At a conference in Chișinău, organised by the Council of Europe together with the Agency for Medicines and Medical Devices of the Republic of Moldova's Ministry of Health, participants acknowledged the growing global threat posed by the falsification of medical products and related crimes. They pointed out that criminal networks are increasingly exploiting online sales, social media, encrypted apps, and e-commerce platforms to distribute falsified products. Of particular concern are lifestyle products, such as weight-loss and performance-enhancing drugs, which promise high profits for organised crime. At the same time, emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, are being used to generate fake endorsements and testimonials. Other concerns include the falsification of veterinary medical products and the increasing circulation of illicit medical products in sports.

Against this backdrop, the conclusions include a number of recommendations for future actions, among other things:

• Strengthening the promotion of further accessions of State Parties to the MEDICRIME Convention;
• Strengthening the 24/7 Network on cooperation and information exchange;
• Addressing emerging threats through guidance and monitoring;
• Enhancing national multi-agency cooperation and expanding international partnerships.

Other priority areas include raising public awareness, particularly about the risks associated with online purchases, and strengthening victim protection and access to justice.

At the conference in Chișinău, the committee of parties to the MEDICRIME convention also adopted a new report on “The Medicrime Convention in the age of AI: challenges and opportunities”. This report was prepared by Prof. Fernando Miró Llinares from the University Miguel Hernández of Elche (Spain). It evaluates the impact of AI on the applicability and relevance of the MEDICRIME Convention, and reflects on the need to update, reinterpret, or strengthen the provisions of the Convention considering the emerging challenges associated with AI.

The project addresses persistent challenges in CAP fraud prevention, including uneven detection capacities, fragmented information exchange and different levels of digital readiness across Member States. Particular attention is given to fraud risk analysis and the application of AI, machine learning and big data analytics to CAP fund management and control. More information is available at the project website.

GINGER is structured around 10 international events bringing together public authorities, Anti-Fraud Coordination Services (AFCOS), paying agencies, EU institutions, academia and private-sector stakeholders to exchange practices and develop data-driven approaches to fraud prevention. Participation is open to all interested participants, and all events are accessible online, including those hosted in person. A certificate of attendance is provided for each event.

Through training, peer learning, risk-mapping and collaborative activities, the project will progressively develop the GINGER Learning Package, consolidating the knowledge and methodologies generated throughout the project into practical resources for future training and capacity-building initiatives.

The first two events have already taken place, and the third event entitled “From Red Flags to Risk Maps: AI and Big Data for Early Warning”, will be held online on 21 September 2026. Registration is already open: <https://forms.gle/hXyeuGw9VDH2Ed6g7>

Further information on the project, including the complete overview and schedule of upcoming events, presentations, recordings and other materials from completed activities, is available in the dedicated GINGER dissemination folder: <https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1fhgqj8jO-sUtZjCfk46A3BGEiASYlmcC?usp=drive_link>.

For information on upcoming events, inclusion in the GINGER mailing list, or to express interest in contributing as an expert or speaker and/or involving your organisation in the project network, please contact ginger.project@unitelmasapienza.it.

Project updates are also available on LinkedIn: @GINGER - EU Funds Governance & Innovation.

Background of the case

The case concerned a vehicle registered in Bulgaria that was stopped during a police check. The Bulgarian authorities found that the vehicle’s chassis number matched an alert entered in the SIS by Germany and the temporary Head of the 3rd District Police Department at the Sofia Directorate for Internal Affairs, Bulgaria. The alert concerned a vehicle sought for use as evidence in criminal proceedings.

Following the hit, the Bulgarian authorities seized the vehicle and contacted the German SIRENE Bureau. The German authorities stated that the vehicle had been reported in connection with an offence of unlawful appropriation and that the company identified as the rightful owner wished to have it returned. The Bulgarian authorities then ordered the vehicle to be surrendered to a representative of that company.

The person registered as the owner of the vehicle in Bulgaria challenged the surrender order before the Bulgarian courts. He argued, in substance, that he had been excluded from the administrative and judicial procedure concerning the return of the vehicle, even though the measure affected his rights and interests.

