Forcing U.S. servicemembers to police American streets isn’t just dangerous for the rule of law, it also harms the military itself. The negative and counterproductive consequences of placing military personnel on the frontlines of domestic law enforcement are well-established and remarkably consistent. Drawing on incidents from American history and contemporary examples from around the world, we detail these risks in a new report, “The Dangers of Military Intervention in Civilian Law Enforcement.”

The topline findings are clear:

When these civil-military lines blur, even well-intentioned domestic military operations can produce unintended consequences that are difficult to reverse…. These dangers — escalation, disillusionment, and politicization — are the predictable outcomes of military intervention in civilian law enforcement.

Police are trained to enforce the law and de-escalate violence, militaries, however, are tasked with deploying overwhelming force. The mismatch of tool to task that sending troops to enforce the law entails puts civilians (and troops themselves) in the crosshairs, jeopardizes military morale and readiness, and injects politics into the armed forces. Escalation, disillusionment in the ranks, and politicization are virtually inevitable when this line in the civil-military boundary is blurred. All Americans should be deeply concerned about the increased deployments of federal military personnel for domestic policing purposes. 

Lessons from U.S. History

The first American century witnessed numerous domestic uprisings that challenged the legitimacy of the new government, including a civil war that posed an existential threat. Wary of concentrated central political power, the federal government for much of the nineteenth century relied on a patchwork of state militias and Regular U.S. Army troops for managing internal security — a fundamentally different reality from the modern era of robust and well-funded state and local police forces. The evolving responses to these early domestic crises shaped how federal force is understood, organized, and authorized for use.

Shays’ Rebellion in 1786 first convinced early leaders of the inadequacy of the federal government’s capacity to respond to civil unrest under the Articles of Confederation, and informed the U.S. Constitution that would replace it. Later, both Presidents George Washington and John Adams utilized statutory authorities to deploy federal military force against anti-tax uprisings — during the Whiskey and Fries Rebellions, respectively — only to later learn that these deployments cost far more than the issue originally at stake. 

Former Vice President Aaron Burr’s botched plot to seize western territory prompted the passage of the Insurrection Act in 1807, which expanded the president’s authority to deploy federal military personnel in “all cases of insurrection, or obstruction to the laws … for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection, or of causing the laws to be duly executed.” The Insurrection Act remains intact today, though invocations of its authority have remained exceedingly rare since its enactment. 

Even when legally authorized and fully budgeted, domestic troops deployments take a toll, especially when the military’s involvement is colored by politics. President Andrew Jackson’s 1834 deployment of federal military force to quash labor unrest along the Chesapeake and Ohio (C&O) Canal, for instance, called into question whether the military was used as a tool to shore up the fortunes of the canal company’s president, John Eaton, who served as Jackson’s former secretary of war and was also a close friend of the president. 

Domestic deployments to the former Confederate states during Reconstruction following the Civil War prompted widespread backlash from white Southerners amid accusations of military intrusion in civilian life. Though federal troops largely worked to protect the rights and safety of newly freed Black citizens, this backlash ultimately precipitated the enactment of the Posse Comitatus Act in 1878, which generally prohibited the use of federal troops for civilian law enforcement unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or Congress. Though the Act had its roots in white Southern lawmakers’ desire to end Reconstruction, it codified the boundaries that have since separated the duties of the U.S. armed forces from those of civilian law enforcement — a foundation of U.S. civil-military relations.

Over the next century, episodes of civil strife, labor protests, campus unrest, and the struggle for civil rights continued to shape debates on how, whether, and why to deploy federal military force domestically. Some interventions, like the Army’s heavy-handed ambush of World War I veterans during the Bonus Army March in 1932, clearly illustrate how hasty and politically charged deployments degrade the chain of command and harm the military’s reputation. Others, including the use of the military to enforce constitutional rights in the South during the Civil Rights era, alternatively demonstrate how the judicious deployment of military personnel can help uphold the rule of law under the most extraordinary of circumstances.

Across generations, the distinct roles of the U.S. military and domestic law enforcement have been acknowledged and respected — and, in most cases, consensus emerged as to the need to reinforce this cornerstone of civil-military relations when missions strayed from this north star. The pattern has been consistent over time: escalations of unrest, disillusionment in the ranks, and politicization of the armed forces are the regrettable outcomes of most military interventions in civilian law enforcement. 

These dynamics conspire to undermine military readiness and, as a result, national security. “By diverting focus and resources away from core national security competencies, domestic military operations frequently result in a degraded security environment,” we write in the report. “Given their vulnerability to autocratic abuse, domestic military interventions in civilian law enforcement necessitate a high degree of skepticism — especially when troop deployments are driven by political considerations rather than as a genuine measure of last resort.” 

Contemporary Examples from Abroad

Skepticism of military policing was deeply ingrained in the Founding Fathers’ generation, born of experience under the heel of British military occupation. This instinct has since informed policymakers and leaders around the world, as other democracies sought to establish similar boundaries between national security and the responsibilities of civilian law enforcement. Aspiring autocrats worldwide have, unsurprisingly, repeatedly tried to collapse this distinction to consolidate power and suppress opposition. 

Even in established democracies, though, political leaders have succumbed to the temptation of deploying military personnel in response to domestic security crises. Although military intervention might be warranted in extraordinary cases when unrest truly overwhelms civilian authorities, escalation, disillusionment, and politicization are the most likely outcomes of domestic deployments that exceed measures of last resort. Once a military is pulled into domestic affairs, its readiness to manage foreign threats is degraded while simultaneously elevating the potential for violence and lawlessness at home.

While these trends can be observed all over the world, a few illustrative examples make the point.

Mexico

Recent Mexican history demonstrates the clear escalatory risks that accompany using the armed forces for civilian law enforcement. In 2006, President Felipe Calderón launched a “war on drugs” to address cartel violence that eventually sent military units across most of Mexico’s states. By the end of his term in 2012, the cartels were by all measures more robust and the public was no safer. But the pattern of escalation continued as Calderón’s successors moved forward with increased domestic troop deployments, peaking under former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador.

Following the military’s domestic interventions, homicides increased along with human rights abuses committed by federal security forces. As we explain in the report, 

These spikes in violence were most pronounced in areas with the highest troop concentrations, where domestic military operations more often resulted in excessive force against civilians — reflecting the fundamental mismatch between the military’s combat training and the de-escalation skills required for civilian policing. Arbitrary arrests, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings rose alongside the military’s expanded policing role.

The reputation of the Mexican armed forces for neutrality and professionalism cratered after its foray into domestic law enforcement, and the country continues to endure significant security challenges from entrenched criminal organizations. 

France

In the aftermath of the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack, France launched Operation Sentinelle which, following a subsequent terror attack in Paris later that year, deployed 10,000 soldiers domestically with the aim of providing a visual deterrence. Military patrols around tourist sites became commonplace –– drawing critics from inside and beyond the military who deemed the operation ineffective and, counterproductively, exposed troops to heightened risk. Though the serious threat of domestic terror at the time warranted a strong response from the state security apparatus, the operation stoked disillusionment and morale problems in the ranks, exacerbated by the mismatch between the military’s combat mission and the responsibilities of internal security. 

Seven years into the still-ongoing operation, 

a government audit concluded that the operation prioritized optics over military utility, echoing concerns that what began as a temporary mission has become a seemingly indefinite fixture of France’s security architecture — compromising operational readiness, force retention, and the military’s external defense responsibilities. 

Brazil

For decades, Brazilian presidents have used troops to combat violent crime in Rio de Janeiro – fostering additional violence in some instances while achieving few long-term security gains. Ordering troops into the nation’s biggest city to appear “tough on crime” is a distinctly political mission, one that by its nature is bound to divide the citizenry against its own armed forces.

President Jair Bolsonaro oversaw the most sweeping expansion of the military’s domestic role since the end of Brazil’s military dictatorship, repeatedly raising the spectre of using the armed forces to resolve political disputes, including with Brazil’s Supreme Court. Bolsonaro’s renewed militarization and side-stepping of norms foreshadowed the near-total breakdown of the civil-military divide at the end of his presidency, when a doomed coup plot to overturn his 2022 presidential election defeat culminated in the January 2023 storming of Brazil’s Congress, Supreme Court, and presidential palace by a mob of his supporters.

“Although the plot failed due to a lack of institutional support from the heads of the army and air force, it exposed the corrosive effects of the military’s years-long intervention in civilian affairs,” we write in the report. “By the time Bolsonaro left office, the military’s expanded internal role politicized the armed forces, while also contributing to steep democratic backsliding and persistent threats to the rule of law.”

The Trump Administration

The abrupt deployment of federalized National Guard and Marines to Los Angeles. Attempted federalization of National Guard in Portland and Chicago. Hybrid deployments in Memphis and New Orleans. Threats to deploy troops to other cities governed by the president’s political opponents. Massive expansion of National Defense Areas to facilitate military assistance with immigration enforcement along the border. The Trump administration’s efforts to deploy the military domestically over the objection of local and state leaders, and for questionable law enforcement purposes, threaten to erode the critical line between the military and domestic policing. 

Thousands of National Guard troops remain deployed in Washington, D.C., where the unique status of the District complicates the rules governing use of the Guard. Plus, the administration has announced plans to deploy thousands more Guardsmen from around the country to D.C. this summer. Yet, independent research confirms the same dynamic commonly observed in other domestic policing missions: the effort has had “no measurable effect on violent crime.” Not only are domestic deployments expensive, but they carry heavy costs for our national interest: an escalated threat of violence and bodily harm to civilians and troops alike, disillusionment in the ranks, and the politicization of the armed forces and accompanying degradation of its capacity to fulfill its primary mission – protecting the national security of the United States.

To their credit, federal courts have taken these issues seriously, affirming a clear and substantial role for judicial review of domestic deployments. In December, the Supreme Court foreclosed the administration from using the novel legal theory it advanced to justify the orders to deploy in Los Angeles, Portland, and Chicago. Indeed, timely judicial orders ensured that no troops were actually deployed in Portland and Chicago. The Supreme Court’s ruling went out of its way to emphasize the Posse Comitatus Act’s general prohibition on military policing. And in Los Angeles, a federal judge ruled that many of the actions taken by deployed troops were, in fact, violations of that long-standing protection. 

A federal judge in D.C. likewise concluded that the D.C. deployment was unlawful, and the government’s appeal of that ruling remains pending before the D.C. Circuit. It’s unclear whether courts elsewhere around the country will be scrutinizing domestic military activity in the coming months, with the administration promising a standing National Guard force ready for “rapid nationwide deployment,” and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth refusing to disavow the possibility of troop deployments during the fall elections. What we do know is that those of us concerned with protecting public safety and upholding national security should remain skeptical of any effort to normalize and expand the military’s domestic footprint, which is doomed to degrade security and threaten the longstanding boundaries governing healthy civil-military relations.

The post A Year Later: The Stakes of Ordering Military Personnel to Police American Streets appeared first on Just Security.

But this story misses the important ways that the executive order marks a continuation of the Trump administration’s preferred mode of governing. Trumpian regulation is premised on broad executive discretion, bypassing ordinary rulemaking procedures and, as far as possible, judicial accountability. Where the coercive power of the federal government is insufficient, Trumpian regulation works by building strategic alliances with self-interested private sector elites. And it is premised on control over the circulation of goods, funds, and information.

These all-too-common regulatory techniques have roots far deeper than the current presidency, but they are particular hallmarks of the second Trump administration’s approach to executive power. And they are all on display in the new AI order. Viewed in this way, the order is not a “pivot” for the Trump administration, but just the latest page in the same playbook.

Coordinated, Voluntary Self-Regulation

The president’s June 2026 order on AI purports to avoid burdensome “top-down” regulation, and instead to work “hand-in-hand with American industry to strike the right balance between innovation and national security.” 

The order accomplishes this goal by adopting a paradigm of voluntary and coordinated industry self-regulation. The word “voluntary” appears twice in the order, both times in its key operative provisions. First, the order establishes an “AI security clearinghouse,” which is meant to foster “voluntary collaboration with the AI industry and operators of critical infrastructure” on software vulnerabilities and their remediation. Second, the order contemplates a “voluntary framework” for the review and sharing of so-called “frontier models”—a bit of tech jargon with its own sketchy origin story.

The order makes clear that it does not create any kind of mandatory licensing or preclearance framework. But the administration could not have lawfully done such a thing without either invoking some existing statutory authority (which the order does not do) or getting Congress to pass a new law. Any attempt to implement such a permitting process, without plausible statutory backing, would be immediately frustrated by the courts. Even a Trump-aligned Supreme Court majority—struggling with its own legitimacy crisis—would not rush to bless a new regulatory process governing a massive and growing industry, if that process lacked even an arguable statutory basis.

But the fact that regulation is “voluntary” does not make it meaningless. Industry frequently commits to voluntary regulations, usually for a range of self-interested reasons. The key, then, is understanding why industry might be drawn into signing up. And, in the second Trump administration, experience tells us to look not at how industry will be restricted, but how both industry and the White House, together, will be empowered by the new order.

The New Security Framework

Perhaps the most important provisions of the order concern the regulatory process for new technology under section 3, framed by the order as “Secure Frontier Model Deployment.” Key elements in this process are undefined or inscrutable, and, as always, it is dangerous to act as if a Trump order makes any kind of clear sense. But an ambitious application of the order would empower the White House, in cooperation with federal agencies and a small set of AI developers, to restructure and control the market for emerging technologies.

The actual contours of the review procedure contemplated by the order are as follows. At an initial stage, the National Security Agency (NSA), in consultation with other agencies, will conduct an “assessment” of “the advanced cyber capabilities” of an AI model under development. On the basis of this assessment, the NSA will “determine” whether the model qualifies as a “covered frontier model.” This assessment and designation will be conducted according to a “benchmarking process.” The details of the process will be “classified,” though the assessments themselves may be shared “with AI developers and researchers as appropriate.” AI developers are also expected to “engage the Federal Government to determine whether model(s) under development” meet the criteria for designation.

The consequences of designation appear to follow a two-step sequence. First, the “Federal Government” will be given access to the model for a 30-day period. The purpose of this 30-day access period is not expressly stated in the order, but press coverage suggests it is “to give officials time to identify and address potential vulnerabilities before they are released publicly.” In the public reporting, the length of this period was said to be a major sticking point, and cutting the time from an originally planned 90 down to 30 days was said to be critical for mollifying industry skepticism.

Second, something happens at the end of that 30-day period, but what happens is not entirely clear. The order expects that AI developers will give designated models to the government 30 days “before they plan to release such models to other trusted partners.” The term “trusted partner” is never defined; the order simply says that developers will “collaborate” with the government to “select trusted partners that will have early access to covered frontier models.” The order also never says how long this “early” access will last, nor does it provide parameters for when and under what terms anyone who is not a “trusted partner” can access the model. Nor is it clear what happens to the government’s access at the end of this 30-day period: presumably, government access could cease, or the developer might agree with the government to extend its access beyond that period. And it is at least possible that the government and a developer might never decide to release a model broadly to the public, keeping the model instead under the control of the government and a few “trusted partners.”

The implications here are stark. The NSA, acting according to a secret procedure, can designate any emerging AI technology as “covered frontier models.” Once designated, the Executive Branch can collaborate with AI developers to keep that model controlled within a circle of “trusted partners,” who may enjoy privileged access for an indefinite period. Suggestions in the press that the order simply provides for a 30-day review period before models are released “to the public” are either mistaken, or they have an idiosyncratic understanding of what the “public” means.

If industry signs up to this procedure, then it provides a mechanism for potentially indefinite control of the market. But that means all this depends on the willing cooperation of industry. So, what’s in it for them? 

Coordinated Regulation in the Chokepoint State

In forthcoming work, I argue that the second Trump administration has consolidated a mode of governing I call the “Chokepoint State.” Political scientists Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, in their landmark study of networked power, describe the “chokepoint effect” as the ability of privileged states to control third parties’ access to crucial nodes in economic or information networks. In the Chokepoint State, I argue, administrative capacity is increasingly arranged around controlling these nodes in order to reward allies, punish enemies, and set rules.

The techniques of the Chokepoint State are not new, but their uptake and proliferation have accelerated under Trump. The AI executive order itself, for example, resembles both Trump and Biden-era chokepoint policies in some ways. By attempting to ring-fence the market for emerging technology, the new executive order reflects the “small yard, high fence” strategy of using export controls to structure the global market for semiconductors. And by offering “early access” to “trusted partners,” the order mimics the Compact for Higher Education’s offer of privileged “access” to federal funding in exchange for accepting new quasi-legal obligations on a wide range of issues. 

The difference, of course, lies in the AI order’s explicitly voluntary nature. U.S. export controls rely on a web of regulations, statutes, and (for a large part of their history) emergency powers that enable the Executive Branch to control foreign commerce under the threat of civil and criminal penalties. The Compact for Higher Education, though formally voluntary, relied on explicit and implicit threats that leveraged the Executive’s power over spending, grantmaking, and visa approvals. Here, the new executive order invokes no statute and disclaims any pretension to impose a “mandatory” regime. 

The order thus shows how voluntary and coordinated self-regulation might work in the Chokepoint State. The leading tech firms, having leveraged billions of dollars on AI, would naturally seek U.S. government protection from forces that would erode their dominant position. Under these conditions, it makes sense for these firms to seek a partnership with the White House. Under the framework of this order, or a similar regulation, the leading firms can establish joint public/private control over advanced AI technology, rebranding industry leaders as “trusted partners,” and entrenching their market and political power.

This perhaps accounts for the muted reaction from AI moguls. OpenAI founder Sam Altman posted a brief positive endorsement on X. And, the same day as the executive order, his company released a nine-page policy paper on the governance of “frontier AI.” The paper diverges from the executive order in many of its details, indicating that Altman & co. view the final shape of the administration’s regulatory process as open to negotiation. 

But the continuities are more striking than the differences. OpenAI’s proposals also imply the existence of a network of U.S.-approved trusted partners. One executive told Politico that OpenAI “plans to push policymakers in Washington to create mandatory evaluation processes for AI companies that develop advanced systems,” adding, “[w]e don’t think any specific lab should be making that decision unilaterally.” As these statements suggest, cooperative, voluntary regulation allows the major players to borrow the legitimacy of the state, positioning themselves as the adults in the room while guarding the door to keep out potential competitors.

In this political-economic context, a process built on ad hoc executive discretion may suit insiders just fine. Regulation by executive order, discretion, and “dealmaking”—often just a euphemism for corruption—is the preferred mode of this administration. And, so long as they are confident of their access and influence, large private-sector players stand to gain more from shaping executive discretion than they might get from comprehensive federal regulation. Converting this process into a mandatory regime would only further lock in these dynamics, leading to what one firm has warned could be “a tiered system” in the market for emerging technology.

Meanwhile, smaller players will struggle to catch up. One of the more insightful analyses produced in the first twenty-four hours after the order came from the law firm A&O Shearman. The authors note the complete absence of criteria for identifying “trusted partners.” And they urge companies to engage “proactively” with relevant agencies to position themselves favorably “for trusted-partner designation.” Although it may be coincidence, it is not shocking that the lawyers at A&O Shearman—one of the firms that capitulated to White House bullying in 2025—know a patronage relationship when they see one.

Beyond rewarding allies and punishing adversaries, the group that controls a chokepoint can also set lasting rules of the road. This is a self-evident purpose of the new executive order. In addition to the secret rules for making “frontier model” designations, the order also expects that the government-review and trusted-partner procedures will be part of a “voluntary framework” that is designed by Treasury and other agencies “with AI developers.” No other group is mentioned. 

The result is that the rules for deciding who gets “early” (likely meaning “privileged and indefinite”) access to state-of-the-art technology will be devised by, and for the benefit of, a small group of self-interested firms and their partners in the administration. And these rules may develop largely outside the procedures required of legislation or administrative rulemaking. 

Beyond State versus Market

These important dynamics are missed and obscured by framing the new order as a step toward “regulation” of AI. And this framing is pervasive. Politico trumpeted the new order with the headline “Trump’s AI order is a blow against laissez-faire,” and quoting such “AI safety hardliners” as Steve Bannon. This framing poses a stark alternative between government “intervention” and a free market in which innovation occurs spontaneously.

But we have never been laissez-faire. The relevant question is not whether regulation takes place, but how a regulatory scheme shapes the distribution of public and private power. By placing significant discretion in the hands of an increasingly unaccountable executive, the Chokepoint State obviously enhances the power of the White House. At the same time, executive leverage over chokepoints can enhance the power of private actors who enjoy privileged access to the Oval Office. 

The latest AI executive order may come to nothing. If anything can be said with certainty about this administration, it’s that a great many Trump initiatives start with a big media splash before dying a quiet and unceremonious death. But by providing a platform for close cooperation between the White House and industry insiders to control access to emerging technology, the order shows off this administration’s predilection for the techniques of the Chokepoint State.

The post AI ‘Regulation’ in the Chokepoint State appeared first on Just Security.

The link between the NBA and the Sudanese people runs through the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a key partner of the NBA and the most influential external actor in Sudan’s war, a conflict that has generated the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. Through its commercial branding deal, the NBA essentially has been coopted onto the UAE’s side in that conflict: The UAE’s state-owned airline, Emirates, is flying high during the playoffs, its branding displayed on top of the backboard, digitally overlaid on the court or surrounding areas, and sewn onto the jerseys of all referees — part of the league’s commercial partnership with the UAE that generates hundreds of millions of dollars per year for the NBA and the airline.

This year’s NBA Championship gives the UAE a bonus boost, as it features the New York Knicks, whose jerseys sport patches reading “Experience Abu Dhabi” (referring to the largest of the UAE emirates). The Knicks rake in $30 million annually from this deal.

These displays feed into the UAE’s economic and diplomatic strategy aimed at creating a national brand of “a visionary, futuristic and forward-looking state.” Its reputation is a source of both significant soft power and economic strength.

Yet the UAE is forward-looking only if dystopia awaits. For it is the chief arms supplier of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary group battling the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) for control of Sudan and its resources. (The UAE denies that it has armed the RSF, despite reams of evidence, including from human rights organizations, U.S. lawmakers, the U.S. intelligence community, the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab, and reporting by the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and Middle East Eye. It cynically touts its humanitarian aid to Sudan, even as it seeks to disguise military assistance to the UAE as humanitarian aid.) The UAE is also a hub for RSF-owned businesses and a safe haven for RSF leaders’ wealth through their real estate investments, as documented in an investigation by the policy organization The Sentry (co-founded by one of us, John).

Both the RSF and the SAF are responsible for mass atrocities, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been key supporters of the SAF. The RSF, though, is also responsible for the most intense period of ethnically motivated murder since the Rwandan genocide more than 30 years ago, killing an estimated 30,000 to 100,000 people in and around El Fasher last year in a matter of weeks, as families were massacred and women raped. “We want to eliminate anything black from Darfur,” RSF fighters declared, according to witnesses interviewed by a U.N. independent fact-finding mission. “If we find Zaghawa [a non-Arab ethnic group in Darfur], we will kill them all.” Far from the RSF’s only series of atrocities, which the United States determined in January 2025 amounted to genocide, this was part of a pattern that began only weeks into the war, which erupted on April 15, 2023, with RSF attacks targeting ethnic Massalit residents of El Geneina, in Darfur, killing 10,000-15,000 people by the end of 2023, according to U.N. expert panel estimates.

Laundering a Reputation Amid Racial and Ethnic Killing

The NBA is thus profiting handsomely and laundering the reputation of a regime that is underwriting a militia responsible for killing people based on their race and ethnicity. And even worse, it is part of an ecosystem of elite global brands that persist with their UAE-reputation-boosting brand partnerships more than three years into the UAE-backed genocide in Sudan. Other brands include the Premier League (UK football/soccer), Formula One (car racing), UCI (bicycle racing), the Ultimate Fighting Championship (mixed martial arts, coming soon to a White House lawn near you, unless a new lawsuit stops it), ATP Tour and Grand Slam tournaments (tennis), DP World Tour (golf), Disney, Warner Brothers, and the Guggenheim. They are promoting the image of the UAE that its regime wants the world to see, deflecting the reputational — and real economic and strategic costs this would impose — that the UAE might otherwise experience.

The NBA cannot say it did not know. For nearly two years, at least, human rights organizations have been raising these concerns with NBA leadership. The response is always a variation on a theme: We are following U.S. State Department guidance. (The State Department under both the Biden and current Trump administrations have determined that the RSF is committing genocide but has not publicly identified the UAE for its role in arming the RSF, nor advised against doing business with the UAE.) In effect, the NBA has chosen to delegate its ethical judgments to the U.S. government.

Yet this is not a league known for blindly following government policy. Silence was not an option for the NBA after George Floyd was murdered. After federal immigration agents killed Renée Good and Alex Pretti in Minnesota earlier this year, the NBA Players Association left no doubt where it stood: with the protesters opposed to an inhumane policy. And the NBA Social Justice Coalition — encompassing NBA executives, players, and coaches — has advocated for changes in law at both national and state levels. Nationally, it has supported the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, the Freedom to Vote Act, the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act, and the EQUAL Act (to end the disparity in sentencing for crack and powder cocaine). At the state level, it has advocated for legislation to help reintegrate people with criminal records into their communities and to restore voting rights to formerly incarcerated individuals. And in 2017, the NBA moved its All-Star game out of Charlotte after North Carolina passed legislation that removed protections against discrimination for LGBTQ+ individuals.

Time and again, the NBA, with players in the lead, has chosen to speak out and to act against injustices. Silence and inaction should not be an option now, not when the NBA is encouraging its fans to use their hard-earned dollars to fly Emirates and experience Abu Dhabi — and in so doing, to fund a regime that is sending weapons it buys to a genocidal militia.

Yet now, though genocide is underway and the NBA is bound up with its supporters, the League has abdicated any moral responsibility regarding the atrocities unfolding in Sudan. It needs to change course. Human rights is not a U.S. government priority in the Middle East, where oil has long been the central consideration. Moreover, U.S. policy on the UAE is now wrapped up in President Donald Trump’s family’s business dealings, most notably a UAE-backed firm’s 49 percent stake in their cryptocurrency company, World Liberty Financial, along with a $2 billion investment in the company’s stablecoin. U.S. State Department guidance in this case will not be driven by human rights concerns.

The NBA’s Own Moral Compass

As an ethical organization, the NBA needs to follow its own moral compass, guided by principles rooted in social justice and its own history of championing human rights and racial justice.

The NBA and the Knicks should immediately suspend their partnerships with the UAE, expressly link those decisions to the UAE’s military support for the RSF, and keep the door open to resuming the partnership if the UAE immediately and verifiably ends this support.

On Oct. 27, 2025, at El-Fasher University, one RSF commander encountered a pregnant woman. How far into her pregnancy was she, he asked, according to two survivors. “Seven months,” she responded. He proceeded to kill her — with seven shots into her abdomen, as if it were one for every month toward a life that would never be. The U.S. government may be content to maintain business as usual with the regime in Abu Dhabi that has done so much to make such inhumanity possible. As it has for decades on other issues of racial and social justice, the NBA can listen to its better angels and make a different choice.

The post The NBA’s Genocide Problem appeared first on Just Security.

A curated guide to major news and developments over the weekend. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR – CEASEFIRE 

Israel struck Beirut’s southern suburbs yesterday, in retaliation for a Hezbollah missile attack on northern Israel, Israeli officials said, adding that the strike targeted a Hezbollah command center in Dahieh. The strike killed at least two people and wounded several others, according to Lebanon’s state news agency. Ebrahim Reazaei, a member of the Iranian parliament’s national security committee, wrote on social media that Iran “will give a decisive and painful response to the Zionist regime’s attack on Dahieh.” Barak Ravid reports for Axios.  

Israel said overnight that Iran launched waves of missiles at Israel in the first such bombardment since the ceasefire took effect in April. Iran’s state broadcaster confirmed the missile launches, citing the Iranian armed forces as saying that “if Israel responds to Iranian attacks or does not stop its attacks on Lebanon, Iranian attacks will continue.” Yemeni Houthis also claimed a missile attack on Israel, saying that Israel-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea are now a target again. Kareem Chehayeb, Samy Magdy, Melanie Lidman, and Cara Anna report for AP News. 

President Trump told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last night not to retaliate against Iran’s missile attack because “we are close to doing something good in terms of a deal,” according to a senior U.S. official and an Israeli source. Trump also told The Financial Times yesterday that Netanyahu “won’t have any choice” but to accept any deal the U.S. secures from negotiations with Iran. “I call the shots. I call the shots. He doesn’t call the shots,” Trump said. Barak Ravid reports for Axios; Edward Luce reports; Parisa Hafezi, Nayera Abdallah, and Steven Scheer report for Reuters.

The Israeli military said this morning that it struck a petrochemical complex in Mahshahr, in southwestern Iran. Iran has closed the airspace around Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport following waves of Israeli attacks. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps threatened to expand its retaliation after Israel struck the petrochemical facilities and said it had fired on a similar Israeli industrial site in the coastal city of Haifa. AP News reports; Sanam Mahoozi reports for the New York Times. 

Trump called for Iran and Israel to immediately stop shooting in a post on social media today. Leo Sands reports for the New York Times. 

IRAN WAR – LEBANON OPERATIONS 

An Israeli strike in southern Lebanon on Saturday killed three Lebanese soldiers, the Lebanese army said. Euan Ward reports for the New York Times. 

The Israeli military has deployed White Phosphorus over populated areas in Lebanon in its battle against Hezbollah, according to experts, aid groups, and visual evidence collected by the New York Times. Distinctive smoke trails from this type of munition were seen as recently as May 30 in Nabatieh, a city of roughly 40,000, in social media footage verified by The Times. Sanjana Varghese reports. 

IRAN WAR – OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 

Recent U.S. intelligence reports say the Pentagon has raised Israel’s counterintelligence threat level to “critical” after concerns that Israeli agencies intensified efforts to spy on U.S. officials and eavesdrop on U.S. negotiations with Iran, including targeting senior figures involved in policy and diplomacy, according to some U.S. officials. Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt report for the New York Times. 

“I didn’t guarantee no war,” Trump said in an interview with NBC recorded on Friday. “Why would I have built the strongest military in the world?” he added. Speaking about the U.S.-Israeli war in Iran, he continued: “So when you say I promised, I didn’t promise anything. I don’t like these endless wars. This is not an endless war. We’ve been doing this for three months.” Katie Rogers reports for the New York Times. 

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR 

Israeli strikes yesterday on a police station and a vehicle in Gaza killed at least nine people and wounded 20 others, health officials said. One strike hit a police post adjacent to a large tent encampment of displaced families in Khan Younis, killing five people and wounding 16 others. Another Israeli airstrike killed four people and wounded four others when it hit a vehicle driving through the middle of Gaza City. Nidal Al-Mughrabi reports for Reuters.  

WEST BANK VIOLENCE 

Israeli forces on Friday killed a Palestinian infant in the occupied West Bank when they opened fire on a car in which the boy and several relatives were traveling, according to members of his family and local health officials. The Israeli military said that an Israeli soldier had opened fire on the car in Hebron after troops “perceived a vehicle accelerating toward them.” Aaron Boxerman reports for the New York Times.  

A Palestinian man with Israeli citizenship yesterday shot and killed a reservist and wounded five other people in central Israel after opening fire in multiple locations, the Israeli police said. Hamas praised the shooting as “heroic,” though it did not claim responsibility. Melanie Lidman reports for AP News; Isabel Kershner reports for the New York Times. 

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR 

Ukraine on Saturday hit a Russian military base and other targets near St. Petersburg using long-range drones. The Russian authorities called the attack “unprecedented”, with Gov. Aleksandr Drozdenko of the Leningrad region announcing that more than 140 drones had been shot down. The Ukrainian drone strike on St. Petersburg was the second such attack in four days. Neil MacFarquhar reports for the New York Times.  

The leaders of the United Kingdom, Ukraine, France, and Germany yesterday discussed the urgent need to increase production of weapons to combat Russia’s powerful hypersonic Oreshnik ballistic missile during a meeting in London. They issued a joint statement, underlining “the urgent need to scale up the production of interceptors and co-develop anti-ballistic missiles and deep strike capabilities.” No details, financial or otherwise, on how this would be done were provided. Pan Pylas reports for AP News.  

A French fighter jet on a NATO mission shot down a drone that entered Latvia’s airspace from Russia today. Andrius Sytas and Janis Laizans report for Reuters

A Ukrainian drone crossed into Moldova early this morning, with fragments of it showing traces of an explosion that were found in a field near the eastern village of Lopatna. “Regardless of the drone’s origin, Russia – which launched an illegal war in the neighbouring country – bears ​responsibility for any unmanned aerial vehicle that enters Moldovan territory,” ​the Moldovan foreign ministry said. Reuters reports.  

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan today declared victory in the parliamentary election, overcoming a pressure campaign by Moscow. Ahead of the election, researchers and officials said Russia-linked groups conducted an unusually intense disinformation campaign aimed at undermining Pashinyan. Paul Sonne reports for the New York Times; Steven Lee Myers reports for the New York Times.  

The U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan yesterday expressed concern over the arrest and detention of women in Herat for allegedly failing to comply with dress requirements. The reported detentions follow a Taliban directive issued last week prohibiting women from appearing in public without what authorities described as a “proper hijab,” according to local media. Reuters reports.  

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vice President JD Vance on Friday blamed the murder of 18-year-old Henry Nowak in the United Kingdom on civilizational decline and the failure to stop the “mass invasion of migrants.” U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s office responded that Nowak’s family did not want his death to be used to create further division or hatred. Deputy Prime Minister David Lammy said he spoke to Vance on Saturday to clarify that Nowak’s death had nothing to do with mass migration. Kate Holton and Andrew Macaskill report for Reuters; Pan Pylas reports for AP News.  

The White House is considering a plan to buy the Chagos Islands from Mauritius, sources told the Telegraph. According to the report, U.S. officials have drawn up a proposal to bypass the United Kingdom and make their own deal to take control of Diego Garcia. Reuters reports; Connor Stringer and Tony Diver report. 

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

Illinois Gov. JB Pritzker (D) on Friday halted new state tax incentive agreements for data centers after lawmakers failed to approve a legislative pause. Shia Kapos reports for POLITICO. 

The Los Angeles U.S. attorney’s office said on Friday it has opened “multiple election fraud investigations,” claiming the California election system has “serious structural vulnerabilities.” The announcement followed Trump’s criticism on Thursday of the state’s lengthy ballot-counting system. Jeremy Roebuck and Arelis R. Hernandez report for the Washington Post.  

“There was a thumb on the scale for the president’s version of events that I felt was a level of political influence that I had never seen in 37 years at CBS News,” Scott Pelley said yesterday in his first sit-down interview since he was fired last week. Pelley alleged that CBS News Editor-in-Chief Bari Weiss intervened in a 60 Minutes report about the deaths of Renée Good and Alex Pretti in Minneapolis, pushing for protesters to be portrayed as more violent and for details about Good’s actions toward an officer to be emphasized. Adeel Hassan reports for the New York Times.  

David Rush, a CIA employee who was recently found with $40 million of gold bars in his house, had created a secret intelligence program to funnel millions of dollars from the federal government to himself, according to two U.S. officials. Julian E. Barnes and Edward Wong report for the New York Times. 

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

Sriram Krishnan has informed administration officials that he plans to leave his post as the White House senior policy adviser for AI to start an outside institution focused on technology policy, according to a source. Cat Zakrzewski reports for the Washington Post.  

Trump said on Friday that he believes the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is too bloated, and has tasked acting Director Bill Pulte with overseeing staffing cuts. The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump suggested prioritizing firing staff who served under the Biden and Obama administrations. Aaron Pellish reports for POLITICO; Brian Schwartz reports. 

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION  

A federal judge on Friday invalidated policies the Trump administration enacted last year that halted asylum grants and the processing of immigration benefits for people from 39 countries. Zach Montague and Madeleine Ngo report for the New York Times. 

A political activist and Vietnam veteran filed a lawsuit on Saturday challenging Trump’s planned “night of cage fights” at the White House as part of the celebration of the country’s 250th anniversary. The lawsuit argues that Trump unlawfully authorized the use of federal property for a private, profit-making spectacle that benefits U.F.C. executives and himself as an investor in the company’s parent organization. Zach Montague reports for the New York Times.

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions.

If you enjoy listening, Just Security’s analytic articles are also available in audio form on the justsecurity.org website.

ICYMI: Last Week on Just Security

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We were both set to attend, with rapidly approaching flights, when the decision came just eight days before the planned start. Many others had already traveled to Zambia, meeting with partners and laying the groundwork for what promised to be an important exchange of ideas on how to advance human rights in a world where so much of life exists in the digital sphere.

In reality, however, perhaps human rights and pro-democracy supporters shouldn’t have been surprised. Although the Zambian government cited non-specific administrative and security clearances and “key thematic” concerns, the host organization, Access Now, released a statement on May 1, saying its leaders “believe foreign interference is the reason RightsCon 2026 won’t proceed in Zambia or online.“ The statement said they were told informally that, in order for the conference to proceed, they “would have to moderate specific topics and exclude communities at risk, including our Taiwanese participants, from in-person and online participation.”

Clearly Chinese pressure had come to bear, given Zambia’s deep dependence on trade with China and on its economic investments. But the cancellation of a human rights conference for the audacity of having human rights themes is part of a broader backwards slide towards authoritarianism by the government in Lusaka. The United States under the Biden administration had hailed Zambia as a democratic darling and showered its government and economy with significant support. This belief was embodied within the country’s charismatic new president, Hakainde Hichilema, who had been a political prisoner under the previous regime and pledged to focus on education and expand decentralization to improve development outcomes. He had even taken some steps in that direction.

But the intense personalization of diplomacy and aid relations with countries in transition has long caught donor countries unaware when their partners prove fallible. The history of such dynamics holds an important lesson: that democratic reform is uneven and can often resemble the adage of “two steps forward and one step back.” Highlighting only the positive while ignoring the negative makes it all the easier for the detrimental behavior to continue and expand. Countries and individuals involved in democracy promotion need to take to heart the dangers of lionizing individual leaders without a backup plan should relations sour.

Hichilema’s Promising Emergence

Hichilema’s August 2021 election victory was his sixth attempt at the presidency. Born in a rural southern town and raised herding cattle, he had built a career as a private investor before entering politics in 2006 as leader of the United Party for National Development (UPND). Repeatedly detained by police on dubious grounds and arrested in 2017 on treason charges, Hichilema was released only after the Commonwealth — the voluntary association of 56 mostly former British colonies — pressed the government of then-President Edgar Lungu for his release. By 2021, he had become the most consequential opposition figure in Zambia’s post-independence history.

The 2021 election campaign unfolded against serious institutional manipulation by Lungu, including a recompiled voter register that critics saw as gerrymandered, a failed push for constitutional amendments that would have expanded executive power, and social media restrictions on polling day. Given Hichilema’s significant margin of victory — 59 percent — and reported diplomatic pressure from the United States and others behind the scenes, Lungu ultimately conceded. Voter turnout that August had reached a 16-year high and opposition activists across the continent hailed the outcome as proof that sustained democratic opposition can dislodge even deeply entrenched incumbents.

Hichilema entered office days later, inheriting an economy that had contracted 3.1 percent in 2020, with a total national debt of nearly $27 billion, and the ignominy of being the first African country to default on its external debt during the COVID-19 pandemic. In his inauguration speech, he declared a “New Dawn,” a phrase deliberately chosen to signal a clean break from what he characterized as the brutality and democratic decay of the Lungu years. It was a slogan his government would continue to apply to itself in official communications for years afterward.

A Warm Embrace from the United States

Few bilateral relationships under the Biden administration were cultivated with as much enthusiasm as the one with Hichilema’s Zambia. Washington saw in the “New Dawn” exactly the kind of democratic renewal it wanted to hold up as a model for Africa, especially against the backdrop of one of the Biden administration’s priority themes – strengthening democracy, including via its Summit for Democracy gatherings. Samantha Power, President Joe Biden’s administrator for the U.S. Agency for International Development, spoke with Hichilema days after the Zambia vote, pledging partnership. The following month, Hichilema met then-Vice President Kamala Harris at the White House. The next month, Secretary of State Antony Blinken called Zambia’s commitment to democratic ideals “an inspiration to all seeking freedom, prosperity, and justice.” The Biden administration soon pledged $23 million in new aid to strengthen civil liberties, governance, and economic growth.

The strategic architecture of the U.S. relationship with Zambia rapidly grew more elaborate. The State Department’s Integrated Country Strategy, approved in April 2022, characterized the moment as the best opening in a generation to partner with a Zambian leader aligned on shared democratic principles. The strategy set an explicit ambition of ensuring that the United States would be Zambia’s preferred partner country, with the implicit claim that the main competitor was China. When USAID launched its Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal in September 2022, Zambia was one of eight designated focus countries, making it eligible under two programs, the Partnerships for Democratic Development and Democracy Delivers, and layering substantial new governance and civil society funding on top of an already large bilateral portfolio.

The Biden administration then heavily supported Zambia to serve as a co-host of the second Summit for Democracy in March 2023, casting Hichilema on the world stage as a peer democratic leader and regional model. Total U.S. government support reached an estimated $600 million annually, even as the Zambian government’s failure to curb theft of medicines and medical supplies prompted a cut of $50 million in 2025. The overall funding was anchored by a commitment from the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), begun under President George W. Bush, which had exceeded $5.85 billion for Zambia since 2004 and was on track to achieve control of the country’s HIV epidemic by 2023. When a severe drought struck in 2024, USAID provided an additional $66.8 million in humanitarian and food security assistance.

The Reform Narrative Frays

But as the medicine theft case illustrated, the U.S. enthusiasm ran well ahead of the evidence of reform that Hichilema had promised, and the volume of assistance outpaced the capacity to use it well. As an Africa specialist at USAID for 15 years, it could be painful to see the accumulation of presidential initiatives in one country create as many headaches as opportunities: rationalizing competing priorities, moving money from Washington to the field, structuring agreements with partners, and capturing meaningful results were persistent challenges wherever multiple funding streams converged. Zambia was not unique in this regard, but the volume and pace of funding that flowed its way made it an acute case.

Meanwhile the hoped-for democratic transformation in Zambia justifying the U.S. investment was failing to materialize. Although Hichilema in December 2022 repealed the colonial-era defamation law that had penalized criticism of the president and approved the Access to Information Act in January 2024, aimed at transparency, his government actually grew increasingly intolerant of dissent. In April 2025, Parliament enacted the Cyber Security Act and Cyber Crimes Act, which civil society organizations argued posed sweeping threats to privacy and freedom of expression. Senior opposition leaders were charged with espionage for criticizing Hichilema in a foreign documentary, dozens of legislators were suspended for procedural protests, and anti-corruption prosecutions fell predominantly on opposition-aligned figures. Press freedom surveys found a substantial majority of Zambian journalists reporting deteriorating conditions. The U.S. Embassy in Zambia itself issued an advisory warning U.S. citizens that they could be subject to surveillance under the new cyber laws, an awkward posture for Washington given it had so publicly championed the country’s democratic emergence.

Whether any of this would have prompted a serious reckoning from Washington ahead of Hichilema’s bid for a third term this August is a question the Trump administration’s dismantling of the assistance relationship has made unanswerable. The Biden administration’s democracy agenda was built on bets on charismatic leaders at moments of genuine democratic opening that did not always account for how quickly reformist momentum can stall, how limited U.S. leverage becomes once overtures turn into a full embrace, and how hard it is to help partner countries build durable institutions with U.S. budget and programming cycles measured in fiscal years. Those shortcomings are worth remembering, because the next democratic opening will come, and the question of how to support it without overselling it will matter just as much.

Picking Winners and the Nature of Democratization

The pattern of picking winners predates the Biden administration. When Ethiopia’s Hailemariam Desalegn resigned in February 2018 under pressure from years of street protests, his successor Abiy Ahmed arrived touting extraordinary promises. Appointed rather than elected, Abiy moved fast: releasing political prisoners, lifting the state of emergency, inviting exiled opposition and media back, appointing women to half his cabinet, and concluding a peace deal with Eritrea that earned him the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. Washington invested heavily in justice reform, electoral institution-building, and civil society support, while continuing to protest that Abiy’s replacement for the notorious 2009 NGO law — which had decimated independent civil society — retained worrying supervisory powers and left the operating environment more constrained than donors had hoped. Then in November 2020, fighting broke out in Tigray, escalating into a civil war in which Ethiopian federal forces, Eritrean troops, and Amhara regional militias perpetrated mass atrocities and sexual violence on a catastrophic scale. The United States took far too long to call it what it was.

The world is experiencing a two decade-long negative trend for democracy and freedom, but that does not mean there are not positive stories. According to V-Dem, a global dataset on democracy, 18 countries show positive trends towards democratization, including eight simply moving in the right direction and 10 in the midst of U-turns. The 10 had been democratic, moved towards authoritarianism, and now are moving back towards democracy. The U-turn dataset cautiously includes Zambia, saying it is an “illustrative case of how fragile U-turns can be.” And the annual report was released before Peter Magyar’s victory over Prime Minister Viktor Orban in Hungary, potentially putting that country back on a more democratic path, too.

Most importantly, as the V-Dem report notes, when countries seek to turn back in the direction of democracy after experiencing autocracy, there is a high success rate of becoming a consolidated democracy. These countries are geographically and contextually diverse, including small island nations such as Fiji, Sri Lanka, and the Solomon Islands, developed economies such as Thailand and Poland, and the major power Brazil. They are in regions across the globe, spanning from Latin America to East Asia, with every region in between.

This diversity also means diverse partners for development and democratization. The United States, traditionally the world’s largest donor and supporter of democracy programming, has virtually eliminated its support for such movements under the Trump administration, potentially even aiming to undermine them as it shifts support to far-right movements instead.

However, even when it was the primary source of resources and diplomatic support, the United States never stood alone in its support for freedom and democracy. Australia, for example, provides key diplomatic and development support for budding democracies, in particular in the Indo-Pacific, including Timor-Leste, a state V-Dem describes as “consistently improving on democracy since [2001].” The European Union is already discussing re-starting support to Hungary as that country aims to reorient towards democracy, and an EU accession treaty is being drafted for Montenegro, another of V-Dem’s democratizing states, and may include language that could lead to the loss of EU funds in the event of democratic backsliding.

Further, a recent proposal coming from former Prime Minister of Denmark and Secretary-General of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen would create a “D7,” attempting to aggregate and multiply the support for democracies by six countries and the European Union. Even with a recalcitrant United States, other countries will continue to provide support for greater freedom, democracy, and human rights.

As some countries and regional bodies work to support budding democratic movements, it is important that they heed the lessons Zambia demonstrates. Democratization is not a linear process. Providing support for a new democracy and celebrating the steps forward while also strongly calling out backsliding, and working together to avoid a resurgence of authoritarianism is vital for the entire enterprise. While it may be tempting to support a charismatic leader through thick and thin, especially one who has seen the worst authoritarianism has to offer — as Zambia’s Hichilema did inside a jail cell — it ultimately does no favors for a country’s people who crave democracy and accountability.

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The clause that matters most in the Executive Order is buried in Section 3(c). Nothing in the order, it says, authorizes “mandatory governmental licensing, preclearance, or permitting” for developing or releasing AI models. In effect, the order slams the door on the idea that had been circulating in Washington for weeks: an FDA for AI. 

And yet, the same section does something that it seems designed to disclaim. It builds the scaffolding that a workable mandatory regime would need: a government benchmark that can actually measure when a model has crossed a dangerous threshold, specifically in the cybersecurity domain. This is a sturdy foundation for frontier model review, but one that is undermined by the administration’s unwillingness to make it binding.

