To support practitioners in the application of the new EU rules, Eurojust published a note on 29 May 2026 providing a concise overview of the Directive. The note focuses on provisions with direct implications for international judicial cooperation in criminal proceedings involving environmental offences. It also highlights the assistance that Eurojust can provide to practitioners in cross-border environmental crime investigations in light of the Directive’s novelties. In this context, the note outlines the Directive’s key provisions, in particular those relating to the definition of offences, penalties, jurisdiction, and cross-border cooperation. Eurojust's key statements on the Directive are as follows:

• Definition of offences: The Directive broadens the range of conduct classified as criminal, removing Member States’ ability to opt for administrative sanctions in relation to such conduct. It significantly enhances the harmonisation of definitions of environmental criminal offences across the EU, thereby strengthening legal certainty and ensuring compliance with the principle of legality. Compared to the 2008 Environmental Crime Directive, six new types of criminalised conduct have been introduced, while most existing offences are now subject to an expanded scope and lower criminal liability thresholds. In total, 20 environmental criminal offences have been established.
• Penalties: The Directive introduces stricter criminal penalties by specifying the types and levels of sanctions applicable to both natural and legal persons. This development facilitates meeting the crime severity threshold required for cross-border judicial cooperation, thereby supporting the use of international cooperation instruments and specialised investigative tools.
• Jurisdiction and conflicts of jurisdiction: The Directive lays down jurisdictional rules for environmental criminal offences, defining when Member States are obliged to establish jurisdiction and when they may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. Where an offence falls within the jurisdiction of more than one Member State, the Directive requires the Member States concerned to cooperate in order to determine the most appropriate forum for prosecution. Where appropriate, Member States must refer conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings to Eurojust.
• National coordination: Member States are required to establish mechanisms for strategic and operational coordination among all competent national authorities involved in combating environmental crime.
• EU-level cooperation: The Directive explicitly reinforces the role of Eurojust in providing technical and operational support to national authorities, thereby facilitating coordination in cross-border environmental crime investigations.

Eurojust concluded that the provisions of the Directive are expected to have direct positive implications for the cross-border cooperation at the judicial level. However, the Agency also stressed that environmental crime investigations are usually complex and resource-intensive, and require a multidisciplinary approach combining means of both administrative and criminal law, and highly specialised legal, technical and scientific knowledge.

The operation targeted individuals who have so far managed to evade arrest despite extensive efforts by national Fugitive Active Search Teams (FAST) to locate them. All fugitives are subject to European Arrest Warrants.

Using OSINT and social media intelligence techniques, participating teams worked jointly to trace fugitives who continue to evade justice across borders. FAST intervention teams across Europe remained on standby around the clock, ready to act immediately if a fugitive was located.

In 56 out of the 57 high-level fugitive cases under review, new investigative leads were identified, In 26 cases, investigators obtained information on the fugitive’s possible location, which will now be followed up by FAST.

The SPD outlines AMLA’s objectives across three core deliverables: (1) completion of the Single Rulebook, (2) advancement of supervisory convergence, and (3) strengthened cooperation among Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs).

These are implemented through five key workstreams:

• First, AMLA will focus on delivering its regulatory mandates, with 24 of 40 mandates scheduled for 2026. Central to this is the EU AML/CFT Single Rulebook, which aims to harmonise anti-money laundering rules across the EU, close regulatory gaps, and reduce fragmentation between Member States. AMLA will prioritise mandates that are critical for industry and essential to implementing its supervisory functions and supporting FIUs, ensuring that regulatory measures are both effective and practical;
• Second, AMLA will lay the groundwork for its direct supervision of high-impact financial institutions, set to begin in 2028. In 2026, the Authority will finalise the risk analysis and selection methodology, initiate data collection for testing and calibration, and define procedures for transferring supervisory information from national authorities to support the supervisory model;
• Third, AMLA will strengthen cooperation among EU FIUs, focusing on joint analyses, harmonised technical standards, and mediation mechanisms. Initial peer reviews will begin in 2026, and the optimisation of FIU.net will continue through 2027 to enable secure EU-wide information exchange;
• Fourth, to promote supervisory convergence, AMLA will develop common frameworks for indirect supervision across the financial sector and oversight in selected non-financial sectors. This includes harmonised supervisory models, manuals, and thematic reviews to guide national authorities and ensure consistent application of EU instruments.
• Fifth, AMLA will establish a robust risk analysis framework, mapping data sources and creating infrastructure to collect and analyse information. This will support the identification, assessment, and mitigation of money laundering and terrorist financing risks, forming the analytical backbone of its operations.