The referring Varhoven administrativen sad (Supreme Administrative Court, Bulgaria) is uncertain as to whether the Bulgarian legislation complies with the SIS Regulation when right holders have no participatory rights in the return proceedings.

The ECJ's ruling

The ECJ held that Art. 39 of Regulation 2018/1862 lays down the steps to be taken following a hit on an object alert: the executing Member State must seize the object in accordance with national law and contact the issuing Member State in order to agree on the measures to be taken. However, the Regulation does not determine the procedural rules governing a subsequent national decision to surrender or repatriate the object in response to the issuing Member State’s request.

Therefore, national rules on the adoption of such a surrender decision do not fall within the scope of Regulation 2018/1862. The definition of procedural rules is entirely up to the national law. Since that national procedure was not considered to constitute the implementation of EU law within the meaning of Art. 51(1) of the Charter, the Charter was not applicable either. Consequently, the ECJ did not answer the separate question concerning effective judicial protection under Art. 47 of the Charter.

Background of the case

The case concerned criminal proceedings in Slovakia against AC for defamation. The accused had allegedly posted several videos online containing false allegations about another person. The court of first instance twice discontinued the proceedings, finding that the conduct described in the indictment did not constitute a criminal offence.

The prosecutor appealed. The appellate court set aside the discontinuance orders and referred the case back to the lower court. In its reasoning, however, the appellate court used strong factual language, stating, among other things, that the evidence showed “beyond doubt” that the accused had used lies and that certain events described by him had never taken place.

The criminal court now competent to decide on the criminal proceedings against AC at first instance was concerned that the statements by the appellate court might breach the presumption of innocence. Under Slovak procedural law, the lower court would normally be bound by the legal views expressed by the appellate court. It therefore asked the ECJ whether such appellate findings were compatible with Directive 2016/343on the presumption of innocence and what the lower court should do if they were not.

The ECJ's ruling

The ECJ held that Directive 2016/343 does not prevent an appellate criminal court from examining incriminating evidence in detail at a preliminary stage of the proceedings. Nor does the Directive, as such, prevent the appellate court from assessing whether the constituent elements of the alleged offence may be present, even where the accused has not yet had the opportunity to comment on all evidence.

However, the ECJ stressed that the reasoning must not imply guilt before it is legally established. The key question is whether the decision’s wording, context, and overall reasoning convey only suspicion or instead a premature finding of guilt. It noted that expressions suggesting that all elements of the offence are already established may indicate a breach of the presumption of innocence, but left the final assessment to the national court.

Looking at the binding effect of appellate court decisions under national law, the ECJ held that, if the lower court finds that the appellate court’s rulings are incompatible with the presumption of innocence, it must disregard those rulings, even if national law would normally require it to follow them. This follows from the direct effect of Art. 3 of Directive 2016/343 and the primacy of EU law. However, the lower court need not disregard the appellate decision in its entirety: it may still have to comply with procedural measures ordered by the appellate court, such as continuing the proceedings following remittal.

During his first term as Administrative Director (→eucrim news of 12 October 2023), Jamin oversaw several key developments for the Agency:

• The launch of the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (ICPA);
• The establishment of the Core International Crimes Evidence Database (CICED);
• The creation of the European Judicial Organised Crime Network (EJOCN);
• The development of Eurojust’s new Case Management System.

Background of the case

The case arose from criminal proceedings in Italy concerning serious fraud, money laundering, and participation in a criminal organisation. An Italian court ordered the confiscation of immovable properties of the company involved in the fraud scheme that were located in Slovenia and considered to constitute the proceeds of the offences. The confiscation order was transmitted to the Slovenian authorities for recognition and execution in March 2019.

Before the recognition and execution proceedings in Slovenia, in October 2018 and February 2019, a Slovenian company had registered judgment mortgages over one of the properties in order to secure its claims against the convicted company. It argued that it was a bona fide third party and that execution of the Italian confiscation order would prejudice its rights as a mortgage creditor. The Slovenian court, which has to decide on the execution of the Italian confiscation order, therefore asked the ECJ whether such a creditor could fall within the protection of Art. 8(2)(d) of Framework Decision 2006/783.

