FID Recht - Recht und ReligionTiny Tiny RSS/UNKNOWN (Unsupported, Git error)2026-01-19T10:00:00+00:00https://vifa-recht.de/feed/18tag:vifa-recht.de,2026-03-12:/282383Complaint against Archbishop of Canterbury dismissedOn 12 February 2026, Sir Stephen Males, President of CDM Tribunals (“the President”) i...]]>
On 12 February 2026, Sir Stephen Males, President of CDM Tribunals (“the President”) issued a Decision on a referral made pursuant to section 13(3) of the Clergy Discipline Measure of a complaint made against the Archbishop of Canterbury; on 4 March 2026, he issued a Decision on its publication. The complaint related to the period when Dame Sarah was Bishop of London. The relevant determinations are:
“The complainant is, or at least may be, entitled to anonymity. He says that he has been referred to as N or Survivor N in press reporting of his complaint. He is a vulnerable adult who, on his own account, suffers from a number of mental difficulties, including severe obsessive disorder and clinical depression, as well as physical illnesses [1,2]. The respondent is now the Archbishop of Canterbury, but at all times material to the complaint was Bishop of London. She became Bishop of London on 8 March 2018 [3]”.
“On 12 March 2020 the complainant made a complaint against the respondent pursuant to section 8 of the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003(‘the Measure’). That complaint was addressed to the then Archbishop of Canterbury, (The Most Rev Justin Welby) [4]. Most unfortunately, there were a number of procedural errors in the handling of the complaint, which meant that it never proceeded to preliminary scrutiny and was not dealt with. It appears that this failing was only appreciated in 2025, at which time the complaint was referred to the Archbishop of York (“the Archbishop”), the See of Canterbury being vacant [5].
“Nevertheless, the Archbishop of York was satisfied that these procedural errors did not invalidate any step now to be taken under the Measure and considered that he was able to deal with the complaint fairly and expeditiously”. The President agreed with this assessment [7].
The Archbishop divided the complaint into five distinct allegations, which he referred to as Complaints 1 to 5. In each case the Archbishop determined that there was no misconduct by the respondent and directed that no further action be taken on the complaint [10]. Section 13(3) of the Measure provides that if the President of Tribunals considers that the Archbishop’s determination was “plainly wrong”, he may either direct the Archbishop to pursue such of the courses specified in section 12(1)(b) to (e) of the Measure as he considers appropriate or remit the complaint to the Archbishop and direct him to reconsider he determination that there is to be no further action [13].
The complainant’s referral was limited to the Complaints numbered 1 and 4. There was no challenge to the Archbishop’s determination that no further action was required on Complaints 2, 3 and 5 [14]. Complaint 1 is considered in [19] to [28], and Complaint 4 in [29] to [40].
19. Complaint 1 is in the following terms: ‘… the bishops of London, over decades both prior to, and since the installation of Bishop Sarah Mullally in that office have consistently violated Canon C 30 by actively abetting the priest, REDACTED in his harming vulnerable adults, causing vulnerable adults to be harmed and inciting other persons to harm vulnerable adults, and perpetuating conduct unbecoming or inappropriate to the office and work of a clerk in Holy Orders, including sexual, psychological and financial abuse, threats, intimidation, harassment, and bullying of multiple individuals, in ways which have injured an entire community.’
[…]
28. It is impossible to say that the determination of the Archbishop on Complaint 1 was “plainly wrong”. On the contrary, in my judgment his careful reasoning is impeccable.
29. Complaint 4 is in the following terms: ‘Colleagues who wrote using my name to Bishop Mullally in strictest confidence as preliminary to my CDM complaint, maintaining the same private circulation list throughout various emails, discovered that she had violated that abuse complainant confidentiality and forwarded some of this private correspondence to REDACTED.’
30. This refers to an email dated 1st March 2019, sent to the respondent in the name of the complainant from a body called ‘Scriptural Reasoning’ and copied to 19 other people, some of whom were Church of England officeholders, while others included journalists, one of whom was the BBC’s religious correspondent. The email was not marked ‘confidential’.
31. In fact, although this email was sent in the complainant’s name, purporting to be signed by him, and sent from the same email address from which he had previously sent emails to the respondent, it appears that it was not sent by him but by REDACTED, a woman who was administering the email address, and that the complaint referred to was not the complainant’s, but REDACTED.
[…]
35. The Archbishop accepted that the email had not been sent by the complainant and that it referred, not to his own complaint (which had been submitted but which had not reached the respondent due to postal delays), but to a separate complaint submitted by REDACTED. However, he rejected the submission that the email had been sent in confidence.
Three of the recipients had @bbc.co.uk email addresses and one of these was Martin Bashir, then the BBC’s religious affairs correspondent; another was a well-known lawyer who commented publicly on church-related matters; and one was another incumbent in the Diocese of London.
Contrary to the complainant’s case, therefore, there was no expectation of confidentiality, and the email appeared to be intended to cause as much publicity as possible. It appeared to be an attempt to cause embarrassment to REDACTED by publicising the fact of a complaint having been made against him.
[…]
40. In these circumstances the Archbishop’s decision to dismiss Complaint 4 cannot be regarded as plainly wrong. On the contrary, I consider that his decision was obviously correct.
The President concluded:
“41. …that the Archbishop of York’s determination that no further action should be taken on this complaint was not plainly wrong.
42. However, I think it appropriate to go further. I have no doubt, having considered the matter carefully, that he was right to dismiss the complaint. This was a vexatious complaint which ought not to have been brought”.
March ’26 Decision on publication
The President reiterated his view that the complaint was a vexatious complaint which ought not to have been brought, and that the Archbishop of York had been right to dismiss it [3]. On 17 February 2026 he received a request from the Archbishop of Canterbury that his Decision should be published, with suitable redactions relating to the identity of a priest in the Diocese of London [4]. Dame Sarah gave three reasons for this request, viz:
(1) In view of her office as Archbishop of Canterbury, it would be in the public interest for the Decision to be published.
(2) The complaint had already been well-publicised, largely due to the complainant himself revealing details to the press, which had led to some inaccurate reporting.
(3) The Archbishop was aware that further complaints had been made against her and others; my determination that the complaint was vexatious would give the complainant an opportunity to pause and consider whether he wishes to pursue such complaints.
The President invited representations from the complainant on this request, who in an email dated 2 March 2026, stated is that there was a single course of conduct by the respondent spanning the entire period from 2018 to 2026 which was the subject, not only of the complaint which had now been dismissed, but further complaints made on 6 February 2026.
He made clear that he did not agree with the President’s finding that the 2020 complaint was vexatious and said that he had been under pressure from journalists to give his consent for them to publish facts which he said had come to light pertaining to the respondent’s conduct. He said that he had so far resisted giving his consent to such publication and that it would be prejudicial to him for the President’s Decision to be published until his latest complaints had been resolved. The complainant’s position, therefore, was that th Decision should not be published at this stage [5].
In his Decision, the President expressed no doubt that it was in the public interest that it should be published. The fact of a complaint against the Archbishop of Canterbury had been widely publicised, including (as it appeared) by the complainant himself. It was right that the public should know that this complaint had now been considered in accordance with the applicable statutory procedures and has been found by an independent judge to be vexatious. Those who were interested would be able to decide for themselves whether they agreed with his Decision, but would at least be able to do so with accurate information about the nature of the complaint and the reasons for its dismissal [6].
He did not accept that publication would prejudice the complainant in any way, and accordingly, directed that hid Decision dated 12 February 2026 together with this further Decision on Publication should be published on the Church of England website [7].
Comment
The term “vexatious” has specific meaning in law according to the context of its use. In most areas of UK administrative law, whilst the complaint may be vexatious, a person only becomes a vexatious litigant when the High Court issues a civil proceedings order through the Attorney General under S42 Senior Courts Act 1981. This restricts them from initiating or continuing civil proceedings in the courts without permission. Their name will also be published in the London Gazette and included on the list of vexatious litigants (Note: the list was last updated 2 May 2025).
With regard to the Decisions discussed above, whilst the President analysed the complaints and made reference to their vexatious nature (one in February ’26 and four in March ’26) and stressed that it ought not to have been brought, he did not refer to “N”, as a vexatious complainant.
]]>2026-03-12T08:30:08+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-03-12T08:30:08+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-03-11:/282227Regulating the funerals industry?In reply to an adjournment debate on the regulation of the funerals industry on 9 March, initiated b...]]>In reply to an adjournment debate on the regulation of the funerals industry on 9 March, initiated by Dame Caroline Dinenange (Gosport, Con), the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, Dr Zubir Ahmed, noted that recent cases, though rare, had revealed serious weaknesses in the present system of regulation:
“Unacceptable and distressing incidents, such as bodies being stored or treated in ways that cause deep anguish, were able to occur. In some instances, the police lacked the powers they needed to act. In the case of Elkin and Bell, the two funeral directors in the hon. Lady’s constituency, charges included intentionally or recklessly causing a public nuisance, the common law offence of preventing the lawful and decent burial of a body, and carrying on a business with intent to defraud creditors or another fraudulent purpose.”
He told the House that the Ministry of Justice was “actively exploring options to strengthen criminal law protections for the deceased, including the potential for new offences as outlined in the Law Commission’s 14th programme of work”, which would identify gaps in the current law and whether new offences were needed “to address behaviours that fail to treat a deceased person with dignity and respect”.
He noted the outcome of the independent inquiry into the crimes committed by David Fuller (who sexually abused the bodies of women and girls in hospital mortuaries) and how those actions went unnoticed:
“The overall recommendation of the inquiry’s chair, Sir Jonathan Michael, was for the Government to introduce an independent statutory regulatory regime to protect the security and dignity of people after death in all settings where deceased individuals are cared for, regardless of the institution, including funeral directors. Eleven of the phase 2 recommendations relate to the introduction of statutory regulation, including regulation of the funeral sector. They remain under consideration. Through the Fuller inquiry recommendations programme board, established in July last year, work continues apace with the Ministry of Justice, the Department for Business and Trade and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government to assess options for Government intervention to improve standards of care for the deceased in the funeral sector, and, as such, to respond to the recommendations”.
It was a complex and sensitive matter that required careful and thoughtful consideration to safeguard the rights and dignity of those who have died, to support their bereaved families, and to ensure that any measures were proportionate, “given that we are working with a number of small and medium-sized enterprises”. Discussions within government were continuing; however,
“The funeral sector comprises 6,500 private businesses across the UK, the vast majority of which serve their communities with compassion and integrity, as we have heard tonight. Some 85% are already members of trade bodies that provide guidance, codes of practice and voluntary inspection schemes. The Government are committed to reducing the administrative burdens of regulation on businesses by 25%, and that will contribute to our approach to regulation in this area.” The Government was committed to making a full response to the Fuller inquiry phase 2 report in summer 2026.”
]]>2026-03-11T08:33:45+00:00Frank Cranmerhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-03-11T08:33:45+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-03-10:/282126Diocese of Bangor governance reviewOn Friday 6 March 2026, the Diocese of Bangor published the findings of an independent governance re...]]>On Friday 6 March 2026, the Diocese of Bangor published the findings of an independent governance review, commissioned as part of their ongoing commitment to strengthening accountability, transparency and good governance across the diocese. Extracts[*] from the Press Release are reproduced below; the full report (19pp) may be accessed here.
Diocese of Bangor publishes independent governance review
The Bangor Diocesan Board of Finance and the Bangor Diocesan Trust have today published the findings of an independent governance review, commissioned as part of their ongoing commitment to strengthening accountability, transparency and good governance across the diocese.
The review by Jim Clifford OBE and Alice Hulbert of Sonnet Advisory & Impact, charity specialists, examined the charities’ governance arrangements, financial oversight and organisational culture. It acknowledges the proactive steps taken by trustees in commissioning the assessment and sets their work within a wider effort to ensure that diocesan structures remain robust and effective.
The review describes the breakdown of good governance and proper processes within the charities over five or more years. The charities should have been led by laity, and the BDBF should have formed a counterbalance and critical friend to the Bishop’s Ministerial focus. That positive dynamic tension was lost, and the trustee boards lost sight of their function and importance. Since mid-2025, and on through the period of the review, the report recognises that significant progress has been made to redressing that situation. These improvements include new and clearer leadership, more structured board meetings, improved information flow and decision‑making processes, strengthened financial reporting, and the introduction of formal budgeting and multi‑year financial planning.
The review offers a series of practical recommendations to support the next stage of development. These include merging the two diocesan charities into a single body, updating membership and responsibilities of the trustee boards, and enhancing financial planning and reporting. It also proposes clearer arrangements for risk management, trustee training, staff structures and record‑keeping, together with consistent procedures for overseeing major projects.
Taken together, these steps form a positive and constructive way forward to ensuring that the charities’ and thereby the Diocese’s governance arrangements are fit for purpose and able to support its mission with confidence.
[…]
Notes for editors
1. The governance review concerns two principal diocesan charities: the Bangor Diocesan Board of Finance (BDBF) and the Bangor Diocesan Trust (BDT). The BDBF is responsible for administering diocesan‑wide finances, receiving central grants, overseeing the Bishop’s Ministry Fund, and employing the staff team supporting ministry across the Diocese. The BDT holds diocesan property and funds, both restricted and unrestricted, and makes grants that support ministry areas, church buildings, and statutory education functions. The review recommends that these two bodies should ultimately merge into a single, reconstituted charity with a revised governance structure to ensure clarity of accountability, a stronger skills‑based trustee body, and more effective oversight of diocesan resources.
2. Sonnet Advisory & Impact are an impact-focused research, financial, design and strategic consultancy. Regulated as a firm of chartered accountants, and structured as a social enterprise, they are part owned by Sheffield Hallam University.
3. Jim Clifford has over forty years’ experience advising charities in the UK and beyond on matters including regulatory, governance and financial reviews. An Hon. Professor at Sheffield Hallam University, and a Senior Fellow at Centre for Charity Effectiveness, City St. George’s, University of London, he was awarded an OBE in 2013 for services to Social Investment.
[*] In our reporting of Press Releases, the Extracts used frequently omit the “he said, she said” quotations as in most cases these add little to the understanding of the legal issues involved, and in many cases these can be categorized “MRDA“.
]]>2026-03-10T08:43:08+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-03-10T08:43:08+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-03-10:/282127Tackling hate and discrimination: the UK Government on anti-Muslim hostility and antisemitism On 9 March, the UK Government published a new policy paper: Protecting What Matters: Towards a more ...]]>On 9 March, the UK Government published a new policy paper: Protecting What Matters: Towards a more confident, cohesive, and resilient United Kingdom. In the introduction, it announced that it is
“adopting a non-statutory definition of anti-Muslim hostility and will appoint a special representative on tackling anti-Muslim hostility. In addition to the range of actions the government has already taken to combat antisemitism, we will also act on the recommendations of Sir David Bell’s review into antisemitism in schools and colleges, and on the recommendations of Lord Mann’s review of how the healthcare system deals with antisemitism and other forms of racism. We will roll out training on religious hatred across the Civil Service”.
The non-statutory definition of anti-Muslim hostility (see Chapter 3) is as follows:
“Anti-Muslim hostility is intentionally engaging in, assisting or encouraging criminal acts – including acts of violence, vandalism, harassment, or intimidation, whether physical, verbal, written or electronically communicated – that are directed at Muslims because of their religion or at those who are perceived to be Muslim, including where that perception is based on assumptions about ethnicity, race or appearance.
It is also the prejudicial stereotyping of Muslims, or people perceived to be Muslim including because of their ethnic or racial backgrounds or their appearance, and treating them as a collective group defined by fixed and negative characteristics, with the intention of encouraging hatred against them, irrespective of their actual opinions, beliefs or actions as individuals.
It is engaging in unlawful discrimination where the relevant conduct – including the creation or use of practices and biases within institutions – is intended to disadvantage Muslims in public and economic life.”
The policy paper emphasises that it is not intended to resurrect the crime of blasphemy:
“We do not recognise blasphemy law in the UK and will ensure the Police are equipped to respond to … incidents [of intimidation, threats and harassment] in a way that prevents public disorder and sectarianism and protects the freedom and safety of the public.”
– and in a statement to the Commons, the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, Steve Reed, confirmed that “there is absolutely no question of blasphemy laws by the back door”.
]]>2026-03-10T08:39:21+00:00Frank Cranmerhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-03-10T08:39:21+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-03-09:/282013“Defrocking” in the Church of EnglandDeposition from Holy Orders, more commonly known as “defrocking” or “unfrocking...]]>Deposition from Holy Orders, more commonly known as “defrocking” or “unfrocking”[1],[2], is the ecclesiastical penalty for depriving a cleric of their office and the right to exercise the functions of their orders. In addition to its application to disciplinary procedures initiated by the church, it also provides clergy with a means of avoiding future legislative involvement when they formally leave the church[3].
The associated legislation differs between Anglican Churches within the United Kingdom; recent examples within the Church in Wales included the deposition from Holy Orders of a Bishop and his expulsion from the office of Cleric in the Church. Whilst the penalty of deposition has been unavailable in England since the introduction of the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003, (CDM), it is set to return on the enactment of the Clergy Conduct Measure.
Briden[4] emphasizes that “the deposition from Holy Orders (or unfrocking) operates as a ban on the performance of clerical functions. It does not operate to remove the indelible character which theologically ordination and consecration are taken to bestow”. This is encapsulated in Canon C1 §2 which has remained unchanged: this reflects the position in the Roman Catholic Church [5].
“Defrocking” in the Church of England
The Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 (“the 1963 Measure”) resulted from the Archbishops’ Commission on the Ecclesiastical Courts which reported in 1954; it was introduced “… to reform and reconstruct the system of ecclesiastical courts of the Church of England, to replace with new provisions the existing enactments relating to ecclesiastical discipline, to abolish certain obsolete jurisdictions and fees, and for purposes connected therewith”. The EJM codified the existing disparate legislation on discipline under one Measure. Section 50 of the Measure expressly preserved the power of deposition from Holy Orders following ecclesiastical judicial proceedings in relation to doctrine, ritual or ceremonial, or conduct unbecoming a clerk in Holy Orders.
The Report “Under Authority” (1996) examined the system of clergy discipline in the Church of England and made recommendations for its reform. It states that since the 1963 Measure came into force, no disciplinary cases had been brought before the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved, and only a few disciplinary cases reached the stage of a trial before the consistory court[6]. The report identified weaknesses in the system, including inflexibility, slow procedures, and high costs, and recommended reforms to create a fairer and more effective disciplinary framework.
These recommendations led to the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 (CDM), which received Royal Assent in July 2003 and came fully into force by 2006 on 1 January 2006 [7]. The new Measure did not include the penalty of deposition from Holy Orders on the grounds that it was designed to be more administrative and less punitive; however, the absence of a mechanism to remove clergy from Holy Orders entirely became increasingly untenable in the context of safeguarding failures. The CDM did not repeal section 50 of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963: apart from textual amendments and the repeal of S54 (Disobedience to censure) of the 1963 Measure, Part IV, Censures, no other changes were made. The “Part IV provisions” of the 1963 Measure were retained “as there were clergy deposed under the Measure for whom further deposition remained a possibility for second or subsequent offences involving doctrine, ritual or ceremonial” [8] .
In 2021, the Clergy Conduct Measure Implementation Group (“the Group”) was formed with the specific task of formulating legislative proposals for the creation of a new Clergy Conduct Measure, (Under Authority Revisited, GS 2277). The first major step in the reform of the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 was the Church’s involvement in the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA). The 2003 Measure had also been criticised for being overly legalistic, slow, and burdensome for both complainants and clergy. Originally designed to address serious misconduct, Synod heard that it had become a catch-all process for all complaints, often leading to undue stress and reputational damage for clergy facing minor grievances.
In February 2025, General Synod approved the final drafting of the Clergy Conduct Measurewhich introduced a tiered approach to complaints, ensuring that different levels of concern were handled proportionately. For cases of serious misconduct it reintroduced the penalty of deposition from Holy Orders. The new Measure restored the ability for a bishop to depose a priest or deacon from Holy Orders following a finding of serious misconduct that does not involve doctrine, ritual, or ceremony.
The draft report that the Ecclesiastical Committee was of the opinion that the Clergy Conduct Measure was “not expedient” – Its principal concern being section 31(3) of the Measure which provides:
“(3) The tribunal or court is to sit in private except in a case where: (a) the respondent requests that the sitting be in public, (b) the tribunal or court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to sit in public, or (c) the rules provide for the sitting to be in public”.
The Ecclesiastical Committee’s view was “that the Measure should … be amended to make clear that the tribunal or court will ordinarily sit in public, with limited exceptions where it may be appropriate and justified for sittings to be held in private – such as cases relating to children” (paragraph 7 of the draft report).
The Legislative Committee withdrew the Measure from the Ecclesiastical Committee and sought its reintroduction into the Synod with a view to an amendment being made to address the principal concern raised[1].
The Clergy Conduct Measure(CCM) was reintroduced to Synodfollowing feedback from the Parliamentary Ecclesiastical Committee. Synod agreed an amendment, reversing the presumption of private hearings so that tribunals and courts will normally sit in public. Final approval for the Measure was then secured comfortably across all three Houses[9].
[1] An overview of the term “defrocking” is given by Wikipedia. It is not used Anglican Canon Law, and “laicization” is often, but incorrectly, associated Roman Catholic Canon Law. However, “deposition from Holy Orders” does not make for a snappily-titled headline, and within this post the term “Deposition” will be used.
[2] In his post What’s with all this “defrocking” lingo? Dr Ed Peters comments: “Since the advent of the Johanno-Pauline Code in 1983, the correct phrase to denote the most severe expiatory penalty the Church can impose on a deacon, priest, or bishop is “dismissal from the clerical state” (1983 CIC 1336.1, n. 5). Even the term “laicization”, used for a while after Vatican II to soften the harsh rendering of Latin’s degradatio as “degradation”, is generally avoided today as it seems to imply that the lay state itself is some sort of punishment”.
[4]Moore’s Introduction to English Canon Law, (4th Edition, Ed. T Briden), Page 177.
[5]Canon C1 §2 (Church of England): “No person who has been admitted to the order of bishop, priest, or deacon can ever be divested of the character of his order, but a minister may either by legal process voluntarily relinquish the exercise of his orders and use himself as a layman, or may by legal and canonical process be deprived of the exercise of his orders or deposed therefrom.” [emphasis added].
Canon C290 (1983 CIC 290): “Once validly received, sacred ordination never becomes invalid. A cleric, nevertheless, loses the clerical state: [1] by a judicial sentence or administrative decree, which declares the invalidity of sacred ordination; [2] by a penalty of dismissal legitimately imposed; [3] by rescript of the Apostolic See which grants it to deacons only for grave causes and to presbyters only for most grave causes.”
[6]Under Authority, Report on Church Discipline, Church House Publishing, 1996. Pages 2 to 4 cover the cases since 1963, viz, The Rev Michael Bland, 1969/70; the Rev Thomas Tyler, 1991/2; and the Very Rev Brandon Jackson, Dean of Lincoln, 1995. Mention is also made of the case of the Rev Anthony Freeman concerning the termination of his PTO.
[7]Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 (Appointed Day Instrument 2005) No 6. The time between 2003 and 2006 allowed for: drafting and approving the Clergy Discipline Rules 2005; establishing the Clergy Discipline Commission; setting up diocesan and provincial panels; training bishops, registrars, and tribunal members in the new procedures.
[8]Moore’s Introduction to English Canon Law, (4th Edition, Ed. T Briden), Footnote 45, page 182.
[9] Sections 37 to 49 of the revised Measure relate to Penalties: S41 Deposition from Holy Orders for priests or deacons; and 42 Deposition from Holy Orders for bishops and archbishops.
]]>2026-03-09T13:27:42+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-03-09T13:27:42+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-03-09:/281984Around the WebHere are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:
The Supreme Cour...]]>
Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:
In Childs v. Webster, the 7th Circuit held that there was not a violation of a Muslim inmate’s free exercise rights under RLUIPA or the 1st Amendment when his prison refused to distribute corrected prayer-time schedules to Muslim inmates.
In State of Washington v. Corporation of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, a Washington state appellate court allowed enforcement of a subpoena issued by the state Attorney General’s Office seeking from the Catholic Archdiocese evidence relating to clergy sexual abuse.
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) declared that the State Department has failed to comply with the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA).
Indiana Governor Mike Bruan signed House Enrolled Act 1389 which prohibits governmental discrimination in adoption and foster care matters.
An investigation into the Catholic Diocese of Providence, Rhode Island, shows that an estimated 75 priests have abused more than 300 children since 1950.
]]>2026-03-09T09:22:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-03-09T09:22:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-03-08:/281900Law and religion roundup – 8th MarchUN Human Rights Council: freedom of religion or belief, death and funerals
On Wednesday, the UN Spec...]]>UN Human Rights Council: freedom of religion or belief, death and funerals
respecting funeral rights requires States to refrain from violating these rights and to recognise the absolute right of everyone to have, adopt and change religion or belief without coercion, including restrictions on or denials of funeral rights in order to coerce the next of kin.
protecting funeral rights requires States to prevent others from infringing them, “first and foremost by State actors themselves and secondly through due diligence obligations ensuring protection for individuals and communities in exercising funeral rights against threats, interruptions and violence from non-State actors”.
fulfilling and promoting funeral rights requires States to take positive steps to ensure their enjoyment by everyone, without discrimination; and accountability for infringements “requires justice systems to be alert to, for example, disproportionate or exploitative burdens or charges on those requiring funeral rights that differ from the majority”. [With thanks to Mark Hill KC.]
Confusion relating to marriages of foreign nationals
In response to the confusion regarding marriages of foreign nationals that could leave clergy falling foul of the Marriage Act 1949, as amended following the EU Settlement Scheme, the Registry of the Diocese of Oxford has issued the document Confusion relating to Marriages of Foreign Nationals. By way of reminder, only British and Irish nationals and those foreign nationals with EU Settled or Pre-Settled Status can be married by Banns or Common Licence. All other foreign nationals who do not have EU Settled or Pre-Settled Status should be married by Superintendent Registrar’s Marriage Schedule as per this guidance note: Foreign National without EU Settled Status.
Further arrests at Westminster FMH
The Metropolitan Police has announced that on Thursday, officers of its Public Order Crime Team arrested fifteen members of a group called Take Back Power who were holding a planning meeting at Westminster Friends Meeting House for what the Met described as “a campaign that would have seen them steal from high street supermarkets before redistributing the stolen goods elsewhere”. They were arrested on suspicion of conspiracy to commit theft. Some readers may recall that this is not the first time that a non-Quaker group meeting at Westminster FMH has been arrested and charged with conspiracy.
Scotland: the end of the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme
The Church of Scotland, which is the largest owner of listed buildings in Scotland, reports that, in a letter to the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Lisa Nandy, the Scottish Church Leaders’ Forum has raised concerns about the ending of the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme According to the report, the UK Government made the announcement that the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme (LPWGS) would cease at the end of March 2026, without informing the Scottish Government. The Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, a representative from the Kirk’s General Trustees and the President of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Scotland will be holding talks on the matter with Kirsty McNeill MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Scotland, on 10 March.
Scotland: new funerary methods
The Hydrolysis (Scotland) (No. 1) Regulations 2026 and the Hydrolysis (Scotland) (No. 2) Regulations 2026 came into effect on 2 March. The Regulations legalise the practice of alkaline hydrolysis, aka “water cremation”, in Scotland. As the BBC report points out, however, there is no hydrolysis facility in Scotland as yet, and before it can start, the necessary equipment will need to be built and installed, and the process will be subject to planning permission and approval from Scottish Water.
CPS Guidance on male circumcision
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)guidance on offences against the person now includes male circumcision and states that, in certain circumstances such as the procedure being carried out by those falsely claiming to be suitably qualified practitioners or carried out in non-sterile conditions, it can cross the line into a harmful practice.
On Tuesday, The Pillar posted The cardinal of Penzance, and camp commandments, which comments on Cardinal James Francis Stafford, who was consecrated a bishop at Baltimore Cathedral on 29 February 1976. Like Frederick — the “slave of duty” in The Pirates of Penzance — Cardinal Stafford can count his episcopal “birthdays” only in leap years. Consequently, he has celebrated only 12 anniversaries of episcopal life. “By that count, he’s hardly been a bishop at all”.
]]>2026-03-08T08:18:17+00:00Frank Cranmerhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-03-08T08:18:17+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-03-04:/281557Legal Spirits 075: A Short Take on the Louisiana 10 Commandments CaseLouisiana Authorities Announce the New 10 Commandments Policy (CNN)
A couple of weeks ago, the e...]]>Louisiana Authorities Announce the New 10 Commandments Policy (CNN)
A couple of weeks ago, the en banc 5th Circuit vacated on ripeness grounds a lower court ruling that Louisiana’s law requiring placement of the 10 Commandments in public school classrooms violates the Establishment Clause. In this short take, Mattone Center Director Mark Movsesian explains what the case is all about, and the significance of the en banc court’s decision. Listen in!
]]>2026-03-04T11:00:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-03-04T11:00:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-03-03:/281439Mattone Center for Law and Religion & St. John’sJournal of Catholic Legal Studies Co-Host Annual SymposiumOn Thursday, the Mattone Center for Law and Religion co-hosted its annual symposium with the St. Jo...]]>On Thursday, the Mattone Center for Law and Religion co-hosted its annual symposium with the St. John’s Journal of Catholic Legal Studies. This year’s event featured commentary by Chris Lund (Wayne State) and Eric Rassbach (Becket) on the recent Ten Commandments case from the Fifth Circuit.
The program also included a thoughtful Q&A with the presenters and remarks from Dean Jefferson Exum of St. John’s Law. Thank you to our speakers and all who joined us for an engaging and timely discussion.
]]>2026-03-03T12:00:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-03-03T12:00:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-03-02:/281422Deposition of a Bishop from Holy OrdersOn 26 February 2026, the Church in Wales published the findings of a review into the way in which An...]]>On 26 February 2026, the Church in Wales published the findings of a review into the way in which Anthony Pierce, the former Bishop of Swansea and Brecon, was appointed to senior church roles in the 1990s, despite senior clergy knowing of sexual abuse allegations against him. This present post includes extracts from the Disciplinary Tribunal to which he was referred on the grounds that he engaged in conduct giving just cause for scandal or offence contrary to Chapter IX, Paragraph 9(c) of the Constitution of the Church in Wales.
There have been a number of referrals to the Tribunal on similar grounds, but here the Court commented (at [20]): “The Church in Wales has never before found itself in the circumstance of deposing a Bishop from their Orders.”
IN THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL OF THE CHURCH IN WALES
AND IN THE MATTER OF A REFERRAL IN RESPECT OF RIGHT REVEREND ANTHONY EDWARD PIERCE
JUDGMENT, [1] to [3]
1. By Reference dated the 10th April 2025 the then Archbishop of Wales, Andrew John, and the Bishop of Swansea and Brecon jointly referred to the Disciplinary Tribunal of the Church in Wales the Right Reverend Anthony Edward Pierce (‘the Respondent’), the grounds of the referral being that the Respondent engaged in conduct giving just cause for scandal or offence contrary to Chapter IX, Paragraph 9(c) of the Constitution of the Church in Wales(‘The Constitution’).
2. The grounds for the referral were that on the 12th March 2025 the Respondent was sentenced to a period of 4 years and one month imprisonment, was placed on the Sex Offenders’ Register indefinitely and was made the subject of a Barring Order.
3. The Reference from the Archbishop and Bishop enclosed the relevant Certificate of Conviction from the Crown Court. In accordance with S11(4) of Chapter IX of the Constitution, the preliminary stage of the Tribunal Proceedings was dispensed with and the matter set down for full hearing on 3rd November 2025.
THE BACKGROUND, [4] to [5]
4. The conviction relates to various dates between the late 1980s and early 1990s when, whilst serving as Parish Priest in West Cross Swansea, the Respondent committed acts of indecent assault on a parishioner, a boy aged approximately 14-15 years at the date of the first offences…
5. At the time of the incidents giving rise to the convictions, the Respondent was a Parish Priest, but in 1999 he was elected Diocesan Bishop of Swansea and Brecon. The matters before us are limited to those giving rise to the conviction, although likely because of his subsequent appointment from which he retired in 2008, the referral to us came from both the Diocesan Bishop of the Diocese in which the offences took place, and the [then] Archbishop of Wales.