The idea of a mandatory pre-deployment review for frontier AI models gained real traction by spring of this year. Kevin Hassett, the National Economic Council director, floated vetting new AI models before release “just like an FDA drug”— echoing a proposal made by the NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights Director, Mike Posner, whom I work for, and a number of others. But neither the draft Trump pulled hours before its May signing ceremony—over concerns that it could slow American firms racing to compete with China’s AI sector—nor the version he signed this week made the pre-deployment framework mandatory. What changed between them was a matter of degree in terms of the time period allotted for pre-deployment review—the review window was cut from 90 days to 30 in section 3(b)(ii)—plus the addition of the explicit clause in section 3(c) disclaiming the creation of a mandate.

Admittedly, the FDA model is not a perfect fit for frontier AI, the most powerful, large-scale models at the cutting edge of technology. Scientists can test a discrete drug compound with a known formula. With AI, the underlying system—the billions of numerical parameters, called “weights,” that encode what the model has learned—behaves differently depending on fine-tuning, how users interact with it (including malicious “prompt injections”), and what other systems it connects to online. Many of the potential harms flowing from frontier AI are still unknown, and the tests (or “benchmarks”) to measure whether a model causes harm are contested and underdeveloped in some domains.

But there is one category of harm where benchmarks are more advanced and can feasibly be developed: cybersecurity. Determining whether a model can find and exploit a software vulnerability is a relatively objective question. The vulnerability either exists and the model exploits it, or it doesn’t. That is precisely the kind of testable criterion on which a regulatory threshold can be built, and is far less contested than whether a model could help build a bioweapon or promote self-harm, for example. 

Cybersecurity is the area that Trump’s order is explicitly built around. It instructs the National Security Agency (NSA), working with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Treasury Department, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), to develop “a classified benchmarking process to assess the advanced cyber capabilities of AI models” and to set the threshold at which a model becomes a “covered frontier model,” which makes it subject to pre-release government review. That, in itself, is a worthwhile endeavor. The Trump order’s main flaw is its failure to make this pre-deployment regime mandatory. 

A voluntary regime cannot do the one thing a safety regime exists to do: bind the developer who would rather not be bound. The labs cooperating today seem inclined to do so for now. A voluntary framework reaches them but is silent on what to do with a lab that is reckless, controlled by a foreign adversary, or simply changes its mind on the value of cooperation with the U.S. government down the road.  

Public assurance is only as strong as its ability to bind actors who will not voluntarily opt in, or ones who might opt in today but not tomorrow. The difficulty of benchmarking a model’s capabilities, and in turn the risks it poses, is what makes mandatory pre-approval seem unworkable. In the area of cybersecurity, this order quietly solves that problem. What remains is not a technical obstacle but a political choice. The administration has drawn the right map but stopped at the trailhead.

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These Naval officers had already been selected by a lawfully constituted selection board of senior admirals through one of the most competitive processes in the U.S. military. The removals raise serious legal questions: Did Secretary Hegseth comply with the law and his own delegated authority from the President when he removed these individuals?  

While there are more questions than answers swirling around the legal basis underpinning the removal, Hegseth’s actions undermine the Selection Board process and send an unmistakable signal that support for diversity initiatives, if not the diversity of the candidates themselves, will carry professional consequences. There are three initial points worth making. 

First, removal of an officer selected for promotion is fundamentally different from the firing or reassigning of officers that have already been promoted. The Secretary of Defense’s removal authority is constrained by both statute and the Pentagon’s own governing instructions.

Second, Congress has entrusted the promotion selection board process largely to the respective Secretaries of the Military Departments, not the Secretary of Defense. And the Acting Secretary of the Navy had already certified that these officers are qualified. 

Third, the decision to remove the nine officers likely constitutes an agency action within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). This opens the door for potential judicial review of Hegseth’s decision or other administrative remedies.  To be sure, courts often defer to the military when making personnel decisions. Nevertheless, the removal of names from a promotion list likely constitutes agency action reviewable under the APA when plaintiffs allege that statutory procedures were ignored or officials acted beyond their delegated authority.

How Are Navy Promotion Boards Organized?

Navy promotion boards and appointments are governed by the Constitution, federal statutes, and Navy and DOD instructions. The appointment of officers to the next rank is a time-honored process spelled out in the Constitution’s Appointment Clause. The President possesses the constitutional power to appoint officers to the next rank, subject to the Senate’s advice and consent. In an effort to create stable and predictable military career paths, Congress passed the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) in 1980, setting up formal promotion gates for when officers are in-zone for promotion. Congress followed up in 1986 with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which provided more detail on officer qualifications as part of the promotion criteria.

For flag officer promotions in the Navy, Congress directs the Secretary of the Navy to appoint the members of the promotion board and to convene selection boards. Each promotion board is governed by two key documents—a Convening Order and a Precept – which establish the key criteria for promotion and the standard that the Selection Board must apply. The Convening Order establishes a “best and fully qualified” standard for promotion to the next rank, and includes equal opportunity guidance to the Selection Board. 

While the Precept (which includes Board membership) and Convening Orders for the O-7 promotion board have not yet been released, Selection Boards include equal opportunity language to ensure that the Board is applying the same Selection Board standard for all officers before the Board. This language is specifically included to “ensure that officers of every race, religion, color, sex (including pregnancy), sexual orientation, and national origin are given fair and equitable consideration.” While the membership of the one-star admiral board in question has also not been released, by statute Selection Board members “shall represent the diverse population of the armed force concerned to the extent practicable.”  

The currently available facts do not conclusively or otherwise establish discriminatory intent, but the demographic makeup of those removed and Hegseth’s prior public statements would become relevant evidence in any litigation challenging the removals. For example, Hegseth has publicly made several statements disparaging diversity in the military. Five days before then-President-Elect Trump announced he would nominate Hegseth for the post, Hegseth stated, “We should not have women in combat roles. It hasn’t made us more effective.” In April 2025, Hegseth ordered a review of all military equal opportunity programs, stating that the systems have been “weaponized” and used “in bad faith to retaliate against superiors or peers.” What’s more, Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island recently pointed out that nearly 60 percent of the senior officers that Hegseth has fired are female or Black even though women and minorities currently account for just 20 percent of all generals and admirals. 

The Selection Board equal opportunity language is directly relevant here: if Hegseth’s removals were motivated by the race or gender of the officers involved, those actions would violate the very standard the board was instructed to apply. And the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to apply the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause to the military. For example, Frontiero v. Richardson established that military personnel discrimination on the basis of sex is subject to searching judicial review. 

What Happens During the Selection Board?

It is hard to overstate the seriousness with which each military service treats each Selection Board. Each Member reads the Precept and Convening Order, and each member of a selection board swears that he or she will perform his or her duties as a member of the board without prejudice or partiality. To ensure frank and open discussion of the merits of each officer, Congress mandates that the proceedings of the board are not disclosed. For the Navy admiral board, membership is governed by 10 U.S.C. § 612, which requires that all board members be officers of the same armed force serving in a grade higher than the officers under consideration. Navy flag officer selection boards are among the most tightly controlled and competitive proceedings in the federal government. Congress has taken care to design a system to insulate promotion decisions from political influence. 

The stakes could not be higher. Only one in twenty officers is selected for promotion to admiral – the culmination of decades of military service marked by enormous personal sacrifice and hardship, including extended deployments away from family, combat tours, and the physical and mental demands of a career in uniform. Each officer who reaches this milestone has already survived one of the most competitive professional gauntlets in the federal government. Each deserves a fair and honest assessment of their fitness for the next rank.  This assessment must be grounded in merit, governed by law, and insulated from the kind of political interference that the Selection Board system was specifically designed to prevent.

What Happens After the Selection Board Selects Officers for Promotion?

We wait. Once the board completes its work, the promotion list does not become public immediately. The promotion list works its way through a series of legal reviews to ensure that the selection board was properly constituted, that each member was qualified to serve, and that no disqualifying adverse information has emerged since the board convened. Under the governing Pentagon instruction, the Secretary of the Navy must certify that each officer on the list is mentally, physically, morally, and professionally qualified for promotion before the list is forwarded to the Secretary of Defense and ultimately transmitted to the President for nomination and to the Senate for advice and consent under the Appointments Clause. The list for this cycle was released publicly on May 22, 2026—but only after Hegseth had already intervened to remove nine names. The result is a slate of 22 nominees, none of whom are women.

Can Secretary Hegseth Lawfully Remove These Officers?

Not necessarily. Right now there are more questions than answers governing whether Hegseth lawfully used a delegated authority and whether the removals themselves complied with applicable administrative law and equal protection law. 

First, under 10 U.S.C. § 629, Congress empowers the President, not the Secretary of Defense, with removal authority. The statute does not itself spell out specific criteria, though the Pentagon’s own implementing instructions contemplate somewhat narrow grounds. By a 1982 executive order, the President has delegated removal authority to the Secretary of Defense, but only for grades below flag or general officer (colonel or captain or below). For the one-star admiral promotions at issue here, the President has apparently not delegated removal authority to Hegseth. 

So a fundamental question is not just whether Secretary Hegseth had a sound legal basis to remove the officers, but whether he possessed the authority to do so at all. Absent a presidential directive, approval, or subsequent ratification, an action taken beyond the scope of delegated authority may be legally invalid regardless of its substantive justification.

This raises the question—did Hegseth recommend to the president that the selected officers be removed, or did he remove them unilaterally, contrary to the executive order and statute? If Hegseth removed these names without presidential direction or further delegation, that removal may be void on its face. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 629, the President is required to “notify the congressional defense committees not later than 30 days after removing the name of an officer from such list for any reason other than misconduct.” The U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services should closely scrutinize the removal justification to ensure that it complies with governing statutes and regulations. 

Second, while the Secretary of Defense has enormous leeway in firing officers from existing positions—an authority Hegseth has exercised with extraordinary frequency—that authority does not necessarily extend without limit to removing officers from a promotion list. Indeed, removal from a promotion list is a different matter governed by different rules entirely. Under the Pentagon’s own regulations, the contemplated grounds for withholding or removing an officer appear narrow: a procedural deficiency in the board itself, the emergence of new adverse information not previously before the board, or a determination that the officer is no longer mentally, physically, morally, or professionally qualified for promotion. 

The governing Pentagon instruction focuses primarily on how to handle “adverse and reportable information” or the opening of a new investigation against an officer. The classic example is when a new DoD IG investigation has been opened — a detail that may not have been known to the Selection Board when it convened. Pentagon instructions provide great detail on how that information should be handled, balancing the needs of the military service with the due process rights of the affected officer. Of note, adverse information does not include minor infractions such as speeding tickets. It does encompass information “derogatory, unfavorable, or of a nature that reflects clearly unacceptable conduct, integrity, or judgment on the part of the individual.” Furthermore, adverse information does not include information that is over 10 years old.  

According to the New York Times, one particularly accomplished female naval officer (a surface warfare officer who had completed the prestigious nuclear power school) was removed from the admiral list. Her wrongdoing?  She served as a “diversity liaison officer” 20 years ago to help the Navy recruit women and minorities. Such efforts helped lead to the remarkable success of the Army’s all-female Cultural Support Team in Afghanistan, which provided valuable intelligence to American special operations forces who were prohibited from speaking to Afghan females. The success of this initiative was trumpeted by Hegseth’s former employer (Fox News) and helped open the door for women to serve in combat roles.  Under any coherent reading of DoDI 1320.04, diversity recruitment two decades ago is not adverse information. Hegseth appears to be treating it as disqualifying anyway — while the instruction’s actual adverse information standard seems to go unapplied.

If sued, the DOD will counter that the regulations provide a non-exhaustive list, and 10 U.S.C. § 629 does not specify the legal grounds for the removal. Regardless, Hegseth is required to notify both Congress and the affected officers of their removal from the promotion list—requirements codified in statute and Navy instruction. In doing so, he should clarify the specific legal basis for the removal action and the specific legal authority to take such action. 

Are Legal Remedies Available for the Affected Officers?

Yes. The Department of Defense is an agency within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, and the removal of the officer’s name likely constitutes an agency action within the meaning of administrative law. The government may argue that promotion-list removals are inseparable from the President’s constitutional appointments authority and therefore not subject to ordinary APA review. But where plaintiffs allege that executive officials acted beyond statutory or delegated authority, courts have been willing to examine the legality of the process employed.

The removed officers appear to have a strong case that the decision to remove their names was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” under the APA. Beyond the statutory requirements, the governing instructions and longstanding agency practice constitute the administrative record, which cannot be ignored. In addition, the officers may have equal protection and substantive due process claims discussed earlier. Troublingly, neither the Pentagon nor the White House has offered any explanation grounded in the regulatory criteria, and no misconduct allegations have been made against the removed officers.

What’s more, the Secretary of the Navy has already certified that officers identified in personnel actions are mentally, physically, morally, and professionally qualified for promotion or appointment. What about the administrative record has changed since that certification? The notion that something significant has changed to countermand the Secretary of the Navy for so many officers strains credulity. The Navy’s experience is consistent with a troubling pattern of undermining the judgment of each Service Secretary.  Hegseth and Army Secretary Dan Driscoll were in loggerheads over an analogous promotion issue last month. 

Finally, Congress has already established a parallel administrative remedy that is independent of the Secretary of Defense. The Board for Correction of Naval Records (BCNR) has statutory authority under 10 U.S.C. § 1552 to change any military record when necessary to correct an error or injustice. A removed officer could petition the BCNR to restore their name to the promotion list, and the BCNR could recommend corrective action to the Secretary of the Navy. Federal case law has upheld the broad authority of these administrative correction boards to effectuate lawful promotions to “correct an error or remove an injustice.” Given that the Secretary of the Navy had already certified these officers as qualified for promotion, any such petition would rest on a strong foundation.

Where Do We Go From Here?

Congress and the military departments have constructed the selection board system with meticulous care precisely to insulate promotion decisions from political influence. The system requires sworn board members, written precepts, independent legal review, service secretary certification, and Senate confirmation. Hegseth’s attempt to remove nine officers raises serious questions about whether he is lawfully and legitimately exercising his delegated authority and whether the removals themselves complied with the Equal Protection Clause. The pattern here—Army officers in March, then Air Force officers, and now Navy officers—suggests a systematic effort that raises concerns that promotion decisions are becoming increasingly influenced by political considerations.

Congress should demand a full accounting. The Senate Armed Services Committee has the authority to require the administration to identify, on the record, the specific regulatory basis for each removal. Congress should seek clarity not only about the reasons for the removals, but also about who actually made the decision. Alternatively, Congress could amend 10 U.S.C. § 629 to specify the legal standard for removal of selected officers while making clear that this authority may not be further delegated by the President.  Congress is in the middle of marking up the Fiscal Year 2027 defense spending bill, thus providing a legislative vehicle to amend the removal authority.  If the removals originated with the Secretary of Defense, the administration should identify the source of legal authority permitting him to act; if the decision was made by the President, the administration should say so explicitly.

The removed officers have viable legal paths forward through the courts or the BCNR. A reviewing court may ultimately decide the question of whether Hegseth’s removals were arbitrary and capricious under the APA, or motivated by impermissible considerations of race or sex. Regardless of how and whether litigation unfolds, the promotion board system has for decades been one of the military’s most reliable mechanisms for keeping politics out of the officer corps. If that system can be overridden by a Secretary of Defense invoking no stated legal authority, the entire system is materially undermined. 

Conclusion

The legal questions raised by these removals ultimately extend far beyond the careers of the officers involved. At stake is whether Congress’s carefully constructed promotion system can continue to serve its core purpose: ensuring that advancement to the military’s highest ranks is based on professional merit and lawful process rather than shifting political preferences. If the governing rules can be disregarded without explanation, confidence in the integrity and independence of the officer promotion system will inevitably and substantially erode.

The post Can the Secretary of Defense Remove Admirals from a Promotion List? appeared first on Just Security.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR – LEBANON OPERATIONS 

Israeli airstrikes and Hezbollah rocket and drone attacks in southern Lebanon continued yesterday, despite the announcement of the latest ceasefire agreement. Hezbollah’s leader, Naim Qassem, rejected the U.S.-brokered agreement yesterday, saying it amounted to a demand that his group surrender while Israel continued its offensive. “As long as the occupation continues, the resistance will continue,” Qassem said. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz later said he would not withdraw Israel’s forces or halt operations in Lebanon. In ​Washington, President Trump told reporters he believed progress was being made in Lebanon and the country deserved to have peace, adding, “It’s been going on for a ​long time, you know.” Euan Ward reports for the New York Times; Jana Choukeir and Laila Bassam report for Reuters.  

The majority of House Democrats voted with Republicans yesterday to defeat a Lebanon war powers resolution forced to the floor by Rep. Rashida Tlaib (D-MI). The House voted 92 to 324 against Tlaib’s resolution, which would have directed Trump to remove all U.S. armed forces from Lebanon within seven days of passage. House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY) came out against the resolution ahead of the vote, saying “there are no U.S. service members involved in combat operations or hostilities in Lebanon.” Andrew Solender reports for Axios. 

IRAN WAR – OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 

The first report from the International Atomic Energy Agency since the U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran began in February found little change in its assessment of Iran’s nuclear programme, but reiterated concerns that Iran has not accounted for its stockpiles of enriched uranium and has denied inspectors access to key nuclear sites for nearly a year, according to a copy seen by Reuters. Reuters reports.  

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy yesterday published an open letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin. The letter offered to resume peace talks, but also taunted Putin over wartime setbacks such as inflation and Russia’s dependence on China. Zelenskyy said he would meet for direct talks outside the Trump administration’s negotiating process, suggesting the inclusion of European nations and holding a leaders’ meeting in Switzerland, Turkey, or an Arab state. Andrew E. Kramer reports for the New York Times.  

Putin said yesterday that Russia will strengthen its air defenses to counter recent Ukrainian drone attacks, which have reached deep into Russia. “To our regret, some of them break through,” Putin said. “Russia has an air defense system, we need to improve it, strengthen it, and we will do that.” James Jordan and Harriet Morris report for AP News.  

Ukrainian forces are using images from commercial satellites operated by Colorado-based Vantor to make real-time battle decisions. The rapid delivery to soldiers of geospatial intelligence has shortened the time it takes to locate and strike Russian assets by as much as 90%, according to sources. Heather Somerville reports for the Wall Street Journal.  

The House of Representatives yesterday passed a bill providing $1.3 billion in military aid to Ukraine and expanding sanctions on Russia, with 18 republicans joining Democrats in a 226-195 vote. Connor O’Brien reports for POLITICO.  

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

China’s State Council this week announced new rules requiring national security screening for Chinese companies seeking to invest overseas. Alexandra Stevenson and Murphy Zhao report for the New York Times. 

Somali government forces and opposition fighters yesterday exchanged heavy gunfire in Mogadishu, as a row over delays to elections has escalated. Tensions have built since an announcement last month by opposition leaders that they would lead demonstrations on Thursday to protest what they said was an illegal extension of the president’s term in office. Abdishukri Haybe and Basillioh Rukanga report for BBC News; Hussein Mohamed and Matthew Mpoke Bigg report for the New York Times.  

U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer yesterday called on Elon Musk to stop interfering in British politics, after Musk posted on his platform about the murder of Henry Nowak, which has triggered a public outcry and protests. Musk had posted about the case on X, suggesting ‌police are ⁠biased against white people. Alistair Smouth reports for Reuters.  

The international body overseeing Bosnia’s peace process yesterday failed to agree on a candidate for a new envoy to replace Germany’s Christian Schmidt. Daria Sito-Sucic reports for Reuters. 

Thousands of Albanians are protesting a luxury resort slated for the Albanian coastline and backed by Trump’s daughter, Ivanka Trump, and her husband, Jared Kushner. The protests, raising concerns about conservation, transparency, and the project’s ties to the Trump family, began Sunday, after heavy machinery began working on the project. In an interview, Ivanka Trump spoke about the project at length, calling it “the culmination of all of my experience in real estate.” Fjori Sinoruka and Sammy Westfall report for the Washington Post. 

TECH DEVELOPMENTS 

AI development is moving so rapidly that soon it will be able to advance itself without human involvement, according to a new blog post from Anthropic. “Recursive self-improvement,” a process in which AI systems build, test and improve themselves, is a phenomenon which may come sooner than expected, Anthropic says its research shows. Anthropic added that the ability to slow global AI development would “likely be a good thing” in its blog post. Ashley Gold reports for Axios; Bradley Olson and Sam Schechner report for the Wall Street Journal. 

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The U.S. designation of Brazil’s Commando Vermelho and Primeiro Commando da Capital as foreign terrorist organizations could disrupt cooperation against drug and arms trafficking, Brazilian sources said. Two officials said the move may halt daily intelligence sharing and joint operations. They said probes currently handled by the FBI, DEA, and ​U.S. immigration authorities could instead fall under the CIA and be ⁠classified, interrupting a widely valued information flow. Ricardo Brito reports for Reuters.  

Jamshid Ghomi, a California businessman accused of supplying U.S. computer networking equipment to customers in Iran, including organizations tied to Iran’s nuclear and military programs, has been charged with conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the Justice Department said. Mark Walker reports for the New York Times.  

U.S. CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

The United States yesterday imposed sanctions on Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel, his wife, and three other individuals. Asked if his sanctions were meant to accelerate Cuba’s collapse, Trump said, “We just want them to be a nicely run country.”  He added, “It’s sort of [already] collapsed,” and “we’re going to handle that as soon as we’ve finished” military operations in Iran. Fatima Hussein, Danica Coto, and Matthew Lee report for AP News.

Three international hotel chains and a bank that processes Visa and Mastercard transactions withdrew business from Cuba this week to avoid violating new U.S. regulations. Frances Robles reports for the New York Times.  

 U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS 

ICE acting Director David Ventrulla said ICE is eliminating its requirement to report deaths that occur within 30 days of people being released from its custody, according to an internal memo sent yesterday and reviewed by the Washington Post. The 30-day requirement was adopted in 2021 “to make clear the ICE should not release people simply to avoid deaths in custody,” former acting chief Deborah Fleischaker said. Douglas MacMillan reports.

Christian J. Castro, a federal immigration agent charged in connection with an on-duty shooting in Minnesota, will not waive extradition from Texas, his lawyer told a judge yesterday. Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz (D) will now most likely make a formal request to Texas Gov. Greg Abbott (R) for Castro’s extradition. Federal officials have raised questions about the legality of a state prosecution of a federal agent for on-duty conduct. The Department of Homeland Security said in a statement that “this is a federal issue, and it must be handled at the federal level.” Mitch Smith reports for the New York Times.  

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

Senior Justice Department official Aakash Singh recently instructed prosecutors nationwide to redouble efforts to pursue criminal charges against noncitizens who have voted, sources said. Singh also expressed frustration over the lack of progress in roughly 90 open investigations into possible noncitizen voting cases. Ernesto Londono reports for the New York Times.  

John R. Bolton, a national security adviser to Trump during his first term, has reached a tentative deal with prosecutors to plead guilty to mishandling classified information when he compiled notes for a book that was harshly critical of the president, two sources said. A notice in the Maryland federal court shows that Bolton is now scheduled for rearraignment on June 26. Under the terms of the plea deal, Bolton plans to plead guilty to a single count of illegal retention of classified information and pay a fine, with a possible range of no prison time to 5 years in custody, the sources said. Devlin Barrett and Michael S. Schmidt report for the New York Times.  

Early this morning, Senate Republicans pushed through their $70 billion immigration bill. The 52 to 47 vote sent the measure to the House, which is expected to move quickly to pass it. The vote followed a series of Democratic amendments that forced Republicans to take recorded positions on controversial Trump-backed proposals – including his $1.8 billion victim compensation fund and funding for a White House ballroom project – exposing internal divisions within the Republican Party even as the immigration bill ultimately passed. Annie Karni and Robert Jimison report for the New York Times.  

The Kennedy Center yesterday directed its employees to remove all references to Trump from its communication to comply with a federal judge’s order, according to a memo obtained by POLITICO. Cheyanne M. Daniels and Daniel Lippman report. 

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

Trump yesterday indicated that he will not nominate Bill Pulte to be the director of national intelligence once his temporary appointment expires early next year. Reuters reports.

The Defense Department has reduced its list of recognised faiths and belief systems from 211 to 31, Military.com has learned. This latest revision to the faith codes comes at the direction of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, according to a memo, and is meant to streamline the system and make chaplain support more practical and usable. Nick Mordowanec reports.

The Pentagon is expected to cancel a plan to send Tomahawk missiles to Germany partly because officials are concerned Russia will view it as an escalation, according to two European officials and one U.S. official. Paul McLeary, Stefanie Bolzen, and Chris Lunday report for POLITICO.  

Anthropic is reportedly working with the National Security Agency by installing around six of its engineers in the NSA to help deploy its Mythos AI model for offensive cyber operations, two sources said. Cristina Criddle and Demetri Sevastopulo report for the Financial Times. 

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION

Hegseth has rejected Anthropic’s request to overturn the company’s designation as a national security risk, the Pentagon told the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday. Hassan Ali Kanu reports for POLITICO.  

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions.

If you enjoy listening, Just Security’s analytic articles are also available in audio form on the justsecurity.org website.

ICYMI: Yesterday on Just Security

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After the February 2023 earthquake in Syria, the global effort to deliver humanitarian assistance was complicated by the sanctions still in place on the country. Multiple legal regimes moved to facilitate relief — including the United Nations’ standing humanitarian carve-out, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Syria General License 23, and the European Union’s parallel exemption. Yet these measures did not create a clear and reliable legal framework for humanitarian transactions. The workarounds operated on different terms and timelines, and the practical viability of any transaction still depended on judgments by regulators, counterparties, banks, insurers, and compliance actors regarding ownership, documentation, humanitarian nexus, and transactional risk. The result was a legal environment in which humanitarian transactions were formally permitted in some respects, but remained practically uncertain and difficult to operationalize. Lawful access depended not simply on what the exemptions said, but on whether fragmented public and private actors were willing to treat a transaction as cleared.

What happened in Syria is an often overlooked example of corruption risk that can arise from sanctions. Sanctions are often deployed to fight corruption, but they can sometimes create opportunities for it to flourish when sanctions leave conduct neither clearly prohibited nor clearly authorized, and when authority over lawful access is distributed across fragmented domestic, international, and private systems.

Much of the existing discussion approaches corruption mitigation as a matter of refining individual tools, such as exemptions, guidance, or monitoring. But corruption mitigation should begin one step earlier, addressing the legally structured spaces of partial restriction that sanctions regimes inevitably produce. Sanctions are built through overlapping prohibitions and systems of conditional authorization, but those restrictions are necessarily incomplete. Carve-outs, sectoral unevenness, temporal sequencing, and jurisdictional divergence create sanctions gaps, the spaces where actors compete to qualify for, interpret, or exploit available pathways.

In practice, these spaces are navigated across fragmented domestic sanctions frameworks, layered international legal regimes, and private compliance systems that exercise de facto gatekeeping authority. Where no actor can provide stable authorization and the boundaries of restriction remain uncertain, access to legally usable space becomes scarce, and influence over classification, documentation, routing, and institutional acceptance acquires value. The feasibility of corruption-sensitive sanctions design depends less on refining individual tools than on how legal regimes jointly structure prohibition, authorization, and the gaps between them. Corruption risk ultimately turns on how legal systems allocate authority over what sanctions leave unresolved.

Authorization, Legal Gaps, and Corruption Risk

Sanctions regimes are formally constructed through legal prohibitions, but they function through conditional authorization. Because economic activity must continue, sanctions law establishes when transactions may proceed and through which authorized channels. Licensing frameworks, statutory exemptions, regulatory guidance, and financial compliance rules collectively define the legal pathways through which a country’s economic activity remains permissible.

At the same time, sanctions restrictions are inherently incomplete as a matter of law and enforcement. Legal carve-outs, sectoral distinctions, temporal sequencing, and jurisdictional variation across multiple sending States create areas of partial coverage in which conduct is neither clearly prohibited nor clearly authorized. Enforcement further differentiates these boundaries. Variations in jurisdiction, regulatory authority, evidentiary standards, institutional capacity, and private liability exposure mean that sanctions rules operate unevenly across legal systems and across actors tasked with applying them.

Sanctions regimes therefore generate a layered legal environment composed not only of prohibitions and permissions but of legally ambiguous space — gaps in coverage, overlaps between regimes, and differences in enforceability that require interpretation. Economic activity reorganizes around both legally authorized pathways and the ability to operate within these gaps. Actors seek to qualify for exemptions, structure transactions to fit available carve-outs, route activity through jurisdictions where enforcement is less determinate, and rely on intermediaries able to interpret or operationalize legal ambiguity. For example, restricted goods may be rerouted through intermediaries, relabeled, or sold through black-market channels in jurisdictions where enforcement is weaker or legal coverage is less clear, as illustrated by Iraqi oil smuggling through neighboring states during the Oil-for-Food period.

Corruption risk concentrates in this space. Where authorization is gated and legal boundaries are unevenly defined or enforced — and where sanctions regimes necessarily contain natural gaps in coverage — control over pathways, and over the authority to validate whether activity falls within them, becomes a scarce legal resource.

Fragmentation and the Production of Legal Gaps

Sanctions rarely operate through a single legal regime. Instead, multiple sanctioning States construct parallel domestic sanctions frameworks that govern the same actors, sectors, and transactions. These frameworks differ in scope, definitions, licensing structures, humanitarian carve-outs, evidentiary thresholds, and enforcement design. Although often directed toward similar policy objectives, they produce non-identical legal environments in which the boundaries of restriction vary across jurisdictions. Fragmentation arises from three sources: divergence across domestic sanctions regimes, the absence of governance mechanisms to manage their interaction, and the discretionary translation of international obligations into domestic law.

This divergence is compounded by the absence of governance across jurisdictions. Sanctions regimes operate simultaneously but are administered through separate legislative authorities, regulators, and compliance systems. No institution is responsible for reconciling how overlapping regimes interact in practice. As a result, identical conduct may be clearly prohibited in one jurisdiction, fall within a carve-out in another, or occupy an area of interpretive uncertainty across several. These cross-jurisdictional gaps are not transitional; they reflect persistent differences in how legal authority is exercised. Responsibility for resolving these inconsistencies is therefore displaced onto regulators, financial institutions, and intermediaries operating without a shared legal framework.

The interaction between domestic and international law further expands this space. U.N. Security Council sanctions establish baseline obligations but leave substantial discretion regarding implementation, including the design of exemptions, authorization mechanisms, and enforcement priorities. As States translate these obligations into domestic law, differences in institutional capacity, legal drafting, and policy emphasis generate additional variation. Even coordinated sanctions among partners remain legally distinct measures administered through separate authorities, preserving the possibility of inconsistent coverage.

Together, these dynamics produce layered legal gaps. Divergent domestic rules, the lack of cross-jurisdictional governance, and discretionary implementation of international obligations create areas of partial restriction in which conduct is neither clearly prohibited nor clearly authorized. In the Syrian earthquake context, for example, a relief shipment might be formally permitted under OFAC’s temporary humanitarian authorization, but still be delayed or blocked if European counterparties, banks, or insurers applied different ownership-control rules, documentation standards, or risk thresholds. These gaps are not merely technical inconsistencies; they structure how activity can be classified, routed, and validated across legal systems. Fragmentation therefore does not simply expand ambiguity; it determines who controls access to legally usable pathways.

Sanctions regimes rely on processes of authorization, classification, and verification to translate legal rules into operational permission. Licensing decisions, ownership and control determinations, humanitarian eligibility assessments, and documentation requirements function as decision points through which actors seek entry into areas of partial restriction. Because these determinations are interpreted across fragmented regimes and institutions, access to legally usable pathways depends on actors capable of navigating — or influencing — how gaps are applied.

Corruption risk arises from this interaction between fragmentation and authorization. Where domestic regimes differ, where no authority governs how those differences interact, and where international obligations are implemented unevenly, influence over classification, documentation, routing, and timing becomes valuable. Sanctions gaps therefore persist not only because rules are incomplete, but because the legal architecture of sanctions tolerates divergence without allocating responsibility for managing it. It is within this unallocated governance space that corruption risk concentrates.

Why International Anti-Corruption Law Misses Sanctions Gaps

Sanctions gaps persist because legal systems define, implement, and enforce restrictions inconsistently. These gaps generate value by enabling actors to position conduct within uneven patterns of prohibition, authorization, and practical enforceability. The resulting risk, however, does not map neatly onto the conduct international anti-corruption law is designed to prohibit. This reflects not a deficiency in anti-corruption law’s substantive prohibitions, but a difference in regulatory target.

International anti-corruption frameworks — most prominently the U.N. Convention against Corruption — focus on misuse of entrusted authority: bribery, abuse of office, illicit enrichment, and related offenses. Their regulatory logic is actor-based and transactional. These frameworks identify prohibited exchanges, attribute responsibility, and impose consequences once misconduct can be linked to a public or private actor. Anti-corruption law is therefore oriented toward detecting and sanctioning corrupt exercises of authority after they occur.

Sanctions law operates differently. Rather than focusing primarily on misconduct after the fact, it organizes economic activity in advance by deciding which transactions are barred, which may proceed, and which require further authorization or compliance approval. The relevant conduct is therefore often not bribery or abuse of office, but legal positioning: structuring a transaction to fit an exemption, obtaining documentation that satisfies counterparties, or routing activity through an intermediary willing to treat the transaction as permissible.

The distinction becomes especially clear where formally authorized trade is routed through controlled channels. The Iraq Oil-for-Food Programme offers a stark illustration. Security Council Resolution 986 did not simply prohibit trade with Iraq or restore ordinary commerce. It established a regime of tightly controlled humanitarian exchange in which oil sales, escrowed proceeds, supplier contracts, and imports were routed through institutional approval and review mechanisms. But the same managed channels that made trade legally possible also concentrated authority over pricing, contracting, certification, and access. Those bottlenecks, in turn, became vulnerable to capture. As the Volcker inquiry, created by the U.N. to investigate mismanagement of the program, later found, the Iraqi regime extracted roughly $1.8 billion through illegal oil surcharges and supplier kickbacks. The significance of the episode is not merely historical or scandal-driven. It demonstrates that corruption risk may arise not only from sanctions evasion, scarcity, or administrative discretion in the abstract, but from the concentration of practical authority over the terms on which authorized trade may proceed.

Because anti-corruption law targets corrupt transactions rather than the governance of inconsistent restriction, it does not directly address much of the conduct through which sanctions gaps generate value. Influence over interpretation, classification, routing, timing, or operational clearance may determine whether activity proceeds without necessarily constituting bribery or abuse of office. The regulatory problem is thus structural before it becomes criminal.

This separation is reinforced institutionally. Anti-corruption regimes operate primarily through criminalization, enforcement cooperation, and attribution of responsibility for misconduct, while sanctions regimes operate through administrative authorization, licensing architecture, and distributed interpretive guidance across public and private actors. Decisions that determine access to areas of partial restriction are frequently decentralized, jurisdictionally fragmented, and mediated by compliance intermediaries rather than centralized enforcement bodies. As a result, the points at which corruption risk emerges — classification, validation of eligibility, documentation, and routing — often sit outside the institutional mechanisms through which anti-corruption law operates. The resulting divergence leaves the governance of sanctions gaps largely unaddressed.

Governing Inconsistency: Legal Paths Forward

Sanctions regimes are often assessed through the lens of compliance and enforcement. Yet, the corruption risks associated with sanctions gaps arise earlier, in the way legal authority over areas of partial restriction is distributed across fragmented regimes. Because sanctions are negotiated, implemented, and enforced through politically independent legal systems, inconsistency is a structural feature of sanctions architecture. The task, therefore, is not to imagine a sanctions system without gaps, but to determine how responsibility for interpreting and managing those gaps should be allocated.

A first step is to recognize sanctions gaps as sites of contested legal authority. Areas of partial restriction operate as legally under-allocated governance zones in which domestic regulators, international obligations, and private gatekeepers apply non-identical standards without clear responsibility for classification, validation, or oversight. Corruption risk arises not from ambiguity alone, but from the value attached to managing it. Mitigation therefore begins with identifying where authority is fragmented and establishing baseline procedural expectations for how conduct within these zones is assessed. The objective is not to eliminate ambiguity altogether, but to allocate responsibility for managing it more transparently and predictably.

A second step is selective alignment of the legal rules that make gap exploitation possible. Full harmonization of sanctions policy is neither likely nor necessary. What matters is narrower convergence around the legal elements that determine whether activity can be positioned within operationally usable pathways: ownership and control, facilitation, humanitarian eligibility, documentation standards, and financial intermediation. Coordination through plurilateral forums such as the G7 or G20 can reduce divergence in the treatment of comparable conduct without requiring uniformity on sanctions targets themselves. That form of alignment would not eliminate political autonomy. It would, however, reduce the rents generated by legally structured inconsistency.

A third step is to embed anti-corruption principles more directly into sanctions regime design. Anti-corruption frameworks should not function only as enforcement overlays that respond once bribery, kickbacks, or abuse have occurred. They should also inform how sanctions regimes allocate discretion, structure authorization, and manage inconsistency ex ante. Principles of transparency, procedural regularity, reviewability, and accountability can shape licensing architecture, interpretive guidance, documentary requirements, and the administration of exceptions. The aim is to move anti-corruption intervention upstream: from policing misconduct within sanctions gaps to shaping the conditions under which those gaps operate.

Taken together, these moves reframe corruption mitigation as a problem of sanctions design under conditions of persistent legal divergence. The point is not simply to make sanctions more precise in the abstract, but to change how they operate in moments of real-world pressure. In Syria, clearer recognition of the gap between formal humanitarian permission and operational clearance, combined with closer alignment among U.N., U.S., and EU rules on ownership, documentation, financial processing, and end-use assurances, could have reduced the need for banks, insurers, and counterparties to make fragmented risk judgments transaction by transaction. Relief would still have required safeguards, but fewer actors would have been able to convert uncertainty over clearance into delay, leverage, or selective access. In Iraq, where the Oil-for-Food Programme created controlled channels for authorized trade, embedding anti-corruption principles into contracting, pricing, auditing, and approval processes from the start would have made those channels harder to capture through surcharges, kickbacks, and political gatekeeping. Sanctions regimes cannot eliminate gaps without sacrificing flexibility. But they can decide whether those gaps become informal markets in access or governed pathways through which lawful activity can proceed without empowering the actors best positioned to exploit uncertainty.

The post Sanctions Gaps and the Governance of Corruption Risk appeared first on Just Security.

Thousands of North Korean troops have fought on the side of the Russians against Ukraine, in turn enabling Kim Jong Un’s “hermit kingdom” to learn new methods of modern warfare. The regime in Pyongyang also has accounted for upwards of 50 percent of the artillery used in some Russian units on the Ukrainian front.

The Kremlin also has had assistance from Iran, which supplied Russia with Shahed attack drones, as well as technical support and training to operate Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles, while helping Russia to develop its domestic drone production capabilities.

Since the U.S. and Israeli attack on Iran in February 2026, Moscow has returned the favor, providing the Iranian authorities with intelligence to enhance battlefield awareness. North Korea, meanwhile, has supplied its technology and expertise to help Iran sustain parts of its missile capability.

The dictatorship in Belarus has played its own corrosively supportive role, serving as a staging area for Moscow for logistics and operations against Ukraine. Recent reports suggest that Moscow and Minsk may be “setting conditions to justify Russia launching drone strikes at Ukraine from Belarus.” The authorities in Minsk also have offered strong diplomatic backing for the authorities in Iran, including propaganda on the Iranian regime’s behalf condemning of US and Israeli strikes.

But one power, China, stands apart as a pivotal enabler of authoritarian regimes. It is in a class of its own when it comes to the scale, range, and sophistication of support it provides to authoritarian causes worldwide.

China Modernizing Authoritarian Rule – and Exporting It

It is clear now that, after the brutal Tiananmen Square crackdown on pro-democracy activists in 1989, the most consequential long-term global effect was not just that the Chinese Communist Party survived. It was that, over the subsequent decades, the party learned how to modernize authoritarian rule, build networks of like-minded regimes, and project authoritarianism outward into the international system.

In Russia’s war against Ukraine, for example, the Chinese leadership claims neutrality, but it supplies sizable amounts of “dual-use” components and materials and provides vital support for Russia’s military-industrial base. In late 2025, China also reportedly trained Russian soldiers secretly in China. These soldiers then returned to fight in Ukraine. As noted in a report released today by the Center for European Policy Analysis, where I work, the regime in Beijing has helped keep Russia afloat despite unprecedented western sanctions through trade, energy purchases, and diplomatic cover. As then-NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said at the July 2024 NATO Summit in Washington, DC, China is “a decisive enabler” of Moscow’s war machine.

The Chinese authorities also nourish the Iranian regime’s war-making capacity. China reportedly pays for Iranian oil through covert channels, while helping Iran survive economically and sustain its military-industrial base. Beijing is integral for Iran’s capacity to access foreign funds and generate income to avoid economic collapse, with Chinese banks continuing to be embedded within Iranian money laundering and sanctions evasion networks. China by some U.S. government assessments serves as Iran’s most important economic partner and financial lifeline, helping it weaken the impact of western sanctions.

As with Moscow, Beijing also provides diplomatic and propaganda support for Tehran at the United Nations, for instance, but more broadly through the Chinese state’s formidable international information infrastructure, which skews public narratives against the United States and U.S. allies.

Of course China has long been an ally of North Korea. But Beijing’s support of like-minded regimes in Moscow and Tehran in the context of the current major military conflicts is extensive. It represents only the tip of the iceberg, however, in a far more sweeping support structure that China affords autocrats — and those aspiring to be — so that they can stay ahead of the curve in political, economic, technological, and ideological terms. By doing so, the Chinese party state suppresses fundamental freedoms at home and abroad.

Beijing’s Global Authoritarian Support Services 

Over the past two decades, the Chinese government has made sustained investments in and brought to scale what can be seen as global “concierge services” on behalf of authoritarianism. Such “services” are often viewed by outsiders as piecemeal, rather than as an integrated instrument of global influence.

Simply put, the Chinese party-state has become the world’s most important external supporter of authoritarian standards and behaviors. Beijing affords a full-spectrum approach that makes repression cheaper, more technologically sophisticated, and more resistant to outside pressure.

First, China exports methods of authoritarian governance itself.

Beijing, for example, as I’ve noted previously, functions as a “stealth exporter of secrecy abroad.” As the Chinese government has projected its power internationally, its model of concealment has proliferated. Today, countries doing deals with Beijing discover that “they are expected to follow China’s lead, limiting transparency and accountability just as Chinese leaders do at home.” As a result, global norms of transparency and open government gradually buckle under pressure.

China trains African political leaders to maintain state power and single-party rule at the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School in Kibaha, Tanzania. The Nyerere School is supported by China’s Central Party School and offers ideological training to cadres from African liberation parties. While these parties “all ostensibly adhere to multiparty political systems, many have been largely intolerant of opposition challenges and have employed wide ranging measures to stifle, constrain, and even dismantle opposition parties.” A key goal of the school is to build party capacity to maintain and consolidate state control.

Other authoritarian-friendly training afforded by China that promotes state control includes upgrading the capabilities of foreign police and security officials in surveillance, riot management, and population monitoring. Beijing’s approach frames civil society and dissent as security threats rather than inalienable rights. China’s leadership privileges internet-governance models that normalize censorship, data control, and state-directed information systems. All of these elements bolster transnational repression, which Beijing also works hard to normalize. Transnational repression occurs when foreign governments reach beyond their borders to intimidate, harass, censor, or harm dissidents, media professionals, and activists living abroad. This represents the Chinese leadership’s effort to transpose its repressive governance standard to the wider world.

A second element of Beijing’s full-spectrum approach to spreading authoritarianism is economic support, which serves as a crucial vector for Chinese party state influence. China supplies loans, investment, and emergency financing to governments that Western institutions have isolated for corruption or human rights abuses. As noted above, China also weakens the impact of sanctions by continuing trade and investment with regimes such as Russia, Iran, Myanmar, and North Korea, reducing the leverage democratic states might otherwise possess.

China’s Digital Silk Road initiative is an example of Beijing’s ability to use an economic platform for technological leverage. Across Africa and other regions, Chinese companies have become major providers of mobile and fiber-optic networks, often supported by concessional financing that makes competing alternatives difficult to match. This creates opportunities for surveillance access, as well as longer-term political leverage. Governments whose communications systems depend heavily on Chinese-built infrastructure may become structurally reliant on Beijing’s continued support, reinforcing political and economic ties over time. Chinese companies such as Huawei, Hikvision, and ZTE sell facial-recognition systems, mass-camera networks, internet monitoring platforms, and “smart city” security systems across the developing world. Such tools are marketed for purposes of public safety, but too often are repurposed for identifying dissidents, monitoring activists, and censorship.

The authorities in China are rapidly refining methods of techno-authoritarianism, including predictive policing and population monitoring, enabling systems designed to identify potential threats before opposition movements can organize. China’s Integrated Joint Operations Platform, for instance, combines biometric, financial, and behavioral data to flag individuals deemed “suspicious,” invariably without transparency or public oversight. First developed and extensively tested in Xinjiang, this model gives governments the ability to detect and disrupt dissent before it develops into coordinated political action.

In some cases, Chinese firms have reportedly provided direct operational assistance to local security services. In Uganda, for example, as Josh Chin and Liza Lin observe in their book “Surveillance State: Inside China’s Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control,” Huawei employees reportedly worked alongside security services and helped authorities deploy spyware against political opponents in real time.

In the sphere of diplomacy, China uses its influence at the U.N. and other multilateral institutions to shield authoritarian partners from international pressure. Beijing has repeatedly opposed or weakened efforts to impose stronger international responses against regimes accused of severe repression, including Myanmar after the 2021 coup and Belarus after the 2020 protests, and more recently in the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

Finally, China provides authoritarian governments with ideological backing. Through party-to-party exchanges, state media, and a range of development forums, Beijing promotes the argument that economic growth, political stability, and technological modernization do not require democracy or liberal rights. The message is clear: regimes can modernize while retaining centralized political control. This ideological emphasis is backed up by global information operations that put the United States and other democracies at a strategic disadvantage.

Together, these elements form a mutually reinforcing system that provides surge capacity to authoritarianism and affords the Chinese party state a competitive advantage.

In its own way, the leadership in Beijing has achieved the best of both worlds: it invests in intrusive activities the world over that have the effect of spreading authoritarian standards and behaviors such as secrecy, censorship, surveillance, and corruption. But relatively few observers see this for what it is: autocracy promotion.

Conclusion

The wars in Ukraine and Iran illustrate how authoritarian powers support each other in ways that are inimical to U.S. security and interests. China plays a crucial role more broadly, serving as the keystone for authoritarian assistance globally. Beijing is also cooperating more intensively with like-minded regimes in ways that afford further opportunities to bolster authoritarian standards and practices.

Given these circumstances, the United States and its democratic allies do not have much margin for error in this context of intense contestation. The extent of the threat is evident. As I observed in CEPA’s “China-Russia Meta Threat” report: “The United States and its democratic allies must…prepare for a long-term and comprehensive strategic competition with these authoritarian adversaries. The only safe assumption is that the leaders of Russia and China, both of whom prioritize regime survival above all else, will continue to adapt and challenge U.S. interests and security.” For these reasons, if the world’s democracies are to defend essential interests, they will need to act with far greater unity, purpose, and strategic coherence.

The post China’s Global ‘Concierge Services’ to Strengthen Fellow Authoritarians appeared first on Just Security.

It took nearly a century, but as part of the Second Reconstruction, Congress fulfilled that responsibility. It enacted a Voting Rights Act that goes beyond merely restating the constitutional prohibitions contained in the first sections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The single most important contribution the Court ever made to minority citizens’ voting rights was to uphold and apply those congressionally expanded prohibitions.

The current Supreme Court thinks differently. Section 2, as amended by Congress in 1982, was designed, and had been read for decades, to bar not only intentional discrimination but also practices and procedures that resulted in minority voters having less opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. (That “results” language, after all, is what the text explicitly provided.) In Louisiana v. Callais, the Court returned amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to a mere restatement of the constitutional prohibition on purposeful vote dilution. We are only just beginning to see how Justice Samuel Alito’s disingenuous opinion for the Court threatens to dismantle a fundamental pillar of the Second Reconstruction.

