciding what and how to investigate can reduce—or, conversely, enable—executive branch stalling and stonewalling. I saw this firsthand as a Justice Department official who responded to dozens of contentious congressional investigations during the 118th Congress. Based on that experience, here are several steps congressional Democrats can take—some starting now—to counter executive branch stonewalling next Congress.

Lay the Groundwork Now

Every congressional investigator knows their work is limited by two-year election cycles. When control of Congress changes, pending investigations become legally and politically moot: congressional subpoenas are generally understood to expire when Congress adjourns for the final time, and changes in party control moot congressional inquiries as a political matter. What’s more, in the summer of an election year, committee members typically turn their attention to campaigning and away from legislating and investigating, further compressing the window for Congress to investigate. 

The upshot? It’s essential for Democrats to hit the ground running on Jan. 3, 2027, which in turn requires them to lay the groundwork now. This includes identifying the issues committees will investigate, which Democrats are by many accounts already doing—but it shouldn’t stop there. Ideally, Democrats should also be pursuing investigations into those same issues now, through letters to executive branch agencies and other investigative targets. 

The executive branch will take the position that the clock to respond to Democratic requests starts only when, and if, Democrats renew those requests in their capacity as committee chairs. But sending oversight requests now will give a rhetorical edge to future Democratic committee chairs, who can point to their prior unanswered demands as evidence of Trump administration stonewalling and use them to justify aggressive deadlines and expedited enforcement. For example, if House Judiciary Committee Democrats pursue an investigation into FBI Director Kash Patel’s lavish travel spending as reports suggest, they can point to letters like this one from Ranking Member Jamie Raskin as evidence they’ve been waiting over a year for answers.      

Prioritize, Focus, and Follow Up

When investigating the executive branch, it’s essential for Congress to prioritize, focus, and relentlessly follow up on its requests. Why? The executive branch components responsible for fielding and responding to congressional requests—typically, agency offices of legislative affairs and general counsel—are nowhere near sufficiently staffed to keep pace with the volume of requests Congress sends. 

To understand why this matters, it’s helpful to start with the process a congressional oversight demand sets in motion. When Congress sends a letter requesting documents, the recipient needs to determine where the documents reside and how to obtain them; collect and review documents to determine whether they’re responsive to the request; and evaluate whether they contain privileged or otherwise sensitive information. When Congress investigates the private sector, these steps are likely handled by a dedicated team of law firm associates and partners with access to sophisticated document review technology. In the executive branch, they likely fall to a small group of lawyers who are simultaneously responsible for responding to dozens of other document requests from the same and other committees, preparing principals to testify at hearings, and preparing other employees for closed-door briefings and interviews. There simply aren’t enough legislative affairs lawyers to keep pace with this workload, as evidenced by the hundreds of prosecutors and FBI agents who have been pulled away from their day jobs in recent months to review and process documents in response to Epstein Files-related demands. 

Given this reality, the executive branch necessarily prioritizes among oversight requests—and this is where choices by Congress matter. The executive branch responds to most congressional investigations by starting with low-hanging fruit and deferring fights over sensitive information as long as possible. If a committee articulates a clear, focused set of priorities, it becomes more difficult for the executive branch to run the clock by producing documents that are technically responsive but substantively innocuous. A kitchen sink approach has the opposite effect. A multiplicity of overbroad, unfocused investigative requests enables executive branch delay and invites the executive branch to prioritize for Congress.

As one example, when House Republicans reclaimed committee gavels in the 118th Congress, the House Judiciary Committee immediately sent letters to the Justice Department and FBI renewing various requests committee Republicans had made when they were in the minority. The letters requested testimony from more than 20 officials and contained well over 100 distinct requests for documents and information, many with additional subparts. Absent further prioritization by Congress, the executive branch responds to this type of sweeping request by choosing its own priorities.

Prioritizing and focusing is easier said than done when investigating an administration that uses a flood-the-zone strategy, and the best approach will vary by committee and issue. Still, Democrats can follow a few basic rules of thumb. First, identify a discrete set of topics to investigate and don’t try to cover the waterfront. Second, make investigative requests as targeted as possible. And finally, leverage knowledge from insiders—whistleblowers, former employees, or both—who can provide valuable insight about the most important information to ask for.

Congressional prioritizing and focusing won’t prevent the Trump administration from asserting executive privilege and using other aggressive legal arguments to withhold information from Democratic committee chairs. But in cases where executive privilege-based disputes are inevitable, prioritizing enables Congress to call the question sooner, giving itself more time to pursue subpoena enforcement measures before the two-year clock expires.  

In addition to prioritizing their requests, congressional Democrats should prepare to relentlessly follow up on them. Because of the resource constraints I’ve described, the executive branch generally takes a sharks-closest-to-the-boat approach to its work. A committee should not assume the executive branch is methodically working behind the scenes to fulfill its request just because the committee sent a focused letter with a deadline. It probably isn’t. Absent persistent outreach to legislative affairs staff and threats to escalate, an oversight request will stay at the bottom of the executive branch’s pile.       

Prepare Now for a Battle of Precedents

Over the years, the executive branch has amassed a large arsenal of legal arguments it deploys to withhold information from Congress. This collection includes various theories of executive privilege, only some of which Congress recognizes. It also includes Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)-authored doctrines that purport to immunize high-ranking White House officials from congressional testimony and insulate other executive branch employees from testimony outside the presence of agency lawyers. 

These doctrines are largely unvalidated by the courts, in part because congressional-executive branch oversight litigation is rare. Instead, the law of congressional oversight forms primarily through interbranch custom, with Congress and the executive branch alike citing their longstanding practices as precedent in oversight disputes. For example, take any Justice Department response to Congress, and there’s a good chance it cites the “Linder Letter”—decades-old correspondence laying out the Department’s longstanding position against providing certain types of information to Congress.

As it turns out, these executive branch doctrines are somewhat situational, and not as ironclad as the Trump administration is likely to argue in response to Democratic investigations. As I document in a forthcoming article, the executive branch has repeatedly deviated from supposedly longstanding positions during unified-government investigations into prior administrations. For example, the 119th Congress has seen significant executive branch cooperation with Republican investigations into the Biden administration—often contrary to doctrines the executive branch relies on to withhold information from Congress during divided-government confrontations. At the Justice Department, this has included allowing employees to appear for congressional interviews without agency lawyers present, authorizing testimony by line attorneys, and sharing information with the House and Senate Judiciary Committees about criminal charging decisions in Biden-era prosecutions.

Congressional Democrats should carefully document and track these precedents now so they can deploy them during interbranch negotiations and litigation next Congress. The executive branch will undoubtedly argue its prior concessions were voluntary accommodations that don’t prevent it from withholding information from Congress in future disputes. But as OLC itself has long acknowledged, factual precedents can drive the outcome of congressional-executive branch oversight disputes, during which “the difficulty in resisting congressional demands for information increases almost geometrically if similar information has been produced in the past.”

In addition to documenting executive branch concessions, congressional Democrats should share them across committees, which—at least in my experience as a Senate investigator—do not track these types of precedents in a centralized way. The organization Co-Equal is a good resource for some precedents, but this work should also be done by congressional committees themselves, which have more access than outside groups to relevant precedents. 

Understand What Leverage Works, and What Doesn’t

During divided government, Congress needs to play hardball if it wants the executive branch to respond to its investigative demands. But not all hardball tactics are created equal. Before launching an investigation, congressional Democrats should understand the available escalation path, likely executive branch countermoves, and what tactics offer the most leverage against the administration. 

When the executive branch doesn’t respond to an investigative request, a committee’s next step is generally to issue a subpoena. In some cases the executive branch may be motivated to avoid a subpoena, but in my experience the threat of a subpoena alone is unlikely to force an intransigent executive branch to give Congress what it wants. The low barriers to compulsory process in the House, where unilateral subpoenas by committee chairs are permitted and increasingly common, reduce the leverage subpoenas provide against an executive branch that has come to expect them as a routine part of the oversight process. 

The threat of civil subpoena enforcement litigation is similarly baked into the executive branch’s calculus in most oversight confrontations. In theory, the prospect of an adverse judicial opinion undermining long-held institutional positions on executive privilege or testimonial immunity should motivate the executive branch to avoid litigation. In practice, the amount of time it takes to litigate, and the fact that delay benefits the executive branch in oversight disputes, means the executive branch is rarely motivated to avoid litigation at all costs. To be clear, this doesn’t mean Congress shouldn’t sue to vindicate its institutional interests, especially when an unreasonable executive branch position is ripe for challenge. But it means litigation should not be the only lever congressional Democrats pull.  

Neither should criminal contempt. Contempt has played an increasing role in congressional-executive branch confrontations ever since the House held Attorney General Eric Holder in contempt during its long-running Fast and Furious investigation. The denouement of that process illustrates why even the threat of criminal sanctions provides limited leverage over the executive branch: citing its longstanding position that an executive branch official cannot be constitutionally prosecuted for contempt of Congress when the president has asserted executive privilege, the Justice Department quickly informed the House that it would not prosecute Holder. The same process played out following subsequent contempt citations during the first Trump administration and Biden administration, and is all but guaranteed to occur should congressional Democrats cite Trump administration officials for contempt. 

If subpoenas and civil litigation are baked into the executive branch’s oversight strategy and the outcome of criminal contempt a foregone conclusion, what tools should Congress use to actually force compliance with its investigations? Ones that deprive the executive branch of something it wants.  

For starters, Senate Democrats can leverage their advice-and-consent role. If they win back control of the Senate, Democrats can delay or block hearings and floor consideration for President Donald Trump’s nominees, as Senate Republicans did the last time control of the White House and Senate was divided. If Democrats remain in the minority, their ability to use the nominations process as leverage will be more limited: Senators have historically used holds on executive nominees to exact oversight concessions, but Republicans effectively removed this tactic from the minority’s playbook when they changed Senate rules to allow streamlined consideration of most executive branch nominees. 

Congressional Democrats should also wield their power of the purse in response to executive branch stonewalling. Threats to withhold appropriations from agency programs in response to oversight noncompliance tend to make executive branch officials take notice, especially when they target operational priorities. For example, the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees periodically “fence off” an agency’s ability to access appropriated funds pending the sharing of information with Congress—a tactic exemplified by language in the most recent National Defense Authorization Act preventing Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth from accessing 25 percent of appropriated travel expenses until he disclosed unedited video of Caribbean boat strikes with the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. In my experience, threatened or actual fences and funding cuts to programs can create internal pressure within an agency that moves the dial in favor of disclosure. 

Congress can also threaten the salary of agency legislative affairs personnel under the so-called “713 rider,” a recurring appropriations rider that prohibits the use of appropriated funds to pay the salary of executive branch officials who prevent other executive branch employees from communicating with Congress. In my experience, 713 rider threats are less effective than threats to programmatic funding at combatting executive branch stonewalling. In theory, the rider allows the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to direct an agency to claw back the salary of an official who interferes with Congress’s ability to obtain information. In practice, the executive branch is unlikely to follow GAO’s direction because it takes the position that the rider cannot interfere with the president’s ability to control the dissemination of confidential and potentially privileged information. 

The benefit of leveraging nominations and program funding isn’t just that doing so targets things the executive branch wants—it’s that unlike civil litigation or criminal contempt, these tactics require no support from courts or the executive branch. At first glance, the same could be said for inherent congressional contempt, a long-dormant process under which Congress asserts inherent constitutional authority to fine or imprison an executive branch official. House members of both parties have attempted to reinvigorate inherent contempt in recent years, but this tool is unlikely to provide congressional Democrats much leverage. Given the executive branch’s position that inherent contempt cannot be used to punish officials who withhold information based on an executive privilege claim, any attempt to arrest or fine a Trump administration official is virtually guaranteed to end up in court. 

* * *

Congressional Democrats aren’t guaranteed to win back committee gavels next Congress, but if they do, they will need to hit the ground running with an oversight agenda that accounts for the myriad ways the Trump administration will delay and stonewall their requests. By taking steps now to prioritize and focus their investigations, marshal helpful precedents, and identify what tools give them the most leverage, Democrats can maximize their chance of success.  

The post The Anti-Stonewalling Playbook: How Congress Can Plan Now to Counter Executive Branch Obstruction Next Term appeared first on Just Security.

Such rhetorical statements – if followed through – would amount to the most serious war crimes – and thus the president’s statements place servicemembers in a profoundly challenging situation. As former uniformed military lawyers who advised targeting operations, we know the presidents’ words run counter to decades of legal training of military personnel and risk placing our warfighters on a path of no return. 