THE LAW, [6] to [9]
6. The Proctor, Ms Helen Randall, of Counsel, brings the case and the burden rests on her to prove the case upon the balance of probabilities. However, in accordance with Rule 31 of the Tribunal’s rules a certificate of conviction in criminal proceedings is to be regarded as conclusive proof that the acts therein specified were committed by the person named in the document. This only issue before us, therefore was whether the Proctor was able to prove that the set out in the Certificate constituted conduct giving just cause for scandal or offence.
[…]
9. Given the facts that prompted this Referral we do not need to trouble ourselves with a detailed consideration of precisely what scandalous or offensive mean. We accept the meanings ascribed to them by common usage.
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT, [10] to [15]
The Respondent did not appear before the Tribunal, and indicated that he did not wish to attend the hearing or be represented. However, the Tribunal later received two character references (sent directly to the Tribunal by the authors), the second of which asked it “to consider the environment at the time of the offending and how matters have changed since then“. The writer said “Bishop Anthony’s behaviour was as wrong when it happened as it is now, but our understanding of the impact of such actions has changed. I think we have to be careful not to make judgements of past events based on current thinking” [14].
The Tribunal was unable to accept this proposition and stated: “15. Child sexual abuse is child sexual abuse whether it happened 35 years ago or now. The damage it causes has not altered with the passage of time and in our judgment the fact that understanding of that damage may have developed over the relevant period provides no mitigation to the gravity of the Respondent’s actions. In any event, in the criminal proceedings the Respondent was sentenced in accordance with the law as it stood at the time of his offending, and received an immediate custodial sentence of over four years” [15].
OUR DECISION, [16] to [17]
16. We have no doubt that the facts which led to the convictions were scandalous and would, in the eyes of a person of reasonably robust persuasion, be regarded as both scandalous and offensive. The information before us shows that Mr Pierce knowingly entered into a course of conduct which is undoubtedly inherently wrong, in the eyes of both the Church and wider society. His failure to confess what he had done when he was considered for preferment is an indication of a clear hope that he would never be found out.
17. We thus find the charge proved.
THE PENALTY, [18] to [24]
18. Chapter IX of the Constitution of the Church in Wales sets out at Paragraph 18 the powers of sentence open to the Disciplinary Tribunal. They range from the most minor, an absolute discharge, to the most serious, the deposition from Holy Orders and expulsion from the office of a Cleric in the Church in Wales.
19. This is clearly a case which demands the most serious of sanctions…We find that the only appropriate sanction that is consonant with the gravity of his offending is for Mr Pierce to be deposed from Holy Orders.
20. The Church in Wales has never before found itself in the circumstance of deposing a Bishop from their Orders. Section 42 of Chapter IX of the Constitution envisages the duty falling to the Bishop of the Diocese where the cleric holds, or last held, office. It does not make separate provision for Bishops, although a Bishop clearly falls within the Constitutional definition of a Cleric. However, we are mindful that powers of deprivation of Bishops (and other disciplinary sanctions) were vested in the Metropolitan prior to disestablishment [1]. For the avoidance of doubt and uncertainty, we believe the appropriate way forward is for the Archbishop and the Diocesan Bishop jointly to execute a deed of deposition.
21. We therefore direct the present Archbishop of Wales, jointly with the Diocesan Bishop of Swansea and Brecon, to depose the Right Reverend Anthony Edward Pierce from Holy Orders and to expel him from the office of Cleric in the Church in Wales.
The Tribunal further commented that It was worth noting the effects of a deed of deposition, here, the effects of which are the same as a deed of relinquishment.
[1] See Halsbury’s Laws of England (1st edition, 1910), Ecclesiastical volume, para 726.
]]>2026-03-02T15:20:58+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-03-02T15:20:58+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-03-02:/281394Movsesian to Lecture at University of Padua Next WeekI’m very much looking forward to lecturing at the University of Padua next week on judicial r...]]>I’m very much looking forward to lecturing at the University of Padua next week on judicial review in the United States. Thanks to my friend, Professor Andrea Pin, for the kind invitation to meet with his law students. Details below. Friends of the Forum, please stop by and say hello!
]]>2026-03-02T14:16:18+00:00Mark Movsesianhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-03-02T14:16:18+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-03-02:/281361Around the WebHere are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:
The U.S. and Isr...]]>
Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:
The U.S. and Israel carried out strikes on Iranian leadership and military targets, and Iran responded with missile and drone attacks on Israel and U.S. bases in the region. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in the initial attack.
St. John’s University said it will withdraw recognition of its faculty unions, writing that it had become clear the school lacked “the flexibility required to fulfill its Catholic-centered mission” while core academic decisions were tied to collective bargaining.
Two Jewish advocacy organizations filed suit Thursday against California, its Department of Education, and state officials, alleging that authorities failed to address widespread antisemitic harassment targeting Jewish and Israeli students on campus.
Attorney General Pam Bondi announced federal civil rights charges against 30 additional individuals in connection with a January protest inside a Minnesota church where a pastor works for ICE, stating that 25 people are in custody and more arrests are expected.
The New York City Council held its first hearing this week on a package of bills focused on protecting houses of worship and schools and addressing antisemitism and other religious hate. The proposals, part of Speaker Julie Menin’s action plan, would require the NYPD to create a response plan for credible threats that block access to religious institutions and schools.
]]>2026-03-02T09:16:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-03-02T09:16:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-03-01:/281321Law and religion roundup – 1st MarchAssisted dying
Probably the major law and religion news of the week was that, on Thursday, Jersey...]]>Assisted dying
Probably the major law and religion news of the week was that, on Thursday, Jersey’s States Assembly approved the Draft Assisted Dying (Jersey) Law 2025 by 32 votes to 16. The draft Law is now awaiting Royal Assent – as is the Isle of Man’s Assisted Dying Bill 2023, which was passed by Tynwald almost a year ago, in March 2025.
Meanwhile at Westminster, the Government has indicated that it will not allocate further time for the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill before the end of the current session in May. With only a limited number of Friday sitting days remaining in the Lords, the Bill seems unlikely to complete its parliamentary stages in time and will therefore fall automatically.
At Holyrood, MSPs will begin considering amendments to the proposed Scottish legislation on 10 March, with a final vote expected on 17 March.
VAT on private school fees
On Friday, in R (BYL & Anor) v Chancellor of the Exchequer[2026] EWCA Civ 170, the Court of Appeal dismissed a challenge to the imposition of VAT on fees at private schools operated for disadvantaged Charedi Jewish children and for parents wishing their children to follow a strictly Evangelical Christian curriculum. The nub of the application was that “Parliament ought to have carved out an exemption for low-cost schools, particularly religious schools”, but the Court was satisfied that the Government had provided an objective and reasonable justification for declining to do so [184]. We hope to post a note on the judgment in due course – though the claimants have already made it known that they will seek permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Abuse Redress Measure 2025: progress
In answer to a written question from Julia Buckley (Shrewsbury, Lab) asking when the Church of England Redress Scheme will be open to applications, the Second Church Estates Commissioner said this:
“Following the Abuse Redress Measure receiving Royal Assent on the 18th December 2025, the National Church Institutions (NCIs) are finalising the technical operational details before the scheme launches. The NCIs are working with a multi-stakeholder Steering Board, survivors and the scheme’s administrator to put the operational arrangements for the scheme in place, including building and testing the application process and preparing support systems and communications.
The NCIs are working to ensure the scheme launches in 2026 and will provide as much notice as possible via the scheme’s website, where any interested party may register for updates: www.redresscofe.org/w/webpage/registration.”
Religious slaughter again
On Tuesday, Esther McVey (Tatton, Con) was given leave under the Ten-Minute Rule to bring in a Bill “to introduce compulsory labelling of halal and kosher meat and products containing halal and kosher meat; and for connected purposes”. Despite leave having been given without a division, its chance of becoming law is pretty well zero.
“Realistically, there is rarely time for TMRBs to be considered beyond their introductory stage. Few TRMBs become law, but they are a useful mechanism to enable MPs to generate debate about an issue and to test the opinion of the House on a subject”.
In accordance with standard practice, the Bill was ordered to be read a second time – on Friday 10 July – and to be printed. It should be noted, however, that lots of TMRBs never even get drafted, let alone printed, so don’t bother watching this space – although our Index on Religious slaughter gives an overview of developments and a link to the informative document produced by the House of Commons Library in 2025.
The Met Police and Freemasonry
In R (United Grand Lodge of England & Ors) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis[2026] EWHC 330, Chamberlain J refused to strike down the new requirement that all Metropolitan police officers and staff who are or who have been members of “an organisation that has confidential membership, hierarchical structures and requires members to support and protect each other” must declare that fact, confidentially, to the local professional standards unit.
“Freedom of belief” rather than of “religion”: but it was subsequently announced that the United Grand Lodge had decided not to appeal. Lewis Graham comments on the decision in the Administrative Court Blog, here: Freemasons in the police force.
Ngole
Our apologies to anyone who was confused by the way our note on the outcome of the EAT appeal in Ngole appeared: so were we. Because of an unexplained WordPress glitch, we had to post it twice. Grrrrrr.
On Tuesday 17 February, the Ancient Briton blog ceased posting, but with its strapline “‘Anonymous’ comments for publication must include a pseudonym”, it was never a primary source of information for us.
And finally…II
Likewise, whilst the Beaker Folk of Husborne Crawley blog is not one of our primary sources, as well as being great fun it does generate a number of referrals to the blog, and as a quid pro quo, here’s a recent post – God Loves a tidy Toilet alarm cord. To us, this appears to support the view that “health and safety” issues can be “an objection of last resort”, as we sometimes see in consistory court deliberations and anonymous comments on other blogs…
]]>2026-03-01T09:04:36+00:00Frank Cranmerhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-03-01T09:04:36+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-28:/281195“No” to Interim Bishop of BangorThe Archbishop of Wales, the Most Rev Cherry Vann, has posted the following update on the proposals ...]]>The Archbishop of Wales, the Most Rev Cherry Vann, has posted the following updateon the proposals for an Interim Bishop of Bangor[1].
Interim Bishop of Bangor: Message from the Archbishop of Wales
Dear friends,
Today, we have held interviews of an Interim Bishop of Bangor. I am very grateful for all those, from the diocese and the province, who have been involved in this discernment process.
Any process of discernment has to be open to an outcome that it is not right to proceed in the way we hoped. This is what has happened on this occasion and so we will not be proceeding with the appointment of an interim bishop.
Instead, I am going to ask the Governing Body’s Standing Committee to recommence the electoral college process.
The diocese remains in my prayers.
Archbishop Cherry
[1]. On 25 November, the Governing Body of the Church in Wales agreed time-limited constitutional changes that would allow an interim Bishop to be appointed to the Diocese of Bangor.
]]>2026-02-28T12:55:56+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-28T12:55:56+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-28:/281150Ecclesiastical court judgments – FebruaryReview of the ecclesiastical court judgments during February 2026
Summaries to the four consistory c...]]>Reviewof the ecclesiastical court judgments during February 2026
Summaries to the four consistory court judgments reviewed during February 2026 are listed below, with links to the L&RUK review. These included [*]:
Re St. Nicholas Bradfield [2026] ECC She 1 The Petitioners from St Nicholas, High Bradfield, a Grade I listed medieval church, sought permission to install a new kitchen, servery, accessible toilets, and a shallow access ramp on the north side of the building [1,2]. The works, planned over several years, aimed to replace inadequate and outdated facilities. The current kitchen was cramped and unsuitable, and the church had no internal lavatory; the only permanent toilet was down a steep and slippery cobbled lane and not owned by the church. A temporary Portaloo was in place, but was inappropriate for regular use, especially for elderly or those with disabilities. These shortcomings hindered worship, mission, and community events, including the well-attended annual music festival [5] to [6].
Consultation with amenity societies raised no objections [8]. The Church Buildings Council supported the scheme but insisted on replacing proposed Karndene flooring with engineered oak, a change the petitioners accepted [9]. Planning permission and building regulations approval have been granted, and public notices produced no objections. Applying the Duffield framework, the Chancellor found that any harm to the church’s significance was minimal, the need compelling, and the benefits substantial. A faculty was therefore granted, subject to a proviso in respect of the flooring. [Re St. Nicholas Bradfield [2026] ECC She 1] [Top of section] [Top of post].
Re St. Kenelm Minster Lovell [2026] ECC Oxf 2 The Chancellor considered a faculty petition for internal works at the Grade I listed church of St Kenelm, Minster Lovell. In the absence of an incumbent, the petition was brought by the two churchwardens, Brenda Bennett and Judith Warwick (who also serve as the PCC Treasurer and Secretary respectively) and a third member of the PCC, the Rt Hon Jack Straw. [2]. The proposals included: re-ordering the north transept to create a WC, servery and heritage/interpretation space; removing and adapting some mid-19th-century pews; installing a ramped accessible route (with possible removable handrails); relocating the war memorial; and creating a new accessible external path to the south door [2,3]. The church is described in [4] and [5], with photographs on pp 26 to 36 of the judgment.
The DAC consulted Historic England [10] who did not wish to offer any comments on the proposals and Historic Buildings & Places (HBP), (the working name of the Ancient Monuments Society) [11], the Church Buildings Council (the CBC) [12], and The Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB) [16]. Although the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB) objected—mainly to pew removal, handrails in the crossing, and the handling of damp—the DAC ultimately did not object, subject to extensive conditions.
Applying the Duffield test for listed churches, the Chancellor accepted that there would be some harm to the church’s significance, particularly from the loss and relocation of pews and visual intrusion, but found it limited and justified. The public benefits – improved accessibility, welcome, facilities for visitors and worshippers, heritage interpretation, and the long-term viability and mission of the church – were clear and convincing and outweighed the harm. [42] to [45].
Being satisfied that some, albeit modest, degree of harm would be caused by the parish’s proposals for the reordering of the north transept [53], the Chancellor considered the fourth of the Duffield questions, and was “entirely satisfied that the
petitioners [had] established a clear and convincing need, and justification, for these proposals if St Kenelm is to improve its connection with, and fulfil its evangelical potential as a place of welcome, and education, for the very many visitors to the neighbouring Minster Lovell Hall who do not currently choose to enter the church, and thereby provide the financial support required to continue the thousand-year Christian presence in Minster Lovell [54].
Re St. John the Baptist Tideswell [2025] ECC Der 2 The petitioners wished to replace the gas boilers at the Grade I listed church with new gas boilers. The existing gas boilers had been damaged by flooding. An initial request for like-for-like replacement was delayed because it failed to demonstrate “due regard” to the Church of England’s Net Zero Carbon guidance, which is mandatory under the Faculty Jurisdiction Rules. After criticism from the Diocesan Advisory Committee (DAC), the petitioners produced a detailed revised options appraisal assessing a wide range of low-carbon heating solutions. The appraisal concluded that a fully electric system was currently impractical due to inadequate electricity supply and cost, but proposed a phased approach: short-term replacement of gas boilers, followed by medium-term integration of air source heat pumps, and longer-term carbon offsetting. The Chancellor held that the petitioners had now properly engaged with the Net Zero guidance and that immediate heating was necessary for the church’s mission and community use. A faculty was therefore granted, but only on strict conditions: the new gas boilers must be hydrogen-ready, supplied on a green tariff, subject to carbon offsetting, and approved for a limited period of five years to 2030, during which progress towards low-carbon alternatives must be demonstrated. [Re St. John the Baptist Tideswell [2025] ECC Der 2] [Top of post]
Exhumation
Other
Re St. Peter Aubourn [2026] ECC Lin 1 The petitioner sought to have the cremated remains of her husband exhumed and reinterred elsewhere in the churchyard, as the area where the remains were interred had become waterlogged and made access difficult. The cremated remains were interred in September 2023. The problem that had arisen was that the area where cremated remains are interred became heavily waterlogged over a lengthy period making it difficult to attend this grave. Bishop Ch. had given judgement for a Faculty in another exhumation application in the same cremated remains area for the same reason, Re St. Peter Aubourn [2024] ECC Lin 1.
It was proposed that the interred remains, which were in a cardboard container, would be exhumed and reinterred in a new cremated remains plot in the churchyard at a higher elevation. It is near the footpath which will also make it easier to visit the graves. The undertaker also states that removal of the ashes is possible [2].
The Chancellor commented:
“[9]. This is a case in which it was plainly a mistake to have cremated remains interred in a place that was to become so waterlogged so soon after the interment when immediate family members are likely to want to visit, and who are now prevented from visiting.
[…]
[12]. The new grave will require a new flat memorial set flush with the ground to the prescribed dimensions in conformity with the Churchyard Regulations. All new interments in the new cremated remains area will have the same style of memorial. This is so that the churchyard can be easily maintained and also contributes to a sense of harmony in the churchyard. I note that the Petitioner’s expectation from her application is that the existing memorial will simply be lifted and reinstalled in the new position.
If it is not flat and is not flush with the ground and to the same size as other memorials in that cremated remains area, then I am minded to direct that it will have to be replaced by a new memorial.
[13]. … if having spoken to the Rural Dean or the Vice Chair, the Petitioner remains concerned about this I will of course hear any further representation she may want to make to me about this. I would also in those circumstances be assisted by having the views of the Rural Dean and some more photographs of the new cremated remains area. I will then rule on that issue
definitively.
[14]. However, subject to that the Faculty for the exhumation and reinterment is granted.
Burial Act 1853 (Notice): Order giving notice of the discontinuance of burials in: St Mary’s Church (Annex) Churchyard, Chithurst, West Sussex ; St Paul’s Church Churchyard (Extension), Coven, Wolverhampton, West Midlands; All Saints Churchyard, Elsham, Brigg, North Lincolnshire.
Burial Act 1853 (Final) Order prohibiting further burials in: St John the Baptist Churchyard, Hammerwich, Burntwood, Staffordshire; St Thomas Becket Church Churchyard, Bridford, Exeter, Devon; and St Mary’s Churchyard, Thundridge, Hertfordshire.
CDM Decisions and Safeguarding
Written determinations of disciplinary tribunals hearing complaints brought under the CDM, together with any decisions on penalty are published by the Church of England; included are judgments from the Arches Court of Canterbury and the Chancery Court of York where determinations have been appealed. The majority of complaints that are made under the CDM are resolved by the bishop, archbishop, or President of Tribunals, without having to convene a tribunal.
Name: The Revd DEAN RAYMOND EDWARD HALL Diocese: Worcester Date imposed: 12th January 2026 Relevant CDM section: 16(1) Statutory Ground of Misconduct: 8(1)(d) = Conduct unbecoming & inappropriate to the office & work of a clerk in Holy Orders Penalty: Removal from Office and prohibition from ministry for a period of 5 years (with effect from 1st February 2026)
Name: The Revd SION AWEN MIHANGEL HUGHES CAREW Diocese: Lincoln Date imposed: 25th January 2026 Relevant CDM section: 16(1) Statutory Ground of Misconduct: 8(1)(d) = Conduct unbecoming & inappropriate to the office & work of a clerk in Holy Orders Penalty: Rebuke and injunction
Name: The Revd EDWARD PHILLIPS-SMITH Diocese: Chelmsford Date imposed: 8th January 2026 Relevant CDM section: 30(1)(a) Statutory Ground of Misconduct: 8(1)(d) = Conduct unbecoming & inappropriate to the office & work of a clerk in Holy Orders Penalty: Prohibition for life
Name: The Revd TIMOTHY BILES Diocese: Salisbury Date imposed: 18th December 2025 Relevant CDM section: 30(1)(a) Statutory Ground of Misconduct: 8(1)(d) Penalty: Prohibition for life
Safeguarding
Anthony Pierce
The Church in Wales has published the findings of a detailed review into the way in which the former Bishop of Swansea and Brecon was appointed to senior church roles in the 1990s despite senior clergy knowing of sexual abuse allegations against him. [Post] [CiW Review].
CFCE Determinations
The dates of the Cathedrals Fabric Commission for England may be found by scrolling down to the bottom of the page Cathedrals Fabric Commission. The programme for 2026 is here and the next meeting will be on Thursday 5 February. Decisions taken on Thursday 11 December 2025 are yet to be reported.
Links to other posts
Recent summaries of specific issues that have been considered in the consistory courts include:
David Tudor Statement: A Bishop’s Disciplinary Tribunal for the Diocese of Southwark which in November upheld a new complaint against David Tudor under the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 has today published its penalty of a lifetime prohibition from ministry. This is the second lifetime prohibition against Tudor. (16 February 2026).
[*] This is an approximate classification based upon the main issues considered by the court. Determinations relating to reordering and building works will often address other aspects of the Petition.
Notes on the conventions used for the navigation between cases reviewed in this post are summarized here.
]]>2026-02-28T08:30:10+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-28T08:30:10+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-26:/281051Emory’s Center for the Study of Law and Religion to Host Summer InstituteFrom July 13 to 26, Emory University’s Center for the Study of Law and Religion will host a residen...]]>From July 13 to 26, Emory University’s Center for the Study of Law and Religion will host a residential summer institute for higher education faculty on the fundamentals of law and religion for humanistic research and teaching. Each day of the institute will feature introductions to key themes in law and religion scholarship, case studies in the field, and panel discussions on texts and methods. Participants will also have the opportunity to workshop a scholarly project in progress with their peers.
The Institute will be led by project co-leads Whittney Barth and Silas Allard of Emory University’s Center for the Study of Law and Religion, with guest faculty drawn from leading institutions in law, religious studies, and history. A full list of faculty is available here.
For more information and application details, visit the official Institute website.
]]>2026-02-26T21:25:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-26T21:25:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-26:/281024Conservative religious views on sexuality and direct discrimination in employment: NgoleIn Ngole v Touchstone Leeds (RELIGION OR BELIEF DISCRIMINATION) [2026] EAT 29, the question before t...]]>InNgole v Touchstone Leeds (RELIGION OR BELIEF DISCRIMINATION)[2026] EAT 29, the question before the Employment Appeal Tribunal was whether the Employment Tribunal had erred in law in its analysis of complaints by Mr Ngole of direct discrimination in employment because of his religious belief in a conservative view of sexuality [1].
Background
Mr Ngole, who holds an MA in Social Work from Sheffield University, applied for the role of discharge mental health support worker at Pinderfields Hospital in Wakefield [6 & 7]. He has firm religious beliefs in marriage as a divinely-instituted lifelong union between one man and one woman, that sexual relationships may only be expressed within a monogamous marriage of one man and one woman, that sex is a biologically immutable, and that it is not possible for a person to change sex/gender [8] – and Touchstone accepted that he held those beliefs [9]. He had been removed from the Sheffield social work course, but was restored after he successfully sued in the Court of Appeal to be reinstated: see R (Ngole) v University of Sheffield[2019] EWCA Civ 1127[16-21].
Touchstone gave him a provisional offer of a job, but when it became aware of the content of his Facebook posts and media report on the outcome of his appeal [22-25] and called him for a second interview [27], after which the offer was withdrawn.
In 2024, an Employment Tribunal ruled that Mr Ngole had been directly discriminated against when the job offer was withdrawn, but rejected his further discrimination claims about the second interview and Touchstone’s final decision not to employ him: we noted the judgment here. He appealed on a series of grounds.
The judgment
At the EAT, Employment Judge Tayler concluded that some of Touchstone’s reasoning might have been problematic, especially where it relied on fears that third parties would discover Mr Ngole’s beliefs; however, it had been lawful for Touchstone to seek reassurance by way of a second interview about how he would treat LGBTQI+ service users:
“On a fair reading of the judgment as a whole … it appears that the Employment Tribunal decided that the reasons for the respondent’s decision to invite the claimant to a second interview were because of the firm views that the claimant had expressed about homosexuality and same-sex marriage in the posts, of which the respondent was aware from reading the Guardian and BBC news stories, and the conclusion that the claimant should demonstrate that he would be able to meet the needs of the respondent’s service users and work with all his colleagues, including by complying with the respondent’s policies. The reference to reputation damage in this context is to the damage that would be caused if the respondent did not support its service users and employees from the LGBTQI+ community” [93].
He concluded, however, that the appeal succeeded in part. Touchstone’s refusal to reinstate the job offer was to be remitted to the Employment Tribunal that had heard the case originally, which
“must analyse each reason, or group of related reasons, for the treatment separately and decide whether, at least in part, the treatment of the claimant was, in reality, because of his religious beliefs as opposed to something properly separable from them that justified the treatment. While there has been a significant passage of time, I expect that the Employment Tribunal will remember the case well, and will be better placed than a newly constituted Employment Tribunal to carry out the necessary analysis” [123].
]]>2026-02-26T13:39:10+00:00Frank Cranmerhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-26T13:39:10+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-26:/281025Anthony Pierce Review publishedThe Church in Wales has today published the findings of a detailed review into the way in which Anth...]]>The Church in Wales has today published the findings of a detailed review into the way in which Anthony Pierce, the former Bishop of Swansea and Brecon, was appointed to senior church roles in the 1990s despite senior clergy knowing of sexual abuse allegations against him. Extracts from the Press Release are reproduced below.
Anthony Pierce Review Published
Provincial news Posted: 26 February 2026
The Church in Wales has published the findings of a detailed review into the way in which Anthony Pierce, the former Bishop of Swansea and Brecon, was appointed to senior church roles in the 1990s despite senior clergy knowing of sexual abuse allegations against him.
Mr Pierce, who was Bishop between 1999 and 2008, was jailed for four years in March last year after admitting separate sexual offences against a boy aged under 16, committed between 1985 and 1990, when he was a parish priest in the West Cross area of Swansea.
When those offences were admitted in 2025, the Church in Wales reviewed how issues relating to Mr Pierce had been handled in the past and found that senior clergy had apparently been aware of sexual abuse allegations against him when he was appointed Archdeacon in 1995 and then Bishop of Swansea and Brecon in 1999. These allegations were not reported to the police until 2010. As a result, the Church appointed Gabrielle Higgins to carry out a review which has now been published.
While the review was being prepared, the Church in Wales has also taken forward a referral to its Disciplinary Tribunal. As a result of the Tribunal’s findings, the Bishop of Swansea and Brecon, the Rt Revd John Lomas, has deposed Mr Pierce from holy orders and he is no longer a priest of the Church in Wales. The decision can be viewed here.
[…]
Anyone with safeguarding concerns to contact a member of our team via the Church in Wales website:
Alternatively, Safe Spaces is a free and independent support service, providing a confidential, personal and safe space for anyone who has been abused through their relationship with either the Church of England, the Catholic Church in England and Wales or the Church in Wales. You can contact the Safe Spaces team by:
Tel: 0300 303 1056 (answerphone available outside of opening times)
Email: safespaces@firstlight.org.uk
Anyone with concerns or information about this case should contact South Wales Police on 101.
Update: 3 March 2026 at 11:22. On 2 March 2026, Nation Cymru reported that a former Archbishop of Wales had lost the right to officiate at church services (PTO) following the abuse report.
]]>2026-02-26T13:36:16+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-26T13:36:16+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-26:/281007Valero Estarellas on State-Hired Religion TeachersLast November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consorti...]]>
Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. María-José Valero Estarellas (Universidad Villanueva) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here.
A Question That Looks Small — But Isn’t
It is not uncommon that an employment dispute quickly becomes a constitutional stress test. This is exactly what happens in many European and Latin American countries when the State hires teachers to provide denominational religious instruction inside public schools. These teachers stand in a legally unusual place: they are paid by public funds and formally linked to the State through an employment contract, yet their ability to teach depends on ecclesiastical approval and, often, on a heightened “duty of loyalty” that reaches beyond the workplace. This dual status—public employee and religious representative—creates recurring conflict between church autonomy, state neutrality, and the individual rights of teachers.
In the background sits a simple question with complicated consequences: who gets to decide whether a particular person can credibly teach a faith? Religious communities argue that credibility is inseparable from doctrine and conduct. Teachers, not infrequently laypersons, point to privacy, family life, expression, and anti-discrimination guarantees. Public authorities, acting as employers, must decide whether they are merely implementing a religious decision or whether they are responsible for it in the language of fundamental rights.
The different major judicial models that are shaping the field have provided different approaches and solutions: the U.S. ministerial exception, the European Court of Human Rights’ balancing method, the Court of Justice of the European Union’s equality-driven review, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ delegation logic. The through-line is the Stat’s duty of denominational neutrality: what courts say it means, what proportionality requires them to do, and why those two can collide.
The structural tension: “dual status” work in a public institution
Denominational religious education within public schools is common in many national systems. The arrangement appears straightforward: the State provides the institutional and employment framework; the religious community determines who is qualified to teach its faith; and students (or their parents) choose whether to participate. Legally, however, the model is hybrid.
Religion teachers are typically employed under public contracts, yet access to the post depends on a religious “gateway” condition. Churches or other faith communities issue certificates of suitability—such as the missio canonica—and may withdraw them when a teacher is deemed no longer to meet doctrinal or moral expectations. That withdrawal may trigger termination or non-renewal of the public contract. While this may resemble an ordinary labor decision in form, in substance it reflects an ecclesiastical judgment about morality, representation, credibility, and trust.
From a constitutional perspective, this tension is inseparable from the scope of religious freedom itself. The right to freedom of religion, as protected in international human rights law, entails the correlative right to the autonomy of religious communities. That autonomy extends beyond institutional independence to include the authority to define doctrine, articulate duties of loyalty, and determine how closely a particular function is connected to the core of the community’s religious or evangelizing mission. These are internal determinations, grounded in the community’s self-understanding as a body of belief.
This is why such cases are particularly difficult. A court cannot treat a religion teacher in a public school as it would any other civil servant, because the teacher’s function is explicitly religious: it involves transmitting a faith tradition as true, not teaching about religion from a neutral, historical, or sociological perspective. The legal question, therefore, is not merely whether the teacher was treated fairly under ordinary employment standards, but whether courts may legitimately second-guess an ecclesiastical decision about representation and credibility without turning the State into an arbiter of religious identity—precisely the role that the principle of state neutrality is meant to preclude.
The U.S. model: a clear jurisdictional boundary
In the United States, these questions are largely settled for two reasons linked to constitutional design. First, there are no public schools that provide confessional religious instruction in the way found elsewhere; public education is expected to remain secular under prevailing Establishment Clause doctrine. Second, U.S. law recognizes a robust “ministerial exception.”
The ministerial exception exempts certain religious organizations’ employment decisions from civil judicial review when the employee performs important religious functions. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (2012) and Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (2020) reaffirmed and broadened this principle, emphasizing that the relevant question is function, not formal ordination. When a teacher’s role includes transmitting faith and forming students religiously, courts generally may not override a church’s decision to hire, retain, or dismiss.
This is not a “balancing test.” It is a boundary rule. The point is not that individual rights do not matter, but that civil courts are institutionally barred from adjudicating certain disputes because doing so would require them to evaluate religious reasons. In this model, neutrality is best protected by non-interference: the State does not decide whether the church’s reasons are good enough.
Strasbourg’s path: from deference to balancing
Europe has taken a different path. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) approaches church–employee disputes through a balancing of competing rights. Early case law tended to be deferential. The ECtHR accepted that States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in regulating relations between religious institutions and civil authorities. Within that framework, domestic courts could limit their review to procedural safeguards—checking, for example, that basic fairness was respected—without reviewing the religious motives behind the decision.
The shift came with the twin judgments Obst v. Germany and Schüth v. Germany in 2010. In those cases, the Court made clear that domestic judges should not simply defer. Instead, they must weigh, in concrete terms, the individual’s rights (often privacy and family life) against the church’s institutional autonomy. This new approach treated church autonomy as an important interest, but not an automatic trump card.
The Grand Chamber refined the method in Fernández Martínez v. Spain (2014), a case that resonates strongly with the topic of religion teachers in public schools. Fernández Martínez, a former Catholic priest, taught religion in a Spanish public school. After marrying and fathering children, and after publicly opposing Catholic doctrine, the bishop refused to renew his authorization. Because authorization was a condition of the teaching post, the State did not renew the employment contract. He claimed violations of privacy and non-discrimination. The Grand Chamber found no violation, emphasizing that Spain had appropriately balanced the competing interests and respected the Church’s autonomy.
The Court later consolidated the approach in Travaš v. Croatia (2016), involving a Catholic religion teacher whose authorization was withdrawn after he remarried following a civil divorce, contrary to Church doctrine. Again, the public contract ended. Again, the Court found no violation, holding that the domestic authorities had struck a permissible balance.
On the surface, these outcomes might reassure religious communities: the ECtHR sometimes upholds dismissals. The deeper story, however, is methodological. In making the decision depend on proportionality, Strasbourg invites national judges to look into the “reasons” behind an ecclesiastical judgment.
Neutrality and the proportionality trap
Here is where neutrality becomes the key theme. The ECtHR repeatedly says that state neutrality precludes public authorities from assessing the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the coherence of ecclesiastical doctrines. Neutrality, in this sense, draws a red line: the State may not act as theologian.