According to this provision, "[t]he competent judicial authority of the executing State (...) may also refuse to recognise and execute the confiscation order if it is established that: the rights of any interested party, including bona fide third parties, under the law of the executing State make it impossible to execute the confiscation order, including where this is a consequence of the application of legal remedies in accordance with Article 9".

The ECJ's ruling

The ECJ held that a mortgage creditor may qualify as an interested party and, potentially, as a bona fide third party within the meaning of Art. 8(2)(d) of Framework Decision 2006/783. As a result, the competent authority of the executing Member State may refuse to recognise or execute a confiscation order if the creditor’s rights make execution impossible under national law.

The ECJ clarified that, for the bona fide status, it must be established that that third party was not aware of the fact that the purpose of that transfer or acquisition was, for the suspected or accused person, to avoid confiscation. The creditor’s bona fide status must be assessed by the national court in light of all the circumstances. The fact that the judgment mortgage was registered before the recognition and execution proceedings – and even before the confiscation order itself – may indicate the absence of fraudulent behaviour. At the same time, the national court must consider circumstances that may point in the opposite direction, such as whether insolvency or criminal proceedings were already pending when the mortgage was registered.

The ECJ therefore concluded that Art. 8(2)(d), read in light of Art. 17(1) of the Charter, allows the executing Member State to refuse recognition or execution of a confiscation order concerning immovable property that constitutes proceeds of crime where the rights of a bona fide mortgage creditor would make execution impossible. It remains for the national court to determine whether the creditor was in fact acting in good faith.

Third countries that have posted a Liaison Prosecutor to Eurojust are among the most frequently involved non-EU partners, benefiting from the possibility of systematic exchanges of personal data. Liaison Prosecutors posted at Eurojust can facilitate the opening of cases involving EU Member States and may be invited to participate in cases initiated by the Member States. Their role has become a key component of Eurojust’s operational cooperation with international partners.

Twelve Liaison Prosecutors are currently seconded to Eurojust. Against this background, and with a view to further expanding Eurojust’s network of international partners, Eurojust and the Dutch Government signed an amendment to the Agency’s Seat Agreement on 3 July 2026. The amendment supports Eurojust’s increasing cooperation with countries outside the EU, including through the continued deployment of Liaison Prosecutors seconded to the Agency.

Developed by operational experts from both organisations, the priorities aim to enhance coordination and support joint efforts when criminal networks operate across national borders. They cover key areas, including organised crime, cybercrime, economic and financial crime, and counter-terrorism, enabling a more coordinated and proactive response to evolving criminal threats.

The EDPS welcomes the objectives of the proposal and recognises that EPPO’s and OLAF’s direct access to VAT information is necessary to achieve the objective to effectively combat intra-Community VAT fraud. He stresses, however, that the proposal is at the sensitive crossroads between administrative VAT cooperation and criminal law enforcement. Data protection follows different legal regimes and principles in these fields, which is why the separation must be carefully reflected in the legal framework.

The EDPS recommends that the proposal more clearly explains and underlines the exceptional nature of providing direct (albeit limited) access to administrative databases for law enforcement purposes. In addition, it should be clarified to avoid that the envisaged amendments would be misconstrued or later relied upon as precedent for more general application.

The EDPS also emphasises that appropriate legal, technical and organisational safeguards tailored to the targeted nature of the measure are needed. While some technical and organisational details may be specified through implementing acts (as envisaged by the proposal), core parameters must already be defined in the basic legislative act. Therefore, the EDPS recommends the inclusion of several additional safeguards in order to comply with the EU data protection law principles, such as purpose limitation, data minimisation and accountability.