Iranian power plants and other critical civilian infrastructure are protected from attacks by the law of war the United States helped craft after World War II. Such an object can lose its protection only if it is used for military purposes by the enemy and its destruction “offers a definite military advantage.” Even then, such an object can be attacked only if, after a case-by-case rigorous analysis, the “concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” outweighs the civilian suffering that is expected to result. (Geneva Convention Additional Protocol I art. 52, art. 57; DOD Law of War Manual, § 5.6, § 5.12).

Despite those well-settled legal parameters, President Trump has repeatedly threatened to obliterate such infrastructure without regard to the law’s high demands. His comments are blatant expressions that he is willing to turn the United States into a rogue State like Iran and Russia, one that rejects the fundamental legal restraints that protect innocent non-combatants like children, and the Iranian civilian population itself. 

Effects on Servicemembers 

While our Commander-in-Chief threatens to “obliterate” “each and every one of their electric generating plants,” U.S. military commanders have been approving strike packages, wrestling with how to transform Trump’s dangerous bombast into lawful targets. 

Asking our military professionals—lawyers and commanders alike—to grapple with the president’s erratic behavior is enormously consequential.  U.S. military commanders have sworn to obey the Constitution and only those orders from their superiors that are lawful.  Threats to bomb Iran “back to the Stone Ages” and to show “no quarter, no mercy” are plainly illegal.  Trump’s outrageous statements gravely threaten our military professionals’ bedrock moral and legal principles, ones enshrined in the law of war that they’ve been trained to follow their entire careers.  

We write to highlight that the Commander-in-Chief’s dangerous rhetoric  places our service members in an intolerable position in several respects.  

• First, such threats undermine U.S. legitimacy and global standing, as they demonstrate a rejection of binding international agreements and core commitments to the laws of war. Indeed, the U.S. military doubled down on its commitment to the law of war following Vietnam War-era atrocities, requiring our Armed Forces to follow the law regardless how any conflict is characterized. An operation that followed through on Trump’s rhetoric would be one of infamy in the history of modern warfare. 
• Second, they pose a significant risk of moral and psychic injury for servicemembers.  National soul-searching regarding how Americans fight followed the long U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which both civilian casualties and detainee abuse undermined strategic objectives and weighed heavily on soldiers’ consciences long after the fighting stopped.  This reflection led to initiatives such as the Pentagon’s civilian harm mitigation program and new laws regarding detention and interrogation practices, strengthening U.S. commitment to fighting honorably and effectively through adherence to the law.   
• Finally, the public record of intent to commit war crimes puts soldiers at risk of later liability. In any future war crimes or U.C.M.J. investigation—for which there may be no statute of limitations—their actions will be judged based on the reasonably available information at the time of the strikes.  See, e.g., Executive Summary of the Investigation of the Alleged Civilian Casualty Incident in the al Jadidah District, Mosul, May 8, 2017.  Long after the Secretary of Defense receives his anticipated pardon from the president, it is not unlikely that both his and Trump’s expressly stated intent to commit acts that amount to clear war crimes and to dispense with “stupid rules of engagement” may be considered evidence of notice and scienter on the part of servicemembers’ during any future congressional or criminal investigations.  

The U.S. military trains to fight with precision and lethality according to the law of war – precision meaning attacking only lawful military objectives while doing our utmost to protect innocent civilians caught up in the fight. The legal hurdle to convert a civilian object such as a power plant into a lawful military objective is a high one because the United States and its allies vigorously rejected “total war” after the massive suffering endured by millions during World War II.  What President Trump threatens is exactly that, from a civilian targeting perspective – total war against Iran, a complete rejection of the legal limits the United States has incorporated into the law governing U.S. military operations for both pragmatic and moral reasons.

The Heart of Targeting 

U.S. military commanders translating Trump’s orders face a daunting legal and operational task, one that focuses on impact on the Iranian civilian population. Given the scope of his rhetoric, it appears difficult to steer clear of war crimes.  To be sure, civilian structures like power plants, roads, bridges, and even water desalination plants can be targeted under particular circumstances.  For example, bridges are frequently engaged during ground operations as a means of denying the enemy access to key terrain or supply routes, and a water treatment plant being used as a fighting position is easily targetable in self-defense.  But this is only true when the impact on civilians has been carefully considered and expected not to be excessive compared to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the strike.  

Indeed, the harm induced by striking a power plant is specifically envisioned by the Department of Defense Law of War Manual.  See, e.g., DOD LOWM, Section 5.12.1.3, Foreseeable Harms Versus Remote Harms (“For example, if the destruction of a power plant would be expected to cause the loss of civilian life or injury to civilians very soon after the attack due to the loss of power at a connected hospital, then such harm should be considered in assessing whether an attack is expected to cause excessive harm.”).  And as a case in point, the International Criminal Court is investigating Russia for war crimes regarding their intentional targeting of the Ukrainian civilian electrical grid during wintertime that plunged thousands of Ukrainians into life-threatening cold conditions, thereby causing unnecessary civilian suffering that was not outweighed by claims of military advantage. The United States also made sure to “condemn, in the strongest possible terms” the Russian operations against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. And the State Department’s 2022 formal determination that Russia had committed war crimes included attacks on “critical infrastructure.” (See also, United Nations Independent International Commission on Inquiry on Ukraine para. 109 (“The Commission has also found that the Russian armed forces’ waves of attacks, starting 10 October 2022, on Ukraine’s energy-related infrastructure and the use of torture by Russian authorities may amount to crimes against humanity.”))

Indeed, the United States has traditionally served as a leader in this sphere, developing an entire methodology for determining the collateral effects of munitions on various types of targets (“Collateral Damage Estimation” or “CDE”); a process in which we have both advised in real-time.  See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (“CJCSI”) 3160.01D, “No-Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology,” last published May 2021 (2012 public version).  The United States maintains a database of facilities on a “No Strike List,” or “NSL,” which divides civilian structures in two protected categories.  Notably, nuclear power plants appear on the higher of those categories on the NSL, while nearly all other civilian structures—including electric-generating power plants—are recognized to hold standard no-strike protections.  The methodology also calculates a noncombatant civilian casualty cut-off value (“NCV”), which serves as a guide to proportionality for certain effects which might yield civilian casualties.  Cold and clinical as it may sound, employing CDE methodology and considering NCVs are a perfect example of how the United States has operationalized the concept of proportionality and distinction directly into its conduct of war.   

In other words, American military targeting processes have institutionalized and operationalized principles such as distinction and proportionality – to ensure a target qualifies as a lawful military objective in the first place – and precautions in an attack, which forces targeteers to ask whether we can temporarily disable a power plant, for example, versus destroying it.  

Diminishing Civilian Morale Is Not A Military Advantage 

In light of the president’s comments, it is important to highlight that the DOD Law of War Manual’s note on targeting civilian infrastructure states: “Diminishing the morale of the civilian population and their support for the war effort does not provide a definite military advantage. However, attacks that are otherwise lawful are not rendered unlawful if they happen to result in diminished civilian morale.”  DOD Law of War Manual, § 5.6.  Such “morale bombing” has been rejected for many decades; it had gained support during World War II only to be roundly rejected by Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and customary international law.  The idea of using civilian pain in order to effectuate political goals would rightly stoke criticisms that the United States’s use of military force against civilian targets equates to acts of sheer terrorism. (See Additional Protocol I art. 51(2) (“Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”) (emphasis added); DOD Law of War Manual, § 5.2.2 (“Measures of intimidation or terrorism against the civilian population are prohibited, including acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population.”) (emphasis added).

By all accounts then, the law of war prohibits “acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population.” It is difficult to read President Trump’s egregious threats of great destruction as anything but intending to spread terror, making it even more incumbent on U.S. military professionals to ensure strikes are limited in their impact on the Iranian people.To be sure, as stated above, individual components of Iranian civilian infrastructure may indeed constitute lawful military targets under specific circumstances in which they contribute to the enemy’s military action and their destruction would provide a definite military advantage. That said, the damning public rhetoric surrounding these planned strikes against all power plants in an undifferentiated manner casts the legitimacy and legality of such an operation in serious doubt, to say the least.  We urge military decisionmakers within the chain of command to think long-term, trust their training, and remember their oaths. American military professionals must remind their chain of command that the United States is not like Iran or Russia: our country is great because it adheres to the law of war and emerges victorious because of such adherence, not in spite of it. That might be said of all sorts of operations. Surely, here, the mass devastation on a civilian population makes where to draw the line excruciatingly clear.

The post When War Crimes Rhetoric Becomes Battlefield Reality: The Slippery Slope to Total War on Iran appeared first on Just Security.

A curated guide to major news and developments over the weekend. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR 

Saturday 

Israel attacked Iran’s largest petrochemical complex on Saturday, killing at least five people and injuring 170 others, according to Iranian state media. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed that the Israeli military had struck the factories, saying the targeted sites were part of a “money machine” for the Iranian government. Farnaz Fassihi reports for the New York Times.

A provider of satellite imagery, Planet Labs, said it would further withhold distribution of photos from the Iran conflict zone at the request of the U.S. government, a Planet spokesperson said on Saturday. Planet had already slowed down how quickly it released imagery from the region, citing concerns that the data could be used by U.S. adversaries. Micah Maidenberg reports for the Wall Street Journal.

Chinese private firms, some linked to the military, are using AI and open-source data to track and market detailed intelligence on U.S. military movements during the Iran conflict. “In the lead-up to the escalation of tensions in Iran in 2026, we quickly identified the locations of weapons and equipment deployed in the Middle East,” and “exposed” the refueling pattern of U.S. carrier groups, a Hangzhou-based firm called MizarVision said on its website. Cade Cadell and Lyric Li report for the Washington Post.

Sunday 

The U.S. military yesterday rescued an injured U.S. airman who had been stranded in Iran after his fighter jet was shot down on Friday. The downed Air Force F-15E fighter jet had two crew members, one of whom was quickly rescued. President Trump announced yesterday on social media that U.S. Special Forces, aided by a C.I.A. deception campaign, had successfully extracted the second airman from deep inside Iran. John Sakellariadis reports for POLITICO; Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper, Greg Jaffe, and Julian E. Barnes report for the New York Times.

The Iranian Red Crescent Society said yesterday that one of its ambulances was hit in an airstrike during an emergency mission in Fars province. The organization added that 46 of its ambulances have been damaged during the war and four of its aid workers have been killed. Eve Sampson reports for the New York Times.

Iranian drone strikes in Kuwait yesterday damaged two power and water desalination plants and started a fire at the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation’s oil complex, Kuwaiti officials said. The Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company in Bahrain said a drone attack started fires at its facilities, and the UAE reported fires at an Abu Dhabi petrochemical plant. Eve Sampson reports for the New York Times.

Monday 

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said today that Israel killed Major General Seyed Majid Khademi, the head of intelligence for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in an overnight strike. Emanuel Fabian reports for the Times of Israel.

“The President of the United States, as the highest official in the country, has publicly threatened to commit war crimes,” Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said today, warning Trump not to follow through on his threats to attack Iranian civil infrastructure. Gharibabadi’s comments followed a series of social media posts by Trump over the weekend, including, “Tuesday will be Power Plant Day and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it ! ! ! Open the Fuckin’ Strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell – JUST WATCH. Praise be to Allah.” Edward Wong reports for the New York Times; Erika Solomon reports for the New York Times; Barak Ravid reports for Axios.

The United States, Iran, and a group of regional mediators are discussing the terms for a potential 45-day ceasefire, four U.S., Israeli, and regional sources said yesterday. The sources added that the chances of reaching a partial deal by Trump’s latest deadline of Tuesday at 8 pm ET are slim. Trump told Axios yesterday that the United States is in “deep negotiations” and that a deal could be reached in time. Barak Ravid reports.

A source told Reuters today that a Pakistani-brokered plan which emerged overnight proposes an immediate ceasefire, followed by negotiations on a broader settlement to be concluded within 15-20 days. Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, was in contact “all night long” with Vice President JD Vance, U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff, and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, the source said. A senior Iranian official said Iran would not reopen the Strait of Hormuz as part of a temporary ceasefire. Reuters reports.

LEBANON 

An Israeli airstrike yesterday in Kfarhata, a village in southern Lebanon, killed seven people, including a 4-year-old child, according to the Lebanese health ministry. Another Israeli attack in Beirut killed four people and injured 39 others. Nazih Osseiran reports for Reuters.

ISRAEL-GAZA WAR 

An Israeli airstrike yesterday killed four Palestinians in northern Gaza, local health authorities said. The Israeli military said it had struck and killed members of a Palestinian militant cell who were operating near the troops, posing an immediate threat to them. Reuters reports.