Yet proportionality review makes it difficult to honor that red line. To assess whether an interference with a teacher’s private life is proportionate, a judge must ask whether the church’s concern is serious enough, whether the teacher’s conduct truly harms the church’s credibility, and whether the employee’s role is close enough to the religious mission to justify a stricter duty of loyalty. These questions are not purely procedural. They require a court to evaluate how much weight a religious norm should carry in each given situation.
The Court attempts to manage the tension by framing its analysis as contextual rather than doctrinal. Judges are not asked whether a doctrine is “true,” but whether the application of the doctrine to the employee’s case is reasonable and proportionate. The problem is that reasonableness is itself a substantive standard. Once a court declares that a religious reason is not “relevant and sufficient,” or that it does not justify a loyalty expectation, it is necessarily making a judgment about internal religious criteria.
That is why one can describe proportionality as a neutrality trap. Neutrality begins as a promise not to judge faith. Proportionality ends by requiring courts to judge how faith-based reasons should translate into civil consequences. The line between oversight and intrusion becomes blurry. What was meant to be a shield against interference risks turning into a tool for intervention.
This risk is particularly acute for religion teachers in public schools because the State is the employer. A judge may feel compelled to scrutinize the church’s decision more closely, reasoning that public employment should not hinge on unreviewable religious determinations. But that instinct places secular courts in the uncomfortable position of evaluating ecclesiastical rationales to decide whether the State should enforce them.
Luxembourg’s contribution: equality law and effective judicial review
A parallel development appears in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Although the CJEU’s cases often involve religious organizations as employers rather than the State as employer, the underlying move is similar: religious reasons are subjected to intensive judicial review under anti-discrimination law and Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.
In Vera Egenberger (2018), a non-confessional applicant was excluded from a post advertised by a Protestant welfare organization because she was not Protestant. The CJEU held that national judges must verify whether the religious requirement is objectively justified by the nature or context of the work and is directly related to the organization’s ethos. In IR v. JQ (2018), involving a Catholic hospital director dismissed after remarrying civilly, the CJEU stressed that differences of treatment must be assessed under the Directive’s framework and that courts must be able to review whether the requirement is essential, legitimate, and justified.
These rulings interpret Article 4(2) of Directive 2000/78, which permits differences of treatment in religious employment when religion constitutes an “essential, legitimate and justified occupational requirement” consistent with the organization’s ethos. The CJEU reads this exception narrowly. It insists on “effective judicial review,” meaning that courts must not simply accept the employer’s characterization of its ethos and requirements. They must test it.
Again, the rhetoric is equality, not theology. But the operational effect is similar: secular judges must decide how closely a particular job is linked to a mission and whether a loyalty expectation is genuinely required. The interpretive authority shifts from the religious body to the court. Neutrality is reframed from non-interference into oversight in the name of non-discrimination.
The Inter-American twist: delegation and state responsibility
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) adds a further layer by foregrounding the State’s responsibility when ecclesiastical decisions affect public employment. In Pávez Pávez v. Chile (2022), the IACtHR held that when a State allows church authorities to issue and withdraw certificates of suitability for religion teachers in public schools, the State effectively delegates a public function. Consequently, the State must ensure adequate safeguards against discriminatory decisions.
The IACtHR’s reasoning introduces a differentiated approach between religion teachers in public institutions and those working in private ones. The public setting changes the analysis because the State is involved, directly or indirectly, in implementing the religious decision. The result is a stronger push toward procedural and substantive safeguards, and thus toward increased judicial review.
So what should “neutrality” mean in a pluralist democracy?
At this point, the debate becomes less about one teacher and more about constitutional architecture. Is it compatible with pluralist democracy for courts to review the coherence of religious doctrines or moral expectations under the guise of equality law? Can judges realistically assess whether a religious motive is “reasonable” without substituting secular reasoning for the community’s own understanding of faith and mission?
The European model tends to answer these questions with the tools it knows best: proportionality, balancing, and context. Those tools have virtues. They take individual rights seriously. They avoid categorical immunities. They offer a way to explain outcomes with reasons rather than with jurisdictional bars.
But the same tools carry predictable costs. Once courts are required to evaluate the centrality of a belief, the seriousness of a moral rule, or the proximity of a job to a mission, neutrality stops being a barrier and becomes an invitation. The State, through its judges, becomes a manager of the boundary between the spiritual and the civil, and that management inevitably reflects secular assumptions about what religion should be allowed to demand of its representatives.
Why religion teachers are the fault line
Religion teachers in public schools are the place where these tensions are hardest to avoid. The teacher is not merely an employee; the teacher is a transmitter of doctrine. The church is not merely an employer; it is a community of belief that claims authority to define who can represent it. The State is not merely a bystander; it is the contracting party and the institution responsible for education.
That triadic structure makes the disputes unavoidably high-stakes. If courts grant broad deference to churches, teachers may find their public employment contingent on religious judgments with limited civil protection. If courts intensify review, churches may see their internal standards filtered through secular reasonableness tests. Either way, a choice is being made about what neutrality demands.
What judges end up weighing (even when they say they won’t)
In the Strasbourg line of cases, domestic courts are encouraged to look at a familiar set of factors. They ask whether the employee knew, when accepting the job, that loyalty expectations applied; whether the employee’s duties were “close” to the church’s mission; whether the conduct that triggered the conflict was public and likely to affect the church’s credibility; how severe the consequences were for the employee; and whether alternative employment was realistic. These are practical considerations—and they are precisely the kind of things proportionality is designed to capture.
But notice what sits underneath each factor. If a court asks how “close” a teaching post is to a religious mission, it must first describe what the mission is. If it asks whether conduct damages a church’s credibility, it must assess the public meaning of that doctrine. Even when framed as social context, the court’s reasoning necessarily interacts with religious content.
This is why the procedural/substantive distinction matters. Procedural review can check notice, process, and consistent application of civil rules. Substantive review asks whether the religious reason is strong enough. The moment courts take that second step, neutrality is no longer simple abstention; it becomes a contested practice.
Public versus private: should the State’s role change the level of scrutiny?
A recurring argument—especially after Pávez Pávez—is that public employment should trigger heightened protection. If the State pays the salary and controls the post, then it seems troubling if a public contract can be ended by an ecclesiastical decision that the State cannot meaningfully review.
Yet the counterargument is that if the State chooses to offer denominational instruction in public schools, it must accept that the faith community can define who can credibly teach that religion. Otherwise, denominational instruction becomes a hollow label: a confessional course without confessional control. The State cannot have it both ways.
Why this debate matters beyond religion classes
Religion teacher cases may look niche, but the logic reaches further. Democracies often partner with faith-based actors in schools, hospitals, and charities. In many of these settings, a job involves representing a religious ethos while also serving the public. When disputes arise, courts face the same choice: defer to religious self-definition, or apply reasonableness tests that interpret the ethos from the outside.
What is clear is that “neutrality” cannot be a slogan. It must do real work—protecting rights without turning judges into supervisors of religious meaning.
Looking ahead: design choices that reduce conflict
For U.S. readers, these disputes underscore how much institutional design shapes constitutional outcomes. Where public schools do not offer confessional instruction, and where the ministerial exception draws a firm jurisdictional line, courts are largely spared the task of weighing religious reasons against civil standards. In systems that combine public employment with denominational teaching, that line is harder to draw—and neutrality becomes harder to sustain.
The recent trajectory of the European Court of Human Rights is therefore worth watching. Strasbourg has not abandoned balancing, but it has increasingly tried to objectify it. Rather than inviting courts to assess the substance or social plausibility of religious norms, the Court has placed growing emphasis on whether religious communities act in a non-arbitrary, coherent, and intelligible way when enforcing loyalty expectations—especially where those expectations affect access to public employment.
This shift does not amount to a European version of the ministerial exception, nor does it eliminate judicial review. What it does is narrow the field of inquiry. Courts are asked less to evaluate what religious communities believe, and more to verify how their decisions are made and applied. In doing so, some of the pressure placed on the principle of neutrality is relieved: judges can exercise oversight without becoming de facto theologians.
That approach is no panacea. Hard cases remain, particularly when the State itself enforces the consequences of ecclesiastical decisions. Still, it points toward a pragmatic middle ground—one that seeks to contain, rather than resolve, the tension between church autonomy and individual rights. For systems that cannot rely on categorical boundaries, this more disciplined form of review may offer a way to protect both without turning secular courts into arbiters of religious identity.
The balance is fragile, and unfinished. But the direction matters: away from theological second-guessing, and toward judicial restraint grounded in institutional competence rather than abstract neutrality alone.
]]>2026-02-26T12:03:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-26T12:03:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-26:/281008Pagotto on the Relationship Between Religious Teachings and Human RightsLast November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consorti...]]>
Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Tania Pagotto (University of Milan-Bicocca) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here:
Academic religious teachings contrary to human rights standards
The 2025 European Parliament briefing on Academic Freedom reports that academic freedom declined across many European states, with concerning developments in Lithuania, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Hungary, and other traditionally liberal countries. Similar trends emerge in North America, where academics face pressure or negative consequences for expressing controversial views (Seckelmann et al. 2021).
Tensions are common in the context of religious instruction and in the teaching of religious law, when religious doctrines taught in universities conflict with contemporary human-rights standards. For instance, a Canon law professor might note that marriage is a sacred covenant between a man and a woman and that and that homosexual relations contravene natural law. While a Sharia law scholar might teach that Islamic law recognises stoning as a sanction for adultery to protect an alleged public morality.
How can public institutions respond to the teaching of religious doctrines that conflict with human-rights principles?
Academic teaching and research are increasingly regulated considering the pursue “academic justice” (Ragone 2024). Academia, colleges and research institutions aspire to create learning environments free from discrimination, hatred and distress, a safe spaces for learning for the community, including vulnerable groups, marginalised communities, and protected minorities.
Comparable dynamics can be observed also in other fields, such as controversies surrounding dark heritage, monuments or statues tied to colonialism, slavery, and racial inequality. Supporters of the removal of such a dissonant inheritance promote a more inclusive collective memory and public spaces through the elimination of the symbols of oppression and the emergence of “the forgotten history” (Olusoga 2016).
To pursue educational justice and to create a space free from anxiety for everyone, institutions adopted a range of regulatory measures, tools, and initiatives that impact upon individual academic freedom.
Students, university unions, and governing bodies amended certain practices. For instance, with “no-platforming” universities and colleges might deny “unpopular” speakers the opportunity to research or teach at their institutes. A well-known example is the 2008 controversy stemming from Pope Benedict XVI’s invitation to the inauguration of the academic year at Sapienza University of Rome, due to his theological position on Galileo.
Other practices include the use of “gag orders”. Faculty can be prohibited to foster open discussions over sensitive subjects, to prevent embarrassment and feelings of marginalisation among students. Such orders restrict directly religious academic freedom and may produce a chilling effect on scholars. For instance, at the Idaho University, a faculty adviser affiliated with a Christian society was subjected to a gag order injuncted by a Court after a student’s complaint about the biblical explanation of marriage.
Distinctions to be made: blasphemy laws and memory laws
At first glance, the legal issues surrounding religious academic freedom may appear to resonate with the restrictions on blasphemous speech adopted to safeguard respect for the religious convictions of believers (Temperman and Koltay 2017).
A further parallel can be drawn with European memory laws, whereby state authorities regulate public discussion of certain historical events, most notably, traumatic episodes in a nation’s past (Belavusau and Gliszczyńska-Grabias 2017).
Blasphemy laws and memory laws restrict free speech to protect the dignity of believers, on the one hand, and of victims and their families, on the other hand. They limit religious hatred speeches and expressions denying past atrocities or glorifying them to prevent today offences and to preserve collective memory. Both laws divide public opinion: either people advocate for restraints on offensive expression, or they defend the free exercise of opinion and speech.
The context of religious academic freedom, however, calls for important distinctions to be drawn. The rationale grounding academic research and academic teaching, in fact, operates within distinct realms when compared to that of blasphemy laws or memory laws.
Religious academic freedom of research is pivotal because of the features of the “soft sciences” themselves. Opposing views and disagreement are “the shoulders of giants” through which scholarship advances. Above all, limiting religious academic freedom of teaching would weaken not only the autonomy of schools and colleges, but also their the educational mission, acting as an intellectual gymnasium for future citizens (Ragone 2025).
Religious academic freedom and dissent on campus
While human rights and fundamental freedoms change over time to reach new (hopefully higher) levels of protection, religious doctrines will always preserve their eternal truths. This inherent and unremovable tension suggests that questions surrounding religious academic teaching and research will probably become increasingly contentious in the near and far future.
Given the particular nature and research methodology of human sciences, removing religious teachings altogether or pressing religious schools to change the curriculum they offer may not constitute the most adequate response by the States and governments to such a delicate challenge.
From this perspective, restricting the dissemination of contentious religious teachings should be approached with utmost caution. Gagging and no-platforming methods not only constitute direct prohibitions but also operate in a preventive way, with the outcome of denying in advance any exercise of free speech by and with the learning community.
By contrast, procedures that alert the audience to possibly sensitive content, without censoring it, are a less intrusive means of minimizing distress for students while guaranteeing academic freedom. One example is the use of trigger warnings issued before teaching doctrines in conflict with contemporary understandings of rights, liberties, and democratic values.
However, neither trigger warnings are infallible nor uncontroversial. On one side, backlash may arise because the trigger warning itself is perceived as stigmatizing religious expression; on the other side, complaints may be brought when, notwithstanding the trigger warning, the alert is regarded as insufficient.
Greater pluralism means stronger pluralism
The strength of all these measures lies in their intender aim: although imperfect, they try to reconcile academic freedom of individuals and schools’ autonomy with the pursuit of academic and educational justice.
Their weakness, however, may eclipse this virtue, since all of them are difficult to reconcile with the enduring presumption that greater pluralism fosters stronger pluralism. This intuition has been extended by scholars application even to the sensitive domains of dark heritage and dissonant cultural site, such as the permanence of racist monuments in public spaces (Lixinski 2017, 153).
Teaching religious doctrines dissonant with contemporary understanding of human rights and democratic standards should not be limited by virtue of the content (what academics teach). In fact, it would be incongruous to limit academics in the enjoyment of their free speech rights in a place where free ideas always flourished, while ordinary citizens would be permitted to express contentious opinions in the public sphere (Darian-Smith 2025).
Should any obligation be imposed upon the academic religious teachings, it should at most be limited to the responsibility to present opposing scholarly views and interpretations whenever a sensitive or contested topic arises while lecturing.
Limiting any religious teachings contrary to human rights standards would undermine the mission of universities and schools. But discussing and facing the coexistence of irreconcilable religious perspectives would strengthen democracy and cultivate critical engagement.
]]>2026-02-26T12:02:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-26T12:02:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-26:/281009Moreno Soler on Funding for Single-Sex Religious SchoolsLast November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consorti...]]>
Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Víctor Moreno Soler (University of Valencia) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here.
I. Introductory remarks
The debate surrounding single-sex education (SSE) raises a fundamental question: Does SSE deliver developmental benefits and encourage women to enter nontraditional fields, or does it allow gender stereotypes to go unchallenged?[i] This issue reflects a complex negotiation between three core principles: parental rights, understood as the freedom to choose the educational model that best aligns with family values; institutional freedom, referring to the autonomy of the center to define their pedagogical identity; and the public interest, which upholds the principles of equality and non-discrimination, as well as the best interests of the child.
It is important to emphasize that single-sex schools are not necessarily religious, and religious schools are not necessarily single-sex. A wide variety of institutional models and rationales exist behind the provision of SSE, ranging from pedagogical theories to cultural or religious convictions.
Some scholars argue that SSE is based on the premise that men and women differ biologically, psychologically, and developmentally. From this perspective, SSE is not merely a pedagogical model, but a response to those differences aimed at improving educational outcomes. Others, however, contend that such schools may not provide the most conducive environments for girls’ social and academic development and might risk reinforcing gender stereotypes or traditional gender roles.
The purpose of this analysis is not to determine whether single-sex education is pedagogically desirable. Instead, it is to consider the extent to which schools adopting this model may claim access to public funding.
II. International Regulatory Framework
At the international level, there are key instruments that address single-sex education, establishing its legality provided that equivalence criteria are met.
1. The 1960 UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education.
This Convention is the first binding international legal instrument dedicated entirely to the right to education. It plays a pivotal role in legitimizing single-sex education, provided certain conditions are met.
First, it explicitly states that the establishment or maintenance of separate educational systems or institutions for male and female students shall not be considered discriminatory.
It then sets out the criteria for compliance: institutions must offer equivalent access to education, employ teaching staff with qualifications of the same standard, ensure school premises and equipment of comparable quality, and provide students with the opportunity to pursue the same or equivalent courses of study (Article 2.a of the 1960 UNESCO Convention).
Another distinct issue — the one directly at stake here — is the question of whether this SSE may claim a right to state funding. This Convention does not provide any guidance on this matter, as none of its provisions addresses the public funding of single-sex education.
2. The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
This Convention does not prohibit single-sex education, even though it appears to promote coeducation. In fact, it encourages “coeducation and other types of education which will help to achieve this aim (the elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women).” (Article 10.c).
We must ask whether single-sex education inherently reflects or reinforces stereotyped conceptions of the roles of men and women. Regardless of the model, CEDAW establishes that States Parties are obligated to take all appropriate measures to ensure equal conditions for access to education—including access to curricula, examinations, teaching staff, equipment, and scholarship opportunities.
These requirements apply to all educational settings, including single-sex institutions, which could demonstrate that their institution does not compromise necessarily gender equality in substance or outcomes.
Here again, no provision addresses the issue of public funding for single-sex education. Each State remains free to decide whether it wishes to finance SSE or to withhold such funding.
III. National Framework
The situation of single-sex education varies significantly from one country to another, each presenting its own particularities. It would neither be feasible nor appropriate to examine all existing systems in detail. Therefore, this analysis will focus specifically on the cases of the United States and Spain. The former has been presented as one of the most prominent examples of a country with single-sex education; however, the actual scope for implementing SSE in public schools depends on the interplay between federal regulations, judicial interpretation, and state-level education policies. The latter has undergone two major educational reforms in the past decade—both of which addressed the issue of SSE—prompting the Spanish Constitutional Court to take a position on the constitutionality of public funding for such models.
1. United States
A. Regulation
Historically, the 1972 Title IX federal law prohibited sex discrimination in publicly funded educational programs, leading many public schools to transition to coeducational models. This framework changed with the enactment of the Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001/2002, which relaxed Title IX’s implementing regulations and allowed public school districts to establish single-sex classes or schools if they considered such programs to be “in the best interest of their students”. This flexibility was intended to allow for innovative programs aimed at improving student performance.
However, it was not until 2006 that the U.S. Department of Education established strict requirements for public schools implementing single-sex education programs, primarily focused on ensuring non-discrimination and parental freedom. These regulations established three key safeguards:
Voluntary enrollment: Participation in single-sex school must be absolute and completely voluntary for parents and students. They must receive clear information about the program and give explicit consent. Thus, their silence or passivity cannot be interpreted as acceptance.
Substantial equality and alternative offerings: If a school district offers a single-sex school or class, it must provide a substantially equal coeducational alternative in the same subject or activity. This equality is assessed by factors including, but not limited to, admission criteria, curriculum, facilities, and staff qualifications, and disciplinary policies.
Educational justification: Implementation must be based on a “reasonable motive” that justifies the program, such as the need for academic improvements due to high failure rates or discipline problems, and must be periodically evaluated.
Although these regulations remain formally in force, recent federal case law has raised significant obstacles to the practical implementation of SSE in public schools, as illustrated by Doe v. Vermilion Parish School Board (2011), and A.N.A. v. Breckinridge County Board of Education (2012). Thus, while the regulatory framework is permissive in theory, the scope for implementing public SSE has become increasingly limited in practice.
B. Exception for religious schools
Religious schools that receive federal funds are generally subject to Title IX unless they claim a religious exemption. Under 34 CFR § 106.12, a religious organization may request exemption from provisions of Title IX if compliance would conflict with its religious tenets. This exception requires two conditions: (1) the institution must be controlled by a religious organization; and (2) the challenged requirement must be inconsistent with its religious doctrine. This includes rules on sex-based separation.
Nevertheless, this exemption applies only to Title IX. Religious schools remain subject to state laws, many of which impose stricter anti-discrimination requirements or exclude SSE from eligibility for public funding. Therefore, a religious school may be exempt from federal obligation but still barred from offering SSE if state law conditions public funding on coeducation. In that case, it could legally operate, but it would not be entitled to public funding.
2. Spain
The central legal controversy in Spain has consistently focused on whether SSE schools should receive public funding (concerts), rather than the absolute legality of the model itself, which is generally uncontested in the private sphere.
For decades in Spain, the permissibility of SSE was derived from the lack of explicit prohibition in early educational laws and the interpretation that coeducation was a means – though not the only means – to promote the elimination of gender inequality.
In 2013 the Parliament passed a law which explicitly stated that SSE did not constitute discrimination – if UNESCO 1960 criteria were met – and prohibited unfavorable treatment in the granting of concerts. The Spanish Constitutional Court (SCC), subsequently confirmed that if the pedagogical model is constitutional, it cannot be excluded from public funding in conditions of equality (Decision 31/2018).
However, in 2020, the Spanish Parliament enacted a new law that prohibited public funding for single-sex education (SSE) centers that separate students by gender. In its Decision 34/2023, the SCC validated this refusal of public funding to SSE schools, since it affirmed that the denial of financing constitutes a “legitimate political option” of the legislature. The legislator has an ample margin of discretion to decide which educational models to support, and the denial of funds is seen as consistent with the State’s duty to remove obstacles to real equality (Art. 9.2 Spanish Constitution, SC).
Therefore, it could be said that the question of whether to permit or exclude public funding for SSE ultimately depends on the policy direction chosen by the ordinary legislator. It should also be noted that regional authorities cannot go beyond the framework established by the national legislation, and the last two national education reforms illustrate this clearly: they neither allowed regions to bar funding for SSE when it was guaranteed nor to permit it when the national law prohibited it.
In Spain, the legislation does not establish any exceptions for religious schools, so the same framework applies uniformly.
IV. Some Questions
Does separating students by sex inherently violate principles of gender equality, or can it be justified pedagogically and legally under certain conditions?
How should states assess whether single-sex schooling promotes or undermines inclusion and equal opportunity?
Is the freedom to choose single-sex education part of the broader right to educational freedom protected under constitutional or international law?
If a state chooses not to fund single-sex education, does it violate parental rights or principles of educational pluralism?
Should the legal assessment of public funding for SSE differ when the provider is a religious institution?
[i] Rose, L., Pierce, M., Dale, J., Miller, I. and Zong, L. (2023). Single-Sex Education. The Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law, 24 (2), 787-809.
]]>2026-02-26T12:01:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-26T12:01:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-25:/280946Martínez-Torrón on Public and Private EducationLast November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consorti...]]>
Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Javier Martínez Torrón, (Universidad Complutense), submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here:
Introductory note on conceptual issues: public and private education
I. A frequent confusion
When the issue of education is addressed in academic circles, in the political discourse, or even in the context of colloquial conversations, it is usual to make an essential distinction between public schools and private schools1. Often, the dichotomy public and private schools is presented as implying that there is some sort of opposition between those two types of schools, not only with regard to their nature but also the goals and interests they pursue, as if they were different or even diverging.
The terminology “public and private schools” may be confusing in a way that can affect the approach to the issue of public funding of schools, as well as some other aspects of the basic notions about education and the educational system. For that reason, I think it would be important to clarify some points about the nature of education and the State’s role in it.
Two ideas — sometimes forgotten — seem particularly significant to me. First, the education offered by the national educational system is always public to some extent; irrespective of which schools provide it, education is a public service that concerns the entire society. Second, the term “public” should not be understood as synonymous with “State owned” or “State managed”; public implies the notion that something should be controlled by society, and society is not equivalent to the State or State authorities.
For those reasons, it has been often suggested that a more precise terminology would be “schools managed by the State” and “schools managed by private institutions”. In my opinion, thereis no problem in using the usual terminology — public and private schools — provided that we know what we mean by those terms and we do not incur confusion.
Let us see some of the consequences of the above remarks.
II. Public funding of private schools: a matter of quality and equality
Some of those consequences regard private schools. If we conceive education as a public service, the fact that a school is owned or run by a private institution — religious or not — does not give that school carte blanche to do whatever it wants. Private schools do not have an unrestricted right to teach anything, or to choose what not to teach, or to organize the school system and environment. They certainly have the right to their own ethos, and to have that ethos permeating the entire school system and practices; this will necessarily have an impact on issues such as the teaching program and textbooks, as well as the admission of students and the recruitment teachers. But private schools also have a responsibility towards society, and therefore they have accountability. Such responsibility and accountability are in connection with the role of State authorities, which are competent to regulate education and to design the educational system, both for public and private schools. This, however, does not give in turn State authorities a limitless power in the area of education. I will return to this point later.
From this perspective, it is difficult to understand why there should be any constitutional or legal problem in allocating public funds for the maintenance and functioning of private schools, including those with a religious ethos. They provide the same public service as public schools; they just do it in a different way. The school ownership or management do not change the nature of the service provided. The purpose of public funding is to guarantee that the public service of education is provided with the quality that society expects from it, and that all citizens have equal access to such public service. Again: the notion of public money does not imply that the State is the owner of it; the State is just its administrator, an agent of society.
Quality and equality should be the main points of reference in this area. Who is the owner or manager of a school should be secondary, or even irrelevant. Except for some extreme political positions, these notions are normally understood in European countries, most of which have a tradition of funding private schools (i.e., schools run by institutions other than the State) with public money, under certain conditions. In the US, the situation is less clear, due to some Supreme Court judgments declaring unconstitutional, as contrary to the establishment clause, the use of public money to support religious schools2. Even though the trend in the Supreme Court has gone in the opposite direction for a few years, in some US legal and political circles there is still some belief — as a sort of dogma — in the unconstitutionality of devoting any public money to private schools, especially if they are religious. Such approach, in my view, goes against the rights of parents to decide on the religious and moral orientation of their children’s education, as well as against the principle of equality — why should religious schools be discriminated with regard to other schools (public or private) when they provide the same service and have been freely chosen by parents?
One of the issues often raised when discussing the public funding of religious schools is that of the State’s religious neutrality — if the State is not supposed to support any particular religion, or even religion in general over non-religion, it should not give money to religious schools, as this would be a way to support religion. However, this argument forgets that the fact that the State itself is religiously neutral does not mean that neutrality has to be a characteristic of each and every institution providing a public service. Religious neutrality is a feature — and a duty — of the State but not of the public service itself, including education. What States must guarantee, as a consequence of their religious neutrality, is that no citizen is prevented from receiving such public service because of his religion or belief, and that no parent is obliged to accept for his children a type of education that is in violation of his religious or philosophical beliefs.
III. The limited competences of governments on education, especially when values are concerned
Some other consequences of my two initial statements relate to the conception of the State’s role in education. On the one hand, it is society, not just the State authorities, who is responsible for public schools. Therefore, it is important that, when managing public schools, State authorities act in consultation with the civil society, especially the students’ parents and other members of the school community.
On the other hand, from a more general perspective, such consultation should be a characteristic of all government’s action in the area of education, once we assume that the State’s role in education is limited. As indicated above, State authorities do not have a limitless power over the educational system. Indeed, this point, in my opinion, has not been sufficiently addressed in international documents, which seem too deferent to the self-understanding that national States have of their role and competences in the realm of education. Thus, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights, when dealing with the right to education and parent’s rights with regard to their children’s education, refers to “any functions” that States assume “in relation to education and to teaching”; there is no indication that no one but the States themselves will define which those functions would be, and therefore the Convention does not provide clear guidance about any possible limitation on the States’ self-definition of their competences3.
In my view, the conception of the State’s role in education must depart from an essential premise: the aim and raison d’être of the national system of education understood as a public service is to educate citizens — especially the youth — to live in community. This includes a general cultural education, professional education, and education on commonly shared civic values. The purpose of a national system of education should not be instructing about how to be a good person — but just a good citizen — or about what is the meaning of one’s life. Thisfundamental idea, so often forgotten, should be taken into account when designing school curricula for public and private schools, particularly in areas with a stronger moral profile or more ethical implications.
In other words, governments do not have complete freedom to organize the national education system in whatever way they like or fits better their political or ideological agendas. They must be aware of their limitations, which include parents’ rights. And, even prior to that, governments must assume that their role in planning and implementing the education of youth is limited. It is important to keep this in mind, because it often happens that “enlightened” officials and experts tend to enlarge State’s competences on education, and feel entitled to teach members of society what is best for the education of their children as persons.
Certainly, the education of youth has to do with values and not only with providing information and helping develop skills. The value side of education is precisely the one that most frequently raises concern in families, for it is closely linked to the realm of morals. In this area, it is legitimate for States — and perhaps necessary — to teach about values that are part ofpublic morals or about commonly shared values. Conversely, States do not have legitimacy to teach about ethical values concerning people’s choices strictly related to their destiny or the meaning of their lives. This is the role of families and, if that is the individual’s choice, religious or belief communities.
Such limitations on the State’s function vis-à-vis education is in direct connection with its religious neutrality, which in turn is a consequence of the State’s incompetence to make judgments on the truth or falsity of religious and comparable doctrines4. The realm of the State is not the truth but the good, and this circumscribed to interpersonal relationships, i.e., to the living together of citizens under its jurisdiction. The State’s religious neutrality is also a relative moral neutrality, which compels governments to refrain from invading the sphere of strictly personal moral choices. This is the reason why teaching programs or courses designed by State officials cannot interfere with personal morals. The only morals that governments are entitled to transmit through the educational system are those embedded in the fundamental international human rights documents, the Constitution, and the legal system, as well as in commonly shared values. Nothing else.
Such remarks are pertinent when we consider the recent proliferation of new courses in the school curricula of many countries: about sex education, and about citizenship, which often include contents concerning human emotions, affectivity, and moral choices in extremely delicate matters. Many of such courses generate social division and cause strong social reaction, which is a clear sign that the values they teach are not commonly shared5.
IV. The State’s neutrality and how to address morally sensitive issues
The State’s religious neutrality has also consequences with respect to the way certain morally sensitive issues are addressed at school, such as religion, the beginning and end of human life, sex, or sexual identity. The teaching about such subjects — which is no doubt difficult but is at the same time necessary — has created numerous controversies, and the question they bring up is: are controversies caused by the attitude of stubborn and reactionary parents or rather by invasive educational policies aimed at imposing a particular moral view on students?
Such type of teaching raises issues not dissimilar from those derived from neutral teaching about religions or beliefs6. Teachers in charge of those courses need academic competence and moral integrity, so that sound scholarship goes hand in hand with impartiality and the endeavor not to cross the boundaries that separate legitimate school activity from the sphere reserved to private moral choices. And, as there is always the risk of abuse, a proper school system should have mechanisms of control — ex ante and ex post — that are efficient and agile.
Both teachers and academic programs must recognize the moral dimension or profile of sensitive topics and be very honest about it. Indeed, ignoring such moral dimension implies a moral positioning, and presenting it as the only valid or objective view would be an unacceptable moral indoctrination of students. For the same reason, it is important to make the appropriatedistinctions. For example, adolescents can learn about the essentials of reproduction and contraception, but they should not be taught that those areas are morally irrelevant. Just the opposite, their moral dimension should be emphasized, noting that each person is entitled to take his own choices or sides, and it is not the school’s function to tell students anything in that regard. Moral choices in the area of sexuality are their problem, and this is something they should discuss with whomever they want, e.g., their families, their friends, or their religious communities. The same applies to sexual orientation or identity: teaching that all people have equal rights and equal dignity irrespective of their sexual identity or orientation does not entail denying that some sexual behaviors may be in conflict with some religious or moral choices. Such conflicts exist, and it does not mean that those religious or moral choices are illegitimate or bad, for the realm of law and personal ethics should not be confused, and we should be careful not to make them equivalent or transplant values from one to the other as if itwere inconsequential.
Many of the difficulties that arise in the teaching of morally sensitive issues could be solved if the State authorities with competences on education engage in a proper dialoguing and cooperation process with the civil society7. The main stakeholders are families, but also religious and belief communities should be considered. Such dialogue requires empathy and a delicate combination of firmness in keeping some basic ethical values that structure society and flexibility to accommodate a diversity of beliefs as much as possible. In other words, holding on to the essential while negotiating everything else, and keeping in mind that sometimes the best is the enemy of the good; i.e., that pursuing the ideal educational system at the expense of ignoring the legitimate choices of families and religious communities is not a sensible policy because it is bound to create social division, and education should generate social harmony.