To support practitioners in the application of the new EU rules, Eurojust published a note on 29 May 2026 providing a concise overview of the Directive. The note focuses on provisions with direct implications for international judicial cooperation in criminal proceedings involving environmental offences. It also highlights the assistance that Eurojust can provide to practitioners in cross-border environmental crime investigations in light of the Directive’s novelties. In this context, the note outlines the Directive’s key provisions, in particular those relating to the definition of offences, penalties, jurisdiction, and cross-border cooperation. Eurojust's key statements on the Directive are as follows:

• Definition of offences: The Directive broadens the range of conduct classified as criminal, removing Member States’ ability to opt for administrative sanctions in relation to such conduct. It significantly enhances the harmonisation of definitions of environmental criminal offences across the EU, thereby strengthening legal certainty and ensuring compliance with the principle of legality. Compared to the 2008 Environmental Crime Directive, six new types of criminalised conduct have been introduced, while most existing offences are now subject to an expanded scope and lower criminal liability thresholds. In total, 20 environmental criminal offences have been established.
• Penalties: The Directive introduces stricter criminal penalties by specifying the types and levels of sanctions applicable to both natural and legal persons. This development facilitates meeting the crime severity threshold required for cross-border judicial cooperation, thereby supporting the use of international cooperation instruments and specialised investigative tools.
• Jurisdiction and conflicts of jurisdiction: The Directive lays down jurisdictional rules for environmental criminal offences, defining when Member States are obliged to establish jurisdiction and when they may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. Where an offence falls within the jurisdiction of more than one Member State, the Directive requires the Member States concerned to cooperate in order to determine the most appropriate forum for prosecution. Where appropriate, Member States must refer conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings to Eurojust.
• National coordination: Member States are required to establish mechanisms for strategic and operational coordination among all competent national authorities involved in combating environmental crime.
• EU-level cooperation: The Directive explicitly reinforces the role of Eurojust in providing technical and operational support to national authorities, thereby facilitating coordination in cross-border environmental crime investigations.

Eurojust concluded that the provisions of the Directive are expected to have direct positive implications for the cross-border cooperation at the judicial level. However, the Agency also stressed that environmental crime investigations are usually complex and resource-intensive, and require a multidisciplinary approach combining means of both administrative and criminal law, and highly specialised legal, technical and scientific knowledge.

The operation targeted individuals who have so far managed to evade arrest despite extensive efforts by national Fugitive Active Search Teams (FAST) to locate them. All fugitives are subject to European Arrest Warrants.

Using OSINT and social media intelligence techniques, participating teams worked jointly to trace fugitives who continue to evade justice across borders. FAST intervention teams across Europe remained on standby around the clock, ready to act immediately if a fugitive was located.

In 56 out of the 57 high-level fugitive cases under review, new investigative leads were identified, In 26 cases, investigators obtained information on the fugitive’s possible location, which will now be followed up by FAST.

The SPD outlines AMLA’s objectives across three core deliverables: (1) completion of the Single Rulebook, (2) advancement of supervisory convergence, and (3) strengthened cooperation among Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs).

These are implemented through five key workstreams:

• First, AMLA will focus on delivering its regulatory mandates, with 24 of 40 mandates scheduled for 2026. Central to this is the EU AML/CFT Single Rulebook, which aims to harmonise anti-money laundering rules across the EU, close regulatory gaps, and reduce fragmentation between Member States. AMLA will prioritise mandates that are critical for industry and essential to implementing its supervisory functions and supporting FIUs, ensuring that regulatory measures are both effective and practical;
• Second, AMLA will lay the groundwork for its direct supervision of high-impact financial institutions, set to begin in 2028. In 2026, the Authority will finalise the risk analysis and selection methodology, initiate data collection for testing and calibration, and define procedures for transferring supervisory information from national authorities to support the supervisory model;
• Third, AMLA will strengthen cooperation among EU FIUs, focusing on joint analyses, harmonised technical standards, and mediation mechanisms. Initial peer reviews will begin in 2026, and the optimisation of FIU.net will continue through 2027 to enable secure EU-wide information exchange;
• Fourth, to promote supervisory convergence, AMLA will develop common frameworks for indirect supervision across the financial sector and oversight in selected non-financial sectors. This includes harmonised supervisory models, manuals, and thematic reviews to guide national authorities and ensure consistent application of EU instruments.
• Fifth, AMLA will establish a robust risk analysis framework, mapping data sources and creating infrastructure to collect and analyse information. This will support the identification, assessment, and mitigation of money laundering and terrorist financing risks, forming the analytical backbone of its operations.