SUDANESE CIVIL WAR 

Sudanese Rapid Support Forces paramilitary killed at least 10 people last Thursday in a drone attack that hit a hospital, Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières) said. Fatma Khaled reports for AP News.

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS  

A criminal case against Myanmar’s newly elected President Min Aung Hlaing was filed in Indonesia today by a group of civil society organizations, accusing the leader of acts of genocide against the Rohingya ethnic group. The claimants said Indonesia’s penal code allowed for “universal jurisdiction” for certain serious crimes. Reuters reports.

South Korean National Intelligence Service Director Lee Jong-Seok said today in a closed-door briefing at the National Assembly that the teenage daughter of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un could now be considered as his successor. Hyung-Jin Kim reports for AP News.

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ICE agents detained the niece and grand-niece of the late Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani after Secretary of State Marco Rubio revoked their lawful permanent residence status, the State Department said on Saturday. Soleimani was killed in a January 2020 U.S. airstrike in Baghdad. Iranian state media yesterday reported that the Iranian national recently arrested in the United States had no family ties to Soleimani. The State Department also said that Rubio terminated the legal status of Fatemeh Ardeshir-Larijani, the daughter of former Iranian Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani, and her husband. Kanishka Singh reports for Reuters.

The State Department quietly expelled Iran’s deputy ambassador to the U.N. last December, citing national security concerns, according to a U.S. official and another source. This was one of three expulsions of Iranian diplomats in New York over the last six months. A State Department official said the action occurred before the protests in Iran and was unrelated to those events. Barak Ravid reports for Axios.

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS

A Trump administration policy freezing visa extensions and work permits for people from 39 countries has forced many foreign doctors to stop working in U.S. hospitals, worsening an existing physician shortage, according to a New York Times review. Miriam Jordan reports.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo will receive third-country nationals deported from the United States under a new deal with the Trump administration, the DRC said yesterday. The statement said the DRC will receive deportees starting in April, but did not say how many it had agreed to take. Reuters reports.

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington quietly removed from its website educational resources about racism and canceled a workshop about the “fragility of democracy,” according to sources. Two former museum employees who left amid the changes told POLITICO they believed the museum was altering its content preemptively, so as not to draw unwanted negative attention from the Trump administration as it cracks down on “corrosive ideology.” Irie Sentner reports.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

Trump has proposed boosting defense spending to $1.5 trillion in his 2027 budget released on Friday. This would amount to a roughly 40 percent increase from what the United States spent on the Pentagon this fiscal year. Trump is also seeking $152 million to return the former Alcatraz prison island to active duty. Regarding cuts, the budget proposes that “savings are achieved by reducing or eliminating woke, weaponized, and wasteful programs,” a White House fact sheet says. Tony Romm reports for the New York Times; Nate Raymond reports for Reuters; Herb Scribner reports for Axios.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION

A federal judge on Friday blocked the Trump administration’s admissions data collection for public universities in 17 states. The judge said the government has the authority to collect such data, but ruled that the current approach was flawed and impractical, especially given staffing cuts at the Education Department and uncertainty around who would manage the data. Bianca Quilantan reports for POLITICO.

A federal judge on Friday denied the Trump administration’s motion to reconsider his decision to block subpoenas to the Federal Reserve. Victoria Guida and Josh Gerstein report for POLITICO.

The Trump administration on Friday appealed a federal judge’s order to halt the construction of Trump’s White House ballroom, arguing in an emergency motion that pausing the project would raise national security risks. Dan Diamond and Jonathan Edwards report for the Washington Post.

The post Early Edition: April 6, 2026 appeared first on Just Security.

First, the Islamic Regime has not fallen, which means the long-term threats it poses to its population and the world remain. More specifically, hard line elements appear to remain in control according to well-sourced Iranian diaspora reporting, and they are still fighting with daily ballistic missile and drone attacks against U.S. interests in region, Israel, and the Gulf states. The Iranian leadership almost certainly feels that it is in a relatively solid position strategically as the energy crisis they have created through attacks on ships in the Strait of Hormuz is causing global economic disruptions.

While the Iranian leadership and IRGC knows that their conventional military has been seriously degraded, they reportedly still retain roughly half of their missile launchers, roughly half of their drones, and, even more importantly, can turn to Russia and China to rebuild these capabilities over time. The resumption and potential acceleration of their nuclear program is still a possibility as their enriched uranium lies underground and is likely retrievable. The U.S. special operations command has reportedly moved requisite forces in to the region for such an operation given the threat. However, U.S. casualties almost certainly would be significant, and it is unclear if President Trump would take such a risky decision given the potentially enormous costs and political blowback that could ensue.

Moreover, Iran has not yet unleashed its global terrorist apparatus on the West. While there have been attacks that are likely inspired by support for Iran and Hezbollah, intelligence agencies have warned for years about cells of Iranian agents that could potentially pursue Iran’s plans for asymmetric warfare and payback for the attacks they have endured.

Despite the highly positive military math delivered daily by Pentagon briefings that claim U.S. war objectives are all being met, there is ample evidence that Iran likely believes they are winning, especially the long game. The bottom line is that from the Iranian perspective, this conflict is not yet over in any sense. Iran knows they have cards remaining to play, and they will use them if the United States and Israel continue to climb the escalation ladder. Indeed, as President Trump continues to terrorize Iranians by threatening to destroy bridges and power plants, he risks fomenting popular resentment against the United States not undermining the regime.

These assessments would be highly unwelcome by the U.S. or Israeli administrations, who are trying to put the best face on the status of this conflict.

President Trump has seemed surprised that the Iranian regime did not fold like a deck of cards and generally does not know what to make of Iranian resiliency. Secretary Hegseth too was also reportedly “caught off guard” by Iran’s escalation.

While U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies are no doubt working overtime on collection – and, indeed, some of our points above are based on news reporting of updated intelligence assessments – the real question is the following: if Iran is proving to be a more formidable adversary than we anticipated, how good has our collective intelligence been?

On the other side of the ledger, much has been written about the superb U.S. and Israeli intelligence community targeting efforts on the initial (and some follow-on) decapitation strikes, when the Iranian supreme leader Khamenei and many of his senior officials were killed. The “find, fix, and finish” methodology that was developed and refined  in the Global War on Terrorism appeared to work at least at the outset of this conflict. In fact, the joint efforts reportedly were sparked by the U.S. recruitment of a human source on the ground, who could provide requisite “pattern of life (POL)” on the Supreme Leader. The Mossad reportedly hacked traffic cameras in Tehran to support this effort, demonstrating the creativity for which they are famous. These are no small feats and should be highly commended. We are sure there was a great deal of quiet satisfaction in the halls of CIA and at Mossad headquarters in realizing the goal of eliminating some of the world’s most evil men.

Yet the applause around this success may in fact mask a potentially serious collection gap, as we don’t see the United States or Israel gaining advance knowledge of Iranian regime plans and intentions. Why are we concerned about this?  Because both Washington and Jerusalem seem to have been repeatedly caught flat-footed from the strength and character of the Iranian response. The Iranian aerial attacks against over a dozen countries in the Middle East and the closure of the Straits of Hormuz should have been actions that were picked up by U.S. and Israeli spies. These tactics – especially the closing of the Straits – were very well known as possibilities amongst those who have worked on a potential war with Iran. Our reactionary posture, however, suggests they were somehow not fully anticipated, which may also be the result of decision-makers, especially including the president, not listening to the intelligence provided. But CIA Director John Ratcliffe in recent testimony on Capitol Hil claimed to speak directly with President Trump multiple times per week plus was “in the room” for all relevant major decisions that Trump has taken on Iran.

So what are the questions that the CIA and Israeli collection are perhaps not adequately answering?  There are quite a few, but essentially the following are logical collection priorities:

• What is the actual health status of the Supreme Leader?
• Who is making the important decisions within the Iranian government, and what are their current plans for potential leadership succession?
• Will Iran continue hitting Gulf energy targets and what does their escalation ladder look like?
• Will the Houthis enter the fray further?
• Has Iran mobilized their overseas terrorist apparatus and under what conditions will they do so?
• Are U.S. strikes against critical economic infrastructure counterproductive to any goals of regime change?

All these questions require high-level penetrations of the Iranian regime and more. Not just someone who can provide the POL on a target to be eliminated. We require the recruitment of human agents who can provide unique granular level detail on the plans and intentions of the Iranian military, political, and intelligence leadership.

Israeli intelligence deserves a bit of extra scrutiny after a recent well-sourced media report indicated that Mossad promised Prime Minister Netanyahu (who relayed this to Trump) that Israel via covert action could lead a quick and successful uprising against the regime. This of course never occurred, and, as a result, this optimistic scenario may turn out to be a grave intelligence error. Of note, the decapitation strikes and other kinetic high value target operations are far less complex than fomenting an uprising.

Finally, even if Mossad was far too optimistic in pushing this plan, what did CIA Director Ratcliffe and other operational and analytic leaders in the U.S. intelligence community say to Trump about the odds of success? After all, it is the job of U.S. intelligence community senior personnel to comment on and critique any high-risk operation that is planned by a friendly liaison service.

Taking out bad actors with U.S. and Israeli blood on their hands who continue to pose severe threats is, on our view, often a correct course of action and both the U.S. and Israeli intelligence services excel at it. But the more subtle art of developing sources and divining the intentions of adversaries does not seem to have been as successful here. The wildcard of course sits in the Oval Office – if he is simply not properly listening to his intelligence community the best spy efforts won’t matter.

The post How Good is Our Intelligence on Iran? appeared first on Just Security.

• In the U.S. Strike on an Iranian School, What a Serious Military Investigation Should Look Like
  by Annie Shiel and Priyanka Motaparthy
• Khamenei’s Killing and the Perilous Death of the Assassination Ban
  by Luca Trenta and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi
• “Precision Strike Missiles” (PrSMs) in Iran War: The U.S. Obligation to Conduct a Legal Review of New Weapons
  by Michael W. Meier
• Over 100 International Law Experts Warn: U.S. Strikes on Iran Violate UN Charter and May Be War Crimes
  by Tom Dannenbaum, Rebecca Hamilton, Adil Ahmad Haque, Oona A. Hathaway and Gabor Rona

Lebanon

• Washington Is Backing the Wrong Lebanon Strategy
  by Nadim Houry

Israel / Death Penalty

• Statement by Israeli International Law Scholars Concerning Israel’s New “Death Penalty for Terrorists” Law
  by Eliav Lieblich, Yael Ronen, Michal Saliternik and Yuval Shany

Russia-Ukraine War

• Iranian Officials’ Legal Liability in Russia’s Drone War on Ukraine
  by Celeste Kmiotek and Anastasiya Donets
• Ukraine’s Long-Term Landmine Problem
  by Brian Dooley and Suchita Uppal

Series: Syria in Transition

• Transitional Justice in Syria: Domestic-Led Accountability Efforts Cannot Function in Isolation
  by Rebecca Hamilton and Anya Neistat

Department of Homeland Security

• How Secretary Mullin Can Reform DHS
  by Mark Zaid and Andrew P. Bakaj

Emerging Technologies

• The Case for Imposing Costs on China’s AI Distillation Campaigns
  by Joe Khawam
• A Feasible Precaution Ignored: AI Targeting Algorithms and the Failure to Recognize Protected Emblems
  by Michael Loftus
• Global Governance of Emerging Technologies: Counterterrorism Challenges at the United Nations Security Council
  by David Scharia

FISA Section 702

• The Truth Behind Section 702 Query Statistics
  by Elizabeth Goitein and Hannah James
• A Response to the Brennan Center’s “Myths and Facts” on Section 702 Backdoor Searches
  by George Croner

United States / Arctic

• The Trump Administration Is Sabotaging Its Own Arctic Strategy
  by Michael Schiffer

Gender and Security

• What the Latest Session of the Commission on the Status of Women Reveals About Global Rights
  by Beth Van Schaack, Jessica Anania and Vicka Heidt

Counterterrorism

• The Financial Action Task Force: An Accountability Mechanism for the United States
  by Ashleigh Subramanian-Montgomery and Sarah Gardiner

Trump Executive Actions

• Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions (Updated)
  by Just Security
• A Survey of Sovereign Standing: Developments in State-Led Lawsuits Against the Federal Government
  by Bethany Davis Noll and Sofia DeSimone
• The Unconstitutionality of the Trump Administration’s New Executive Order on Elections
  by Chris Hardee

Piracy

• Where the Law Gets Thin: The Jurisdictional Gap Pirates Exploit
  by Saby Martinez

The post Digest of Recent Articles on Just Security (Mar. 30-Apr. 3, 2026) appeared first on Just Security.

