The new legisation aims at the EPPO and OLAF taking part in the flow of information between individual Member States within the Eurofisc network and thus ensuring a more timely and more comprehensive overview of cross-border VAT fraud at Union level. Launched in 2010, Eurofisc is a decentralised cooperation network comprising the EU Member States and Norway, which, as an early warning system, facilitates the rapid exchange of targeted information (e.g. on VAT returns, registrations and transaction data) between national tax authorities.
Regulation 2026/1743 sets out clear procedures for how the EPPO and OLAF may query or use VAT information, what restrictions apply, and how Member States cooperate in providing or facilitating access where needed.
]]>The first day was dedicated to the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), with emphasis placed on practical concerns. In the first part of the session, the implementation and practical application of the EAW was discussed from the perspective of the European institutions, i.e., the Commission and the Council. The officials shared their experience − based not only on the Commission’s implementation reports of 2005 and 2007, but also on the current round of mutual evaluations on a Member-State-by-Member-State basis. Although it was reiterated that the EAW is a success story, several shortcomings were pointed out. Implementation of the EAW still differs, leading to a lack of consistency in the application of the instrument among the Member States.
Some Member States, for instance, inserted reservations into their national legislation with regard to aspects of surrender of own nationals, thus indicating residual mistrust of other EU criminal justice systems. It is additionally problematic that some Member States transposed an optional ground for refusal into a mandatory one or included grounds for refusal not provided for in the Framework Decision. Problems experienced by executing states with in absentia judgements led to the overall question of how the guarantees with regard to the fundamental rights of the requested person are ensured in the course of EAW proceedings. Another major current problem which was highlighted during the conference is the issuing of EAWs for apparently minor offences or offences for which little punishment is expected, causing these EAWs to clash with the principle of proportionality.
A more consistent and homogenous application is therefore expected from the handbook on the EAW which is being drafted by the Council Secretariat. The state of play of the handbook as well as its contents was presented in detail. The handbook will address problems in practice and aims at assisting legal practitioners by providing uniform guidelines on how to fill in the EAW form. It will be the first time that all relevant practical information on the EAW is contained in one document. The participants welcomed this project designed to facilitate the handling of EAWs. In particular, the fact that the handbook will be translated into all EU languages was considered an important step towards ensuring a more consistent and transparent application of the instrument.
In the second part of the session on the EAW, experts discussed experiences in national practice with the application of EAWs, including the United Kingdom, Sweden, Portugal, the Czech Republic, and Italy. All in all, the speeches showed that each national legal system still retains certain typicalities concerning surrender under the EAW. Interestingly, the speeches also revealed that common law and continental law systems are faced with similar problems regarding mutual recognition and mutual trust, but provide different solutions. In this context, participants discussed best practices which could also apply in each other’s − principally different − legal orders. Issues which were addressed in this context were, for example, how to protect nationals from extradition, how to prevent surrender if draconic or inappropriate punishment is likely, or how to take into account possible procedural rights infringements.
The session on the EAW ended with the presentation of views from Eurojust and liaison magistrates. The lessons learnt by these two actors confirmed the conclusion drawn after the first day that the EAW instrument is being successfully used in practice, especially in comparison to the circumstances and difficulties prior to its existence. However, administrative and practical problems still need to be resolved, the currently most important problem being how to take into account the principle of proportionality.
In the course of the second day, the tool of Joint Investiga tion Teams (commonly abbreviated JITs), created by a Council Framework Decision of 2002, was examined. So far, little experience exists as all JITs have been carried out on a bilateral basis up until now. The experts addressed three aspects of JITs:
(1) Emphasis was put on concerns regarding the gathering of evidence within the teams and the use of foreign evidence in national criminal law proceedings.
(2) Concrete insight into the practical work of JITs was given by presenting experiences between Belgium and the Netherlands in the Rhine-Maas region as well as between Finland and Estonia in the Baltic Sea region.