Callais involved the complex interaction of three strands of the Court’s districting jurisprudence: racial vote dilution claims under section 2 that the way district lines were drawn unfairly minimizes a minority group’s ability to elect; now-nonjusticiable claims that the lines are an unconstitutional political gerrymander; and so-called Shaw claims that race played an excessive role in the construction of district lines. Justice Alito wrote for the six-justice majority; Justice Elena Kagan wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson.

Initially, Louisiana (whose population is roughly one third Black) redrew its six congressional districts after the 2020 census in a way that created one majority-Black district and five majority-white ones. (The majority-Black district is the successor to a district the State was forced to draw in the mid-1980s following one of the first lawsuits successfully litigated under amended section 2.) A group of Black plaintiffs sued, claiming that the refusal to draw a second majority-Black district constituted unlawful racial vote dilution under section 2. After a district court held that they were likely to prevail, Louisiana redrew its map to create a second majority-Black district. The configuration of the revised map was driven by political considerations—in particular, the desire to protect three powerful Republican incumbents. A different group of plaintiffs—the Callais plaintiffs—then sued, claiming the state’s new map was an impermissible racial gerrymander. (This Shaw claim did not require them to allege or prove any dilution of their votes.) On reargument before the Court, Louisiana did not defend its map. Rather, it sought to return to its 5-1 plan. The Court ultimately agreed that “the State’s underlying goal was racial”—to create a second majority-Black district. The Court held that the map could not survive strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment given that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, properly construed, did not require the creation of a second majority-Black district.

So let’s look at how the Court construed amended section 2.

Justice Alito conceded, as he must, that amended section 2 was a congressional response to (and rejection of) the Court’s decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden, which had held that section 2 of the Act in its initial form prohibited only purposeful racial vote dilution. Congress amended section 2 to impose a “results” standard: Under section 2(b), a voting practice or procedure violates that standard “if, based on the totality of circumstances,” members of a racial minority group “have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”

Justice Alito stated that this language “sets a baseline against which to assess the opportunity of minority voters” and that “the baseline is the chance enjoyed by nonminority voters to secure the election of their preferred candidates.”

But it doesn’t make sense to frame the baseline that way. By definition, in any jurisdiction where minority plaintiffs bring a section 2 claim, there are some nonminority “other members of the electorate,” to use section 2(b)’s language, who have the chance to elect their preferred candidate. (Otherwise the elected positions would be vacant.) And there are also of course some nonminority voters whose chance of electing their preferred candidate is nonexistent. To which group ought minority voters be compared?

The more sensible place to begin is with one of the key “circumstances,” to deploy another word from the statutory text, when it comes to vote dilution cases: American elections are conducted from geographically defined constituencies. We should therefore begin by asking whether the minority’s reduced voting power is in some way attributable to the current configuration of those constituencies. Thus, in Thornburg v. Gingles, the foundational section 2 vote-dilution decision, the Supreme Court offered a three-part framework whose first prong asks whether there is an alternative to the challenged scheme that would give minority voters an opportunity to elect: Is the minority group sufficiently numerous and geographically concentrated that it could form a majority of the electorate in a fairly drawn single-member district? If the plaintiffs establish this first element, then the section 2 inquiry can proceed through the other two prongs of the Gingles test to determine whether racially polarized voting is preventing minority voters from succeeding within the existing scheme, before turning to whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the political process is not equally open to minority citizens. In short, the initial comparator is the current configuration of districts versus an illustrative district.

Callais replaces that straightforward inquiry with one that focuses from the outset on the chances white voters enjoy. It then cunningly defines that chance as being “whatever opportunity results from the application of the State’s combination of permissible criteria.”

That allows the Court to hold, under a purported “update” and “realign[ment]” of the Gingles framework, that a defendant jurisdiction can deny minority voters an opportunity to elect representatives of their choice as long as it also denies that opportunity to some group of white voters who share a salient characteristic with the minority voters. To be more specific, states can deny minority voters any chance to elect candidates of their choice whenever minority voters prefer candidates who are Democrats as long as the State creates no majority-white Democratic districts. Indeed, the implications are more radical still: Protection of incumbents is apparently also a permissible basis for drawing district lines. Thus, in any jurisdiction where minority voters have not already succeeded in electing a representative of their choice, they can be locked into electoral impotence. They cannot effectively challenge the existing system because they will be unable to show that they can create an opportunity district without removing an incumbent. And when it comes to local offices, the Court’s analysis creates a roadblock to challenging at-large elections, since by definition any section 2 suit seeks a change to the jurisdiction’s current election criteria.

More fundamentally, to call rank partisanship a permissible criterion marks a sea change in the Court’s approach. Less than two years before Justice Alito joined the Court, all nine Justices then sitting agreed that severe partisan gerrymandering is incompatible with constitutional values and likely unlawful; they disagreed only over whether this constitutional violation was justiciable.  In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Court again reiterated the incompatibility of partisan gerrymandering with democratic principles, even as it held such challenges nonjusticiable. But in Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, Justice Alito treated South Carolina’s partisan desire to disadvantage a group of voters not as regrettable, but as evidence of legislative “good faith.” And in Callais, he declared that partisanship is “a constitutionally permissible criterion that States may rely on as desired.”

The Court’s insistence that partisan motivations defeat a section 2 results claim makes it unlikely that plaintiffs can ever prevail in challenging a districting plan involving partisan elections, since partisanship (or, at the very least, incumbent protection) will nearly always be one consideration. Or as Justice Kagan phrased it in her powerful dissent, “Bang, bang, bang. It is like shooting fish in a barrel.” That presumably leaves available the possibility that plaintiffs can establish liability under section 2 only by proving a racially discriminatory purpose. (And perhaps they will have to show, in mixed-motive cases where both racial and political purposes are at play, that the jurisdiction would have adopted the plan even absent any political considerations—a near-impossible task.) Justice Alito comes close to saying just that when he wrote that a court can find a section 2 violation “only when the circumstances give rise to a strong inference that intentional discrimination occurred.” The Court’s statement that this “does not demand a finding of intentional discrimination” seems only to mean that a district court can make an “inference of racial motivation” without using magic words to announce “whether the state legislature as an institution” was motivated by racial concerns. How a reviewing court is then supposed to decide whether to affirm a finding of liability that stops short of that final step is nowhere explained.

This too marks a doctrinal sea change. Justice Alito cited City of Boerne v. Flores for the proposition that “a law that seeks to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment by prohibiting mere disparate impact would fail to enforce a right that the Amendment secures.” But that is not what Boerne says. To the contrary, the Court there expressly stated that legislation “can fall within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional.” And an example it gave was Congress’s decision in the Voting Rights Act to ban literacy tests nationwide despite the fact that the Court had previously upheld North Carolina’s test on the ground that such tests were constitutional unless it was shown that they had been adopted for the purpose of excluding Black citizens. And in earlier decisions, the Court had recognized that prohibiting disparate impact can be an appropriate way to capture purposeful discrimination given the difficulty in proving a discriminatory motivation.

It was entirely foreseeable that the Court’s decision in Callais would set off a series of attempts by states under Republican control to eliminate majority-Black and -Latino districts even before the Court took the extraordinary step of issuing its mandate immediately, so as to enable Louisiana to eliminate its second majority-Black district although the primary election was already underway with mail ballots having been sent out and returned. So Callais marked not only the gutting of section 2 but also a rollback of the Purcell principle, which directs federal courts to hesitate before altering the legal landscape close to an election.

In short order, Louisiana adopted a plan that eliminated the second majority-Black district. Alabama and Tennessee also adopted new plans for this fall’s election. Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina may follow suit for the next election cycle. And Texas and Florida may be emboldened to tweak their maps even more.

In a June 2 per curium order, with a 6-3 vote breaking down on the same lines as Callais, the Court applied Callais to uphold the Alabama legislature’s 2023 map, which (unlike the remedial map the federal court adopted after finding that Alabama’s 2021 map violated section 2) failed to draw a second majority-Black district. The Court’s analysis shows that its “update” of Gingles goes far beyond its treatment of the three-part framework. In Gingles, the Court had reaffirmed that a finding of a racially discriminatory purpose in a vote-dilution case is a finding of fact that “must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.” The three-judge court in Alabama found that the 2023 plan Alabama proposes to use for the 2026 election was intentionally discriminatory. “[T]ry as we might,” that court wrote, “we cannot understand the 2023 Plan as anything other than an intentional effort to dilute Black Alabamians’ voting strength.”

The court pointed to a series of subsidiary facts supporting this determination. One telling example: as part of the 2023 plan, the legislature enacted a series of “findings” that reflected a commitment to providing a majority-white Gulf Coast community, described in terms of its “French and Spanish colonial heritage,” with a district, while not discussing at all “the majority-Black community of interest in the Black Belt, which shares a heritage of enslavement.” Moreover, the Alabama court squarely “reject[ed]” any argument that “partisan goals rather than racial animus motivated the 2023 Plan.”

After the Supreme Court directed it to reconsider that holding in light of Callais, the Alabama court reaffirmed its finding: “[T]he purpose of the 2023 Plan was to distribute Black voters across districts to dilute their votes, at least in part because they are Black. . . . We reach this conclusion with great reluctance and dismay and even greater restraint — only after another exhaustive analysis of an extensive record, as the Supreme Court’s remand order and its precedent instructs us. We reject in the strongest possible terms the State’s attempt to finish its intentional decision to dilute minority votes with a veneer of legislative regularity.”

Under any principled application of the clearly erroneous standard, the Supreme Court would not have overturned this finding, which involved precisely the kind of “intensely local appraisal of the design and impact” of the challenged plan by a court having “particular familiarity with the indigenous political reality” of Alabama that used to produce an affirmance. Instead, late at night and again by a 6-3 vote, the Court allowed Alabama to put into effect the new plan for the already-underway 2026 election.

And those congressional maps are only the beginning. We should expect to see the dismantling of state legislative districts as well. To the extent that the Voting Rights Act served as at least a minimal constraint on political gerrymandering, that constraint is gone. In tandem with Rucho’s elimination of the deterrent effect on the most egregious gerrymanders that the possibility of Supreme Court intervention used to provide, the post 2030 round of redistricting is likely to be exceptionally bloodthirsty.

A half-century ago, the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he very essence of districting is to produce a different—a more ‘politically fair’—result than would be reached with elections at large, in which the winning party would take 100% of the legislative seats.” That essence was the impetus behind Congress’s decision in 1842 to require states to use single-member districts to elect their Representatives. Before that, many states elected their House delegations through statewide elections. This produced many one-party delegations. For example, in the 11th Congress, Connecticut elected seven Federalists and no Republicans, while New Jersey elected six Republicans and no Federalists.  In the 26th Congress (the last one before the 1842 act), Georgia elected nine Whigs and no Democrats while New Hampshire elected five Democrats and no Whigs. The current Court seems completely comfortable that we might return to the days in which states create winner-take-all congressional delegations. That situation could only exacerbate the pathologies of our current politics. And if it results in monoracial as well as single-party delegations from southern states, it threatens to end the Second Reconstruction as well.

The post Bang, Bang, Bang: <i>Callais</i> Kills Off the Voting Rights Act appeared first on Just Security.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR – CEASEFIRE

President Trump privately told aides he would consider ending the ceasefire with Iran if Tehran kills U.S. troops, U.S. officials said, insisting that the ceasefire remains intact. Secretary of State Marco Rubio yesterday described the recent tit-for-tat attacks as purely defensive in nature and not a renewed outbreak of full-scale war. “In that part of the world, ceasefire is when you’re shooting in a more moderate manner,” Trump told reporters, adding that peace talks are advancing. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said yesterday that Israeli attacks on Beirut would lead to a return to all-out war. Alexander Ward, Laurence Norman, and Robbie Gramer report for the Wall Street Journal.  

Trump also said yesterday that the war in Iran is “not a big thing” for the United States. He reiterated that the conflict was going better than expected, maintaining that he was “very proud” of what he called a “detour” to Iran. Trump went on to claim that “costs were coming down” for consumers, and cited “great financial people” who he said had assured him that because 401(k)s were rising, “everybody’s making a lot of money.” Erica L. Green reports for the New York Times.  

IRAN WAR – LEBANON OPERATIONS 

Israel and Lebanon yesterday agreed to implement a full ceasefire, contingent on Hezbollah halting attacks and withdrawing its operatives from the area south of the Litani River, according to a joint statement from the United States, Israel, and Lebanon. The agreement “reaffirmed that the future of the relationship between Israel and Lebanon must be decided by the two sovereign governments,” rejecting “any attempt, by any state or nonstate actor, to hold Lebanon’s future hostage.” Ephrat Livni reports for the New York Times. 

Trump yesterday confirmed that he had sharply criticized Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over Lebanon in a tense phone call on Monday. Asked whether he called Netanyahu “fucking crazy” and that he would be in prison if not for Trump, Trump confirmed he did. In an interview with CNBC, Netanyahu also did not deny any of the details about the call reported by Axios, but said it did not amount to a “crisis” in his relationship with Trump. “If you think this is a crisis, you should be at some other conversations…we have a common goal,” Netanyahu said. Barak Ravid and Marc Caputo report for Axios.

A U.N. peacekeeper in Lebanon died today from wounds sustained when mortar shells hit his position in southern Lebanon, UNIFIL said, and two others were wounded. UNIFIL did not say where the shells originated, but confirmed that it had opened an investigation into the incident. Reuters reports.  

IRAN WAR – OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 

The House of Representatives yesterday voted 215-208 to approve a war powers resolution that would halt the U.S. military action against Iran, with four Republicans siding with the Democrats. The House is also expected to consider a war powers resolution to block U.S. action in Lebanon. Lisa Mascaro reports for AP News. 

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR 

Israeli airstrikes today killed at least nine Palestinians, including five members of the same family, in separate attacks in Gaza, health officials said. Medics said Israeli planes launched strikes on four apartments before dawn. A video circulated on Palestinian social media, which Reuters could ⁠not immediately verify, showed people going into one apartment with blankets to recover bodies. Nidal Al-Mughrabi reports for Reuters. 

The Israeli Supreme Court ruled yesterday that a government policy banning visits to Palestinian prisoners by representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross violated Israeli and international law. The policy, which prohibited visits to those deemed “security” prisoners in the Israeli system, was enacted after Oct. 7, 2023. The Red Cross said in a statement that it stood ready to restart its visits and called the decision “an important reminder of the role [it plays in] ensuring the conditions of detention and treatment of detainees” meet international humanitarian law standards. Ephrat Livni reports for the New York Times. 

WEST BANK VIOLENCE 

Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich yesterday announced the construction of more than 2,162 residential units in three Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank. The new homes would “strengthen our hold on the land, reinforce Israel’s security, and establish clear facts on the ground that prevent the creation of an Arab terror state in the heart of the country,” ​Smotrich said in a statement. Benjamin Raab reports for Reuters.  

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR 

The House of Representatives voted 218-204 yesterday to take up a bill to impose new sanctions on Russia and provide additional aid to Ukraine. The bill must still win passage in the House. Trump has repeatedly signaled that he does not want Congress to constrain his flexibility to negotiate directly with Moscow, and could veto the legislation if it reaches his desk. Robert Jimison reports for the New York Times.  

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

The U.N. General Assembly yesterday elected Austria, Kyrgyzstan, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe to the 15-member Security Council for two-year terms starting on Jan. 1, 2027. German Foreign Minister Joseph Wadephul said that Germany’s leading role in rallying support for Ukraine and its close relations with Israel may have cost Berlin the chance of a seat on the council. Reuters reports; Rachel More reports for Reuters.  

Serbia’s Security ⁠and Information Agency (BIA) said in a statement yesterday evening that ​a trip to Montenegro is a high security risk for Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic due ​to “hostile activities of foreign secret services and a presence of a criminal clan there.” Speaker of the Parliament Ana Brnabic said Vucic planned to travel to the summit with EU and Balkan leaders despite the ​warning. Reuters reports.  

Taiwan is set to increase its arsenal of powerful anti-ship missiles to more than 1,800 by early 2029, as it seeks to enhance its capacity to counter a mounting threat of blockade or invasion by China, according to a Reuters calculation and current and former Taiwan military officers. David Lague and Yimou Lee report.

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Netanyahu said he would support a new Republican-led proposal to phase out the roughly $3.8 billion in annual U.S. military aid to Israel and replace it with a relationship based on trade and joint defense cooperation. Rep. Marlin Stutzman (R-IN), who is introducing the resolution, said the goal is to send a message “to the rest of the world that Israel is not just leaning on America.” In a letter to Stutzman, Netanyahu wrote that “the time has now arrived for us to move from aid recipient to partner,” according to a copy viewed by the Washington Post. Natalie Allison reports. 

The United States and other nations in the Five Eyes intelligence partnership yesterday issued a joint warning that China is using LinkedIn and other job platforms to pry secret information from security professionals worldwide. Chinese operatives “pose as employees of private consultancies, think tanks or human resources firms and place online job advertisements” aimed at attracting those with access to state secrets, the alert stated. Greg Miller reports for the Washington Post.  

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS 

Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin yesterday appeared to reverse the Trump administration’s position by saying it would willingly deport Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia to Costa Rica. Abrego Garcia’s lawyers immediately sent a copy of Mullin’s remarks to the federal judge handling the deportation case, who had previously pressed the administration on why it could not send him to Costa Rica. Alan Feuer reports for the New York Times.   

New Jersey Gov. Mikie Sherrill (D) said yesterday that federal immigration officials were continuing to bar her from entering Delaney Hall, a detention center in Newark. On Tuesday, the state’s attorney general, Jennifer Davenport, filed a lawsuit after state health officials were denied access to the medical unit and several other areas of the facility during an inspection. Tracey Tully reports for the New York Times. 

A report by the Department of Homeland Security’s internal watchdog has found that ICE officers at a detention center in Louisiana violated federal standards on physical force and noted that the facility refused to provide full video of some episodes of violence against detainees. The report is part of a wider audit that the inspector general’s office is conducting of ICE’s roughly 200 detention centers. Hamed Aleaziz and Nicholas Nehamas report for the New York Times. 

“All [ICE] training starting July 1st will be back up to the regular standards,” Mullin told the House Homeland Security Committee yesterday. Documents released by Senate Democrats earlier this year showed that training hours had dropped by roughly 40 percent as of February, to approximately 336 hours. Hamed Aleaziz reports for the  New York Times. 

An AP News investigation finds that dozens of children have been re-separated from their parents under Trump’s renewed immigration enforcement, despite a prior court settlement meant to prevent such family separations. Garance Burke and Sonia Perez D. report.

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

Several Republican senators said yesterday that they would not support Bill Pulte if Trump nominated him to serve as director of national intelligence permanently. Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY) said the law that created the job required nominees with extensive ​national security experience. Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC) likewise said he would not support Pulte’s nomination. Jonathan Landay, Patricia Zengerle, and Erin Banco report for Reuters.  

Voters in Monterey Park, California, yesterday overwhelmingly approved a ballot measure permanently banning data centers, with about 86% support, making it likely the first U.S. city to do so. Billy Witz reports for the New York Times.  

TECH DEVELOPMENTS 

In a new policy paper, OpenAI has proposed mandatory government-led safety evaluations for advanced AI models, overseen by the Commerce Department’s Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI), which differs from the White House’s new voluntary framework led by the National Security Agency. Brendan Borderlon reports for POLITICO. 

Top AI executives, including OpenAI’s Sam Altman and Anthropic’s Dario Amodei, have urged Congress to require companies selling synthetic DNA and RNA to screen orders and verify customers, arguing that increasingly powerful AI could lower the barriers to creating dangerous biological weapons. Amrith Ramkumar reports for the Wall Street Journal. 

Google released a set of guidelines yesterday that it says should become the industry standard on data center water consumption. The framework calls for returning more water to local watersheds than its data centers consume by 2030, avoiding water-intensive cooling in more water-stressed regions, and disclosing water use annually. Amy Harder reports for Axios.  

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

Trump yesterday announced his intention to nominate acting Attorney General Todd Blanche to the post permanently. Katherine Faulders and Nicholas Kerr report for ABC News.  

Trump yesterday signed an executive order reclassifying about 8,000 senior federal workers and making it easier to fire them for any reason. Democrats, unions, and good-government groups have objected, arguing that the change would erode long-standing protections that keep the civil service from becoming a politicized patronage system. Meryl Kornfield reports for the Washington Post.  

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions.

If you enjoy listening, Just Security’s analytic articles are also available in audio form on the justsecurity.org website.

ICYMI: Yesterday on Just Security

The post Early Edition: June 4, 2026 appeared first on Just Security.

In a conventional administration, that résumé would raise obvious questions about his ability to oversee the nation’s intelligence enterprise. But Pulte’s lack of national security experience may also signal the role the president expects the acting DNI to play in the coming months.

The DNI was created in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks to establish coherence for a community whose budgets, cultures, authorities, and operational centers remained dispersed across the government. Congress assigned the director sweeping responsibilities: head of the Intelligence Community, overseer of the National Intelligence Program, and “principal adviser to the President . . . for intelligence matters related to the national security.” 

Yet the office never fully escaped the condition it was designed to overcome. From the beginning, the DNI’s influence depended less on statutory language than on presidential confidence and preference. CIA directors retained operational authority, institutional weight, and, often, closer access to presidents. Over time, the DNI role settled into something more practical — albeit still critical — than the original reform ambition: coordinator of judgments, manager of process, broker among agencies, and guardian of community-wide integration.

That unresolved tension continued through the first Trump administration. What may be new with the current administration since I last addressed this issue in June 2025 for Just Security is the direction in which Trump has taken it. The DNI may no longer be competing for primacy as the president’s intelligence adviser, but instead becoming more of an instrument for political validation, public defense, and institutional cover.

CIA Director John Ratcliffe appears to have emerged as the president’s principal intelligence adviser in practice. In contrast, Tulsi Gabbard’s influence as DNI over major national-security decisions waned considerably, with the office’s remaining value increasingly appearing to lie in managing the public perimeter of those decisions and lending the DNI’s institutional prestige to politically-charged actions.

Pulte’s appointment should be assessed against that trajectory. The question is not only whether he is qualified. It is whether his appointment confirms that the DNI role under Trump is being remade into something different from both the post-9/11 statutory design and the imperfect coordinating role the office has usually performed.

What the Last Year Clarified

In the first six months of Trump’s second term, the Intelligence Community’s direction was troubling but still unsettled. The administration had begun reorganizing offices, tightening review, removing personnel, and framing the intelligence bureaucracy as an institution in need of political correction. The open question was whether those moves would remain “performative” and reversible, or whether they would settle into something more durable and substantive.

Over the last year, the Intelligence Community did not stop functioning in its traditional role. The January 2026 mission to seize Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was an extraordinary operational success, with intelligence reporting and covert support playing critical roles. Iran points to a different problem. Before the war that began on February 28, the president reportedly received assessments warning about the risks of joining Israel in a direct military campaign against Tehran. Since then, public reporting indicates that U.S. intelligence assessments have continued to complicate Trump’s claims about Iran’s nuclear timeline, military readiness, and remaining missile capacity. 

If that reporting holds, the Iran case may prove less an intelligence failure than a policymaker failure: intelligence continued to assess and warn, while decision-makers chose a course and a public narrative the evidence did not support.

Throughout this period, ODNI’s role appeared to drift. CIA and Ratcliffe increasingly occupied the center of operational and analytic influence, while ODNI under Gabbard became something more ambiguous: still responsible for day-to-day community management, but increasingly visible as a public and political instrument for the president.  For instance, in July, Gabbard accused Obama administration officials of a “treasonous conspiracy” over the 2016 Russia assessment, claiming “irrefutable evidence”— a charge that a Ratcliffe-directed CIA review did not support.

In the months that followed, the geography of influence told the story more clearly than any formal announcement could. When the administration executed its capture of Maduro—the most consequential foreign operation to date — the White House released photographs from Mar-a-Lago showing Trump surrounded by senior national security officials, including Ratcliffe, as the operation unfolded. Press reports indicated that Gabbard was excluded from the operational planning stage as well.

Her appearance at the January 28 federal raid on the Fulton County election hub in Atlanta sharpened the point. Captured in photographs as FBI agents seized 2020 election materials, Gabbard’s presence was difficult to explain through any conventional understanding of the DNI’s foreign-intelligence role. At minimum, the episode raised the concern that the office’s prestige had been borrowed for political validation after its influence over major national-security decisions had diminished.

By the time Gabbard resigned, the imbalance no longer needed to be inferred from bureaucratic charts. She resurfaced most prominently at the March 2026 Annual Threat Assessment hearing, but that appearance only highlighted how episodic her role had become. Press reporting after her resignation indicated that she had been left out of critical White House decision-making on Iran.

That is the trajectory Pulte inherits: an ODNI still responsible for managing the Intelligence Community, but less clearly positioned as the president’s authoritative intelligence voice and increasingly available for political use.

Why Pulte Matters

If ODNI had simply become a reduced management office, Pulte’s appointment would still be troubling but easier to categorize: A president had selected an inexperienced loyalist to keep the machinery running while relying on someone else for intelligence judgment. That would be a serious personnel problem, but not necessarily a new institutional one.

But Trump did not take the quieter path. He did not simply allow the deputy DNI or another senior ODNI official to serve in an acting capacity while the administration searched for a nominee. He reached completely outside the Intelligence Community and selected Pulte — an official already Senate-confirmed for another position and therefore presumably able to step into an acting role without facing a new confirmation process (I do not consider here the potential legal issues that may complicate this appointment). That choice suggests the appointment is not only about continuity. It places a trusted political actor atop an office whose advisory role may have narrowed, but whose formal responsibilities remain substantial.

Those responsibilities matter greatly. The DNI may not direct CIA operations, and Pulte is unlikely to become the president’s leading source of judgment on Iran, Russia, China, or terrorism. Still, ODNI is positioned to influence community priorities, shape coordination, oversee access to sensitive intelligence, and provide institutional weight to how threats are described. The ODNI also has significant declassification authority; significant access to Americans’ communications through, for example, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 702 program; and a public platform to make criminal referrals even if not well-founded. 

That is where Pulte’s record becomes relevant. At FHFA, he did not build a public profile as a conventional regulator. He became prominent through politically charged actions and referrals involving Trump’s perceived adversaries, including Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook, New York Attorney General Letitia James, and Senator Adam Schiff, among others.  Those actions do not prove how he would behave at ODNI, but they are relevant to assessing whether he is likely to treat the acting DNI role as a quiet caretaker assignment or as another post from which federal authority can be used in service of the president’s worst political proclivities. 

Counterterrorism is where that danger becomes more concrete. As DNI, Pulte would have authority over the National Counterterrorism Center, whose mission is to integrate terrorism-related intelligence and ensure that terrorism concerns are identified, analyzed, and elevated across the government. The administration’s May 2026 counterterrorism strategy identifies traditional threats, including al-Qa’ida, Iran, jihadist networks, cartels, and transnational criminal organizations. But it also moves toward treating political and cultural identity as a warning indicator, including references to “violent secular political groups” whose ideology is described as “anti-American,” “radically pro-transgender,” and anarchist. That framework does not require intelligence fabrication to become dangerous. It can blur the line between evidence of movement toward violence and suspicion attached to ideology, protest activity, or political identity.

The danger is not that Pulte will personally redirect U.S. intelligence collection overnight. It is that an acting DNI with little apparent attachment to intelligence tradecraft, placed atop an office already drifting from advisory influence toward political utility, could help normalize the use of intelligence language itself for domestic political purposes. Indeed, election disputes, protest movements, and ideological communities need not be formally labeled threats to be damaged by the suggestion that national security agencies are watching them.

What Still Can Be Done

The administration’s decision to install Pulte as acting DNI – rather than nominate a permanent intelligence professional or allow a senior ODNI official to serve temporarily (by statute and by regulation, the Principal Deputy Director is the most obvious fit) – communicates a message. It suggests the White House does not view the office as needing restored independence or deeper intelligence credibility. That makes congressional response and oversight more important, not less. 

If Pulte becomes acting DNI after Gabbard leaves, the Senate may never receive the ordinary forum in which to test his understanding of the office, his view of analytic independence, or the limits he would recognize on the use of intelligence authorities in domestic political disputes. Congress should not treat that outcome as inevitable. Given the need for seasoned national-security judgment in the DNI role, and given Pulte’s record of using federal authority in politically charged ways, members of both parties should press the White House to explain why a senior ODNI official — particularly the principal deputy director, the obvious statutory and regulatory fallback — should not serve instead. The absence of a nomination is not a reason for patience. It is the reason a congressional response should begin now.

Early Republican unease gives the committees no excuse to wait. Several Republican senators have already questioned Pulte’s qualifications, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio — a former member of the Senate Intelligence Committee — said he had never encountered Pulte in an intelligence context. But unease is not oversight. Unless members are willing to press for answers on authority, access, duration, and safeguards, concern over the appointment will remain a political reaction rather than an institutional check.

The House and Senate intelligence committees should press immediately for clarity on the scope of Pulte’s authorities: whether he will exercise the full powers of the DNI; whether he will retain his FHFA responsibilities while serving (which appears to be the plan); what access he will have to NCTC, election-security intelligence, declassification decisions, clearance reviews, and analytic products; how long the administration intends to keep him in acting status; and how the White House understands the respective roles of Pulte and Ratcliffe.

Those questions are not procedural housekeeping. They go to whether ODNI can remain an intelligence integration office or become a political instrument with access to intelligence machinery. That distinction should be established well before the November midterms. Oversight cannot make a president value inconvenient intelligence. But it can create a record, slow abuse, and make clear that intelligence authorities are not political conveniences to be reassigned without scrutiny.

Conclusion

The concerns I raised in June 2025 centered on whether personnel changes, review layers, and public attacks on alleged politicization would push the Intelligence Community toward political reinforcement rather than independent warning. A year later, the problem appears more defined. The traditional intelligence function has continued largely through CIA and Ratcliffe, while ODNI’s role has drifted toward management, access, and political validation.

That distinction should not be reassuring in any simple sense. The intelligence apparatus has not collapsed, and the professional workforce continues to collect, analyze, warn, and support operations against national security threats as priorities are set by elected leaders. Venezuela and Iran both suggest that much of that professional function remains intact. But that is precisely what makes the current trajectory more troubling. Intelligence can still function while the institution created to integrate it, elevate it, and protect its warning role becomes more available for political use.

That is why ODNI’s unresolved role still matters. The office has served an important function for the Intelligence Community, even if not always in the commanding role the statute seemed to imagine or past DNIs may have sought. Whether the DNI model remains practical, and what adjustments it may require after more than two decades, is a larger question for another article. 

The immediate issue is narrower: Pulte would inherit an office that still matters, even as its role under Trump has become more vulnerable to political use.

The office still holds tools that can shape what the government treats as a threat. It has access to sensitive intelligence, influence over coordination, visibility into analytic products, and authority over institutions such as the National Counterterrorism Center. In a normal system, those tools help the Intelligence Community bound uncertainty, frame risk, and warn policymakers. In a politicized system, they can give official weight to suspicion, blur the line between dissent and threat, and make political claims look like intelligence concerns.

That is the warning now. The next failure may not come because analysts failed to collect or assess. It may come because the institutions meant to warn and protect were redirected toward validation. Intelligence can still function and still be weakened. Analysts can still write with rigor while their work is routed around, softened, or selectively used. ODNI can still manage the community while becoming less a guardian of independent judgment than a mechanism for political cover or worse.

If that trajectory holds, the danger will not be hidden. It is already visible. Pulte’s appointment does not prove that ODNI has become a political instrument. But it gives Congress, the Intelligence Community, and the public every reason to ask whether that is where the office is headed — and whether the next institutional failure will come not from silence, but from warning stripped of real authority.

The post The Acting DNI and the Intelligence Office Trump Wants appeared first on Just Security.

This commitment made in Chisinau ensures clear political legitimacy and long-term financial viability for the STCA. It also represents another monumental step toward the realization of a fully functioning tribunal. With each completed phase, the risk of political backtracking recedes, and legal inevitability grows stronger. The trajectory toward full accountability for Russia’s crime of aggression is advancing with both urgency and resolve. The progress reflects recognition of a fundamental reality: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not just an attack on a sovereign state, but on the international legal order itself.

Developing an Operational Structure 

The landmark foundational agreement formally establishing the STCA, signed by Ukraine and the Council of Europe less than a year ago, marked one of the most significant developments in international criminal law since Nuremberg. Rather than a mere legal aspiration or diplomatic project, the tribunal is steadily becoming an operational mechanism for accountability for the crime of aggression.

Following the relevant domestic ratification processes by participating states, the focus will begin to shift from the current work of the “advance team” in Strasbourg, where the Council of Europe is based, toward the tribunal’s “skeleton phase” and the development of its operational structure in The Hague. This includes continued discussions concerning the tribunal’s final operational budget, including security. The Dutch government is leading this process.

During the “skeleton phase,” the STCA’s Management Committee will be constituted and will enter into a host-country agreement with the Netherlands. The Committee will function in a manner similar to that of the Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal Court — it will make all principal decisions, including on budgetary matters, the recruitment of key personnel, and the appointment of the prosecutor and judges. It will also be able to sign agreements with states and international organizations, which will cover pivotal issues such as the arrest, transfer, or detention of indicted individuals.

The final “fully operational” phase will follow, allowing for the STCA to fully function,, including indictments, arrest warrants, and trials. This phase will require further security arrangements and formal confirmation regarding the long-term use of the court premises.

When the framers of the United Nations Charter enshrined Article 2(4) at its adoption in 1945 in the wake of the Second World War, they established one of the most enduring principles of modern international law. It provides:

“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 

Those 38 words capture the essential objective of the Charter. The STCA, therefore, stands as the bridge between the Charter’s aspirational promise and the practical reality of holding accountable those who choose to violate it. The Charter established the prohibition against the crime of aggression; the STCA is the mechanism through which this prohibition is finally given effect. And there is no clearer example of the crime of aggression than Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Thus, the STCA seeks to close one of the most enduring gaps in international criminal law and, in doing so, complete the trajectory that began with Nuremberg and with the promulgation of the Charter itself.

A Call for Concrete Support

It is now important that the momentum continues and that additional states, not only in Europe, but also from Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Indo-Pacific, now join the EPA as full or associate members. Doing so is not simply an act of solidarity with Ukraine; it is a reaffirmation of international law. Every additional state that joins the EPA strengthens the legitimacy, universality, and deterrent power of the STCA, while reinforcing the continued vitality of the U.N. Charter itself and ensuring that international law can meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Failure to support this effort will send a dangerous signal to future leaders: that territorial conquest and aggression can succeed without consequence.

The post Ukraine and the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression: Redefining International Justice appeared first on Just Security.

The Syrian Domestic Trial

On April 26, 2026, criminal proceedings opened in the Fourth Criminal Court in Damascus against Brigadier General Atef Najib, a cousin of Assad and until March 2011 the head of the political security branch in the southern Syrian city of Daraa. Other defendants charged in the case, including Bashar al-Assad and his brother, Maher al-Assad, are fugitives.

At the second hearing on May 10, 2026, the court read out at least ten charges against Najib focusing on a period in early 2011 when protests broke out in Daraa. The offenses listed include murder, torture resulting in death, responsibility for massacres, the suppression of peaceful protests, and the torture of minors.

Najib pleaded not guilty. He denied all charges, asserting that he was transferred  to a different post on March 22, 2011, and had no authority over other security agencies after that. His defense is contested: the indictment covers conduct beginning in February 2011, before his claimed transfer, and the factual record suggests he exercised command authority over the early crackdown.

Limitations of Syrian Domestic Law

The prosecution is pursuing the case under domestic law. The Syrian penal code prohibits such crimes as murder, torture, assault, and arbitrary detention. Yet prosecutors are also characterizing the offenses as crimes against humanity, citing Articles 12 and 49 of the country’s new Constitutional Declaration. Issued on March 13, 2025, the declaration purports to incorporate treaties ratified by Syria and other elements of customary international law into the national legal system. Article 49 also excludes crimes against humanity and other international crimes committed from the principle of non-retroactivity — but, problematically, only for former regime officials.  These constitutional provisions have yet to be formally incorporated into Syria’spenal code.

In addition, Syrian law has no provision for command responsibility – nothing comparable to Article 28 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This gap limits prosecutions to direct perpetrators and effectively shields the chain of command.

The issue of punishment, meanwhile, poses a conflict between the requirements of domestic justice and the possibility for international judicial cooperation. Article 535 of the penal code stipulates the death penalty for premeditated murder, and some of the victims’ families have called for its application. Syria is a retentionist state, and its penal code allows the death penalty for certain  grave offenses, including murder, treason, other crimes “against state security,” and broadly conceived terrorism-related crimes.

Under long-established principles, however, European Union member states will not extradite suspects who may face the death penalty, absent highly credible diplomatic assurances that the death penalty will not be applied to the fugitive in question. Many EU states, as well as the UK, will also restrict mutual legal assistance in proceedings where execution is a realistic outcome — effectively foreclosing the cooperation that Syrian prosecutors will need.

In parallel with Najib’s proceedings, the court has proceeded with a trial in absentia of Bashar al-Assad. However, it is far from clear that the authorities complied with Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which, while recognizing the right of an accused to be tried in their presence, requires that the accused be formally informed of the charges and of the date of trial.

Assad did not appear in court, appoint a lawyer, or respond to the summons. At the May 10 session, the court declared the absent defendants to be fugitives from justice despite any proof of formal notice to them. Pursuant to Article 322 of Syria’s Code of Criminal Procedure, the court stripped Bashar al-Assad and Maher al-Assad of their civil rights and placed their assets under government administration.

Meanwhile, Assad is in Moscow under Russian protection, and the bilateral framework between Russia and Syria offers no practical pathway for his surrender. In May 2014, Russia vetoed a resolution in the U.N. Security Council that would have referred the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC). No subsequent attempt has succeeded in overcoming this impasse. Although Russia is under no legal obligation to cooperate with the ICC, which has already charged President Putin and five other Russian officials for alleged war crimes in Ukraine, the ICC can nonetheless issue arrest warrants for individuals residing in Russian territory, including Assad. That limits suspects’ ability to travel in the 125 ICC member states, as their risk of arrest would be potentially significant. ICC prosecutions also help to establish a permanent record of evidence.

Obstacles to ICC Prosecution

Today, the surest route to ICC jurisdiction over crimes in Syria would be for the new government to join the court and grant it retroactive jurisdiction under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, much as Ukraine did to enable prosecution of Russian officials. The ICC chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, visited Damascus in January 2025 and held talks with interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Sheibani. Both the U.N. high commissioner for human rights, Volker Türk, and the head of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, Robert Petit, called on Syria to ratify the Rome Statute.

However, the new Syrian authorities have yet to take this step, largely to avoid exposing themselves and their allies to possible prosecution for crimes committed during their earlier rule as rebel leaders in Syria’s Idlib province. ICC jurisdiction cannot be limited to actors on only one side of a conflict but extends to anyone acting within a designated time frame and territory.

The same political logic shapes the government’s domestic accountability architecture. By Decree No. 20 of May 17, 2025, President al-Sharaa established the National Commission for Transitional Justice (NCTJ), but its mandate is confined to “grave violations caused by the defunct regime,” excluding crimes attributed to other armed groups.

The hostility of U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration to the ICC may also be deterring Syrian action. The U.S. government has imposed sanctions on certain ICC judges and senior prosecutors because of their role in charging Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and in allowing a possible investigation of U.S. torture in Afghanistan during the administration of President W. Bush. At a time when one of Syria’s diplomatic priorities is securing sanctions relief from Washington, the new Syrian authorities may not want to be seen as embracing the ICC.  Similarly, the Gulf Arab states, whose funding Syria will need for reconstruction, might also view ICC membership unfavorably.

Finally, the transitional leadership has framed accountability as a Syrian-led process, so subjecting itself to the jurisdiction of an external body appears politically difficult for a government that is still consolidating its domestic authority. However, the ICC’s principle of complementarity may offer a way out of this dilemma. By initiating domestic proceedings, the government can claim to be “ready and able” to prosecute and theoretically shield itself from any intervention by the ICC under Article 17 of the Rome Statute. But Syrian authorities will have a more difficult time sustaining a claim that their domestic prosecutions are equivalent to ICC action without more completely incorporating, as described above, international crimes such as crimes against humanity as well as liability doctrines such as command responsibility.

The Way Forward

The European Union has perhaps the greatest leverage to encourage a more productive approach to transitional justice. In May 2025, the EU lifted its economic sanctions on Syria, retaining only arms-related restrictions and targeted measures against former regime figures. On May 11, 2026, the European Council restored full application of the EU-Syria Cooperation Agreement, and the first high-level EU-Syria political dialogue took place that same month. On May 18, 2026, the Council renewed targeted individual sanctions against past regime officials through June 2027 while delisting seven entities, including the Interior and Defense Ministries. With engagement deepening, the EU-Syria partnership framework should now tie further sanctions relief and reconstruction support to clear benchmarks: enacting legislation on crimes against humanity and war crimes, submitting the instrument of accession to the Rome Statute, and expanding the mandate of the NCTJ to include all perpetrators of violations.

The trial of Najib could be a watershed moment in the history of Syrian accountability. However, its transformation into a genuine basis for accountability depends on the willingness of the transitional government to build the necessary legal and institutional framework, not merely to conduct judicial proceedings of limited scope and impact.

The post Syria’s Accountability Gap: The Najib Trial and the Case for the ICC appeared first on Just Security.

As Congress begins drafting the FY2027 defense authorization and appropriations bills, members have a narrow but critical window to act. They must seize this moment to halt the unraveling of U.S. civilian protection efforts and compel the Pentagon to rebuild the capacity it has dismantled before further harm becomes inevitable. 

Background: Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR)

Nearly two decades of U.S. counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria caused devastating civilian harm, with a 2021 study by the organization Airwars estimating more than 20,000 civilians killed in U.S. operations in those wars and in Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Finally in 2018, Congress enacted a requirement through Section 936 of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop a civilian harm policy. In 2022, in response to damning media reporting on botched airstrikes in Afghanistan and Syria and civil society demands for reform, the Pentagon released a Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP). That Action Plan laid out an unprecedented set of reforms across the U.S. military to improve civilian protection and included the publication of the congressionally mandated policy for reducing civilian harm.

The Action Plan sequenced the implementation of more than 100 actions over the course of four years (FY2022 – FY2025). It required the DoD to place civilian harm mitigation and response teams at the various combatant commands, including personnel for conducting civilian harm assessments and analyzing the civilian environment. The plan also included the establishment of a Civilian Protection Center of Excellence (CP COE), the updating of joint doctrine, the development of civilian harm trainings and exercises, integration of civilian protection practices into professional military education, and revised policies for responding to civilian harm, among many other initiatives. Research conducted by the organization where I work, the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), found that, by the end of 2024, the DoD had hired more than 160 personnel to fill these functions, many of which had become well-integrated into planning processes, the targeting cycle, and civilian harm assessment cells.

Just as the CHMR “enterprise,” as it is often to referred to by department officials, was established, staffed, and beginning to carry out its core mandate, the second Trump administration disrupted that momentum, appointing a secretary of defense with a notorious animosity towards the laws of war and slashing the workforce across DoD. Since the initiation of these staffing cuts and of related restructuring at the Department of the Army, CHMR staffing has been decimated to just 10 percent of its original size. Several combatant commands lost their entire CHMR teams, while others managed to retain a single person dedicated to the mission. The Center of Excellence, once at nearly 40 staff, is down to seven. The Pentagon cut CHMR resourcing in its FY2026 budget requests, but Congress appropriated $11.6 million anyway to preserve what they could, labeled “conflict operations analysis,” according to information obtained by CIVIC. This amount was significantly lower than the $72.8 million the DoD had previously estimated would be needed to fulfill the Action Plan’s requirements, based on a joint manpower assessment completed in 2024. Moreover, the Pentagon’s $1.5 trillion budget request for FY 2027 appears to have fully zeroed out all dedicated CHMR funding.

Amid these cuts, U.S. military leaders — including Trump administration appointees — have affirmed the importance of maintaining the CHMR program, and veterans’ groups have called on Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to protect these programs due to the support they provide in upholding the values, morals, professionalism, and effectiveness of the U.S. military.

The DoD Inspector General Report 

At the end of 2024, before President Donald Trump entered office in late January 2025, the DoD Office of the Inspector General self-initiated an evaluation of the CHMR Action Plan’s implementation. The report was completed amidst upheaval of the inspector general system, including the sudden dismissal of the Pentagon’s own inspector general, and a nearly year-long process to appoint his successor, whose actions and previous affiliation with the Trump administration has prompted concerns that the office may not truly be politically independent.

Nevertheless, many of the report’s findings align with CIVIC’s past research on implementation of this action plan under the previous administration. But the report also reveals that the Pentagon is violating its own policy and federal law regarding harm mitigation obligations. According to the report, the gutting of CHMR personnel and funding and its resulting failure to fully implement the CHMR-AP have rendered the DoD lacking “many of the personnel and tools designed to execute DoDI 3000.17 and meet the statutory purposes of the CP CoE.”

The report documents the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby and the Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll submitting requests to Hegseth for the elimination of the Center of Excellence and for the rescission of the DoD Instruction on CHMR and the Action Plan. Fortunately, since the Center of Excellence was enshrined in law by 10 U.S.C. 184 and the DoD Instruction was similarly mandated in statute in 10 U.S.C. 134, DoD could not eliminate either without congressional action. As a result, both the Center of Excellence and the DOD Instruction are both still active — although significantly degraded in capacity and implementation — but they require congressional funding and support to function as intended.

The Inspector General’s evaluation team initially found that DoD was on track to complete its Action Plan objectives that were due to be met by the end of September 2025. However, by mid-2025, the IG team updated its status assessment for most objectives from “on track” to “at risk,” finding that many DoD components had stopped implementing their assigned actions in the Action Plan, the CHMR Steering Committee was no longer meeting, and combatant commands had “largely divested their CHMR personnel.” This led the IG team to ultimately conclude that DoD “did not fully implement any of the CHMR-AP objectives by the end of FY2025.”

Recommendations by the Inspector General evaluation team and the responses from Under Secretary Colby illustrate fundamental differences in both entities’ understanding of the law and the responsibilities the law entails. For example, the IG report notes that the “Under Secretary did not agree with the need to develop and implement a plan to ensure compliance with statutory requirements,” as recommended by the report. The Under Secretary asserted that the DoD was already in compliance with 10 U.S.C. 134 since they had designated a senior civilian official responsible for CHMR. The Inspector General did not accept this assertion and explained that 10 U.S.C. 134 also mandates that the designated official must “develop, coordinate, and oversee compliance with” the department’s civilian harm policy.

Similarly, the Under Secretary argued that the DoD was complying with 10 U.S.C. 184 on the Center of Excellence because the center was still operating with a fulltime staff. In response, the report stated that the statute does not simply mandate the center be staffed, but that the law assigns specific tasks for the center to carry out. The Inspector General’s Office requested additional information and updates from the Under Secretary to ensure the department is moving toward fuller compliance with both statutes.

The Under Secretary concluded his response by stating that the “CP CoE and DoW policy [needed] to reflect current leadership’s priorities and direction,” and that a review was underway for both the Center of Excellence and the DoD Instruction that would be completed by the end of January 2026 and December 2026, respectively. It is unclear if either of these reviews were ever completed.