Nevertheless, terrorist organizations have demonstrated considerable skill in exploiting widely available commercial technologies to advance their operational objectives. Their strength stems from strategically adapting universally accessible technologies to suit their needs. They have become particularly adept at utilizing social media and artificial intelligence for propaganda dissemination, recruitment, and the orchestration of terrorist activities.

The capacity to exploit commercially available technologies for nefarious purposes poses substantial challenges for governance of these technologies. Policymakers and security agencies must maintain constant vigilance and address these evolving threats while simultaneously incorporating advanced technologies into counterterrorism strategies.

For instance, biometric technology is systematically utilized at borders and airports to detect suspected individuals. Surveillance technologies enable monitoring and situational awareness. Signal intelligence is deployed to intercept communications across a range of digital channels. Blockchain technologies are increasingly leveraged to trace illicit financial transactions, while artificial intelligence facilitates predictive analytics, behavioral pattern recognition, the processing of large datasets and the rapid removal of terrorist propaganda. Collectively, these technologies constitute a multilayered counterterrorism architecture that demonstrates a profound reliance on emerging technologies.

Below, I trace how the U.N. Security Council has adapted to the terrorists’ use of emerging technologies over time, relying on principles and non-binding guidance that offer flexibility and the possibility of building consensus in an increasingly uncertain time.

Governance of New and Emerging Technologies

Governing emerging technologies presents a highly complex challenge. First, there is the significant gap between the rapid proliferation of new technological innovations and the comparatively slow process required to develop, implement, and enforce effective governance frameworks. Technology develops exponentially, while governance remains linear.

Second, terrorists quickly adapt their operations to new governance regimes, often within weeks. In the digital realm, for example, terrorists have become adept at “platform hopping” – migrating from one online space to another in response to new restrictions.

A third challenge is that new technologies quickly diffuse across national boundaries. If a single country does not endorse an effective AML/CFT (Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism) governance regime for new payment methods, then it can be rendered ineffective.

Collectively, these challenges lead to what is usually referred to as the “regulatory lag” or “reg-lag.” Reg-lag stems from the fact that governance struggles to keep pace with rapid technological innovation due to systemic, technological, and political weaknesses. It is compounded by the fact that many policymakers lack the technical expertise needed to effectively govern complex new technologies and is exacerbated by political gridlock and corporate influence on governments. Ultimately, these factors leave policymakers constantly playing catch-up with the speed of technological development.

Shortening reg-lag requires alternative governance models. While not flawless, such models can reduce imminent risks of exploitation and encourage ongoing collective learning as technology develops. It does not necessarily mean abandoning traditional multilateral frameworks. When terrorists started exploiting the new world of widely available commercial flights, the international community responded with the development of a series of U.N. conventions. Multilateral instruments offer comprehensive solutions and confer broad legitimacy, yielding numerous notable successes – from U.N. conventions to regional frameworks and targeted, risk-specific arrangements. Nevertheless, the processes of adoption and implementation of these instruments are characteristically protracted.

Over the years, several alternative governance regimes have emerged. These include sandboxes – a controlled environment in which regulatory bodies permit organizations to test innovative products under relaxed regulatory requirements, while maintaining oversight and safeguards. Another alternative governance regime involves the development of an overseeing body for specific technology or specific right (i.e. privacy). A third governance model involves the establishment of a self-regulatory mechanism, composed of industry stakeholders who collaboratively develop, implement, share and enforce standards governing member conduct. In the context of counterterrorism, a notable example is the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). The emergence of these governance regimes assumes their imperfectness, yet they provide an important immediate check at least until a more elaborate comprehensive regime emerges. They create a common language and understanding of the proper response to the threat.

For alternative governance regimes to be effective, several key principles need to be followed. Foremost is the establishment of values-based frameworks, rooted in human rights, sustainability, safety, and adherence to rule of law principles: legality, necessity, proportionality, accountability and independent oversight.

Other critical elements of effective governance regimes include stakeholder engagement, participation from civil society, academia, and the private sector, adaptation mechanisms to handle evolvement of new technological applications and international cooperation.

The Security Council and the Governance of Emerging Tech

Incitement Online

On 7 July 2005, four British nationals, acting on behalf of al-Qaeda, executed a coordinated attack on London’s public transit network. The attack claimed 52 civilian lives and wounded over 700, becoming the deadliest terrorist incident in the U.K. since the Lockerbie bombing in 1988.

The bombings prompted a profound shift in understanding the global threat of the relatively new yet already broadly available technology of the internet. The findings showed that exposure to online incitement can influence individuals to carry out attacks within their own country. It also led to intensive discussions over what can be a global response to the threat of online radicalization, incitement, recruitment and training, as the terrorists traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan. This discussion resulted in the adoption of resolution 1624 (2005).

Resolution 1624 (2005) is a notable example of internet governance that, while effective in certain respects, remains fundamentally constrained. Divergence among major powers led to a compromise, with the resolution urging States to “prohibit by law” incitement, rather than to “criminalize” it explicitly, leaving much discretion to States on how to implement it. Furthermore, unlike many normative counterterrorism resolutions, it was not adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, underscoring its limited enforceability.

The approach embraced in Resolution 1624 (2005) illustrates the benefits and limitations inherent to formal global governance regimes. On the one hand, it created a common understanding of the threat, which led to numerous subsequent initiatives, including the development of concepts such as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). On the other hand, it left critical issues regarding enforcement mechanisms unresolved and to the discretion of Member States.

The Rise of ISIL

In June 2014, the world woke up to a new shocking reality. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) stunned the world as its forces quickly captured key Iraqi cities. In August, ISIL attacked the Yazidi minority in the Sinjar region, committing mass atrocities against it. That same month, ISIL released videos showing horrific crimes committed in its so-called caliphate, including the beheading of American journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff.

At the U.N. headquarters in New York, the international community quickly began forming a counter-ISIL plan. Alongside building a military coalition, discussions emerged over creating a framework to improve cooperation in preventing foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from traveling to Syria and Iraq and prosecuting ISIL members for their crimes. Informal consultations regarding what would eventually become resolution 2178 (2014) continued day and night until its adoption by heads of state in September 2014. For those present in New York during this period, it was clear that the Security Council is the only global body capable of acting swiftly, decisively and universally.

Resolutions 2178 and 2396: The Governance of New Tech

Resolution 2178 (2014) was innovative and ambitious on several fronts, most notably in establishing a new category of offense related to FTF travel. It was also novel in its incorporation of technological measures to address the movement of FTFs. It encourages Member States to employ screening procedures, including collection and analysis of travel data, and to do so without resorting to profiling based on stereotypes.

Yet, the terrorist threat from ISIL continued to evolve and the world began to face a new challenge. Between 2014 and 2016, major attacks were perpetrated by returnees, including the May 24, 2014 shooting at the Jewish Museum of Belgium, the Jan. 7, 2015 assault on Charlie Hebdo’s office in Paris, and the Nov. 13, 2015 attacks in Paris, among others. In parallel, a series of assaults were carried out by individuals inspired, rather than directed, by ISIS. These included the Dec. 2, 2015 San Bernardino shootings, the June 12, 2016 Pulse nightclub massacre in Orlando, the July 14, 2016 truck attack in Nice, and the Dec. 19, 2016 Christmas market truck attack in Berlin.

These attacks culminated in the adoption of resolution 2396 (2017), which called on Member States “ to collect biometric data and to develop and share information related to watchlists or databases of known and suspected terrorists, including FTFs.”

Biometric Technology and Alternative Governance Regimes

Biometric technology has a long historical trajectory, with early instances dating back to ancient Babylon, where fingerprints were employed to authenticate commercial transactions. In the past three decades, the domain has witnessed considerable advancements, notably the expanded use of DNA analysis and facial recognition technologies.

In the context of the fight against ISIL, biometric technology became a critically effective technology to identify ISIL suspects and prevent FTFs’ travel even when they use fraudulent documents.

In resolution 2396 (2017), the Security Council decided that States shall develop and implement systems to collect biometric data to responsibly and properly identify terrorists, including FTFs, in compliance with domestic law and international human rights law. The Security Council also encouraged Member States to share this data responsibly with INTERPOL.

Resolution 2396 (2017) introduces several advancements over Resolution 2178 (2014). It obligated all States to develop and implement biometric systems without first establishing a universal and binding governance regime, which still does not exist. The Member States saw the risk of ISIL as greater than the risk of potential abuse. Additionally, the scope of application was broadened, incorporating the two terms “responsibly” and “properly.” The Security Council did not provide definitions for these terms but clarified that they are supplementary to the existing requirement to observe human rights law.

Alternative Governance Regimes in the U.N. Security Council: The Non-binding Guiding Principles Approach

Biometric technology is an intrusive investigative technique. It enables intelligence and law enforcement agencies to access not only individuals’ actions and personal data but also information about their physical characteristics and DNA. It can be collected without a person’s knowledge or consent and may be retained or repurposed, raising serious human rights concerns. It is no wonder that the adoption of these measures by the Security Council led to much criticism.

Yet, a more nuanced assessment of the Security Council’s efforts should consider not only the urgency with which it acted but also the mechanisms it provided to establish a governance framework. While this approach may not be flawless, it offered meaningful safeguards against potential abuses. The two alternative tools for governing emerging technologies collectively deployed by the Security Council were the use of principles rather than rules and the focus on non-binding guidance.

Principles are recognized as an effective tool for governing new tech for several reasons. Principles represent shared commitments to legal and ethical concepts. If properly developed, they can make sure that society benefits from the advantages that technology offers while upholding the rule of law and human rights. A principle–based approach also prevents innovative technologies from becoming bogged down in the regulatory thicket that often results from a rule–focused response.

The other tool recommended for governing new tech is to consider non-binding governance approaches. For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recommends: “Commitments and obligations that are not directly enforceable by governments.” The advantage of the non-binding mechanism is that it can offer flexible interim solutions to govern emerging technologies as uncertainties of technological pathways are reduced over time. Non-binding interventions are well suited to shape the norms surrounding the development and deployment of emerging technologies due to their collaborative nature. They can provide a venue for back-and-forth dialogue between technologists, regulators, and society.

The Madrid Guiding Principles and Their Addendum

Immediately following the adoption of resolution 2178 (2014), the Counter Terrorism Committee of the U.N. Security Council (CTC) began developing guiding principles on how Member States should implement the resolution’s complex requirements. These later became known as the “Madrid guiding principles.” Concluded in 2015, the Principles provided practical guidance for addressing FTFs, from radicalization and travel to prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration.

Building on this success, the Security Council requested in resolution 2396 that the CTC and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) review the 2015 Madrid principles with a focus on the threat of returnees. The CTC promptly initiated the development of what later became the Addendum to the Madrid Guiding Principles, which notably included a dedicated chapter addressing the use of biometric technologies. The Addendum acknowledges the critical role of biometric data in preventing terrorist travel but also reminded Member States that any interference with privacy must comply with human rights law. It stressed that biometric technology creates challenges because of reg-lag. It called on States to introduce effective privacy impact assessments, establish review or other types of oversight bodies, and consider the potential impact of such new technologies. The CTC went on to remind Member States that it is essential to provide safeguards for the protection of data and human rights, focusing on information about children.

Following the adoption of the Addendum, U.N. bodies, working collectively with the support of civil society, developed a compendium on the use of biometric technology that provides further human rights-based guidance on the use of this technology.

The Delhi Declaration

Building on these successes and facing an unprecedented number of new technologies available for terrorist purposes, from unmanned aerial systems (UASs) to crypto, crowdfunding and gaming, the CTC intensified its use of non-binding guiding principles. During a ministerial special meeting in Delhi in 2022, the CTC adopted the Delhi Declaration on “Countering the Use of New and Emerging Technologies for Terrorist Purposes.” Aware of the criticism related to the lack of full participation of civil society in the development of the Madrid guiding principles, the CTC and CTED held numerous discussions before and during the meeting itself with civil society, the private sector and academia.

The Delhi Declaration marked another critical step in the Security Council’s development of a governance regime for emerging tech. It detailed a long list of principles applicable to governance of new tech in the context of terrorism, including the need to balance fostering innovation and interconnectivity, as well as the free and secure flow of information, with preventing and countering the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes. It emphasizes the importance of engaging the tech sector, academia and civil society in the development of specific governance regimes for these technologies while maintaining a full respect for human rights.

It also led the CTC to adopt two new sets of non-binding guiding principles to assist Member States in countering the threat of terrorists using emerging technologies. In 2023, the CTC adopted the Abu Dhabi non-binding Guiding Principles, which are the first comprehensive guidance for addressing the misuse of UASs by terrorists. And in 2025, the CTC adopted the Algiers non-binding Guiding Principles on “Countering the Use of New Payment Technologies and Fundraising Methods for Terrorist Purposes.”