In addition to delivering its core tasks, AMLA will continue to scale up its operational capacity by recruiting new staff, investing in IT infrastructure to establish a secure and agile system, and consolidating internal governance structures. Over the coming years, the Authority will implement key regulatory mandates, develop and refine its risk frameworks, and gradually expand its supervisory and operational functions across the EU. It will also finalise the assessment methodology and prepare for the 2027 selection of entities for direct supervision. Throughout this process, AMLA will engage closely with national competent authorities and stakeholders to ensure that the new EU AML/CFT framework is robust, consistent, and fit for purpose.

The two authorities worked together closely to ensure a smooth transition. Key EBA tools and expertise, including databases, supervisory insights, and risk assessments, have been transferred to AMLA. Existing EBA guidelines and standards will remain in effect until AMLA issues its own, ensuring continuity for both financial institutions and national supervisors.

Under the new framework, AMLA will complete the EU’s Single Rulebook on Anti-Money Laundering, promote consistent supervision across Member States, and coordinate the work of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) to improve cross-border information sharing. AMLA will also directly supervise 40 of the EU’s most complex financial institutions and groups. The EBA will continue to address money laundering risks through its banking oversight, working closely with AMLA to maintain a coherent system.

To support ongoing collaboration, the two authorities have established a formal Memorandum of Understanding in 2025, enabling regular information exchange, joint initiatives, and consistent engagement with the private sector.

The appointment process began in January 2025, when the European Commission prepared a shortlist of candidates for the Executive Board and submitted it to the European Parliament. In March 2025, AMLA’s General Board proposed five members – Simonas Krėpšta, Rikke-Louise Petersen, Marcus Pleyer, Derville Rowland, and Juan Manuel Vega Serrano – which the European Parliament approved in April 2025. Following the withdrawal of Mr Pleyer in May 2025, the Council appointed four members. Ms Verbeek-Kusters now joins the Board as the fifth full-time member.

Ms Verbeek-Kusters brings extensive expertise in financial intelligence to the table. She has led the Netherlands’ Financial Intelligence Unit since 2008 and has twice served as Chair of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, playing a key role in international cooperation against money laundering and terrorist financing.

With her appointment, AMLA’s Executive Board is now fully operational and ready to steer the Authority as it implements its supervisory, regulatory, and operational mandates across the EU.

The first hearing brought together over 1,600 stakeholders, including obliged entities from the financial and non-financial sectors, as well as civil society organisations. The hearing was structured around two sessions, each dedicated to a draft standard that forms a cornerstone of the Single Rulebook.

The first session focused on the criteria for identifying business relationships, occasional transactions, and linked transactions. It explained how these distinctions determine when obliged entities must carry out customer checks, and how attempts to circumvent these checks by splitting transactions can be prevented.

The second session addressed customer due diligence, outlining the information and documentation that obliged entities should collect for standard, simplified, and enhanced due diligence procedures.

The slides on customer due diligence and business relationships presented during both sessions are available to download.

The public hearing is part of a wider consultation process. Written submissions on both Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) were open until 8 May 2026. Input received during the public hearing will complement the written submissions and play a vital role in shaping the final standards.

Obligations for private entities to prevent the use of the financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing are now prescribed in the directly applicable Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, "the AML Single Rulebook" (→eucrim 2/2024, 117-118). It replaces the system to date that has regulated said obligations in five AML/CFT Directives.

The operation was carried out in close cooperation with a broad international network of partners, including law enforcement agencies from 31 countries worldwide, asset recovery offices (AROs), financial intelligence units (FIUs), specialised anti–money laundering and organised crime units, as well as leading private-sector partners from the financial services and cryptocurrency sectors.

Project A.S.S.E.T. was further supported by Eurojust, INTERPOL’s Financial Crime and Anti-Corruption Centre (IFCACC), the EPPO, and the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA), highlighting the unprecedented level of cooperation.