This dialoguing process is not necessarily easy; indeed, it is often arduous and time-consuming. But the most valuable things are difficult to achieve. Guaranteeing freedom is complex.Authoritarianism is much simpler, but that fact does not make it better.
There are, of course, further distinctions and terms. And as in some national contexts as the United Kingdom, the term “public school” has a meaning which is different from the one taken into account in this paper. ︎
This is the text of article 2 of the Protocol to the European Convention: “Right to education. — No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions”. ︎
The fact that some teaching causes a strong social reaction in a particular national context is not necessarily a sign that it should be avoided or is not necessary. Sometimes it is just the opposite — think, for instance, of the fight against racism in the US in the 1960’s — but the government will need a solid legal and ethical justification to try to rectify some social tendencies through the education system. ︎
]]>2026-02-25T12:03:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-25T12:03:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-25:/280947Liberman on Academic Freedom and the Problem of “Teaching to Hate” in Primary and Secondary SchoolsLast November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the Internationa...]]>
Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Ariel J. Liberman (Auburn University) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here.
I. Introduction: ‘Hate’ Despite Inclusive Education Policy
Recent years have seen great exertions from educational ministries across North America and Europe to emphasize inclusivity in the context of public school. Expressly designed with an aim of combatting discrimination against religious, national, ethnic, and sexual minorities, legislation on inclusive education has been broad and targeted, and involved systemic redesign as well as substantive curricular reforms. The project is noble and necessary in theory and in practice; there is an avowedly civic benefit to introducing such educational curricula in nations which prize pluralism and require collective engagement from a diverse citizenry. And yet, despite many visionary efforts, ‘inclusivity’ seems to effectively stop at the theoretical. For instance, we have seen marked increases in incidents of expressed ‘hate’ on school grounds. As a focal point for this paper, we might direct our concern particularly at the rampant hate speech – or even physical violence – directed against religious minorities (as one example) that are taking a political visage. These incidents present a unique problem: more than just immature religious bullying, they exemplify emboldened student proclivities to ‘other,’ exclude, peers on the basis of identity. Worse, we are seeing these students excused for doing so on grounds of free expression, activism, or national values. Schools, in other words, are permitting the incubation of hate; inclusivity is relegated to theory and curricula, never practiced.
The rising global tide of antisemitism in education offers an example. Such ‘hate’ against Jews often stems from a perceived political, historical dual-loyalty to their community, or, more contemporarily, connection to the State of Israel. Across the world, the denial of Jewish identity, the expression of antisemitic tropes disguised as political speech, and the marginalization of Jewish voices in educational spaces have become mainstay, legitimated by teachers in classrooms as anti-Zionism.
Consider one example out of California. By 2022, dozens of states in America had championed ‘inclusive education’ policies, with California having served as a thought-leader championing the advent of mandatory ‘ethnic studies’ curricula across lower schools dedicating to educating students on “marginalized groups” and their contributions to America. The proposal raised expressly that “school curricula must not only provide content knowledge but must also equip students with the tools to promote understanding as community members in a changing democratic society.” And, yet, by some accounts California boasted the highest percentage increase in antisemitic incidents across K-12 classroom spaces in the country. A great percentage are attributed to the equating of Jews with the entity of Israel at a time when hostilities in that region received international media attention. More, teachers were supportive, excusing absences and touting their own positions on grounds of protecting democratic engagement and perceived political expression. To them students coalesce as young Americans exercising constitutional freedoms to stand with Palestinians. This is laudable and patriotic, deserving protection despite virulently hateful overtones.
I seek to raise for discussion the problem of hate in schools – legitimized by teacher and administration in our primary and secondary education either affirmatively or by silence – and disguised as political expression or aligned with advocacy. I try to discuss it as a function of ‘inclusive education’ policy and ask: how can hate, as expressed by children– even in ‘inclusive’ environments– be protected, encouraged, and defendedunder the color of national values and in spite of ‘inclusive’ educational efforts? Is it a necessary evil to protect other important pillars in education, particularly academic freedom?
There are a few normative arguments that I hope to raise in taking the above position. First, I argue that there exists a fundamental dissonance between the vision of inclusive education espoused at the highest legislative levels in many nations and the practical realities of implementation of ‘inclusive communities’ at local levels. It is this dissonance that allows ‘hate’ to remain in schools – even ensuring that ‘hate’ thrives. In addressing the issue, I argue in favor of top-level mandates that expand the of principle of ‘inclusive education’ at the primary and secondary level to contemplate ‘teach-not-to-hate’ curricula, representing a larger social and moral imperative to combat expressions of hate which justifies necessary limits on ‘academic freedom’ – or, in the case of K-12 schooling – local implementation and teacher discretion in content instruction.
II. Teacher Responsibility in Incubating ‘Hate’ in Lower School Contexts
Teachers are responsible for so much of a child’s identity and values formation. The public-school space uniquely checks lessons learned in the home, church, or community; at school, one learns to be a citizen in a broader sense. Research further affirms the relationship between teachers’ attitudes, self-efficacy, and the ultimate implementation of any top-level education policy. They are responsible for teaching inclusively and cultivating inclusive environments. And, by extension, I posit they are responsible for excising hate in the classroom. This, I trust, is not too radical a view.
But what does it really mean to be responsible for inclusivity? There are varied definitions of ‘teacher responsibility,’ and most carry both internal and external dimensions. Internally, to be ‘responsible’ is to believe (or at least buy-in) in the inclusive education project. Externally, the teacher must be held accountable to it by some measure. Turning back to the problem of permitting or justifying ‘hate’ in primary and secondary school spaces, we might analyze the phenomenon as a function of teacher responsibility.
One explanation for administrators permitting ‘hatred’ – as speech, as physical violence, as intimidation – against selected students on the basis of their identity could always be that teachers simply do not really believe in the idea of ‘inclusion,’ or the policy project. But this, I would wager, is not the case. When it comes to addressing incidents of hate, teachers must objectively respond as trained professionals. Yet, what constitutes ‘hate’ is adjudged by a highly individual measure. Qualitative research supports that “teachers [experience difficulty] distinguishing appropriate speech from hate speech, [or else] will not necessarily recognize subtle forms of hate speech or trivialize the phenomenon.”
Their own prejudice emboldens them to engage – or, if not engage, then witness without intervening – in the ‘hate.’ In Ontario, Canada, for instance, “nearly 16% of reported incidents of antisemitism involved anti-Israel actions or activities supported or organized by teachers or school administrators.” In 2024, a major rights group in Berlin, Germany assessed the 20% of their caseload involved addressed incidents of Islamophobic expression by educational staff. Put another way, where teachers are the ultimate arbiters of what constitutes hate.
Additionally, teachers’ own internal impression of what should constitute ‘hate’ is often colored by the endorsed positions of the teachers’ unions and local associations to which they belong. it is these local associations and unions which often have a principal role in evaluating and engaging teachers, and, from a policy perspective, influencing the implementation of top-level inclusive education policy regimes (environmental and curricular). This thereby impacts the ‘external’ dimensions of the teacher responsibility calculus. In other words, teachers’ unions often provide the lenses by which teachers and administrators judge teachers’ reactions to ‘hate’, and even their determinations as to what is ‘hate.’
In an American congressional hearing on antisemitism, one witness reported that “teachers’ unions have a significant role in spreading [hateful] ideologies” by encouraging and endorsing the “introduction of antisemitic and anti-Israel content into the classroom.” In California, particularly, one union encouraged teachers’ use of an unapproved ‘Teach Palestine’ curriculum which problematically characterized Zionism, touted Jewish global conspiracy tropes, and related these back to American experiences of settler-colonialism. The union actively combatted legislation aimed at blocking such antisemitic materials in classes required for students’ graduation, and upheld that, as a union, they “have the right to support Hamas as part of its political activism.”
In these ways, both ‘belief’ in the project of inclusion and the ‘measures’ by which we can assess teachers’ activities have become compromised. Teachers, in many ways, are preempted from appreciating certain manifestations of ‘hate’ on campus or reacting to it with appropriate severity. Further, they become unable to secure a classroom environment which allows for effective, inclusive engagement with “hate” so long as they engage such curricula which alienate Jewish students.
This reality impacts the project of a truly inclusive education. I argue therefore that policy regimes which overly defer ‘responsibility’ to teachers, administrators and local boards in executing plans for ‘inclusive education’ projects is not only ineffective in actually assuring against the persistence of ‘hate’ in schools but potentially offers an invitation for fostering this hate. It is the position of this author that ‘responsibility’ in determining curricula in certain areas be subsumed back to higher levels.
III. Measuring A Social and Moral Imperative in Lower Schools Against Teachers’ Academic Freedom
What I propose is a top-down legislative mandate for a ‘no-hate curriculum,’ an affirmatively imposed obligation on teachers and local boards – under threat of financial sanction – to vet curricula which may nurture hate and exclusion, combat physical incidents of hate, and promote inclusivity in a broader sense. But is this appropriately contemplated as part of the broader inclusive education project? Let us first focus on one major concern: that such a mandate has repercussions on academic freedom.
Recently, California has played host to a path-breaking attempt to legislatively combat the rising tide of ‘hate’ in their primary and secondary school spaces. Assembly Bill 715 (AB 715), the Antisemitism and Civil Rights Bill, was passed by the legislature in September 2025, and signed by the Governor in October 2025. A brief glimpse of AB 715 draws one’s focus to the bill’s outright prohibition of instructional materials which “would subject a pupil to unlawful discrimination,” expansion upon law that “afford[s] all persons in public schools . . . equal rights and opportunities in the educational institutions of the state,” assurance that teacher instruction be “factually accurate and align with the adopted curriculum,” and setting of broader guideposts which articulate the bounds of “discriminatory bias.” AB 715 represents an attempt at broadly proscribing the contours of ‘inclusive education;’ it is a statement that some ideas ought not be introduced in schools, and that certain principles ought be prioritized.
I will outline those principles in a moment but first let us consider the chief opposition to AB 715. The California Teachers Association (CTA) offers one scathing rebuke: a failure to honor a full, robust interpretation of teachers’ academic freedom. CTA reads ‘academic freedom’ as meaning “the ability of educators to ensure that instruction includes perspectives and materials that reflect the cultural and ethnic diversity of all of California’s students,” and contemplating “the rights of educators to assist students in developing critical thinking skills by exploring and discussing divergent points of view.” The provisions of AB 715 which delimit instructional materials on the basis of “factual accuracy” introduces a subjective standard which inherently privileges some students’ points of view over others, they argue. Mara Harvey notes that a teacher’s work requires “trust, nuance and open dialogue. [AB 715] undermines a real fight against antisemitism by conflating legitimate political debate with hate speech.”
Indeed, it is derivative to some extent of the discussions in the higher education sphere in the United States and Europe. Such restrictions, some argue, will simply discourage teachers and students from engaging in controversial discussion on Israel, reading materials, or having their beliefs on the subject challenged. And, yet, unlike the case for higher education, the case for robust academic freedom at this schooling levels remains unconvincing.
This position comes down, in many ways, to a question of balancing values. The educational principles at play are myriad: instillment of factual, descriptive knowledge, prevention of discriminatory conduct, but also moral and civic objectives. Morally, such legislation posits that a priority in early school is to cull that impulse to hate, to teach with a mind toward connecting. Complimentarily, a civic goal is to empower freedom of religion and bolster freedom of expression, though without isolating, vilifying, demeaning fellow citizens. It is in our civic interests to live harmoniously together, and to educate children toward coexistence. Further, such initiatives maintain that educating for coexistence, preserving child’s safety and well-being, and fostering connection through learning, ought to be weighed more heavily than other values, like a teacher’s academic freedom.
AB 715 has its flaws, but it is a guardrail against material and instruction which isolates fellow students. They promote, implicitly, the value of co-existence citizen-to-citizen. Of course, this does not mean shying away from difficult conversations or engaging controversy in the classroom. Rather, students ought to learn about injustice, protest, resistance alongside values like honesty, respect, empathy, temperance, responsibility, and kindness. When the student is set to engage “sensitive geopolitical issues,” the goal shifts away from galvanizing them toward a position on an issue and toward facilitating conversation and understanding.
In short, as the identities of future citizens are being forged, certain educational and civic values ought to take prescience over curricular protection. It belies the assumption that children need first be educating in how to navigate conflict as a part of a broader civic ecosystem with diverse citizens, without hate, before being invited to engage in taking sides in a controversial debate. School, ought to be foremost a place of safety; it ought to be a check modulating minds towards harmony as a civic virtue for the sake of peace coexistence in a democracy.
IV. Conclusion: National Prescriptive Mandates and the Inclusive Education Project
Taken together, these ideals – the reality of heightened incidents of hate in primary and secondary school spaces, the failures of teacher ‘responsibility’ in effectively ensuring inclusive environments, and a demand that primary and secondary school spaces primarily honor civic values of coexistence– counsel in favor of prescriptive mandates like California’s AB 715. AB 715 is also unique in its effort to allocate resources toward ensuring proper enforcement of this new view on ‘inclusive education’ at a higher level. it is geared to actively fight existing antisemitism on school grounds. This bill, in particular, establishes a new Office of Civil Rights and funds an Antisemitism Prevention Coordinator. It also requires districts to investigate and take corrective action when discriminatory content is used in education. the power of this prescriptive mandate also lies in returning authority from local teachers and to statewide actors over those ‘external measures’ by which one responds to ‘hate.’
But perhaps we must go farther than AB 715 does. More than simply prohibiting certain cirricula (i.e., ensuring a ‘no-hate curriculum), legislative action ought to oblige affirmatively that teachers ‘teach not to hate;’ they ought to channel a clear social, moral and civic imperative to ‘teach not to hate’ in schools. On this score, Germany’s legislative history on antisemitism offers interesting guidance.
In 2021, Germany’s Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs issued a joint recommendation which mobilized a clear definition of antisemitism to provide “orientation for dealing with different forms of antisemitism, describes their effects and highlights prevention and intervention measures.” Directed at “classroom teachers and other educators at schools of all kinds and levels,” the recommendation is distinctive in its discursive tenor – bringing educators into conversation with legislators, rather than projecting a top-down mandate, but moored in a more concrete ideal of a hate-free school. “Open, free and democratic societies based on the rule of law,” the recommendation maintains, are seriously threatened by antisemitism, and indeed any form of hate, and the “schools’ mission [is to] instill maturity and a sense of responsibility in children and young people” to prevent and combat hate.
The recommendation offers specific guidance on how administrators and teachers effectively combat antisemitism on the ground, prescriptions for fighting ‘hate’ by way of cultivating “civic courage and argumentative strategies” and emphasizing the essentiality of a “respectful and open learning environment.”
While detractors of this recommendation and other pieces of legislation proffer similar counterarguments previously discussed, the profundity of Germany’s formally articulation hatred’s manifestations and affirmation of a democratic obligation to avoid it, is striking. Is this a model to which legislators should take heed? Or is this too much of an infringement on academic freedom?
While the extent and definiteness of any prescriptive mandate is open to debate, the broader notion that such a ‘prescriptive mandate’ is needed, is clear, Obvious tensions will arise, but the position more satisfies the ultimate objectives of education for a plural democracy. and principally ensures a more accurate realization of the vision of ‘inclusive education.’
]]>2026-02-25T12:02:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-25T12:02:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-25:/280948Lazzarini on the Dismissal of Professors in Cases of Conflict with the University’s Religious EthosLast November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the Internationa...]]>
Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Alessandra Lazzarini (University of Padua) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here.
Introduction
The contention over the dismissal of faculty members in U.S. religiously-affiliated universities suggest that the scholarship and the case law on academic and religious freedom do not seem to provide a roadmap to reconcile the claim of academic freedom of professors with the autonomy of religious institutions. Unlike the strong protection of religious freedom offered by the First Amendment, academic freedom is the offspring of the decades-long efforts of the AAUP (American Association of University Professors) and of the ambivalent case law of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Academic freedom has two dimensions: individual academic freedom, which is the freedom of the individual faculty members; and institutional academic freedom, which is the freedom of the institution to pursue its mission and to be free from outside control. Thus, both the university and its professors possess (at least in theory) academic freedom as well as religious freedom; sometimes these protections overlap or align, but other times they clash. For example, in 2016 Wheaton College dismissed Professor Hawkins because she said publicly “I stand in religious solidarity with Muslims because they […] are people of the Book” and wore a headscarf as a symbol of solidarity. While this statement was perceived by many as inclusive, Wheaton College regarded it as raising significant theological concerns and as inconsistent with, if not contrary to, the institution’s mission and vision. Professor Hawkins and the College later reached an agreement outside of court.
In this short piece, I consider what happens when such disputes are actually litigated by reflecting on the tensions between the institutional academic freedom through which religious universities preserve their mission and the individual academic freedom of professors in U.S. dismissal cases, with a focus on the so called “ministerial exception” doctrine.
Individual and institutional academic freedom
The most authoritative and consequential statement on academic freedom in the United States issued by a private institution is the 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom of the AAUP. The Statement does not mention the institutional dimension and reports the three principal aspects of the individual academic freedom of faculty members: “full freedom in research and in the publication of the results,” “freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject,” and freedom from “institutional censorship or discipline» when they «speak or write as citizens.” The 1940 Statement, however, did not require religious institutions to adopt this conception of academic freedom. In fact, the Statement simply reads: “Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment.” Hence, the “Limitations Clause” allowed religious colleges and universities to implement autonomous principles and policies, provided that such restrictions were explicitly disclosed in advance.
However, subsequent attempts by the AAUP to refine this position generated more tensions between individual and institutional academic freedom. In 1970 the AAUP added a footnote to the Limitations Clause of the 1940 Statement: “Most church-related institutions no longer need or desire the departure from the principle of academic freedom implied in the 1940 Statement, and we do not now endorse such a departure.” From this moment on, the distance between the position of the AAUP and the right of religious universities to uphold their faith has been widening. In 1988 a subcommittee of the AAUP stated that “an institution has no ‘right’ under the 1940 Statement simultaneously to invoke the Limitations Clause and to claim that it is an institution of learning to be classed with institutions that impose no such restriction.” Hence, the Limitations Clause works as a switch: universities relying on it lose the status of member of the higher education community. Furthermore, through the decades the AAUP has conducted numerous investigations of religious colleges and universities to ensure respect for the principles of academic freedom, and these institutions continue to be included in the “censure list,” often with no regard for the religious institution’s need to preserve its own identity. In a few words, the AAUP has progressively espoused an “all or nothing” view that sees individual and institutional academic freedom as alternatives. This view has exacerbated political controversies and criticism whenever a professor is dismissed by a religious higher education institution, as the AAUP has constantly sided with the former without advocating any real protection to the latter.
The Supreme Court first recognized the principle of individual academic freedom during the McCarthy era when it affirmed that it “is a special concern of the First Amendment,” thus providing some protection to communist professors from unjustified dismissal and pressures. The Supreme Court’s decisions in the field have grounded academic freedom in freedom of expression, but they have been more rhetorical than practical, as they did have not provided a clear understanding of what this right actually guarantees to professors. Furthermore, because of the “state action” doctrine, the First Amendment can limit the internal authority of a university only if its administrators can be characterized as exercising state powers. Therefore, only faculty members of state universities enjoy substantial and procedural constitutional rights against their institutions. Since the 60% of higher education institutions in the United States is private and one in five U.S. colleges has ties to a religious organization, the First Amendment’s jurisprudence cannot afford a real protection for faculty members of private institutions, particularly in cases of dismissal from denominational universities.
The Supreme Court has never pivoted around the concept of individual academic freedom. The Court has instead developed an institutional model of academic freedom. In the Court’s case law, institutional academic freedom guarantees “the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university” and includes a university’s “four essential freedoms”: ‘to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.'” Furthermore, the lower Courts have repeatedly echoed this approach and affirmed that the institutional dimension should prevail and that the individual one has never been endorsed by the Supreme Court: “The Supreme Court […] appears to have recognized only an institutional right of self-governance in academic affairs. […] It was not focusing on the individual rights of teachers.” Thus, the existing jurisprudence on academic freedom offers no meaningful protection in cases of dismissal, especially since it does not shield even faculty members at public universities. In order to warrant some protection to academics, the lower Courts have begun to apply the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the free speech rights on the workplace of public employees, with ambivalent results.
The ministerial exception
For the First Amendment, religious organizations, including those of higher education, must be free to pursue their mission. Put differently, through its Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the First Amendment guarantees the institutional academic freedom of religious colleges and universities. Yet, the very mechanism that protect this autonomy, i.e. the ministerial exception, overrides the individual academic freedom of professors. Furthermore, this legal doctrine was primarily developed by the Supreme Court in the context of K-12 education, where individual academic freedom is not a recognized value.
The ministerial exception bars an individual from suing for employment-related discrimination if a religious institution employs the individual and deems him or her to be a “minister.” In 2012, the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church and School v. EEOCrecognized for the first time the exception grounding it on both the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses. Eight years later, the Court reaffirmed and reinforced its approach in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru. Both cases concerned teachers dismissed by a religious elementary school and the central legal question was when the teacher could be considered a “minister.” In Hosanna-Tabor the Court did not adopt a “rigid formula” in order to decide if the plaintiff (whom the school considered as a ‘called’ teacher) was a minister. However, it took into account four factors: “(1) she had the title of “minister,” (2) her position had a significant degree of religious training, (3) she held herself out as a minister, and (4) her duties reflected the Church’s message.” The Court stated that because of her status of called teacher, she should be considered a minister and that «by imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments. According to the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions».
In Our Lady of Guadalupe the Court reasoned that, while they did not have the title of “minister,” the teachers still served as ministers for purposes of the ministerial exception because they carried out certain teaching responsibilities that were within the scope of a “minister” and analogous to those employed by the teacher in Hosanna-Tabor. Furthermore, the Court stressed that “What matters is what an employee does. Implicit in the Hosanna-Tabor decision was a recognition that educating young people in their faith, inculcating its teachings, and training them to live their faith are responsibilities that lie at the very core of a private religious school’s mission.”
In the years following Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe, lower courts have applied these decisions in numerous dismissal cases involving professors and their religious universities (see some examples here, here, and here). However, the outcomes have been quite divergent, highlighting the difficulty of applying jurisprudence originally developed for the K–12 education system to the context of higher education and the resulting discretion left to the courts. Amid this uncertainty, in 2022 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Gordon College v. DeWeese-Boyd, a case litigated in the Massachusetts state courts which involved an affiliated religious higher education institution and its professor, who had been denied promotion to full professor. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stressed that the U.S. Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe adopted a “functional analysis” for determining whether an employee is a minister within the meaning of the exception. And it stated that DeWeese-Boyd “was, first and foremost, a professor of social work. She taught classes on sustainability and general social work practice and oversaw practicums.” Furthermore, unlike the Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe cases, DeWeese-Boyd had no obligation to engage in specifically religious duties. Finally, the Court noted that “a faculty member with DeWeese Boyd’s responsibilities at Gordon is significantly different from the ordained ministers or teachers of religion at primary or secondary schools in the cases that have come before the Supreme Court” and it concluded that “the significant expansion of the ministerial exception doctrine requested by Gordon is not dictated nor, do we believe, directed by existing Supreme Court precedent. It is our understanding that the ministerial exception has been carefully circumscribed to avoid any unnecessary conflict with civil law.”
In 2022, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the aforementioned ruling and, in a statement “Respecting the denial of certiorari”, Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, commented on the merits of the case. In this statement the Court described as “troubling and narrow” the vision of religious education developed by the Massachusetts JSC. Furthermore, in the Court’s arguments there is an evident shift from a focus on the minister’s figure to the “autonomy” of the religious institution in defining the content and method of its religious instruction. Quoting Our Lady of Guadalupe the Court stated: “The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment sometimes forbid courts to intervene in employment disputes involving teachers at religious schools who are entrusted with the responsibility of instructing their students in the faith.'” Thus, the Court’s criterion consists in the total deference to the higher education institution.
Conclusions
The individual academic freedom of professors emerges as an important value in legal scholarship but lacks support in the First Amendment’s jurisprudence. Conversely, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the institutional academic and religious freedom of religious institutions. The AAUP’s emphasis on the individual freedom of faculty members overlooks the institutional perspective, while the ministerial exception’s jurisprudence does not consider the specificities of institutions of higher education. Indeed, if the Court’s reasoning prevails, faculty members at religious institutions would be left without meaningful legal protections. As employees of private institutions, they would not benefit even from the already weak guarantees of academic freedom. Nor could they seek protection under anti-discrimination laws, since the university has unilaterally classified them as “ministers”.
Two significant steps seems to be available to safeguard both individual academic freedom and the institution’s confessional identity. First, the AAUP may reconsider their position and appreciate that the institutional dimension of academic freedom is an essential feature of the First Amendment. Second, courts could diversify the K-12 education system from the higher education context in their decisions. Indeed, college students are no lo longer children. They have the possibility to choose which university to enroll in, and even whether to attend university in the first place. Furthermore, mature students should be engaged in critical thinking. The Supreme Court has long acknowledged these positions in its broader academic freedom jurisprudence (for example here, here, and here); applying them to the dismissal cases in denominational universities could fundamentally transform how courts evaluate the rights of university faculty.
]]>2026-02-25T12:01:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-25T12:01:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-24:/280759Conference Announcement: The Rule of Law and the Common Good in MarchOn March 12th and 13th, Boston College Law School and the Morrissey College of Arts and Sciences wi...]]>On March 12th and 13th, Boston College Law School and the Morrissey College of Arts and Sciences will host a conference, “Rule of Law and the Common Good: An Emerging Synergy between Legal Theory and Catholic Social Thought.” Speakers include theologians Patrick Reardon, SJ (Campion Hall), Michelle Becka (Würzburg), and Anna Rowlands (Durham), and legal scholars Jed Purdy (Duke), David Luban (Georgetown), and Mary Ellen O’Connell (Notre Dame). Details here.
]]>2026-02-24T12:20:44+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-24T12:20:44+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-24:/280760Kudła on Religious Education in Public SchoolsLast November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Con...]]>
Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Weronika Kudła (Pontifical University of John Paul II) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here.
I. Religious Education in Public Schools: Lessons from Poland
In most EU countries religious education is present in public schools, often organized in cooperation with religious authorities and financed by the state. Only in four Member States—France (outside Alsace–Moselle), Slovenia, Luxembourg, and Bulgaria—religious instruction takes place outside the public school system. Thus, religious education is part of the public school system in 23 EU Member States. In eight countries, it is formally compulsory, although students may usually opt out at their parents’ request (only in Greece and Cyprus are Orthodox pupils required to attend). In fifteen EU countries, including Poland, participation in religion classes is voluntary and depends on a written declaration by parents or older students.
Against a European backdrop increasingly defined by secularism and framed as religious neutrality, Poland stands out as a predominantly Christian country, though some experts note that Poland seems to be the fastest secularizing country in the world. Recent social, political, and legal shifts make the Polish experience particularly noteworthy in discussions of religion in public education. While this post focuses on schooling, these debates unfold against a backdrop of broader cultural and religious changes in Poland, including declining engagement with the Catholic Church and shifting patterns of religiosity.
Religious education remains firmly embedded in the Polish public school system, yet it has become the focus of legal disputes, administrative interventions, and symbolic controversies. These conflicts reveal deeper constitutional tensions around religious freedom, state impartiality, and cooperation between public authorities and religious communities. Poland’s experience thus offers more than a national story: it functions as a test case, exposing how fragile carefully balanced legal arrangements can become amid political polarization and social anxiety.
II. Cooperation as a Cornerstone
Church–State relations in Poland are structured by four principles enshrined in Article 25 of the Constitution: 1) equality of churches and religious associations, 2) impartiality of public authorities, 3) mutual autonomy, and 4) cooperation for the good of the person and the common good. This model, often described as coordinated separation, rejects both hostility to religion on the one hand and confessional dominance of a single church recognized as the state church on the other. It is also common across Europe and shapes the model of religious education and the limits of freedom of religion or belief in schools.
Article 53 of the Constitution protects freedom of conscience and religion as a personal right rooted in human dignity and, in Article 53(4), explicitly permits churches and other recognized religious associations to provide religious instruction in public schools, provided that others’ freedom of religion or belief is not infringed.
Complementarily, the Preamble to the Education Law defines education as a common good and stipulates that teaching and upbringing—while respecting the Christian system of values—shall be based on universal principles of ethics. Respect for Christian values in the preamble does not convert education into a confessional enterprise; rather, it guides teleological interpretation in a system that is axiology-aware but constitutionally impartial, not secularist.
These principles are further specified and implemented by ordinary statutes. Religion classes are organized at the request of parents or pupils (after reaching the age of majority), attendance is optional, and students may choose religion, ethics, both, or neither. Curricula and textbooks are developed by religious communities, while teachers—although employed by public schools—require denominational authorization. Beyond the classroom, the law allows voluntary prayer, religious symbols, and participation in religious practices, provided that no coercion occurs. Normatively, the framework is coherent and balanced: it reconciles religious freedom, pluralism, and state impartiality through cooperation rather than exclusion. However, the Polish case demonstrates that strong constitutional principles only produce effective protection when paired with faithful implementation and political consensus; without it, polarization can undermine the practical exercise of rights.
III. Executive Regulation and the Breakdown of Cooperation
Between 2024 and 2025, the Ministry of National Education adopted a series of executive regulations that significantly altered the organization of religious education in public schools. Mixed inter-grade and inter-stage groups are now explicitly permitted. Grades from religion and ethics no longer appear on the school certificate nor are they counted toward the final grade average, following the Regulation of 22 March 2024. The weekly load of religious instruction has been reduced from two lessons to one lesson per week, without the need for prior consent of church authorities. This change, introduced by the Regulation of 17 January 2025, has been particularly criticized for infringing the principle of cooperation, since it was not preceded by the required consultation with religious associations.
Religious communities challenged the Ministry before the Constitutional Tribunal, arguing that the regulations not only affected organizational matters but also interfered with constitutionally protected autonomy and the institutional dimension of freedom of religion. The reasoning of the Constitutional Tribunal in case U 10/24 —which was subsequently reiterated in judgments U 11/24 and U 2/25 —was grounded in a consistent constitutional logic. The Tribunal held that the challenged regulation was unconstitutional in its entirety because it violated the consensual model of regulating Church–State relations guaranteed by Article 25(3) of the Constitution. By adopting executive measures concerning religious education without the agreement required by statutory law, the Ministry breached not only the cooperation principle, but also the principles of legality and the rule of law.
Importantly, the Tribunal emphasized that the disputed provisions went beyond technical organization. By enabling extensive inter-grade and inter-level aggregation of religion classes, the regulation interfered with parents’ constitutional right to ensure the moral and religious upbringing of their children in a manner appropriate to the child’s age and maturity (Article 53(3) in conjunction with Article 48(1) of the Constitution). It also undermined pupils’ right to education adapted to their developmental capacities, making it impossible to tailor religious instruction to differentiated curricula and pedagogical methods.
The Tribunal further found that these organizational changes conflicted with Poland’s international obligations under the Concordat with the Holy See, which guarantees that religious education in public schools is to be conducted in accordance with approved curricula. Finally, the regulation was held to violate the principle of protection of legitimate expectations and the constitutional protection of work, as its abrupt entry into force—following only a one-month vacatio legis—created a real and foreseeable risk of sudden job losses among religion teachers without adequate transitional safeguards. Taken together, the Tribunal’s reasoning confirms that the executive regulations did not merely adjust the framework of religious education, but structurally altered it in a manner incompatible with constitutional guarantees of cooperation, parental rights, legal certainty, and institutional autonomy.
However, these judgments were never published in the Journal of Laws and therefore did not acquire formal legal force (in March 2024, the Polish Parliament adopted a resolution addressing the effects of the 2015–2023 constitutional crisis concerning the Constitutional Tribunal, in which it declared that appointments of several Tribunal judges made between 2015 and 2018 were unconstitutional, that the office of the President of the Tribunal was held without proper authorization, and that numerous judgments are legally defective, a view echoed by the European Commission, which has questioned the Tribunal’s independence under Article 19 TEU).
As a consequence, regulations found to be unconstitutional continue to be applied in practice. Schools, parents, and teachers are left navigating a landscape of conflicting norms, where constitutional guarantees formally remain in place but lack effective protection. This situation exposes a deeper systemic problem. The non-implementation of constitutional judgments transforms freedom of religion in public education from a constitutionally secured right into a matter contingent on current governmental policy. In this way, religious freedom—designed to be shielded from political fluctuation through the mechanism of cooperation—becomes politicized. The Polish case thus demonstrates that even a carefully balanced constitutional framework may lose its normative force when institutional checks fail and political polarization undermines respect for constitutional adjudication.