In addition to delivering its core tasks, AMLA will continue to scale up its operational capacity by recruiting new staff, investing in IT infrastructure to establish a secure and agile system, and consolidating internal governance structures. Over the coming years, the Authority will implement key regulatory mandates, develop and refine its risk frameworks, and gradually expand its supervisory and operational functions across the EU. It will also finalise the assessment methodology and prepare for the 2027 selection of entities for direct supervision. Throughout this process, AMLA will engage closely with national competent authorities and stakeholders to ensure that the new EU AML/CFT framework is robust, consistent, and fit for purpose.

The two authorities worked together closely to ensure a smooth transition. Key EBA tools and expertise, including databases, supervisory insights, and risk assessments, have been transferred to AMLA. Existing EBA guidelines and standards will remain in effect until AMLA issues its own, ensuring continuity for both financial institutions and national supervisors.

Under the new framework, AMLA will complete the EU’s Single Rulebook on Anti-Money Laundering, promote consistent supervision across Member States, and coordinate the work of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) to improve cross-border information sharing. AMLA will also directly supervise 40 of the EU’s most complex financial institutions and groups. The EBA will continue to address money laundering risks through its banking oversight, working closely with AMLA to maintain a coherent system.

To support ongoing collaboration, the two authorities have established a formal Memorandum of Understanding in 2025, enabling regular information exchange, joint initiatives, and consistent engagement with the private sector.

The appointment process began in January 2025, when the European Commission prepared a shortlist of candidates for the Executive Board and submitted it to the European Parliament. In March 2025, AMLA’s General Board proposed five members – Simonas Krėpšta, Rikke-Louise Petersen, Marcus Pleyer, Derville Rowland, and Juan Manuel Vega Serrano – which the European Parliament approved in April 2025. Following the withdrawal of Mr Pleyer in May 2025, the Council appointed four members. Ms Verbeek-Kusters now joins the Board as the fifth full-time member.

Ms Verbeek-Kusters brings extensive expertise in financial intelligence to the table. She has led the Netherlands’ Financial Intelligence Unit since 2008 and has twice served as Chair of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, playing a key role in international cooperation against money laundering and terrorist financing.

With her appointment, AMLA’s Executive Board is now fully operational and ready to steer the Authority as it implements its supervisory, regulatory, and operational mandates across the EU.

The first hearing brought together over 1,600 stakeholders, including obliged entities from the financial and non-financial sectors, as well as civil society organisations. The hearing was structured around two sessions, each dedicated to a draft standard that forms a cornerstone of the Single Rulebook.

The first session focused on the criteria for identifying business relationships, occasional transactions, and linked transactions. It explained how these distinctions determine when obliged entities must carry out customer checks, and how attempts to circumvent these checks by splitting transactions can be prevented.

The second session addressed customer due diligence, outlining the information and documentation that obliged entities should collect for standard, simplified, and enhanced due diligence procedures.

The slides on customer due diligence and business relationships presented during both sessions are available to download.

The public hearing is part of a wider consultation process. Written submissions on both Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) were open until 8 May 2026. Input received during the public hearing will complement the written submissions and play a vital role in shaping the final standards.

Obligations for private entities to prevent the use of the financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing are now prescribed in the directly applicable Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, "the AML Single Rulebook" (→eucrim 2/2024, 117-118). It replaces the system to date that has regulated said obligations in five AML/CFT Directives.