As a result of this coordinated cooperation, authorities identified and traced 884 bank accounts, 80 companies, 55 crypto wallets, 74 vehicles and one vessel, and 44 real estate properties, including six valued at a combined €5.64 million. They also located two suspected criminals, with one arrest carried out via the European Network of Fugitive Active Search Teams (ENFAST).

Furthermore, the operation generated significant intelligence on criminal financial networks and emerging money laundering methods, supporting ongoing investigations across participating jurisdictions and strengthening future cross-border enforcement efforts.

The commemoration took place against the backdrop of growing armed conflicts worldwide and increasing pressure on the international criminal justice system. Eurojust and its partners reiterated their shared commitment to ensuring accountability for the most serious international crimes and to supporting victims and survivors. Attention was drawn to the continued efforts of EU Member States in exercising extra-territorial and universal jurisdiction.

In 2025 alone, over 30 new cases were opened across more than 20 countries, reflecting sustained investigative and prosecutorial activity in relation to crimes committed in more than 30 states.

Recent judicial developments were also highlighted, including landmark convictions in Sweden for genocide through the transfer of children; the first convictions in the Netherlands and France for crimes committed against the Ezidi community; and ongoing proceedings in cases involving Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In Belgium, an indictment was filed in a case involving alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Liberia.

Progress in accountability for crimes committed in Ukraine was also underlined, including the work of the JIT on alleged core international crimes in Ukraine (➝eucrim 1/2025, 8). In this context, a landmark conviction in Finland was highlihted, where a Russian national was found guilty on the basis of universal jurisdiction for war crimes committed in 2014.

Finally, Eurojust also underlined increasing efforts in the area of corporate accountability (legal responsibility of companies for participation in criminal conduct), with ongoing investigations into alleged corporate involvement in core international crimes.

Hungary must now appoint three candidates for the post of European Prosecutor at the central office in Luxembourg. The Council will nominate one of them. Hungary will also need to propose candidates for the posts of European Delegated Prosecutors to the European Chief Prosecutor.  

Hungary is the 25th EU Member State who joined the enhanced cooperation scheme of the EPPO. Now, only Ireland and Denmark are not participating on the basis of opt-out reservations for justice and home affairs matters included in primary EU law. Therefore, Hungary's participation in the EPPO is also historic in other respects: With the entry into force of the aforementioned Commission Decision (on 2 August 2026), the EPPO Regulation 2017/1939 ceases to be an act adopted within the framework of enhanced cooperation and will become an ordinary act of Union law, and thus part of the acquis. This means that any new member state joining the European Union in the future will be required to join the EPPO.

President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, commented on 10 July 2026: "Today brings good news for Hungary. This is a welcome step in the fight against fraud and corruption. The people of Hungary will now have a safeguard in place to ensure EU funds work in their interest. Hungary, welcome to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office." Commission Vice-President Henna Virkkunen and Commissioner for Justice, Michael McGrath, also highlighted the historic day for Hungary and the EU.

It pointed out, inter alia, that the upcoming entry into application of the Pact on Migration and Asylum will reinforce the management of the EU's external borders and provide Member States with more effective tools to address unauthorised movements within the Schengen area. The Commission also believes that the new EU information systems - the Entry-Exit System (which has been fully applicable since April 2026) and the future rollout of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) - will improve oversight of movements across the EU's external borders, and thus support the monitoring of persons entering and leaving the Union and crossing borders. The Commission ultimately calls on EU Member States to increase the use of non-systematic police checks or mobile biometric identification and vehicle tracking technologies as effective alternatives to internal border controls. The Member States should gradually replace border checks with alternative solutions.

According to the Schengen law (the Schengen Borders Code), a Member State can reintroduce internal border controls in view of addressing a serious threat to public policy or internal security, when this is necessary and proportionate. In principle, the maximum duration of border controls at internal borders shall not exceed two years. The Commission is obliged under the Schengen Borders Code to assess the necessity and proportionality of the prolonged internal border checks (over 12 months for the same reason). This has been done now by the opinions.