IV. Legal Instability and Its Social Consequences for Religious Education
Legal instability coincides with rising social anxiety surrounding religion in public schools. For instance, in December 2025, a teacher at a primary school in Kielno allegedly removed a classroom cross and threw it into a trash bin after students refused to take it down themselves. The incident provoked immediate protests outside the school, involving local politicians, parents, and public figures, and attracted widespread media attention. Importantly, the prosecutor’s office opened an official investigation into the potential offense of offending students’ religious feelings, underscoring the legal significance of the act.
Authorities emphasized the sensitivity of the situation: the Minister of Education warned that religious symbols are being used politically, while local officials ensured psychological and pedagogical support for students and clarified the investigative process. The incident highlights the emotional weight of religious symbols in schools and illustrates how regulatory uncertainty can escalate localized classroom events into broader social and political conflict. It underscores the importance of clear legal guidance and faithful implementation of constitutional guarantees to reduce anxiety, prevent politicization of school life, and maintain trust in educational institutions.
Religion classes scheduled at marginal hours discourage participation and stigmatize both pupils and teachers, amounting to indirect discrimination. Inconsistent local decisions regarding religious symbols, prayers, or celebrations fragment constitutional standards and undermine equality. Polish education law remains largely silent on new educational spaces, such as online learning, where questions of religious expression and neutrality are increasingly pressing.
The lack of a specialized complaint mechanism leaves students, parents, and teachers dependent on general remedies, which are slow and ill-suited to resolve school-level disputes. In this environment, social anxiety magnifies conflicts, showing that constitutional guarantees require both legal clarity and practical mechanisms for their enforcement.
V. From Conflict to Constitutional Lessons
The Polish experience demonstrates that freedom of religion in education cannot be secured by legal text alone. Cooperation between the State and religious communities, faithful implementation of constitutional principles, and sensitivity to social and political dynamics are all essential. At its core, the current crisis is not about whether religion belongs in public schools. It is about how constitutional principles are implemented—and whether they are treated as binding norms or adjustable policy preferences. Poland’s Constitution provides clear answers: denominational teaching is lawful, voluntariness is essential, pluralism must be respected, and cooperation is obligatory. Experiences from recent controversies show that legal frameworks gain meaning only when embedded in a culture of dialogue, procedural transparency, and institutional accountability.
Poland’s experience offers a cautionary lesson for all societies committed to religious freedom: when constitutional guarantees are subject to political manipulation, even a majority faith can find itself under pressure, while minority perspectives can be leveraged to marginalize religion more broadly (see comparative analysis of religious expression in schools in Poland and the United States).
One constructive response would be the establishment of an independent ombudsman for religious freedom in education, tasked with promoting dialogue, fostering tolerance, and guiding administrators, teachers, and students in navigating religious diversity. By investing in education that respects both freedom of conscience and pluralism, societies can prevent the politicization of religious practice and cultivate inclusive, respectful learning environments.
What is at stake is constitutional culture. In the Polish constitutional order, neutrality is not equated with the exclusion of religion from the public sphere. Instead, it is conceived as positive impartiality: the state does not identify with any belief system, but it also does not suppress religious expression or treat it as inherently suspect. This distinction is central to understanding both the legal framework governing religious education in Poland and the controversies that have emerged around it. Neutrality achieved through exclusion breeds conflict, while neutrality grounded in cooperation fosters stability. These questions extend far beyond Poland. They go to the heart of democratic governance in pluralistic societies, reminding us that constitutional law ultimately lives not only in judgments and statutes, but in classrooms, school corridors, and everyday social practice.
]]>2026-02-24T12:04:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-24T12:04:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-24:/280761Garnett on the Funding of Religious Schools, Cooperation with Religion, and the Principle of EqualityLast November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the Internationa...]]>
Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Richard W. Garnett (University of Notre Dame) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here.
In 1947, the Supreme Court of the United States constitutionalized a metaphor taken from a constituent-service letter authored by Thomas Jefferson. When Jefferson, in his 1801 Letter to the Danbury Baptists, professed his “sovereign reverence” for the decision of the American people to constitutionalize church-state “separation,” he supplied what is for many the “authoritative interpretation” of the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses. “No metaphor in American letters,” Prof. Daniel Dreisbach has observed, “has had a greater influence on law and policy than Thomas Jefferson’s ‘wall of separation between church and state.’”
And yet, as then-Justice William Rehnquist observed in a prescient 1985 dissenting opinion, the “wall” metaphor is “based on bad history” and has “proved all but useless as a guide to sound constitutional adjudication.” The term “cooperation” points to a more promising path. The Constitution of the United States and the history, practices, and traditions of our political community, reveal and call for an appropriate “differentiation” between political and religious authority, that is, between “church” and “state.” They invite us not to search for a “wall” separating the two but instead for the appropriate terms of reasonable and productive cooperation in efforts to secure the common good and human flourishing.
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The American law of church and state is, to a large extent, the product of political and other struggles over education and, in particular, over the funding of education in Catholic schools. For a long time, the relevant legal doctrines could not be understood apart from American anti-Catholicism, nativism, and nationalism. For several decades in the mid-to-late Twentieth Century, these doctrines were constructed around the “wall of separation” metaphor; more recently, though, the conversation has become one about permissible cooperation.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the development and rapid expansion of “common schools” coincided with – and was, in many respects, a reaction to – a dramatic increase in Catholic immigration. Catholic parents and leaders objected to the pervasive Protestant ethos of these schools and sought accommodations from curricular practices that they found burdensome on religious grounds, especially mandatory recitations from the King James Bible. While accommodation occurred in some places, elsewhere, Catholic children were punished when they refused to participate in these recitations.
When Catholics’ efforts to exercise “voice” failed, they turned to “exit.” As the fiery bishop of New York, “Dagger John” Hughes, explained at the time, the common-school practice of putting Protestant material “into the hands of our own children, and that in part at our expense, was … unjust, unnatural, and at all events to us intolerable. Accordingly, through very great additional sacrifices, we have been obliged to provide schools … in which to educate our children as our conscientious duty required.”
In the years that followed, equality-based demands for the public funding of Catholic schools increased; these demands also fueled new waves of nativism and conspiracy theories that Catholics were engaged in a concerted effort to destroy American democracy. In 1875, James G. Blaine, then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, proposed an amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibiting any public funds from flowing to “sectarian” schools. That anti-Catholic animus fueled this effort is widely accepted. While the federal Blaine Amendment narrowly failed to secure approval, Congress thereafter required several new states to adopt similar language in their state constitutions as a condition of statehood. Other states voluntarily amended their own constitutions and, eventually, thirty-seven states’ constitutions included “Baby Blaine” anti-aid Amendments.
Nativist organizations, including the Ku Klux Klan, wanted to go further. The Klan and allied organizations, including the Masons, joined movements for obligatory public schooling in several states. These efforts were ultimately successful in Oregon, which enacted a law mandating instruction in public schools in 1922. Three years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the law violated the due process rights of both parents and private schools: “The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose,” the justices said, “excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”
The Pierce decision did not address the question whether the Constitution had anything to say about government assistance to parents seeking to exercise this fundamental right. However, and despite the battles over the public funding of Catholic schools in the nineteenth century, it is clear that local governments, states, and the federal government had, from the time of the Founding, financially supported private religious schools for a variety of reasons and in a number of ways.
For decades, these practices by and large flew under the federal constitutional radar. That changed with the Supreme Court’s decision in Everson. In that case, the Court considered an Establishment Clause challenge to a New Jersey law authorizing school boards to reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children to private schools, including religious ones. Upholding the law, the Court made two significant moves that would shape future school-funding litigation: First, the Court “incorporated” the Establishment Clause, holding that it applied to state and local laws as well as federal ones. Second, employing the “wall of separation” metaphor, it held that the clause “requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary.” Two decades later, in Board of Education v. Allen, the Court relied on this neutrality principle to uphold a New York program that lent textbooks to students attending religious schools, reasoning that the beneficiaries of the program were students, not schools.
While Everson and Allen took a relatively accommodationist approach to programs providing public benefits to children attending religious schools, the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine took a strong “separationist” turn in the early 1970s. Importantly, in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Court established a three-part test to determine whether a law violated the Establishment Clause. In Lemon the Court concluded that the school-aid programs at issue violated the Establishment Clause due to the potential for excessive entanglement, and found that monitoring the secular content of instruction would require substantial, ongoing state oversight. Two years later, in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist (1973), the Court used the Lemon test to invalidate a New York tuition reimbursement and tax benefit program for parents of private school students on the ground that the financial aid would “advance religion.”
Thereafter, the Court repeatedly held that a variety of public-benefit programs violated the Lemon test. For example, in Meek v. Pittenger (1975), the Court struck down a Pennsylvania program that provided instructional materials and equipment to religious schools while upholding only loaned textbooks. The Court reasoned that items like maps, films, and projectors could be diverted to religious instruction, making state aid impermissible. The incongruence of the books-but-not-maps reasoning led the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan to quip, “But what about atlases?” In Wolman v. Walter (1977), partially invalidated an Ohio program that provided standardized tests and diagnostic services to religious schools. And in Aguilar v. Felton (1984), the Court held that the Lemon test prohibited states from using federal education funds to pay teachers in religious schools to provide supplemental tutoring to disadvantaged students.
Beginning in the 1980s, the Court gradually began to soften this this position, returning to the neutrality benchmark, especially when government aid reached religious schools indirectly through individual choice. In Mueller v. Allen (1983), the Court upheld a Minnesota tax deduction for educational expenses that benefited both public and private (including religious) school students. In Witters v. Washington (1986), the Court held that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit a state from permitting a blind student to use public funds to pursue a degree in ministry. In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District (1993), it reached the same conclusion about a publicly funded sign language interpreter for a deaf child attending a Catholic school. And in Agostiniv. Felton (1997), it allowed public school teachers to provide remedial instruction in religious schools under a federally funded program.
In 1995, two important things happened in the history of the parental-choice effort. First, Wisconsin expanded eligibility to participate in the Wisconsin Parental Choice Program – the nation’s first modern voucher program – to include religious schools. Second, Ohio enacted the Cleveland Pilot Scholarship Program, a modest means-tested program that also enabled participants to attend religious schools. Both of these programs were challenged on Establishment Clause grounds, and the Court ultimately reviewed the Cleveland case. In 2002, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court upheld the Cleveland program, rejecting an establishment for two reasons: the program was both neutral toward religion and of “true private choice,” with public funds ultimately flowing to religious schools only as the result of parents’ independent choices.
* * * * *
The law of religious-school funding in the United States today is that governments and religious actors may, and increasingly do, cooperate in providing education to children and, therefore, in promoting authentic human flourishing and development. It is worth nothing, though, what has not happened: It is not – at least, not yet – the law that equal treatment of state and non-state schools and education providers is required. True, a recent line of cases, starting with Trinity Lutheran, prohibits states from invoking extra-strict understandings of “separation” as a justification for discriminating against otherwise eligible religious schools in the context of school-funding programs. Still, governments remain free to adopt policies that, in effect, impose a financial penalty on the exercise of that right. A next step in the repairing of American religious-freedom law must be remedying this defect.
]]>2026-02-24T12:03:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-24T12:03:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-24:/280762Ferrante on Religious Freedom and Equality in Funding Religious SchoolsLast November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Con...]]>
Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Mario Ferrante (University of Palermo) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here.
The public funding of religious schools is one of the most sensitive issues in contemporary constitutional law. It simultaneously engages three cornerstones of democratic coexistence: religious freedom, freedom of education, and the principle of equality – both formal and substantive. At the heart of current debates lies a simple yet demanding question: how can a legal system fund religious schools without undermining state neutrality or creating unjustified privileges?
Over the last few decades, the gradual transformation of European school systems has made it clear that state neutrality in education cannot be understood as indifference towards religion. Rather, it implies a commitment to ensuring equal dignity for different educational options within the framework of shared constitutional values. In this context, the balance between religious freedom and equality becomes crucial in determining whether – and under what conditions – public money can legitimately support religious schools.
In this perspective, the question of public funding for religious schools cannot be reduced to a technical issue of public–private relations. It must instead be situated within the broader framework of parents’ freedom of educational choice and the right to education. In the Italian case, these are guaranteed by Articles 30 and 34 of the Constitution. The implementation of these principles requires that educational pluralism should not result in new forms of inequality, nor that cooperation with religious institutions should degenerate into religious privilege.
The Italian experience is particularly interesting when viewed in comparative perspective. The United States has recently moved towards a form of “inclusive neutrality,” which allows religious schools to participate in generally available public programs, with religious freedom often prevailing over concerns about separation. France, by contrast, maintains a strict model of laïcité, centered on a sharp institutional separation between state and religion. Italy, for its part, seeks to define an intermediate model of “cooperative secularism,” in which collaboration between the state and religious communities in the protection of civil and religious rights operates within the limits set by substantive equality and the general interest.
This intervention takes that balancing problem as its central thread. It first sketches recent U.S. case law on the funding of religious schools, then presents the Italian model and its constitutional and legislative framework, and finally situates Italy in the broader European landscape. The underlying claim is that equality – understood in both its formal and substantive dimensions – can serve as the key to reconciling religious freedom and state secularism in the funding of religious schools, allowing for cooperation without privilege and genuine pluralism without discrimination.
1. The U.S. Trajectory: From Exclusion to “Inclusive Neutrality”
In the United States, the public funding of religious schools has been at the center of a significant evolution in Supreme Court case law, marked by ongoing tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Carson v. Makin (2022) represents a turning point. By a six‑to‑three majority, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the exclusion of religious schools from a tuition‑assistance program established by the State of Maine for families living in school districts without public secondary schools. Denying a public benefit solely by reason of the religious character of an institution, the Court held, violates the Free Exercise Clause and amounts to discrimination on grounds of religion.
Carson is consistent with a line of precedents increasingly favorable to the participation of religious institutions in generally applicable public programs, inaugurated by Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer (2017) and developed further in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2020). In these decisions, the Court reiterated that, once a state decides to fund private education, it may not discriminate between secular and religious schools purely on the basis of their religious status.
At the same time, scholars have underlined the risks of an expansive reading of the Free Exercise Clause that effectively narrows the scope of the Establishment Clause and, with it, the principle of state neutrality. Under this approach, the separation between state and religion is redefined in a more permissive direction, and neutrality risks being transformed into a form of mandatory inclusion of religious actors in public funding schemes.
Recent U.S. case law thus illustrates a model of secularism based on a logic of non‑exclusion: the state may not withhold public benefits from an entity solely because it is religious, except in situations where such support would amount to the state’s endorsement or coercive imposition of a particular faith. This is a delicate balance, in which religious freedom tends to prevail over strict separation, and the traditional idea of “benevolent neutrality” is recast in a more assertive and participatory form.
From a European and Italian perspective, this shift raises an important question: how far can a system go in the direction of “inclusive neutrality” without eroding the distinct role of the Establishment Clause (or its functional equivalents) as a safeguard of state neutrality and equal treatment among beliefs?
2. The Italian Framework: Secularism, Equality, and the “National Education System”
In Italy, the regulation of public funding for religious schools operates within a different constitutional framework, marked by the principle of secularism, which the Constitutional Court has recognized as a “supreme principle” of the legal order. Since the late 1980s, the Court has described secularism as a structural principle that requires both neutrality of public authorities towards different religious and non‑religious beliefs, and an active protection of religious freedom in its individual and collective dimensions (a key decision is judgment no. 203 of 1989, available on the Italian Constitutional Court website).
The freedom to establish schools and to provide education is guaranteed by Article 33(4) of the Constitution, which recognizes the right of individuals and entities to set up educational institutions “at their own expense,” traditionally paraphrased in Italian debate as “without cost to the State”. This wording, the result of a compromise between different political and ideological forces, has given rise to intense controversy. Constitutional case law has generally interpreted it as excluding full financial equivalence between private and state schools, rather than as an absolute ban on any form of public support to private – including religious – schools.
A major shift came with Law No. 62 of 2000, which defined a “national education system” composed of state schools and “state‑recognized” private schools (s.c. “scuole paritarie”). These private schools – including many religious schools – must comply with public standards on curricula, teacher qualifications, non‑discriminatory admissions, and the accessibility of fees. In return, they are integrated into the public system, their diplomas have the same legal value as those issued by state schools, and they may access certain forms of public funding. A brief description of this framework (in Italian) is available on the Ministry of Education website.
The inclusion of state‑recognized schools within the national system thus marked a transition from a model of rigid separation to one of functional integration, in which public and private providers cooperate to pursue constitutionally protected educational objectives. However, this reform has also generated new tensions. On the one hand, it affirms parents’ freedom of educational choice; on the other, it raises concerns about preventing public resources from turning into unjustified religious privileges.
These tensions were heightened during the Covid‑19 pandemic, when state‑recognized private schools – many of them religiously affiliated – complained of insufficient public support and alleged unequal treatment in comparison with state schools. This situation reignited the debate on the meaning of “without cost to the State” and on the scope of the principle of substantive equality.
More recently, Italy’s 2026 budget law introduced a private‑school bonus in the form of vouchers worth up to €1,500 per student, intended for families with an Equivalent Economic Situation Indicator (ISEE) not exceeding €30,000. The vouchers are designed to cover enrollment costs for private lower‑secondary schools and the first two years of upper‑secondary education, with higher amounts for lower ISEE brackets. This measure has reignited political debate on the appropriateness of allocating public funds to private schools.
If freedom of teaching and freedom of educational choice are to be effective, access to public benefits should not depend on the religious affiliation of an institution, but on its compliance with objective criteria of social usefulness and conformity with constitutional principles. From this perspective, public funding of religious schools does not necessarily amount to a privilege, but may represent a means of implementing educational pluralism, provided that equal treatment and non‑discrimination are ensured.
The balance between freedom and equality is thus central to a form of secularism that is not merely “passive” but cooperative: a model that can value the contribution of religious institutions without compromising state neutrality.
3. Catholic Religious Education and the Logic of Cooperation
Questions of cooperation between the state and religious institutions in education are particularly evident in the teaching of Catholic religion in public schools and in the presence of religious schools within the national education system.
Instruction in Catholic religion is one of the main expressions of collaboration between the Italian state and the Catholic Church under the 1984 Villa Madama Agreements, which revised the Lateran Concordat and were implemented by Law No. 121 of 1985. Article 9 of those Agreements governs instruction in Catholic religion in public schools as an optional subject: the content and teachers are approved by church authorities, while the subject is offered within the public-school timetable under the constitutional framework of state secularism and religious freedom. (An English translation of the 1984 Agreement is available on Concordat Watch).
Article 9 seeks to balance two requirements: on the one hand, the aim of school teaching that highlights principles (Catholic principles) considered to be “part of the historical heritage of the Italian people”; on the other, the “respect for freedom of conscience and for the educational responsibility of parents.” In line with the latter requirement, instruction in Catholic religion is an optional subject, and pupils (or their parents) may freely choose whether or not to attend. In accordance with the first requirement, and within the framework of cooperative secularism envisaged by the Agreements, certain confessional elements are maintained – even in the public-school context – such as the need for teachers to receive ecclesiastical approval and the determination of curricula by the competent church authority.
Some scholars argue that the evolution of the constitutional framework and the increasing religious diversity of Italian society require a rethinking of instruction in Catholic religion, transforming it into a cultural subject focused on knowledge of different spiritual traditions and on interreligious dialogue. Such a reform, they contend, would reconcile the historical role of Catholicism in shaping national identity with the need to promote genuine pluralism. Others reply that such a “cultural” subject would pursue objectives that are, if anything, additional to those envisaged by Article 9 of the Agreements, which refer to a specific function of religious instruction that is both of ecclesiastical interest and of public relevance.
From this perspective, the issue of public funding for religious schools must also be read in light of these considerations. Public support is justified only insofar as it serves to make the right to education and the freedom of educational choice effective, while reasonably reconciling these aims with the Constitution’s concern to recognize and protect specific religious identities. What must be avoided are a priori advantages granted to particular denominations, which would be inconsistent with the Italian model of secularism embodied in the Constitution.
4. The European Context and the Italian “Middle Way”
In Europe, the relationship between education, religion, and secularism has developed in different ways, reflecting the diverse constitutional traditions of the Member States.
The French model, rooted in the experience of the Revolution, is based on a strong principle of separation between state and church. Public education is strictly secular, and the exclusion of religious instruction from state schools is an integral feature of the republican order. This has produced a deliberately rigid model that leaves little room for religious actors within the school system and has generated growing tensions in the face of increasing cultural and religious diversity.
By contrast, in several Germanic and Scandinavian countries, religion is more openly recognized as a possible component of the educational process. Cooperation between public authorities and private providers often takes the form of equal participation by religious schools in the national education system, provided that they comply with state‑defined quality standards and with principles of non‑discrimination. The German case, in particular, offers a model of balance between religious freedom and the secular character of the state: religious schools, especially those linked to the main Christian traditions, may receive public funding commensurate with their educational functions, if they offer teaching consistent with constitutional values and guarantee equal access to pupils irrespective of their beliefs.
In this comparative context, Italy occupies an intermediate position. The principle of secularism, as developed by the Constitutional Court, does not entail passive neutrality, but rather an attitude of openness and cooperation. Educational pluralism is considered an integral part of the democratic system, and the legal recognition of state‑recognized religious schools is a direct expression of this approach.
However, significant difficulties remain at the level of practical implementation, largely due to the persistent ambiguity surrounding the constitutional formula that private schools must be established “without cost to the State.” The experience of other European democracies shows that public funding of religious schools is not, in itself, incompatible with secularism, provided that it is governed by transparent criteria and serves the general interest – in particular, the promotion of the right to education and the safeguarding of substantive equality.
5. Equality as the Key to Cooperative Secularism
The principle of equality, in both its formal and substantive dimensions, is the conceptual and practical pivot for balancing religious freedom with state neutrality.
Formal equality requires that no religious institution receive direct or indirect privileges in access to public funding. Substantive equality, however, demands that the state adopt appropriate measures to remove obstacles that effectively prevent families – especially those belonging to religious or cultural minorities – from exercising their freedom of educational choice. A combined reading of Articles 3, 8, 19, and 33 of the Constitution supports the conclusion that religious freedom and freedom of education cannot be meaningfully exercised under conditions of marked economic inequality.
The achievement of educational pluralism therefore requires public intervention that promotes equity, without compromising the secular character of the state. In practical terms, any public funding scheme that includes religious schools should be governed by general and non‑discriminatory criteria, such as compliance with national educational standards, openness of admissions, respect for fundamental rights, and effective oversight by public authorities. Funding should be proportionate to the public educational function performed and should not be tied to adherence to, or promotion of, a particular faith.
In this way, equality operates not only as a limit on privilege, but also as a positive requirement to design regulatory frameworks that enable families from different social and religious backgrounds to make genuine educational choices. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly stressed that secularism does not coincide with indifference towards religion, but translates into a positive commitment to safeguarding freedom in all its individual and collective dimensions. It follows that cooperation with religious institutions – including in the form of balanced and reasonable financial support – is legitimate when it serves to give effect to fundamental rights and to promote social cohesion.
Italy can thus put forward an original model of balance in which the principle of secularism takes the form of cooperative secularism: a state that does not privilege any faith, but recognizes and values the contribution of religions to the common good, while guaranteeing equal dignity and equal access to public benefits for all.
6. Concluding Remarks
The question of public funding for religious schools cannot be adequately addressed by simply opposing religious freedom and the principle of secularism. Both principles contribute to shaping a model of democratic coexistence grounded in the plurality of worldviews and in the equal dignity of all forms of education that comply with constitutional standards.
In comparative perspective, the recent U.S. trajectory towards “inclusive neutrality” highlights the potential of non‑exclusionary models, but also the risk of weakening institutional safeguards of neutrality. The French model of strict separation underlines the value of a clear public secular space, but struggles to accommodate growing religious diversity. The German and broader North‑European experiences suggest that regulated integration of religious schools into the public system, under strong equality‑based conditions, can reconcile religious freedom, secularism, and social cohesion.
Against this background, the Italian system, thanks to its distinctive balance between freedom, equality, and cooperation, offers an original model: a secular state that recognizes the educational value of religious institutions without renouncing its neutrality. Secularism, understood as a “space of freedom,” permits cooperation with religious denominations for purposes of general interest, while preventing any form of subordination or privilege.
Only such a balance can ensure that religious freedom and secularism do not conflict, but instead cooperate in building a genuinely pluralistic and inclusive school system.
]]>2026-02-24T12:02:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-24T12:02:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-24:/280763Bacquet on Public Funding and the Autonomy of Faith SchoolsLast November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consorti...]]>
Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Sylvie Bacquet (University of Westminster) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here.
Public funding of religious schools depends largely on how religion is positioned within each state’s constitutional framework. While some countries such as the UK, Belgium or Canada accommodate faith schools within a state funded structure, others such as France and the US have constitutional restrictions linked to secularism models. There are different levels of funding but usually, higher levels of funding come with increased state regulation. Such regulation may limit the autonomy of faith schools to admit pupils solely on the basis of the school’s religious ethos. This paper examines the extent to which receiving public funding may limit a faith school’s freedom to filter the admission of students according to their religious affiliation. Particular attention is given to the specific examples of England and France given that their church-state relations systems are at polar opposites and affect school funding radically differently. I will argue that while state funding places limitations on the autonomy of the religious school, it also ensures a level of oversight which protects against discrimination, preserves children’s autonomy and protects the right to education.
The UK Context – state funding with relative autonomy
The UK education system is rooted in the establishment of the Church of England. As a result, one third of state-funded British schools have a religious character. While the majority are Christian, a growing number represent other denominations including Judaism, Islam, Sikhism and Hinduism. These schools benefit from certain exemptions in relation to admission of pupils and staff and when oversubscribed can use faith as an admission criterion, therefore prioritizing applicants of their own faith (s.11 of the Equality Act 2010). In England, admission criteria are dependent on the funding agreement of each school type. In practice, religious schools of minority faith are almost always oversubscribed given that they represent a smaller proportion of faith schools. In contrast, Church of England schools, are in greater number due to their association with the established church and therefore are more likely to have places available for all applicants not just those affiliated with their faith.
There are broadly speaking three categories of faith schools: voluntary aided, voluntary controlled and faith academies. Each receives a different type of state funding.
Voluntary aided (VA) schools receive funding for their day to day running costs from the local authority and the Department for Education (DfE) provides capital grants for major building projects. This typically covers 90% of the costs of the school while the remaining 10% must be met by the schools’ governing body. Voluntary aided schools design their own admission policy and if they are oversubscribed can give priority to applicants of their own faith.
Voluntary controlled (VC) schools also receive funding from the local authority to cover their running costs and staff salaries. While the local authority employs staff and is the main admissions authority, the school’s land and buildings are usually owned by a charitable foundation, and the local authority may consult with this foundation on admissions policy. Unlike VA schools, VC schools do not have to contribute to the costs of the school. As a result, admission policies may not always prioritize religious applicants. The local authority typically gives priority to those who live close to the school (proximity), those who have a sibling at the school, children in care and those with an Education Health and Care Plan.
Faith academies were introduced in 2000. Unlike VA and VC schools, their funding comes from central government rather than local authorities. The academy trust is responsible for how the money is used and they are accountable to the government for performance and financial management. They have more autonomy in their governance and operations compared to community schools as described above. Admission criteria are set out in their funding agreement, but academies are generally responsible for setting their own admission criteria. Like other faith schools, they can discriminate on the basis of faith when they are oversubscribed. Since 2007 however there is a 50% cap on religion-based admission to protect inclusivity. As a result, those schools may only select up to 50% of pupils based on religion when they are oversubscribed. The cap only applies to entirely new academies and free schools.
In 2024, under the Conservative government, there was an attempt to scrap the 50% cap so that faith academies were no longer restricted but this was later abandoned due to a lack of public support and concerns about equality and discrimination by organizations that campaign for the abolition of faith schools such as the Secular Society. The primary motivation behind the proposal was to support the expansion of free schools by addressing the restrictions imposed by the current 50% admissions cap, which some faith groups view as conflicting with their religious obligation to prioritize children of their own faith. Critics of the proposed reform were particularly worried about the impact this would have on children with disabilities and more disadvantaged children generally as there is evidence that faith schools are less inclusive in relation to those children.
Admission criteria and Case Law
The UK school admission code 2021 provides statutory guidance on religious selection by faith schools and stipulates that faith schools are required to consult with their respective religious authorities when designing their faith-based admission criteria. This was initiated following persistent concerns about faith schools’ policies and a number of judicial interventions. It has been argued however that ‘this complex intertwinement of religious and state authorities has led to an unjustified intrusion of the secular into religious matters’ (Myriam Hunter-Henin, 2018).
In order to be considered a priority applicant for the purpose of the oversubscription criteria applicants are usually required to demonstrate their belonging to the faith through a supplementary information form (SIF). Depending on the schools those requirements may be more or less stringent and as a result may exclude certain groups within the communities. In the UK, this was the subject of a Supreme Court case in 2009. In the JFS case, the UKSC held that JFS school, a modern Jewish Orthodox school had discriminated against the applicant on the basis of ethnic origin when he was denied admission due to his mother’s ethnic origin which was not deemed halachically Jewish as she had undergone a process of conversion. In other words, the applicant did not satisfy the matrilineal test used by JFS at the time to determine his connection with Orthodox Judaism. Following the ruling, JFS changed its admission criteria to a point system based on religious practice rather than matrilineal descent. Those point-based systems however remain controversial as they might exclude certain applicants. This was recently put to the test in a High Court decision.
In CKT v. OSA, High Court of England and Wales examined whether a Church of England school was ‘indirectly discriminatory’ in relation to the protected characteristic of race. Twyford school provided for the allocation of an extra point (‘Church of England Point’) in their admission criterion for certain applicants: One point is awarded to applicants whose family’s main place of worship is at a Church of England church or Churches in Communion with the Church of England.
While the claim failed on the basis of race discrimination, the court nonetheless acknowledged [para 194] that faith-based admission criteria are likely to cause indirect discrimination. On this occasion the extra point was found to be a proportionate mean of achieving the school legitimate aim, in this case preserving an Anglican ethos.
As mentioned above, those who campaign to end faith schools however have highlighted that faith-based criteria lead to discrimination not only based on race but also disability and lower socio-economic backgrounds.
The case of France – limited public funding with controlled autonomy
In France, where article 1 of the Constitution provides for strict separation between religion and the state, the situation is completely different due to the principle of laïcité and the law of 1905 which prevents the state from remunerating religion. As such, state schools which are publicly funded must not be associated with religion, this includes funding, teaching and the display of religious symbols (Law of 2004 on the wearing of religious symbols at school). Schools with a religion denomination exist but they are usually within the private sector and do not receive state funding, with the exception of private schools called ‘sous contract’. Those schools have an agreement with the state which imposes certain conditions in exchange for funding.
Private schools under contract (‘sous contrat’)
Private schools may enter into agreements with the state, becoming ‘sous contrat.’ These schools receive public funding in exchange for adherence to the national curriculum and non-discriminatory admissions. Teachers are employed and remunerated by the state, and religious instruction must take place outside official school hours. While these institutions may retain a confessional ethos, they are prohibited from selecting students based on religious affiliation. 96% of private schools under contract are Catholic while the remaining 4% is made up of Jewish, Muslim, Protestant and secular schools. This model integrates faith schools into the public system under strict regulatory control, ensuring both access and accountability.
By contrast, private schools deemed ‘hors contrat’ do not receive public funding but enjoy complete autonomy over curriculum and admission (Loi Debré 1959). They currently only represent 4.4% of the student population but are increasing in number. Concerns have arisen regarding inadequate oversight, particularly within ultra-conservative or extremist institutions, leading to closures by the Ministry of Education. The French model thus demonstrates the state’s preference for regulation through funding.
Discussion: state funding as a limitation or safeguard?
State funding inevitably restricts religious autonomy, but it also ensures adherence to equality norms and protects the right to education. Critics of faith schools, including Humanists UK and the National Secular Society, argue that faith-based admissions undermine social cohesion and perpetuate segregation. Data from the UK suggest that faith schools are more socially selective than non-religious schools, with disparities in Free School Meal eligibility reflecting socio-economic stratification. Nevertheless, advocates assert that faith schools contribute positively to moral development, community engagement, and academic performance. There is also evidence to show that faith schools have better academic results although this has been debated as some have argued that it is mainly as a result of socio-economic factors.