How Capability Loss is Driving Civilian Harm – and Strategic Risk 

The IG report cites concerns from military officials that reduced CHMR resourcing not only increases the risk of civilian harm but endangers military personnel and mission success and decreases readiness, battlespace awareness, and legitimacy, among other disadvantages. This severe degradation of DoD’s capabilities for reducing harm to civilians has occurred just as U.S. operations are expanding across multiple theaters — including Iran, Somalia, Venezuela, the Caribbean and East Pacific, and Nigeria — with growing reports of civilian harm. CIVIC’s analysis aligns with the military officials’ statements in the IG report: without CHMR experts in place, the risks of U.S.-caused civilian harm increase. For example, the civilian environment teams at combatant commands, responsible for mapping population density, civilian infrastructure, and essential networks and services, were established to ensure commanders can anticipate potential second- and third-order effects on civilians before a strike. Without these teams, targeting decisions are more likely to rely on incomplete or outdated data, increasing the risk of errors like those now under investigation in Iran. The loss of red-teaming elements, designed to challenge assumptions and advise teams of civilian risks in advance, has weakened a critical internal check for preventing confirmation bias.

The dismantling of civilian harm assessment cells has similarly stymied the acknowledgement and redress for victims and survivors of harm and crippled the feedback loop that turns mistakes into improved practice. These teams were put in place to rapidly receive, review, and assess allegations of harm and identify patterns and lessons. Without them, commands like Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) that covers Central and South America and Central Command (CENTCOM) in the Middle East are now struggling to keep up with the reports they’re receiving about civilian casualties. CENTCOM’s civilian harm team has been cut from about 10 staff to 1 amid thousands of strikes in Iran. CENTCOM Commander Admiral Bradley Cooper demonstrated in congressional testimony that the command either does not have the capacity or does not have the will to review public reports of harm. When asked by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing if CENTCOM had looked into public reports of nearly 40 strikes on hospitals and schools in Iran, Cooper stated that they had not, despite department policy requiring them to do so. Five days later, Cooper testified to the House Armed Services Committee that he had spent the weekend with his team conducting those assessments, finding that only the Minab school strike correlated with a U.S. strike and U.S. munitions. This statement contradicts both civil society reporting on civilian harm in Iran and the DoD’s own civilian harm assessment procedures.

As the tempo and geographic scope of U.S. military operations has increased, the DoD has simultaneously dismantled the analytic, investigative, and learning architecture intended to reduce civilian harm, creating exactly the conditions under which civilian protection failures become more likely and more difficult to correct. Repeated congressional scrutiny now appears to be the only way to prompt the department to carry out its basic duty to prevent civilian harm.

Rebuilding Civilian Protection Now 

On the same day the Inspector General’s report was released, U.S. Representative Adam Smith of Washington, the top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, told Army Secretary Driscoll in his opening statement for an Army budget hearing, “You are in violation of the law right now on civilian harm.” He continued, “I’d like to know either a) what the explanation is for why you think it’s okay for you to ignore the law that this Congress passes or b) what you’re planning to do to fix that problem.” Congress’s attention and pressure on this issue is critical to ensuring that the Defense Department’s civilian protection capabilities do not continue to deteriorate under the current leadership.

Congress is currently writing the defense authorization and appropriations bills for FY 2027, so members have a pivotal opportunity to sustain and rebuild the military’s civilian protection capabilities. It is imperative that Congress take the following steps:

• Explicitly appropriate sufficient funds for harm mitigation functions, including specific billets for CHMR personnel and the appropriate safeguards for ensuring the money is used specifically for CHMR.
• Designate a CHMR official at every operational combatant command, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Joint Staff – a requirement already reflected in DoD policy and validated by commanders but not currently being followed.
• Complement the IG’s report on the implementation of the Action Plan by requiring a report on the implementation of the DoD Instruction itself, a critical part of implementing 10 U.S.C. 134.
• Finally, continue to exert pressure on the military for accountability and transparency related to its operations and the resulting civilian harm, particularly for operations in Iran such as the airstrike on the Minab school and ongoing extrajudicial killings via strikes against alleged drug boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific.

The DOD should not wait for Congress to restore and enforce its CHMR capacity, however. It can and should act immediately to rebuild critical functions already within its authority. In line with the Inspector General’s recommendation to strengthen collaboration between the Center of Excellence and the military’s Joint Staff, DoD leadership should relocate the Center of Excellence from its current position within the Army to the Joint Staff. This move would better align with the center’s intended purpose of providing direct operational support to combatant commands and resolve ongoing friction, since the Army has signaled its desire to be relieved of hosting responsibilities and requested its disestablishment, as discussed in the IG’s report.

DoD must also ensure that appropriated funds are actually used to sustain CHMR capabilities. In the FY2026 appropriations, according to information obtained by CIVIC, Congress provided $11.6 million for “Conflict Operations Analysis” intended for civilian harm mitigation and response. It remains unclear how, or even whether, these resources have been directed toward that purpose. As Congress works to restore broader funding, the department should take the signal from its combatant commanders’ statements for the IG report and immediately begin reconstituting civilian protection teams at combatant commands and reinstating key personnel lost from the Center of Excellence and the policy team under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Rebuilding this workforce is essential not just for compliance, but for restoring the DoD’s ability to anticipate, assess, and learn from civilian harm incidents.

Finally, a memo from the Inspector General affixed to the report upon release instructs the department to provide within 30 days a “response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations.” Under Secretary Colby must provide a timely and good-faith response to the Inspector General outlining a concrete plan to return to compliance with federal law and the department’s civilian harm policy. This response should include clear timelines, responsible offices, and measurable benchmarks for rebuilding capacity. Absent these course corrections, the DoD will continue to expand global operations without the institutional safeguards to mitigate and respond to civilian harm, undermining both its legal and moral obligations and long-term strategic objectives.

The post Congress Can Act Now on U.S. DoD Inspector’s Report Revealing Violations of Civilian Harm Policy and Law appeared first on Just Security.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR – CEASEFIRE

U.S Central Command said yesterday that Iran had launched missiles and drone strikes on Kuwait and Bahrain, and on civilian mariners near the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps confirmed it had targeted the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and a U.S. vessel identified as the Panaya. U.S. forces conducted strikes on an Iranian military ground control station at Qeshm Island in retaliation, according to Centcom. Iran cited the Qeshm strikes as grounds for its own attacks. This recent round of strikes came after the U.S. military said it “disabled” an oil tanker heading for an Iranian port by striking it with a Hellfire missile. Aaron Boxerman, Christina Goldbaum, and Michael Crowley report for the New York Times; CNN reports; Rebecca Falconer reports for Axios.  

Iranian drones and missiles overnight caused injuries and severe damage to the T1 building at Kuwait International Airport, according to Kuwait’s General Civil Aviation Authority. The Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry said that the strikes killed one person. The U.S. military said the Iranian attacks on Bahrain and Kuwait were either thwarted or failed. Iran’s Foreign Ministry said today that Kuwait and Bahrain bore “direct and clear responsibility” for the attacks, alleging their territory and facilities had been used to support U.S. military operations against Iran. Estelle Shirbon, Christina Anagnostopoulous, and Farouq Suleiman report for Reuters.  

IRAN WAR – LEBANON OPERATIONS 

Israeli drone strikes on southern Lebanon yesterday killed at least 11 people, as another round of talks between Israel and Lebanon began in Washington. Kareem Chehayeb and Bassem Mroue report for AP News.  

U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres on Monday proposed three options to the U.N. Security Council for replacing the peacekeeping mission in southern Lebanon when it ends on Dec. 31, all of which would maintain U.N. monitoring of the Israel-Lebanon border, support the Lebanese army, and strengthen diplomatic efforts to implement the 2006 ceasefire resolution. Edith M. Lederer reports for AP News.  

IRAN WAR – OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 

The U.S. Treasury Department yesterday imposed sanctions on Iran’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, Nobitex, and some of its founders, accusing them of helping the Iranian government to evade sanctions, pay for militant activities, and transfer wealth abroad. Ephrat Livni reports for the New York Times.  

Secretary of State Marco Rubio yesterday outlined the Trump administration’s demands for a peace deal with Iran before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, saying Iran must reopen the Strait of Hormuz and commit to future talks curtailing its nuclear program before Washington will lift its blockade of Iranian ports or ease financial sanctions. “Any sanctions relief is conditions-based, which means it has to be in return for the reason why those sanctions were put in place in the first place, which is their nuclear program,” Rubio said. Noah Robertson and John Hudson report for the Washington Post; Felcia Schwartz reports for POLITICO.  

The Trump administration should not have been surprised by Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz after the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran in February, because years of military war games and repeated Iranian warnings had consistently identified this as Tehran’s most likely response, according to several former U.S. officials. Michael C. Crowley reports for the New York Times. 

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR 

Ukraine yesterday launched one of its largest long-range drone attacks on Russia, striking targets including oil and military facilities near St Petersburg as the St Petersburg International Economic Forum opened. Russia said it downed 50 drones over the Leningrad region, and more than 350 drones in total. The strikes followed Russian attacks hours earlier on several Ukrainian cities, which killed 23 people and wounded 130 others, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Kosta Gak, Anna Chernova, and Helen Regan report for CNN; Jekaterina Golubkova reports for Reuters; Valentyn Ogirenko and Anna Voitenko report for Reuters.  

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

Malawi’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said yesterday that it will repatriate its nationals seeking to leave South Africa, where attacks on African migrants have been reported in parts of the country. Mozambique said five ​of its citizens were killed in violence in the coastal town ‌of ⁠Mossel Bay over the weekend, while Ghana repatriated hundreds of nationals last week. Reuters reports.  

Cambodia yesterday announced it has launched a rarely used U.N. dispute-resolution process called compulsory conciliation under the UNCLOS treaty to try to settle its 25-year maritime boundary dispute with Thailand over a 26,000 sq km area in the Gulf of Thailand believed to contain up to $300 billion worth of oil and gas resources. This follows the Thai government’s announcement last month that it had unilaterally terminated its 2001 agreement with Cambodia. Reuters reports.  

TECH DEVELOPMENTS 

Meta is dialing back elements of its plan to collect employee mouse movements, keystrokes, and other actions for use as AI training data, it said in an internal memo yesterday, following weeks of angry pushbacks from staffers. New controls will allow employees to pause ⁠the data collection for up to 30 minutes at a time and ​request exemptions from the initiative, according to the memo. Katie Paul reports for Reuters.  

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Trump yesterday endorsed Abelardo De La Espriella, a right-wing candidate in Colombia’s presidential election, in a social media post. De La Espriella thanked Trump for his “decisive support,” promising to strengthen U.S.-Colombia relations “like never before.” Annie Correal reports for the New York Times.  

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative yesterday proposed tariffs of 10% and 12.5% on goods from numerous trading partners following a forced labour investigation, according to a report released yesterday. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer stated that partners’ failure to address forced-labor imports creates an uneven playing field for American workers. Kimberley Kao reports for the Wall Street Journal. 

Rubio said yesterday that the United States would re-engage with the global vaccine alliance Gavi after cutting funding in 2025, citing the need to address the ongoing Ebola outbreak. Patricia Zengerle and Kennifer Rigby report for Reuters.  

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

The Supreme Court yesterday allowed Alabama to use a congressional map that eliminates one of two majority-Black districts. The justices, split 6-3 on ideological lines with conservatives in the majority, granted an emergency request filed by Republican officials seeking to use the map, which was enacted in 2023 but has never been used. Lawrence Hurley reports for NBC News. 

Federal authorities are investigating where former Rep. George Santos engaged in insider trading by betting on Kalshi, a prediction market, about whether he would attend Trump’s State of the Union address in February. David Yaffe-Bellany and Sharon LaFraniere report for the New York Times.  

Kurt Olsen, a White House official who aided Trump’s attempt to overturn the 2020 election, has joined the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida. Erin Banco and Andrew Goudsward report for Reuters.  

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche said yesterday that he was withdrawing a proposal to create a $1.8 billion fund to compensate people claiming to be victims of unfair prosecution. “We’re not moving forward with the fund, period,” Blanche said. Blanche also said he would leave in place an order he signed last month that would, in effect, block the Internal Revenue Service from investigating Trump, his family, and his businesses for tax violations. Glenn Thrush and Alan Feuer report for the New York Times. 

Trump yesterday named Federal Housing Agency Director Bill Pulte as acting Director of National Intelligence. Pulte is one of Trump’s closest political allies and has no known background in intelligence. Gregory Svirnovskiy and John Sakellariadis report for POLITICO.  

Trump yesterday signed an executive order asking AI companies to give the administration access to powerful models 30 days before public release. The previous version would have required companies to allow the government to review models for up to 90 days. The order also asks national-security and cyber officials to address software vulnerabilities identified by models like Anthropic’s Mythos. Amrith Ramjumar reports for the Wall Street Journal.  

The Trump administration has hired Elias Irizarry, a convicted Jan. 6 rioter who later expressed remorse, to work inside the Defense Department’s Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Office. Two sources characterized the work Irizarry will be doing as among the most delicate that the Pentagon performs, with all positions requiring top-secret security clearance. Several employees have raised concerns about the appointment, questioning how anyone convicted of an assault on democracy could be trusted for such a sensitive role in the U.S. government. Tara Copp and Salvador Rizzo report for the Washington Post.

The Office of Management and Budget on Friday published a 400-page proposed rule that, if finalized, would require all federal grants to be approved by the president’s political appointees, who must ensure that the money would “demonstrably advance the president’s policy priorities. Tony Romm reports for the New York Times.  

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION 

A group of transgender young people filed a lawsuit against the Justice Department, urging a federal judge to block a criminal subpoena issued to NYU Langone. The subpoena instructs hospital officials to appear before a grand jury this month with documents “sufficient to identify each patient” under 18 who received gender-related treatments since 2020. Amy Harmon reports for the New York Times. 

Several state attorneys general filed a lawsuit yesterday against the Trump administration to challenge its deal with TotalEnergies to end its U.S. offshore wind projects. “We are fighting back to stop this illegal agreement that threatens to erase over a thousand union jobs and cheat millions of New Yorkers out of clean, affordable energy,” New York Attorney General Letitia James said. Clara Hudson reports for the Wall Street Journal.  

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions.

If you enjoy listening, Just Security’s analytic articles are also available in audio form on the justsecurity.org website.

ICYMI: Yesterday on Just Security

What Congress Should Do About the President’s Sweetheart Deal in Trump v. IRS

By Brandon DeBot and Kelsey Merrick

The post Early Edition: June 3, 2026 appeared first on Just Security.

Fully unwinding the settlement and holding its architects accountable requires congressional action with at least three core components: 

(1) Block the unprecedented sweetheart deal that tries to preclude tax audits and any other potential claims the government may have against the President, his family, and his other affiliates. The initial signals from the administration are that it intends to pursue the Acting Attorney General’s order purporting to provide an extraordinarily broad release of any and all claims—including tax audits—the government had or could have against the President and his affiliates for conduct preceding the agreement. This could eliminate substantial tax liability for the President, including a long-running audit with potentially over $100 million in dispute. Congress should act to block the IRS from implementing this release, which the Acting Attorney General does not have authority to provide on his own, and add more guardrails to prevent any future administrations from abusing the IRS’s authority to resolve taxpayer disputes.

(2) Fully investigate potential criminal violations of the tax code provisions that forbid political interference and hold any lawbreakers accountable. Given the reporting about how the agreement was reached, the circumstances raise substantial questions whether these laws (see specific provisions below) were violated, as discussed below. Oversight bodies, including Congress, and future administrations should thoroughly investigate any potential violations and hold anyone who violated the laws accountable. 

(3) Fully block the $1.8 billion fund before any payments are made and ensure that this kind of presidential self-dealing cannot be attempted again. Without further intervention by either Congress or the courts, the administration could simply change its mind and attempt to move forward with the fund if the current court injunction expires on June 12, 2026. Lawmakers should also enact additional guardrails to prevent this type of collusive arrangement from coming close to succeeding again under this or any future administration. 

These core components address two aspects of the settlement that have drawn less attention than the $1.8 billion fund: the potential criminal violations of the tax code stemming from the negotiations, and the legislative options available to block the audit release. Both warrant closer examination. 

As more details on the settlement negotiations come to light, serious questions remain about whether criminal statutes against political interference in tax audits and tax administration were violated.

Recent reporting has shed some light on how the President reached an agreement with his own administration, raising additional alarm that the tax laws making it a crime to interfere in audits and corruptly impede tax administration may have been violated. The known circumstances of the lawsuit raise substantial questions under two criminal provisions in particular: the bar on political interference with audits, and the broader prohibition on corruptly impeding tax administration. The facts should be thoroughly investigated, as should the extent to which they may give rise to potential crimes under the following statutory provisions:

• Criminal interference in audits. Section 7217 of the Internal Revenue Code makes it a crime for the President and other specified political officials to directly or indirectly request that the IRS terminate any ongoing audit or investigation of any particular taxpayer. Section 7217 carries a three-year statute of limitations. It was enacted by Congress in the 1990s on an overwhelmingly bipartisan basis following revelations from the Watergate tapes about President Nixon’s plans to use the IRS to punish his enemies and reward his allies. We previously noted that negotiations involving President Trump and White House officials to end audits of the President, his family, and his businesses risk violating this provision. Recent reporting suggests that the President discussed the audits and his advisers received drafts of the so-called settlement agreement—indicating that covered officials may have sought to influence the Acting Attorney General’s purported release.

• Criminally corrupt interference in tax administration. The tax code also makes it a crime more generally to interfere with the administration of internal revenue laws. Under section 7212, any person who corruptly tries to impede the due administration of the tax laws is guilty of a crime, with a six-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court has held that section 7212 prohibits only specific interference in a particular investigation or audit. Thus, if a future Department of Justice sought to prosecute anyone under section 7212, it may need to prove that the defendants negotiated the audit release knowing that the IRS already had a specific audit or audits underway that they intended to end unlawfully. Reporting suggests that those involved in negotiating the release were aware of at least one pending audit. As previously reported, President Trump was under audit as of at least 2024 for double-claiming tax deductions, with likely more than $100 million still potentially in dispute. Reporting over the weekend suggests that Trump’s company had recently entered into settlement talks with the IRS regarding this specific audit—negotiations that would no longer be necessary under the broad release of claims signed by the Acting Attorney General despite his lack of authority to do so.

Further, to the extent there was a criminal conspiracy to commit either of these crimes, the statute of limitations to prosecute them would not begin to run until the last overt act of the conspiracy. Section 7212 applies more broadly than 7217, which is limited to government officials specified in the statute. It is therefore possible that the actions of individuals not covered by section 7217 – such as the Attorney General or the President’s personal lawyers – could violate section 7212. (We bracket for now further consideration of other relevant felony offenses or whether the President would be entitled to absolute immunity, presumptive (and thus rebuttable) immunity, or no immunity at all as defined by the Supreme Court in Trump v. United States.) 

Many factual questions also remain about who, exactly, was involved in the settlement agreement and thus who might have violated federal statutes against political interference in the tax system. The settlement talks were reportedly “closely held” between only a few Department of Justice officials and Trump’s personal lawyers, with some White House officials feeling “blindsided” by the final agreement. But reporting also suggests that Department of Justice officials worried that a settlement that resulted in taxpayer funds going to the President directly could “expose them to a criminal investigation of conspiracy to defraud the government,” and that “[o]ne of the questions raised was whether giving the Trump family protection against I.R.S. scrutiny would run afoul of” section 7217. And though Acting Attorney General Blanche said that settlement negotiations included “a discussion” regarding “any pending audits,” he disclaimed taking part in those discussions, despite being the sole signatory of the audit release. One interpretation of the reporting to date is that administration officials are trying to distance themselves from accusations of unlawful political interference, underscoring why oversight bodies and the public should press for a full understanding of the facts. 

Lawmakers should consider legislation to more explicitly prohibit the President and other officials from effectively closing their own tax audits while in office.

Prior to the latest reporting that the Trump administration plans to drop the $1.8 billion fund, lawmakers had been considering a range of legislative options that would block or otherwise limit the fund. Proposed measures could be voted on in the Senate as early as this week as amendments to the reconciliation bill to provide immigration enforcement funding that the GOP is seeking to advance.  

Despite the administration’s reported decision to back away from the fund for now, legislative action remains urgent and worthwhile. What is needed are laws to block the IRS from implementing the Acting Attorney General’s order and add barriers to make it more difficult for President Trump and future presidents to attempt this kind of self-dealing. Lawmakers should continue to consider legislation that would not only permanently block the fund but also address the extraordinarily broad release of tax audits and other legal claims the government may have against President Trump and the “affiliated individuals.” 

As we previously explained, the Attorney General does not have the authority to unilaterally drop tax audits of the President or anyone else as part of settling Trump’s lawsuit against the IRS. Nevertheless, legislative action could prevent the IRS from implementing the Attorney General’s order and prevent any president from future self-dealing to obtain audit relief for himself or his allies. While section 7217 makes it a crime for the President and other political officials to interfere in an existing audit, this section of the code alone would not prevent the IRS from entering into closing agreements with the President or his relatives. Additionally, while it may be possible for a future IRS to undo such a closing agreement with a showing of fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a material fact under other sections of the code (e.g., section 7121), legislation could explicitly and specifically address and prohibit self-dealing by preventing the IRS from entering into closing agreements with a sitting president and other high-ranking officials and affiliates. This is one among a variety of legislative and oversight options that lawmakers should consider with the goal of ensuring that the IRS does not now act on the Acting Attorney General’s unauthorized directive, or any like it in the future.

The post What Congress Should Do About the President’s Sweetheart Deal in <i>Trump v. IRS</i> appeared first on Just Security.

The series will expand regularly and is paired with a continuously updated Anti‑Corruption Tracker that documents every concrete action in one place. Forthcoming pieces explore international accountability measures, FOIA, the role of inspectors general, and what states can do to protect against weakened federal anti-corruption measures, and more.

• What Congress Should Do About the President’s Sweetheart Deal in Trump v. I.R.S. by Brandon DeBot and Kelsey Merrick (June 2, 2026)
• FEPA’s First Test: Protecting American Companies Returning to Venezuela by Scott Greytak and Tom Firestone (May 21, 2026)
• State and Administrative Law Backstops to Federal Corruption by Reed Shaw and Winston Berkman-Breen (May 19, 2026)
• If President Trump is Concerned With the Entry of “Criminal Aliens,” Why Is the U.S. Welcoming Corrupt Foreign Officials? by Melissa Hooper (May 15, 2026)
• The Just Security Podcast: The Latest on International Anti-Corruption Enforcement by Richard Nephew, Bruce Swartz, and Dani Schulkin (May 14, 2026)
• Dubious Delistings: Unexplained U.S. Sanctions Removals for the Corrupt and Well-Connected by Adam Keith and Amanda Strayer (May 11, 2026)
• Will Congress Throw Out a Tool to Fight Money Laundering and Corruption? by Dani Schulkin, Jodi Vittori, and Matthew Stephenson by (May 7, 2026)
• Pioneering Plunder: How to Stop Modern Profiteering in Public Office by Abigail Bellows (Apr. 30, 2026)
• A Year Later – What Did the Pause on FCPA Enforcement Do? by Richard Nephew (March 10, 2026)
• The White House’s New Fraud Section: Key Questions by Dani Schulkin and Amy Markopoulos (Jan. 23, 2026)
• Global Corruption, Local Hypocrisy: The Promises and Pitfalls of the U.S. Combating Global Corruption Act by Schuyler Miller and Adam Keith (Dec. 9, 2025)
• How to End the Shadow Budget and Protect Congress’s Power of the Purse by Scott Levy (Nov. 21, 2025)
• Is the U.S. Becoming a Captured State? A Comparative Perspective by Naomi Roht-Arriaza (Nov. 18, 2025)
• The $550 Billion Shadow Budget: Trump’s Japan Deal and the Disappearing Appropriations Clause by Scott Levy (Oct. 30, 2025)
• Should Inspectors General be Moved to the Legislative Branch? by Jason Powell (Oct. 22, 2025)
• The Human Costs of Systemic Corruption by Abigail Bellows (Aug. 11, 2025)
• The Freedom of Information Act and Deteriorating Federal Transparency Infrastructure by Amanda Teuscher (Aug. 4, 2025)
• Hard to Kill: The Transnational Survival of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by Bruce Swartz, Sonia Mittal, Inbar Pe’er, and Brady Worthington (July 24, 2025)
• When the Guardrails Erode: An Anti-Corruption Series by Dani Schulkin and Amy Markopolous (July 23, 2025)
• The Anti-Corruption Tracker: Mapping the Erosion of Oversight and Accountability by Dani Schulkin, Amy Markopoulos, and Maya Nir (July 23, 2025)
• American Businesses Still Face International Human Rights Obligations, Even as Oversight Diminishes at Home by Nicole Vander Meulen (June 23, 2025)

The post “When the Guardrails Erode” Series appeared first on Just Security.

The Committee sought input from relevant stakeholders, and alongside Just Security’s recent publication of 2020-26 U.N. Special rapporteur on the right to adequate housing Balakrishnan Rajagopal’s submission to the Committee, we set out our submission to the Committee below.

Writing as international legal scholars whose work includes the law of armed conflict, we seek to assist the Committee by setting out clearly the correct methodology for approaching the question of the Covenant’s application and interpretation during armed conflict. We begin the analysis by reference to the now well-established proposition that “[t]he existence of an armed conflict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of treaties.” In the absence of a derogation clause, and without any indication in the Covenant’s text, context, or object and purpose that its application is abrogated during war, the default position is one of continuity. The Covenant therefore continues to apply during armed conflict, occupation and post-conflict settings.

That conclusion, however, does not mean that armed conflict is legally irrelevant to the Covenant. Rather, we argue that its relevance should be approached carefully and through ordinary principles of general international law. Armed conflict may matter in at least three distinct ways. First, it may affect the territorial or extraterritorial scope of a State’s Covenant obligations, including where a State exercises control over territory or persons abroad (Part II of our submission). Second, the factual circumstances that constitute an armed conflict may affect the operation of particular Covenant rights, including questions of resources, capacity and lawful limitations under Article 4 ICESCR (Part III of our submission). Third, in some circumstances, international humanitarian law may inform the interpretation of Covenant rights, but only where the relevant IHL rule genuinely concerns the same subject matter and can thus properly be brought into the interpretive exercise (in accordance, for example, with Art 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) (Part IV of our submission).

We caution, therefore, against broad claims of IHL as lex specialis, which have served to obfuscate rather than clarify the relationship between distinct legal rules in armed conflict. In many cases, IHL and the ICESCR will simply apply alongside one another, without any need to consider the relationship between the two. In other cases, the Covenant may add important protection precisely because it addresses forms of systemic or cumulative harm that are not adequately captured by the attack-specific, ex ante rules of IHL. For example, even where individual attacks are considered lawful under IHL, the cumulative destruction of housing, schools, healthcare facilities, food and water supplies, or cultural life may still raise distinct questions under the ICESCR.

The forthcoming General Comment offers the Committee an important opportunity to bring clarity to this area. In our view, that clarity should begin from the proposition that the ICESCR has an independent and additional protective function in armed conflict. The task is not to ask whether the ICESCR applies in armed conflict. It does. The task is to articulate a principled methodology for understanding how particular Covenant obligations apply.

We submitted the following observations in response to the Committee’s call for inputs.

The post The ICESCR in Armed Conflict: Submission to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights appeared first on Just Security.

China’s Far-Reaching Influence in Zambia

China’s economic influence in Zambia is extensive and deeply entrenched, a point reinforced by data. Copper exports dominate Zambia’s economy, generating almost 80 percent of the country’s foreign-exchange earnings, and China is embedded throughout the value chain that moves copper from the ground to global markets. As such, Beijing is Zambia’s largest official creditor, owed $5.7billion, with the debt continuing to grow. The Chinese government reports that bilateral trade reached $7.6 billion in 2025, a 13.6 percent year-on-year jump, with China absorbing more than $5.6 billion of Zambian exports, primarily copper. Starting in December 2024, China reduced tariffs on all Zambian products to zero, a concession that deepens Zambia’s structural dependence on the relationship.

China does not just buy Zambia’s copper, it digs it. China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Corporation announced a $1.3 billion investment in 2023 alone, with cumulative investment in Zambian mining already at $1.5 billion. In 2024, the Chinese Mining Enterprise Association committed $5 billion by 2031 to help Zambia reach its copper production targets.

And copper is not the only area where Zambia exhibits dependence on China. In the energy sector, China has invested more than $2.3 billion building hydroelectric stations, solar plants, and transmission lines. Just in April, Zambia secured a $1.5 billion investment from China Machinery Engineering Corporation to boost electricity generation by 900 megawatts. That comes on top of a $3.5 billion power purchase agreement signed in 2023 between Zambia’s national power utility and China’s Integrated Clean Energy Power Company, as well as the completion in 2025 of Zambia’s largest grid-connected solar plant by PowerChina International Group.

Even in a sector like healthcare, a field traditionally dominated by the United States, China has made notable gains in Zambia. It financed the expansion of the Levy Mwanawasa University Teaching Hospital to 1,200 beds from 250, and when cholera killed more than 700 Zambians in 2023 and 2024, Lusaka turned to Beijing for emergency support. In 2024, the two countries signed a paired-hospital cooperation mechanism, establishing specialist clinical partnerships, with China donating medical equipment. The Chinese government reported at the time that 25 medical teams sent to Zambia over the years had diagnosed and treated 6.4 million patients and performed more than 39,000 operations. For a country where public health infrastructure remains stretched, these are important moves.

When a single country serves as the largest creditor, mining operator, power generator, hospital developer, and the builder of its premier conference venue (the Mulungushi International Conference Center, where RightsCon was due to be held, was financed by a $30 million grant from Beijing), the extent of Chinese influence is unmistakable.

However, solely focusing on China’s coercion captures only part of the story.

Zambia’s Troubling Democracy Record

When President Hakainde Hichilema took power in 2021, ending seven years of democratic deterioration under Zambia’s previous head of state, Edgar Lungu, there was hope that he would govern as a reformer and institute changes that would entrench respect for rights and the rule of law. At first, he seemed to follow through on these promises, abolishing repressive legislation, such as the country’s notorious defamation statute as well as its death penalty. But public discontent with his administration began to increase, owing in part to rising prices and high unemployment, causing Hichilema to reverse course. As Human Rights Foundation research fellow Wiriranai Brilliant Masara wrote last year in the Journal of Democracy, “Hichilema chose to consolidate power, and civil society groups that once celebrated his rise began sounding the alarm over shrinking civic space.”

With general elections now scheduled for August, repression in Zambia has intensified. Hichilema has increasingly weaponized the colonial-era Public Order Act of 1955 to restrict public gatherings such as protests. Reports have described arrests of opposition figures and critics exercising free expression and assembly, restrictions on opposition rallies, and ruling party supporters brandishing weapons at peaceful gatherings. Journalists in particular face growing pressure. The government has targeted prominent investigative reporter Thomas Zgambo, who as of December 2024 had been arrested three times in 13 months for publishing stories officials consider overly critical. Authorities also have sanctioned the “storming” of radio stations to intimidate broadcasters and brought a surge of defamation, libel, and sedition charges to suppress unfavorable coverage.

Also problematic, in 2025, Hichilema enacted two new laws, the Cyber Security Act and the Cyber Crimes Act, focused on cyber resilience, protecting critical information infrastructure, and curbing digital crime. While the measures addressed some legitimate concerns, critics noted that the government’s interpretation could turn them into tools for suppressing digital rights, thereby coming into conflict with RightsCon’s commitment to protecting online expression and digital privacy. (Organizers selected Zambia as the conference site in 2024, when its democracy appeared comparatively healthier; they coordinated with government officials “every step of the way” and signed an official MOU in 2025.)

Thus, many organizations saw the government’s handling of RightsCon as significant both for highlighting Chinese coercion as well as for underscoring Zambia’s own repressive direction. Groups such as the Africa Editors Forum called the cancellation “state pressure dressed as procedure” and warned that requiring a rights-focused convening to conform with “national values” would position the state as “the ultimate arbiter of acceptable speech.”

RightsCon would have placed Zambia’s record under intense international scrutiny just weeks before the official start of the election campaign (though arguably the cancelation essentially does the same and perhaps even more so). For a government in such a position, hosting the summit carried substantial risk. While China’s pressure is seen as the primary catalyst for RightsCon’s cancellation, Zambia’s anti-democratic drift should not be underestimated as a meaningful factor influencing the government’s decision.

Future Lessons

In the changing global order, China’s preferences and its willingness to throw around its weight matter more and more. From commodities to its investments in future technologies, its influence has become solidified. Moreover, Zambia represents just the tip of the iceberg; China’s investments and trading relationships with other African countries are even larger. In 2024, the five leading destinations for Chinese foreign direct investment on the continent were South Africa, Mozambique, Niger, Algeria, and Mauritius. On the debt side, Angola carries the highest loans from China by far, followed by Ethiopia, Kenya, and then Zambia. The questions raised by RightsCon’s cancellation are not unique to Lusaka. They are issues every African capital with a dependent relationship vis-a-vis Beijing will be forced to contend with.

But country context matters too. Democratic norms and governance shape to what extent political leaders will resist or comply with China’s requests. In a country like Zambia, where evidence of democratic erosion is well-documented, the government’s decision to call off RightsCon was disappointing but perhaps not surprising.

What then are the broader lessons for the global rights and democracy community? China’s growing influence, particularly in countries with democratic erosion trends, combined with Washington’s retreat from championing international values, creates conditions in which incidents like the RightsCon cancellation become more likely, not less. The convergence of Chinese structural influence and domestic democratic backsliding is not incidental. It is the terrain on which digital rights is being contested.

What happens next matters greatly. If governments across the continent observe that canceling a global civil society event, whether due to foreign pressure or domestic political calculation, carries minimal international consequences, the incentive to make similar decisions only grows. Conversely, if Zambia’s decision draws sustained condemnation, leads to the cancellation of other international events, and imposes economic costs, it could be persuasive in the region and deter other countries from making similar bargains. So far, the signals are mixed. Early in May, for example, the U.N. educational and cultural organization UNESCO proceeded with hosting a global conference in Lusaka marking World Press Freedom Day (although it moved some of the scheduled events online or to Paris). Other global events scheduled for Zambia in 2026 include a major fashion conference (FashionEVO Summit), an international gathering on machine learning, and a global convening on psychology and mental health.

Other lessons extend to technology policy. As noted above, laws designed to safeguard Zambia’s digital economy can equally serve as tools for restricting rights and civic activity. Zambia’s experience is a reminder that responsible digital governance requires more than legislation. It requires accountability, independent oversight, and a political culture willing to resist the temptation to deploy regulatory tools for political ends.

The digital rights community faces an uphill climb in the wake of the RightsCon debacle. Other leaders on the continent are watching closely, gauging whether China’s priorities outweigh competing concerns. Yet, the fallout from the summit’s cancellation is not definitive. Democracies still maintain considerable clout in Africa and can use it to demonstrate that China’s demands will not be cost-free.

The post In Addition to Chinese Pressure, a Backsliding Democracy May Explain Zambia’s Decision to Cancel a Major Human Rights Summit appeared first on Just Security.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR – LEBANON OPERATIONS 

Iranian state media reported yesterday that Tehran was halting peace negotiations with the United States and might end the ceasefire, citing ongoing Israeli attacks in Lebanon. There was no direct confirmation of the reports, and President Trump told an NBC reporter that he had not heard from Iran. Trump later said in a CNBC interview that the peace talks had “started to get very boring” and that he did not care if they were over. Laila Bassam, Maya Gebeily, and Hatem Maher report for Reuters.

U.N. Security Council members, except for the United States, yesterday called for Israel to withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon and refrain from threatened escalatory attacks. Farnaz Fassihi reports for the New York Times.  

Trump said yesterday that he had spoken with Hezbollah through intermediaries and secured a pledge that it would not attack Israel. Trump also said he spoke to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and they agreed that “Israel will not attack them, and they will not attack Israel.” Two U.S. officials told Axios that Trump lashed out at Netanyahu over Israel’s escalation in Lebanon. One official summarized Trump’s remarks as, “You’re fucking crazy. You’d be in prison if it weren’t for me. I’m saving your ass. Everybody hates you now. Everybody hates Israel because of this.” Reuters reports; Laila Bassam, Maya Gebeily, and Hatem Maher report for Reuters; Barak Ravid and Marc Caputo report. 

After Trump’s announcement, Netanyahu said in a statement, “I told [Trump] that if Hezbollah doesn’t cease its attacks…Israel will strike terror targets in Beirut.” Netanyahu also said that Israel would continue military operations in southern Lebanon. Aaron Boxerman, Christina Goldbaum, Johnatan Reiss, and Richard Perez-Pena report for the New York Times. 

Hours later, Lebanon announced a partial ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel. According to Lebanon’s embassy in Washington, the agreement would not end the conflict but calls for Israel to refrain from strikes on Beirut, while Hezbollah halts attacks on Israel. Hostilities in southern Lebanon continued yesterday evening. The Israeli military said today that it had intercepted two projectiles that crossed from Lebanon into northern Israel. Laila Bassam, Maya Gebeily, and Hatem Maher report for Reuters.

IRAN WAR – OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 

In recent days, the Trump administration has threatened to sanction and even bomb Oman, after a new intelligence assessment concluded that Muscat was planning to join Iran in tolling vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, according to a U.S. official. Oman has repeatedly denied that it plans to do so. Washington has also pressed Oman to cut diplomatic ties with Iran, citing the intelligence assessment. Benoit Faucon, Summer Said, and Alexander Ward report for the Wall Street Journal. 

WEST BANK VIOLENCE 

Israeli forces on Sunday shot and killed a Palestinian man at a concrete barrier separating the occupied West Bank from Jerusalem, the Palestinian Health Ministry said. Samy Magdy reports for AP News.  

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR 

Russia launched 656 drones and 73 missiles against Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities overnight, killing at least 16 civilians and wounding more than 100 others, Ukrainian authorities said today. Maria Varenikova reports for the New York Times; Samya Kullab and Vasilia Stepanenko report for AP News.  

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s chief of staff, Kyrylo Budanov, said yesterday that he believed a deal to end the war by winter was a “realistic” outcome. Budanov said he expected a U.S. delegation to visit Moscow and Kyiv in the near future, without providing details. Reuters reports.  

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

Israel’s ​defense ministry said yesterday that France had banned Israeli ‌government officials from a major weapons show in Paris and had imposed restrictions on companies from the country exhibiting there. Reuters reports.  

The EU yesterday agreed on a major migration policy overhaul that aims to accelerate deportations and allow member states to make deals with non-EU countries to host migrant detention or “return hub” centers. Sam McNeil reports for AP News.  

The United Kingdom will not have to pay Rwanda tens of millions of pounds over the cancelled deal to deport asylum seekers, the Permanent Court of Arbitration said yesterday. The Hague-based body said it had rejected all financial claims made by Rwanda. Stephanie van den Berg reports for Reuters.  

TECH DEVELOPMENTS 

The Chinese company Geedge Networks is developing new products that use AI to analyze location data and internet activity to predict who might do or say something critical of the government, according to leaked company documents. Julian E. Barnes reports for the New York Times.  

China’s military has stepped up its efforts to acquire Nvidia’s AI chips, according to Wirescreen, a software platform. Records document instances when suppliers agreed to deliver chips under the military’s terms, but they do not document the final delivery. John Costello, the Wirescreen analyst, said the data showed “directly and irrefutably” that U.S. technology was equipping the Chinese military. Ana Swanson and Tripp Mickle report for the New York Times.  

Florida Republican Attorney General James Uthemeier filed a lawsuit yesterday against OpenAI and Sam Altman, alleging that ChatGPT is unsafe and the company misled the public about associated risks. This is the first state action against the company. Aaron Mak, Andrew Atterbury, and Hasan Ali Kanu report for POLITICO.  

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

A Kenyan court today blocked a proposed U.S. Ebola quarantine facility for another three weeks. The court first blocked the plan last week, but the U.S. military continued to fly in staff and equipment, according to a U.S. official. Hundreds protested against the plan in Nanyuki yesterday. Protest organizer Patrick Wahome said two people were killed by gunshot wounds after police opened fire. Humphrey Malalo reports for Reuters.  

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum said yesterday that far-right sectors in the United States are coordinating with domestic groups to attack her government. Sheinbaum added that she did not believe the attacks were being orchestrated by Trump. Raul Cortes reports for Reuters.  

The International Labour Organization rescinded the appointment of a top U.S. official to be deputy head of the U.N. agency because of delays in payments from the United States, it said yesterday. Olivia Le Poidevin and Emma Farge report for Reuters.  

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS 

The State Department plans to reduce the number of U.S. embassies and consulates in Africa that can process visas for foreigners from 50 to 20 in the coming weeks, according to three U.S. officials and an internal memo obtained by AP News. Matthew Lee and Sam Mednick report.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

The Trump administration plans to drop its controversial $1.776 billion “anti-weaponization” fund, two senior administration officials told Axios. “This has become a distraction,” a second administration official said. “The president believes government was weaponized against people — it wasn’t just him. But this isn’t the time and vehicle for it.” The Justice Department complained on social media about the Virginia court ruling, which temporarily barred any disbursements from the fund, but said, “the department will abide by [it].” Marc Caputo reports. 

The Defense Department has designated its press office a classified space and banned journalists from accessing it to meet with affairs officers, according to four sources, who confirmed the change in security status took effect in recent weeks. The move, which officials say is tied to housing speechwriters who handle classified information, further restricts media access amid an ongoing legal dispute over Pentagon press policies that have limited reporters’ access to the building. Scott Nover reports for the Washington Post. 

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has blocked the promotion of eight Navy captains to one-star admirals, including two female and two Black officers, according to current and former U.S. officials. At the same time, Hegseth is trying to promote at least one member of his inner circle who was previously passed over for promotion several times, some of the people said. Lara Seligman reports for the Wall Street Journal.  

The Trump administration is dismantling a $368 million deep-ocean observation system that was put in place a decade ago to monitor coastal environments, marine ecosystems, and powerful currents that affect the global climate. Eric Niiler reports for the New York Times. 

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION 

A federal appeals court yesterday ruled that Hegseth’s policy to remove transgender members of the military was fueled by “the bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group.” However, the panel was divided over how to apply its ruling, opting to protect only the specific plaintiffs in the case. Kyle Cheney and Josh Gerstein report for POLITICO. 

A federal judge yesterday ordered the National Park Service not to interfere with Accountability Now USA’s display of an “86-47” flag at its ongoing demonstration near the National Mall, rejecting the contention that the phrase was meant as a coded call for violence against Trump. Josh Gerstein and Kyle Cheney report for POLITICO.   

The Democratic Party indicated in a court filing yesterday that it is appealing a judge’s decision last week not to immediately block Trump’s executive order tightening rules on mail-in voting. Reuters reports.  

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions.

If you enjoy listening, Just Security’s analytic articles are also available in audio form on the justsecurity.org website.

ICYMI: Yesterday on Just Security

The post Early Edition: June 2, 2026 appeared first on Just Security.

“We’re releasing a lot of information having to do with extraterrestrial things,” President Donald Trump said in a Cabinet meeting on May 28, the day the new site went live. “And people are totally fascinated by it … it’s literally trending number one.” Earlier in the month, the Pentagon began releasing files on U.F.O.s at the site, war.gov/UFO. But the aliens on the new official White House website aren’t extraterrestrial, despite the space theme. They are people: foreign nationals or those mistakenly assumed to be. And the timing of the president’s comments and the new site appear to be a bait and switch, luring in the public with the promise of extraterrestrials only to deliver law enforcement propaganda. Regardless of the kitschy premise, the site is neither a game nor a joke.

Echoing white supremacist rhetoric and the great replacement theory, which claims nonwhite foreigners are displacing and destroying white majorities, the site refers to dangerous invaders who arrived in the United States “under the cover of darkness” and infiltrated American society thanks to a conspiracy by “presidents, congressmen, and senior officials.” In 1950s typeface, and under a fake “declassification” label, the site says these “aliens” have “embedded themselves directly into our society.” Only one man, it declares, had the courage to reveal the secret, and now only he has the solution.

“President Trump told the truth. The cover-up is over. Secure the border. Deport them all.”

Contrary to the White House’s claim, it’s no secret that millions of undocumented people—“aliens” in the old English lexicon of U.S. legalese— live in the United States. It’s equally obvious that the White House aims to round up millions and expel them, since Trump and his advisers have long proclaimed that as a top priority. During his 2024 campaign, Trump promised “the largest deportation program in American history.” The people he is targeting, he relentlessly and falsely demonizes, calling them “vicious, violent criminals” and “stone-cold killers” who will “walk into your kitchen and cut your throat” and “not even think about it the next morning.”

Mass expulsion would transform the United States as profoundly as anything else Trump is attempting in his second term, and he can’t do it at the scale he wants without the public backing he famously craves. The new website is brazen propaganda to get Americans to hate their neighbors and to support purging millions of people from the country. Under the cover of amusement, the site systematically works to construct migrants as an existential threat, to dehumanize them, to stifle empathy for them, and finally, it asks people to report “suspicious aliens,” thus becoming complicit in the government’s effort to dispense with them.

Constructing the Threat

Whitehouse.gov/aliens pushes inflammatory buttons familiar to experts on rhetoric that increases the risk of intergroup atrocities by instilling deep fear of members of another group. Such rhetoric, that one of us has named “dangerous speech” for its capacity to inspire violence, can demonize any human group. Dangerous speech is similar across languages, cultures, and history. Since no human has been born hating another group of people, dangerous speech is a vital tool for cultivating the collective fear necessary for people to support attacking or removing another group— in this case with arrests, imprisonment, and expulsion. 

“ALIENS” (capitalized in Trumpian style) pose a “real danger,” the site claims, to “every American family, every community, and the future of our nation.” Against the starry black sky of the new site, foreign nationals are depicted as dangerous not only with words but also with a heat map of immigration arrests that have taken place all over the country, from Blacklick, Ohio to Henderson, Nevada, along with long text blocks of crimes, many of them violent. The impression this creates is false, which is typical when tyrants use dangerous speech to accrue power. In fact, noncitizens commit fewer crimes than U.S. citizens, and most of the people Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has arrested have never been convicted of any U.S. crime, as the Cato Institute reported last year. Since then, the share of noncriminals in ICE detention has only risen, to more than 70 percent as of April, and only a tiny proportion of those detained are the violent criminals ICE claims it is chasing.

Moreover, quite a few of the invading “Aliens” seem to be U.S. citizens, including some people born on U.S. soil, according to the White House site. The United States is even on the site’s list of native countries of people arrested by ICE. And WIRED reported that according to the site’s heat map of arrests, ICE has grabbed at least one U.S.-born person in 715 of the listed American cities and towns. In 83 of the locations identified, every single person ICE arrested was a U.S. citizen. 

Stamping out Empathy 

The Aliens website makes two other moves familiar to scholars of mass atrocities: dehumanizing members of a group (here, conflating them with extraterrestrials and referring to them as “it”) and quashing public compassion for them. 

”If you’ve witnessed an Alien abduction, do not be alarmed,” the site exhorts in glowing green. “The Alien is in good hands. We will take care of it … and return it safely to its place of origin.” 

In reality, ICE officers have broken down doors to drag people into subfreezing streets in their underwear, and deported them to foreign sites of torture. More than 60,000 people who are now in ICE detention on any given day often lack adequate medical care, and many of them do not get returned safely to their countries of origin. Protests against these actions, especially in Minneapolis where ICE officers shot U.S. citizens Alex Pretti and Rene Good to death (leading to more protests), have irked the White House.

Compassion has been a nuisance in other State campaigns to purge large groups of people. In 1941, for example, Nazi Governor-General Hans Frank, outlining a program to annihilate Jews, complained of public sympathy for them: 

I know that there is criticism of many of the measures now applied to the Jews in the Reich. There are always deliberate attempts to speak again and again of cruelty, harshness … [A]gree with me on a formula: we will have pity, on principle, only for the German people, and for nobody else in the world.