Collectively, these new instruments provide a broad toolkit that recognizes the interconnectivity of technological threats and the necessity of coordinated, collective responses.

The Security Council’s Governance Initiatives in the Broader Context 

The governance of emerging technologies demands a nuanced approach, a challenge that extends beyond counterterrorism. Effective governance is essential to ensure the safe integration of new technologies, to prevent their misuse, and to safeguard human rights, while simultaneously enabling society to reap the benefits of innovation. Yet, when these technologies are employed in the context of countering terrorism, the complexity and criticality of governance increase substantially.

On the one hand, the deployment of advanced technologies in counterterrorism can play a pivotal role in thwarting terrorist attacks. On the other hand, certain highly intrusive countermeasures pose significant risks to fundamental rights, raising the potential for abuse. It is no wonder that with the lack of a proper governance regime there have been calls for moratoria on the use of the most intrusive technologies, such as spyware.

The Security Council’s governance initiatives must be viewed within this broader context. As described in detail earlier, these initiatives were formulated in response to urgent and unprecedented global threats. Their primary objective was to prevent terrorists from abusing new capabilities while mitigating associated risks, with the understanding that more comprehensive governance frameworks will evolve over time, whether through the Security Council, its subsidiary bodies, or other relevant stakeholders. Both the Security Council and the CTC have consistently maintained that the governance regime they endorse is intended to supplement established international norms and were immediately followed by the development of practical non-binding guidance.

There is abundant fair criticism of the solutions offered by the Security Council and the CTC in developing these guiding principles. They are connected to a broader discussion over the growing use of “soft law” in counterterrorism, not just by the Security Council but also by bodies such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the U.N. Global Compact. The U.N. Special Rapporteur notes in this context that these guidelines are often “formulated in processes that are non-transparent.” Concerns were also raised regarding the mainstreaming of human rights in the development and enforcement of this guidance. In providing these concerns, the Special Rapporteur reflected a sentiment many Member States within and outside the Security Council share.

Although this article does not purport to prescribe a definitive model for the governance of emerging technologies within the counterterrorism sphere, it aims to elucidate the underlying rationale guiding the Security Council’s initiatives and the urgency with which these measures were undertaken. The Security Council confronted an unprecedented global crisis, necessitating immediate global action. While recognizing that hasty though necessary solutions may lead to misuse, the Security Council then immediately advanced a principled, non-binding framework designed to mitigate these risks, while also stressing that its efforts are intended to complement human rights principles and, where appropriate, be superseded by other, perhaps more elaborate instruments.

Author’s note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or policies of the United Nations or any of its Member States.

The post Global Governance of Emerging Technologies: Counterterrorism Challenges at the United Nations Security Council appeared first on Just Security.

Issued late in the day on March 31, 2026, the new executive order, titled Ensuring Citizenship Verification and Integrity in Federal Elections, includes two other main provisions. The first requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide to each state lists of eligible voters who are state residents and instructs the Department of Justice to prioritize criminal prosecutions of state and local officials “who issue Federal ballots to individuals not eligible to vote in a Federal election.” The second provides that federal funding should be withheld from states that refuse to comply with the mandates in the order. Under the Elections Clause of the Constitution, the executive branch has no authority over state voter eligibility determinations. It therefore cannot require states to consider any lists pulled together by federal agencies and cannot lawfully take any action against a state, whether criminally or administratively, for refusing to comply with the order’s other purported requirements. But these provisions seek to coerce states into complying with a scheme the executive branch has no authority to impose.

The Legal Framework: The Constitution Gives States and Congress—Not the President—Authority Over Federal Elections

The Trump administration’s latest attempt to police voter eligibility through unilateral executive action follows its failed attempt last year in Executive Order 14,248 (March 25, 2025), Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections. As relevant to the new executive order, the courts uniformly blocked the main operative provisions as beyond the president’s power under the Constitution because they lacked statutory authority. 

The provisions in the 2025 executive order would have added proof of citizenship and eligibility requirements to the standardized national voter registration form prescribed in the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501-20511. The order also would have required federal agencies to “assess citizenship” of individuals who apply for public assistance before providing them a voter registration form pursuant to the NVRA. And the order purported to add “documentary proof of U.S. citizenship” and “proof of eligibility to vote” to the statutorily prescribed “post card” voter registration and absentee ballot application that is sent to servicemembers and voters abroad, under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20301-20311.

In a comprehensive decision, the federal district court for the District of Columbia held that the President has no authority to supplement the carefully limited contents Congress specified on the standardized federal voter registration form. As the court pointed out, the Elections Clause of the Constitution gives states primary authority to determine the time, place and manner of choosing members of Congress, and gives Congress authority to make or alter such regulations. The Constitution conspicuously omits any independent authority in the President. Moreover, although it gives Congress the authority to alter regulations relating to time, place and manner, it gives Congress no authority over the states to determine voter qualifications and eligibility. Based on this constitutional framework, the court rejected the other provisions as well, because the president had no authority to alter or supplement the requirements specified in statute. The court entered final judgment on all claims the day the administration issued its new executive order.

The overarching constitutional problem with the March 2025 order is the same problem that will doom the key provisions of the new order. The Constitution conspicuously avoids giving the president any unilateral authority over the elections process. State authority to determine who represents the states in congress, and who is elected as president, is the foundation for the federal constitutional system. That is why the Constitution strikes a balance between the primacy of the states and the authority of Congress to prescribe laws relating to the time, place, and manner of elections. As the D.C. federal court recounted, the balance was the result of a compromise to satisfy those who, one one side, feared federal control over voter eligibility, and who, on the other, feared that exclusive state control of the time, place, and manner of elections could empower rogue states to undermine the federal government by refusing to hold elections. 

Indeed, the Constitution does not give even Congress the authority over eligibility rules, except through the provisions in the Bill of Rights that guarantee the right to vote. As Justice Scalia explained in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona (2013),

[p]rescribing voting qualifications . . . “forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government” by the Elections Clause, which is “expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of elections.” The Federalist No. 60, at 371 (A. Hamilton); see also id., No. 52, at 326 (J. Madison). This allocation of authority sprang from the Framers’ aversion to concentrated power. A Congress empowered to regulate the qualifications of its own electorate, Madison warned, could “by degrees subvert the Constitution.” 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 250 (M. Farrand rev. 1966). 

The most conservative members of the Court, such as Justice Thomas, have taken an even stronger view regarding Congress’s lack of authority under the Elections Clause to legislate in areas that impinge on states’ exclusive power to determine voter eligibility. Writing in the same case: 

Congress has no role in setting voter qualifications, or determining whether they are satisfied, aside from the powers conferred by the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, which are not at issue here. This power is instead expressly reposed in the States.

Whatever the scope of congressional authority to prescribe citizenship eligibility rules for state elections, despite these constitutional limitations, the limitations make it clear that the executive branch enjoys no unilateral authority whatsoever.

The Legal Problems with the Latest Administration Executive Order

The recent executive order, Ensuring Citizenship Verification, would enlist the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in creating “state citizenship lists” that would be sent to the states (Section 2). It would require the USPS to regulate the mailing of state absentee ballots (Section 3). And it includes implementation and enforcement provisions (Sections 4 and 5) that call on the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security to enforce federal laws against state election officials and to manage the citizenship list required in Section 2.

Section 2. Establishment and Transmission of State Citizenship Lists and Prioritization of Investigations and Prosecutions Related to Election Fraud

Section 2(a) directs DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, working with the SSA, “to compile and transmit to the chief election official of each State a list of individuals confirmed to be United States citizens who will be above the age of 18 at the time of an upcoming Federal election and who maintain a residence in the subject State.” The list must be updated and given to the states at least 60 days before each election. The federal government cannot require states to use the list. But the same section (in 2(b)) threatens state and local officials with criminal prosecution. It provides that “the Attorney General shall prioritize the investigation and, as appropriate, the prosecution of State and local officials or any others involved in the administration of Federal elections who issue Federal ballots to individuals not eligible to vote in a Federal election,” citing several federal criminal laws. However baseless the threat—since, to the extent any of the laws might conceivably apply, they require criminal intent—the purpose is clear. The executive order seeks to coerce state and local officials into acceding to overreach by the executive branch.

The section includes a qualifier that the program must comply with the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. The Privacy Act prohibits the disclosure of information about U.S. citizens by federal agencies, unless the disclosure falls into one of several exceptions specified in the Act. Implementing the March 2025 executive order, which required agencies to make citizenship-related databases available to the states on request, the administration relied on the Privacy Act’s “routine use” exception. Under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7), the exception applies “with respect to the disclosure of a record, the use of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected.” The agency must publish a notice in the Federal Register at least 30 days before disclosure and must provide an opportunity for notice and comment. Affected individuals, civil liberties organizations, or even states could challenge the notifications in federal court under the Administrative Procedure Act. It is difficult to see how compiling such a massive voter registration list is “compatible” with the reason the data was initially collected, which had nothing to do with voting. After all, the executive branch has no role in state election eligibility determinations. Nor have the states asked for this list. And the low incidence of unlawful voting by non-citizens would undermine the argument that it serves a legitimate purpose. It is inconceivable that federal agencies will be able to administer such a massive list reliably, particularly since the order requires the list to be based on a voter’s current residence.

Section 3: United States Postal Service Rulemaking on Mail-In and Absentee Ballots

Section 3 directs the USPS to initiate a rulemaking within 60 days to (a) require state ballot envelopes to contain standard markings and a bar code, (b) specify that states “may” notify USPS if the state intends to allow mail-in ballots to be transmitted by USPS and whether it intends to submit to USPS a list of voters eligible to vote and to whom the state intends to send a mail-in ballot; (c) provide that USPS will not allow mailing of ballots to individuals not included on a “State-specific list” administered by USPS; (d) create a “State-specific list” (also referred to as the “Mail-In and Absentee Participation List”), including procedures for individuals to enroll in the program and procedures for states to issue mail-in ballots to such individuals with bar codes to track the ballots; and (e) promulgate procedures for states to provide “suggested modifications or amendments” to the lists before a federal election. The USPS must issue the regulations within 120 days.

These provisions are unconstitutional for the same reasons the courts invalidated the March 2025 executive order. The executive branch possesses no constitutional or statutory authority to create a new federal absentee ballot eligibility scheme. The provisions affect voter eligibility, which is within the exclusive province of the states. They also affect state election procedure, which is within the shared authority of the states and Congress. These provisions would effectively invalidate state election laws regulating absentee ballots, imposing an unauthorized additional voting registration scheme and altering deadlines for mail-in voting. The 60-day list-submission deadline would effectively nullify the many state laws that allow voters to request absentee ballots within days of an election.

The order invokes the NVRA and the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 as statutory support, but those laws authorize specific federal agencies (primarily the EAC) to perform specific, limited functions. The NVRA assigns USPS a limited, ministerial role in voter registration—making mail-in voter registration forms available at post offices. And as to HAVA, it created the EAC as an independent, bipartisan commission to oversee the federal role in working with the states in election administration. Neither law gives the executive branch statutory authority to implement a mail-in voter registration scheme run by USPS.

The order also relies on the authority of the USPS over the mails, but the USPS lacks any authority to carry out the mandates in the order. The USPS’s basic statutory authority is “to provide for the collection, handling, transportation, delivery, forwarding, returning, and holding of mail, and for the disposition of undeliverable mail.” 39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1). The purpose of the USPS is to establish and carry out a universal mail service to unite the country (39 U.S.C. § 101(a)). The USPS’s authority over “mailability” is about the physical characteristics and content of mail (e.g., hazardous materials, obscenity, fraud), not about conditioning mail service on the identity or eligibility of the sender or recipient in relation to election regulation. Accordingly, Section 3 of the order lacks any statutory basis.

Even if the USPS’s authority were more on point, the administration cannot rely on vague statutory authorities concerning the mails to impose an unprecedented voter registration scheme. Whether viewed through the lens of the “major questions doctrine” or ordinary statutory construction, that conclusion is basic common sense. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump is instructive. The Court held that non-specific language in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) did not authorize the administration’s worldwide tariff regime. There, as here, the Constitution gave the authority the president claimed (to impose tariffs) to Congress alone. And there, as here, the administration sought to use the claimed statutory authority in an unprecedented way, with dramatic implications for the nation. The plurality opinion invoking the major questions doctrine observed that “[w]e have long expressed ‘reluctan[ce] to read into ambiguous statutory text’ extraordinary delegations of Congress’s powers,” quoting one of several cases establishing the doctrine That part of the opinion reasoned that the considerations underlying the major questions doctrine “apply with particular force where . . . the delegation involves [a] core congressional power.” There, it was the power of the purse. Here, it is an even more fundamental power, the power over state elections for federal office. The opinion also looked to other laws relating to the powers claimed by the President. As with tariffs, Congress has carefully defined federal statutory requirements relating to state elections. It has created independent implementing organizations, such as the EAC, subject to numerous requirements that ensure the agencies remain nonpartisan and responsive to the states. Finally, in evaluating whether ambiguous language in IEEPA ceded such vast taxing power to the President, the opinion found it “telling that in IEEPA’s ‘half century of existence,’ no President has invoked the statute to impose any tariffs—let alone tariffs of this magnitude and scope.” Likewise here, no President has ever used USPS’s broad organic authority over the mails to regulate voting by mail. While a majority did not join in calling this a “doctrine,” demanding special legislative clarity, they agreed with the essential statutory analysis.