While state funding may indeed impose limitations on the autonomy of faith schools and religious communities, they can also provide a level of scrutiny and accountability by acting as a safeguard against potential discrimination, segregation or indoctrination. There is evidence to suggest that this has been an issue especially with schools which fall outside of public funding.
Ultimately, the challenge is to balance the competing interests of parents to educate their children according to their religious convictions and the interests of the general public to be protected from discrimination in education. If there was no public funding available, it may marginalize religious communities which are poorer. Left unregulated however, faith-schools and schools in general may pose a threat to children. There have been reported cases of gender segregation, failure to provide core curriculum teaching, safeguarding risks and exposure to extremist ideology.
Conditional funding therefore not only ensures fair distribution of public resources but can also be seen as a proportionate mean of achieving the legitimate aim of protecting tolerance and equality in a pluralist society. As such, it cannot be found in breach of the right to religious freedom.
The English exemption of allowing schools to give preference to applicants of their own faith when the school is oversubscribed seems reasonable as this usually affects schools of minority faith which make up for a small proportion of all faith schools. The imposition of strict quota in this instance would be counterproductive but in a schooling system where a third of all schools are faith-schools, the imposition of a quota on certain types of schools is a reasonable intervention to ensure public values are respected.
Conclusion
The comparative analysis of England and France illustrates how the relationship between religion and the state fundamentally shapes the administration of faith schools. In England, state funding is compatible with a degree of religious autonomy, yet the 50% admissions cap and related equality frameworks reflect the government’s ongoing attempt to balance inclusivity with respect for faith identity. In France, by contrast, the principle of laïcité establishes a stricter divide between state and religion, with public funding conditional on the renunciation of religious selection. Both models demonstrate that state funding inevitably imposes limits on religious freedom, but these limits serve an essential function in safeguarding equality, protecting children’s rights, and ensuring public accountability.
Ultimately, public funding should not be viewed solely as a constraint on religious schools but as a mechanism that reinforces pluralism within a democratic society. Conditional funding provides a means to reconcile faith-based education with universal principles of non-discrimination and social cohesion. The challenge for policymakers lies in maintaining this delicate equilibrium ensuring that religious diversity enriches, rather than fragments, the public education landscape.
]]>2026-02-24T12:01:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-24T12:01:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-23:/280665Around the WebHere are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:
Sitting en banc,...]]>
Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:
Sitting en banc, the 5th Circuit overturned a panel decision declaring a Louisiana law requiring the display of the Ten Commandments in all classrooms of the state’s public schools and universities unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the dispute was not yet ripe for review.
A Woman’s Concern, Inc. v. Healey, (D MA, Feb. 17, 2026) was an action brought by Your Options Medical Centers (YOM), a religiously affiliated pregnancy resource center, wherein they alleged that the state of Massachusetts’ Department of Public Health violated their free speech, free exercise and equal protection rights when it disseminated information critical of pregnancy resource centers. This week, the federal district court for the District of Massachusetts rejected this claim, primarily reasoning that YOM was not targeted for actual or threatened enforcement action.
President Trump posted a Presidential Message on Ash Wednesday, calling for all Americans to remember that the Lenten themes of the “prayer, fasting, and almsgiving have been foundational to our strength from the earliest days of our national story.”
The Department of Justice announced that it is opening Title IX investigations into three Michigan school districts “to determine whether they have included sexual orientation and gender ideology (SOGI) content in any class for grades pre-K-12.” If the districts are including such content, “the investigations will examine whether the schools have notified parents of their right to opt their children out of such instruction.”
The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops released its “Annual Report on the State of Religious Liberty in the United States.” “The report summarizes developments on national questions and federal policies affecting religious liberty in the U.S., including the role of religion in American public life, and the challenges and opportunities of the present moment.”
Earlier this month, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas received a draft constitution “that aims to transition the PA to a full-fledged state”. The draft contains a number of provisions on religion and religious freedom.
]]>2026-02-23T12:58:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-23T12:58:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-22:/280630Law and religion roundup – 22nd FebruaryA week in which the US Supreme Court demonstrated that the separation of powers is not entirely dead...]]>A week in which the US Supreme Court demonstrated that the separation of powers is not entirely dead…
Places of Worship Renewal Fund
Further details continue to emerge about the operation of the Places of Worship Renewal Fund. In answer to a written question from Freddie van Mierlo (Henley and Thame, Lib Dem), the Minister of State at DCMS, Ian Murray, said this:
“The Places of Worship Renewal Fund will provide an equivalent overall level of financial support to that provided by the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme, £23 million per annum.
The new Places of Worship Renewal Fund is a capital fund providing grants upfront, which in some cases, may award a greater proportion of the project costs than what would have previously been received through the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme.
We are aware of concerns regarding the transition between the two schemes. Guidance, including eligibility criteria and application process on the new Places of Worship Renewal Fund, will be published in due course.”
It should be remembered that the new Fund is for England only; Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales will need to make their own domestic arrangements to support listed places of worship. The Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme closed to new applications on 18 February because all the funding in the 2025/2026 budget had been allocated.
Reform of religious education in Scotland
On Tuesday, the Children (Withdrawal from Religious Education and Amendment of UNCRC Compatibility Duty) (Scotland) Bill, introduced to clarify the legal position on the withdrawal of pupils from religious observance in schools, was passed in a final stage three vote at the Scottish Parliament. The changes will align the relevant legislation with existing guidance on religious observance to strengthen alignment with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Once brought into effect, it will strengthen pupils’ rights in relation to religious observance and religious and moral education (RME). The Bill was amended at Stage 2 to separate religious observance from religious and moral education in relation to the pre-existing parental right to withdraw. As a result of the change, the parental right to withdraw a child will only apply to religious observance, and it will no longer be possible to withdraw from RME. Russell Sandberg comments here.
Hamit Coskun again
Last October, we reported on the judgment in R v Hamit Coskun[2025] Southwark Crown Court 10 October,in which Mr Coskun appealed against his conviction for an offence under s.5 Public Order Act 1986, enhanced by the aggravation provisions of s.31 Crime and Disorder Act 1998: setting fire to a copy of the Quran outside the Turkish Consulate in London. Bennathan J upheld his appeal, on the grounds that the Prosecution had not demonstrated satisfactorily either that Mr Coskun’s conduct could properly be found to be disorderly or that it was within the hearing or sight of a person who was likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress.
The Crown Prosecution Service appealed and, according to the BBC report, at the hearing last week, David Perry KC argued for the CPS that “Burning a book in a residential or commercial part of central London, between Knightsbridge and Hyde Park, is in itself disorderly and even more so when the book is a holy text, whatever the religion.”Judgment was reserved.
Note: Subsections (4) and (8) of s.66 Criminal Justice Act 2003 provide that, when the Court of Appeal reverses or varies a ruling, it must either order a resumption of the Crown Court proceedings or a fresh trial, or order the acquittal of the defendant(s) for the offence(s) under appeal. By virtue of subsections (5) and (8), the Court of Appeal will only order the resumption of the Crown Court proceedings or a fresh trial where it considers it necessary in the interests of justice to do so. [With thanks to Wikicrimeline.]
Appointment of Bishop of Durham
On Thursday, it was announced that the new Bishop of Durham is to be the current Archdeacon of Auckland, the Ven Richard Simpson, in succession to Bishop Paul Butler. On election, the Bishop of Durham becomes one of the Lords Spiritual ex officio, and will be a member of the House of Lords after his introduction to the Upper House.
The Times of Maltareports that the Vatican has dissolved St Peter’s Monastery, in Mdina, and appointed a Benedictine abbot to take control of “administrative matters related to the property”. The last resident is Mother Abbess Sr Maria Adeodata dei Marchesi Testaferrata De Noto; and the Vatican is accusing her of having “unilaterally signed, without authorisation, two 50-year leases on the property to private individuals – each for a fee of less than €2,000 per month”. The Vatican apparently told the Archdiocese of Malta that the leases signed by the abbess were invalid “due to non-observance of the regime of canonical authorisations”, and attempts by the Archbishop to resolve the matter were unsuccessful. [With thanks to Mark Hill KC.]
And you thought the faculty jurisdiction was complicated?
]]>2026-02-22T08:40:22+00:00Frank Cranmerhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-22T08:40:22+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-20:/280444Bishop of Lincoln suspended (updated)On 20 February 2026, the Diocese of Lincoln issued the following statement.
Diocesan Statement Reg...]]>On 20 February 2026, the Diocese of Lincoln issued the following statement.
Diocesan Statement Regarding the Status of The Bishop of Lincoln
20th February 2026
The Bishop of Lincoln, The Rt Revd Stephen Conway, has been suspended from ministry while a complaint made to the National Safeguarding Team is responded to according to House of Bishops Code of Practice. This includes referral to the appropriate statutory authorities.
The Bishop of Grantham, The Rt Revd Dr Nicholas Chamberlain, will be performing the function of the Diocesan Bishop during this period.
Support is in place for those affected and there will be no further comment while the process is ongoing.
We understand that this will be a deeply unsettling time. The Diocesan Safeguarding Team is available for anyone who wishes to contact them. They can be contacted via email: safeguarding@lincoln.anglican.org or by phone: 01522 504070.
Alternatively, Safe Spaces is an independent and confidential support advocacy service. Contact their free helpline: 0300 303 1056.
And there is also support from ThirtyOneEight, a safeguarding support line. Their number is 0303 003 1111.
Comment
Bishop Conway has been Bishop of Lincoln since 2023, before which he was Acting Bishop of the diocese, in addition to being Bishop of Ely. His suspension by the Archbishop of Canterbury follows the House of Bishops’ Code of Practice. The Suffragan Bishop of Grantham, Dr Nicholas Chamberlain, will be performing the function of the diocesan Bishop in Bishop Conway’s absence.
The Guardians of the Shrine of Our Lady of Walsingham have accepted the resignation of the Bishop of Lincoln, the Right Reverend Stephen Conway, as Visitor to the Shrine. Bishop Conway offered his resignation following news of his suspension as Bishop of Lincoln, pending ongoing investigations. Master of the Guardians, Fr Philip Barnes, acknowledged with gratitude the work Bishop Conway had done and said that the Guardians would work on choosing a successor in the near future.
Updates
On 20 February 2026, the BBC reported that Bishop Conway had been arrested and released on conditional bail.
]]>2026-02-20T18:04:36+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-20T18:04:36+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-19:/280301Religious education and collective worship in Northern Ireland schoolsReaders will no doubt recall the Supreme Court’s judgment in JR87, Re Application for Judicial Revie...]]>Readers will no doubt recall the Supreme Court’s judgment in JR87, Re Application for Judicial Review [2025] UKSC 40, in which the Court upheld the judgment of Colton J at first instance that religious education and collective worship in the school of the anonymised child applicant were not conveyed in an objective, critical, and pluralistic manner, contrary to Article 9 and Article 2 of Protocol 1 ECHR; Russell Sandberg commented on it here.
The immediate response was for the Northern Ireland Government to commission a Review of RE and collective worship. In answer to a series of written questions in the Northern Ireland Assembly by Nick Mathison (Alliance) about progress (which I report without comment) Paul Givan (DUP), the Minister of Education, , said this:
1: On the Review, on retaining the legislative requirement for RE “to be taught according to the Holy Scriptures”, and on ensuring that RE does not present Christianity, three identical answers:
“The Supreme Court judgment made clear that the legislation itself does not prevent Religious Education (RE) being taught in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner, because schools are permitted, and now encouraged, to add broader material beyond the Core Syllabus.
The Court was, therefore, satisfied that the legislation did not compel a breach and indeed was explicit that ‘The School in teaching religious education was required to include the core syllabus, as specified by the Department, but it could have taught additional matters so that overall, the education could have been conveyed in an objective, critical, and pluralistic manner. Accordingly, it was possible for a school lawfully to teach religious education and to provide collective worship, and the legislation did not require the School to breach A2P1 or article 9 ECHR’
The Terms of Reference for the Review explicitly required the revised syllabus to ensure that RE in Northern Ireland is taught as an academic discipline, developing analytical and evaluative skills, and ensuring that pupils explore a range of religious and non-religious worldviews, and encourages engagement with questions of belief, ethics, identity and meaning, reflecting the diversity of contemporary society.”
“I have put in place a comprehensive and transparent process for revising the Religious Education (RE) Core Syllabus. My Department has launched an open expression‑of‑interest process, inviting applications from experienced practitioners across all schools in Northern Ireland. This open process is designed to attract a range of applicants from across school sectors, who can provide their subject knowledge and classroom experience to the drafting process. Applications will be assessed against the agreed essential criteria. Alongside this, there will be extensive wider engagement. The specific approach is a matter for the Review Chair, Professor Noel Purdy OBE, but engagement will include an open call for evidence, public surveys, and focus group discussions involving children, young people, parents, and a wide range of other stakeholders. The process will culminate in a full public consultation.”
“The approach to drafting the revised RE Core Syllabus and the wider engagement process is a matter for the drafting group, led by Professor Noel Purdy. The Religious Education Advisory Committee has no formal role in the review process, though the drafting group may wish to engage with members of the Committee and consider previous work undertaken by the Committee and others.
The Terms of Reference for the work make clear that the revised Core Syllabus should be pluralist and inclusive, specifically ensuring pupils explore a range of religious and non-religious worldviews, and encourage engagement with questions of belief, ethics, identity and meaning, reflecting the diversity of contemporary society. The Terms of Reference also set out the need for wider engagement and consultation as part of the drafting process.”
“A syllabus is a document that outlines what will be taught in a specific subject or course. The new Religious Education (RE) Core Syllabus will set out the key learning objectives by Key Stage, as defined in the Review’s Terms of Reference. It will not provide guidance on how schools should engage with external groups, which is an operational matter for schools across all aspects of the Curriculum.”
“The Supreme Court judgment, in the matter of JR 87 and another, explicitly states that ‘there is no challenge in this case to collective worship in schools in Northern Ireland being focused on the Christian religion or that in Catholic maintained schools the focus of collective worship may be distinctive of the Catholic denomination’. The Supreme Court did not strike down or question the legality of collective worship, and the duty placed on schools remains firmly in place.
While the Court found that the arrangements for collective worship in JR 87’s school breached rights, this was because how it was delivered in that school. The finding related to ineffective withdrawal arrangements and the risk of stigmatisation not because Christian collective worship itself was unlawful.
My focus, therefore, has been to ensure that every school now implements a simple, immediate, and confidential withdrawal process. I issued new guidance confirming that an unqualified right exists for parents to withdraw their children wholly or partially from RE and/or collective worship.
By strengthening the right of withdrawal and ensuring consistent implementation across all schools, I have taken the precise and proportionate action needed to meet the Court’s requirements while maintaining the statutory framework for collective worship in Northern Ireland.”
]]>2026-02-19T09:06:00+00:00Frank Cranmerhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-19T09:06:00+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-18:/280227Significant opposition to significant rise in burial feesOn 26 January 2026, we posted Church proposes significant increase in fees for burial which reviewed...]]>On 26 January 2026, we posted Church proposes significant increase in fees for burial which reviewed Schedule 1 of the draft Order, GS2434. A new Parochial Fees Order is required to set the fees for 2027 and beyond (the maximum period permitted under the Ecclesiastical Fees Measure 1986 (the 1986 Measure) is five years).
The draft Order prescribes the “base figures” on which the parochial fees for the period 1 January 2027 to 31 December 2031 will be calculated for marriages, funerals and burials, the erection of monuments in churchyards and certain other matters. TheExplanatory Memorandum, GS 2434X, states (at [6]) that “Other than in the case of the fees for burials, the base figures are the currently payable figures for 2026″; a significant increase in burial fees is proposed, the rationale for which is described in the Policy Note, GS 2434P.
General Synod Debate
The Church Times reported that Synod voted overwhelmingly against the proposed increase of £1000 in burial fees[1]. First to speak was the Bishop of Blackburn, the Rt Revd Philip North, who asked for an adjournment. Whilst acknowledging that there was
“an intense debate to be had about the level of fees”, including philosophical questions about how fees should be set, and deeper issues about the accessibility of Occasional Offices to low-income communities“. “All that will do is take all day, push important matters of business out of the Synod, and result in the most terrible mess.”
However, his argument was followed by a debate of nearly three hours, and 20 pages of amendments to the Fees Order. Many speakers referred to the strength of feeling in parishes and the pastoral importance of funeral ministry.
Compare and contrast
In its report(£) Synod overwhelmingly rejects £1000 rise in burial fees the Church Times commented “The General Synod voted overwhelmingly against a proposed increase of £1000 in burial fees, after a debate of nearly three hours on Friday morning” [2].
In February 2020, General Synod changed the target year for “Net Zero” from 2045 to 2030 “achieved through an amendment which was decided after less than ten minutes debate, by a majority of 15, with a turnout that meant fewer than a third of Synod members voted in favour of it”[3].
[1] Under the new order, burial of a body in a churchyard immediately after a service in church would be £1390; for burial on a separate occasion, it would be £1425.
]]>2026-02-18T08:00:59+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-18T08:00:59+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-17:/280170David Tudor StatementOn 16 February 2026, the Church of England issued a Statement on David Tudor, extracts of which are ...]]>On 16 February 2026, the Church of England issued a Statement on David Tudor, extracts of which are reproduced below. The Press Release includes links for anyone seeking further support.
David Tudor statement
16/02/2026
A Bishop’s Disciplinary Tribunal for the Diocese of Southwark which in November upheld a new complaint against David Tudor under the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 has today published its penalty of a lifetime prohibition from ministry. This is the second lifetime prohibition against Tudor.
The tribunal determined that the allegation of clergy misconduct, relating to the serious sexual abuse of a 15 year old during the time David Tudor was a priest in the Diocese of Southwark in the 1980s, had been proved. Read the full determination and the determination on penalty.
See response from the dioceses of Southwark and Chelmsford to the Tribunal’s penalty and determination on the new complaint.
A former Rector in Chelmsford Diocese, Tudor was first prohibited from ministry for life in October 2024 following two complaints under the Clergy Discipline Measure. The penalty imposed followed a full admission of guilt to disclosures of serious sexual abuse from the two complainants, relating to the time when he was a priest in the Diocese of Southwark.
In November it was announced that The David Tudor Safeguarding Practice Review, commissioned by the National Safeguarding Team, NST and the dioceses of Southwark and Chelmsford, has extended beyond the initially planned six-month deadline due to new police information. Survivors were updated on this and support continues to be offered.
]]>2026-02-17T13:20:53+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-17T13:20:53+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-16:/280113Around the WebHere are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:
In Illinois Dis...]]>
Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:
In Illinois District Court, a Child Evangelism Fellowship sued a school district alleging violation of the 1st and 14th Amendments for several acts, like their exclusion from literature distribution forums.
This past December, an appeal was filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Arroyo Castro v. Gasper, where a district court in Connecticut previously denied a teacher’s preliminary injunction after she was disciplined for displaying a crucifix in her classroom.
In Inclusive Louisiana v. St.James Parish, a district court refused to dismiss claims against the Defendant, which alleged that Plaintiff’s land use rights were violated by industrial pollution, going against the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.
In Davenport v. Episcopal Health Services, Inc., a district court in New York held that the ministerial exception barred Title IX and Fair Labor Standard Acts claims by a student Chaplain.
On Tuesday February 10th, the House Subcommittee on Early Education held a hearing to discuss Mahmoud v. Taylor, a case regarding parental opt-outs in the Maryland public school system.
]]>2026-02-16T14:06:18+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-16T14:06:18+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-15:/280034Law and religion roundup – 15th FebruaryPalestine Action in court
On Friday, in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [202...]]>Palestine Action in court
On Friday, in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin), three judges in the Administrative Division of the High Court, with Dame Victoria Sharp P presiding, declared unanimously that the proscription of Palestine Action – under which many people protesting out of religious conviction, including clergy of various denominaitions, have been arrested and charged – had resulted in a very significant interference with their rights to freedom of speech and freedom of assembly and was therefore discriminatory.
The claim succeeded on two grounds (the other grounds failed):
Ground 2: that the decision to seek proscription was contrary to the Human Rights Act 1998 because it amounted to an unjustified interference with Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 11 (freedom of association and peaceful assembly) ECHR and further, amounted to discrimination contrary to Article 14; and
Ground 6: that the decision to seek the Order proscribing Palestine Action was made by the Home Secretary in breach of her own policy on when she would exercise her discretion to seek an order proscribing an organisation.
The Court agreed that Palestine Action had organised and undertaken actions that amounted to terrorism under in the Terrorism Act 2000:
“At its core, Palestine Action is an organisation that promotes its political cause through criminality and encouragement of criminality. A very small number of its actions have amounted to terrorist action within the definition at section 1(1) of the 2000 Act” [138].
Nevertheless, it held that the nature and scale of the group’s activities had
“not yet reached the level, scale and persistence that would justify the application of the criminal law measures that are the consequence of proscription, and the very significant interference with Convention rights consequent on those measures” [140],
In spite of finding for the claimant, however, the Court did not lift the ban, which will remain in force while the Government appeals.
Mark Elliott, Professor of Public Law at Cambridge, comments on the judgment in Public Law for Everyone, here. David Allen Green comments in The Empty City, here.
Places of Worship Renewal Fund: further details
Details of the new Places of Worship Renewal Fund continue to emerge. In answer to two written questions to the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport by Simon Hoare (North Dorset, Con), Ian Murray, Minister of State at DCMS said this:
“The Places of Worship Renewal Fund is a capital fund, meaning it will award grants for projects to cover capital works, rather than just the VAT element. Further details on the Places of Worship Renewal Fund specific criteria, application process and funding allocation will be announced in due course” [here].
“The Listed Places of Worship Scheme was run on a first come first served basis. The new Places of Worship Scheme will instead target funding at areas of the most need, and Places of Worship will go through a proportionate application process. We are currently designing the criteria with experts from the sector, and have not made an estimate of numbers eligible, which will partly depend on the size of grants applied for. The fund will deliver £92 million over 4 years” [here].
In answer to a written question from Pippa Heylings (South Cambridgeshire, Lib Dem), he said that the Department’s evaluation of the LPWG Scheme “showed that while the current Scheme had many benefits, 80% of respondents said that they would still have carried out the work without the rebate. As we look towards a new fiscal period and the evolving needs of our community, it is essential that government support is deployed to the areas where it can have the greatest impact and where it is needed most” [here].
Further information came to light during the Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee’s oral evidence session on protecting built heritage with the DCMS Minister of State, Baroness Twycross, in which she made it clear that the new Fund will be more focused than the Scheme it replaces:
“The key difference is that it is going to be targeted. The VAT model we previously used was a pretty blunt tool. The new fund, which will have £90 million over the next four years, will be targeted at areas of double disadvantage … We are working through the criteria and how that will work in practice, because I am also clear that a postcode is not necessarily reflective of where the place of worship is undertaking its community work. So we are looking at how it will support community cohesion as well” [Q. 291]
It remains to be seen how DCMS interprets “areas of double disadvantage”.
Ecclesiastical Law Society
Booking is now open for the Ecclesiastical Law Society’s Day Conference, at 10 am on Saturday 13 June at St Peter’s, Eaton Square. The theme of the conference (which will include the AGM) is BurialLawand Churchyards: fit for the future?
The ticket price includes all refreshments and lunch. Further details here.
Helena van Coller, International Journal for Religious Freedom: Church bells, chimes and calls to prayer: A religious blessing or noise nuisance?: on the law of nuisance in South Africa. (Which, incidentally, reminds Frank that well-struck rounds or call-changes are less likely to annoy the neighbours than badly-rung Stedman Triples.)
]]>2026-02-15T08:53:33+00:00Frank Cranmerhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-15T08:53:33+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-11:/279645Clergy Conduct Measure – further consideration by General SynodOn Tuesday 10 February 2026, General Synod considered the Reintroduction/Final Approval of the Clerg...]]>On Tuesday 10 February 2026, General Synod considered the Reintroduction/Final Approval of the Clergy Conduct Measure, Clergy Conduct Measure, GS 2311Band Report by the Legislative Committee (Clergy Conduct Measure), GS 2311W.
The Ecclesiastical Committee raised concerns about the Clergy Conduct Measure and was of the opinion that it was not expedient. The Legislative Committee withdrew the Measure from the Ecclesiastical Committee and sought its reintroduction into the Synod with a view to an amendment being made to address the principal concern raised[1].
“The Clergy Conduct Measure(CCM) was then reintroduced to synod following feedback from the Parliamentary Ecclesiastical Committee. Synod agreed an amendment, reversing the presumption of private hearings so that tribunals and courts will normally sit in public. Final approval for the Measure was then secured comfortably across all three Houses.
Synod then approved changes to the Church Representation Rules concerning PCC decisions taken by correspondence, introducing the requirement that at least one third of members must give written approval and that no member objects. The motion passed with strong support.
[1] David Lamming’s Comment discusses the procedure involved. He notes: “A previous occasion when the EC found a draft Measure inexpedient concerned what became, after amendment, the Churchwardens Measure 2001. James Behrens wrote about the process in an article for the Ecclesiastical Law Journal: 6 Ecc LJ 97. In that case, the draft Measure first received Synod’s approval in July 1997 and, after being batted back and forth between Synod and the EC, eventually received Royal Assent nearly four years later in April 2001”.
]]>2026-02-11T10:06:13+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-11T10:06:13+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-10:/279526Phased replacement of gas boiler in Grade I churchThe recently reported case Re St. John the Baptist Tideswell [2025] ECC Der 2 concerns the replaceme...]]>The recently reported case Re St. John the Baptist Tideswell [2025] ECC Der 2concerns the replacement of the gas boilers at a Grade I listed church which had been damaged by flooding. The initial request for like-for-like replacement was refused because it failed to demonstrate “due regard” to the Church of England’s Net Zero Carbon guidance, which is mandatory under the Faculty Jurisdiction Rules.
The petitioners had sought a like-for-like replacement on the understanding that Ecclesiastical Insurance would only cover like-for-like replacement of gas boilers. However, Clarke Ch. clarified:
“…further enquiries revealed that this is indeed the standard response, although, when pressed, there is no requirement that insurance money is used on a fossil fuel system, simply that payment has to be made on this basis, which is more understandable” [4].
“Heating is the main source of carbon emissions for most churches and so decisions [although this about replacement of heating systems will be the most important net zero carbon decisions that most churches will have to make. That is most particularly the case where fossil fuel boilers have failed and a new heating system is required.
The Chancellor cited with approval the review by the Deputy Chancellor of the diocese of Carlisle in Re All Saints’ Church, Scotby [2023] ECC Car 2 whose judgment concluded:
“[27]. … the purpose of requiring the Petitioners to explain how they have had “due regard” to the guidance, and of requiring the DAC to set out its opinion on that explanation, is clearly to enable, and indeed to require, the Chancellor to make a decision on whether they have actually had due regard to the guidance”.
In Re All Saints’ Scotby, the Deputy Chancellor had “helpfully distilled five key points from the Church’s guidance”; these were repeated in full at [12]. These key points were also adopted by Chancellor Ormondroyd in Re Christ Church Chineham[2025] ECC Win 1. The DAC’s non-recommendation appears to have provoked further action from the Petitioners in the form of a Revised Options Appraisal which runs to 62 pages – “undated, but…uploaded to the OFS, along with other documents, on 1 March 2025” [14].
“[15]. This Revised Options Appraisal does address the ideal, most energy efficient option, before then considering other options, in the light of a commitment to working towards net zero carbon by 2030. It is what should have complied at the outset.
The Appraisal determines that the ideal system would be electrical, but concludes that this is impractical. It then considers Combined Heat and Power, Electric boilers, Air Source Heat Pumps, Air to Air Heat Pumps, Biomass boilers, Ground-source Heat Pumps, Localised Heating, Solar generation of electricity, Hydrogen ready boilers and conventional gas boilers. Its final conclusion is a request for a three phase programme:
[16]. This analysis is of the type which ought to be carried out by every parish with a Grade 1 listed building which needs to replace its heating system. It enables both the DAC and the Court to consider properly the key points contained in the issued guidance.
[17]. It was following the submission of the Revised Options Appraisal that this petition was referred to (the Chancellor). It had not been reconsidered by the DAC and so the Notification of Advice was still a “Not Recommend”.
After visiting the church, the Chancellor requested a reconsideration by the DAC of its advice, and he was provided with a copy of the minutes of the DAC meeting. However, in essence, while impressed by the Revised Options Appraisal, the DAC was unwilling to change its advice because what was being requested was unchanged and the DAC was not convinced that there was a genuine commitment to proceed to the proposed Phase 2 [19].
It is in that context and with the principles set out in the judgment in mind, that Clarke Ch. considered this petition. He held that the petitioners had now properly engaged with the Net Zero guidance and that immediate heating was necessary for the church’s mission and community use. A faculty was therefore granted, but only on strict conditions: the new gas boilers must be hydrogen-ready, supplied on a green tariff, subject to carbon offsetting, and approved for a limited period of five years to 2030, during which progress towards low-carbon alternatives must be demonstrated.
Comment
Even the Church’s “Net Zero Carbon 2030: Impact Report“, (January 2023 to March 2024), now acknowledges that “The Church of England’s contribution to climate change is small compared to the footprint of the UK and then globally” (page 34) – a point we have been making on a number of occasions.
The total emissions of the Church of England constitute less than 0.05% of those of the United Kingdom, which themselves are one hundred times smaller in global terms. Furthermore, places of worship – churches, church halls and cathedrals – account for under 30% of the Church’s total GHG emissions.
Furthermore, the timescale for achieving this target, 2030, is substantially shorter than that for national and global targets, 2050.
]]>2026-02-10T11:43:34+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-10T11:43:34+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-10:/279511Legal Spirits 074: Religion and the State in JapanNearly eighty years after Japan adopted constitutional provisions separating religion and t...]]>
Nearly eighty years after Japan adopted constitutional provisions separating religion and the state, Japanese courts continue to grapple with a question familiar to American lawyers: how to enforce separation without severing law from history, tradition, and social practice. In this episode of Legal Spirits, Mark Movsesian speaks with Professor Eiichiro Takahata of Nihon University about the Japanese Supreme Court’s church–state jurisprudence, including its adaptation of U.S. Establishment Clause doctrine and its distinctive reliance on common-sense social understandings. The conversation offers a comparative lens on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent turn away from abstract tests like Lemon and toward history and tradition—and highlights both the parallels and the limits of that convergence. Listen in!
]]>2026-02-10T13:57:44+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-10T13:57:44+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-09:/279415Around the WebHere are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:
The U.S. Departm...]]>
Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:
The U.S. Department of Justice has opened a civil-rights investigation after vandals broke into and desecrated Holy Innocents Catholic School in Long Beach, California, destroying religious statues, damaging the tabernacle, and causing extensive property loss.
The Archdiocese of New York alleges in a state-court filing that its longtime insurer, Chubb, secretly operated a victims’ advocacy website called the “Church Accountability Project” as part of a “shadow campaign” to pressure the archdiocese and gain leverage in ongoing litigation over insurance coverage for clergy abuse claims.
A year after Episcopal Bishop Mariann Budde publicly urged President Donald Trump to show mercy toward immigrants and other vulnerable groups during an inaugural prayer service, she joined hundreds of clergy in Minneapolis protesting the administration’s escalating immigration enforcement and mass-deportation efforts.
Italian church and government authorities launched investigations after a restored cherub in Rome’s Basilica of San Lorenzo in Lucina appeared to resemble Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, sparking controversy about politicizing sacred art and drawing crowds that disrupted Mass.
As the Vatican appeals court reviews the high-profile financial scandal known as the “trial of the century,” defense lawyers are scrutinizing Pope Francis’ role, focusing on secret decrees he issued in 2019-2020 that granted prosecutors sweeping investigatory powers, including warrantless wiretapping, raising concerns about fairness and transparency.
A federal indictment filed in Wisconsin accuses four individuals of participating in a years-long scheme to defraud Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Milwaukee by issuing fraudulent checks, fabricating work payments, and attempting to conceal the theft, with hundreds of thousands of dollars potentially subject to forfeiture.
]]>2026-02-09T12:00:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-09T12:00:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-08:/279344Law and religion roundup – 8th FebruaryFinancial support for listed places of worship
The details of future financial support for listed pl...]]>Financial support for listed places of worship
The details of future financial support for listed places of worship continue to emerge in dribs and drabs. In reply to a written question from Tonia Antoniazzi (Gower, Lab) asking the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport if she will make an assessment of the potential impact of recently announced changes to capital funding for places of worship on places of worship in Wales, the Minister of State, Ian Murray, said this:
“The Places of Worship Renewal Fund is focused solely on England because heritage policy is devolved. Future capital funding for Wales is supported through Barnett allocations, which provide proportional funding to the Welsh Government. As these funds are not ring-fenced, it is for the devolved administrations to determine how this funding is allocated and spent according to their priorities. Therefore, we do not plan to assess the impact of this capital funding for places of worship in Wales.