The operation was carried out in close cooperation with a broad international network of partners, including law enforcement agencies from 31 countries worldwide, asset recovery offices (AROs), financial intelligence units (FIUs), specialised anti–money laundering and organised crime units, as well as leading private-sector partners from the financial services and cryptocurrency sectors.

Project A.S.S.E.T. was further supported by Eurojust, INTERPOL’s Financial Crime and Anti-Corruption Centre (IFCACC), the EPPO, and the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA), highlighting the unprecedented level of cooperation.

As a result of this coordinated cooperation, authorities identified and traced 884 bank accounts, 80 companies, 55 crypto wallets, 74 vehicles and one vessel, and 44 real estate properties, including six valued at a combined €5.64 million. They also located two suspected criminals, with one arrest carried out via the European Network of Fugitive Active Search Teams (ENFAST).

Furthermore, the operation generated significant intelligence on criminal financial networks and emerging money laundering methods, supporting ongoing investigations across participating jurisdictions and strengthening future cross-border enforcement efforts.

The commemoration took place against the backdrop of growing armed conflicts worldwide and increasing pressure on the international criminal justice system. Eurojust and its partners reiterated their shared commitment to ensuring accountability for the most serious international crimes and to supporting victims and survivors. Attention was drawn to the continued efforts of EU Member States in exercising extra-territorial and universal jurisdiction.

In 2025 alone, over 30 new cases were opened across more than 20 countries, reflecting sustained investigative and prosecutorial activity in relation to crimes committed in more than 30 states.

Recent judicial developments were also highlighted, including landmark convictions in Sweden for genocide through the transfer of children; the first convictions in the Netherlands and France for crimes committed against the Ezidi community; and ongoing proceedings in cases involving Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In Belgium, an indictment was filed in a case involving alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Liberia.

Progress in accountability for crimes committed in Ukraine was also underlined, including the work of the JIT on alleged core international crimes in Ukraine (➝eucrim 1/2025, 8). In this context, a landmark conviction in Finland was highlihted, where a Russian national was found guilty on the basis of universal jurisdiction for war crimes committed in 2014.

Finally, Eurojust also underlined increasing efforts in the area of corporate accountability (legal responsibility of companies for participation in criminal conduct), with ongoing investigations into alleged corporate involvement in core international crimes.

Hungary must now appoint three candidates for the post of European Prosecutor at the central office in Luxembourg. The Council will nominate one of them. Hungary will also need to propose candidates for the posts of European Delegated Prosecutors to the European Chief Prosecutor.  

Hungary is the 25th EU Member State who joined the enhanced cooperation scheme of the EPPO. Now, only Ireland and Denmark are not participating on the basis of opt-out reservations for justice and home affairs matters included in primary EU law. Therefore, Hungary's participation in the EPPO is also historic in other respects: With the entry into force of the aforementioned Commission Decision (on 2 August 2026), the EPPO Regulation 2017/1939 ceases to be an act adopted within the framework of enhanced cooperation and will become an ordinary act of Union law, and thus part of the acquis. This means that any new member state joining the European Union in the future will be required to join the EPPO.

President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, commented on 10 July 2026: "Today brings good news for Hungary. This is a welcome step in the fight against fraud and corruption. The people of Hungary will now have a safeguard in place to ensure EU funds work in their interest. Hungary, welcome to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office." Commission Vice-President Henna Virkkunen and Commissioner for Justice, Michael McGrath, also highlighted the historic day for Hungary and the EU.

It pointed out, inter alia, that the upcoming entry into application of the Pact on Migration and Asylum will reinforce the management of the EU's external borders and provide Member States with more effective tools to address unauthorised movements within the Schengen area. The Commission also believes that the new EU information systems - the Entry-Exit System (which has been fully applicable since April 2026) and the future rollout of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) - will improve oversight of movements across the EU's external borders, and thus support the monitoring of persons entering and leaving the Union and crossing borders. The Commission ultimately calls on EU Member States to increase the use of non-systematic police checks or mobile biometric identification and vehicle tracking technologies as effective alternatives to internal border controls. The Member States should gradually replace border checks with alternative solutions.