(3) Representatives from Europol and Eurojust explored their role in implementing JITs and possibilities for their participation in JITs.
All in all, legal practitioners who had experience with JITs highly appreciated this tool. However, during the discussion, participants still doubted whether JITs would also run well if three or more states were involved, since experience has gained so far only in smaller JITs on a bilateral basis. A major obstacle in this context was seen in the somewhat cumbersome and lengthy procedure used to conclude agreements on the setting up of JITs. With regard to a potential future strategy, participants agreed that the added value of JITs must be examined on a case-by-case basis and that it is essential to gain further practical experience with JITs so that other Member States which may still be rather sceptical will more readily accept and implement this instrument.
]]>The publication of the four summary reports is based on GRECO's rules of procedure. Summary reports are published within six months of the report's adoption if the state concerned does not authorise the publication of the full report.
GRECO also announced that, following the reports, it had concluded the fourth-round compliance procedures for Denmark and Ukraine. Hungary and Türkiye remain subject to GRECO's compliance procedures and have been invited to report on their progress in 2027.
Meanwhile, on 9 October 2026, GRECO could publish the full compliance report on Denmark. In this context, GRECO regretted that twelve years after the adoption of the fourth-round evaluation report on Denmark, none of its recommendations addressed to members of parliament have been fully implemented. According to the compliance report, GRECO hold essential that a Code of Conduct for members of the Danish parliament is issued, supported by counselling, awareness-raising, and effective supervisory measures.
]]>Graves has worked as a prosecutor for the Crown Prosecution Service since 2007 and specialised in serious economic, organised and international crime. Since 2020, she has worked in the field of international judicial cooperation. In 2025, she joined Eurojust as Assistant to the UK Liaison Prosecutor. Graves succeeds Christopher Williams as the UK’s liaison prosecutor at Eurjust; he had previously taken up the post in March 2022 (→eucrim 1/2022, 19-20).
]]>The proceedings date back to April 2022, when the Commission sent Germany a letter of formal notice after detecting a gap in the transposition of the LED in relation to the activities of the Federal Police (Bundespolizei). According to the Commission, Germany had still not adopted relevant transposition measures by July 2026. A bill to modernise the Federal Police Act, which includes provisions intended to implement the LED, was already pending before the Bundestag. Two days after the Commission’s decision, however, an initial attempt to secure its final adoption was unsuccessful. Germany was given two months to remedy the shortcomings; otherwise, the Commission could refer the case to the CJEU and request financial sanctions.
Germany had already been subject to an earlier infringement procedure concerning incomplete transposition of the LED at Länder level. In July2019, the Commission sent a letter of formal notice after finding that only ten of the sixteen Länder had adopted implementing measures by the end of the transposition period (→eucrim 2/2019, 104). This was followed up with a reasoned opinion in May 2020, when measures from five Länder were still outstanding. The Commission’s first evaluation report on the LED, published on 25 July 2022 (COM(2022) 364 final; →eucrim 3/2022, 187) noted the separate transposition gap concerning the Federal Police.
]]>The Action Plan builds on the existing EU legal framework for AI and cybersecurity, which includes the AI Act, the Cyber Resilience Act, the NIS2 Directive, the Digital Operational Resilience Act for the financial sector, and the Cyber Solidarity Act. The Commission stresses that these instruments already provide important legal and operational foundations, but that additional measures are needed to address the specific risks and opportunities created by advanced AI-enabled cyber capabilities.
Seeking to make the AI frontier safe, accessible, and deployable for cybersecurity purposes, the Commission will support the creation of an EU evaluation capacity for AI models, including cybersecurity aspects – expected for 2027. This capacity is intended to strengthen third-party assessment of advanced AI capabilities and support the regulatory work of the AI Office. In addition, the Commission, together with the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), will develop a European blueprint for structured access to advanced AI capabilities for cybersecurity purposes. The blueprint is intended to help public and private European actors, including critical infrastructure operators and cybersecurity providers, access such capabilities safely and without undue delay.