This contrasts with the previous Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme (LPWGS), which operated UK-wide as a VAT-rebate scheme. Tax policy is not devolved.
To ensure continued support across the UK, we are working closely with sector funders to maximise opportunities for all nations. The National Lottery Heritage Fund (NLHF) remains a vital resource, offering grants across the UK and investing £100 million over three years in places of worship. This includes a strategic initiative designed to provide targeted support and build capacity, ensuring that places of worship in Wales have access to investment.”
Religious education in Northern Ireland
On Tuesday, Paul Givan, Minister of Education, made an oral statement on religious education in light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in JR87, Re Application for Judicial Review[2025] UKSC 40, in which the Court upheld the judgment of Colton J at first instance that religious education and collective worship in the school of the anonymised child applicant were not conveyed in an objective, critical, and pluralistic manner, contrary to Article 9 and Article 2 of Protocol 1 (ECHR). He also published new guidance on withdrawal from RE and collective worship in all grant-aided schools.
He told the Northern Ireland Assembly that, in light of the judgment, he had decided that it was necessary for the Department to revise the core syllabus and had published Terms of Reference for the Review of the RE Syllabus. He had also concluded that it was “neither desirable nor easily achievable to bring about fundamental changes to collective worship” and was therefore publishing guidance “to support schools to meet these requirements and to ensure clarity and consistency across all schools”. Finally, because the Supreme Court had criticised the current lack of inspection of Religious Education and collective worship, he intended to bring forward legislation in the current Assembly term “to ensure robust, transparent and accountable inspection arrangements for both Religious Education and arrangements for withdrawal”. [With thanks to Russell Sandberg, who comments on the statement here].
Abortion and the Crime and Policing Bill
On Monday, the House of Lords debated an amendment to Clause 191 of the Crime and Policing Bill, which would decriminalise abortion for women acting in relation to their own pregnancy, even up to full term, in England and Wales. The amendment to retain the reference to the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, so that the deliberate destruction of a viable unborn child would remain an offence, was withdrawn [With thanks to the Religion Media Centre].
Religious slaughter
In reply to a written question from Adam Dance (Yeovil, Lib Dem) asking whether the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs is taking steps to increase the proportion of livestock in the UK that are pre-stunned before slaughter, Dame Angela Eagle, Minister of State for Food Security and Rural Affairs, said this:
“Regulations require that animals must be stunned prior to slaughter so that they are unconscious and insensible to pain. The only exception to the requirement to stun is where animals are slaughtered in accordance with religious rites. The Government would prefer all animals to be stunned before slaughter, butwe respect the rights of Jews and Muslims to eat meat prepared in accordance with their religious beliefs.
For sheep and goats, the Government supports an industry-led initiative called the Demonstration of Life Protocol, which provides assurance for Muslim consumers that the stunning of these animals is compatible with halal slaughter requirements, while protecting the welfare of the animals involved and supporting opportunities for trade” (emphasis added).
Ecclesiastical Law Society
Upcoming online “bite-size events”:
10 February: What is the Anglican Communion?
10 March: What is a Diocese?
21 Apri:l: What is an Archbishop?
All start at 17:30 and are free to attend; further details are available on the ELS website, here.
]]>2026-02-08T08:30:29+00:00Frank Cranmerhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-08T08:30:29+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-07:/279245Further papers for February General SynodThe Church of England’ General Synod will meet in London from 9 to 13 February 2026. Links to the ag...]]>The Church of England’ General Synod will meet in London from 9 to 13 February 2026. Links to the agenda and papers were included in our post here. Below are further links to the House of Laity of the General Synod, and the Convocations of Canterbury and York which will meet on the afternoon of 9 February 2026.
There are two sessions scheduled for Questions on the afternoons of Monday and Tuesday:
]]>2026-02-07T10:19:44+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-07T10:19:44+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-05:/279088Edward Colston: the future of All Saints churchOn 4 February, the Diocese of Bristol issued a Press Notice announcing the completion of the first s...]]>On 4 February, the Diocese of Bristol issued a Press Notice announcing the completion of the first stage of a consultation to determine the future of All Saints Church, Corn Street. The church, formerly known as All Hallows, contains the tomb of Edward Colston and a memorial to him by Flemish sculptor John Michael Rysbrack. The church was closed to the public in 1984 and used as an education and resource centre for the Diocese of Bristol until 2015. The Press Notice is reproduced below.
Stage one of consultation exploring future of All Saints, Corn Street, completed
The first stage of a consultation to determine the future of All Saints Church on Corn Street, believed to be the burial place of Edward Colston, has been completed. Commissioned in 2024 and carried out by external consultants, the project has identified several potential future uses for the historic building. These proposals will be explored and developed further in the second phase of the consultation.
The first stage of the consultation engaged with members of Bristol’s African Caribbean heritage communities, as well as other stakeholders whose work and/or knowledge was deemed relevant to the issue. The process involved interviews, focus groups, artistic responses, visits to the building and surveys to gather opinions on the church’s future. All respondents were offered the opportunity to visit the building and approximately 50% did so. The methodology used open-ended questions to encourage reflection and discussion. The Rt Revd Neil Warwick, Acting Bishop of Bristol and Bishop of Swindon, said:
“The completion of the first stage of the consultation marks an important step in listening, learning, and discerning the most appropriate way forward for the building. Former Bishop of Bristol, The Rt Revd Viv Faull, began this vital work, and the Diocese and I remain dedicated to it.”
The consultation revealed differing perspectives on the building’s potential future use. These perspectives and early-stage proposals will be explored in the second, broader stage of the process. Further information about this second stage will be shared by the Diocese in the coming weeks.
The building has been closed to the public since 1984 but was used as offices until 2015. Due to its location, legally required works to fix the building’s roof are set to begin in early spring to protect public safety. The works, which will last for around six months, are completely separate from the consultation and will not influence the final decisions about the building’s future.
Comment
Roof repair
A detailed Diocesan Report (25 May 2025) stated that the centrality of roof repair had been highlighted by the Bishop’s Council which reviewed the situation in March and May 2025; it concluded that the least-worst option remained to repair the roof, as tendered, on the grounds that:
there is a legal liability to do so
the roof is fragile, and will require increasingly more costly maintenance unless a more permanent repair is made;
most of the potential future options under consideration will take a number of years to come to fruition, in which time yet further expenditure on the roof will be necessary to ensure that the DBF meets its legal liabilities, and obligations to owners of adjoining properties;
by not carrying out the work, the appraisal of options following the consultation on the future of the building will be compromised as the building will deteriorate further;
there are obligations to maintain the integrity of the church building as All Saints is attached to commercial and residential properties;
The longer it takes to repair the roof, the greater the (wider) public safety risk becomes.
Other issues
The Diocesan Report gives details of: the background; the monuments/artifacts in the church; discern potential options; legal obligations – BDBF Liability for Closed Buildings and Financing repairs and maintenance of Closed Buildings; financial authority; urgency; strategic racial justice priorities; vault access; and potential options for the future.
A reference states the Edward Colston’s body was reportedly exhumed and reinterred in the vault, which was described as “very deep”, directly in front of the monument. There is a possibility that the individual exhumed and identified as Colston in 1843 was not, in fact, Colston; the identity was questioned by contemporaries.
Recent investigations have revealed that there is no visible point of entry into the vault, other than breaking open the seal. It is uncertain how many layers lie beneath; it may go straight to the void where the remains were reinterred in 1854, or it may be laid on a bed of screed, or other tiles.
An article in The Guardian notes that elsewhere in the Diocese, the church of St Agnes in the St Paul’s district is struggling to find £887,000 for maintenance work on its tower and building. A spokesperson for the diocese said: “Our church buildings team has been working closely with the parish to assess the structural repairs and restoration required for the church tower, as well as other essential works needed to safeguard the historic building.
“The diocese has different legal responsibilities for open and closed church buildings. The works currently taking place at All Saints are a statutory requirement and essential to protect public safety. We understand the concerns raised by St Agnes, and we regret any distress caused because of these legal obligations.”
]]>2026-02-05T16:07:24+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-05T16:07:24+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-05:/279011Upcoming Panel: Displaying the 10 Commandments in Public School ClassroomsLater this month, the Mattone Center will co-host its annual symposium with the St. John...]]>
Later this month, the Mattone Center will co-host its annual symposium with the St. John’s Journal of Catholic Legal Studies. This year’s panel will address Roake v. Brumley, the 5th Circuit case on the constitutionality of displaying the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms. We’ll hear from Christopher Lund (Wayne State) and Eric Rassbach (Becket Fund). We’ll post a video of the event later.
Space is limited, but if interested, please email Center Director Mark Movsesian at mark.movsesian@stjohns.edu. Thanks!
]]>2026-02-05T12:00:00+00:00Mark Movsesianhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-05T12:00:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-03:/278917Death watch beetle provides opportunity for lavatory in vestryIn 2015 as part of a reordering project, the ground floor of the tower of All Saints, Wrington[1] wa...]]>In 2015 as part of a reordering project, the ground floor of the tower of All Saints, Wrington[1] was converted into a vestry, “shielded from the nave by a wooden screen situated neatly within the tower arch”. The vestry has a wooden floor and various cupboards; beneath the floor was included a foul drainage connection; although not utilized at that time, this proved to be timely “future proofing”.
It was discovered that the joisted wooden vestry floor of All Saints had become infested with death watch beetle, necessitating repair. The proposed remedial work includes the replacement of the present floor with stone brought to the level of the paving in the nave, in addition to various consequential works. This also provided an opportunity to introduce a lavatory cubicle with disabled access, taking advantage of the existing drainage connection.
Two associated projects were the subject of the petition Re All Saints Wrington[2026] ECC B&W 2, presented by the Rector and the two churchwardens who estimated the aggregate cost of the works to be £94,000 [3]. The petition attracted a substantial level of opposition. Four parishioners joined in the proceedings as parties opponent while a further 15 letters of objection were sent to the Registry (one of which was later withdrawn) [4]. Most of opponents to the proposals had a connection with Wrington Church extending over many years, and several had served as church wardens or in other important roles within the parish.
The Issues to be Determined
Although some objectors challenged the need for any additional toilet facilities, given the availability of those in the Reading Room outside the churchyard, the majority, together with the Petitioners, recognised that convenient facilities are required if the church building is to fulfil its potential for worship, mission and community use. This was reflected in the agreed particulars of objection which stated: “At the outset we wish to point out that we are not objecting to the concept of a WC within the Church grounds, but not in the Vestry of a Grade I Listed Building” [6].
Briden Ch. noted:
[7] This realistic concession reflects the experience in many churches where such provision for the comfort of those who use the building has led to growth and has reinforced the contribution of the church to the life of the community. For the purposes of this judgment the need for change at least to the extent accepted by the parties opponent, cannot realistically be disputed.
“[8] …despite the reluctance among the objectors to concede the principle of a lavatory within an outstanding historic building, there can be no arguable case, based on the guidance in re. Alkmund, Duffield [2013] Fam 158, that harm will result from the proposed change. The absence of potential harm is evident from the supportive attitude of the statutory consultees. Of these, the Victorian Society made no substantive response.
[9] Had any issue of harmful intervention arisen it would undoubtedly have been recognised and made the subject of comment by those consultees. Moreover, at diocesan level no questions of harm has been identified by the Diocesan Advisory Committee in respect of the vestry as a location. While there is no evidence of harm (in the Duffield sense) upon which the objectors can rely, it is open to them, as they have done, to contend that the vestry is, in other respects, an unsuitable place for a lavatory.
[10] The difference between the parties was further narrowed by the document prepared by the WC committee and headed “Assessment of advantages and disadvantages of six toilet locations including attached and remote options”, (“the Assessment Document”, 31 July 2024). On the basis of the representations made, the Court had to decide, for the purpose of selecting a location, between Number 1, the petitioners’ proposal, and Number 3, a new external building in the churchyard where sheds currently stand, which had the support of the parties opponent.
It was common ground that the beetle attack must be addressed and the floor repaired. While the parties opponent saw the cost of repair as a justification for economy regarding the provision of a lavatory, for the petitioners the removal of the wooden floor was an opportunity not to be missed providing their scheme for internal facilities receives approval [11].
Location
With regard to the location, neither of the remaining potential sites – in the churchyard or within the tower – was deemed to be ideal, [12] to [16], and “[o]n balance the tower vestry is to be regarded as the preferred location. Hidden by the tower screen, its position does not intrude upon the historic nave or the churchyard, and is reasonably remote from activities within the building. Along with the remainder of the vestry arrangements, the layout is fully reversible without harm to the surrounding architecture” [17].
Safeguarding
An advantage asserted for the tower vestry solution in the Assessment Document was that “care and safeguarding responsibilities were met in full”. This assertion was “roundly condemned in the particulars of objection as, ‘An exaggerated view of the safeguarding issues used as a means of ignoring realistic outside alternatives all at a likely lesser cost’”. Against this, the Chancellor commented [18]
“[q]uite apart from the emphasis now put upon safeguarding in the life of the Church of England, the practicalities have been explained in the letter […] from the Head Teacher of Wrington Church of England Primary School. Pupils of the school”,
on which he continued:
“The need, on the grounds of care and safeguarding, to escort young children to the Reading Room applies equally to an isolated building (as proposed in Option 3) in the churchyard but some 60 metres from the church and close to the churchyard gateway. Conversely, safety is maximised if the pupils can be kept under supervision within the church. Since engagement with the school is an essential feature of the role of the church within the community, the petitioners have rightly attached importance to safeguarding as a justification for Option 1”.
Extent of Consultation
The particulars of objection allege that there has been a lack of direct consultation with the congregation and the inhabitants of the village, leading to Option 1 being presented as a fait accompli. Closely connected with this allegation was the suggestion that the process had been rushed in order to avoid the imminent imposition of Value Added Tax upon the works [19]. Briden Ch. observed:
“Plainly there is a difference of perception concerning the level of public consultation. It is possible that greater interaction with the congregation and residents might have avoided some of the misconceptions, for example with regard to the impact upon the traditional appearance of the building, which feature in the objectors’ letters.
Even so, the question arises, what difference to the outcome would more extensive consultation have made? In the event, the petitioners have produced a scheme which has been favoured by the D.A.C., Historic England and the amenity societies and has been accepted by this Court as the least disadvantageous of the possible solutions. Further discussion at parish level is unlikely to have been productive, since the petitioners had good reason to adhere to their preferred scheme even in the face of opposition”.
Finance
The particulars of objection dwelt in some detail upon the means of funding the two elements (the floor and the lavatory) which appeared in the petition; it was questioned whether the lavatory is affordable [23]. The Chancellor explained “[t]he role of the Consistory Court in this respect is limited, because by Section 4(1)(ii)(a) of the Parochial Church Councils (Powers) Measure 1956 there is vested in the PCC power, duties and liabilities with respect to “The financial affairs of the Church including the collection and administration of all moneys raised for church purposes”.
Democratic control of the finances is underpinned by the requirement in the Church
Representation Rules that the year’s financial statements shall be open for discussion at the Annual Parochial Church Meeting (See Part 9, Rule M5(i)(c)of these Rules).
“[26] The Consistory Court will not override the PCC in the exercise of its wide statutory powers in determining how money is to be raised or spent. The financial information to be given in paragraph 4 of the faculty petition is directed to the narrower issue of the adequacy of money required for the task in hand. With that issue the Court is concerned because it will not sanction works or purposes which on their face are doomed to failure for lack of funds. Where money is to be raised after the faculty has been granted, a condition is likely to be imposed requiring a minimum level of funding before all or part of the work may be commenced.
[27] Applying the principles summarised in paragraphs 25 and 26 to the particulars of objection and the petitioners’ response, it is clear that the principal objections, notably the dissipation of capital, and spending upon the foul drainage connection and architect’s fees from the capital accounts, fall within the remit of the P.C.C. in the exercise of its administrative powers. The Court will not interfere with the control of the P.C.C. over these matters. In so far as the parties opponent have expressed the fear that the lavatory project will simply run out of money, the petitioners have, however, a case to answer. They have sought to do so in their response.
[28] Of the estimated aggregate cost of £94,000 (which includes a 10% allowance for contingencies) the petitioners expect a contribution of £44,000 from capital funds to cover the cost of the vestry floor as a repair item. The balance of £50,000 is intended to be raised from various sources such as gifts, pledges and grant funding without recourse to the assets of the church or its regular income. Thus far, the petitioners’ appeal for money has met with reasonable success, and (in line with experience elsewhere) it is expected that more contributions would be forthcoming after a faculty had been granted.
[29] The petitioners’ expectations, while realistic, might remain unfulfilled… The appropriate means of catering for such contingencies is the imposition of a faculty condition that the projected works shall be divided into convenient phases and operations in relation to each phase shall not commence until at least 75% of the funding applicable to that phase has become available.
Conclusion
[30] Despite the written submissions ably deployed by the parties opponent and supported in the letters of the remaining objectors, it has been concluded in this judgment that the weight of expert advice, and at least on balance the practical advantages associated with the petitioners’ preferred plans, justify the grant of a faculty for the interior lavatory cubicle.
A faculty will accordingly pass the seal as prayed. The faculty will also extend to the uncontentious floor repairs. There will be a condition in terms set out in paragraph 29 and a further condition for archaeological oversight of works to the floor or other excavations.
Postscript
[1] Sir Charles Barry, one of the architects for the Houses of Parliament was said to have used Wrington’s tower as inspiration for the Victoria Tower.
]]>2026-02-03T16:33:29+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-03T16:33:29+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-02:/278754Around the WebHere are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:
A student pro-li...]]>
Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:
A student pro-life group from Noblesville School District filed a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, after the Seventh Circuit upheld the school’s refusal to permit the group to post flyers because of the political content. The action, E.D. v. Noblesville School District followed after the school suspended the students for several months.
In Polk v. Montgomery County Public Schools, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction sought by a substitute teacher who objected on free speech and free exercise grounds to the school district’s Guidelines for Student Gender Identity. The majority rejected plaintiff’s free exercise and free speech claims, concluding that the Guidelines are neutral and generally applicable and that they satisfy the rational basis standard.
Coastal Family Church filed an emergency motion seeking to stay a temporary injunction issued by a Florida state court which would bar the use of its strip mall unit for religious services.
The Third Circuit Court heard oral argument in Anash, Inc. v. Borough of Kingston. The lower court refused to grant a preliminary injunction to an Orthodox Jewish Yeshiva whose property was condemned, noting that plaintiff had not suffered irreparable harm, and that it was unlikely plaintiff would succeed on the merits of its challenge to zoning ordinances. Now, on appeal, the Yeshiva claims violations of RLUIPA and the due process clause.
A new report from Open Doors, a Christian advocacy organization, entitled World Watch List 2026, was released last week. The report assesses the persecution of Christians around the world, covering the period from October 1, 2024, to September 30, 2025. Topping their list of the 50 countries where Christians face the most extreme persecution are North Korea (#1), Somalia (#2), and Yemen (#3).
The NIH recently announced that it will no longer fund research involving human fetal tissue from elective abortions. Support for such research has declined steadily since 2019, while advances in breakthrough technologies “have created robust alternatives that can drive discovery while reducing ethical concerns.”
]]>2026-02-02T14:05:04+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-02-02T14:05:04+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-02-02:/278646Ecclesiastical court judgments – JanuaryReview of the ecclesiastical court judgments during January 2026
Summaries to the 16 consistory cour...]]>Review of the ecclesiastical court judgments during January 2026
Summaries to the 16 consistory court judgments reviewed during January are listed below, with links to the L&RUK review. These included [*]:
Re St Martin’s Church, Brampton [2025] ECC Car 11 The petitioners applied for permission to appeal against the Chancellor’s judgment of 12 October 2025 refusing a faculty for external access works at the church. Permission was sought under rule 23 of the Faculty Jurisdiction Rules, requiring the proposed appeal to have a real prospect of success or some other compelling reason for it to be heard.
The petitioners argued that the alternative access proposal identified in the judgment would result in inequality of access, would itself cause serious harm to the building’s significance, and that the lack of equal access was rendering the church increasingly unfit for use.
The Chancellor refused permission to appeal. He held that the grounds advanced did not engage with the proper test. The petitioners had not identified any error of law, fact, or principle, nor any improper exercise of discretion. Instead, they relied on new evidence and a restatement of disagreement with the conclusions reached. The Chancellor explained that the judgment had expressly recognised the importance of equal access and had accepted the compelling need relied upon by the petitioners. The proposed grounds disclosed no realistic prospect of success and no other compelling reason to permit an appeal. Permission to appeal was therefore refused. [Re St Martin’s Church, Brampton [2025] ECC Car 11] [Post] [top]
Re Sherborne Abbey [2025] ECC Sal 2 A major re-ordering was proposed for Sherborne Abbey, a Grade I listed church, including: conversion of the existing north-east vestry into toilet facilities; creation of a new vestry beneath the organ loft in the north transept and Wykeham Chapel; relocation of the Horsey Monument to the north quire aisle; introduction of a discreet hospitality unit in the Lady Chapel; accessibility improvements; and confirmation of a Madonna statue in the Lady Chapel.
Extensive consultation had taken place over several years. While objections were raised—particularly regarding cost, alternative locations, and impact on the Victorian organ loft—amended proposals led to the withdrawal of objections from the Victorian Society.
Applying the Duffield questions, the Chancellor found that most elements caused no harm or only very slight harm. The new vestry would cause low to moderate harm, mainly through loss of a spiral staircase and partial enclosure of the transept, but this had been carefully mitigated by design revisions. The Chancellor held that the clear and convincing justification—improved facilities, accessibility, hospitality and operational effectiveness—produced substantial public benefit outweighing the harm. A faculty was granted, subject to conditions. [Re Sherborne Abbey [2025] ECC Sal 2] [Top of section] [Top of post].
Re Holy Trinity Sunningdale [2026] ECC Oxf 1 This was an unopposed faculty petition for extensive internal reordering of the Grade II listed Victorian church, to create a flexible worship space and community hub. The proposals included removal of most nave pews, a new floor with underfloor heating, improved lighting and heating, relocation of the font, removal of later screens, and construction of a substantial west-end mezzanine accommodating a café, meeting rooms, office, toilets and storage, with glazed partitions separating social and worship spaces. The Diocesan Advisory Committee recommended approval. The Church Buildings Council and Historic England ultimately deferred to the DAC, although Historic England considered the proposals would cause a high level of harm to the interior. The Victorian Society objected in principle to the loss of pews, treatment of the floor and the design of the glazing, but did not become a party opponent. Applying the ‘Duffield’ framework, the Chancellor found that the proposals would cause harm to the significance of the church, but that the harm was outweighed by the substantial public and missional benefits, including improved worship, accessibility, community use and long-term sustainability. A faculty was granted, subject to conditions controlling materials, design details, retention of some pews, and protection of historic fabric. [ELA link to judgment – a very large file, 2MB] [Top of section] [Top of post].
Other building works, including re-roofing
Re St. Martin Brampton [2025] ECC Car 9 The petitioners sought permission for works to improve access at St Martin’s Church, Brampton, a Grade I listed church; the only church designed by Philip Webb, with stained glass by Burne-Jones and Morris [6]. The proposed works included internal alterations and major external access works involving a ramp and lift at the principal entrance. The Victorian Society, as party opponent, contested the petition in part, challenging the proposed external works altering access to the Church [2]. The Chancellor accepted that there was a compelling and well-evidenced need to improve access, noting that the steep steps excluded many worshippers, visitors, and community users, and undermined the Church’s mission.
However, applying the Duffield framework, he found that the external access proposals would cause a high degree of harm to the Church’s exceptional significance, particularly its unaltered integrity as a unique work by Webb. Although the public benefit of equal access was substantial, the Court concluded that the petitioners had not yet fully explored a potentially less harmful alternative entrance beneath the Paradise Window, partly due to a misunderstanding of rights over the adjoining car park. As serious harm to a Grade I building should be permitted only exceptionally, the external proposals were refused. The internal works, car park resurfacing, and minor ancillary works were approved.[Re St. Martin Brampton [2025] ECC Car 9] [Top of section] [Top of post]. See also Re St Martin’s Church, Bramptonre. refusal of appeal on judgment.
Re St. Bartholomew Colne (No. 2) [2025] ECC Bla 5 The Chancellor granted a faculty for the renovation and extension of a Grade II listed former grammar school building situated within the curtilage of the churchyard and now used as parish rooms, in order to create a “Centre of Hope” supporting community outreach. The proposals included demolition of a 1980s extension, construction of a new two-storey extension with improved accessibility, refurbishment of the interior, new kitchen and welfare facilities, replacement windows, and additional storage. Applying the ‘Duffield’ principles, the Chancellor determined that the works would cause no harm to the setting or significance of the adjacent Grade I listed church and only moderate, largely reversible harm to the Grade II parish rooms building itself. That harm was outweighed by clear and convincing public benefits, including enhanced facilities for a food bank and wider community support. Concerns raised informally by the Georgian Group regarding window replacement and internal storage were resolved or addressed by conditions. The faculty was granted subject to conditions, including approval of detailed designs for windows and storage, compliance with planning and archaeological conditions, confirmation of funding, and a three-year period for completion. [Re St. Bartholomew Colne (No. 2) [2025] ECC Bla 5] [Top of section] [Top of post].
Re St. Helen Etwall [2025] ECC Der 1 The Rector and Churchwardens petitioned for the introduction into the church of a memorial plaque in memory of a Flight Lieutenant in the Royal Air Force, who died in Iraq in 2003 and was buried at RAF Maham in Norfolk. The proposal was to place the memorial plaque next to an existing war memorial[1].
The deceased had no connection with the parish, but his parents lived in the parish and regularly attended the annual Remembrance Sunday service. The Diocesan Advisory Committee recommended the work [4]. However, the Chancellor, whilst mindful of the pastoral motivation behind the petition, refused to grant a faculty, as the deceased had no link with the proposed memorial location and he was already commemorated at Burntwood, where he grew up, at RAF Marham, where he had been based, and at the National Memorial Arboretum. [Re St. Helen Etwall [2025] ECC Der 1] [Top of section] [Top of post].
Re St. Mary Penwortham [2025] ECC Bla 4 The Chancellor granted a faculty for (i) the repair of a vandalised 1901 stained-glass window and (ii) the extension and adaptation of 1950s parish rooms attached to a Grade II* listed medieval church, in order to create accessible meeting room, classroom, kitchen and toilet facilities. While Historic England and the Church Buildings Council objected to the scale and visual impact of the proposed extension, neither became a party opponent. Applying the ‘Duffield’ principles, the Chancellor found that the window repair was wholly beneficial and uncontroversial. As to the extension, following a site visit, he concluded that it would cause no more than moderate harm to the significance, setting and appearance of the listed church and conservation area. That harm was outweighed by clear and convincing public benefits, including improved accessibility, accommodation for school visits, community use, safeguarding, and income generation essential to the church’s mission and sustainability. The court rejected the argument that the nave could suitably provide the same benefits without greater harm. Accordingly, the faculty was granted, subject to conditions. [Re St. Mary Penwortham [2025] ECC Bla 4] [Top of section] [Top of post].
Re St. Mary Magdalene Whitgift [2025] ECC She 7 The petitioners sought permission for the replacement of the slate covered nave roof with one of terne coated stainless-steel. The excessively shallow pitch of the roof had led to severe water ingress and rotting timbers, a problem which was being exacerbated by decaying and vegetation covered flashings. The Chancellor considered the works were well planned and urgently needed and that they would preserve the building as a place of historical and architectural interest and as a focal hub for its congregation and community. She therefore directed that a faculty be issued. [Re St. Mary Magdalene Whitgift [2025] ECC She 7] [Top of section] [Top of post].
Re All Saints Wrington [2026] ECC B&W 2 The wooden vestry floor at the base of the church tower had become infested with death watch beetle, necessitating repair. This would involve the replacement of the current floor with stone brought to the level of the paving in the nave, together with various consequential works. At the same time, the opportunity had arisen to insert in the vestry a lavatory cubicle with disabled access, taking advantage of an existing drainage connection. There were four parties opponent and a further 15 letters of objection from people who objected to the installation of a lavatory cubicle. However, the Chancellor concluded that “the weight of expert advice, and at least on balance the practical advantages associated with the petitioners’ preferred plans, justify the grant of a faculty for the interior lavatory cubicle”. [Re All Saints Wrington [2026] ECC B&W 2] [Top of section] [Top of post].
Church Treasures/Sale of Paintings/Loans/Memorials
Re St. Peter Little Budworth [2025] ECC Chr 1 The Churchwardens wished to sell by auction a painting entitled ‘The Good Shepherd’ (c.1859) by William Dyce, a Scottish born painter associated with the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood. The painting was introduced into the church by faculty in 1924. Since about 1987, the painting has been subject to loan agreements with two galleries. A reproduction of the painting was hung in the church some time after removal of the original. The second loan agreement ended in 2024, when the painting was transferred to Bonhams auctioneers pending a decision as to its future. The Diocesan Advisory Committee supported the petition, pointing out that the painting was not original to the church; a reproduction was on display; the original had been absent from the church for 50 years; the environment of the church was not suitable for the original painting; the parish could not afford restoration of the painting and had been unable to find another gallery to take the painting. The Chancellor considered the guidance in the Court of Arches decision in Re St. Lawrence Oakley with Wootton St. Lawrence (2015) and determined that in all the circumstances it was appropriate to grant a faculty for the sale of the painting. [Re St. Peter Little Budworth [2025] ECC Chr 1] [Top].
Re Mill Road Cemetery Cambridge [2025] ECC Ely 2 Mill Road Cemetery in Cambridge, which was closed in two stages in 1904 and 1949, and has since been maintained by Cambridge City Council (“CCC”), is owned by the incumbents of several parishes in the City of Cambridge. CCC applied for a general faculty to carry out further maintenance of the cemetery. The Chancellor considered that there was merit in reducing the need for the Consistory Court to be involved in the faculty process whenever works were needed outside those normally permitted without faculty. He therefore granted a faculty. [Re Mill Road Cemetery Cambridge [2025] ECC Ely 2] [Post] [Back] [Top].
Re St. John the Evangelist Perlethorpe [2025] ECC S&N 4 The petitioners applied for permission to erect a memorial in the churchyard. Certain features of the design were outside what was authorised to be permitted by a parish priest under the churchyards regulations, namely, the memorial was larger that the maximum measurements allowed; there was an oversized plinth; kerbs were proposed; and it was proposed to have a design on the back of the memorial. The Chancellor approved the design, subject to conditions, including that there be no kerbs, and that there should be a smaller plinth. [Re St. John the Evangelist Perlethorpe [2025] ECC S&N 4] [Post] [Top of section] [Top of post].
Re St. Cuthbert Kentmere [2025] ECC Car 12 The petitioner sought a faculty to erect a headstone in the churchyard of St Cuthbert’s, Kentmere, to commemorate his late wife, Lucy Nelson, who was widely known as “Cinders”. An initial informal approach did not proceed, for various reasons. Following consultation, a petition was presented for a new design, using riven slate with V-cut lettering, and featuring a carved sunflower motif on its reverse. It received unanimous PCC support and favourable advice from the DAC, which praised the quality of its design and confirmed that it would not set an unwelcome precedent. The DAC accepted the use of “Lucy” as an appropriate contraction of the deceased’s given name(?) and expressed concern only as to the practicalities of the placement of the name “Cinders” on the reverse of the stone. The Chancellor accepted the DAC’s advice but concluded that, in the particular circumstances, personal expression and the deceased’s own preferences justified allowing the name “Cinders” to appear on the reverse beneath the sunflower motif. A faculty was therefore granted. The petitioner was ordered to pay the costs of the petition. [Re St. Cuthbert Kentmere [2025] ECC Car 12] [Post] [Top of section] [Top of post].