Eliminating a large group within a society requires the complicity of a critical mass of the public. During Stalin’s Purge beginning in 1937, millions of people were denounced by others as “enemies of the people” and then arrested, often tortured, and killed. In East Germany, the Stasi secret police recruited nearly 200,000 Inoffizielle Mitarbeiteror (“informal collaborators”) or IMs who informed on their friends, neighbors, and families. In Nazi Germany, the Gestapo relied heavily on informers to help root out Jews and people who tried to protect them or merely opposed the Nazi regime. In the 1994 Rwanda genocide, political leaders instigated a mass mobilization of Hutus against their Tutsi neighbors. The same pattern can be found in the genocide of the Rohingya in Myanmar, and beyond.

A big red button on the White House’s “Aliens” website invites the public to take part in Trump’s mass deportation plan by becoming an informer. Clicking on “REPORT SUSPICIOUS ALIENS” leads to an ICE tip line, providing a pathway to action for potentially millions of people who might not have been looking for a way to engage with ICE.

One Savior

The website also strives to convince viewers that deliverance from the purported existential threat of an “Alien invasion” runs through one, and only one man: “President Trump was the first to call out the real danger Aliens pose.” He is “Bold. Unapologetic. Unafraid.” 

Trump has repeatedly pressed the idea of an alien (migrant) invasion—so much that on the first day of his second term he signed an Executive Order titled, “Protecting the American People Against Invasion,” and offered himself as the only protection, the only person who could repel it. It is typical of authoritarians to introduce a terrifying threat, and then offer themselves as the only savior. 

Actually delivering on mass deportation, however, is an immense political, financial, and logistical challenge. Legislation that Trump called his “Bill Beautiful Bill” provided $170 billion over a four-year period for immigration enforcement, enabling a mass recruitment campaign of new ICE officers to conduct immigration arrests, alongside a 400 percent increase in the organization’s detention budget. This infrastructure of mass deportation is essential context for understanding why whitehouse.gov/aliens is not “cheeky” or “tongue-in-cheek” as some media outlets have described it. With its conspiratorial flavor and meme-ification style, it is a cleverly crafted piece of propaganda to instill and increase American fear so that the Trump administration can catapult the country back to an imagined, demographically homogenous past. 

The post Dangerous Speech in Disguise: The White House’s New “Aliens” Website Is Not a Joke appeared first on Just Security.

The targets range from an individual who drove a tractor through the border fence, paving the way for the invasion of Hamas ground forces into Israel, to senior Hamas leaders, such as Ezzedin al-Haddad. He had risen to become head of the al-Qassam Brigades as the IDF serially killed his predecessors and was reportedly rebuilding Hamas’s military capability. And, on May 26, the IDF killed his successor, Mohammed Odeh, who was involved in the planning of the Oct. 7 massacre. In addition to those being killed, hundreds of Gazans are awaiting trial in Israel for their participation in the attacks, and this month, the Israeli Parliament passed legislation establishing a special military tribunal to try them. The fact that they are in custody awaiting trial underscores the distinction between criminal accountability and targetability, separate legal issues governed by separate bodies of law.

Following the May 15 strike on al-Haddad, Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, the IDF’s Chief of Staff, warned, “The IDF will continue to pursue our enemies, strike them and hold accountable everyone who took part in the October 7th massacre.” Defense Minister Israel Katz similarly announced after Odeh’s death, “We pledged to eliminate everyone who led the October 7 massacre, and that is what we will do,” Katz wrote. “They are all marked for death, everywhere.” Unsurprisingly, Hamas has labeled the campaign “nothing but an extension of the policy of extrajudicial executions and systematic killing that Israel has practiced against the Palestinian people for decades.”

Public debate in Israel has for some time focused on the legal basis for targeting those who participated in the Oct. 7 attacks. Media reports (e.g., here and here) asserted that the IDF’s International Law Division took the position that lethal force under the law of armed conflict (LOAC) is “preventive” rather than “punitive,” and therefore cannot be based solely on an individual’s past participation in the Oct. 7 attacks. Reportedly, in at least some instances, attacks against individuals who participated in the massacre were disapproved on this basis, which sparked controversy. An IDF Spokesperson seemingly rejected the claims, albeit with vague language, stating, “The policy is to act against all participants in the massacre, regardless of their membership in a terrorist organization. To this end, an orderly operational process is carried out in accordance with international law.”  

Although Israel’s policy regarding the Oct. 7 perpetrators also extends to capturing, detaining, and ultimately trying them, in this article, we examine the legal issues raised solely by the lethal operations under the law of armed conflict (LOAC). Our inquiry focuses on who, when, and how those involved in the Oct. 7 massacre may be attacked pursuant to the so-called “conduct of hostilities” rules. Without access to the intelligence underpinning individual attacks, it is, of course, difficult to draw definitive conclusions; therefore, we will set out the conditions that would underpin such determinations. While many of the attacks are almost certainly lawful, some may be unlawful if the facts are as reported in the Wall Street Journal article. 

A note on the general legal framework for any analysis of lethal force: Although our discussion is limited to LOAC, we remind readers that unlawful killing under that body of law is also a war crime, murder under the domestic law of States with adjudicative jurisdiction, an extrajudicial killing under international human rights law, and, in some instances, a crime against humanity.

The Applicable Law

That an armed conflict is underway is evident from the continued acts of violence between the belligerents and the real risk of resumption of armed confrontations. This is especially the case given Hamas’s failure to demobilize, dissolve, or suffer complete military defeat and instead remain in control of significant territory. Accordingly, the Israeli attacks are governed by LOAC. 

That said, the classification of conflict in Gaza remains contested. The hostilities between Israel and organized armed groups in Gaza, principally Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, constitute at least a non-international armed conflict. At the same time, certain rules traditionally associated with international armed conflict–most notably those governing occupation and blockade–are often invoked in relation to Gaza by international bodies and, in some contexts, by Israel itself. Indeed, some schools of thought maintain that the armed confrontations involve an international armed conflict and an occupation under the Fourth Geneva Convention. For present purposes, little turns on these issues. The core conduct of hostilities rules relevant here–distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack–apply in materially similar form in both international and non-international armed conflict.

In that regard, we note that Israel is not a Party to the 1977 Additional Protocol I, which contains the key treaty-based “conduct of hostilities” rules for international armed conflict. However, as indicated in the ICRC study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, with some nuances, those rules generally reflect customary law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflict.

It is also essential to understand that the LOAC targeting rules apply to the Israeli campaign against the Oct. 7 attackers even though there has been a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas since October 2025 (ICRC 2025 Commentaries, common art. 3, para 564 (“[A]rmed confrontations sometimes continue well beyond the conclusion or unilateral pronouncement of a formal act such as a ceasefire, armistice or peace agreement. Relying solely on the existence of such agreements to determine the end of a non-international armed conflict could therefore lead to a premature end of the applicability of international humanitarian law in situations when, in fact, a conflict continues.”). A ceasefire, standing alone, is but a temporary suspension of hostilities (Hague Regulations, art. 36; see also here). In this regard, the ceasefire agreement provides, “All military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment and targeting operations, will be suspended.” But from a LOAC perspective, the mere fact that an attack might have breached a ceasefire term is irrelevant for our purposes; it does not render an otherwise lawful attack under LOAC unlawful. Whether the attack breaches a LOAC obligation depends instead on who was targeted and how.

Lawful Targets

Before turning to who may be targeted in the campaign, it is essential to dispel one red herring. Revenge, retribution, or retaliation cannot provide the legal basis for an attack. Public statements and the reported prioritization of targets whose deaths may console victims’ families make motive relevant to how the campaign is perceived. But motive is not the legal test. The question is whether the individual is targetable at the time of attack and whether the attack otherwise complies with LOAC limitations on how and when an attack may be mounted. 

During an armed conflict, it is permissible to attack members of the enemy armed forces and civilians who are directly participating in hostilities for such time as they are participating (Customary IHL study, Rules 1, 4, 6). The Israeli campaign implicates both categories.

Those involved in the Oct. 7 attacks are neither “combatants” nor members of “dissident armed forces,” well-known categories of targetable individuals in international and non-international armed conflict, respectively. However, under international law applicable to both types of armed conflict, “organized armed groups” are also treated as “armed forces” for targeting purposes, and their members may be attacked while serving in that group (DoD Law of War Manual, § 5.7.1; Customary IHL study, Rule 4; Interpretive Guidance, page 32; AP I, art. 43). 

When a group consists of both fighting and non-fighting components, only the former qualify as an organized armed group. Thus, in this case, membership in Hamas does not, on its own, render an individual targetable. Rather, only those who are members of the fighting component (the “overall organized armed group”) and leaders who exercise control over both the fighting and non-fighting functions of Hamas are targetable on the former basis. In Hamas, the overall organized armed group comprises its fighting wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, and other sub-organizations that are directly involved in Hamas’s military operations, but not, for instance, those elements of the organization that provide social services. Palestinian Islamic Jihad may be easier to characterize as an organized armed group in its entirety, at least to the extent it has no meaningful non-military component. The key point is that individuals may be targeted based on their “status” as members of an organized armed group, rather than on their individual conduct at the time of the attack. 

An open question is whether all members of the group may be attacked. The U.S. position, with which Mike agrees, is that “[l]ike members of an enemy State’s armed forces, individuals who are formally or functionally part of a non-State armed group that is engaged in hostilities may be made the object of attack because they likewise share in their group’s hostile intent” (DoD Law of War Manual, § 5.7.3). 

By contrast, the ICRC has argued that only group members who have a “continuous combat function”– like serving in a combat role, gathering intelligence actionable at the tactical level of war, or transporting ammunition to active fighting positions on the front line– are targetable based on their membership. The ICRC explains that the criterion “distinguishes members of the organized fighting forces of a non-State party from civilians who directly participate in hostilities on a merely spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized basis, or who assume exclusively political, administrative or other non-combat functions (Interpretive Guidance, page 34). Critics view the approach as impractical and imbalanced, especially in unconventional warfare, since members without a continuous combat function may not be attacked on the basis of membership, whereas their counterparts in the regular armed forces performing the same functions may be (see, e.g., Watkin). But its proponents respond that the State does not need to rely on members of its armed forces for non-combat roles, and the decision to make them members of the armed forces comes with its own tradeoffs.

Much has been written about the controversy, but for our purposes, suffice it to say that, at least,  any current member of Hamas’s overall organized armed group or Islamic Jihad whose role in the organization is related to the conduct of hostilities is targetable around the clock. This would be true whether or not an individual participated in the Oct. 7 massacre or what their role was in that attack. 

But it must be cautioned that the mere fact that individuals participated in the attacks while they were members of an organized armed group has not, as such, rendered them targetable now. They must be members at the time they are killed; once they have left an organized armed group, their targetability depends on whether they are directly participating in hostilities at the time of an Israeli lethal operation against them, that is, the second basis for attacking them.

Under LOAC, a civilian who is not a member of an organized armed group (or does not have a continuous combat function under the ICRC interpretation) may be attacked if “directly participating in the hostilities,” a standard that applies equally in both international and non-international armed conflict (Customary IHL study, Rule 6; AP I, art. 51.3; AP II, art. 13.3) Unlike members of organized armed groups, however, direct participants may be targeted only “for such time” as they are so participating. The two central issues surrounding direct participation are, therefore, which actions qualify as direct participation and the scope of the “for such time” limitation.

In its Interpretive Guidance on direct participation, the ICRC has identified three constitutive elements that qualify an act as direct participation. Although there is some controversy over their application in concrete situations, these elements are generally considered an accurate characterization of the law (page 46).

1. the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm), and
2. there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and 
3. the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus).

We view the ICRC’s three-element framework as a useful and generally accurate synthesis of existing law, while recognizing that reasonable disagreement persists over whether these elements reflect the correct interpretation of the law in the first place. Notwithstanding those debates, there is universal agreement on the rule itself.

Most of the controversy regarding the rule’s actual application centers on the causation element, specifically whether certain acts constitute direct participation that opens the door to an attack, or merely indirect participation. For instance, there is disagreement over whether those who merely build weapons that are subsequently used by others qualify as targetable direct participants. 

There is no question that almost every act directly associated with the Oct. 7 attacks qualifies as direct participation in the hostilities and would have rendered all those individuals who were not members of organized armed groups targetable while the attack was unfolding. However, targetability based on direct participation is subject to a time constraint; it is available only “for such time” as the participation is underway. 

The scope of the for such time limitation has been the subject of significant disagreement. The ICRC takes the narrow view that the period of targetability is limited to “measures preparatory to the execution of a specific act of direct participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment to and the return from the location of its execution” (Interpretive Guidance, page 65). The late Yoram Dinstein took a broader view, according to which, “it is necessary to go as far as is reasonably required both ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ from the actual engagement” to determine the relevant time span during which an attack is permitted. (Conduct of Hostilities, page 201; see also Boothby). Some States, including the United States, have articulated positions that align somewhere in between, emphasizing that civilians who repeatedly take a direct part in hostilities may be targetable for the duration of their participation and that the temporal window is informed by an unbroken chain of causation between the preparatory, execution, and return phases of specific hostile acts (see, e.g., DoD Law of War Manual, § 5.8.4).

Of particular relevance vis-à-vis the Israeli campaign is the Israeli Supreme Court Targeted Killings case, which guides the IDF at least as a matter of domestic Israeli law. There, the court reviewed IDF targeting operations through the lens of LOAC, including the rule relating to the loss of protection by civilians directly participating in the hostilities. In doing so, the court tackled the “for such time” limitation and, while admitting that this question calls for a case-by-case approach, made a distinction between two situations (¶ 40): 

On the one hand, a civilian who takes a direct part in hostilities on a single occasion or sporadically, but has severed his connection with them (whether entirely or for a lengthy period), should not be attacked. On the other hand, we must avoid a phenomenon of the revolving door, whereby every terrorist may invoke sanctuary or claim refuge while he is resting and making preparations, so that he has protection from being attacked.

Notably, following the court’s decision, the ICRC’s continuing combat function test may be seen as an attempt to address the second category; it’s unclear how the court would have decided these issues with the benefit of the status-based targeting category that the ICRC’s framework allows.

All that said, there is no question that the participants in the Oct. 7 attacks were fully targetable as they prepared to carry them out, while they were underway, and as they returned to Gaza, even if they were not members of an organized armed group. However, even under Dinstein’s more relaxed interpretation of “for such time,” the vast majority of those who directly participated in the Oct. 7 attacks would not remain targetable today on that basis alone. Unless they are current members of an organized armed group or are otherwise presently engaged in acts amounting to direct participation in hostilities, their past participation, in and of itself, does not render them targetable. Such perpetrators would fall within the first category of examples given by the Israeli Supreme Court. 

It must be cautioned, however, that past participation nevertheless matters with respect to membership in an organized armed group and direct participation. Such participation can support, as an evidentiary matter, the conclusion that an individual is still a member of an organized armed group. It may also be relevant to assessing whether the individual is planning or preparing attacks. But neither proposition collapses the distinction between indicia of targetability and targetability itself.

Limitations on Attacks

Obviously, the IDF must adequately verify the status of those it attacks in this campaign. The reported reliance on facial recognition, intercepted communications, and location data also underscores this obligation. The issue is not whether advanced technology, including artificial intelligence, may be used; it may. Rather, it is whether the information available at the time, assessed in good faith and considering the system’s limitations, reasonably establishes that the individual is a lawful target (Targeting Killings case, ¶ 40; DoD Law of War Manual, § 5.4.3.2). 

This conclusion is not defeated merely because some doubt remains. Targeting law does not require certainty. As the DoD Law of War Manual explains, commanders and other decision-makers “must presume that persons or objects are protected from being made the object of attack unless the information available at the time indicates that the persons or objects are military objectives,” with that presumption serving as the starting point for the exercise of good-faith military judgment (§ 5.4.3.2). Thus, residual uncertainty does not preclude attack when the available intelligence reasonably establishes current membership in an organized armed group or direct participation in hostilities. Doubt only becomes legally decisive when the evidence does not reach that threshold; where the intelligence does not reliably establish current membership in an organized armed group or direct participation at the time of the lethal operation, the individual may not be attacked merely because they appear on an Oct. 7 list. 

Even if the individuals who participated in the Oct. 7 attacks qualify as members of an organized armed group or as direct participants at the time they are attacked, the strike must comply with the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions in attack. The former prohibits  “[l]aunching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” (Customary IHL study, Rule 14; AP I, arts. 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii); DoD Law of War Manual, § 5.10). Accordingly, when planning an attack, the IDF is obligated to assess the likely collateral damage to civilian objects or incidental injury to civilians to ensure it is not excessive to the military advantage generated by killing the target. For instance, the al-Haddad strike, in which 13 bombs were dropped on an apartment and a car trying to leave, also killed his wife, daughter, and several other civilians. Those whom the IDF expected to harm when executing that strike would have had to be factored into the proportionality assessment under the law.

The essential point regarding the campaign is that the advantage must, as noted by Dinstein, “be military and not purely political” (page 122; see also ICRC Commentary to AP I, ¶¶ 2207-09). This being so, it is appropriate for the IDF to consider, for instance, how killing a lawfully targetable individual who participated in the Oct. 7 attacks will affect Hamas’s current or future military operations or capabilities. By contrast, general deterrence, public reassurance, or the satisfaction of retribution is too diffuse or otherwise beyond the bounds to be weighed as the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from a particular attack. (DoD Law of War Manual, § 5.12.2). As the ICRC Commentary to Article 57 of Additional Protocol I explains, “The expression ‘concrete and direct’ was intended to show that the advantage concerned should be substantial and relatively close, and that advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would only appear in the long term should be disregarded… A military advantage can only consist in ground gained and in annihilating or weakening the enemy armed forces.” (¶¶ 2209 and 2218).

Such attacks must also comply with the requirement to take precautions in attack (Customary IHL study, Rule 15; DoD Law of War Manual, § 5.11; AP I, art. 57) This requires that they be planned, approved, and executed in a manner that poses the least risk of harm to civilians and civilian objects, so long as no military advantage is sacrificed to minimize civilian harm. In the context of the Israeli campaign, for instance, it would be unlawful to conduct an operation against lawful targets, but that is designed to send a message to those in Gaza, if doing so would present a greater risk to civilians and civilian objects than alternative means of killing the individuals.

Concluding Thoughts

The key legal point is straightforward. Participation in the Oct. 7 attacks did not place every participant indefinitely beyond the protection of the law of armed conflict. Under LOAC, individuals may be targeted because they are current members of an organized armed group or because they are presently directly participating in hostilities. But absent one of those bases for targetability, past participation alone does not suffice. And, indeed, past participation in the Oct. 7 massacre would not be necessary either. 

This does not mean many of the reported Israeli operations are unlawful. Al-Qassam Brigade, other Hamas entities that regularly support its military operations, or Islamic Jihad operatives are lawful military objectives regardless of their role on Oct. 7. Likewise, individuals who participated in the attacks and are currently directly supporting or conducting attacks may be targeted. This is so even if a motive for the strikes is retribution for their past conduct. But that cannot be the sole purpose or legal basis. Ultimately, the legality of the campaign under LOAC turns not on the horror of the attacks the people of Israel suffered, which is unquestionable, but on the status and activities of those targeted at the time force is used against them.

The post “Hunting” the October 7 Attackers: What the Law of Armed Conflict Permits – and What It Doesn’t appeared first on Just Security.

A Sting interceptor costs about $2,500. In comparison, a single U.S.-made Patriot interceptor missile that does the same job costs more than $3 million and requires significantly more time and resources to build and operate than a drone. Lockheed Martin produced approximately 600 of the most advanced PAC-3 type of Patriot missiles last year; meanwhile, the Ukrainian Armed Forces used about 700 of these interceptors in the span of only four winter months in 2025-2026.

The conflict in the Middle East has further exposed the shortcomings of a high-end, slow-production approach to defense systems. In March 2026, when Iran launched hundreds of Shaheds at Persian Gulf states, countries with the most advanced U.S.-supplied air defense systems outside NATO watched their defense capabilities erode as their interceptor stockpiles drained quickly. The air defense systems worked as intended, yet they were not designed to protect against the intensity and scale of Iran’s attacks.

Kyiv is building drones in massive quantities out of wartime necessity against Russia’s ongoing full-scale assault, now in its fifth year. A key part of that necessity is Russia’s large-scale use of Iranian-made Shahed drones against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. That Russian campaign has raised serious questions about Iran’s responsibility under international law. In response, Ukraine is rewriting the global rules of air power and air defense, replacing sheer mass and large stockpiles of weapons as key factors in warfare with the benefits of quantity, speed, and the ability to learn faster than the enemy. It is a novel and adaptive, low-cost military-industrial model that is already catching the interest of other countries.

Ukraine’s Military Spending Growth

Throughout 2025, Russia launched more than 54,000 Shahed-type drones against Ukraine. These drones, made from commercial parts, cost as much as $50,000 each. Each drone required a response. Copying an expensive foreign solution to this problem was not an option, so Ukraine built its own.

That was not easy. Ukraine’s military spending consumes an estimated 40 percent of its GDP compared with Russia’s 7.5 percent. Yet its overall military spending is less than half that of Russia, so it adapted by accelerating its production cycle. Ukraine now produces 6 to 9 times as many drones per person of working age than Russia.

This shift gave rise to what Ukrainians now call “Mala PPO” (small-scale air defense). This anti-drone ecosystem includes interceptor drones, mobile fire units, and automated anti-aircraft guns – all reducing the need for expensive missiles. By early 2026, Ukrainian firms were producing up to 1,000 interceptor drones each day. In February alone, these drones accounted for 70 percent of Shahed intercepts in the Kyiv region.

Offensive Use

Mass use of drones goes beyond interception. It also includes offensive operations, even on the ground. A spike in Ukrainian production of land-warfare first-person-view (FPV) drones), small and nimble aircraft controlled remotely through a headset that streams live video from the drone’s camera, lets a single operator guide it accurately to a target. Each drone costs between $300 and $400. This has offered a partial solution to Ukraine’s shortage of artillery ammunition. FPV drone-production grew from about 3,000-5,000 units per year in 2022 to about 3 million in 2025. As of early 2026, Ukraine’s defense industry could produce more than 8 million FPV drones annually.

In addition to the FPV drones used on the front lines, Ukraine has new long-range drones that are much more costly to produce but can target oil refineries, ammunition depots, and military airbases deep inside Russia. They work alongside Western-supplied missiles, such as the Anglo-French Storm Shadow and the U.S.-made ATACMS, while avoiding the higher per-unit costs and the restrictions imposed by international partners for the weapons they provide. Ukrainian drones have hit targets more than 1,500 kilometers (932 miles) from the frontline — distances at which few Western governments would allow attacks against Russia with their own weapons.

The June 2025 “Spiderweb” operation, a coordinated long-range drone strike launched simultaneously against multiple Russian airfields deep inside Russian territory, illustrates yet another new form of Ukrainian drone deployment. It took only 117 FPV drones costing about $117,000 altogether to damage or destroy more than 40 Russian aircraft across five airbases valued at more than $7 billion. Long-range Ukrainian drone strikes have also targeted oil extraction, refining, and fuel infrastructure hundreds of miles from the frontline, periodically forcing shutdowns and compelling Russia to redirect its resources from the front.

Home-produced long-range unmanned systems allow Ukraine to strike targets deep inside Russia while avoiding the need to get permission that likely wouldn’t be granted to use weapons provided by Western allies to hit targets inside Russian territory. The debate over these restrictions has been a constant part of the war. The United States and its partners have repeatedly limited or conditioned Ukraine’s ability to strike beyond its borders with arms supplied by the West. In contrast to Western-supplied missiles such as ATACMS or Storm Shadow, which cost more than $1 million per unit and may be subject to those kinds of restrictions, Ukrainian drones can be used freely, and cost between $400 (for tactical frontline operations) and $400,000.

Ukraine’s economic model of high production and rapid technological improvement could be called “drone Keynesianism,” borrowing from John Maynard Keynes’s argument that governments can solve structural problems through massive, sustained spending on production. Rather than producing drones itself, the Ukrainian state procures the weapons, creating a constant market demand to which hundreds of competing private firms respond. The state sets the floor through defense orders, subsidies, and fast-track contracting, but does not control the ceiling.

As a result, more than 500 companies now manufacture drones in Ukraine, with roughly 40 to 50 of them considered market leaders. The private sector makes up about 90 percent of FPV output. There are no national champions, no guaranteed contracts, and no five-year plans. Success is measured not so much through fulfilling procurement specifications, but by whether the technology performs under fire.

Constant Tech Iteration in Wartime

Can the Ukrainian model be copied? Russia has been trying to do so over the last several years. Iran built its Shahed drones under conditions of sanctions and used components anyone can order online. The United States has recovered these drones from the Ukrainian battlefields, reverse-engineered them, and created its own low-cost clone — the LUCAS attack system — within months. However, copying a design is not the same as developing the economic and social ecosystem that enables constant technological iteration under conditions of war. That is what Ukraine has, and, so far, no other country has replicated it.

The ecosystem’s first key element is its feedback loop. Ukrainian engineers work alongside combat units, receiving live performance data and returning modified systems back to the frontline within weeks. Some brigades rework up to half of the delivered drones before deploying them. Such improvisation would grind most standard Western procurement programs to a shutdown — modification of delivered equipment without manufacturer sign-off is rarely if ever permitted under European or U.S. defense contracting rules.

The Ukrainian feedback loop functions as a form of quality control conducted under real-world, rather than lab or test-field conditions. The European Union’s standard defense certification cycle can run years. Ukraine’s runs weeks.

The second core element of the Ukrainian drone-production ecosystem is its institutional culture. Russia’s military-industrial complex is built around state giants, like Rostec or the Kalashnikov Combine, and works on long-term guaranteed contracts. That may be good for scaling up a proven design. But a jamming technique that works today, for example, may be useless by next month if the adversaries adapt. Typically, centralized systems cannot swiftly react to quick changes on the battlefield. Europe’s procurement, organized around prime contractors like the French Airbus and Thales, the German Rheinmetall, is also built on multi-year development procedures. They try to reduce risks before deployment rather than learn from failures on the battlefield — the ideal scenario, of course, but not always feasible.

Lastly, the Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles production ecosystem depends on talent. The same software engineers and electronics designers who built Ukraine’s pre-war technology-export sector now run the drone economy. What happened after the 2022 full-scale invasion could be called a “dronization without militarization” of the economy. It has its advantages and disadvantages.

Industry Risk

The prospect of declining state demand has inspired small enterprises to seek dual-use innovation rather than locking themselves into permanent military production dependent on continuously high defense spending. However, since 2022, Ukraine’s military-industrial complex has suffered from brain drain. More than 120,000 IT and engineering professionals have left Ukraine. One large Kyiv defense company alone, for instance, has more than 700 unfilled technical vacancies.

The talent problem is one part of Ukraine’s broader industrial fragility. Almost 89 percent of Ukrainian drone producers depend on Chinese components. The supply chain from Beijing has been tightening since 2023. And procurement is reactive. Despite the industry’s efforts to diversify with dual-use manufacturing, without predictable demand from the biggest customer, manufacturers cannot plan. Units sometimes wait months for equipment that arrives already outdated.

In the meantime, Western aid, though crucial, is poorly structured. It is irregular, aimed at battlefield gaps rather than industrial stability. If the war ends quickly, a production base designed to produce 7 million drones annually will face a sudden drop in demand.

Yet, new opportunities for Ukraine’s drone production ecosystems have emerged recently. After years of needing and receiving Western weapons, Ukraine began massively exporting its own technologies and expertise in 2026. Kyiv has opened 10 weapons export offices across Europe and agreed to supply Gulf states with its complete air defense package, including maritime drones, electronic warfare systems, and interception technology.

These are not standard arms deals. Ukraine is not selling a finished product to a passive buyer. It is offering partner countries something closer to a living ecosystem: the production templates, engineering expertise, and feedback-loop methodology that allow a buyer to manufacture, modify, and improve drone systems on their own soil. When a country buys a billion-dollar Patriot battery, it acquires defense capability, but not the seller’s knowledge and ability to adapt. When the threat changes, as it did with Iran’s massive Shahed attacks, the buyer needs to return to the market to buy a new capability.

Over the past four years, Western governments have debated and rationed weapons deliveries to Ukraine, including Patriot missiles. To sustain its war effort and secure a reliable weapons supply, Ukraine therefore had no other choice but to lessen its dependence on the West. Ukraine created an industrial system in which knowledge is local, adaptation is ongoing, and responding to new threats does not require a call to Washington.

By contrast, much of Europe and the United States is still reading from an older map. The opportunity to change that, with Ukraine as a full partner, is there to be taken.

* * *

(Author’s note: A more extensive outline of the rise of Ukraine’s “dronized” economy can be found in a recent EPIK Policy Brief.)

The post How Ukraine Became a Drone Superpower appeared first on Just Security.

The catalog below organizes our collection of articles primarily about the war into general categories to facilitate access to relevant topics for policymakers, researchers, journalists, scholars, and the public at large. The archive will be updated as new pieces are published.

We welcome readers to use the archive to follow the unfolding situation and generate new lines of analysis. To search headlines and authors, expand one or all of the topics, as needed, and use CTRL-F on your keyboard to open the search tool. The archive also is available in reverse chronological order at the Israel-Hamas War articles page.

The post Just Security’s Israel-Hamas War Archive appeared first on Just Security.

A curated guide to major news and developments over the weekend. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR – CEASEFIRE 

President Trump on Friday requested several changes to a proposed deal to extend the existing ceasefire with Iran and reopen the Strait of Hormuz during a Situation Room meeting, sources said. The exact changes are unknown, but officials said Trump insisted on tougher language surrounding Iran’s nuclear commitments. Another source said Trump wanted some of the wording around reopening the Strait of Hormuz amended as well. One foreign official said the changes are not substantive and mostly center on the U.S. desire for assurances on key issues. Kevin Liptak, Logan Shiciano, and Kathleen Magramo report for CNN; Marck Caputo and Barak Ravid report for Axios.

The United States carried out further “self-defense” strikes in Iran over the weekend, targeting Iranian radar and command and control sites. U.S. Central Command said last night that the strikes were a response to “aggressive Iranian actions that included the shootdown of a US MQ-1 drone opening over international waters.” Meanwhile, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said it struck a U.S. air base, allegedly used to launch an attack on a telecommunications tower on Iran’s Sirik Island, according to Iranian state media outlets. The IRGC’s announcement came after Kuwait reported it repelled drone and missile attacks. Kevin Liptak, Logan Shiciano, and Kathleen Magramo report for CNN; Yan Zhuang reports for the New York Times.  

IRAN WAR – LEBANON OPERATIONS 

Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Israeli Prime Minister Benjaim Netanyahu over the weekend, putting forward a plan to allow for “gradual de-escalation” between Israel and Lebanon, a U.S. official said yesterday. Rubio proposed that, as a first step, Hezbollah would stop all attacks on Israel, and in return, Israel would refrain from escalation in Beirut. Aoun tried to advance the proposal; however, Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said Israel had to stop shooting first. Reuters reports.  

The Israeli military captured a strategic, Crusader-era Beaufort castle in southern Lebanon yesterday, following days of fighting in the area. “From Beaufort Ridge, Hezbollah terrorists managed military and combat activities and carried out numerous attacks,” the IDF said. Netanyahu yesterday praised the operation, saying, “We returned to Beaufort stronger than ever.” Kareem El Damahoury and Todd Symons report for CNN; Aaron Boxerman and Natan Odenheimer report for the New York Times.  

“Now my directive is to deepen and expand our hold on areas that had been under Hezbollah’s control,” Netanyahu announced yesterday. The IDF said it had “expanded its operations against Hezbollah targets north of the [Litani] river” and in “additional areas.” Kareem El Damahoury and Todd Symons report for CNN.

Netanyahu today ordered an attack on the Hezbollah-controlled southern suburbs of Beirut. A Lebanese source said Netanyahu’s announcement reflected the deterioration of the U.S-led diplomatic track in recent days. Citing the escalating violence in Lebanon, France has called for an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council. Reuters reports.   

IRAN WAR – OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 

U.S. forces in recent weeks have helped coordinate the passage of around 70 commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, according to U.S. officials. The officials said that most of the vessels had turned off their transponders to avoid detection when going through the narrow waterway. Peter Eavis and Eric Schmitt report for the New York Times. 

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR

An Israeli airstrike killed at least two Palestinians and wounded 12 yesterday at a Gaza cafe packed with people celebrating public holidays, Gaza health officials said. Reuters reports.  

“To call it a ceasefire is a joke,” one Israeli soldier told AP News during an interview about the ongoing situation in Gaza. Three soldiers described a sense of confusion among forces, with a lack of clarity on the rules of engagement around the yellow line. Some commanders paid lip service to the ceasefire agreement, while privately voicing a desire for the war in Gaza to continue, the soldiers said. Sam Mednick reports.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR 

Ukraine’s presidential envoy on sanctions policy, Vladyslav Vlasiuk, said in recent days that fragments of an Oreshnik ballistic missile that Russia fired at Ukraine on May 24 contained microchips from Belarus. Vlasiuk urged Western allies to tighten sanctions enforcement against Belarus. Yuras Karmanau reports for AP News.  

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

The Ta’ang National Liberation Army said yesterday that an accidental explosion of material stored for mining killed multiple people in Myanmar’s Kaung Tat village. The BBC and local ​news outlet Shwe Phee Myay News Agency said at ​least 55 people had died, ‌and ⁠that dozens more were wounded. The TNLA said the incident was being investigated. Reuters reports.  

Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary and President To Lam told Reuters on Friday that there was no contradiction in seeking stronger relations with China and ensuring progress in solving the ongoing territorial disputes across the South China Sea. Greg Torode reports. 

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Hundreds of young people in Nanyuki, Kenya, demonstrated today against the establishment of an Ebola quarantine center for U.S. citizens at the Laikipia Air Base. The protests come two days after Kenya’s High Court suspended the facility’s establishment, pending a hearing on Tuesday. Kenyan Health Minister Aden Duale said yesterday that the quarantine center was for “everyone” and not exclusively for U.S. nationals, while Rubio said the U.S. government intends to commit $13.5 million toward Kenya’s Ebola preparedness efforts. Evelyne Musambi reports for AP News. 

“When our interests align, we act together with focused resolve,” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore over the weekend. “When our interests diverge, we adjust pragmatically without the drama or the moralising. I think Western Europe might take note.” Gregor Stuart Hunter, Rae Wee, and Jun Yuan Yong report for Reuters.  

A senior U.S. military officer met with Cuban counterparts at the perimeter of Guantánamo Bay Naval Station on Friday, where they had a brief exchange on security matters regarding the base, which continues to hold 15 prisoners, according to a post by U.S. Southern Command. Cuba’s government said the meeting was “positive.” Carol Rosenberg, Julian E. Barnes, and Eric Schmitt report for the New York Times.  

U.S. CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

The U.S. military on Friday killed a further three men in a strike against an alleged drug smuggling boat in the eastern Pacific Ocean, U.S. Southern Command announced on Saturday. According to Brown University, the costs of the operation are now at $4.7 billion. Narcotics experts say the boat strikes have failed to slow the smuggling of cocaine from South America to the United States. Julian E. Barnes reports for the New York Times.  

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS 

The Department of Homeland Security said on Friday that it would be up to individual immigration officers to decide whether someone should be forced to go abroad to gain a green card, adding that officers had long had such discretion. The announcement appeared to be a partial walk-back of a change announced last month that immigrants seeking permanent residency would have to return home to do so. Hamed Aleaziz, Madeleine Ngo, and Lydia DePillis report for the New York Times.  

Police on Friday arrested an ICE officer in Texas on four counts of second-degree assault for the non-fatal shooting of Venezuelan immigrant Julio Cesar Sosa-Celis in Minnesota in January, and one count of falsely reporting a crime for his actions in the aftermath. Gregory Svirnovksiy reports for POLITICO. 

Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin is considering pulling some customs staff from Newark’s airport to help federal officials respond to protests at Delaney Hall, a nearby immigration detention facility, two administration officials said. New Jersey Gov. Mikie Sherrill (D) announced plans Friday to create protected protest zones around the Delaney Hall facility to try to “lower the temperature” there — a decision Mullin praised as a “win for law and order.” But Sherrill also called the idea of pulling federal customs officials from Newark Liberty International Airport “completely ridiculous,” citing the upcoming FIFA World Cup. Myah Ward and Oriana Pawlyk report for POLITICO.  

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

Roughly one in five lawyers who worked in the federal government at the end of 2024 had left by March 2026, according to a New York Times analysis of federal employment data, amounting to an exodus of more than 10,000 lawyers. Many departing lawyers cite staffing cuts, disagreements with administration policies, and concerns about political pressure, with many moving to state attorneys general offices, nonprofits, and advocacy groups that are challenging the administration in court. Eileen Sullivan and Andrea Fuller report. 

Former Attorney General Pam Bondi on Friday declined to answer any questions from members of the House Oversight Committee about Trump’s involvement in anything surrounding the Epstein files, according to Democratic lawmakers. Bondi reportedly also said the Committee would need to direct many of its questions to acting Attorney General Todd Blanche. Perry Stein and Maegan Vazquez report for the Washington Post.

Louisiana Republicans on Friday passed a new gerrymander that will eliminate one of the state’s two Democratic, majority-Black House districts. Andrew Howard reports for POLITICO.  

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION 

A federal judge on Friday barred the Trump administration from taking steps to launch Trump’s $1.8 billion “anti-weaponization” fund. The order prohibits the government from establishing the fund or processing disbursements until a hearing is held in June. Zach Montague reports for the New York Times.

A federal judge on Friday ruled that Trump’s effort to rebrand the Kennedy Center in his own name is illegal, stating that it violated the clear language of federal law that requires the building to honor “President Kennedy and President Kennedy alone.” The order came as part of a broader ruling that also overturned a plan announced in March to close the center for two years of renovations. Kyle Cheney and Josh Gerstein report for POLITICO.

The American Civil Liberties Union and other groups filed a lawsuit on Friday over alleged human rights abuses at the United States’ largest immigration detention center in El Paso, Texas. A DHS spokesperson said claims that there are inhumane conditions at the camp are categorically false. Andrew Hay reports for Reuters. 

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions.

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The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 has created an unprecedented opening to address this crisis. For the first time, it has become possible to conduct search efforts on Syrian soil and to engage directly with families of the missing in their country. There is also a new national mechanism dedicated to clarifying the fate and whereabouts of the missing, the Syrian National Commission on Missing Persons (NCMP), which was established by presidential decree in May 2025.

As the head of the Independent Institution of Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic (IIMP), established by the United Nations General Assembly in 2023 and mandated to clarify the whereabouts of the missing and support their families, I have witnessed both the scale of the challenge and the emergence of new possibilities. This moment presents a critical opportunity to apply lessons learned from other contexts and to avoid repeating past mistakes. The analysis and recommendations throughout this article draw directly from my experience working on these complex and demanding issues across diverse contexts.

From Advocacy to Global Norms

For decades, families of the missing across the globe have led the search for their loved ones, demanding truth, justice, and recognition. Women—because they are overwhelmingly women—have tirelessly sought to locate their family members, an anguishing and exhausting process. Families have demanded clear and immediate answers—an “immediate” that has stretched unbearably long.

The mobilization by these families has been the principal catalyst for normative and institutional developments—the adoption of laws and treaties, the creation of specialized national and international search mechanisms, and the development of public policies.

The international community and individual states have recognized enforced disappearance as a distinct violation, defined as the deprivation of liberty by state agents, or by individuals or groups acting with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the state, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation or concealment of the person’s fate or whereabouts (See: the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; and the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons). The concept of a “missing person” expands beyond enforced disappearance. It encompasses not only individuals whose fate or whereabouts are unknown as a consequence of a crime or a human rights violation committed by state or non-state actors, but may also include persons presumed missing in contexts marked by conflict, violence, instability, institutional collapse, or natural disasters. This broader concept reflects the realities faced by families as well as practitioners working across different contexts who are looking for thousands of missing persons.

The Four Elements

Decades of collective experience has shown that responding effectively to large-scale patterns of disappearance requires concrete action through the implementation of evidence- and practice-based knowledge. Most countries with tens and hundreds of thousands of missing persons have created, or already had in place, specialized extraordinary search mechanisms—national, international, or hybrid. We also know that the search for missing persons is not only an ethical or humanitarian undertaking; it is also inherently political, financial, technical, and ultimately transformative in character. The issue of the missing permeates society as a whole, and responding to it in a responsible manner, based on proven methodologies, is central to processes of stabilization and peacebuilding. And yet, comparative shows there are still numerous misconceptions worldwide surrounding the search for the missing—namely, that it can be done rapidly; that mass graves can or should be immediately exhumed; that DNA is the sole solution; that a single database can resolve the issue; or that the process can be accomplished through funding or laboratories, without more. It has also often wrongly assumed that the task can or should be managed by a single entity, whether national or international. While some of these assumptions may seem intuitive, experience has consistently shown them to be inaccurate, particularly when not embedded within a comprehensive, multidisciplinary, and coordinated strategy.

In my experience leading, coordinating with, and advising national search mechanisms, four elements are indispensable to improving the chances of providing answers to families in contexts where tens or hundreds of thousands remain unaccounted for. First, there must be genuine political will on the part of both the state and the international community. Second, there must be sustained efforts to build and preserve trust with families of the missing and among broader stakeholders. Third, access to and sharing of the broadest possible range of information between involved entities is essential. And fourth, technical methodologies and procedures designed specifically for large-scale search operations must be established and implemented. Of course, as Syria clearly illustrates, these elements must be understood as operating within a broader framework of state obligations.

I. Political Will

Political will on the part of the state includes first acknowledging the existence of a disappearance crisis that requires extraordinary and specialized mechanisms; engaging genuinely with families; enacting specific legislation and reforming existing laws; and resolving institutional tensions. It also entails allocating adequate resources to build institutional infrastructure and investing in specialized national capacities. It requires adopting as well large-scale search methodologies. Ultimately, a robust institutional framework—anchored in sustained legal authority and reliable funding—enables search processes to advance consistently and effectively.

Political will is equally necessary beyond national borders, requiring effective coordination and sustained collaboration with specialized international and technical organizations, as well as continued engagement by the international community. Such engagement must be both political and financial, supporting a clear public policy capable of addressing a large-scale, multidisciplinary process over the short, medium, and long term. It also demands concrete measures to facilitate the sharing of information among national and international stakeholders.

The search for the missing in contexts with thousands of cases does not occur in a vacuum. Countries facing disappearance crises often confront broader challenges, particularly in contexts of ongoing conflict or transition (as is certainly the case in Syria). Urgent needs include financial, health, housing, educational, infrastructural, and security concerns, alongside demands for truth and justice. Addressing these while advancing the search for the missing is integral to rebuilding the social fabric and preventing recurrence.

II. Trust

The greater the trust among all relevant actors, the more freely information flows, the faster the processes are implemented, and the higher the likelihood of providing answers.

The information and accumulated knowledge held by families and civil society organizations, as well as their participation and confidence, constitute essential components of any search process. Building trust between national authorities and families of the missing in contexts marked by violence and political transition is challenging but achievable. It requires engagement, transparency, inclusivity, careful management of expectations and accountability.

The search process typically must involve a wide range of domestic institutions, including prosecutorial authorities, judicial bodies, forensic services, law enforcement agencies, military institutions, civil registries, legislative actors, and dedicated search mechanisms. Trust among these entities is essential for ensuring access to information, enabling the effective implementation of processes, and the development of a credible and coherent state response.

At the international level, specialized institutions must be able to coordinate and share information. Trust amongst international actors enhances not only the outcomes of search efforts, but also the prospects of financial and political support for ongoing search efforts. To maintain cooperation and trust at this level, it is crucial that international actors recognize and respect national ownership of the search process, also bearing in mind that national authorities bear the primary responsibility to the crisis. Undoubtedly, building trust requires recognition that the search process should be led at the national level, given that primary responsibility of the national authorities, as well as the fact that they possess the greatest access to information. At the same time, national authorities must recognize that this process cannot be carried out in isolation, and that decades of accumulated experience available at the international level must be taken into account and applied jointly, with the shared aim of providing answers to the families of missing persons as promptly as possible.

III. Information

At its core, most times disappearance entails the deliberate—or at times de facto—suppression and fragmentation of information, regardless of its source. Relevant materials may reside in official archives, witness testimonies, journalistic investigations, administrative records, or other repositories. Each constitutes only a partial trace; taken together, they form an intricate mosaic. No single actor holds all the pieces, and those who do are not always willing to share them.

Numerous of the missing persons cases worldwide show that, had information been centralized or shared in real time, missing persons might have been located within days or months rather than years. These examples underscore that information-sharing is not abstract; it has a direct and tangible impact on families. Yet no country has successfully established a unified, comprehensive database on missing persons. Information remains dispersed among actors for legal, ethical, technical, or political reasons.

Families and civil society organizations often harbor deep mistrust toward authorities or other actors tasked with supporting them. National authorities—prosecutors’ offices, military institutions, police forces, hospitals, and detention centers—frequently invoke data protection, prosecutorial confidentiality, or national security to justify withholding information from one another and, often, from families. Even where dedicated search mechanisms exist, information remains fragmented and requires sustained legal, technical, and political efforts to coordinate and share. International organizations also face constraints arising from limitations within their mandates, the absence of family consent, or sometimes the reluctance of civil society actors to share information with them.

Over the past three decades, debates and regulatory frameworks on data protection and data sharing have developed significantly (see: here, and here). However, they have not fully engaged with all the specificities of the humanitarian mandate to search for missing persons—one that requires a distinct analytical and operational approach, while often intersecting with criminal justice systems and prosecutorial authorities.

Pending the establishment of comprehensive mechanisms, all actors involved in the search process should at least operate within structured arrangements identifying which institution holds which categories of information. Even knowing that a particular authority is actively searching for a specific person is a meaningful first step toward generating answers for families and society. The central challenge, therefore, is to establish communication channels that clarify who holds what information and how it can contribute to locating missing persons. Search is inherently a collective endeavor—no one can do it alone.

IV. Methodology

Once access to information has been secured, the subsequent challenge lies in the capacity to analyze, compare, contextualize, and systematically integrate that information into methodological frameworks designed for large-scale search operations, tailored to the specific context.

Over decades, experience has generated critical lessons regarding what works and what does not. Some initiatives, even if well-intentioned, have ultimately fallen short of delivering the expected results. The publication of photographs or documents, or the opening of a mass grave, if undertaken outside a carefully structured process, may generate isolated leads, but rarely delivers comprehensive answers to families and society at large. On the contrary, in certain instances, such actions delay the process of locating other missing persons. In many cases, they also retraumatize the families.

An extraordinary challenge—such as the disappearance of hundreds of thousands—demands extraordinary solutions, implemented through extraordinary mechanisms. Responses to crises of this magnitude cannot be fragmented, nor can they rely solely on ordinary national systems or on the international community acting in isolation.

We cannot assume that ordinary national justice and forensic systems are capable of simultaneously addressing mass disappearance crises and the routine demands arising from daily violence. Yet, all too often, the initial instinct of countries and societies facing such crises is precisely that: to rely on existing processes, methodologies, infrastructure, and personnel. The need to strengthen ordinary services—both to address daily and isolated cases and to ensure non-repetition—is indisputable. Yet this does not mean that conventional systems and structures possess the technical, legal, or methodological capacity to manage the extraordinary and highly technical process of searching for thousands of missing persons. What is required instead is a specialized, multidisciplinary approach and methodology designed for mass or generalized search efforts.

The international community, acting in isolation, is likewise operationally unable and politically constrained in resolving missing persons crisis of this magnitude in a sustained and durable manner. While notable examples of international engagement exist. Large-scale search is a complex, medium- and long-term undertaking that can only be carried out with a clear understanding of the local context. And of course, most of the highest-value information remains within national borders. The most essential role of the international community and organizations working on missing persons is to support and accompany national efforts in countries facing this crisis in the design and coordinated implementation of search processes: contributing with operational expertise through specialized entities, and providing critical political and financial support.