The Action Plan is structured around three main pillars:
Finally, the Action Plan contains an international dimension. The Commission emphasises that AI-enabled cyber risks are global and that cooperation with like-minded partners is necessary to avoid fragmentation, strengthen trusted access to advanced AI capabilities, and adapt vulnerability management practices. The EU intends to pursue these objectives in bilateral and multilateral settings, including the G7, cooperation with partner countries, international AI evaluation networks, and exchanges with NATO.
]]>The report concerns the DSA risk-management framework for Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs). Under Arts. 34 and 35 DSA, these providers must assess systemic risks arising from the design, functioning, and use of their services, including their algorithmic systems, and put in place reasonable, proportionate, and effective mitigation measures. The report is based on a broad range of sources.
The systemic risks identified in the report are grouped into several categories, including:
A particular focus is placed on the protection of minors who are concerned with the most prominent and recurrent systemic risks identified: grooming, exposure to harmful or age-inappropriate content, unsafe account settings, addictive or compulsive design features, cyberbullying, and the dissemination of AI-generated or manipulated sexual content.
The report further discusses how artificial intelligence affects several risk categories: sexual abuse material, illegal hate speech, disinformation, gender-based violence, public security, and health misinformation. At the same time, it also refers to mitigation measures involving automated tools, hash-matching, detection systems, content provenance standards, AI-generated content labels, watermarks, and AI red-teaming.
As regards mitigation, the report does not identify any measures as “best practices” or “good practices”. Instead, it maps mitigation approaches currently reported or observed across different types of services: terms and conditions and their enforcement, content moderation and risk detection, safety-by-design measures, user empowerment tools, awareness measures, and out-of-court dispute settlement. Additional measures cover social media platforms, online marketplaces, pornographic platforms, and online search engines.
The report highlights the importance of stakeholder engagement and data access. It reiterates that effective risk assessment and mitigation should involve users, affected groups, civil society organisations, independent experts, and researchers. It further notes that reliable data access and third-party scrutiny are important for identifying systemic risks and assessing whether mitigation measures are effective or not.
In its outlook, the report underlines that the DSA risk-management framework is still in the early stages of implementation. Future reports are expected to benefit from enforcement practice, stakeholder expertise, monitoring under DSA codes of conduct, and research outputs resulting from the Art. 40 DSA data-access mechanism.
]]>The resolution points to the increasing use of children as part of the operational strategies of criminal and terrorist groups: they may be used to shield adult perpetrators from detection and prosecution, to expand illicit activities, or to perform low-risk tasks with limited knowledge of the wider criminal network. According to Europol data, minors are involved in more than 70% of illegal market activities, including drug trafficking, extortion, online fraud, money laundering, illicit firearms trafficking, and violence-as-a-service schemes.
MEPs called for the future EU action plan on the protection of children against crime to include the following:
As regards criminal law, Parliament asked the Commission to address child recruitment in the upcoming proposal to modernise EU rules on organised crime. MEPs suggested that the recruitment of children could be treated as an aggravating circumstance and reinforced their call for a new common definition of “criminal organisation” – taking into account the use of violence, corruption, or intimidation. They also called for a revision of the EU Pyrotechnics Directive in order to address the use of pyrotechnics as weapons, including the exploitation of vulnerable young people.
The resolution further highlights the role of drug-related intimidation as a recruitment pathway and calls on Member States to incorporate interagency responses into national strategies. MEPs also urged stronger cooperation between Member States, Europol, and Eurojust, particularly in ports, logistics hubs, and urban areas with vulnerable communities.