According to the Schengen law (the Schengen Borders Code), a Member State can reintroduce internal border controls in view of addressing a serious threat to public policy or internal security, when this is necessary and proportionate. In principle, the maximum duration of border controls at internal borders shall not exceed two years. The Commission is obliged under the Schengen Borders Code to assess the necessity and proportionality of the prolonged internal border checks (over 12 months for the same reason). This has been done now by the opinions.

The operation focused on counterfeit and falsified medicines, the trafficking of anabolic-androgenic steroids and other doping substances, illegal food and sport supplements, and counterfeit sanitary products and medical devices. A total of 907 investigations were launched, 43 organised crime groups were investigated, and 66 websites were taken down.

Europol observed the following trends as a result of Operation SHIELD VI:

• An increased threat of poisoning and overdose due to abnormal medicine consumption outside a medical framework, such as the proliferation of counterfeit semaglutide-based products used as fat burners and the increasing availability of fake medicines containing potent synthetic substances.
• Criminals exploit the growing demand for medicines by these behaviours. Europe faces challenges due to the misuse of prescription and over-the-counter medicines for non-therapeutic purposes as well as the proliferation of online trafficking channels, particularly through unregulated websites.
• Social media and online marketplaces, both on the surface web and on the dark web, continue to be central to the trade of counterfeit pharmaceuticals, as they provide anonymity and target large audiences.
• Criminal networks typically operate one or more underground laboratories where they manufacture illicit pharmaceuticals and doping substances using raw ingredients.

Giving examples of operational success stories, Europol concluded that a multi-faceted approach is essential to effectively combat pharmaceutical crime. This approach should integrate health regulation, criminal justice cooperation, and public awareness campaigns.

OLAF Director-General, Petr Klement, emphasised the critical role of cross-border cooperation and interinstitutional cooperation with Europol in tackling counterfeit goods before they reach consumers: "The trade in illegal medicines represents a persistent and evolving threat, not only to public health but also to the integrity of the legal supply chain. By combining efforts, OLAF, Europol, and national customs authorities have safeguarded European consumers from dangerous health products”.

According to the report, a critical first step is to identify all business use cases that rely on public key cryptography. This inventory enables the development of a prioritised transition roadmap, with the quantum risk of each use case being assessed based on three parameters:

• “Shelf life of protected data”, which refers to how long the data remains sensitive;
• “Exposure”, which indicates the extent to which data is accessible to potential attackers;
• “Severity”, which reflects the business impact of a potential compromise.

When the quantum risk is assessed, organisations can prioritise actions based on the migration time of each use case, i.e., the complexity and timeline required to achieve quantum safety for a particular use case. The report explains how to assess risk using a Quantum Risk Score, set up a Migration Time Score, and determine migration priorities. It also provides example use cases to demonstrate the methodology and warns against cryptographic antipatterns in cybersecurity. These are commonly used but flawed practices that can increase vulnerabilities, operational risk, and long-term technical debt, particularly in financial institutions. Identifying and addressing them early on can strengthen security, improve cryptographic maturity, and support faster and more flexible migration to future-ready systems.

The report concludes that the transition to quantum-safe cryptography is not merely a technical upgrade. It is a strategic imperative that demands foresight, coordination, and disciplined execution across the entire ecosystem, and is necessary for businesses to position themselves as leaders in secure digital innovation for the quantum era.

ECAMS provides operational, technical, and forensic support to Member States, with a focus on dismantling high-risk migrant smuggling networks. It offers capabilities in data-driven investigative support, open-source intelligence (OSINT), operational analysis, and strategic coordination, including stakeholder management and deployment capacity.