There are no quick fixes or magical formulas. A clear understanding of time—its weight, its demands, and its scale—is fundamental. Yet we know that, for families of the missing around the world, there is no time; we are already late. But the establishment of a large-scale methodology is not a “fastidious” or merely administrative step; it constitutes action. Such processes must be designed and implemented with the meaningful participation of families, whose engagement is essential to building systems capable of generating credible and trustworthy answers.

While every search must be tailored to its specific context, comparative experience with large-scale or generalized search, followed by targeted and individualized lines of inquiry, has shown that this approach remains, to date, the most effective means of improving the chances of providing answers to families of the missing, as illustrated by local or national experiences in countries such as Argentina, Guatemala and Mexico. In some instances, this approach has been implemented by civil society organizations rather than state authorities (see, e.g., the work of the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team and the Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundation).

Looking Ahead

Syria presents an opportunity, in the search for missing persons, to apply the most valuable lessons from past experiences around the globe and to avoid repeating the same mistakes. Sharing these lessons is a moral obligation for those of us who have lived through them or witnessed them firsthand. It is essential to remember that this work concerns suspended lives—not only those of the missing, but also those who live in anguish as they continue to wait for them, and the broader societies that feel their absence.

Just over a year after Syrians began to rewrite their history and open pathways of hope toward a different future, new possibilities are emerging despite many local and regional challenges. Sixteen months ago, it was inconceivable that search efforts could be conducted directly on Syrian territory, or that a national institution dedicated to this task would be established—one with which national and international actors could begin to collaborate.

Today, as we implement our broad mandate alongside families and allies, the Independent Institution on Missing Persons is also developing concrete projects with the Syrian National Commission for Missing Persons. Through these initiatives, and with the understanding that a trustworthy network must be built among all those involved, operational and methodological lessons are being shared, and support is offered for the development of technical, legal, and procedural frameworks for the search for missing persons and assistance to their families.

As families frequently remind us, searching for the missing is not about words—it is about action. It is also about processes. Rebuilding a country, creating institutions, and achieving social reconciliation are processes that unfold in stages. The search for missing persons is no different: it is a collective undertaking requiring a clear methodology grounded in a multidisciplinary mass-search approach, access to information, trust and political will.

Searching for missing persons is a complex, collective, long-term, and fundamentally humanitarian issue. Accounting for the missing is also intrinsically linked to the right of families to truth, and should be conceived as a justice issue in the broader sense of the concept. It must also run in parallel with the many demands related to rebuilding the state. Our responsibility is to help implement an integrated, inclusive, and methodologically sound process over the medium and long term, while supporting the families of the missing.

There remains, without question, a long road ahead. Yet in a country shaped by a rich history—marked by hope, tensions, and challenges, and by both past and present demands—one truth stands out with clarity: the tireless determination of families to find their loved ones and the resilience of a society striving to rebuild itself. Truth and the search for all those who are missing constitute a fundamental pillar of any meaningful process of collective healing and reparation.

The post The Search for the Missing in Syria: Learning from the Past appeared first on Just Security.

Rubio’s terrorism framing for Cuba is not new, but the factual basis for using it expired long ago. Meanwhile, the rhetorical pattern, creating a “leading state sponsor of terrorism” narrative around a country the administration appears to want to confront militarily, looks an awful lot like the runway the Trump administration built before striking Iran in February.

For more than a decade (2008 to 2018), I ran the office at the State Department that managed state sponsor of terrorism (SST) designations. I have written about Cuba’s SST and Not Fully Cooperating Country designations before—for Lawfare, the Conversation, and Defense One. The empirical case has not changed since I last looked at it. On the merits, Cuba does not belong on a list of state sponsors of terrorism. What has changed is U.S. policy toward Cuba and the unseriousness with which the Trump administration wields the “terrorist” designation to support its policy goals.

A Brief History of Cuba Being on the List

Cuba was first designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1982 by the Reagan administration. The justification at the time was historically defensible. Havana was actively arming and training left-wing militant groups across Latin America and parts of Africa, most notably Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the FARC, and its National Liberation Army, the ELN. Cuba’s foreign policy in the 1960s, 1970s, and into the 1980s was to export revolution, and the U.S. designation fit the country’s conduct.

That conduct attenuated over time. By the late 1990s and through the 2000s, Cuba was no longer arming foreign insurgencies. Increasingly, it was hosting peace processes for them. Havana served as a venue for negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC, talks that produced the 2016 peace accord, and later for negotiations with the ELN. Hosting peace talks at the request of an allied government is the opposite of sponsoring terrorism.

That is why the Obama administration removed Cuba from the SST list in 2015. The review focused on the statutory standard: whether Cuba had provided support for international terrorism in the preceding six months, and whether it had given assurances it would not do so in the future. The answer was no on the support, and yes on the assurances. The legal determination was clean. The policy judgment behind the de-listing was straightforward. Decades of sanctions had not produced political change on the island, and continued isolation was not advancing U.S. interests.

Ping Ponging on and off the List

What has happened since 2015 is policy whiplash dressed up in counterterrorism vocabulary. The Trump administration returned Cuba to the list on January 11, 2021, in the final days of its first term. The Federal Register notice legalizing the action was not published until January 22, two days after President Joe Biden’s inauguration. The stated basis was Cuba’s refusal to extradite 10 ELN leaders who had been in Havana since 2017 as part of the Colombian government’s own peace process.

That justification fell apart in August 2022, when the Colombian government under President Gustavo Petro suspended the arrest warrants it had previously asked Cuba to honor. The predicate for the 2021 designation was gone. The designation, however, remained in place.

The Biden administration eventually moved. In May 2024, the State Department quietly removed Cuba from the separate Not Fully Cooperating Country (NFCC) list, meaning Cuba was now seen as cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. There was no press release. A spokesperson explained that the circumstances had changed. They had. Cuba had resumed law enforcement engagement with the FBI in 2023, and the United States-Cuba Law Enforcement Dialogue had met multiple times. On January 14, 2025, six days before leaving office, Biden certified the statutory predicates for rescinding Cuba’s terrorism designation as a State Sponsor and notified Congress of his intent to lift it. The rescission required a mandatory waiting period. President Donald Trump revoked the certification on the first day of his second term. Biden had waited too long to act and Trump was immediately ready to quash the Biden administration’s maneuver.

That is the ping pong at play when it comes to Cuba’s placement on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. On in 1982. Off in 2015. On in 2021. Notice to remove in January 2025. Reinstated within hours of Trump’s second inauguration. The list has stopped being a determination of fact. It has become a partisan struggle.

Cuba Is Not a Leading State Sponsor of Terrorism

Set aside the politics for a moment and look at Cuba’s activity. The statutes underpinning the designation, including the Foreign Assistance Act, the Export Administration Act, and the Arms Export Control Act, ask whether a government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. Cuba’s current conduct does not meet that bar in any meaningful sense, and certainly not in any way that puts it in the same category as Iran.

Consider the comparison. Iran is fairly described as the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. The State Department’s own most recent Country Reports on Terrorism named Iran in those terms, citing operational support for Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis in Yemen, Kataib Hezbollah and other militias in Iraq, and a global network of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force activities. Iran funds, arms, trains, and directs proxies that have killed thousands of people across the Middle East, including American servicemembers.

What does Cuba do that is comparable? Rubio’s January 2025 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and his statements since, cite four categories of behavior. Providing sanctuary for ELN negotiators sent to Havana at the Colombian government’s request. Harboring of United States fugitives, some dating to the 1970s and 1980s. Engaging in diplomatic friendliness with Iran, Russia, and China. And the residual claim of supporting FARC, which was removed from the Foreign Terrorist Organization list in November 2021 because it had dissolved as an organization under the 2016 peace accord.

None of this is terrorism sponsorship in the way the statute contemplates. Sheltering criminal fugitives, no doubt, is a serious foreign policy grievance. It is not provision of safe haven to a terrorist organization for operational purposes. Hosting ELN negotiators at the request of the Colombia is not sponsorship of the ELN, it is the opposite. Having diplomatic and intelligence ties with U.S. adversaries is a national security concern, but the same is true of dozens of countries that are not on the list, which currently only includes Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria. And the FARC predicate for the SST listing evaporated in 2021 when the State Department itself delisted what was left of the group.

The Financial Action Task Force, the intergovernmental body that sets global standards on terrorist financing and money laundering, rated Cuba compliant or largely compliant with 38 of its 40 recommendations in its 2022 follow-up report. That is a stronger record than several countries the United States considers close partners.

Rubio also cited a report from Axios that Cuba acquired roughly 300 drones from Russia and Iran. Even if the reporting is accurate, drone acquisition by a sovereign State is not terrorism sponsorship. It is procurement. The United States does not place countries on the SST list for buying weapons from rivals. If it did, the list would be considerably longer.

Any objective assessment would conclude that Cuba is a corrupt and repressive one-party State with a hostile foreign policy posture. It is not a meaningful current sponsor of international terrorism, and it hasn’t been for several decades. Furthermore, calling it the leading sponsor of terrorism in the region requires either ignoring Iran’s proxies operating in Latin America or stretching the word “leading” past its breaking point.

The Language Before a Strike

The reason Cuba’s placement on the list matters now, and not just as a disagreement about list management, is that the Trump administration is using the terrorism designation as policy infrastructure for something else. The pattern is recognizable to anyone who watched the runway built before the Trump administration launched strikes on Iran in February.

In the months before Operation Epic Fury, administration officials and allied lawmakers in Congress moved in lockstep on a specific phrase. Iran was, repeatedly and with escalating emphasis, “the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism.” That framing did real work. It established the moral and legal predicate for direct military action. When the strikes came, the language was already in the bloodstream of the public conversation, and the administration could point to the designation and the rhetorical record as authority for what it was doing.

The Trump administration used a similar playbook in Venezuela, where it rolled out several Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designations against groups inside the country before using military force against the government. The opening gambit came in January 2025, when Trump signed Executive Order 14157 directing the State Department to designate transnational criminal organizations as FTOs under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Pursuant to that order, Rubio designated eight groups, effective February 20, 2025, including Tren de Aragua, the entity most directly tied in U.S. messaging to the Maduro regime’s export of instability. The Treasury Department then sanctioned the Cartel de los Soles as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on July 25, 2025, naming Maduro as its head and accusing the network of providing material support to Tren de Aragua and the Sinaloa Cartel. Then, in November 2025, Rubio announced that the U.S. government was designating Cartel de los Soles an FTO under Section 219, effective November 24, 2025, with the press statement naming Maduro directly as the cartel’s leader and framing the Venezuelan state as a narco-terrorist enterprise rather than a sovereign government. That sequence converted a 2020 U.S. indictment against Maduro into something operationally actionable (perhaps not unlike the recent indictment against Castro). Roughly six weeks after the Cartel de los Soles FTO designation took effect, on January 3, U.S. forces conducted Operation Absolute Resolve, a military raid on Caracas that captured Maduro and his wife and transported them to the Southern District of New York to face charges. Although U.S. officials publicly framed the operation as the execution of a criminal case rather than regime change, the terror listings in the lead-up to Maduro’s capture tell another story.

A similar lexicon is now being deployed against Cuba. “One of the leading sponsors of terrorism in the entire region.” “A failed state 90 miles from our shores.” “Friends of our adversaries.” The Justice Department’s unsealing of the Castro indictment on Cuban independence day, the timing of the Nimitz strike group’s arrival in the Caribbean, the more than 240 sanctions imposed since January, the interception of at least seven oil tankers bound for Cuba, and CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s May visit to Havana to warn that the window for talks is closing—these are not isolated events. They are laying the groundwork for another possible conflict. The terrorism framing is the rhetorical scaffolding for it.

Whether the administration intends to use military force against Cuba, or whether it intends to use the threat of it as leverage for regime change through economic strangulation, remains unclear.

Time for Something Different

Make no mistake, the Cuban regime is a primary driver of the suffering of the Cuban people. The government’s corruption, its mismanagement of the economy, its repression of dissent, and its insistence on a failed economic model are responsible for the dire conditions on the island. Anyone who has spent time on these issues knows this. But the United States bears responsibility too. The Trading with the Enemy Act has applied to Cuba since the 1962 missile crisis. The Helms-Burton Act of 1996 codified the embargo and added extraterritorial reach. The terrorism listing layers further restrictions on top of these punishments. Nearly six and a half decades of comprehensive sanctions have not produced regime change. They have hardened the regime’s grip and deepened ordinary Cubans’ suffering.

Using the terrorism tag as an excuse to intervene in Cuba, whether with military force or with a deeper strangulation campaign, is inappropriate. It misuses a counterterrorism authority that was designed for genuine state sponsors of terrorism, of which Cuba is no longer one. It accelerates the degradation of the list as a credible foreign policy tool. Further, it sets a precedent that any administration can use the designation against any adversary regardless of the underlying facts.

The Trump administration has, with very few exceptions, steered clear of the hard work of foreign policy. It has preferred sanctions and force to diplomatic engagement. Cuba is an opportunity to do something different. Real diplomacy is difficult. It requires patience, it requires sustained attention across administrations, and it requires being willing to call a partner a partner rather than an enemy. This approach has not been tried with Cuba for any sustained period in 60 years. President Barack Obama’s 2015 experiment of pursuing a new policy in Cuba was not given enough time. Now is the time for meaningful diplomacy. It is not time for another conflict under the guise of counterterrorism.

The post The Pretext Behind the Trump Administration Labeling Cuba a State Sponsor of Terrorism appeared first on Just Security.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR – CEASEFIRE 

Vice President JD Vance said yesterday that the United States and Iran are very close to a memorandum of understanding that would extend the ceasefire by 60 days, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and launch talks on limiting Iran’s nuclear program. Sources told Reuters that the negotiators had reached an agreement, but President Trump had yet to give his final approval. U.S. officials told Axios that the Iranians said they had the necessary approvals for the deal and were prepared to sign. Iran’s Tasnim news agency, citing a source close to the negotiating team, said the text of the agreement had not been finalized or confirmed. Barak Ravid reports for Axios; Jonathan Landay, Steve Holland, and Yomna Ehab report. 

IRAN WAR – OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told reporters yesterday that he had spoken with Oman’s ambassador, who said there were no plans for Oman to cooperate with Iran by imposing a toll in the Strait of Hormuz. Jonathan Landay, Steve Holland, and Yomna Ehab report for Reuters. 

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said yesterday that he had directed the Israeli military to expand its control of Gaza to 70 percent of the enclave. As per the ceasefire agreement struck last October, the Israeli military pulled back to an area encompassing roughly 53 percent of the territory. Earlier this month, Netanyahu disclosed that Israel had increased its control to 60 percent. David M. Halbfinger and Johnatan Reiss report for the New York Times.  

Israeli ambassador to the United Nations Danny Danon said yesterday that Israel would cut ties with the U.N. Secretary General, António Guterres, and his office after a decision to include Israel and its security services on an upcoming sexual violence blacklist over alleged sexual abuse of Palestinian detainees. Danon called the decision “disconnected from the facts and reality.” U.N. spokesperson Stephane Dujarric characterized Israel’s announcement as largely symbolic and unlikely to change U.N. operations. Hamas is also included on an associated list of countries and groups accused of using sexual violence as a weapon of war. Ephrat Livni reports for the New York Times; Farnoush Amiri and Edith M. Lederer report for AP News.  

France has asked for the public prosecutor to investigate the treatment of French nationals, who were part of the recent activist flotilla heading for Gaza, by Israeli authorities, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said today. “Based on ​a report I requested from our Consul General ​in Turkey, who informed me of sexual violence, ⁠exposure to the cold, beatings, and repeated humiliation ​of French nationals, all of these acts are likely ​to constitute criminal offenses,” Barrot said. Reuters reports.  

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR 

A Russian attack drone hit an apartment building in eastern Romania this morning, according to the authorities. Romania’s foreign ministry said the drone had been involved in an overnight assault on Ukraine, but had crashed into a building in Galati. Two people were injured, and several others required medical attention. NATO condemned “Russia’s recklessness” and confirmed that it was in touch with the Romanian authorities. Cassandra Vinograd reports for the New York Times.   

Russia is set to overspend on the war in Ukraine by Rbs2tn ($28 billion) this year, according to a letter seen by the Financial Times. Max Seddon and Anastasia Stognei report.

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

Russia has intensified its efforts to undermine Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s bid for re-election next month, according to Western intelligence and government officials. In addition to disinformation campaigns, Moscow has plans to transport tens of thousands of Russian-Armenians to sway the vote, intelligence officials said. Tom Balmforth, Gram Slattery, Humeyra Pamuk, and Lucy Papachristou report for Reuters.  

China is building a military complex, which includes more than 80 launch pads, bunkers, and communications nodes near the isolated nuclear silos that hold the Chinese military’s longest-range missiles, according to satellite images reviewed by Reuters. Greg Torode, Laurie Chen, and Vijdan Mohammad Kawoosa report.

 U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. Central Command said it had “received multiple threat reports concerning adversary exploitation of commercial location data to target or surveil U.S. personnel in theater,” according to a letter shared with Reuters. The message was sent on April 14 and offered no further information about where U.S. forces were being targeted. A bipartisan group of lawmakers sent a letter to the Pentagon yesterday, warning that it was time to “start treating the adtech industry as a national security threat.” Raphael Satter reports.

Guatemala has agreed to carry out joint strikes with the United States military inside its territory to target drug trafficking groups, according to three sources. Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo agreed to both airstrikes and other military actions in a call with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth last week, two sources said, with operations to start as early as next month. Maria Abi-Habib and Eric Schmitt report for the New York Times. 

The United States yesterday designated Brazil’s two biggest drug gangs as terrorist groups. The move comes just days after two sons of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro visited Trump at the White House, where they asked him to impose such a label. Ana Ionova reports for the New York Times.  

A 50-bed quarantine unit that the United States is setting up in Kenya to house U.S. citizens exposed to the Ebola virus could be operational from today, according to senior administration officials. Officials told reporters yesterday that the decision to send Americans to Kenya was based purely on what was best for their health. U.S. doctors and public health advocates have criticized the approach, arguing that the United States has over a dozen of the best facilities in the world to care for people with Ebola. Karoun Demirjian and Apoorva Mandavilli report for the New York Times; Carmen Paun and Cheyenne Haslett report for POLITICO.

The High Court in Nairobi today suspended the U.S. plan to establish the quarantine facility until petitions against it are heard on Tuesday. An organization formed to defend Kenya’s Constitution, Katiba Institute, and the Kenya Law Society separately challenged any presence of Ebola-related facilities. The Kenya Law Society asked the court to nullify any agreements signed between the U.S. and Kenya on the project, citing public health risks and a lack of public participation. A Kenyan doctors’ union on Thursday issued a 48-hour strike notice should the country proceed with the deal. Evelyne Musambi reports for AP News.  

U.S. CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

The Trump administration is bracing for the potential collapse of the Cuban government as early as this summer, and has prepared new military response plans in case the island descends into chaos, U.S. officials told Axios. One presidential adviser said the approach to Cuba is “classic Trump: Push your enemy off balance. It’s pressure, watch the response, apply more pressure, watch the response, apply more pressure.” Marc Caputo reports.

The death toll from the Trump administration’s monthslong series of strikes against alleged drug trafficking boats in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean has risen to at least 199 people after survivors of recent attacks were not found. Konstantin Torpoin and Ben Finely report for AP News.  

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS 

Relatives of detainees at Delaney Hall, an immigration detention center in Newark, said yesterday that incarcerated migrants were being beaten and subjected to pepper spray following a hunger strike by some inmates. Federal officials have denied that a hunger strike is taking place, but family members of detainees taking part in the strike have disputed that claim. Ana Ley and Mark Bonamo report for the New York Times.  

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

The Justice Department’s examination of E. Jean Caroll’s lawsuits against Trump involves investigating donations made by a nonprofit founded by billionaire Reid Hoffman to pay for Caroll’s legal bills, sources said. One source said that Hoffman’s nonprofit, American Future Republic, is actually the current subject of the criminal inquiry, although that could change. Glenn Thrush and Benjamin Weiser report for the New York Times.  

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

Bessent said yesterday that the Treasury Department has been working on a mock-up of a $250 note bearing Trump’s face. The move would mark a dramatic remaking of U.S. money, which is currently only allowed to bear images of the deceased. Bessent acknowledged that any policy change would require approval from Congress. Alan Rappeport reports for the New York Times.  

The Pentagon this week announced a $9.7 billion contract with Dell Technologies. The deal is drawing scrutiny as Trump earlier this year purchased more than $1 million in Dell stock, raising concerns about a potential conflict of interest. The White House yesterday denied any conflict, saying that Trump’s investments are managed independently by his children and advisers. Eric Lipton reports for the New York Times.  

The White House is split into three camps over how to regulate AI, according to two senior White House officials. One faction, which includes former AI Czar David Sacks, favors less regulation to help the industry compete against China, while others like Hegseth advocate for greater barriers to Mythos-type models. A proposed executive order requiring AI companies to voluntarily share advanced models with the government before release was abruptly paused last week after last-minute objections, but officials say it may still return in revised form. Diana Nerozzi and Sophia Cai report for POLITICO.  

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION 

A federal judge yesterday declined to block an executive order Trump signed in March targeting mail-in voting and directing the creation of a federal database of citizens to help guide states on voter eligibility. The judge said it was premature for the court to intervene, adding that the administration had yet to carry out much of the order, leaving most of the harm predicted by the lawsuit as hypothetical. Zach Montague and Adam Sella report for the New York Times. 

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions.

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ICYMI: Yesterday on Just Security

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When Congress established new tools to attack global corruption and protect human rights, it intended to hold responsible corrupt officials and human-rights abusers who often operate beyond the reach of the judicial system. These legislative authorities are used by the executive branch to implement restrictive measures ranging from visa bans to full economic and trade sanctions. The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act – named after Sergei Magnitsky, the Russian tax lawyer who died in pretrial detention after exposing a massive state fraud – created the most expansive extraterritorial financial sanctions program that the United States had ever assembled. While authority under Section 7031(c) of the State Department’s annual appropriations legislation focuses on barring entry to the United States, it nonetheless causes enough reputational damage to sever banking relationships, collapse business partnerships, and destroy political careers.

This exceptional power, however, has made U.S. human-rights and anticorruption efforts a prime target for exploitation. Legal standards for designations are deliberately broad, evidentiary records are usually hidden from public scrutiny, and designated individuals are afforded minimal procedural protections. Consequently, the architecture of both Global Magnitsky sanctions (GLOMAG) and Section 7031(c) has proven remarkably susceptible to manipulation by the very actors these laws were designed to confront: oligarchs, corrupt officials, and authoritarian governments who work to co-opt U.S. moral authority to neutralize business rivals, silence political opponents, and settle personal scores. 

Structural Vulnerabilities

The Global Magnitsky Act authorizes the President to designate any foreign person for whom the executive branch possesses “credible information” indicating corruption or human-rights abuse. Section 7031(c) similarly directs the Secretary of State to deny visas to officials “credibly alleged” to have been involved in significant corruption or a gross violation of human rights. Neither statute defines “credible,” nor do they establish minimum evidentiary thresholds or safeguards. 

Challenges to designations for these restrictive measures are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), under which courts review executive action with an “arbitrary and capricious” standard. This effectively asks only whether the government had a “rational basis to believe” its conclusion. As the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly confirmed in litigation involving the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which administers most sanctions programs including GLOMAG, the government is not required to disclose classified or law-enforcement-sensitive evidence even to the designated party, let alone to the public. The result is a system in which designations may rely on a small number of foreign-government reports, nongovernmental organization (NGO) filings, or diplomatic cables that have never been tested against contrary evidence. 

The Global Magnitsky Act explicitly contemplates that the executive branch may act on “credible information obtained by other countries.” While this was intended to pragmatically recognize that foreign partners often have superior intelligence about local businesses and officials, it creates an opening for bad actors to feed disinformation into the U.S. designation process. Rumors and accusations can be packaged in formats that agencies recognize as credible – foreign court filings, law-enforcement records, parliamentary testimony, NGO reports – and routed through formal channels where they acquire a false veneer of legitimacy before reaching Washington. Moreover, Executive Order 13818, which implements the Global Magnitsky Act, diverges from it in significant ways – substituting “serious human rights abuse” for the Act’s defined criteria of “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,” broadening the targeting reach, adding material-assistance prongs, and reverting to standard OFAC evidentiary and removal requirements.

Because designated individuals are almost always non-U.S. persons, they cannot claim constitutional due process protections. OFAC’s administrative delisting process requires the petitioner to submit arguments or evidence establishing that “an insufficient basis exists for the [designation]” or that “the circumstances resulting in the [designation] no longer apply” — standards that can be impossible to meet when petitioners have no right to see the evidence against them. They can only request a so-called “courtesy document,” consisting of a short index of the unclassified information underlying their designation, which is always heavily redacted. The State Department’s 7031(c) process is even more opaque and has no formal reconsideration mechanism. Unlike the European Union’s asset-freeze regime, which its Court of Justice has repeatedly subjected to due process review, GLOMAG designations face almost no domestic judicial check on their factual basis. 

When OFAC publishes additions to its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List, the releases include names, aliases, and broad descriptions of alleged conduct, but never disclose the actual evidentiary basis. Section 7031(c) visa ineligibility determinations are sometimes not published at all or disclosed only to the individual’s own government. This overbroad secrecy, which is justified as a national security concern, largely eliminates the possibility of independent legal, journalistic, or academic scrutiny. A bad actor who successfully injects a false narrative into the agency targeting process can therefore be confident that the factual predicate for any resulting designation will probably never be challenged. 

Documented Patterns of Manipulation

The Western Balkans and former Soviet Bloc vividly illustrate this weaponization dynamic, with competing oligarchic networks that maintain sophisticated intelligence operations in Washington. Investigative reporting by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) has documented cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina where rival political factions retained U.S. lobbying firms and NGO intermediaries specifically to compile and transmit adverse dossiers about their political opponents to the State Department and OFAC. Often, the competing factions were indistinguishable on anticorruption or human-rights grounds, and both sides had documented records of graft. All that separated them was relative success in prompting U.S. action against their opponents. The resulting designations isolated the targeted officials while their no less corrupt rivals continued to operate with impunity. 

The U.S. government designated several officials affiliated with one political bloc in Bosnia and Herzegovina largely on information provided by rival party networks. Regional investigative media outlets Detektor and Istraga published analyses illustrating the political influences around U.S. sanctions actions and suggesting that primary sources of accusations made to the U.S. government were themselves subjects of domestic criminal investigations. Investigative reporting by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) uncovered how a businessman in Uzbekistan lobbied a member of Congress to inquire about a rival cement company’s alleged Russia links in contravention of U.S. sanctions, prompting a formal request to the Treasury Department. Similar dynamics have also been reported in North Macedonia, where, from 2021 to 2023, there was a torrent of lobbying activity by business rivals seeking Section 7031(c) determinations and OFAC designations against their opponents in the judiciary and law enforcement. 

The Los Angeles Times and the investigative platform Plaza Pública in Guatemala have reported extensively on how visa ban designations on the State Department’s “Engel List” in Central America – imposed under the now-expired Section 353 of the Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act – became entangled in local factional politics. Certain political networks and other interests in Guatemala hired lobbyists or cultivated relationships with U.S. NGOs to direct visa ban designations of judicial officials, while characterizing their efforts to do so as anticorruption activism. Dozens of prosecutors, judges, and businesspeople in Guatemala were added to the Engel List while mutual, retaliatory prosecutions and litigation were pending before domestic courts. NGOs and exiled former officials have publicly advocated for U.S. designations, while the targeted individuals argue they are being sanctioned based solely on unverified court filings and accusations by the same people they are fighting in Guatemalan civil and criminal courts.

Russian state media and government-affiliated think tanks have invested heavily in generating credible-looking adverse information about Ukrainian, Georgian, and Baltic officials and businesses, foisting it on journalists, human-rights organizations, and ultimately the U.S. government. The Prague-based European Values Center for Security Policy has documented Russian influence operations specifically designed to insert disinformation into Western human-rights reporting channels, which can feed directly into the Section 7031(c) and GLOMAG designation processes. China has also shown awareness of the evidentiary requirements of GLOMAG designations and begun taking actions to counter U.S. sanctions. There is strong circumstantial evidence that Chinese actors have attempted to influence NGO reporting that supports sanctions targeting efforts. Chinese intelligence has reportedly cultivated sources inside diaspora human rights organizations seeking to discredit witnesses and testimony underlying designation actions. 

Consequences of Exploitation

The damage caused by the weaponization of these human rights and anticorruption designations falls into several overlapping categories. At an individual level, designated persons can suffer immediate and severe collateral consequences – including lost business relationships, frozen finances and severed banking access, and severe reputational harm – without any impartial assessment of whether the underlying allegations are in fact accurate. In contexts where designations are politically motivated, these consequences function as a form of political repression, instead of the accountability demanded by the statutory authorities. 

At a systemic level, the credibility of the GLOMAG and Section 7031(c) frameworks are themselves eroded. When independent analysts and journalists document that designation lists include individuals targeted through manipulation rather than genuine wrongdoing, it becomes far easier for adversarial governments to dismiss legitimate designations as politically motivated – a narrative that Russia, China, and others have actively promoted. The value of Section 7031(c) and GLOMAG designations in driving behavior change degrades every time the process is demonstrably exploited. 

This weaponization also has a chilling effect on legitimate accountability. Genuine anticorruption and human-rights advocates, investigators, and whistleblowers must operate with the knowledge that their adversaries can invert the very tools designed to protect them. Knowing that rivals might trigger U.S. sanctions imposition as a retaliatory measure creates a powerful disincentive to pursue legitimate advocacy or investigations. 

Improving the Framework

The most direct corrective measure to prevent co-optation of the designation process would be legislative or administrative articulation of what “credible information” actually requires. At a minimum, the standard should mandate corroboration from independent sources, prevent uninvestigated reliance on information provided by parties with a direct financial or political interest in a proposed designation, and require assessment of the accuracy of all sources. The APA’s “rational basis” standard is insufficient protection in a designation context given the magnitude of the consequences involved. Instead, a “preponderance of independently corroborated evidence” standard would better reflect the significance of designation actions and U.S. due process values. 

While classified or law-enforcement-sensitive sources should not be revealed, unclassified evidentiary summaries, similar to those routinely produced in financial-intelligence contexts, ought to be published or otherwise available at the time of a designation. The European Union’s General Court has held that designated parties in asset-freeze proceedings must receive sufficient information to understand the basis of their designation and mount a meaningful challenge. The United States should administratively or legislatively adopt an analogous standard, providing both designated individuals and independent observers with a factual predicate to review, evaluate, and challenge as necessary. 

Establishing an independent review panel – composed of non-political interagency civil servants with security clearances – to assess the evidentiary bases for both proposed designations and delistings, before they become effective would substantially reduce the risk of politically motivated manipulation. The panel would review only for factual sufficiency and would have no role in policy judgments. Further, under current delisting processes, the burden is entirely on the designated person to disprove allegations they cannot fully see. A reformed standard should require the government to affirmatively demonstrate that the basis for designation remains valid – based on a “preponderance of independently corroborated evidence standard,” and in light of all available information including as submitted by the petitioner. Finally, a clear timeline for review would prevent indefinite pendency of designations based on evidence that no longer holds up. 

***

GLOMAG and Section 7031(c) remain among the most frequently deployed instruments of U.S. human-rights and anticorruption policy. Their power derives from the severity of their consequences – and that severity makes them attractive to those who would weaponize them. The structural vulnerabilities of these frameworks reflect deliberate determinations to preserve executive flexibility to combat corruption and protect human rights. But flexibility without accountability in the use of these restrictive measures enables other forms of injustice. 

The documented patterns of manipulation by business and political rivals – from Sarajevo to Guatemala City, and from Russian influence operations to NGO and professional lobbying efforts in Washington – demand a serious policy response. Raising evidentiary standards, requiring public disclosure of factual predicates, establishing independent review, and creating enforceable delisting timelines would not weaken these tools. It would strengthen them by ensuring that human-rights and anticorruption designations remain a credible instrument of U.S. policy rather than a commodity to be weaponized for individual gain.

The post The Weaponization of GLOMAG: How Rivals Co-opt U.S. Sanctions to Target Business and Political Opponents appeared first on Just Security.

But simply spending more is not, by itself, sufficient. The deeper question is whether this proposed budget is structured to sustain American strategy in the Pacific for the long term.

The budget comes on the heels of President Donald Trump’s Beijing summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping – the first visit of a U.S. president to the Middle Kingdom since Trump’s last trip there nearly a decade ago. Unlike last time, this visit yielded only modest commercial outcomes that included a Chinese order of 200 Boeing airplanes and a commitment to purchase at least $17 billion of U.S. agricultural products annually (compared with a $250 billion commitment in 2017).

And the trip only further muddied the waters on critical areas of disagreement. For instance, the Chinese bluntly warned the U.S. about “clashes and even conflicts” over Taiwan, while President Trump declared that U.S. arm sales to Taiwan, which are mandated by U.S. law, are “a very good negotiating chip” with Beijing, and added that he “wasn’t looking [for Taiwan] to go independent.” This lack of resolve likely left Taipei, as well as many U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific, alarmed.

The Beijing visit — combined with the April Capitol Hill testimony of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, which also produced little in the way of policy substance — leaves more questions than answers about the U.S. strategy that this massive budget request is meant to underwrite.

So Much Overdue for U.S. Security in the Indo-Pacific

After more than a decade of underinvestment relative to the shifting balance of power away from the United States and Europe and toward the Indo-Pacific, U.S. defense resources for the theater are finally beginning to catch up to the rhetoric. The ramp-up in munitions production is overdue. The shipbuilding increase is overdue. The push to build out U.S. defense logistics west of the international date line is overdue. Under the request, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) will grow 16 percent to a total of $11.7 billion, for the first time satisfying all the requirements of the U.S. military’s Indo-Pacific Command.

The hearings of the House and Senate Armed Services committees with Hegseth, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Air Force General Dan Caine, and in the Senate, with Acting DoD Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer Jules W. Hurst III were a missed opportunity to examine the substance of the budget and the serious questions it raises about U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. What should have been a rigorous examination of the administration’s historic $1.45 trillion defense request — an increase of $440.9 billion or 44 percent in defense spending from the current year — became a predictable round of political theater.

The new budget request comes up short on three counts when it comes to the Indo-Pacific.

The first problem is durability. Funds envisioned for key items relevant to the Indo-Pacific, such as the purchase of additional munitions and the planned purchase of F-35 jets, hinge on a separate budget “reconciliation” process that may not succeed. That’s not the mark of sound, multi-year planning. The Pentagon and the defense industrial base cannot plan multiyear production lines, shipyard expansions, or theater logistics based on funding that may not appear again. Shipyards, production lines, and logistics hubs take years to build, and they can’t be financed against money that may vanish after a single budget cycle. Building these investments into the Pentagon’s regular annual budget — even at a smaller headline number for each year — allows planners to actually plan, and would buy more lasting deterrence than a one-time approach that might evaporate on the whim of a single vote in the House or Senate.

The second problem in the budget request is the lack of prioritization, exemplified by the lack of connection between the sequencing and the strategy. The unclassified summary of the 2026 National Defense Strategy makes no mention of the massive new budget request, suggesting a lack of strategic coherence. The result is a budget in which the sixth generation F-47 and the F/A-XX jet programs, expanded shipbuilding, the drone enterprise, the munitions ramp-up, and a pay raise for the troops are all designated equal priorities, rather than being ordered in relation to the others.

When everything is a priority, nothing is. The munitions burn rate from recent operations in the Middle East is case in point: capabilities needed for Indo-Pacific contingencies have already been expended elsewhere, and the budget does not honestly reckon with that tradeoff.

The Imperative of Relationships for U.S. Military Access

The third problem is cooperative U.S. military access to the territory of allies. The Pacific Ocean is vast and unlike its potential adversaries, the U.S. homeland is thousands of miles away from a potential fight in the Indo-Pacific — what the Pentagon likes to call “the tyranny of distance.” Access, basing and overflight are as critical to military success in the region as any weapons platform, and U.S. military posture and U.S. and allied investments in military bases and facilities in Japan, Australia, Palau, the Northern Marianas, and the Philippines all depend on favorable diplomatic relationships with Tokyo, Manila, Canberra, and the Freely Associated States.

These relationships are all currently complicated by public pressure from top U.S. officials on Japan and South Korea over burden-sharing, the recently-completed review of the Australia-U.K.-U.S. (AUKUS) trilateral partnership, perceptions of inconsistent U.S. performance in meeting its obligations to the three Pacific Island nations under “Compacts of Free Association,” and uncertainty over the U.S. posture toward Taiwan. The Beijing summit did nothing to dispel that uncertainty, including the administration’s subsequent decision to pause the $14 billion arms package to Taipei. These developments are eroding the political foundation of the U.S. posture in the region.

A budget can purchase capabilities, but it cannot replace the relationships which underpin those basing rights and overflight permissions, and which give those capabilities deterrent value in the first place. Strengthening alliance relationships is the cheapest force-multiplier available, and it does not require new appropriations.

The second Trump administration can look to its first iteration for inspiration. The 2017 National Security Strategy stated: “We will strengthen our long-standing military relationships and encourage the development of a strong defense network with our allies and partners… We will maintain our strong ties with Taiwan in accordance with our “One China” policy, including our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide for Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs and deter coercion… We will re-energize our alliances with the Philippines and ­Thailand and strengthen our partnerships with Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and others to help them become cooperative maritime partners.” This is what strengthened relationships across the Indo-Pacific should look like – and what should be the basis of a bipartisan policy today.

The instinct behind the budget’s Indo-Pacific investments is right. But connecting the proposed spending to a more coherent strategy — and strengthening the alliance relationships that make a more robust forward presence possible — would produce an approach the region can take more seriously.

Settling for a topline number without those fixes would leave the United States with a massive budget ship without a policy rudder. It’s a problem the Beijing summit threw into sharper relief, as allies were left to parse competing U.S. and Chinese readouts about Taiwan and to wonder about other aspects of the administration’s China policy.

The Indo-Pacific aside, this budget request should also serve as an impetus for Congress to grapple with the alarming state of the nation’s fiscal health, including the national debt that now exceeds 100 percent of GDP, according to the Congressional Budget Office. The committee hearings over the last month regrettably failed to press these questions, but Congress should continue to demand answers from the administration for the American people.

The post The Historic U.S. Defense Budget Request Needs a Sound Indo-Pacific Policy appeared first on Just Security.

At the May 21 meeting, the BoP submitted its inaugural six-month report to the Security Council and its High Representative for Gaza, Nickolay Mladenov, briefed United Nations member States on progress – and lack thereof. He acknowledged “near daily” ceasefire violations, and warned that the deteriorating status quo risks becoming permanent. Calling on the Security Council to press Hamas to disarm, he also urged Israel to honor its ceasefire commitments.

With violence continuing in Iran, Lebanon, Israel, and elsewhere throughout the Middle East and international attention fragmenting, the meeting served as a sharp reminder that the humanitarian conditions in Gaza continue to worsen, and that the future of the occupied Palestinian territory, including Gaza, remains deeply uncertain.

Third States have had to consider the role they are willing to play. While the United States and the BoP have called on third States to provide troops to the ISF, only five States have reportedly pledged troops to date – Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Morocco. Meanwhile, about twenty States have reportedly contributed personnel to the CMCC.

The decisions third States make about participation in the BoP, ISF, and CMCC carry significant legal weight. This post seeks precisely to inform those decisions. It addresses the following questions: is the plan compatible with international law and, if not, what are the implications for third States? Are they required to support the Trump plan? May they lawfully do so, if they so choose? Ultimately, this piece concludes that, given the serious concerns raised by the Trump plan, a prudent approach for third States would be to refrain from participation and instead engage outside the framework of the plan. States choosing to support the implementation of the plan must do so only in a manner consistent with their obligations under international law, as Security Council endorsement of the plan does not shield them from those obligations.

This post draws from arguments developed at greater length in a legal brief recently published by the IHL Centre (where I work): International Law Parameters for Third-State Engagement in Gaza. Readers interested in the legal consequences of participation in the BoP, ISF, and CMCC (would participating States become parties to the conflict in Gaza? Would they become occupying powers alongside Israel? What are their legal obligations irrespective of these thresholds being met?) can refer to the second section of the IHL Centre’s legal brief for additional discussion beyond the scope of this post.

Resolution 2803 and the Right to Self-Determination

Some aspects of Resolution 2803 – for instance, the need to deliver humanitarian aid consistent with international law (para 3) – do not raise legal issues. Other core elements of the post-ceasefire framework, however, do. This post focuses on the latter.

At the heart of the legal concerns raised by the Trump plan and Resolution 2803 lies the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. By virtue of this right, all peoples can “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (ICCPR article 1(2); ICESCR article 1(1)). This right is widely recognised as a peremptory norm (jus cogens), from which no derogation is permitted (International Court of Justice (ICJ), July 2024 Advisory Opinion, para 233), not even by the Security Council.

Several aspects of Resolution 2803 are difficult to reconcile with this right. Most notably, it places significant political and economic decision-making powers in the hands of a foreign-led “Board of Peace,” without formal Palestinian representation (for more analysis on this see here). This is in direct contradiction with the idea of a people freely determining their own political status and economic development. It also subjects the exercise of self-determination to externally-imposed benchmarks, including vaguely-defined reform of the Palestinian Authority (PA) (Resolution 2803, para 2). It also endorses – though it does not authorize (see IHL Centre, p. 12) – the continuation of an Israeli presence in Gaza, including through the maintenance of a “security perimeter” (para 7). Such unconsented-to presence amounts to an occupation as a matter of international law, which by definition implicates the temporary denial of at least certain aspects of the right to self-determination (as aptly noted by Judge Cleveland in her Separate Opinion on the ICJ’s July 2024 Advisory Opinion, para. 33).

While some have argued that the resolution must be read as reaffirming the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination (most notably Sierra Leone as a Security Council member), doubts remain as to whether it can indeed be interpreted in a manner consistent with that right.

Use of Force and Other Forms of Foreign Intervention

The Trump plan and Resolution 2803 also raise significant issues under the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. The use of force and other types of intervention envisaged in the plan would be compatible with international law only if consented to or authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Neither condition can presently be clearly established, at least as regards Israel’s interventions (see more below).

Resolution 2803 engages the prohibition on the use of force (enshrined in article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and in customary international law, see ICJ July 2024 Advisory Opinion, para. 95 and IHL Centre, pp. 13-15) in two ways.

First, it authorizes the deployment of a multinational force, the ISF, empowered to use “all necessary measures” (para 7) – language that encompasses the potential use of armed force. The prohibition on the use of force (and whether any available exceptions to that prohibition attach) are therefore implicated, with particular relevance for States participating in the ISF.

Second, the resolution endorses a potentially indefinite Israeli “security perimeter presence […] until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat” (para 7). Such a presence involves the use of force on foreign territory, and must therefore be justified under one of the recognised exceptions to the prohibition. Assertions based on Israel’s right to self-defence have been convincingly dismissed – either on the basis that Israel could not invoke such right following the October 7, 2023 attacks, or that, even if it did, the Israeli military response has exceeded the customary limits of necessity and proportionality attached to this right (see Milanovic,  Haque, and Wilde). Even assuming, arguendo, that Israel could initially invoke self-defence following the attacks of October 7, 2023, a continued and open-ended military presence aimed at countering a broadly defined “resurgent terror threat” would not comport with the necessity requirement of the right to self-defence, which presupposes a specific (ongoing or imminent) armed attack (IHL Centre, pp. 14-15).

Beyond the use of force, the resolution entails other forms of intervention by the BoP (and States participating in it), including decisions relating to the “reconstruction” and “redevelopment” of Gaza, governance, the “delivery of public services” and security (paras 2, 4). Such measures implicate the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a State (U.N. Charter, article 2(7); IHL Centre, p. 16), which also protects non-member States (see Nolte) – such as Palestine as a non-member observer State of the United Nations.

Consent and Chapter VII Authorisation

As noted, the only circumstances under which the use of force and other foreign interventions in Palestinian affairs would not breach international law is if they were consented to by the sovereign – that is, the Palestinian people – or authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.

Serious doubt arises as to whether valid consent to the forms of foreign intervention envisaged in Resolution 2803 and the Trump plan has been granted on behalf of the Palestinian people. Under international law, in order for consent to be valid it must be expressed by a competent authority, it may not be vitiated by coercion, and it must be clearly established (see IHL Centre, pp. 16-20; International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, article 20; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 52; Tams; Nolte)

In the case of Gaza, it is unclear if Hamas, the PA or the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) possesses the authority to express valid consent (see IHL Centre, pp. 16-18). The fact that the Palestinian people – in whom sovereignty over the territory ultimately vests – have yet to realize their right to self-determination, and that no democratic national elections have been held in Gaza, or indeed in the occupied Palestinian territory more widely – since 2006 (the April 2026 municipal elections “symbolically” included a city in Gaza for the first time in 20 years) may lend support to the view that there is, at present, no legitimate government with the authority to give valid consent.

While Hamas has rejected any foreign intervention, the PA (hence, arguably, the PLO) has expressed support for the foreign interventions envisaged in the Trump plan and Resolution 2803 (though not for Israeli interventions, see IHL Centre, pp. 19-20, 29), which may be interpreted as indicating consent. However, even if it was accepted that the PA – despite its deficit of structural and democratic legitimacy  – possesses the authority to express consent on behalf of the Palestinian people, there are serious concerns that such consent was vitiated through coercion by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the U.N. Charter (IHL Centre, p. 18).

In light of these considerations, a prudent approach for third States would be to proceed on the basis that there is no valid Palestinian consent – at least to Israel’s presence in Gaza and other forms of interventions. Even if such consent exists, it is of uncertain scope and may be withdrawn at any time, requiring continued vigilance.

As regards Security Council authorization, Resolution 2803 is marked by ambiguity. On one view, the absence of any explicit reference to a “threat to international peace and security” or to Chapter VII itself weighs against an enforcement mandate. Yet the resolution’s use of terms such as “authorizes,” “decides,” and “all necessary measures” may suggest an implied Chapter VII authorization, consistent with some past Security Council practice (IHL Centre, pp. 20-22).

Even if the Security Council was implicitly acting under Chapter VII, Resolution 2803 cannot be read as conferring a blanket Chapter VII authorization for all foreign presences it contemplates. Any enforcement powers are confined to the specific authorizations granted to the BoP, ISF, and participating States, and only within the limits expressly set out. They do not appear to extend to Israeli presence and other forms or interventions: the Security Council did not expressly “authorize” Israeli presence (the reference to “international civil and security presences authorized by this resolution” appears to cover only the BoP and ISF, not Israel, see IHL Centre, notes 31, 156).  This reading is supported by the positions expressed by certain Council members. For instance, Sierra Leone appears to consider that the Council was acting under Chapter VII specifically and only when authorizing the ISF (see reference in IHL Centre, note 110).

Importantly, a Chapter VII authorization would in any event have no bearing on concerns relating to the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, which cannot be derogated from.

Implications for Third States

Certain core elements of Resolution 2803 may conflict with the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and – absent Palestinian consent or Chapter VII authorization – with the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention, at least insofar as Israeli presence and interventions are concerned. What follows for third States? How should these concerns shape their decision whether to support the implementation of the Trump plan and Resolution 2803?

First, Resolution 2803 appears to impose few, if any, legal obligations on third States. The only paragraph directly addressing them – paragraph 9 – merely “[c]alls upon” them “to work with the BoP to identify opportunities to contribute [resources and assistance]” to its operating entities and the ISF, and “to give full recognition to its acts and documents.” Whether the verb “calls upon” is binding or recommendatory depends on context ; IHL Centre, p. 23). Here, a plausible reading is that paragraph 9 creates, at most, an obligation to accord recognition to the BoP’s acts and documents and to explore possible avenues of support, but falls short of requiring support as such. This wording suggests that States retain discretion as to whether, ultimately, to support; and those concerned about legal breaches will want to refrain and engage outside these mechanisms.