A central part of the resolution concerns the online dimension of child recruitment. Parliament warned that digital services are used to identify, target, groom, manipulate, and coerce children. It called for robust and consistent enforcement of the Digital Services Act, in line with the Commission’s guidelines on the protection of minors, and for stronger protection of minors through the upcoming Digital Fairness Act. MEPs also welcomed Europol’s Operational Taskforce GRIMM and called for joint investigations to target recruiters, instigators, and high-level actors, rather than focus only on minors who carry out offences.
Parliament finally called for stronger international cooperation, better data collection, and adequate EU funding for civil society organisations, community-based initiatives, sports associations, and educational programmes in areas particularly exposed to organised crime recruitment.
]]>The operation was part of Project Medusa, which was launched in April 2026 to strengthen the cross-border investigation of DFSA and disrupt online networks facilitating such offences. The investigations revealed that perpetrators use encrypted messaging services, forums, and closed chat groups to exchange information and material, normalise abusive behaviour, facilitate the illegal trade in prescription medicines and narcotics, and coordinate offences. Europol stressed that the detected crimes are not isolated incidents but a pattern of organised, mutually reinforcing behaviour.
The offences predominantly target women and may be committed over extended periods. In some cases, perpetrators exploit positions of trust or professional authority. The investigations concerned not only rape and sexual assault, but also dangerous bodily harm and attempted murder, given the risks associated with the deliberate sedation of victims.
Since the launch of Project Medusa, 113 investigations have been initiated, resulting in 57 arrests and the safeguarding of 158 victims. The June operation identified 156 victims and perpetrators, and it generated 274 new investigative leads. In addition, four new misogynist online communities were identified.
]]>The visual publications present the main findings, figures, and developments in focused, easy-to-read overviews. They complement the full Annual Report by allowing readers to access specific aspects of Eurojust’s work without having to consult the report as a whole. This facilitates a quicker overview of the Agency’s activities from its 2025 casework: key developments, achievements, and trends in 2025.
Four areas are covered:
On 11 August 2026, Flavia Roy took up her duties as Liaison Prosecutor for Switzerland at Eurojust. She had already been working at Eurojust since November 2024 as Deputy Liaison Prosecutor and is also a member of Eurojust’s Economic Crime Team. Before joining Eurojust, she worked as a public prosecutor and investigative judge in Switzerland. She succeeds Philip Schotland, who held the post from September 2024 until mid-2026.
On 3 August 2026, Lukáš Starý was appointed National Member for the Czech Republic. He previously served as Deputy National Member and has worked at the Czech National Desk at Eurojust since 2011. During his time there, he has been involved in several thematic teams, including as Chair of the Trafficking Team and the Board on Relations with Partners. Before joining Eurojust, he worked as a prosecutor in the Czech Republic, including in the International Department of the General Prosecutor’s Office. Lukáš Starý succeeds Pavel Zeman as the Czech National Member at Eurojust.
Lastly, Alexandru Cladco took up his duties as Liaison Prosecutor for the Republic of Moldova in July 2026. He has been seconded from the Moldovan General Prosecutor’s Office for a five-year term. Mr Cladco has more than 20 years of prosecutorial experience and has held several positions in the field of international cooperation, including as Head of the International Cooperation and European Integration Department of the General Prosecutor’s Office.
]]>The four episodes look at different aspects of the changing cybercrime landscape. The first explores cybercrime enablers, including dark web marketplaces, cryptocurrencies, and increasingly sophisticated infrastructures used by criminals to avoid detection. The second examines how offenders involved in child sexual exploitation are adapting to new technologies, including the use of AI and end-to-end encrypted platforms. The third focuses on the evolution of ransomware, addressing ransomware-as-a-service, attacks on digital supply chains, social engineering, and the increasingly blurred lines between cybercriminals and hybrid threat actors. The final episode examines the growing threat of online fraud, including the use of AI to personalise fraudulent approaches to individuals and organisations. A bonus episode on child sexual abuse material (CSAM) answers questions raised during Europol’s preceding live expert session and discusses, inter alia, the use of new technologies to detect and generate CSAM, changing offender behaviour and the role of law enforcement cooperation.