Even if the USPS had the statutory authority to implement such a scheme, at least under current law a president cannot dictate how the USPS carries out its statutory responsibilities. The USPS is governed by a 11-member Board of Governors. Like other agencies that Congress seeks to insulate from direct political control, such as the EAC, the USPS board is bipartisan. The board members serve fixed, staggered terms and can only be removed “for cause” — not at the President’s will. (That is, unless the Supreme Court in Trump v. Slaughter overturns Humphrey’s Executor, and rules that such provisions are an unconstitutional constraint on presidential power under Article II.) This structure exists precisely so that day-to-day operations and policy decisions are made by the Board and the Postmaster General, who is selected by the board, not the White House. 

These provisions, if implemented, would cause chaos for mail-in and absentee voting. They could disenfranchise many eligible voters through errors and through imposing an onerous voting registration requirement. Even if such a program were lawful, which it is not, the USPS does not have the resources or institutional competence to administer such a program. 

Sections 4 and 5: Implementation and Enforcement

The implementation and enforcement provisions of the executive order require DHS to create the “infrastructure” for the citizenship list required in Section 2(a). The provisions also require the Attorney General to (1) enforce compliance with the federal criminal statutes referenced in the order and to “provide guidance to election officials” and others, including private companies involved in the “printing, production, shipment, or distribution of ballots;” and (2) “take all lawful steps, along with other agencies, to deter and address noncompliance with Federal law, including withholding Federal funds from noncompliant States and localities where such withholding is authorized by law.” 

While the provisions instructing the Attorney General to enforce federal law and pursue withholding federal funds from a “noncompliant state” may not be facially unlawful (because they are limited to actions authorized by law), they raise significant concerns. The risk is that the Department of Justice will invoke these provisions to threaten states and private actors, coercing them to follow federal mandates that are legally dubious. It is unusual to direct the Attorney General to “provide guidance” on federal criminal laws. While the Department may comment on its enforcement efforts and policies, it generally does not suggest that specific types of conduct might violate federal law. It would be especially unusual for the Department to “provide guidance” to a private company that its conduct violates federal law. The Department does not issue threats, it brings prosecutions. But these provisions seem to represent another area in which the President seeks to undermine the independence of the Department and use it as a political tool.

* * *

As a concluding observation, this executive order is further evidence of the significant departure from good-faith legal review within the Office of the White House Counsel, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice, and the general counsels’ offices at the relevant agencies, to the extent any of them were consulted. By statute, OLC is supposed to review all executive orders for “form and legality.” Parts of the order are so clearly unlawful, either OLC is being cut out or OLC is operating under significant political constraint. Aside from the legal problems, there are clues throughout the text that it was not reviewed according to the usual rigorous OLC process. Consider this phrase in the policy section of the order: “The Federal Government has an unavoidable duty under Article II of the Constitution of the United States to enforce Federal law.” Had OLC reviewed the order, “Federal Government” would have been replaced with “the President.” Article II establishes the office of the President, who, under the theory advanced by the Trump administration, is vested with all the power of the executive branch. Indeed, that theory would be required for the view that the President can dictate how an independent agency such as the USPS must act. 

The post The Unconstitutionality of the Trump Administration’s New Executive Order on Elections appeared first on Just Security.

It is easy to see why Patron’s message is needed. Ukraine is now the most heavily mined country in the world. Over 20 percent of its territory is contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance — explosive weapons such as bombs, rockets, shells, or grenades that failed to detonate and remain highly dangerous. That’s an area of approximately 139,000 square kilometers, roughly the size of New York state. According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 6,279 people were killed or injured by mines and explosive remnants of war in 2024; approximately 90 percent were civilians, and nearly half were children. Approximately 3.7 million people remain internally displaced, with the fear of explosives being a primary deterrent to return.

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are using mines. To make matters worse: the war in Ukraine and other threats of Russian aggression have further weakened legal efforts to ban the use of mines altogether. Sadly, therefore, this April 4th does not mark progress in the campaign to limit the harm done by mines to civilians around the globe. Quite the opposite. 

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Human Rights First, including one of the authors, has visited the frontline region of Kharkiv dozens of times. In March 2024, Human Rights First visited minefields in the region, speaking with civilians supporting mine clearance work, including demining specialists, and documented ongoing demining efforts.

The Ongoing Harm to Children in Ukraine

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) says that Ukraine is facing contamination “not seen in Europe since the end of the Second World War.” Since February 2022, Save the Children reports, at least 1,660 civilians have been killed or injured by landmines and explosive remnants of war, including 179 children, exceeding the number of incidents recorded over the previous seven years of hostilities in eastern Ukraine. The United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) reported last year that adolescent boys aged 14 to 17 accounted for nearly 80 percent of the child casualties between February 2022 and March 2025 — largely because they are more likely to explore high-risk areas. “Additionally, adolescents from rural areas and low-income families face a higher risk of engaging in hazardous behavior,” UNICEF has found. 

While many areas of Ukraine are contaminated, the highest levels are concentrated in the eastern and southern regions, where there has been prolonged ground fighting, occupation, and heavy shelling. Many of the mines are hand-sized and delivered by aircraft or mortars. Known locally as “petals” because of their shape, to a child they can resemble toys. They are now particularly difficult to spot as spring vegetation conceals them in fields.

Kristina Kolii is based in the frontline city of Kharkiv and is part of the mass education effort teaching children about the dangers of landmines. Human Rights First met with her in Kharkiv in March this year and spoke with her about her work. Before the 2022 invasion, Kolii worked as a shoe designer, and says she “knew absolutely zero” about mines. After assisting with humanitarian efforts following the 2022 invasion, she now visits schools to warn about the explosives. 

“Kids often don’t understand the dangers, they see them on the ground and think they’re toys. But they’re generally open to learning, and have good questions,” Kolii told Human Rights First. “A huge effort is needed to educate the population,” she said. “But children learn quickly when we tell them about the dangers.” Kolii is currently undertaking a course to examine land and identify where mines are located, so sappers can clear the explosives.

Other efforts led by UNICEF and civil society actors to reach children on the issue have included door to door visits, comic books, a cartoon film, and online games. These collective efforts have shown results. According to a 2024 UNICEF survey, 97 percent of children in Ukraine have been taught basic mine safety rules and 80 percent can identify potentially hazardous objects. Yet many still take risks that expose them to deadly explosives.

Education is one challenge; locating and destroying the explosives another. International land mine experts estimate that over two million landmines have been laid by Russia in Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion, a level of contamination one expert has deemed “unrecognizable in modern history.”

The Ottawa Convention: Further Weakened 

In response to the widespread death, injury, and devastation caused by mines, the international community adopted the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, also called the Ottawa Convention. The law prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines, and obliges its 164 States parties to clear contaminated land and assist victims. These obligations reflect core principles of International Humanitarian Law, which rejects the use of inherently indiscriminate weapons. However, China, India, Pakistan, Russia and the United States never joined the Ottawa Convention. Human Rights First has for years urged the United States to ratify the Convention.

Several States that were a party to the treaty have either withdrawn from it or ceased to abide by their commitments. In July 2025, Ukraine notified the U.N. that it would “suspend the operation” of its obligations, citing the pressures of defending against Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described mines as an “irreplaceable tool” for defense. States parties have rejected Ukraine’s position in Geneva, stressing that suspension is not an option under the Ottawa Convention and complete withdrawal is not designed for States actively engaged in hostilities. Despite these objections, Ukrainian forces were already using mines prior to its announcement. Indeed, the Biden administration reversed its policy against supplying Ukraine with anti-personnel landmines in late 2024.

Other countries bordering Russia, including the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Finland, and Poland have withdrawn from the Ottawa Convention, also citing growing threats from Moscow.

All of these actions mean that the Ottawa Convention, which was never ratified by the world’s global powers, has been further weakened. 

A Crisis With No End in Sight

Fully demining Ukrainian land is likely to take decades. The Ukrainian Association of Humanitarian Demining has estimated it will take up to 30 years. Authorities often appear overwhelmed by the scale of work required, and unlicensed demining operations are springing up. Some desperate civilians do the enormously dangerous job for themselves.

Even if a cease fire or peace deal is eventually reached, Ukraine will still face a series of serious long-term challenges, including severely damaged infrastructure, a national mental health crisis, and a continuing Russian propaganda campaign. Before its agricultural sector can properly recover, the country will have to carry out an unprecedented landmine clearance program. 

The Stockholm School of Economics estimates the full cost of demining will be upwards of $35 billion, including “the need for tens of thousands of trained specialists — far more than the roughly 4,500 currently available.”

These eye-watering estimates — of the money, personnel, and time required — are calculated on the situation today, without more mines being deployed. But Russia’s war on Ukraine shows no sign of stopping, and more explosives are being scattered across Ukraine’s roads, fields, and forests all the time. 

This April 4th is a sad reminder that the effort to ban mines has been greatly undermined — nowhere more so than in Ukraine. 

Editor’s Note: See here for additional Just Security pieces analyzing the use of mines and their devastating effects around the world.

The post Ukraine’s Long-Term Landmine Problem appeared first on Just Security.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR 

A U.S.-Israeli strike on a major bridge just outside Tehran yesterday killed at least eight people and injured around 95. President Trump said on social media that the U.S. military “hasn’t even started destroying what’s left in Iran,” adding “Bridges next, then Electric Power Plants! New Regime leadership knows what has to be done, and has to be done, FAST!” Lex Harvey, Avery Schmitz, Adam Pourahmadi, Sana Noor Haq, and Angus Watson report for CNN; Barak Ravid reports for Axios.

Iranian state media today released photos of what it claimed was the wreckage of a U.S. Air Force F-35 fighter jet downed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. According to CNN, the photos from the wreckage show a partial logo for “US Air Forces in Europe” that appears on a F-15 tail fin. U.S. Central Command has yet to comment on the IRGC’s claims. Brad Lendon and Isaac Yee report for CNN.

Roughly half of Iran’s missile launchers are still intact and thousands of one-way attack drones remain in Iran’s arsenal after five weeks of U.S.-Israeli strikes, according to recent U.S. intelligence assessments, three sources told CNN. Two sources said that roughly 50 per cent of Iran’s drone capabilities still exist. “They are still very much poised to wreak absolute havoc throughout the entire region,” one of the sources said of Iran. In response to questions on this intelligence, a White House spokesperson said, “Here are the facts: Iranian ballistic missile and drone attacks are down 90 per cent, their navy is wiped out, two-thirds of their production facilities are damaged or destroyed.” Haley Britzky, Natasha Bertrand, and Jim Sciutto report.

Iranian human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh was detained by Iranian intelligence agents at her house in Tehran this week, her daughter said yesterday. Since the war began on Feb. 28, Iranian authorities have reportedly arrested hundreds of people, often for communicating with foreign media. Days before her arrest, Sotoudeh gave an interview to a Persian media outlet abroad in which she said the Islamic Republic’s policies “have exposed us to death” and spoke out against the government’s crackdown on protests in January. Sarah El Deeb reports for AP News.

Iran said yesterday it would seek to oversee shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz even after the war. An Iranian deputy foreign minister said that though Iran was drafting a protocol for his country and Oman to monitor transit through the strait, Iran would not be imposing restrictions. Yeganeh Torbati reports for the New York Times.

IRAN WAR – POLITICAL RESPONSE 

A U.N. Security Council effort led by Bahrain to authorize military force against Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz faced disagreements yesterday, with Russia, China, and France opposing the use of force, according to a diplomat and a senior U.N. official. A final draft of the proposal, obtained by AP News, authorizes defensive – but not offensive – action to ensure vessels can safely transit through the strait. China, Russia, and France’s views on the changes are not known. The vote on the resolution is expected to take place tomorrow. Farnaz Fassihi reports for the New York Times; David Brunnstrom and John Irish report for Reuters; Edith M. Lederer reports.