Third States that choose to provide support may do so only to the extent and in a manner compatible with international law – in particular, to the extent that the scope and temporary character of the BoP and ISF interventions can be reconciled with the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, and that any use of force and other forms of interventions remain within the bounds of the purported Chapter VII authorization. Even on the doubtful reading that Resolution 2803 creates an obligation to support the BoP and ISF (at most for States that have the capacity to do so), such an obligation cannot extend to support contrary to the right to self-determination (Article 103 of the U.N. Charter does not operate to displace peremptory norms) and, arguably, to other U.N. principles such as the prohibition to use force and the principle of non-intervention, where they are at risk of violation (Peters; IHL Centre, pp. 25-26).

Accordingly, any participation in the implementation of the Trump plan and Resolution 2803 – including through support to the BoP and ISF – is constrained by third States’ international law obligations and requires careful assessment as well as continuous review.

Finally, irrespective of their decision to participate or not in the implementation of the Trump plan, all States can – and in some regards must – take measures in response to violations of international law by Israel. In case of serious breaches of peremptory norms, such as the basic rules of IHL and the right to self-determination, they have specific obligations, including the obligation to cooperate, through lawful means, to bring those breaches to an end (see IHL Centre p. 31). In its Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, the International Court of Justice gave concrete expression to these duties, holding that “it is for all States … to ensure that any impediment resulting from the illegal presence of Israel in the oPt to the exercise of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination is brought to an end” (ICJ July 2024 Advisory Opinion, paras 278–279). That obligation continues to bind all States.

Conclusion

The institutional complexity and innovation of the Trump plan for Gaza should not obscure the grave concerns the plan raises under international law, including norms as fundamental as the right to self-determination and the prohibition on the use of force. The endorsement of the plan by the UN Security Council does not shield it from the demands of international law.

For third States, participation in the plan thus carries significant risks, including the risk that they will have a hand in compounding existing violations or contributing to new ones. At the same time, disengagement is not a tenable option. Despite the ceasefire, hostilities and other acts of violence continue across the Gaza Strip; Israel has reportedly expanded its control beyond the “yellow line,” accompanied by further destruction of property and restrictions on impartial humanitarian organisations. Troubling proposals – such as the establishment of so-called “alternative safe communities” or “planned communities” – underscore that the plan’s implementation will continue to have significant legal and humanitarian implications, making clearsighted and persistent engagement by the international community essential.

While international law offers no easy solution, it requires third States to act as legal gatekeepers. Whether within or outside the framework of the Trump plan, many possess levers that must be used to ensure respect for international law. If they choose to support this framework, such support must remain strictly conditioned on compliance with international law and be continuously reassessed in light of evolving facts on the ground.

The post Follow the Law, Not the Plan: Legal Considerations for Third States in Gaza appeared first on Just Security.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR – CEASEFIRE 

President Trump said yesterday that he will not be rushed into a deal with Iran, adding that Iran’s efforts to outlast him will not work because he doesn’t “care about the midterms.” The White House dismissed Iranian state media reports that “an initial, unofficial document” outlining the framework for an agreement would lift the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports in exchange for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, while leaving it under joint Iranian-Omani control. CNN reports; Max Bearak, Erika Solomon, Euan Ward, Luke Broadwater, and Michael Levenson report for the New York Times.  

“Oman will behave just like everybody else or we’ll have to blow them up,” Trump told reporters yesterday following news of a plan that would see Oman and Iran jointly charge a toll for ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. “They understand that. They’ll be fine.” Gregory Svirnovskiy reports for POLITICO.  

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said early this morning that they launched an attack targeting a U.S. air base near Bandar Abbas Airport, which they say was the source of U.S. strikes on Iran hours before. The U.S. military shot down four Iranian drones and struck an Iranian ground control station in Bandar Abbas late on Wednesday, a U.S. official said. “These actions were measured, purely defensive and intended to maintain the ceasefire,” the official said. The IRGC said its response was “a serious warning” to the U.S., saying its “aggression will not go unanswered.” Kuwait’s army reported this morning that its air defenses were intercepting hostile drones and missiles, though it did not state the origin of the attacks. Kathleen Magramo reports for CNN; Qasim Nauman, Eric Schmitt, Luke Broadwater, Euan Ward, and Erika Solomon report for the New York Times; Jana Choukeir, Enas Alashray, and Phil Stewart report for Reuters. 

IRAN WAR – LEBANON OPERATIONS 

Israel’s military yesterday declared a new area of southern Lebanon as a combat zone and said residents should move north, warning it would act “with great force” against Hezbollah in the area. In Beirut, Israeli surveillance drones were heard buzzing above the city, and a warplane was heard flying yesterday, according to Reuters reporters. Three senior Israeli officials said Israel believes it has freedom of action in southern Lebanon despite the ceasefire, but less so in Beirut. Reuters reports.  

Waves of Israeli strikes hit the city of Tyre in southern Lebanon this morning, according to the Israeli military and social media videos from residents, killing at least 14 people. Israel said the strikes targeted suspected Hezbollah infrastructure. Shelters in the nearby city of Sidon have reached full capacity, the head of the municipality told the BBC, with no space remaining for newly displaced people. Tyre’s authorities are advising residents to travel further north to Beirut. Samantha Granville and David Gritten report for BBC News. 

Israel’s air force carried out an airstrike on a southern suburb of Beirut today. The outcome of the airstrike was not immediately clear at the time of writing. Kareem Chehayeb reports for AP News.  

IRAN WAR – OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 

The Treasury Department announced yesterday that it had added Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority – a body launched last week to oversee the waterway – to its sanctions list. Reuters reports.  

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR

Israeli strikes yesterday killed at least seven people in Gaza City. Hamas also confirmed that Israeli airstrikes the day before had killed the new leader of its military wing, along with his wife and two of his children. Wafaa Shurafa and Melanie Lidman report for AP News.  

The International Stabilization Force for Gaza still has no troops, as none of the five countries that pledged troops have come through with any significant contributions. Indonesia, which had pledged 8,000 troops, put its commitment on indefinite hold a week after the United States and Israel attacked Iran. Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafie Sjamsoeddin said it suspended its plan due to what seemed to be a lack of commitment from a distracted Washington, adding, “We have not yet received any implementation guidelines.” David Rising reports for AP News.  

The United States has re-added U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories Francesca Albanese to a list of sanctioned individuals, according to a notice posted yesterday on the Treasury Department’s website. The move follows an administrative stay issued by a federal appeals court last week, allowing the government to once again enforce Albanese’s designation. The appeals court order made clear that the decision was procedural and “should not be construed in any way as a ruling on the merits.” Reuters reports.  

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

Uganda yesterday ordered the closure of its border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo due to a surge in Ebola cases. The measure goes against guidance by the World Health Organization, which said that border closures “push the movement of people and goods to informal border crossings that are not monitored, thus increasing the chances of the spread of disease.” Rodney Muhumuza reports for AP News.  

Ghana yesterday chartered a flight to repatriate 300 of its citizens living in South Africa, according to Ghanaian officials, after rising anti-immigrant protests and attacks left many foreigners fearing for their safety. About 890 Ghanaians in South Africa have registered to be repatriated, Ghana’s High Commissioner to South Africa said, adding that another flight was expected to depart Johannesburg on Friday. John Eligon, Eden Harris, and Zimasa Matiwane report for the New York Times.  

 U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

A new International Institute for Strategic Studies report warns that a potential U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan could escalate to the nuclear level, as both sides may target each other’s critical military command and communications systems without clear “guard rails” to prevent escalation. The study, released ahead of Asia’s biggest annual defense meeting in Singapore this weekend, also says the Asia-Pacific is becoming the center of a new nuclear arms race as China rapidly expands its nuclear capabilities and regional tensions grow. Greg Torode and Jun Yuan Yong report for Reuters.  

U.S. CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

The U.S. military yesterday struck another vessel suspected of transporting drugs in the eastern Pacific Ocean, killing two men. Reuters reports.  

The Trump administration has instructed federal prosecutors in Miami to avoid pursuing criminal investigations into Venezuelan acting President Delcy Rodríguez, according to current and former U.S. law enforcement officials. It is unclear whether prosecutors had implicated Rodríguez in any crimes or whether investigators were moving toward an indictment. A Justice Department spokesperson said in an email, “There was never an investigation into her to shut down.” Joshua Goodman, Alanna Durkin Richer, and Jim Mustian report for AP News.  

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services had already started asking some applicants why they did not leave the United States and return home to apply for a green card prior to the announcement of USCIS’s new policy last week, according to two lawyers. The lawyers said it was unclear how widely the questions were being posed and whether they applied only to certain applicants. Lauren Kaori Gurley and David Nakamura report for the Washington Post.   

The South African government and advocacy groups for the country’s Afrikaner white minority yesterday rejected the Trump administration’s position that there’s a humanitarian emergency affecting white people in South Africa. A spokesperson for the Afrikaner trade union, Solidariteit, said the union “is in no way aware of anything that the Trump administration could be referring to.” Michelle Gumede reports for AP News.  

TECH DEVELOPMENTS 

OpenAI yesterday announced new partnerships and tools ahead of upcoming elections to combat misinformation, including cybersecurity support for U.S. voting system manufacturers, and collaborations with election officials and organizations like The Associated Press and Democracy Works. The company is also endorsing transparency legislation to combat deepfakes, including the Protect Elections from Deceptive AI Act and the Preparing Election Administrators for AI Act. Maria Curi reports for Axios. 

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

The Justice Department has launched a criminal investigation into E. Jean Carroll, the former magazine columnist who accused Trump of sexual assault, according to multiple sources. The investigation is focused on whether Carroll committed perjury in testimony tied to her two civil lawsuits against the president. Hannah Rabinowitz, Paula Reid, and Kara Scannell report for CNN.  

California Gov. Gavin Newsom (D) yesterday signed legislation intended to safeguard elections by introducing numerous restrictions on who can gain access to ballots and the areas where they are processed. Newsom described it as a way to “address the legitimate anxiety” over election security amid attempts by the Trump administration and Trump’s allies to tamper with results. Lauren Rosenhall reports for the New York Times.  

Newsom also vowed yesterday to tax “100 percent of those proceeds” that California residents receive from a $1.776 billion “anti-weaponization” fund that Trump secured in a settlement with the Justice Department. Tyler Katzenberger and Nick Reisman report for POLITICO.  

35 retired federal judges have asked a U.S. district court judge to reopen a lawsuit Trump and his family pursued against the Internal Revenue Service, arguing that a controversial agreement creating the $1.776 billion Justice Department compensation fund may have involved fraud and improper manipulation of the judicial system. The judges claim the deal unlawfully shields Trump and his family from certain past IRS tax claims while allowing a presidentially controlled fund to distribute taxpayer money without congressional approval. Maegan Vazquez reports for the Washington Post.  

Trump yesterday filed a revised lawsuit against Dow Jones, publisher of the Wall Street Journal. A judge dismissed Trump’s earlier complaint that alleged he was defamed by an article about a birthday letter to Jeffrey Epstein, giving Trump until May 27 to file a new complaint. The new complaint alleges that the defendants acted with “actual malice” in several aspects, citing Trump’s repeated denial of any involvement with the letter. Corinne Ramey reports for the Wall Street Journal.  

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

The Trump administration is pursuing funding deals, potentially including equity stakes, with drone companies to boost domestic production and lower costs, sources told the Wall Street Journal. The Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital, with $210 billion in lending authority, is vetting companies such as Performance Drone Works, Nero Technologies, and Unusual Machines (which has links to Donald Trump Jr. as a shareholder and advisory board member). Heather Somerville and Amrith Ramkumar report.

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions.

If you enjoy listening, Just Security’s analytic articles are also available in audio form on the justsecurity.org website.

ICYMI: Yesterday on Just Security

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Following the shootdown, the Security Council requested that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) investigate the incident. ICAO concluded in its findings that the Cuban fighter jets made no attempt to direct the civil aircraft out of sovereign airspace or instruct them to land, and failed to follow ICAO procedures for interceptions. After receiving the ICAO report, the Security Council adopted resolution 1067, in which it endorsed the ICAO findings and concluded that the shootdowns were unlawful.

Against this backdrop, the Q&A below provides an overview of the legal framework governing shootdowns. In short, shootdowns are prohibited under both international and domestic U.S. law absent very specific circumstances. The United States criminalizes the use of force against civil aircraft, with jurisdiction potentially attaching to foreign government officials – although charges of this nature have rarely been brought against foreign officials. The Q&A takes no position on the decision to indict Castro, nor the likelihood that he may face criminal trial in the United States on the basis of these charges. Instead, it provides the legal context in which the indictment has been issued.

Are Aerial Shootdowns of Civil Aircraft Permitted Under International Law?

No, except in self defense as described below. International law prohibits the shooting down of civil aircraft. Two primary treaties codify this prohibition: (1) the Chicago Convention; and (2) the Montreal Convention. Cuba and the United States are parties to both. The prohibition is understood to reflect customary international law binding on all States.

The Chicago Convention

The Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention) expressly prohibits the use of weapons against a civil aircraft in flight (Article 3 bis). The U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has noted that there is reason to believe that the article is “declaratory of customary international law,” as has ICAO. 

The Chicago Convention also provides parameters for interceptions of civil aircraft that do not involve the use of force, requiring that such interceptions must be a last resort, and that in those instances “the lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered” (see Article 3 bis (a)). The Convention also established ICAO and mandated it with developing international standards and procedures in relation to air navigation (see Article 37). ICAO subsequently issued standard procedures for aircraft interceptions, which include radio signals, visual signals, and physical signals such as flashing lights and rocking the wings of the intercepting aircraft. These procedures, and whether the Cuban fighter jets complied with them, have been at issue in the Cuba case.

The Montreal Convention 

The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (the Montreal Convention) prohibits damaging or destroying a civil aircraft in flight or in service, and obligates States Parties to criminalize such action with the attachment of “severe penalties” (see Article 3). 

While not at issue in the Brothers to the Rescue case, the distinction between a civil aircraft “in flight” versus a civil aircraft “in service” is an important feature of the Montreal Convention. An aircraft is “in flight” from when its external doors close after embarkation, until they open for disembarkation. But an aircraft is “in service” from the initiation of preflight preparations of the aircraft (i.e. by ground personnel or the crew for a specified flight) until 24 hours after landing – a significantly more expanded period of time. This means that the prohibition under the Montreal Convention extends not only to aircraft in active flight, but also to those on the ground during the protected period, making it more protective than the Chicago Convention in this regard. Law enforcement or military action against grounded civil aircraft such as bombing, strafing, ramming, shooting tires or turbines, or similar are prohibited under this Convention.

Are There Any Exceptions to the Prohibition Under International Law?

Yes, although they are quite limited. As OLC emphasized in its 1994 memo on the topic, “the only recognized exception to this rule is self-defense from attack.” The fact that a civil aircraft may be used for unlawful purposes – including, for example, suspected drug trafficking – has no bearing on this prohibition, nor does the unpermitted entry into a foreign country’s sovereign airspace or the failure to comply with ICAO interception signals. In these situations, States may protect their sovereign airspace by (a) directing the aircraft to land at a designated airport; (b) giving the aircraft any other instructions to cease violations; or (c) taking any “appropriate means consistent with relevant rules of international law, including [Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention].” In other words, a wide range of activity is permitted to address violations of sovereign airspace, but the use of force is not one of them.

Additionally, the Montreal Convention is generally understood not to apply to military forces acting in armed conflict (see, for instance, here at pg. 200). The Chicago Convention similarly states that its provisions do not “affect the freedom of action” of States engaged in armed conflict (see Article 89). This is not to say that States may freely target civil aircraft during times of armed conflict – to the contrary, they may only be targeted to the extent that they constitute a military objective and are otherwise targetable under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law).

Does the United States Support These Conventions?

Yes. The United States is a State Party to both the Chicago Convention and the Montreal Convention, and implemented its obligations under the Montreal Convention via domestic U.S. legislation (see further below). 

The United States has invoked international law in response to the shooting down of civil aircraft before, for instance in response to the shootdown of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (KAL 007) by the Soviet military in 1983 (indeed, it was this shootdown that led to an amendment of Article 3 of the Chicago Convention to ensure there was no ambiguity as to its prohibitions on shooting down civil aircraft in flight). Additionally, the U.S. has at various times supported the process by which the ICAO Council (of which the United States is a member) eventually determined that Russia had violated the Chicago Convention when it shot down Flight MH17.

Are Aerial Shootdowns Permitted Under U.S. Domestic Law?

No. The Aircraft Sabotage Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. section 32, establishes criminal offenses pertaining to the damaging, destroying, or threatening to damage or destroy a civil aircraft in service or in flight, in close alignment with international law. The penalties for violating these provisions are severe, including up to life imprisonment or, if the crime results in the loss of life, potentially the death penalty (see FN 11).

18 U.S.C. section 31 uses the same definitions for “in flight” and “in service” as those used in the Montreal Convention, meaning that the prohibitions also extend to grounded aircraft during the protective preflight and 24-hour post-landing periods. A civil aircraft is defined in 49 U.S.C. section 40102 as any aircraft that is not a government aircraft utilized for non-commercial purposes.

The law does not prohibit “ordinary law enforcement operations” in relation to either the crew or the cargo, including searches, seizures, or arrests – and incidental damage caused to an aircraft during a seizure and arrest operation would not trigger criminal liability, according to the Department of Justice (see FN 25).

Are There Any Exceptions to the Prohibition Under U.S. Domestic Law?

Yes, there are limited exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force against civil aircraft under domestic U.S. law. The U.S. domestic legal exceptions are more expansive than those available under international law, including some counternarcotics-related activities under very specific circumstances.

Self-Defense and Armed Conflict

The U.S. domestic prohibition on the use of force against civil aircraft in flight or in service is excepted in circumstances where there is an imminent, serious threat of physical harm, for instance emanating from a crew’s active armed resistance to lawful police orders. Otherwise, the behavior or affiliations of the pilots do not affect the prohibition (in the absence of a presidential determination, as discussed below). Indeed, the 1994 OLC memo made clear that even in the instance that a civil aircraft is engaging in unlawful activity, the only permitted exception to the prohibition on using force against that aircraft is self-defense against a threat of imminent, serious physical harm.

The prohibition under U.S. law also does not apply during armed conflict, with the same caveats as noted in the discussion above.

Presidential Determination

There is one other exception to the prohibition under domestic U.S. law, in very specific and limited circumstances. In large part in response to the 1994 OLC memo (and its implications for potential U.S. government officials’ liability), Congress quickly passed legislation to provide a narrow exception to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. section 32 for specific law enforcement-related shootdowns. 

Specifically, foreign government officials engaging in shootdowns are not liable if two conditions are met: (1) the targeted aircraft is “reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking,” and (2) the president of the United States has certified to Congress (on an annual basis) that shootdowns are necessary due to the “extraordinary threat posed by illicit drug trafficking to the national security of that country” and that the country has “appropriate procedures in place to protect against innocent loss of life in the air and on the ground. . .” This exception was codified in 22 U.S.C. section 2291-4. Although quite rare, presidents have exercised this authority in a number of contexts, most notably in Colombia (a determination which appears to be currently in effect).

Does the U.S. Domestic Law Prohibition Extend to Officials of Foreign Governments?

Yes. U.S. district courts have held U.S. criminal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. section 32(b) in particular extends to those who use force against a civil aircraft “even if a U.S. aircraft was not involved and the act was not within [the United States]” (see United States v. Yunis). Under section 32(b), it is sufficient that an offender is present in the United States for jurisdiction to attach; further, the Yunis court found that such jurisdiction may attach even if a defendant is only on U.S. soil because they have been brought to the United States for prosecution on other charges (and indeed, noted that the Montreal Convention would in fact obligate the U.S. to either prosecute or extradite an individual charged with offenses established under the treaty, such as section 32(b)). 18 U.S.C. section 32(a), the specific provision under which Castro has been charged, does not have this expansive extraterritorial scope, but it does apply to U.S.-registered civil aircraft shot down abroad (see FN 14), as DOJ claims was the nature of the aircraft shot down by the Cubans in 1996. Citing caselaw as well as legislative history, the Department of Justice emphasized in 1994 that the prohibition under both sub-sections (and attaching criminal liability) extends to government officials acting in their official capacities. Notably, the memo – which was focused in particular on the risk of secondary liability for U.S. government officials facilitating shootdowns abroad, rather than on the potential to directly prosecute foreign officials themselves – did not address the issue of various immunities that may attach in certain scenarios, and which would need to be considered in any direct prosecution of a foreign official who may potentially benefit from such immunities.

Has the United States Brought Criminal Charges on This Basis Before?

Yes. The United States has pursued criminal charges against foreign government actors under 18 U.S.C. section 32 in the past, including in response to the bombing of Pan American Flight 103 under the direction of Libyan state officials (with new charges filed as recently as 2020). 

The Department of Justice has also taken the position that 18 U.S.C. section 32 would apply to the use of force by law enforcement or military officials of foreign governments taken against civil aircraft suspected of engaging in drug trafficking as part of an official government counternarcotics program if the requirements noted above are not met, although no prosecutions on this basis have been brought to date.

The post Shooting Down Civil Aircraft: What International and U.S. Law Say About a Charge in the Raul Castro Indictment appeared first on Just Security.

This was not the Afghanistan I knew five years ago. I should know, I was its attorney general.

When I took office in 2016, the prosecution system I inherited employed 6,000 people. Fewer than 3 percent were women. By the time the United States withdrew in 2021, that figure had reached 23 percent. Through U.S.-funded rule-of-law programs via the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), we trained 250 female prosecutors and integrated them into every level of the justice system — from Kabul to provincial offices that had never seen a woman behind a prosecutor’s desk.

As these professional women entered the system, something measurable happened. The U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented a significant increase in the number of cases registered by police, prosecutors, and courts across multiple provinces alleging violence against women. Women were coming forward to report crimes they had always experienced but never reported. UNAMA attributed the increase directly to Afghan women’s growing demands for justice — they were not coming forward because violence had increased but because, for the first time, they believed the system might listen. Post-Taliban Afghanistan at the time already had established laws and policies focused on protection and justice for women and children, including specialized legal frameworks, family police units, specifically assigned prosecutors and special courts. But the element that had been lacking for female victims was just one thing: someone in the room who shared their experience. When women prosecutors were present, women came forward. The connection was that direct.

Constructing a New Legal System

Afghanistan’s legal system was reconstructed after the post-9/11 U.S. invasion in 2001 that toppled the Taliban, which had been harboring al-Qaeda. With international support, the country developed a new written constitution, an independent three-tier court structure, an independent Attorney General’s Office, and an independent bar association. Prosecutors built cases. Judges decided them. The defense lawyers provided legal defense and legal consultations. These were separate functions — a structural guarantee that no single person could both accuse and convict. Evidence was required. Decisions could be appealed. Courts kept written records.

This system took 20 years to construct. It took 11 days to lose.

On Aug. 15, 2021, I watched Kabul fall, feeling numb. Within days, the Taliban released thousands of prisoners — abusers of women, drug traffickers, murderers, members of armed groups, all of whom had been convicted by the system we built. Many of those men knew exactly who had put them there.

Within weeks, the targeted killings began. The Afghan Prosecutors Association, now in exile, has documented at least 57 prosecutors and family members killed since August 2021. Most were either shot or beaten to death in their homes or on the street by the criminals or terrorists they had helped convict. A prosecutor was killed in Nangarhar Province on Aug. 26 that year. Another in Farah the next day. A third, Nusrat Ullah, on Sept. 12. The pattern was not random.

Female prosecutors faced a different but equally final outcome. Those who had spent years building careers in law were stripped of their positions and told to go home. Many received direct threats. Many fled to Pakistan or Iran, where they now face deportation back to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Others are in hiding inside Afghanistan. Amnesty International reported in December that “Iran and Pakistan alone have unlawfully expelled more than 2.6 million people to the country this year. About 60 percent of those returned are women and children.”

The Taliban had previously announced a general amnesty for former government workers. But it was no more than a gesture. The United Nations has documented at least 800 human rights violations against former Afghan officials and security forces between August 2021 and June 2023, including more than 200 extrajudicial killings. No one was investigated. No one has been held accountable.

Injustice in the Taliban’s Legal System

The Taliban did not build a different legal system. They eliminated the concept of one. Under the Taliban, courts both investigate and decide criminal cases. A single judge — appointed for Taliban affiliation and for Taliban-aligned religious training rather than legal education — controls all functions. Women may not appear in court except as parties to a dispute, and only then with a male guardian present.

In January 2026, the Taliban issued a Criminal Procedure Code for Courts that formalized this in writing. It criminalizes domestic violence only when a woman has suffered a broken bone or visible injury. It prescribes a three-month prison sentence for any woman who visits her family without her husband’s permission. It accepts slavery. As a former judge in Afghanistan described it to Amnesty International: “In Taliban courts, the voice of a woman is not heard — not because she has nothing to say, but because there is no one left to hear her.”

Today, in addition to widespread repressive measure such as barring females from education above the sixth grade, 1,825 women are held in Taliban prisons, a 435 percent increase since the Taliban took power, according to the regime’s own Interior Ministry. At every stage — investigation, prosecution, defense — there are no women working on their cases, either against them, or in their defense, or ruling as judges. A woman who enters the Taliban legal system is sacrificed twice: first by the society that failed to protect her, and then by a system with no one in it who can speak for her.

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants in July 2025 for the Taliban’s supreme leader and its chief justice on charges of “ordering, inducing or soliciting the crime against humanity of persecution,” specifically against women, girls, and otherwise on the grounds of gender or gender identity or expression. In October 2025, the U.N. Human Rights Council created the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Afghanistan to collect and preserve evidence of international crimes. These are necessary and meaningful steps. But mechanisms require memory. They require the world to keep paying attention, not only when Afghanistan competes for headlines, but consistently, over time.

In addition to the 57 prosecutors and family members killed, more than 3,800 remain in hiding in Afghanistan, likely still unemployed and facing famine. They are the institutional memory of a justice system. They know how to build cases, train investigators, protect witnesses, and prosecute the crimes the Taliban has now made legal.

After the fall of Kabul, I worked with the U.S. Association of Prosecuting Attorneys to launch the Prosecutors for Prosecutors campaign, an effort to relocate 1,500 prosecutors and their families to safety. The campaign exists because these men and women, who had been trained by the United States and allied nations to uphold rule of law in Afghanistan, do not qualify for Special Immigrant Visas for the United States because they were not U.S. government contractors. Some were jailed. Some were tortured. Many were threatened and ordered not to tell others they had been detained.

As the ICC investigations continue and the U.N. investigative mechanism for Afghanistan proceeds, several specific steps remain within reach. The International Court of Justice and other international human rights treaty bodies should deploy their full accountability tools against Taliban repression — the legal architecture exists; what is required is the political will to use it. The Afghan Adjustment Act, which has stalled in congressional committees for years, could resolve part of this crisis. Congress should reconsider eligibility for Afghans in dangerous situations, including prosecutors and judges who served under U.S.-funded rule-of-law programs — people who stood beside American institutions for two decades and were left behind on a paperwork technicality. The U.S. Association of Prosecuting Attorneys and the Prosecutors for Prosecutors campaign are prepared to bring these cases directly to senators and congressional representatives in their home states and districts. The State Department should fund the Prosecutors for Prosecutors campaign directly, as it does for similar relocation efforts in other conflict zones. The U.N. accountability mechanism should prioritize evidence collection on the targeted killing of prosecutors, whose murders represent the deliberate destruction of institutional memory. And the international community should resist normalizing Taliban governance through trade or diplomatic engagement that is not conditioned on minimum protections for women and former justice officials.

This piece was not written to assign blame. I wrote it because the people who built Afghanistan’s legal system, who showed up every day knowing the risks, who believed their country could become something different, deserve action just as robust to defend them now. They must not be forgotten.

Withdrawal from Afghanistan should not mean withdrawal from all promises, all ethical obligations, all human rights obligations. Justice in Afghanistan is not finished. It is only interrupted. The discernment comes when the world makes the choice to call their representatives, to ask for their allies to be accounted for.

* * *

(The author extends sincere thanks to Negar Hamidi, who contributed immensely to the research and writing of this piece.)

The post I Was Afghanistan’s Attorney General. Here Is What Justice Looked Like — and What Destroyed It. appeared first on Just Security.

In each of these episodes—spanning the three most recent administrations—members of Congress and others have called for a president to be declared unable to exercise his powers under Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. The United States will, in less than a month, be led by its second consecutive octogenarian president. But what exactly does Section 4 require or permit?

Although the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is nearly 60 years old, its most controversial provision, Section 4, has never been invoked. Section 4 authorizes just nine government officials—the vice president plus a majority of principal officers (eight of the 15 listed executive department heads)—to temporarily separate the president from his or her powers and duties by voting and transmitting to the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate a written declaration that “the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.” The president would then have a right to challenge that declaration, and, if he or she did, but the vice president and Cabinet majority adhered to their belief that the president was unable, the two houses of Congress would each vote to resolve the dispute within three weeks. If each house sustains the vice president’s position by a two-thirds vote, the vice president would continue to serve as acting president while the president remained stripped of his or her powers. Thus, on a remarkably compressed constitutional timeline of less than one month, a sitting president could be separated from his or her powers. Yet this is a constitutional text that even many trained lawyers regularly misconstrue and a constitutional procedure that very few Americans understand.

To address this knowledge gap, in 2018, the Peter Gruber Rule of Law Clinic at Yale Law School authored a comprehensive, detailed “Reader’s Guide” explaining the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s history, nature, and scope. A description of its major findings may be found here. Our goal was to carefully explain the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s text and operation to laypeople and lawyers alike. In developing this guide over many months, we consulted closely with leading experts and studied as many sources as we could find, including text, legislative history, academic commentary, the limited number of existing relevant judicial analyses, and all significant past studies on the issues. Through these efforts, we developed what we hoped would be a single, authoritative document to provide a fair and thorough reading of all interpretive issues relating to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.

Given the many intervening events, our Rule of Law Clinic has recently updated its Twenty-Fifth Amendment Guide to reflect subsequent developments arising during the Trump and Biden administrations—including, apparently under the first Trump administration, the only known instance of a principal officer (then-Education Secretary Betsy DeVos) reportedly expressing support for invoking Section 4 after the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol. As calls to invoke Section 4 proliferate, this blogpost distills: (1) the Reader’s Guide’s updated guidance on Section 4’s meaning; (2) its potential application today; (3) Section 4’s standard of inability, addressing some common misconceptions; and (4) suggested limits to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s applicability in times of national uncertainty.

Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment

A judgment of impeachment by the Senate removes a president from office. But the Constitution provides two other ways by which presidential powers and duties may be transferred from a sitting president to the vice president without removing the president from office. These means are described in Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.

Temporary Voluntary Transfer of Power: Section 3 of the Amendment allows a president to temporarily transfer power to the vice president if the president is or will be “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.” Presidents have historically used this provision to transfer their power during medical procedures, for instance, those requiring general anesthesia. Upon recovery, they have reclaimed the duties and powers of their office simply by transmitting a written notification to the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate that they have regained their ability to discharge the powers and duties of the office. 

Involuntary Transfer: Section 4 provides a different, more politically charged mechanism for separating a president from the powers of the office. Although it has never been officially invoked, Section 4 allows a vice president and a majority of “principal officers of the executive departments” (a smaller group than those who meet as part of the whole Cabinet) to temporarily disempower a president who is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.” This determination is effective immediately; and once the letter is transmitted (not received), the vice president becomes the acting president. To be sure, Section 4 also permits Congress to pass a law creating an “other body” to replace the principal officers’ role. But proposals to do so have gained little traction, and any such proposal at a time of active Twenty-Fifth Amendment discussion would likely have to be enacted by overriding a presidential veto, making its formation unlikely for now. One such proposal from U.S. Representative Jamie Raskin (D-MD) would create a bipartisan commission composed of medical experts, retired statespersons, and one chair selected by the commission’s membership.

A president may contest that determination by asserting in writing that no inability exists. Once a president contests, the vice president and principal officers have four days to affirm that they stand by their original judgment. If they do not, the president regains his or her powers. If they do, the vice president remains acting president, and the question of inability moves to Congress, which faces a 21-day time limit to decide by affirmative vote. Two-thirds majorities in both houses of Congress (among members present) can sustain the transfer of presidential powers to the vice president less than 30 days after the original determination is sent. If less than two-thirds of either house supports the vice president’s position, the president resumes power immediately.

Section 4 is extraordinarily difficult to invoke, because it requires coordinated action by officials who are typically political allies of the president and appointees in his or her administration. That requirement is designed to screen out frivolous or opportunistic invocations. 

Section 4 is also designed to be responsive but reversible: although temporary power can shift quickly to a vice president, that shift only becomes durable with sustained agreement among the vice president, a majority of principal officers, and supermajorities in Congress that the vice president should continue to exercise the president’s powers. It also presumes that the vice president and principal officers can assess a president’s condition. But even if the vice president and a majority of principal officers have decided to invoke Section 4, what exactly does it mean for a president to be “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office”?

The meaning of “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office”

The Constitution offers no definition of presidential inability. The standard is intentionally broad, supplying no criteria beyond the text and legislative history. As a matter of common sense, nearly all presidents will at times face illness, injury, or fatigue. Thus, “unable to discharge” cannot logically include situations where a president is operating below peak capacity but is still able to perform core presidential duties, such as issuing rational commands to the armed forces. Conversely, the phrase could encompass situations where a president is still capable of performing some public-facing activities, but behind the scenes, is unable to carry out the core decision-making responsibilities of the office.

Over the last decade, increasing calls for invoking Section 4 can be understood as reflecting three theories of the “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office” standard. From narrowest to broadest, these theories include diagnosed medical inability; medical inability inferred from erratic action; or inability unlinked to any medical condition. Calls to invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment after January 6, 2021 provide useful examples of each. The Guide concludes that the best reading should recognize the second theory: inferred medical inability. Broadly speaking, the constitutional term “unable” may extend beyond a diagnosed debilitating medical condition, to non-medical situations such as when a president is kidnapped, suffers from severe alcohol or substance abuse, or faces a conflict of interest that prevents him from acting in the best interests of the country in a particular situation. It cannot be stretched, however, to cover policy or legal disputes over the proper exercise of “the powers and duties of [the President’s] office.” 

(1) The narrowest theory: Limiting to a diagnosed medical inability

On the narrowest view, “unable” is limited to a diagnosed medical or physical incapacity—including a mental condition.

For instance, after members of the House of Representatives called on Vice President Mike Pence and the principal officers to invoke Section 4 against President Donald Trump after the events of January 6, 2021, Pence demurred, claiming that the Amendment “was designed to address presidential incapacity or disability” and implying that the “unable” standard should reflect a certified medical judgment. Under this view, even reckless presidential action would not qualify unless connected with a medically diagnosed disabling condition. Impeachment, not the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, would be the appropriate avenue for removal for presidential recklessness. 

(2) A broader theory: Inferring medical inability from presidential actions

But what if available evidence points toward presidential inability, even without a confirmed formal medical diagnosis? Patterns of behavior, surrounding circumstances, and demonstrable failures of judgment may suggest a medical condition—such as dementia—and may constitute evidence of inability even absent a formal medical diagnosis. Could a broader reading of “unable” allow inability to be inferred from a president’s conduct even without a formal medical diagnosis?

Some of those who called for Section 4 to be invoked in connection with the events of January 6, for instance, argued that Trump’s inability was demonstrated by his denial of the election results and his response to the storming of the Capitol. The same approach animated calls to invoke Section 4 with regard to President Joe Biden, particularly surrounding concerns about his age, even in the absence of any medical diagnosis of inability. Similarly, calls to invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment have been made by critics of Trump during his second term, based on his allegedly erratic statements. Recent reporting suggests that even his own aides are concerned about his judgment: during the high-stakes April 2026 rescue mission of the downed pilot in Iran, aides reportedly kept the president out of real-time operational discussions, instead relaying updates at intervals because they believed his reactions would not be helpful. 

Absent medical diagnosis, Section 4 is unlikely to be successfully invoked on the basis of a single episode suggesting that a president has dementia or a similar disabling mental condition. But we conclude that a documented pattern of highly erratic presidential decision-making and judgment, or repeated episodes of incoherence or other signs of dementia, might be a sufficient basis for a vice president and a majority of principal officers to conclude that Section 4 should be invoked, so long as their decision included adequate consultation with medical experts familiar with the president’s “physical and mental condition.”

(3) The broadest theory: Entirely delinking “unable” from an identifiable medical condition

At the outer edge is the view that “unable” has no meaningful legal content—that it is essentially whatever the relevant actors say it is. Under this view, all that the invokers need to do is claim that a president is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.” Whatever the vice president and eight principal officers decided constituted “inability” would be sufficient to force an involuntary transfer of powers.

In the wake of January 6, some framed invocation as a practical constitutional tool—alternative to the remedy of impeachment—for removing a president. They called for the invocation of Section 4 to remove Trump from office—without explicitly claiming that a medical condition or limitation prevented Trump from discharging his powers and duties, or that his actions were themselves a sign of inability. 

But this reasoning misses a key point about the Amendment. It was not written as a simple vote of no confidence: its drafters created a broad standard to encompass a range of emergency situations, not to render the term “unable” an empty term that can be used to collapse the distinction between genuine inability and ordinary political disagreement. The Amendment was not intended to punish a sitting president. It was designed to preserve the continuity of government: to avoid a constitutional gap, not to provide a political weapon. The point was to ensure that someone who is physically and mentally able is always exercising the constitutional powers of the president. When a president becomes objectively unable to discharge his or her constitutional responsibilities, the Amendment provides mechanisms to ensure that the vice president, who has been elected for this purpose, may assume those duties relatively seamlessly, so the nation is not left without a constitutionally capable leader.

Section 4’s limits—and the judgment it demands

What types of situations are most likely to trigger a serious consideration of Section 4? The first and clearest case would be unambiguous medical or physical incapacity: a president who is clearly unable to function due to a medical or physical condition, most obviously unconsciousness. Primary drafter Senator Birch Bayh said that

[a] President who was unconscious for 30 minutes when missiles were flying toward this country might only be disabled temporarily, but it would be of severe consequence when viewed in light of the problems facing the country.

The example illustrates how inability does not have to be permanent to be critical, reflecting the Amendment’s core purpose of providing a mechanism for efficiently responding to time-sensitive crises. 

A second case likely to trigger consideration of Section 4 is severe but contested impairment. If a president is conscious but experiences significant physical or cognitive impairment that arguably prevents the discharge of core responsibilities, invocation of Section 4 may become likely, but also more contested.

A third case would be age-related decline: where a president appears to be slowing down, makes fewer public appearances, and does not work the long hours the job normally requires. On these facts alone, Section 4 probably cannot be invoked. Pressure from Congress or the public may lead to the disclosure of medical information about a president’s ability, but without concrete evidence of inability as to core presidential responsibilities, it would be difficult to remove a president based on a mere perception or allegation of age-related decline. 

A fourth case would involve corruption. Even extensive evidence that a president is corruptly using the benefits of their office for personal enrichment and rewards to family members or cronies is not alone proof of inability to discharge the core duties of the office. If evidence of corruption is overwhelming, impeachment would likely be the better vehicle for presidential removal than the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Still, one cannot rule out the possibility of a Twenty-Fifth Amendment Section 4 case where a persistent pattern of consistently lawless presidential behavior led objective medical experts to diagnose a condition suggesting that the president is medically unable to distinguish right from wrong. 

Finally, a fifth, difficult case would involve a demonstrated presidential unwillingness responsibly to discharge the powers and duties of the office. At what point may a reasonable constitutional observer infer presidential inability from presidential unwillingness to act? Could Section 4 be invoked, for example, if a president should refuse to respond to an existential, time-sensitive threat; indicates that they are committed to a course of action that would endanger America or the world—an act of war that the vice president and principal officers strongly oppose; or acts in a way that would threaten American constitutional democracy, such as calling to suspend elections? One could argue that a president’s plan to engage in constitutionally subversive activity demonstrates that he or she has become “unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office.” As with any potential invocation of Section 4, the vice president and principal officers would likely deliberate and threaten the invocation of Section 4 privately to attempt to persuade the president to take another course. In an extreme case, a president might exhibit a pattern and practice of openly flouting the law—clearly violating statutes or the Constitution, or disregarding court orders—over the objections of the vice president and the principal officers. In such an extreme case, those constitutional actors could combine evidence of these actions with medical evidence to infer that the president has become “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office” under Section 4, especially if proposed presidential actions pose significant danger to the country or public. These actions could also constitute impeachable offenses. 

These cases show that Section 4 is difficult to invoke and sustain. The constraints are not only substantive but structural: the Amendment concentrates decisive authority in the vice president, meaning that even substantial agreement among other actors in the Section 4 process may not translate into action. And these constraints are not accidental—they reflect the Amendment’s purpose of ensuring continuity without inviting opportunistic removal. They also reflect Section 4’s intended role as a last resort, meant for extraordinary instances when ordinary political pressure or other avenues for accountability are unfeasible.

In sum, Section 4 is not a purely mechanical or strategic tool. As Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., who helped draft the Amendment, emphasized, the Section 4 actors’ “constitutional propriety” and the public’s “constitutional morality” are indispensable to its functioning. Disagreement about Section 4’s boundaries will be inevitable. Reasonable actors will differ about where presidential inability begins and ends. But Section 4 is not a blank check. It is bounded by text, structure, and institutional design as well as political judgments about the costs to the nation of using it. 

In recent years, impeachment resolutions have become increasingly commonplace. But if voters elect candidates who are able to perform the duties of the office, the moments where the Twenty-Fifth Amendment becomes applicable should be rare. Should a Section 4 invocation loom, the key watchwords will be transparency, judgment, fidelity to the Constitution. Congress should push for greater information-sharing by holding a vice president accountable through its formal powers. (Vice presidential nominees Gerald Ford and Nelson Rockefeller, for example, both testified before Congress under Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.) Congress could inquire into how the vice president understands his or her constitutional duty under the Amendment, such as what steps he has taken to prepare for these responsibilities, whether a protocol for deliberation is in place, how he understands the scope of “inability,” and his views on specific, publicly reported health issues or behaviors of the president. The public should push for good judgment—demanding transparency both with regard to a president’s medical condition and to the way in which decision-making is currently being conducted within the executive branch. Above all, those officials entrusted with exercising the judgments entailed by that Amendment—the vice president, the principal officers, and Congress—should do so in service of the public and with loyalty to their constitutional roles and to the best interests of the country they serve. 

***

Authors’ note: The authors are grateful to Professor Joel K. Goldstein for his extensive advice about the Twenty-Fifth Amendment generally, and this article in particular.

The post How the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Applies Today appeared first on Just Security.

The core legal issues implicated by the strikes are not up for debate. Contrary to the administration’s claims, the United States is not engaged in an armed conflict with a secret list of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (see here, here, and here as well). That means international humanitarian law (the law governing armed conflict) does not apply, and the use of lethal force as a first resort is not lawful. Plainly speaking, the killings are unjustified summary executions—murder. This systematic killing of individuals (at least 193 people across 57 incidents, to date) may even constitute crimes against humanity.

Less certain is whether anyone will ever be held accountable for these crimes. As a general matter, States are first and foremost responsible for holding individuals and institutions acting on the State’s behalf and within its jurisdiction to account for their actions, including for conduct that violates their own domestic laws or international criminal law. While States are expected to police actions within their borders and by their personnel, if they fail, foreign or international courts may sometimes step in. 

For the U.S. boat strikes, there are at least two paths for domestic accountability. As previously discussed, servicemembers who participate in the boat strikes may be exposed to domestic criminal liability under Title 18 of the U.S. Code and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. And, on Jan. 27, the families of two victims filed a lawsuit in federal court in Massachusetts under the Death on the High Seas Act and the Alien Torts Claims Act. We believe the United States can and should hold its own personnel accountable, and that failing to do so further entrenches a damaging precedent for the rule of law – that the most powerful can commit grave crimes with impunity. 

That said, the prospect of near-term justice and accountability in the U.S. federal or military judicial systems is extremely remote during the more than two-and-a-half years remaining in President Donald Trump’s second term. And the general, long-standing culture of impunity in Washington, even for the commission of grave violations of international law, would need to change to improve the prospects of justice even after he leaves office. But the United States is not the only actor in the international system capable of investigating and prosecuting these acts. 

In this post, we survey possible foreign domestic and international venues for accountability for the United States or its responsible personnel; we do not, however, address immunity ratione personae because the set of alleged perpetrators extends beyond the U.S. president. Ultimately, we believe that foreign domestic courts have the most potential for the families of victims to receive justice outside of the United States. But justice can proceed in surprising ways, especially as political winds change—as former Chilean General Augusto Pinochet learned almost 30 years ago, and as former Philippine President Rodriguo Duterte is learning today.

Foreign Domestic Courts

Criminal Law and Murder Statutes

The nationality of the victims of the boat strikes suggests a natural starting point for accountability—their home States’ domestic courts. Although the United States has not released the names or nationalities of the victims, it appears that at least some of the victims have been Venezuelan, Trinidadian, Saint Lucian, Colombian, or Ecuadoran nationals. These States already have laws that would allow for prosecution of crimes like murder or attempted murder. And, if they have embraced passive personality jurisdiction, they would be able to prosecute crimes committed against their citizens abroad. But, even if one of these States is able to establish jurisdiction, it must still muster the political will to pursue a prosecution. 

There are obvious geopolitical downsides for Colombia, Ecuador, or other affected States to pursue criminal accountability. Colombia, for example, was at one point in Trump’s crosshairs. But these States do not have to act immediately. The crimes of murder and attempted murder typically carry no or very lengthy statutes of limitation, such as 20 or 30 years (for example, see here and here). Officials in Colombia, Ecuador, or other affected States could quietly gather evidence of the crimes and wait to issue indictments until Trump is out of office, and the White House is not occupied by the president who ordered the killings. 

Even then, these States would need to identify perpetrators and acquire sufficient evidence admissible in their courts to satisfy relevant domestic legal standards of criminal guilt. Somewhat ironically, the United States may have helped these States’ potential pursuit of accountability through the Trump administration’s public identification of at least three high-level potential perpetrators responsible for directing these crimes: Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who frequently posts on social media about the killings; Admiral Frank Bradley, U.S. Special Operations Commander; and Gen. Francis Donovan, Commander of U.S. Southern Command. And, by repatriating survivors, the United States has furnished potential victim-witnesses who may be able to provide critical testimony in support of any prosecution. But whether this constellation of information is sufficient for a successful prosecution before foreign domestic courts is a question for the relevant prosecutors. 

Perhaps the biggest hurdle would be for States with jurisdiction to acquire custody of alleged perpetrators unless their courts allow prosecutions in absentia. Nevertheless, that challenge should not deter nations from trying. The prosecuting State could convert a national warrant to an international warrant or initiate procedures under its relevant extradition treaties. Doing this increases the potential for criminal liability, which is critical to imposing some kind of consequence–even if the consequences are merely the perpetrators’ self-imposed travel restrictions to avoid arrest, along with public condemnation. 

Universal Jurisdiction 

Another option is for a third State to use a universal jurisdiction statute to prosecute the U.S. officials who perpetrated these crimes in its domestic courts. For example, if experts such as Luis Moreno Ocampo, the former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and Professor Charlie Trumbull, former State Department lawyer, are correct in characterizing the killings as crimes against humanity, those responsible may be vulnerable to universal jurisdiction statutes that reach crimes against humanity. Ninety-nine United Nations member States have universal jurisdiction statutes that cover crimes against humanity, including the majority of NATO countries. 

Significantly, such crimes are not subject to a statute of limitations. And in issuing an arrest warrant for Duterte, the ICC determined that drug traffickers are civilians for crimes against humanity purposes. Worryingly for Trump, Duterte also embraced an explicit, public policy of killing drug traffickers—likely a key fact in establishing culpability. 