The episodes are available via Europol, YouTube, and major podcast platforms.
]]>The stopgap regime, introduced in 2021 as a bridge to a long-term solution, allows providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services to derogate from certain confidentiality requirements under the ePrivacy Directive. It thereby enables them to continue using specific technologies for the processing of personal and other data, to the extent strictly necessary to detect and report online child sexual abuse and to remove CSAM from their services. This is also called "chat control 1.0".
The reinstatement follows the temporary legal gap. The previous interim regime expired on 3 April 2026 after the institutions had initially failed to agree on an extension with the European Parliament rejecting the extension on 26 March 2026.
After the expiry of the previous regime, the legislative process resumed. On 23 July 2026, the Council accepted the European Parliament’s amendments and gave green light to Regulation 2026/1881.
A key change concerns encrypted communications. The Regulation expressly provides that it does not apply to interpersonal communications to which end-to-end encryption is, has been, or will be applied. It also states that nothing in the Regulation should be interpreted as prohibiting or weakening end-to-end encryption. The derogation therefore does not authorise measures that would circumvent end-to-end encryption or enable client-side scanning of encrypted communications.
The Regulation nevertheless remains framed as an interference with fundamental rights. Its recitals acknowledge that voluntary detection measures affect the rights to respect for private and family life and to the protection of personal data. It also stresses that the confidentiality of communications is relevant not only for users in general, but also for communications between victims of child sexual abuse and trusted adults, organisations active in the fight against child sexual abuse, and lawyers.
The reinstated interim regime applies against the background of a prolonged and contested legislative process for a long-term solution. In 2022, the Commission proposed establishing a permanent framework, including risk assessments, detection obligations (also called "chat control 2.0"), and the creation of an EU Centre on child sexual abuse to coordinate efforts (→ eucrim 2/2022, 91-92 and →eucrim 3/2023, 246 with further references). The proposal has since faced sustained criticism, particularly regarding its implications for privacy and encrypted communications (→ eucrim 1/2023, 13-14).
Institutional positions have also diverged. The European Parliament called for a more limited and proportionate approach, while the Council, in its 2025 position, moved away from broad detection orders towards a more risk-based system that preserves voluntary detection practices (→eucrim 4/2025, 260-261). Trilogue negotiations between the EP, Council, and Commission on the permanent framework are ongoing.
The reinstated interim Regulation closes the immediate legal gap, but the central tension remains unresolved: how to ensure effective detection of child sexual abuse online without undermining the confidentiality of private communications, data protection, and other fundamental rights.
]]>At a conference in Chișinău, organised by the Council of Europe together with the Agency for Medicines and Medical Devices of the Republic of Moldova's Ministry of Health, participants acknowledged the growing global threat posed by the falsification of medical products and related crimes. They pointed out that criminal networks are increasingly exploiting online sales, social media, encrypted apps, and e-commerce platforms to distribute falsified products. Of particular concern are lifestyle products, such as weight-loss and performance-enhancing drugs, which promise high profits for organised crime. At the same time, emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, are being used to generate fake endorsements and testimonials. Other concerns include the falsification of veterinary medical products and the increasing circulation of illicit medical products in sports.
Against this backdrop, the conclusions include a number of recommendations for future actions, among other things:
Other priority areas include raising public awareness, particularly about the risks associated with online purchases, and strengthening victim protection and access to justice.
At the conference in Chișinău, the committee of parties to the MEDICRIME convention also adopted a new report on “The Medicrime Convention in the age of AI: challenges and opportunities”. This report was prepared by Prof. Fernando Miró Llinares from the University Miguel Hernández of Elche (Spain). It evaluates the impact of AI on the applicability and relevance of the MEDICRIME Convention, and reflects on the need to update, reinterpret, or strengthen the provisions of the Convention considering the emerging challenges associated with AI.
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