French President Emmanuel Macron yesterday criticized Trump for his unserious approach to the war in Iran and unhelpful attacks on NATO. “When we’re serious, we don’t say the opposite of what we said the day before,” Macron told reporters. Macron also rejected the possibility that nations could forcibly seize the Strait of Hormuz, saying “that has never been an option we have chosen, and we consider it unrealistic.” Mark Landler reports for the New York Times.

ISRAEL-GAZA WAR 

Hamas has told mediators it will not discuss giving up arms without guarantees that Israel will fully quit Gaza as laid out in a disarmament plan for Trump’s “Board of Peace,” three sources told Reuters. A Hamas delegation met with Egyptian, Qatari, and Turkish mediators in Cairo this week to give their initial response to the plan. Hamas conveyed several demands, including an end to Israeli violations of the ceasefire, two Egyptian sources said. Nidal al-Mughrabi and Ahmed Shalaby report.

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS  

A New York Times investigation based on dozens of interviews with Alawites in Syria found that abductions have become common since Bashar al-Assad was ousted in late 2024. The current Syrian government has denied that Alawite women and girls are being targeted by kidnappers, saying that it has only confirmed one such case. The Times verified the kidnappings of 13 Alawite women and girls, in addition to one man and one boy. Syrian activists say they know of scores of such kidnappings, but details are difficult to confirm because victims and their families are too afraid to speak out. Ben Hubbard and Laura Boushnak report.

Myanmar’s military leader, Min Aung Hlaing, was elected president today by the country’s parliament. Richard C. Paddock reports for the New York Times.

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

Trump yesterday announced plans to impose tariffs of up to 100 per cent on certain imported medicines, aiming to pressure manufacturers to lower prices and build production facilities in the United States. All generic drugs and companies that have already struck deals with the United States will be exempted. The Trump administration also announced that it would roll back tariffs on steel, aluminium, and copper for some goods and simplify how the levy was calculated. Ana Swanson and Rebecca Robins report for the New York Times.

U.S. CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

Cuba said yesterday that it was pardoning more than 2,000 prisoners, one of the largest releases in years and the second in less than a month. The Cuban Embassy in Washington said that the latest pardons were a “humanitarian and sovereign gesture,” designed to coincide with Holy Week. It was not clear whether the new pardons were part of ongoing negotiations between the United States and Cuba. Francesca Regalado and David. C. Adams reports for the New York Times.

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS

Salah Sarsour, the president of the Islamic Society of Milwaukee, was detained by ICE agents this week after the authorities said he had been convicted of crimes in Israel more than three decades ago and had lied on his U.S. green card application. Sarsour has no criminal record in the United States. “It is difficult to believe that D.H.S.’s position now is not rooted in a violation of [Sarsour’s] First Amendment right to speak about the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank,” Sarsour’s lawyer said this week. Jacey Fortin reports for the New York Times.

ICE’s office of detention oversight carried out a congressionally mandated inspection of Camp East Montana, the largest U.S. migrant detention camp, over three days in February. The report, published this week, found 49 “deficiencies,” meaning “any violation of detention standards, policies, or operational procedures.” There were 22 deficiencies related to the “use of force and restraints,” 11 related to “facility security and control,” and five related to “medical care.” Kanishka Singh reports for Reuters.

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion this week finding that the Presidential Records Act of 1978 exceeds “Congress’s enumerated and implied powers, and it aggrandizes the Legislative Branch at the Expense of the constitutional independence and autonomy of the Executive.” The law requires presidents to preserve official records during their time in office and says that such records are public property. The DOJ’s opinion, if pursued, would effectively permit White House lawyers to set their own voluntary presidential recordkeeping policy. Maegan Vazquez and Jeremy Roebuck report for the Washington Post.

House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-LA) said yesterday that he will delay a vote on a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funding bill until the Senate makes progress on funding for ICE and CBP, sources told Axios. This marks a shift from his Wednesday announcement with Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R-SD), where they had planned to advance a DHS funding bill excluding ICE and CBP, deferring those agencies to a later reconciliation package. Kate Santaliz reports.

ICE Director Todd Lyons told lawmakers that he had authorized the use of “cutting-edge technological tools” to help the Homeland Security Investigations division fight fentanyl, particularly against organizations using encrypted communications. “It’s outrageous that [DHS] and ICE are using this spyware with no Congressional oversight and a complete lack of compliance standards,” Reps. Summer Leed (D-PA), Shontel Brown (D-OH), and Yassamin Ansari (D-AZ) said in a joint statement yesterday. Tim Starks reports for Cyberscoop.

The National Capital Planning Commission yesterday approved Trump’s plans for a $400 million White House ballroom, asserting that the federal court’s order to halt construction has no bearing on its review process. Jennifer Yachnin reports for POLITICO.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

Trump announced yesterday that Attorney General Pam Bondi will be leaving her role in the Justice Department and “transitioning to a much needed and important new job in the private sector.” Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche will lead the department in an acting capacity. An administration official told POLITICO that Trump is considering additional changes to his cabinet, adding “he’s very angry and he’s going to be moving people.” Trump has expressed particular frustration with Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and Labor Secretary Lori Chavez DeRemer. Kyle Cheney and Josh Gerstein report for POLITICO; Dasha Burns reports.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth yesterday asked Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George to step down and take immediate retirement, sources told CBS News. A senior Defense Department official said, “We are grateful for his service, but it was time for a leadership change in the Army.” One source said Hegseth wants to replace George with someone who will implement Trump and Hegseth’s vision for the army. Sources told the New York Times that two weeks ago, George asked Hegseth to meet with him to discuss the removal of four officers from the one-star list, as well as the general’s view that Hegseth was interfering unnecessarily in Army personnel decisions overall. Jennifer Jacobs, Eleanor Watson, and James LaPorta report; Greg Jaffe, Helene Cooper, and Eric Schmitt report.

Hegseth has taken steps to block or delay promotions for more than a dozen Black and female senior officers across all four branches of the military, according to nine U.S. officials. Two officials said there are concerns in the military and the White House that Hegseth is blocking promotions because of race or gender, as he targets DEI initiatives at the Pentagon. Gordon Lubold and Courtney Kube report for NBC News.

Hegseth directed military commanders yesterday to allow troops to carry personal firearms while stationed at bases. Chris Cameron reports for the New York Times.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION

A coalition of legal groups filed a lawsuit yesterday against the Department of Homeland Security, saying the agency had allowed federal immigration agents to routinely enter homes to carry out searches and arrests without judicial warrants in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The case has been brought on behalf of several people in Minnesota whose homes were searched. Zach Montague reports for the New York Times.

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions.

If you enjoy listening, Just Security’s analytic articles are also available in audio form on the justsecurity.org website.

ICYMI: Yesterday on Just Security

Washington Is Backing the Wrong Lebanon Strategy

By Nadim Houry

The post Early Edition: April 3, 2026 appeared first on Just Security.

In a historic first, long-range Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs) were used in combat during Operation Epic Fury, providing an unrivaled deep strike capability.

“I just could not be prouder of our men and women in uniform leveraging innovation to create dilemmas for the enemy.” – Adm. Brad Cooper, CENTCOM Commander

On March 29th, the New York Times reported that it appeared PrSM, which was “untested in combat,” may have been used in an attack that struck a sports hall and adjacent elementary school near a military facility in southern Iran, according to weapons experts and a visual analysis by the Times. Local officials cited in Iranian media said this strike and others nearby in the city of Lamerd killed at least 21 people. On March 31, 2026, USCENTCOM issued a press release stating, “Several media outlets recently reported accusations of U.S. forces striking a sports hall and residential area in the city of Lamerd, Iran, on Feb. 28. After looking into the reports, U.S. Central Command has confirmed the accusations are false.” It went on to state that the video was not PrSM but rather it was “consistent with the dimensions and silhouette of an Iranian Hoveyzeh cruise missile.” This blanket denial, without providing much supporting evidence, has been viewed by some with skepticism. 

Regardless of whether PrSM was used in this particular attack, these events and the linkage to PrSM raise the question of how the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of the Army test and evaluate new weapons to ensure that they can be used in compliance with the law of armed conflict (LOAC). 

This author served as the Special Assistant to the Army Judge Advocate General for Law of War Matters from 2016 until 2023 and was responsible for conducting the legal review of new weapons for the Department of the Army.  This essay will explain three matters: 

(1) The Precision Strike Missile (PrSM);
(2) The standard DoD Weapons Review Process; and
(3) How the Department of the Army as the proponent of PrSM, would ordinarily evaluate this weapon to ensure that its fielding and use are in compliance with applicable international law.   

What is the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) 

The Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) is a long-range weapon designed for the U.S. Army and developed by Lockheed Martin to replace the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) that has a maximum range of 300 kilometers. PrSM is a surface-to-surface weapon system that provides enhanced capabilities to attack, neutralize, suppress and destroy targets using missile-delivered indirect fires out to a distance of at least 499 kilometers. 

PrSM is compatible with existing launchers such as the M270A2 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). As opposed to the existing ATACMS system, each PrSM pod carries two missiles, effectively doubling the firepower of the ATACMS system that only carried one. PrSM is designed to destroy both area and point targets, including enemy troops, armored vehicles, and air defense systems. 

Reports note that the next iteration of PrSM, which is expected in 2028, will add “multi-mode seeker combining a radar and imaging infrared sensor. This will enable the missile to detect and lock on to moving ships (it’s also called the Land-Based Anti-Ship Missile or LBASM) and perhaps moving land-based vehicles too.”   Future iterations will involve “new payloads allowing the missile to release multiple bomblets and even swarms of small kamikaze drones,” as well as extending the range to “over 620 miles.” 

The U.S. Army announced: 

“The [PRSM] achieved Milestone C approval on July 2, 2025, signaling the program’s transition into the Production and Deployment phase. PrSM Increment 1, designed to neutralize, suppress, or destroy adversary anti-access and area denial capabilities at ranges greater than 400 kilometers, represents a critical advancement in the Army’s long-range precision strike capabilities. PrSM Increment 1 will replace the Army Tactical Missile System, delivering increased range and lethality to Army field artillery formations.”  

The milestone C approval is important as this is when PrSM presumably received a legal review prior to its fielding as part of the DoD weapons review process.

DoD Weapons Review Process

The United States is not a party to Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions; so there is no explicit treaty obligation to conduct legal reviews of new weapons, means or method of warfare. Some commentators note that there is “an implied obligation” to conduct such review as indicated by the practice of States prior to the adoption of Additional Protocol I. The International Committee of the Red Cross, in its 2006 Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare, also takes the view that the requirement to assess the “legality of all new weapons, means and methods of warfare … is arguably one that applies to all States, regardless of whether or not they are party to Additional Protocol I.”  However, the DoD’s position is that there is no customary international law obligation to conduct a weapons review as “there is insufficient state practice and opinion juris.” 

The DoD Law of War Manual reiterates that long-standing U.S. policy requires a legal review of the intended acquisition of a weapon system to ensure its development and use is consistent with LOAC. This policy predates adoption of Additional Protocol I. Each military service has issued regulations implementing this policy. For example, Army Regulation 27-53 (AR 27-53) sets forth the requirements for legal reviews of new weapons and states that the legal review of the acquisition or procurement of a weapon system should occur at an early stage of the acquisition process, including the research and development phases, to ensure its legality under LOAC, domestic law, and other international law (called “Milestone B”). Even though it is important for the evaluation to be done at the earliest stages of the development or acquisition process, AR 27-53 states that “a final legal review must be made prior to the award of the initial contract for production (generally Milestone C or the equivalent) … to determine whether the [weapon] and/or its intended use is consistent with all applicable U.S. domestic law and international legal obligations of the United States, and LOAC.”   

Accordingly, a legal review of a new weapon is a critical component of ensuring that such weapons are used in compliance with international legal obligations. This process – which has been in place since 1974 and has worked very well up until now – enables service members to have confidence that the weapons they are using have undergone a rigorous process and are the best weapons possible that comply with LOAC. 

What is Considered in a Legal Review of Weapons and Weapons Systems

Once a new weapon is ready for a legal review, the procuring agency or command must submit a written request to the legal advisor designated to conduct the review.  Any request will include, at a minimum, the following information: 

1. A general description of the weapon;
2. The intended use of the weapon;
3. The reasonably anticipated effects of the weapon.  All tests, computer modeling, laboratory studies, and other technical analysis and results that contribute to the assessment of the reasonably anticipated effects should be included for review.