The centre is structured into two main units: the Migrant Smuggling Unit and the Expertise and Stakeholder Management Unit. The Migrant Smuggling Unit focuses on different trafficking routes, including land, sea, intra-EU secondary movements, and outbound flows. The Expertise and Stakeholder Management Unit brings together teams responsible for large-scale data analysis and online monitoring, operational deployment support at EU hotspots, and coordination with national and international stakeholders.

ECAMS builds on Europol’s long-standing work in the field of migrant smuggling. Since the creation of the European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC) in 2016, Europol has gradually expanded its operational and analytical capacity, including the establishment of specialised teams for maritime operations, joint liaison structures, and operational task forces targeting smuggling and trafficking networks across multiple regions.

ECAMS represents the latest stage in this development, consolidating existing capabilities into a more structured and operationally integrated centre, with strengthened emphasis on integrated operational support, digital investigative capacity, and deployment-based assistance to Member States in combating migrant smuggling across physical and digital environments.

Setting the scene: The expansion of coca cultivation and increased efficiency in Latin America have led to high levels of cocaine production. Combined with rising cocaine use in several EU Member States, both supply and demand remain high, sustaining a lucrative market that encourages criminal networks to develop more sophisticated trafficking methods. While ports such as Antwerp, Hamburg, and Rotterdam have traditionally been key entry points for large-scale maritime cocaine trafficking into Europe, targeted law enforcement actions and the launch of the European Ports Alliance Public Private Partnership (→eucrim 1/2024, 30) have led to a decrease in cocaine seizures in these ports, having prompted criminal networks to adapt their transportation methods, concealment techniques, and routes.

According to Europol's report, new modi operandi include:

• Diversifying routes and methods by bypassing major ports through at-sea drop-offs, transfers, semi-submersibles, and non-commercial vessels, making detection more difficult;
• More sophisticated concealment techniques, hiding cocaine in industrial equipment, machinery, and materials such as food, plastics, and textiles, which complicates detection using scanners, sniffer dogs, and forensic tests;
• Technological advancements, including encrypted communication, autonomous vessels, and drones, to enhance operations and evade detection.

Against this backdrop, the report concludes that addressing these challenges requires a coordinated, intelligence-led approach integrating maritime, financial, and technological capabilities. Monitoring should extend beyond commercial ports to smaller harbours, coastal areas, and open-sea routes. Financial investigations must adapt to fragmented transactions and informal maritime economies. Forensic and technical expertise should be applied earlier to detect hidden compartments, chemically concealed drugs, and extraction laboratories. Lastly, cooperation among law enforcement, customs, port authorities, and the private sector remains essential to securing supply chains and sharing data in real time, supported by cross-border investigations, integrated analysis platforms, and common risk indicators.

Europol will support the fight against the threat of cocaine trafficking through its dedicated Drugs Unit. The Agency will also provide analyses and coordinate EU-wide operations as well as deploy experts on the ground.

The Industrial Maritime Strategy focuses on reinforcing Europe’s global leadership in shipbuilding and shipping through investment in innovation, digitalisation, and decarbonisation.

The Ports Strategy addresses the role of ports as critical infrastructure for trade, energy, and security. It sets up a comprehensive framework to step up the competitiveness, resilience, security and sustainability of Europe’s ports. Among the five priorities figures also the support for protecting and securing EU ports. In this context, the Commission proposes measures against organised crime and cybersecurity risks. New initiatives will include:

• Establish frameworks for third-country port risk assessments and for background checks for port workers;
• Update and revise guidance on emerging threats;
• Improve alignment of customs controls across EU ports together with better security protocols worldwide;
• Establish a new forum designed to facilitate the exchange of best practices among Member States' cybersecurity and port authorities.
• Carry out an EU-wide security risk assessment to identify the most pressing cybersecurity risks and measures to mitigate them.

Together, the strategies aim to modernise the sector, support the green transition, and reinforce the EU’s economic security, with implementation overseen by a new high-level Maritime Industries and Ports Board. The measures with regard to security build on the European Ports Alliance private-public partnership - an initiative that was launched in January 2024 to strengthen cooperation between European ports in the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking (→eucrim 1/2024, 30).