Nevertheless, prosecuting the perpetrators under a universal jurisdiction statute would take concerted efforts from multiple States. Prosecutors acting under universal jurisdiction statutes would face the same hurdles as foreign domestic prosecutors: mustering requisite political will, collecting evidence, securing witnesses, and meeting the legal standards of admissibility and proof necessary to secure conviction. Theoretically, at least the three U.S. officials already identified could be held accountable for crimes against humanity in a State with universal jurisdiction. As above, the obvious and most consequential hurdle would be the ability to arrest these or other perpetrators. 

But if States have the legal acumen and political will to do so, universal jurisdiction statutes could offer an avenue for accountability and at the very least put pressure on the officials who directed these crimes. 

International Courts

There are three international systems that could provide different types of accountability for the U.S. boat strikes: the Inter-American system, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the ICC. The Inter-American system and the ICJ address actions committed by States, not by individuals. The ICC seeks individual criminal responsibility for violations of the Rome Statute (the treaty that established the ICC), which include crimes against humanity, though the prospects of an ICC case proceeding against the United States in the near term are slim. 

The Inter-American System

The Inter-American system aims to protect the human rights of the populations of member States of the Organization of American States (OAS) and consists of both a court and a commission. The Commission may hear complaints about violations of the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, which the United States is party to, and serves typically as a precursor to the Court. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights hears complaints about violations of the American Convention on Human Rights by a State that is party to that treaty (i.e., no individual accountability). The United States is not a party to the Convention so is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. Nevertheless, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights might still be an option for redress. 

The Commission can review, investigate and analyze allegations against all OAS member States for violations of human rights as recognized in applicable human rights instruments. In the past, the United States has ignored Commission decisions, such as those relating to violations against people detained at Guantanamo Bay. While there is little that the Commission can do to enforce compliance with its decisions, a public report could provide some political pressure. 

Before an individual can petition the Inter-American Commission, they must first exhaust all domestic remedies (though there are a few exceptions to that requirement). After receiving a complaint, the Commission determines if it is admissible and whether it has jurisdiction regarding the alleged violation. If the Commission determines there has been a violation, it will issue a preliminary report to the responsible State recommending remedial measures after which the State has a certain amount of time to respond regarding the implementation of those measures. In some circumstances, the Commission may publish the report of the violation publicly, increasing pressure on the State. 

The family of a Colombian man killed in a U.S. airstrike filed such a complaint in December. The complaint, which is not public, reportedly alleged that he was subjected to an extrajudicial killing in connection with the United States’ strikes in the Caribbean. The family’s lawyer has said that they are seeking compensation for the killing and are asking for the attacks to stop. According to reports, the complaint specifically names Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth as a perpetrator and alleges that the victim was denied due process due to his extrajudicial killing. 

If the Commission deems the complaint filed by family members of attack victims admissible and asserts jurisdiction, the United States could choose not to engage, forcing the Commission to make its determination based solely on the information provided by the petitioner. If the Commission eventually makes its report public in the face of U.S. obstinance, the United States could very well ignore the findings, retaliate by cutting contributions to the OAS, or impeach the legitimacy and competency of the Commission. Nevertheless, an adverse, even if unenforceable, decision by the Commission would be a meaningful public and juridical acknowledgement of U.S. lawbreaking—and a measure of accountability. 

In March, the Trump administration previewed how it will likely respond to any action by the Commission that appears to favor the family’s request (e.g., finding that the Commission has jurisdiction over the complaint). The Commission held a thematic hearing in Guatemala on the U.S. strikes in the Caribbean and Pacific)–an action unrelated to the family’s petition–during which legal experts described the strikes as extrajudicial killings. In response, the State Department admonished the Commission for “acting outside its competence” and accused it of being a “pawn in a domestic litigation strategy,” referring to two pending cases in U.S. federal court. Compared to past U.S. practice, this statement was an unusually aggressive response to a thematic hearing, signalling a likely hostile reaction from the Trump administration to any future steps taken by the Commission related to this topic. 

The International Court of Justice 

The ICJ was established to resolve disputes between U.N. member States. The Court issues opinions in two types of cases: (1) contentious cases and (2) advisory opinions. Rulings by the Court do not result in individual accountability for State officials but serve as an important mechanism to adjudicate States’ violations of international law and curb those violations, or to authoritatively pronounce on the meaning of international law. 

Contentious Cases

When bringing a contentious case to the ICJ, all States involved must in some way accept the jurisdiction of the Court. One way is through a special agreement between the States involved in a dispute to submit to the court’s jurisdiction for purposes of resolving that dispute. States may also submit to the Court’s jurisdiction over disputes arising under a particular treaty or convention (e.g., the Optional Protocol on Compulsory Jurisdiction to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). A third option is for States to accept compulsory jurisdiction, which gives the State the right to bring any other State that has accepted the same obligation before the Court. 

The United States is highly unlikely to accept the Court’s jurisdiction over any contentious case, let alone one involving the boat strikes. The United States withdrew from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in 1985 before the Court ruled the United States broke international law and violated Nicaraguan sovereignty when it armed and trained anti-government rebels. And in 2005 and 2018, under Presidents George W. Bush and Trump, the United States withdrew from two treaties in order to circumvent the Court’s jurisdiction. However, it is possible that a pre-existing treaty between the United States and one of the affected States may furnish jurisdiction, as was the case in the Oil Platforms Case, when Iran challenged the U.S. Navy’s destruction of three oil platforms in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s.

Advisory Opinions

Separately, the ICJ could pronounce on U.S. compliance with international law through an advisory opinion. Advisory opinions issued by the ICJ are non-binding, but still carry significant weight in informing State practice and the interpretation of international law. The U.N. Security Council or General Assembly can request advisory opinions from the ICJ on any legal question (e.g., on the Obligations of Israel in relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations and Third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory). Other organs of the U.N. may also request advisory opinions on legal questions, as long as those questions arise within the scope of their activities (e.g., on a judgment from the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization). 

Given the United States’ ability to veto any measure in the Security Council, the General Assembly is the more likely of the two primary U.N. bodies to request an advisory opinion related to the United States’ extrajudicial killings in the Caribbean and Pacific. Referring the relevant questions of international law for the Court’s consideration (i.e., whether the U.S. strikes against alleged drug traffickers in the Caribbean and Pacific amount to extrajudicial killings or crimes against humanity) would require a member State or a coalition of States to propose a resolution, build momentum within the General Assembly, and lobby for its adoption by majority vote of the body. Because there is no formal procedural requirement for drafting resolutions, and advisory opinion requests can be adopted in a plenary meeting of the General Assembly (i.e., without going to a committee), the process could in theory happen very quickly with the right political support. 

Recent history demonstrates that it is possible for the General Assembly to pursue advisory opinions in politically charged situations. During the last two years, the General Assembly has successfully requested two ICJ advisory opinions that the United States strongly opposed (both involving questions related to Israel’s obligations under international law). 

Still, a vote to refer this situation to the ICJ would likely be more difficult given the political calculations concerning Trump’s response to such a measure. Odds are that he and his administration—already antagonistic to the U.N.—would act aggressively toward any State that might lead a referral effort. Even if that State persevered, States that voted for the resolution could be met with drastic retaliation from the Trump administration, ranging from the imposition of tariffs, to sanctions or visa restrictions. 

But this kind of behavior from the United States is exactly why States should work collectively to address its violations of international law. Lawlessness under Trump will continue unabated if not responded to by a majority of U.N. member States. And his powers are not unlimited—his ability to impose tariffs was at least somewhat curbed in a February decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. 

Moreover, Trump will not remain in power forever, and allowing the global rule of law to be eviscerated in the short term will have long-term repercussions for all States, most notably the middle powers and smaller States most impacted by current U.S. lawlessness. The medium- to long-term consequences should encourage States to at least consider a vote like this to push back. 

The International Criminal Court (ICC)

The ICC can prosecute individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and, for States that have ratified the relevant amendment, the crime of aggression. The Court only has jurisdiction if the accused is a national of a State party to the Rome Statute, the alleged crime took place on the territory of a State party, or the situation is referred to the Court by the U.N. Security Council. 

The perpetrators of the U.S. boat strikes are presumably all U.S. citizens and the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute, which would deprive the Court of those bases of jurisdiction. The U.S. veto makes UN Security Council referral impossible and precludes jurisdiction on that basis. That leaves the possibility of ICC jurisdiction on the basis of the targeted vessels’ States of registration. Under Article 12 Section 2(a) of the Rome Statute, properly registered vessels constitute the territory of their State of registration. The States known to have nationals who were victims of the strikes—Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago, and Saint Lucia—are all parties to the Rome Statute and their nationals are arguably victims of crimes against humanity. Assuming that the boats targeted by the United States are registered in the States whose nationals have been killed, the ICC may have jurisdiction over these crimes despite the United States’ non-party status. We cannot, however, confirm the country of registration of the boats, and this may pose a challenge for the prosecutor as well. 

But the Court is likely to pay a political cost if it approves a request from the Office of the Chief Prosecutor to begin a formal investigation into the boat strikes. American animosity toward the ICC has ebbed and flowed, but dates back to the George W. Bush administration’s infamous “unsigning” of the Rome Statute in 2002. Congress subsequently passed the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, a law that prohibits certain kinds of U.S. support to the ICC and authorizes the president to free U.S. nationals or allied personnel from the Court via “all necessary means” (hence the law’s nickname, the “Hague Invasion Act”). Bush also went so far as to require U.S. partner States to sign agreements, referred to as “Article 98 agreements,” by which they commit to never extradite U.S. nationals to the ICC. 

Despite some examples of U.S.-ICC cooperation in intervening years, U.S. resistance to the ICC’s investigation into alleged crimes committed by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and crimes committed by Israel led Trump to sanction the ICC during his first term. He has been even more aggressive in his second term, sanctioning individual prosecutors and judges. All of this suggests the ICC will act cautiously—at least in the near term—with respect to any investigations involving U.S. nationals (especially while the Office of the Prosecutor is facing its own internal turmoil).

As Professor Trumbull pointed out, there is at least one relevant example of a head of State that the Court has investigated, arrested, and charged after they oversaw the systematic execution of criminal suspects: the Philippines’ Duterte. He currently sits in the Hague awaiting trial for the crimes against humanity of murder, torture, and rape committed during his “war on drugs.” 

Trump’s substantially similar conduct toward alleged drug traffickers means he or other U.S. officials involved could eventually face similar treatment by the Court. 

Time Favors Justice

That still leaves unanswered a question we posed above: Will anyone be held responsible? 

The answer largely depends on the courts and commission we described. We think foreign domestic courts are the most likely to successfully impose some accountability. They likely have the clearest grounds for jurisdiction, are the best situated to collect evidence and secure witnesses, seem to have greater potential to develop the political will to take action, and have the benefit of time. Although the current political climate might be too challenging for many of them to proceed publicly now, they can still begin collecting evidence and pursue charges later. 

Although a much more remote possibility, there is always the potential for political leadership in the United States and its orientation towards accountability to drastically change. If that happens, a future administration could of course pursue prosecutions in U.S. courts for federal crimes—the federal murder statute does not have a statute of limitations and applies on the high seas. However unlikely, it could also cooperate with a later ICC investigation. 

If no one acts, the United States’ murder spree will surely embolden other bad actors and encourage more violations of international law, if it has not done so already. That is a key consequence of entrenched impunity. To deter these crimes—and ensure justice for victims—the people who commit them need to be held accountable. We hope those with the power to do so eventually muster the will. 

The post International Accountability for U.S. Crimes in the Caribbean and Pacific appeared first on Just Security.

A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

IRAN WAR – CEASEFIRE 

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said yesterday that it would launch a “decisive reciprocal response” to any attack that violated the ceasefire. Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei also suggested that Iran would renew strikes on U.S. military installations in his statement commemorating the start of hajj. The Iranian warnings came after U.S. forces struck missile launch sites in southern Iran and destroyed two Revolutionary Guard speedboats on Monday. The U.S. said it acted with “restraint” in light of the weekslong ceasefire, while Iran decried the action as a sign of “bad faith and unreliability.”  Max Bearak, Erik Solomon, Euan Ward, and Michael Levenson report for the New York Times; Aamer Madhani reports for AP News.  

Officials from Gulf countries, who spoke with Trump on Saturday, responded to his push for their nations to join the Abraham Accords with “stunned silence,” according to a source. Another source disputed that characterization, saying that some regional allies responded positively to Trump’s call. Some Middle Eastern officials said they viewed the request merely as Trump’s attempt to appease hawkish Republicans who worry he will give away too much in talks with Iran. “He will keep bringing it up again and again. But it will not be part of the deal,” an official said. Aamer Madhani reports for AP News; Nahal Toosi reports for POLITICO.  

IRAN WAR – LEBANON OPERATIONS 

Israel attacked Lebanon yesterday with more than 120 air strikes, killing at least 31 people and wounding 40, according to state media reports and the Lebanese security services. An Israeli military official said the military was “operating in a targeted manner beyond the Forward Defense Line in order to remove direct threats to the citizens ​of the State of Israel” and Israeli ​soldiers, “in accordance with the directives ⁠of the political echelon.” Jana Choukeir reports for Reuters. 

IRAN WAR – OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 

Iran began restoring internet access for tens of millions of Iranians yesterday, a senior official said. NetBlocks said that its data showed a “partial restoration to internet connectivity” in Iran after 88 days of blackout. Yeganeh Torbati and Sanam Mahoozi report for the New York Times.  

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR

Israel said today that it killed Hamas’s newly appointed armed wing chief, Mohammad Odeh, in Gaza yesterday, days after killing his predecessor. Gaza health ​officials said six people were killed and more than 20 others were wounded in the same ​Israeli strike that destroyed an upper floor of an apartment building in Gaza City. Rami Ayyub, Nidal Al-Mughrabi, and Jana Choukeir report for Reuters.  

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

Ukraine has a six-month window in which to seize the battlefield initiative from Russia and strengthen its hand for peace talks, a senior Ukrainian commander told Reuters. Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky said he believes Russia’s army is exhausted and incapable of making major breakthroughs. If Ukraine’s military can build and maintain momentum over several months, it can gain the initiative along the frontline and push Russia to abandon its designs on the last part of the Donetsk region in eastern Ukraine that it ​does not yet occupy, he said. Dan Peleschuk reports.

Latvia is increasing anti-drone defences on its borders with Russia and Belarus in response to drones flying across its borders, an army official said. “We plan to deploy (drone) interceptor teams over the next two weeks,” Modris Kairiss, head of the Latvian Army Autonomous Systems Competence Centre, told Reuters. The ​teams will consist of up to four soldiers operating killer drones, ​which can destroy incoming military drones in a 10-km (6-mile) radius, he said. Andrius Sytas reports.

NATO will strengthen the defense of its eastern flank by assigning the German-Netherlands corps to help defend Latvia and Estonia in the event of a war with Russia, two sources said. Assigning a second corps for the region will allow NATO to bring in “mass at speed,” according to one military official. Sabine Siebold and Polina Nikolskaya report for Reuters.  

As Russia fails to gain ground in the war in Ukraine, it is “scaling up its daily hybrid activity against the U.K. and Europe,” Director of GCHQ Anne Keast-Butler, the British electronic surveillance agency, is set to say today in her annual speech. Hybrid tactics, countered by GCHQ, have included cyberattacks, sabotage, assassination, and disinformation campaigns intended to destabilize countries’ economies and institutions, according to her remarks. Adam Goldman reports for the New York Times.  

The United Kingdom will sign a new defense and security treaty with Poland today. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said both nations saw “Russia as a strategic threat” and the two leaders are expected to discuss an increase in hybrid attacks. Reuters reports. 

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

A former International Criminal Court judge today launched a commission in the Philippines to investigate former President Rodrigo Duterte’s “war on drugs,” aiming to document alleged extrajudicial killings and compile evidence for potential legal cases. The civilian-led Philippine Truth and Reconciliation Commission will operate independently of government control and said it seeks to ​pursue accountability and create a “credible public record of extrajudicial killings and related abuses.” Nestor Corrales reports for Reuters. 

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

The Trump administration plans to send U.S. citizens exposed to the Ebola virus to Kenya, rather than bringing them home for observation and treatment, according to three sources. A few dozen Public Health Service officers will be deployed to Kenya to staff a potential quarantine facility, the sources said. Apoorva Mandavilli and Zolan Kanno-Youngs report for the New York Times; Sabrina Siddiqui and Liz Essley Whyte report for the Wall Street Journal. 

The Pentagon is substantially scaling back U.S. forces planned for Europe in a crisis, reducing military capabilities by one-third to one-half, according to current and former defense officials. The officials said that NATO allies were notified of the planned cutbacks in a closed-door meeting last week in Brussels. Michael R. Gordon and Robbie Gramer report for the Wall Street Journal. 

U.S. CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC OPERATIONS 

A U.S. military strike yesterday on an alleged drug-trafficking vessel in the eastern Pacific Ocean killed one man and left two survivors. AP News reports.  

U.S. IMMIGRATION DEVELOPMENTS 

Thousands of Cubans deported by the Trump administration to Mexico are stranded in poor conditions, often without legal status, money, housing, or access to work and healthcare, according to a Human Rights Watch report published today. Many cannot return to Cuba and are stuck in “indefinite legal limbo,” with some living in shelters, parks, or on the streets in southern Mexico. Patricia Mazzei reports for the New York Times. 

An AP News investigation found that at least 10 individuals in ICE custody, all men, have died by suicide since Trump took office, according to a review of ICE data, autopsy reports, coroner’s rulings, and police records. Since October, seven deaths have been classified as suicides, a number that is already the most for any fiscal year in the agency’s history. ICE has usually recorded one or no such deaths annually. Ryan J. Foley, Michael Biesecker, and Morgan Lee report.  

U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton yesterday defeated longtime Senator John Cornyn by 28 points in the Republican primary runoff, reinforcing Trump’s influence over the GOP. Alex Isenstadt reports for Axios.  

The South Carolina Senate adjourned yesterday without voting on a new congressional map that would have eliminated the state’s only majority Black district. Eduardo Medina, Emily Cochrane, and Nick Corasaniti report for the New York Times.  

A panel of federal judges yesterday rejected Alabama’s effort to use a new voting map for the November midterm elections, saying that the districts discriminated against Black people and could not be used so shortly before a vote. Alabama’s attorney general, Steve Marshall, said that he would immediately appeal to the Supreme Court. Emily Cochrane and Abbie VanSickle report for the New York Times. 

A Florida judge yesterday refused to block a recently adopted congressional map that could give Republicans four extra seats in the House of Representatives, making it likely the map will remain in place for the 2026 midterm elections as lawsuits continue. Gary Fineout reports for POLITICO.  

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

The Trump administration is planning a government-wide nondisclosure agreement that would bar federal workers from sharing a wide array of “confidential government information,” according to a draft notice posted to the Federal Register yesterday. The notice cited several high-profile leaks, including “unauthorized disclosures” that it said were made to the New York Times and the Washington Post about the U.S. capture of former Venezuelan President  Nicolás Maduro. Scott Nover and Meryl Kornfield report for the Washington Post.  

Trump has appointed former Attorney General Pam Bondi to an advisory committee focused on AI policy, Axios has learned. Alex Isenstadt reports.

Mike Needham, an adviser to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, is being promoted to assistant to Trump and deputy national security adviser, according to a senior U.S. official. Adam Taylor, John Hudson, and Ellen Nakashima report for the Washington Post.  

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION 

Lawyers for the Southern Poverty Law Center asked a federal judge yesterday to dismiss charges accusing it of defrauding its donors, saying that the case was part of a “retributive campaign” by Trump to use the Justice Department to go after groups “deemed to be his political enemies.” Alan Feuer reports for the New York Times.  

The Trump administration yesterday filed its second antisemitism lawsuit against the University of California, Los Angeles. The lawsuit accused the school of taking “no serious action whatsoever” to prevent the harassment of Jewish and Israeli students during pro-Palestinian protests in 2024. Mark Arsenault reports for the New York Times.  

Former President Joe Biden yesterday filed a lawsuit in an attempt to block the Justice Department from releasing the audio recordings and transcripts of his private conversations with his biographer. Rebecca Falconer reports for Axios. 

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions.

If you enjoy listening, Just Security’s analytic articles are also available in audio form on the justsecurity.org website.

ICYMI: Yesterday on Just Security

The post Early Edition: May 27, 2026 appeared first on Just Security.

In this collection, experts analyze the legality of these various operations under domestic and international law. 

On the boast strikes, the articles address how suspected narcotics trafficking at sea is normally addressed by the U.S. government and how these strikes may deviate from that practice, the consequences for when and how the president may unilaterally order the military to employ lethal force, the applicability of domestic criminal laws prohibiting murder and international human rights law prohibiting extrajudicial killing, and a range of related issues.

On the Maduro operation, the essays cover international and domestic law and policy.

The collection also includes analysis of the boarding and seizure of vessels, including U.S. sanctioned oil tankers.

Informational Resources

• Jeremy Chin, Margaret Lin, and Aidan Arasasingham, Timeline of Boat Strikes and Related Actions (continually updated)
• Marie Miller, U.S. Allies and Adversaries’ Reactions to Operation Absolute Resolve to Capture Maduro: UN Security Council Emergency Meeting

Operation Absolute Resolve and Threats of Force against Venezuela

• Rebecca Ingber, The Trump Administration’s Theory of Constitutional War Powers: “The President Could Decide” (Mar. 2, 2026)
• Jeffrey Rogg, U.S. Intelligence in a Post-Maduro Venezuela (Jan. 9, 2026)
• Brian Egan, Tess Bridgeman, and Ryan Goodman, Congress, the President, and the Use of Military Force in Venezuela (Jan. 7, 2026)
• Chimène Keitner, Head of State Immunity and Maduro on Trial (Jan. 6, 2026)
• Michael Schmitt, Ryan Goodman and Tess Bridgeman, International Law and the U.S. Military and Law Enforcement Operations in Venezuela (Jan. 4, 2026)
• Ryan Goodman, Maduro Capture Operation and the President’s Duty to Faithfully Execute U.N. Charter Assessment of 1989 OLC Opinion (Jan. 3, 2026)
• Michael Schmitt, U.S. Saber Rattling and Venezuela: Lawful Show of Force or Unlawful Threat of Force? (Nov. 4, 2025)

Seizure and Blockade of Vessels (Domestic and International Law)

• Rob McLaughlin, Connor McLaughlin, and Michael Schmitt, The Law of Naval Warfare and the U.S. Capture of Neutral Merchant Vessels: The Case of the Marinera (Jan. 29, 2026)
• Rob McLaughlin and Connor McLaughlin, A Law of the Sea Assessment of the U.S. boarding of the Bella 1 / Marinera (Jan. 14, 2026)
• Rob McLaughlin and Tess Bridgeman, The Just Security Podcast: Can the U.S. Seize Russian Flagged Oil Tankers? (Jan. 8, 2026)
• Elizabeth Hutton, Maritime Law Enforcement on the High Seas: Authority, Jurisdiction, and the Seizure of The Skipper An Expert Backgrounder (Dec. 22, 2025)
• Michael Schmitt and Rob McLaughlin, Blockading Venezuela: The International Law Consequences (Dec. 18, 2025)
• Rob McLaughlin and Connor McLaughlin, Was the Visit and Seizure of the Skipper off the Coast of Venezuela Lawful? (Dec. 17, 2025)
• See also Question 31 in Tess Bridgeman, Michael Schmitt, and Ryan Goodman, Expert Q&A on the U.S. Boat Strikes (Dec. 13, 2025)

Operation Southern Spear and Related Operations Legal Analysis (Domestic and International Law)

• Tracey Begley, Benjamin R. Farley and Sarah Harrison, International Accountability for U.S. Crimes in the Caribbean and Pacific (May 27, 2026)
• Orlando J. Pérez, The Shield of the Americas Is the Trump Corollary’s Military Edge (March 16, 2026)
• Brian Finucane, Did the United States Just Bomb Ecuador? (March 13, 2026)
• Miles Jackson, Arbitrary Killings or War Crimes? Why It Matters How the U.S. Strikes in the Caribbean Are Categorized (Feb. 2, 2026)
• Edward Swaine, Can the U.S. Government Be Sued for Wrongful Death in a Caribbean Boat Strike? (Jan. 29, 2026)
• Michael Schmitt, Using an Unmarked Aircraft to Attack an Alleged Drug Boat: Is it Perfidy? (Jan. 20, 2026)
• Michael Schmitt, Marko Milanovic, The International Law Obligation to Investigate the Boat Strikes (Dec. 15, 2025)
• Tess Bridgeman, Michael Schmitt, and Ryan Goodman, Expert Q&A on the U.S. Boat Strikes (Dec. 13, 2025)
• Mark Nevitt, The Law on Targeting Shipwrecked Drug Traffickers: Expert Backgrounder (Dec. 11, 2025)
• Michael Schmitt, Ryan Goodman and Tess Bridgeman, Operation Southern Spear: Why the Crews, Drugs, and Boats are Not Targetable (Dec. 7, 2025)
• Michael Schmitt, Ryan Goodman and Tess Bridgeman, Unlawful Orders and Killing Shipwrecked Boat Strike Survivors: An Expert Backgrounder (Dec. 1, 2025)
• Daniel Maurer, Hypothetical Legal Review of Narcotrafficking Strikes (Nov. 18, 2025)
• Michael Schmitt, Marko Milanovic, and Ryan Goodman, The International Law Obligation of States to Stop Intelligence Support for U.S. Boat Strikes (Nov. 17, 2025)
• Brian Finucane, Dissecting the Trump Administration’s Effort to Circumvent the War Powers Resolution for Boat Strikes (Nov. 3, 2025)
• Rebecca Ingber and Jessica Thibodeau, Expert Backgrounder on War Powers Resolution 60-Day Clock for Boat Strikes Expiring Monday (October 31, 2025)
• Ryan Goodman, Michael Schmitt and Anna Jimenez, Irreconcilable Presidential Determinations: On Tren de Aragua and the Venezuelan Government (October 29, 2025)
• Michael Schmitt, Attacking Drug Cartels in the Territory of Another State (Oct. 17, 2025)
• Marty Lederman, Legal Flaws in the Trump Administration’s Notice to Congress on “Armed Conflict” with Drug Cartels (Oct. 3, 2025)
• Daniel Maurer, US Servicemembers’ Exposure to Criminal Liability for Lethal Strikes on Narcoterrorists (Sept. 24, 2025)
• Marty Lederman, The Many Ways in Which the September 2 Caribbean Strike was Unlawful … and the Grave Line the Military Has Crossed (Sept. 10, 2025)
• Michael Schmitt, Striking Drug Cartels Under the Jus ad Bellum and Law of Armed Conflict (Sept. 10, 2025)
• Mark Nevitt, Using Labels, Not Law, to Justify Lethal Force: Inside the Venezuelan Boat Strike (Sept. 5, 2025)
• Brian Finucane, Legal Issues Raised by a Lethal U.S. Military Attack in the Caribbean (Sept. 3, 2025)

Congressional Actions and Oversight

• Tess Bridgeman and Brian Finucane, War Powers, Venezuela, Drug Boats, and Congress (Jan. 12, 2026)
• Tess Bridgeman, Margaret Donovan and Ryan Goodman, U.S. Boat Strike Campaign: Questions Congress Should Ask Executive Branch Officials (Dec. 4, 2025)
• Stephen R. Weissman, Will the Intelligence Committees Meet the Challenge of CIA Covert Action in Venezuela? (Oct. 31, 2025)
• Mary B. McCord and Tess Bridgeman, What the Senate Judiciary Committee Should Ask A.G. Bondi on Drug Cartel Strikes (Oct. 3, 2025)

Policy Analysis and Opinion

• Mark Nevitt, Killing Shipwrecked Survivors is Not Just Illegal—It Endangers U.S. Servicemembers (Dec. 1, 2025)
• Eugene R. Fidell, Daniel Maurer and Steven J. Lepper, Professional Responsibility and the Boat Strikes (Dec. 1, 2025)
• Brett Max Kaufman, From Secret Law (2001-2024) to None at All (2025-present) (Nov. 21, 2025)
• Sarah Harrison and Mark Nevitt, The Caribbean Strikes and the Collapse of Legal Oversight in U.S. Military Operations (Oct. 23, 2025)
• Ben Saul, The United States’ Dirty War on “Narco Terrorism” (Sept. 22, 2025)
• Annie Shiel, John Ramming Chappell, Priyanka Motaparthy, Wells Dixon and Daphne Eviatar, Murder by Drone: The Legal and Moral Stakes of the Caribbean Strikes (Sept. 17, 2025)
• Brian Finucane, Asserting a License to Kill: Why the Caribbean Strike is a Dangerous Departure from the “War on Terror (Sept. 15, 2025)

Podcast Episodes

• Tess Bridgeman, Rob Mclaughlin, The Just Security Podcast: Can the U.S. Seize Russian Flagged Oil Tankers? (Jan. 8, 2026, also available on YouTube)
• Tess Bridgeman, Rachel Goldbrenner, Rebecca Ingber and Brian Finucane, The Just Security Podcast: Murder on the High Seas Part IV (Dec. 2, 2025)
• Tess Bridgeman, Brian Finucane, Rebecca Ingber, The Just Security Podcast: Murder on the High Seas Part III  (Oct. 21, 2025, also available on YouTube)
• Tess Bridgeman, Brian Finucane, Rachel Goldbrenner, Rebecca Ingber, The Just Security Podcast: Murder on the High Seas Part II — What We Know about U.S. Vessel Strikes One Month In (Oct. 7, 2025)
• Tess Bridgeman, Brian Finucane, Rebecca Ingber, The Just Security Podcast: Murder on the High Seas? What You Need to Know about the U.S. Strike on the Caribbean Vessel (Sept. 9, 2025, also available on YouTube)

The post Collection: U.S. Lethal Strikes on Suspected Drug Traffickers, Operation Southern Spear, Operation Absolute Resolve appeared first on Just Security.

These latest investigations collectively cover almost all trade into the United States (roughly 99 percent). They involve alleged structural excess capacity in 16 economies (including China, the European Union, Japan, Korea, and Mexico), and lack of sufficient protections against imports made with forced labor in 60 economies (again involving China, Japan, and the EU, as well as Canada, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). The scale of these investigations is unprecedented, as is the administration’s transparent intent to use Section 301 to replace the tariffs imposed under IEEPA that the Supreme Court had just invalidated. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, for example, said in March that he expects “tariff rates will be back to their old rate within five months.”

The legal and constitutional question is whether this effort will succeed. More precisely: can the president use perfunctory Section 301 investigations against every major trading partner as an adaptable, permanent mechanism to set and then adjust tariff rates for every country in the world indefinitely, at the president’s will?

The administration’s use of Section 301 is not merely aggressive but structurally transformative. By combining mass investigations, expansive use of the statute’s tariff-modification authority, and the judicial deference historically accorded to USTR, Section 301 can be made to function as something that it was never designed to be: a de facto permanent delegation of tariff-setting power to the executive. The constitutional delegation question, which the Court avoided in Learning Resources, has not gone away. It has migrated to a new statutory vehicle, and courts will have to confront it.

What the Court Left Open

The Supreme Court resolved Learning Resources on narrow grounds. Rather than reach the constitutional question of whether Congress can delegate broad tariff-setting authority to the executive, the majority held that IEEPA itself does not grant that power, relying on the major questions doctrine—a separation-of-powers principle that requires clear congressional authorization before agencies can decide questions of “vast economic and political significance.” Justice Clarence Thomas, writing alone in dissent, argued that Congress could in fact delegate all of this power to the president, and that IEEPA had done so.

That leaves three constitutional and statutory interpretation issues unresolved. The first is the non-delegation question Thomas raised: how much taxing authority can Congress delegate to the executive? The second is the major questions issue: whether any statute, however broadly worded, should be read to authorize tariffs of this scale and indefinite duration absent a clear statement from Congress. The third is arbitrary and capricious review: whether decision making is an abuse of power because the agency relied on factors beyond those Congress intended, failed to consider important aspects of the problem, or offered explanations that run counter to the evidence.

The Object and Purpose of Section 301

Congress enacted Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act in the context of Japan’s rise as a major trade competitor and the U.S. wish for further General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations to open foreign markets. Section 301 requires findings about “acts, policies, or practices”—not about outcomes such as trade balances or capacity utilization rates. It gives the president a negotiating tool to press individual trading partners to cease specific “unfair” practices, such as export subsidies, discriminatory licensing, and intellectual-property violations. Subsequent amendments in 1979, 1984, and 1988 expanded the definition of unfair practices and required USTR under Super 301 to identify priority foreign countries and practices for targeted action—making the statute more targeted, not less, as a tool to reduce trade barriers. The 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act tied Section 301 to WTO dispute settlement, which limited its unilateral use, as recorded in commitments that the United States made in an early WTO case.

Throughout its history, the statute operated as a tool to open markets and enhance intellectual property protection. From 1974 through 2016, USTR conducted roughly 130 Section 301 investigations, the great majority of them aimed at particular practices relating to particular industries of major trading partners (including the EU, Canada, Japan, and South Korea). This pattern shifted during the first Trump administration when USTR launched a broad-based investigation against Chinese treatment of U.S. intellectual property, which resulted in high U.S. tariffs imposed on most Chinese products. Although unilateral and broad in remedy, that 2017–2018 investigation remained based on a factual record identifying specific unfair practices related to one country.

The current sets of investigations, however, are nothing like anything before. USTR is investigating 86 economies simultaneously covering 99 percent of imports, under a dramatically accelerated 150-day timetable, and grounding the investigations in broad theories of “structural excess capacity” and forced labor, including against countries with more stringent labor protections than the United States. What was historically a case-specific, fact-intensive, dispute-driven process is being executed at a pace and breadth that Section 301 was never designed to accommodate.

Three Potential Legal Challenges

Non-Delegation Doctrine

Unlike IEEPA, the Trade Act of 1974 expressly authorizes tariffs as a remedy for unfair trade practices. Non-delegation thus appears to be the weakest of three potential grounds for legal challenge. However, although Congress delegated authority to raise tariffs, it did so within limits. If the president indeed claims that Section 301 constitutes a de facto delegation to raise tariffs against all countries and to change those tariffs at will following perfunctory “investigations,” then non-delegation issues arise. Even the Federal Circuit, in its decision upholding the first-term tariffs, emphasized that any modification must “be tailored to achieve Section 301’s statutory goal of eliminating the investigated conduct” and cannot be used to “raise tariffs for any reason whatsoever.”

Major Questions Doctrine

In the same case which addressed non-delegation, the Federal Circuit held that the major questions doctrine does not apply to the Section 301 tariffs in question. However, it did so only in the narrow context of the first Trump administration’s modification of tariffs imposed pursuant to an existing Section 301 investigation. It has yet to decide whether the doctrine applies to the broader question now before the courts: does Section 301 authorize tariffs imposed globally on all imports from all major trading partners, indefinitely, and modifiable at will without new investigations? The argument against the administration involves statutory interpretation in light of Section 301’s purpose: Section 301 was designed to open specific foreign markets and remedy specific unfair practices, and not to function as a global tariff-setting mechanism or a revenue-raising tool delegated to the president.

Arbitrary and Capricious Review

Claimants can also check the administration’s use of Section 301 through arbitrary and capricious review. This doctrine, under the Administrative Procedure Act, requires courts to set aside any agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” The standard requires agencies to examine the relevant facts, articulate a satisfactory explanation, and show a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. Courts do not assess whether they would have made the same policy choice—they rather ask whether the agency considered the relevant issues, explained itself coherently, stayed within the statutory framework, and avoided reasoning inconsistent with the factual record.

There are four likely criteria that courts will apply in determining whether tariffs imposed under Section 301 satisfy this standard:

• Pretextual abuse: Are investigations structured to replicate tariff levels previously invalidated under another statute, rather than to remedy identified unfair trade practices on a case-by-case basis? Put otherwise, does the simultaneous use of Section 301 against all trade from all major trading partners constitute an abuse that is not in accordance with law?
• Adequacy of the record: Does the scale and speed of investigations undermine the factual basis required for reasoned decision-making?
• Fit between means and ends: Are the tariffs meaningfully tailored to the conduct identified, or do they operate as generalized trade restrictions untethered to specific findings?
• Internal consistency: Are similarly situated countries treated differently without coherent explanation, or do the rationales conflict across investigations?

These factors provide a workable framework for distinguishing aggressive but lawful uses of Section 301 from actions that amount to an abuse of authority.

The Challenge for USTR to Survive Arbitrariness Review

Evidence points against USTR’s investigations across all four factors.

Pace and Capacity

USTR typically takes 12 to 18 months to complete a Section 301 investigation. The administration, however, has instructed the agency to finish these new investigations in 150 days, timed to resolve just before the temporary Section 122 tariffs (which have been challenged successfully before the Court of International Trade) expire on July 24. USTR has roughly 200–250 staff and about 40 attorneys to handle the workload.

By comparison, USTR completed a total of 11 Section 301 investigations across the entire 2017–2025 period. The volume of cases generated by the 301 tariffs imposed on China alone caused capacity problems during Trump’s first term. The agency is now being asked to produce, on a compressed timetable, fact-intensive findings on theories far broader than anything used before under Section 301. That mismatch raises adequacy-of-the-record concerns.

Methodological Inconsistency and Error

USTR has already made a significant factual mistake on the public record. In a Federal Register notice initiating the structural excess capacity investigation, the agency alleged a $27 billion U.S. trade deficit with Singapore. Singapore’s Ministry of Trade and Industry responded with data documenting the opposite: a $27 billion U.S. surplus in 2024 The Ministry also disputed USTR’s claim of underutilized manufacturing capacity by noting that over 90 percent of Singapore’s industrial space was occupied. Although USTR still has time to correct this error, this type of factual error on the agency’s initiating notice—and regarding one of the major indicators that USTR is using to justify its excess capacity investigation against 16 economies—is the sort of defect that courts may question under arbitrary and capricious review.

Even more problematic is the methodological inconsistency that underpins the investigations. Structural excess capacity results when a country’s manufacturing output far outstrips both global and domestic demand; the essential idea is that countries are flooding the market through government subsidies and other measures. But in attempting to demonstrate this outcome, USTR shifts between bilateral and global trade surpluses, and between aggregate and sector-specific surpluses without any legally defensible rationale—appearing instead to select whichever statistics better support a finding of excess capacity for the country in question.

Japan’s inclusion is justified on the basis of its bilateral surplus with the United States—despite having a global goods trade deficit. Singapore, by contrast, is included on the basis of its global surplus—despite having a bilateral deficit with the United States. Both Japan and Thailand are alleged to have excess capacity because specific sectors of their economies have global trade surpluses; both countries, however, have global goods trade deficits at the aggregate level. Under such a loose and inconsistent methodology, the United States itself would meet USTR’s criteria for having structural excess capacity.

This methodological incoherence goes far beyond a simple factual error that USTR could correct on remand. The notice treats trade surpluses as the evidence of unfair conduct, when in fact trade surpluses are an inevitable feature of the global economy, reflecting country-by-country variations in macroeconomic policy and sector specialization. It also focus on outcomes rather than “acts, policies, and practices” that the statute requires. Both the factual errors and the broader methodological vagueness and inconsistencies provide evidence that expose the investigations to legal vulnerability.

The Comment Record Goes Against USTR

The public comments submitted during the structural excess capacity investigation overwhelmingly identify China as the sole source of the problem, with over 40 percent of the country-specific comments focusing on China. Moreover, even commenters who accept the China overcapacity diagnosis—such as the U.S.-China Business Council—advocate for narrowly targeted tariffs with robust exclusions, citing data that past Section 301 tariffs were absorbed by U.S. businesses or passed to consumers, with only 14 percent producing any U.S. reshoring. Comments from foreign governments and industry associations regarding the other countries under investigation tell a different story. Trade lobby group BusinessEurope argued that most EU countries do not have industrial overcapacity and are themselves harmed by Chinese overcapacity.

Multiple submissions from academic economists and think tanks also challenge the three core indicators USTR has proposed: trade surpluses, low industrial capacity utilization rates, and overproduction. A particular difficulty for USTR’s manufacturing-capacity-utilization metric is that the United States has a lower rate than many of the economies it is investigating. Similarly, many countries subject to forced labor investigations, such as EU members, have much stronger labor protections than the United States.

Additionally, the agency must respond to comments submitted on the record. The current factual record provides limited support for substantial tariffs targeting structural excess capacity in most of the 16 economies investigated, and the mismatch between the breadth of the investigation and the strength of the evidence is a significant legal vulnerability that maps directly onto the fit-between-means-and-ends and internal-consistency factors.

The Remand Challenge

Even if courts find that USTR’s investigations fail arbitrary and capricious review, the default remedy is to remand back to the agency rather than to vacate the underlying tariffs. Remand is likely when failures involve insufficient explanation, inadequate consideration of comments, or thin evidentiary records that can be addressed through further process. Since each investigation will result in a distinct determination and (likely) imposition of tariffs, and since different plaintiffs will challenge these determinations before the Court of International Trade (CIT) (which is the specialized Article III federal court that will hear all challenges), the litigation could get messy. Because all these cases will run through CIT, the resulting precedent will be uniform: a ruling on what Section 301 requires in one case will shape what USTR must establish in all of them.

Remand gives USTR additional time to supplement the factual record behind a determination, revise its analyses, and cure procedural defects. In addition, courts are unlikely to impose a temporary injunction on the tariffs during the remand period. USTR, as a result, may not be overly concerned about arbitrary and capricious review. Procedural failures alone are unlikely to halt the administration’s broader strategy.

However, there are three reasons why USTR may still not prevail.

First, even procedural remands create binding precedents. A remand holding that Section 301 requires specific factual development tailored to statutory ends or greater internal consistency across investigations would constrain future Section 301 actions. The broader the precedential constraints on what an initial investigation must establish, the narrower the scope for later modification of tariffs based on a previously completed investigation. Repeated remands across multiple investigations would create considerable pressure on USTR, making the administration’s desire for accelerated, broad investigations harder to achieve.

Second, remand is not the only remedy available. Where the administrative record directly contradicts the agency’s findings, courts can and do vacate them. If a factual error like the one regarding Singapore is included in a final investigation, vacatur becomes more likely. Severe or repeated procedural failures also can support vacatur.

Third, the core concern with the current investigations is a substantive one: that they are pretextually wielded to replicate (or largely replicate) tariff levels imposed under IEEPA that the Supreme Court invalidated. A finding of pretext goes to the legitimacy of the agency’s action and cannot be cured by gathering more evidence. Meaningful constraint, if any, will depend on courts willing to find substantive defects—such as pretextual abuse—that cannot be cured by a better administrative record.

What’s at Stake

The administration’s strategy is best understood as an attempt to reconstruct the IEEPA authority it lost in Learning Resources: a standing executive power to set or modify tariffs on any goods from any country at any time. Section 301 has become the administration’s chosen primary statutory authority for replacing the IEEPA tariffs. If the strategy succeeds through perfunctory investigations, expansive use of the modification authority, and judicial deference to USTR, the constitutional delegation question that Thomas raised in Learning Resources will become largely irrelevant. Delegation will have occurred de facto, regardless of whether the Supreme Court ever resolves the question de jure.

These Section 301 investigations are unlikely to be the last. USTR has signaled potential future ones that could trigger tariffs regarding drug pricing, alleged discrimination against U.S. technology companies, digital goods, digital services taxes, ocean pollution, and trade practices related to seafood, rice, and other goods. These could serve as fallbacks if the current investigations are deemed insufficient. They also could trigger additional measures if the underlying strategy proves successful. Either way, the legal questions raised by the current investigations will not be resolved in a single case or a single presidential term.

Three potential paths could clarify the scope of Section 301 tariff authority. First, the courts could apply the major questions doctrine to deployment of Section 301 at scale, finding that the wholesale conversion of a dispute-specific tool into a global tariff-setting mechanism is the kind of decision Congress must specify explicitly, if indeed permitted under the non-delegation doctrine. Second, the courts could tighten arbitrary and capricious review, particularly around the fit between investigative findings and tariff impositions in order to constrain their pretextual use. Third, Congress could amend Section 301 to clarify its scope—or, more likely, fail to act and allow the executive interpretation to prevail in practice unless the courts intervene.

There is a “power in naming,” whether it be national security or unfairness. If the executive can apply whatever label suits its purpose, such naming is inextricably linked to presidential assertions of power. It can be used to engage in war externally, to unleash ICE forces internally, or to take over the tariff and foreign commerce powers from Congress and wield trade wars against the entire world. Each successful exercise of that power reinforces the idea that the president’s authority is de facto without limit, requiring only some tweak of statutory analysis for the president to reach the desired result.

The stakes in the Section 301 cases are high. The underlying questions are, first, whether Congress retains any meaningful role in setting international trade and tariff policy; and, second, whether the judiciary is willing to impose meaningful constraints on executive claims to unlimited authority.

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As participants in a recent bipartisan delegation of American political and civic leaders to Poland sponsored by The States Forum (and co-organized by one of us, Mieczysław), we heard how liberal democratic forces managed to prevail in the 2023 parliamentary elections. They successfully challenged a regime that had replaced independent public media with nonstop propaganda, subjugated the judiciary, and regularly attacked civil society and other watchdogs with SLAP lawsuits and other measures.

After all, authoritarian governments are adept at creating systems and institutions that are structured so they are hard to change, creating obstacles for reform by subsequent rulers without resorting to arguably undemocratic tactics themselves. Hungary is facing this challenge now after the defeat of Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party in recent elections, but Poles have grappled with dilemmas related to reversing democratic backsliding for more than two years. As one Polish rule of law expert told us, “What if the rule-of-law repair requires bending the rule of law?”

Our Polish interlocutors said they realized that conversations about how to approach a return to full, sustainable democratic institutions did not happen early enough, and thus the new government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk struggled to deliver reforms or resorted to legally questionable measures, such as its takeover of public TV. Tusk and his advisers knew they must radically reorganize and restaff the public broadcaster, which had become infamous for hate speech and disinformation, but they faced a formidable legal challenge: the governing body had been appointed strategically by PiS for a term that exceeded that of parliament. As such, according to one journalist we met, the new government had to use “inelegant legal tricks” to change its leadership, which involved liquidating the broadcaster using mechanisms of financial law. Many opponents of PiS were naturally happy with Tusk’s move, but it also garnered widespread criticism not only from PiS supporters but also from independent civil society organizations. As one watchdog leader told our delegation, “You can’t use shortcuts: otherwise, you just lower the bar, violate standards, which will only make things worse in the future.”

Balancing Speed of Delivery With Effectiveness

Yet, the Polish case shows that moving slowly on reform can be just as problematic as acting too swiftly. Tusk’s reformist government did not act quickly or “creatively” when it came to judicial reform, thereby disappointing many of its core supporters. The judiciary remains problematic and rule-of-law reform still not delivered. This, according to several public opinion specialists, contributed to the government’s loss in the presidential elections in 2025, and the president has significant veto powers.

Polling at the start of 2025 suggested that more Poles thought the rule of law had worsened under Tusk than improved: 34.8 percent said the situation was worse, compared with 24.4 percent who said it had improved. An election observation report from the intergovernmental human rights and rule of law body, the Council of Europe, later noted that the unresolved rule-of-law crisis sustained mistrust in institutions, weakened support for the governing coalition, and contributed to perceptions of broken promises.

Americans looking to a transition in 2028 should be mindful of the Polish experience when considering how to unravel the Trump administration’s harm to U.S. democracy. It has turned the Justice Department into a wing of the president’s retribution machine; created a Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) that stripped government institutions and the American public of tens of thousands of world-class experts who’ve been fired; eliminated entire institutions such as the U.S. Agency for International Development; issued executive orders to undermine elections; and threatened media companies, universities, and law firms that refused to bend their knees to (or pay) the president; weaponized federal law enforcement agencies to terrorize citizens and non-citizens alike. The list goes on.