This information will provide the reviewer with the necessary information to conduct the legal review.  The reviewer may always request any additional information pertaining to the weapon needed to properly review the new weapon.  Once all the information necessary for the legal review of a new weapon has been provided, the reviewer will then conduct the review.  The legal review will consider the following three questions with respect to the new weapon:  

1. Whether the weapon falls within a class of weapons that has been specifically prohibited; 
2. Whether the weapon’s intended use is calculated to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering; and 
3. Whether the weapon is inherently indiscriminate.

If the weapon is not specifically prohibited, the review should consider whether there are legal or policy restrictions on the intended use that are specific to that type of weapon. Finally, Section 6.2.2 of the DoD Law of War Manual provides that “it may be appropriate to advise whether other measures should be taken that would assist in ensuring compliance with law of war obligations related to the type of weapon being acquired or procured. For example, it may be appropriate to advise on the need for training programs and other practical measures, such as promulgating doctrine and rules of engagement related to that type of weapon.” 

Application of the Elements of a Legal Review to PrSM  

Under AR 27-53, PrSM was required to have undergone a legal review prior to its fielding and use in the conflict with Iran. 

Did that happen in this case?  It is unknown as weapons reviews are not made public for a variety of legitimate reasons since they often contain proprietary information as well as technical specifications that need to be protected. Accordingly, those outside the Department of Defense are not privy to the legal reviews.  Although conducting a legal review is required, this author knows from experience there have been instances where a new weapon is fielded without receiving a legal review. Past practice has always been to conduct a legal review once the reviewer is made aware that a new weapon has been fielded without a proper review.  However, there is nothing presented that would indicate that PrSM would be considered an unlawful weapon when assessed against the three questions with respect to new weapons.

Does PrSM fall within a class of weapons that has been specifically prohibited?

The first question to consider is whether PrSM falls within a specific rule of law or treaty obligation that would prohibit or restrict its use.  As Section 6.4.2 of the DoD Law of War Manual provides, those weapons would include poison, poisoned weapons, poisonous gases, and other chemical weapons; biological weapons; certain environmental modification techniques; weapons that injure by fragments that are non-detectable by X-rays; certain types of mines, booby-traps, and other devices; and blinding lasers.  Though a weapon may not be prohibited under LOAC, there may be weapons that either have LOAC restrictions or U.S. policy restricts their use.  Section 6.5.1 of the DoD Law of War Manual include in this category weapons such as mines, booby-traps, and other devices (except certain specific classes of prohibited mines, booby-traps, and other devices); cluster munitions; incendiary weapons; laser weapons (except blinding lasers); and riot control agents. 

PrSM does not fall into any of these prohibitions or restrictions. It contains a “unitary blast‑fragmentation warhead optimized for area and point targets;” it does not have submunitions so it would not be considered a cluster munition and subject to the 2017 DoD Cluster Munition Policy.    

Is PrSM’s intended use calculated to cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury?

The second question looks to determine whether PrSM’s use is calculated to cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. The terms “unnecessary suffering” and “superfluous injury” are generally synonymous. Superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering acknowledges that the use of weapons in war causes suffering, including injury and loss of life. A weapon causes superfluous injury only when, in the normal use, it has a particular effect—and the injury caused is considered by governments as manifestly disproportionate to the military necessity for it. This determination cannot be made in isolation from other weapons. A weapon’s effects must be weighed in light of comparable, lawful weapons in use on the modern battlefield.

To determine whether a weapon causes superfluous injury, a legal review must include an evaluation of the military necessity of the weapon; an analysis of the intended results of its use (including design, that is, what it is designed to do, and intended employment, that is, how it is intended to be used in combat); and a comparison of the weapon with lawful comparable weapons already in use.

PrSM is “designed to detonate just above its target and blast small tungsten pellets outward” and its intended use is “against hardened or soft strategic targets, including enemy air defense systems, command facilities, logistics hubs, and missile launchers.” The United States has similar weapons in its inventory that perform the same function. However, it would be important for the reviewer to analyze any wound ballistic information to verify that the wounds are similar to existing weapons in the U.S. inventory.

The military necessity for PrSM is its ability to engage targets at a range far exceeding the ATACMS maximum range of 300 kilometers. This extended range allows the Army a much-needed deep fight capability.   

Is PrSM inherently indiscriminate?

Distinction is a fundamental rule of LOAC. It requires that military forces direct their attacks against enemy military objectives and distinguish these military objectives from the civilian population and civilian objects. Combatants, civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, and other military objectives may be targeted. Distinction requires that the weapon be capable of being directed against a military objective.  Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.

In determining distinction, “capable of being directed” does not require “terminal guidance” to the final point of impacting the target or use of the most precise weapon under all circumstances.  It does prohibit “blind weapons,” which are those weapons that cannot, with any reasonable assurance, be directed against a military objective.  Indiscriminate weapons also include those that are essentially random in their effects and would be generally as likely to hit civilians as combatants.  

PrSM is a precision guided munition that is designed for high accuracy, with early reports and testing indicating a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of less than one meter, enabling it to strike precise coordinates at long ranges.  PrSM, at least as designed, is not an inherently indiscriminate weapon. As discussed above, there may be instances where other measures should be taken that would assist in ensuring compliance with law of war obligations. The New York Times states that  photos of the aftermath of the detonation of PrSM “show both sites were pockmarked with holes, apparently from the tungsten pellets. related to the type of weapon.”  Based on the information available, the blast radius of tungsten pellets is unclear. This is certainly something the legal review would address as it could affect the appropriateness of using PrSM in populated areas.  If the radius is large, the reviewer may recommend it not be used in those circumstances as that may raise issues with respect to incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects in proximity to military objectives.  

In considering the three questions that must be addressed in a weapons review, and based on the publicly available information I have been able to read, there is no reason to believe that PrSM would fail the requirements of the legal review for a new weapon and to be fielded by the United States. If the testing data confirms the information available, such as a CEP of one meter, PrSM is a lawful weapon.

The Use of PrSM in the Strike Against Iran 

The questions regarding PrSM revolve around the attack on the military facility in Lamerd in southern Iran that also reportedly struck a sports hall and adjacent elementary school and killed at least 21 people.  As the New York Times noted, “Since the weapon is so new, it’s more difficult to assess whether the PrSM strikes in Lamerd were intentional, stemmed from a design flaw or manufacturing defect, or were the result of improper target selection.”

A recent article by Annie Shiel and Priyanka Motaparthy (here) wrote that USCENTCOM is conducting an investigation into this incident to determine the reason why the strike hit the sports hall and school.  It is too early to tell what caused PrSM to strike civilian objects.  

Under LOAC, lawful weapons—those not prohibited by international law—can be used in an unlawful manner if their use violates LOAC principles of distinction and proportionality. Accordingly, if PrSM was directed at the elementary school and sports hall and they were civilian objects (i.e., not being used as a military objective by the Iranian military forces), then it would violate the principle of distinction. An attack using PrSM would violate the principle of proportionality when the expected loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. 

Finally, if it is determined that the strike occurred because of a design flaw or defect with PrSM, then it should be removed from operational use until the flaws or defects are addressed and new testing and evaluation is conducted to ensure PrSM is able to be used in a manner that complies with LOAC. That is why there is both testing and the legal review process in place.  These long-standing procedures help ensure that any flaw or defect is addressed prior to fielding. 

Conclusion

The use of new weapons on the battlefield often raises concern about whether the new weapon can be used in compliance with LOAC. This is especially true with respect to PrSM in that its initial use reportedly resulted in the death of civilians and destruction of civilian objects. As my former colleague, and the individual who instituted the DoD weapons review, W. Hays Parks, noted, there are three  important reasons to ensure new weapons undergo a legal review. First, the United States is a party to law of war treaties prohibiting the use of certain weapons or munitions.  The  United States has accordingly agreed to certain obligations which it must implement in good faith. “As a nation that believes in the rule of law, it is incumbent upon the United States to ensure compliance with treaty obligations,” Hays wrote. Second, the legal review provides the program manager as well as the military commander with an approval of the legality of the weapon or munition in question. It assures commanders and service members that the weapons DoD issues to them are lawful.  Finally, a proper weapons review provides an immediate response to questions that may arise with respect to the legality of the weapon if something goes wrong on the battlefield. 

The post “Precision Strike Missiles” (PrSMs) in Iran War: The U.S. Obligation to Conduct a Legal Review of New Weapons appeared first on Just Security.

Letter of over 100 international law experts on Iran war

We, the undersigned U.S.-based international law experts, professors, and practitioners write to express profound concern about serious violations of international law and alarming rhetoric by the United States, Israel, and Iran in the present armed conflict in the Middle East.

Due to our connection to the United States, our focus here is on the conduct of the U.S. government, but we remain concerned about the risk of atrocities across the region including the continuing risks posed by the Iranian government to Iranians through violent crackdowns on dissent, and to civilians across the Middle East through Iran’s ongoing unlawful strikes on civilian infrastructure using explosive weapons in densely populated areas.

One month has passed since the United States and Israel launched strikes across Iran. The initiation of the campaign was a clear violation of the United Nations Charter, and the conduct of United States forces since, as well as statements made by senior government officials, raise serious concerns about violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including potential war crimes.  

We collectively affirm the importance of equal application of international law to all, including countries that hold themselves out as global leaders. Recent statements from senior U.S. government officials describing the rules governing military engagement as “stupid” and prioritizing “lethality” over “legality” are profoundly alarming and dangerously short-sighted. These claims, particularly in combination with the observable conduct of U.S. forces, are harming the international legal order and the system of international law that we have devoted our lives to promoting. 

The war, which is costing U.S. taxpayers between $1-2 billion each day, is imposing significant harm to civilians in the region, has resulted in the loss of hundreds of civilian lives across the Middle East, and is causing serious environmental and economic harms.

We write to express our concern about 1) jus ad bellum, or the decision to go to war, 2) jus in bello, or the conduct of hostilities, 3) rhetoric and threats from senior U.S. officials and their allies, which portend further abuses, and 4) the decimation of civilian harm mitigation structures within the U.S. government as a part of U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s “gloves off” approach to warfare. 

1. Jus ad bellum concerns: The strikes launched by the United States and Israel on February 28, 2026 clearly violated the United Nations Charter prohibition on the use of force. Force against another state is only permitted in self-defense against an actual or imminent armed attack or where authorized by the UN Security Council. The Security Council did not authorize the attack. Iran did not attack Israel or the United States. Despite the Trump administration’s varied and sometimes conflicting claims to the contrary, there is no evidence that Iran posed an imminent threat that could ground a self-defense claim. Many international law experts have concluded that Israel and the United States’ actions violate the UN Charter, including the President and President-elect of the American Society of International Law, and the President of the American Branch of the International Law Association; UN Secretary-General António Guterres also condemned the attacks as undermining international peace and security.

2. Concerns about violations of international humanitarian law: The laws of armed conflict constrain the conduct of hostilities of all parties to the ongoing conflict. We are concerned that these fundamental rules may have been violated, including in the context of reported strikes on civilians and civilian objects such as political leaders who have no military role, oil and gas infrastructure, including South Pars, and water desalination plants. On March 19, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk condemned strikes on energy infrastructure, noting their “disastrous” impacts for civilians. 

We are seriously concerned about strikes that have hit schools, health facilities, and homes. The Iranian Red Crescent reports that “67,414 civilian sites have been struck, of which 498 are schools and 236 health facilities.” A report by leading civil society organizations found that at least 1,443 Iranian civilians, including 217 children, were killed by U.S. and Israeli forces between February 28 and March 23. 

The strike on Minab primary school is particularly concerning. On February 28, Shajareh Tayyebeh Primary School in Minab, Iran, was struck, resulting in the deaths of at least 175 people, many of them children, according to Iranian officials. Based on easily accessible online information and commercially available satellite imagery, it appears the building had been used as a school for a decade. President Trump denied U.S. responsibility, falsely stating that “It was done by Iran.” However, a preliminary investigation by the Department of Defense reportedly determined that the U.S. conducted the strike, and the targeting had been based on outdated intelligence. The strike likely violates international humanitarian law, and if evidence is found that those responsible were reckless, it could also be a war crime. The strike is among the deadliest single attacks by the U.S. military on civilians in recent decades. 

3. Concerns about rhetoric and threats from senior officials. We are deeply concerned about the dangerous rhetoric government officials have engaged in during the war, including: 

a. Threatened denial of quarter: On March 13, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated “We will keep pushing, keep advancing, no quarter, no mercy for our enemies.” In international law, it is “especially forbidden” to “declare that no quarter will be given,” a prohibition also set out in the Department of Defense’s own law of war manual. Hegseth’s statement likely violates international humanitarian law as well as the U.S. War Crimes statute 18 U.S.C. 2441. Ordering or threatening no quarter is a war crime.