Reservation of grave space
Re St. John Cumwhinton [2025] ECC Car 8 Two related petitions sought the reservation of grave spaces in the churchyard of St. John’s, Cumwhinton. Mrs Patricia Briggs (aged 79) applied for a double-depth plot for herself and her husband, and her daughter, Joanne Briggs, sought a separate reservation. All petitioners owned or occupied property in the parish and both petitions were supported by the District Church Council. The difficulty was uncertainty about remaining burial capacity. One petition stated that the churchyard was likely to suffice for around ten years, while a later petition referred to “5+” years. The churchwarden explained that the churchyard plan was out of date, although some additional space had become available following the loss of a large tree and further options were being explored. The Chancellor applied the principles summarised in Re St Mary, Thame and the test of “exceptional circumstances” articulated in Re St Peter, Hilton. No circumstances “markedly out of the ordinary” had been identified, and the petitioners had not advanced any exceptional justification. Taking into account the petitioners’ local connections, the support of the DCC, and the possibility of increasing burial space, the Chancellor granted both petitions but limited each reservation to ten years. [Re St. John Cumwhinton [2025] ECC Car 8] [Top of section] [Top of page].
Re St John the Baptist Ulpha [2025] ECC Car 10 The petitioner sought a faculty to reserve a single-depth grave space in the churchyard. She lived in the parish, was an active member of the local community, had supported the church financially and practically, and wished in due course to be buried in the same churchyard as her late partner, whose funeral had taken place there. The petition was supported by the PCC. The difficulty was the acute shortage of burial space. The petition acknowledged that the churchyard was likely to serve parishioners for only about three further years. In those circumstances, the law governing grave reservations where space is scarce applied, as summarised in Re St Mary, Thame, and the petitioner was required to demonstrate “exceptional circumstances”, meaning that her case was “markedly out of the ordinary”. The Chancellor accepted the sincerity and depth of the petitioner’s attachment to the church and community and fully understood her wish for reassurance as to her future burial. However, such attachments were not uncommon among parishioners and could not, of themselves, justify prejudicing the burial rights of others. The petition did not meet the required test and was therefore refused. [Re St John the Baptist Ulpha [2025] ECC Car 10] [Top of section] [Top of page].
Re St. Peter Ellastone [2025] ECC Lic 5 The petitioner wished to reserve a grave in the churchyard for himself and his wife. The application was opposed by a majority vote of the Parochial Church Council (“PCC”). The PCC had a policy against grave reservations. The churchyard had about 35 spaces remaining and on average about three were used for burials each year. In view of the PCC’s policy and the limited space left in the churchyard, the Chancellor refused to grant a faculty. [Re St. Peter Ellastone [2025] ECC Lic 5] [Top of section] [Top of page].
Privy Council Business
An archive of the Lists of Business from Privy Council meetings can also be found here. The latest meeting was on 10 December 2025.
CDM Decisions and Safeguarding
Written determinations of disciplinary tribunals hearing complaints brought under the CDM, together with any decisions on penalty are published by the Church of England; included are judgments from the Arches Court of Canterbury and the Chancery Court of York where determinations have been appealed. The majority of complaints that are made under the CDM are resolved by the bishop, archbishop, or President of Tribunals, without having to convene a tribunal.
CDM Decisions
These are decisions made by the President of Tribunals, Deputy President or a delegate that are published in accordance with an order by that judge:
Name: The Revd SION AWEN MIHANGEL HUGHES CAREW Diocese: Lincoln Date imposed: 25th January 2026 Relevant CDM section: 16(1) Statutory Ground of Misconduct: 8(1)(d) = Conduct unbecoming & inappropriate to the office & work of a clerk in Holy Orders Penalty: Rebuke and injunction
CFCE Determinations
The dates of the Cathedrals Fabric Commission for England may be found by scrolling down to the bottom of the page Cathedrals Fabric Commission. The programme for 2026 is here and the next meeting will be on Thursday 5 February. Decisions taken on Thursday 11 December 2025 are yet to be reported.
Links to other posts
Recent summaries of specific issues that have been considered in the consistory courts include:
[*] This is an approximate classification based upon the main issues considered by the court. Determinations relating to reordering and building works will often address other aspects of the Petition.
Notes on the conventions used for the navigation between cases reviewed in this post are summarized here.
]]>2026-02-02T09:01:59+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-02-02T09:01:59+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-01-30:/278309Confirmation of Archbishop of Canterbury – Legal CeremonyOn Wednesday 28 January 2026, Bishop Sarah Mullally DBE became the 106th Archbishop of Canterbury a...]]>On Wednesday 28 January 2026, Bishop Sarah Mullally DBE became the 106th Archbishop of Canterbury at her Confirmation of Election at St Paul’s Cathedral, the first woman to hold the office in its 1,400-year history. The Church of England Press Release notes: “The Confirmation of Election is a legal ceremony, set within a church service, at which Bishop Sarah, the Archbishop-Elect, legally becomes the Archbishop of Canterbury. Archbishop Sarah’s first act as Archbishop will be to take up the Primatial Cross and give the blessing at the end of the service”.
Details of the legal ceremony are included in the Confirmation of the Election Order of Service, (pp 19 to 23 inc.), reproduced in full here, with components of the ceremony reproduced below and elements relating to the opportunity to raise objection italicized.
Extracts from Confirmation of the Election Order of Service
The Confirmation of Election, (19 to 23)
Presentation by the Proctor and reading by the Provincial Registrar of the Letters Patent of the King issued under the Great Seal of the Realm requiring the Confirmation of the Election of the Right Reverend and Right Honourable Dame Sarah Elisabeth Mullally, Bishop of London to be Archbishop and Pastor of the Cathedral and Metropolitical Church of Christ Canterbury.
The Confirmation of Election by the Archbishop of York who decreed that it be proceeded with according to the form and effect of the said Letters Patent in the presence of the Provincial Registrar of the Province of Canterbury, a Notary Public.
The Advocate identified and presented the Right Reverend and Right Honourable Dame Sarah Elisabeth Mullally as the person elected Archbishop and Pastor of the Cathedral and Metropolitical Church of Christ Canterbury.
The production by the Proctor for the Cathedral and Metropolitical Church of Christ Canterbury of the Original Mandate which required public notice to be given and statement that anyone wishing to oppose the election should do so at an appointed time and place prior to the date of the Confirmation, or else would be debarred from pursuing any objection.
Endorsed on the Mandate was a certificate which verified that public notice was duly given as required and that no person had appeared in opposition to the Confirmation.
A Statement by the Archbishop of York that Full opportunity having been given for opposers to appear whose objections could be lawfully received and none having appeared as ordered, we now proceed with the process of Confirmation of the Election.
Presentation by the Proctor to the Archbishop of York of a Petition which sets out in detail the vacation of the See and the steps taken to elect an archbishop and asking that the election be confirmed; signature by the Advocate; and admission by the Archbishop of York who then requests immediate proof of the matters recited in the Petition. The Proctor then exhibited:
a Certificate touching and concerning the Election of the Right Reverend and Right Honourable Dame Sarah Elisabeth Mullally, Bishop of London to be Bishop and Pastor of the Cathedral and Metropolitical Church of Christ Canterbury made by the College of Canons of the said Cathedral and Metropolitical Church and issued under their Common Seal.
a public document containing the consent of the Archbishop-Elect to the said election; and
His Majesty’s Letters Patent which had already been read.
The Archbishop of York admitted all these documents and accepted their validity and the truthfulness of all that is contained in them; The Proctor then requested the court to proceed to the pronouncing of the definitive Sentence or Final Decree in this matter and he porrect that it be read.
The Schedule, which accepted that everything had been done in order, and pronounced as contumacious (i.e., disobedient to the order of the Court) all who would oppose the election, was then read and signed.
The Provincial Registrar gave a Bible to the Archbishop-Elect as she took the Oath kneeling, and standing (with all Royal Commissioners and Legal Officials also standing), made and subscribes to the Declaration.
The Proctor porrected a definitive Sentence or Final Decree in writing which was read and declared.
The Archbishop of York then read the Sentence or Final Decree of the Court that the Election was carried out in due form, that the Election is confirmed and that ‘the care, government and administration of the Spirituals’ of the See of Canterbury are committed to the Archbishop-Elect. The Sentence or Final Decree was then signed by the Archbishop of York and the other Royal Commissioners and countersigned by the Vicar-General, the Advocate and the Provincial Registrar.
The Proctor said: The Lord Archbishop, now Elected and Confirmed, and myself pray that a Public Instrument and Letters Testimonial shall be made and issued by the Commissioners as a record of these proceedings.
The Lord Archbishop of York said “We do decree as prayed”
Welcome by Diocesan Bishops, (24).
The Bishops on the Dais stand and affirm the Confirmation of the Archbishop.
Comment
Since the consecration of the Rt Rev Libby Lane at York Minster in January 2015, these services have attracted a degree of disruption by protestors. On 21 May 2018, we considered the protests at the installation of Rt Revd Sarah Mullally to the See of London based on objections to consecration of women as bishops. During the legal proceedings of the on 28 January 2026 a protest was raised relating to the handling of a safeguarding issue by the Rt Revd Mullally; the Archbishop of York said that a “full opportunity” had been given for lawful objections, but none had been received and the process would therefore continue.
Beyond the service itself, Conservative Anglican groups, especially in parts of Africa and the Global South, have expressed strong objections to Mullally’s leadership, on grounds that she is a woman and also because of broader concerns over theological direction and biblical interpretation.
]]>2026-01-30T13:42:31+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-01-30T13:42:31+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-01-27:/277931Legal Spirits 073: A Short Take on the Minnesota Church ProtestCities Church (MPR News)
In this episode—the first in a new series of Legal Spirits law-and-reli...]]>Cities Church (MPR News)
In this episode—the first in a new series of Legal Spirits law-and-religion short takes—Mattone Center Director Mark Movsesian offers an initial assessment of the recent anti-ICE protest at Cities Church in Minnesota. He explains what is known so far, the legal issues the episode raises, and why those issues matter beyond this particular controversy. Whatever the merits of the underlying cause, he argues, intruding into a private worship service infringes a core understanding of the free exercise of religion. Listen in!
]]>2026-01-27T12:00:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-01-27T12:00:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-01-27:/277928Responsibilities after closure of churchyardIn Re Mill Road Cemetery Cambridge [2025] ECC Ely 2, judicial consideration was given to the respect...]]>In Re Mill Road Cemetery Cambridge [2025] ECC Ely 2, judicial consideration was given to the respective responsibilities of a group of churches and the local authority when the maintenance of a churchyard, closed by Order in Council, was transferred under s.215 of the Local Government Act 1972. Mill Road Cemetery, Cambridge, was purchased by a deed of conveyance on 20 August 1847; the ground was consecrated, and the cemetery divided into separate plots to allow the churches who purchased the land to use as extensions of their individual churchyards; it was opened by the Bishop of Ely in 1848. Until its final closure, it served as the burial ground for 13 city parishes (now 10 through amalgamation) whose churchyards had become full. A chapel built by George Gilbert Scott was demolished in 1954.
The cemetery is held in trust by the trustees (the incumbents of the thirteen parishes) and maintained by Cambridge City Council in collaboration with the trustees and Friends of Mill Road Cemetery. In Re Mill Road Cemetery Cambridge [2025] ECC Ely 2, Guy Belcher, the Biodiversity Manager employed by Cambridge City Council (“CCC”) sought a general faculty to allow the CCC to undertake works of repair to memorials and stonework, tree work and miscellaneous works as further identified in the application in the paragraphs under the heading “WORKS TO BE COVERED BY THE PROPOSED GENERAL FACULTY” within Mill Road Cemetery (“the cemetery”) [1].
Part of the cemetery was closed for burial by Order in Council on 12 December 1904 and the remainder on 29 September 1949 pursuant to the Burial Grounds (Cambridge) Order 1949 [6(b)]. Leonard Ch. commented “Whether CCC took over the maintenance of the cemetery on closure, as they were legally required to do, it is clear that by 1990 the CCC had formally agreed to do so” [6(d)] [1].
The CCC has a responsibility for the maintenance and upkeep of the cemetery and is at present required to apply for a faculty to cover the sort of works for which it now applies for a general faculty. The purpose of the general faculty is to cut down on both the administration and cost involved in the CCC having to apply for individual faculties whilst the churches to which the land belongs keep control of any substantial works which will still require a faculty [2,3].
Submissions to the Court [4] questioned: whether the CCC required faculty approval to carry out any works to the cemetery; the status and power of the parishes “to interfere with the works undertaken in the cemetery” and” to some of the work that the CCC intends to carry out under the general faculty”.
Over the years there have been a number of groups formed, or purportedly formed, to coordinate the approach of the various churches to the use of the cemetery or to take on responsibility for the upkeep of the cemetery. Some of these bodies had no legal basis for their existence, “including one group which identified itself as trustees and which it would seem had no legal entitlement to act on behalf of the Parochial Church Councils (‘PCCs’) of the various churches that owned the land comprising the cemetery” [6(b)].
With regard to the continuing involvement of the parishes, the Chancellor commented:
“[7]. The closure of the cemetery and the rôle of the CCC in its maintenance does not absolve the parishes of responsibility for the cemetery. The freehold title to the land remains with the incumbents for the time being of the churches which share ownership. Their duties include ensuring that the CCC carry out the necessary work to keep the cemetery safe for use and that it is maintained.
[8]. The cemetery, albeit it, is a valuable open space for public use within Cambridge, remains principally a place in which the churches have buried parishioners, and possibly others who applied by faculty to be buried there. The churches through their incumbents and their PCCs are guardians of the mortal remains of those buried on their land in perpetuity. They should, so far as it is possible to do so, ensure that the areas for which they have responsibility remain places of tranquillity“.
Noting the overriding objective of the Churchyard Regulations,[8], Leonard Ch. stressed that that responsibility does not cease because the churchyard or cemetery is closed for burial or because a local council has taken on responsibility for maintaining the churchyard after closure [9]. He further corrected the assertion that the site was formally closed and “passed” to Cambridge City Council for management:
“[11]. For the avoidance of doubt, the site has never been “passed” to the CCC; only responsibility for maintenance and upkeep has fallen on the CCC.
[12]. It is for this reason that the parishes through a vote of their individual PCCs have had to show their support for the faculty application made by Mr Belcher. Similarly any application for a permanent or temporary exhibition in the cemetery would require either a faculty or, possibly an Archdeacon’s temporary licence, before it could be staged. The placing of new benches can be permitted under Faculty Jurisdiction with a ‘List B’ certificate issued by the Archdeacon or other furniture could only be achieved through an application for a faculty, agreed by the individual PCCs and approved by the Chancellor.
[13]. Whether or not the churches who have joint responsibility for the cemetery pass that responsibility to a committee representing all the churches is a matter for them. That committee would have no power to make decisions on behalf of the individual churches but may recommend to the PCCs what needs to be done.It is then for the individual PCCs to acknowledge their approval to work being done under a faculty by a vote at each of the PCC meetings.
[14]. As to the responsibilities of the PCCs and the CCC, under s.215 of the Local Government Act 1972 where the CCC has taken on the obligation to maintain the cemetery in good order there is nothing of a mandatory nature left for the PCC to do by way of church maintenance. That does not absolve the PCCs of the various churches from ensuring that cemetery is properly maintained by the CCC and ensuring that the cemetery is treated in accordance with the Churchyard Regulations 2006 [2].
The purpose of the General Faculty
The Chancellor stated:
“[15]. The CCC want to be able to carry out maintenance work without resorting to separate applications for a faculty which might otherwise be required. Much of the regular maintenance work which they undertake in the cemetery, such as mowing the grass or cutting back shrubs etc, does not require a faculty. More substantial work to memorials, brickwork, signage and tree felling may or will require a faculty.
[16]. The application is drafted in a way that will relieve the CCC of obtaining a faculty for the majority of the work which is undertaken but which retains faculty control for the more substantial work which may have a significant affect on the cemetery.
[…]
[18]. In my judgment the application for a general faculty is unremarkable and there is merit in reducing the need for the Consistory Court to be involved in the process. It recognises the responsibility that has been taken on by the CCC and which they undertake to the benefit of the churches with responsibility for the cemetery and to the benefit of the local community”.
He concluded:
“[22]. The ‘General Faculty’ document which has been drafted by the Parishes’ Committee (but approved by each of the PCCs of the churches whose incumbents retain a freehold title to their part of the cemetery) with input from the CCC provides a sensible way forward whilst the churches retain some limited control over works in the cemetery.
[23]. I do not consider the path closures[3], which are designed to return the cemetery to its pre-Covid state and to protect the grassland, to be objectionable”.
Faculty granted [26].
[1]. Such an assumption is not uncommon in relation to searching for Orders in Council and their subsequent maintenance by the Local Authority. However, Legal Opinions Concerning the Church of England on Closed Churchyards suggests a number of approaches which might be adopted in tracing Orders in Council, (at [5].]
]]>2026-01-27T08:45:39+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-01-27T08:45:39+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-01-26:/277854Around the WebHere are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:
This week, the U...]]>
Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:
This week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heard oral arguments in two cases challenging state laws that require public schools to display the Ten Commandments in classrooms.
The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to hear a case brought by a Jewish group seeking to recover a collection of sacred manuscripts that were seized by the Nazis and are now being held in Russia.
A Ukrainian Catholic Church in Pennsylvania has sued Collier Township, alleging religious discrimination after the town rejected plans for a church bell tower.
The European Court of Human Rights is hearing a case that seeks to remove Christian icons and symbols from public buildings in Greece.
The Vatican is currently evaluating the Trump Administration’s invitation to join the Board of Peace, which was established with the goal of rebuilding Gaza.
]]>2026-01-26T12:00:00+00:00L&R Forumhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-01-26T12:00:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-01-26:/277850Church of England proposes significant increase in fees for burialAn earlier post Parochial Fees 2027 to 2031 described the parochial fees for the next quinquennium, ...]]>An earlier post Parochial Fees 2027 to 2031 described the parochial fees for the next quinquennium, 2027 to 2031, to be considered for approval at the February General Synod. The table in Schedule 1 of the draft Order, GS2434, sets out “base figures” which represent the level of parochial fees at current prices. The Explanatory Note states (at [6]) that “Other than in the case of the fees for burials, the base figures are the currently payable figures for 2026″; a significant increase in burial fees is proposed, the rationale for which is described below.
Comparators for burial fees
An earlier paper on future of Parochial Fees, GS Misc 1420 Update on Parochial fees, was circulated in advance of the meeting of General Synod in York 11-15 July 2025. As a “GS Misc paper” it was not issued for discussion although General Synod members were invited to attend a fringe meeting during the July Group of Sessions to discuss the options, opportunities, challenges and risks of alternative models for parochial fees.
At this fringe meeting it was suggested that the parochial fees relating to the burial of a body or cremated remains in a churchyard were out of line with the burial fees charged for woodland burials. The Archbishops’ Council noted that the fees charged by Local Authorities for burial in cemeteries and those charged by entities offering woodland burials are significantly higher than the Church of England fees. The comparative analysis of such charges and fees reviewed by the Council and its Finance Committee is summarised in the table below. Further detail is provided in Annex 1 of the Policy Paper GS 2432P.
Woodland
LA cemetery
CoE fee*
Burial of body
£1,765-£3,304
£ 2,945-£6,125
£375-£409
Burial of cremated remains
£607-£1,975
£1,120-£4,940
£164-£198
* For the Church of England parochial fees, the lower figure relates to burial following a service in church and the higher figure for burial on a separate occasion. The majority of the fee goes to the PCC: £18 and £52 respectively goes to the DBF
The Council recognised that the scope of these fees was not directly comparable. The Church of England fee includes “an element for the cost of the minister’s time”. The fees for woodland burials and those charged by local authorities “will include the cost of staff to maintain burial grounds and cemeteries respectively and an apportionment of central costs, whereas the assumption is that much of the work done in Church of England churchyards will be accrued out by volunteers and relatives”. However, anecdotal evidence suggests this is becoming an increasingly unreliable assumption with greater family mobility, aging congregations, a greater need for specialist skills to maintain headstones and the churchyard environment in part to greater Health and Safety requirements [6]. The document continues:
“[7]. Having considered this analysis, the Council agreed with the recommendation of its Finance Committee to propose a one-off uplift of £1,000 to the PCC fees relating to the burial of a body or cremated remains in a Churchyard in addition to the inflationary increases. The proposal would bring the fees charged by Church of England parishes more into line with the fees with burials elsewhere.
[8]. It would also provide a significant financial benefit for some PCCs – those with open churchyards. Necessarily it cannot effect other PCCs. But for some PCCs – mostly churches in rural areas – it could be of significant benefit at a time when many PCCs are struggling financially. It is not possible to estimate the overall financial impact of this proposal as [the Council does] not have data on the number of burials. There would be some increased expense for people seeking burials for their loved ones, although in some instances this additional cost would be met from funeral plans arranged by the deceased person.
[…]
[11]. The fees for 2027 provided for in the draft Order are this year’s figures – with a one-off uplift in the PCC fee in relation to the burial of a body or cremated remains in a Churchyard – increased by CPI as at August 2026, but with a cap of 5% (subject to rounding up to the nearest pound).
[12]. The fees for subsequent years will be the previous year’s figures increased by CPI as at the preceding August, again with a cap of 5% (subject to rounding).
Comment
The Archbishops’ Council put this proposal forward for consideration by the Synod “as a way to help many rural churches, and for Church of England burial fees to be more consistent with other forms of burial. But it will of course welcome views from Synod on this matter [9]”.
]]>2026-01-26T08:45:59+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-01-26T08:45:59+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-01-25:/277820Law and religion roundup – 25th JanuarySupport for listed places of worship in England
On Thursday, DCMS announced that from the beginning ...]]>Support for listed places of worship in England
On Thursday, DCMS announced that from the beginning of the new financial year the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme will be replaced by a new Places of Worship Renewal Fund, the scope of which will be England only. We posted on it here – and revised the post three times in the course of that day as further information became available.
There are about 21,000 listed places of worship in the UK, of which about two-thirds are in England. On that basis, the figures would suggest that the effect of the change for England is broadly neutral; however, Sir Philip Rutnam, Chair of the National Churches Trust, expressed concern that
“in future listed places of worship will have to bear the full cost of VAT on repairs. This brings to an end a system that has operated successfully for over 20 years. It means that in future local people will have to raise money not just to repair roofs and towers but to pay a 20 per cent tax to the Government.”
The precise terms on which the Places of Worship Renewal Fund will operate have not yet been published: we will report on them in detail as and when they become available.
Imam sentenced for conducting under-age wedding
BBC News reports that an imam who conducted an illegal wedding ceremony for two 16-year-olds has been given a suspended prison sentence. Ashraf Osmani told Northampton Crown Court that he had been unaware that the law had changed nine months earlier, raising the minimum marriage age in England to 18. He had previously pleaded guilty to two charges of causing a child to marry at Northampton Central Mosque in November 2023. Choudhury J accepted that there had been no “violence or coercion” involved and that the teenagers had gone to Osmani “entirely of their own volition”, and sentenced him to 15 weeks’ imprisonment suspended for 12 months. The Crown Prosecution Service comments here.
John Smyth again
In reply to a written question from Adam Jogee (Newcastle-under-Lyme, Lab) about lessons the Church of England has learned from the case of John Smyth QC, the Second Church Estates Commissioner, Marsha De Cordova, said this:
“The Church of England commissioned the Makin Review into the historic abuse surrounding John Smyth, which was published 7th November 2024 and can be found here.
Following the publication of the Makin Review, a task and finish group was established, which most recently produced a progress report for the February meeting of the General Synod.
The work in this area remains a high priority and is regularly reviewed. It is expected to publish its next progress report ahead of the July 2026 sitting of the General Synod.”
Makin Review: further conclusions
On 21 January, the Church of England issued the Press Release The Makin review: Clergy Discipline Measure outcomes, which stated that allegations of misconduct made under the CDM against two clerics named in the Makin report will not proceed to a tribunal. In the case of the Ven Roger Combes, a former Archdeacon of Horsham, who retired in 2014, the President of Tribunals, Sir Stephen Males, decided that there was “no case for the respondent to answer”; he also declined an application to bring an out-of-time complaint against a former chair of the Titus Trust, the Revd Iain Broomfield. [The CDM Determination on the Ven Roger Combes is here].
Appointment of a Chancellor for the Diocese of Hereford
The Bishop of Hereford is seeking to appoint a new Diocesan Chancellor with effect from July 2026. Further details can be found on the diocesan website.
Quick links
General Synod Papers – February 2026: Outline of business and agenda, aspects of which will be covered in separate posts.
Shiranikha Herbert, Church Times:Rector and diocese penalised for deliberately breaching faculty condition: on Re St Mary’s Doverdale[2025] ECC Wor 1, in which Summers Dep Ch pointed out at [22] that “In the most serious of cases, those who are in contempt of the Consistory Court may be referred by that court to the High Court, which may investigate and punish those breaches as if they were a contempt of the High Court, which can result in a fine or imprisonment.” (Note that the Deputy Chancellor, in relation to the Petitioner, an ordained priest, concluded: “what disciplinary steps, if any, should follow, is entirely a matter for the diocesan authorities to consider” [30]).
Suffolk Inter-Faith Resource: Faith Card:guidance on some of the most commonly-observed aspects of death and dying practices across a range of faiths represented in the UK.
]]>2026-01-25T08:45:10+00:00Frank Cranmerhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-01-25T08:45:10+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-01-24:/277725Parochial Fees 2027 to 2031The level of parochial fees is currently determined by the Parochial Fees Order 2024 which sets the ...]]>The level of parochial fees is currently determined by the Parochial Fees Order 2024 which sets the framework for fees in 2025 and 2026. Under this Order the fees increased annually in line with Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation rounded up to the nearest whole pound, subject to a cap of 5% p.a. A new Parochial Fees Order is required to set the fees for 2027 and beyond (the maximum period permitted under the Ecclesiastical Fees Measure 1986 (the 1986 Measure) is five years). Except for fees relating to the burial of a body or cremated remains in a Churchyard[*], the base figures in the draft Order proposed by the Archbishops’ Council are the fees that are currently payable (i.e. in 2026).
The basis for parochial fees for the next quinquennium, 2027 to 2031, is laid down in the ParochialFeesOrder 2026, GS2434, which is supplemented by a PolicyNote, GS 2434Pand an Explanatory Note, GS 2434X. The draft Order prescribes the parochial fees payable for the period 1st January 2027 to 31st December 2031 in connection with marriages, funerals and burials and the erection of monuments in churchyards and in respect of other, miscellaneous matters.
The Parochial Fees Order 2026 (GS 2434) will be considered for approval on the One Motion Procedure under SO 72 by General Synod on the morning of Friday 13 January 2026. Any member who wishes to give notice of an amendment to the draft Order must do so in accordance with SO 13 not later than 5.30 p.m. on Wednesday 11 February 2026.
The format for the calculation of Parochial Fees follows that used in previous years. The table in Schedule 1 of the draft Order sets out “base figures” which represent the level of parochial fees at current prices. Other than in the case of the fees for burials, the base figures are the currently payable figures for 2026. The fees payable for each year covered by the Order will be determined by adjusting the base figures in accordance with the Consumer Prices Index (CPI), as specified by article 4 of the Order. 8. Those for 2027 will be the base figures increased by the percentage increase in CPI over 12 months as at August 2026.
The relevant percentage figure will be published by the Office of National Statistics in September 2026 at which point Archbishops’ Council staff will perform the necessary calculations and towards the end of the year a table showing the fees payable for 2027 will be available. Should the CPI go down (i.e. if there is deflation) the fees payable will remain at the same level as in the previous year.
Article 5 and Schedule 2 of the draft Order contain supplementary and incidental provisions – for example as to what is included in the fee in certain cases. These are to the same effect as those contained in the 2024 Order.
]]>2026-01-24T09:00:49+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-01-24T09:00:49+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-01-23:/277657Resolution of inscription on headstoneThe prescriptive nature of Diocesan Churchyard Regulations provides parochial clergy with delegated ...]]>The prescriptive nature of Diocesan Churchyard Regulations provides parochial clergy with delegated authority to allow memorials which fall within the certain specified criteria, although they are perfectly at liberty, should they wish, to decline to permit a memorial even though it complies with the Regulations. The case Re St. Cuthbert Kentmere [2025] ECC Car 12 demonstrates the progress of a petition to erect a headstone in the churchyard of St Cuthbert’s, Kentmere, from the initially unsuccessful approaches – informal and via the DAC – to discussions with the Chancellor, and final approval of the agreed format[*].
The petitioner, Mr. Yeats, first applied informally for permission to introduce the gravestone to commemorate his late wife Lucy Nelson, who was widely known as Cinders[1]. Fryer-Spedding Ch. concluded that he was unable to deal with his application in that way because of three matters[2]:
[3]. The Petitioner wished to commemorate his wife without referring to her given name, Lucinda, a name she actively disliked. That proposal did not appear to comply with the Carlisle Diocesan Churchyard Regulations including the requirement (paragraph 2.5.4 of Appendix B) that “The Christian and surnames of the deceased should be given”.
[4]. Mr. Yeats proposed a design showing a large sunflower on the reverse of the stone. At least one member of the PCC expressed reservations about the design.
[5]. Only a bare majority of the PCC favoured the initial proposal, and some concerns had been raised which were not obviously unreasonable.
Following further engagement with the PCC, Mr. Yeats presented his petition – a stone to be designed and created by Pip Hall – which received the unanimous support of all PCC members present at its meeting on 23 May 2024 [6]. The DAC commended the high-quality craftsmanship of Pip Hall’s work and the Chancellor was satisfied that the proposed stone would be of high aesthetic quality and appropriate within the churchyard of this Grade II listed church.
The DAC did not consider that the design would set an unwelcome design precedent and advised regarding use of the names “Lucy” (rather than “Lucinda”) and “Cinders”. The DAC’s view (with which the Chancellor agreed) was that the use of the name “Lucy” was suitable, appropriate and commonly recognised as a familiar form of the name “Lucinda” [9]. Whilst the DAC favoured placing the name ‘Cinders’ on the front of the stone, beneath ‘Lucy Nelson’, leaving the reverse to focus on the carved sunflower motif [10], Mr Yeats wished to avoid putting the name “Cinders” on the front of the stone, in part so as to leave space for an inscription in his memory, in due course [13].
The Chancellor accepted the DAC’s advice but concluded that, in the particular circumstances, personal expression and the deceased’s own preferences justified allowing the name “Cinders” to appear on the reverse beneath the sunflower motif. A faculty was therefore granted; the petitioner was required to pay the costs of the petition including any fees incurred by the Registry in dealing with the faculty application.
[*] As a rule, we would not name petitioners in cases such as this, but in Re St. Cuthbert Kentmere, names are an important factor.
]]>2026-01-23T08:45:36+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-01-23T08:45:36+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-01-22:/277572HM Government announces future funding for listed places of worshipOn 22 January, the Government announced a £1.5 billion package of support for “cultural organisation...]]>On 22 January, the Government announced a £1.5 billion package of support for “cultural organisations” over the coming five years. The press release is here.
The package includes “£230 million for heritage, protecting and preserving heritage buildings, including listed places of worship, across the country”. Specifically in relation to places of worship:
“In recognition of the important role religious heritage buildings play in the UK’s national story, a new £92 million fund called the Places of Worship Renewal Fund will replace the £23 million Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme and bring these important buildings into line with other heritage assets. It will give them access to the same level of financial support from the Government as historic houses, monuments and other heritage sites.”
The Church of England subsequently issued a press release welcoming the Government’s announcement. However:
“we are very concerned that the end of the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme – after more than 20 years – will mean added pressure on local fundraisers and inevitably a drain on other sources of funding. We will work with the wider sector and the Government to see how that burden can be alleviated.”
Bs Twycross subsequently confirmed on behalf of DCMS that
… the new Places of Worship Renewal Fund will be for England only. UK-wide heritage funding is available through organisations including the National Lottery Heritage Fund and we are working closely with funders in the sector to ensure that opportunities for funding places of worship throughout the UK are maximised.
]]>2026-01-22T11:17:32+00:00Frank Cranmerhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-01-22T11:17:32+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-01-21:/277508General Synod Papers – February 2026The Church of England’ General Synod will meet in London from 9 to 13 February 2026. Links to the ag...]]>The Church of England’ General Synod will meet in London from 9 to 13 February 2026. Links to the agenda and papers are reproduced below.
]]>2026-01-21T17:24:43+00:00David Pocklingtonhttp://www.lawandreligionuk.com2026-01-21T17:24:43+00:00Law & Religion UKtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-01-20:/277387Legal Spirits 072: Religion at the “Constitutional Court of Europe”In this episode, Mattone Center Director Mark Movsesian speaks with Judge Ioannis Ktistakis of ...]]>
In this episode, Mattone Center Director Mark Movsesian speaks with Judge Ioannis Ktistakis of the European Court of Human Rights about his career as an advocate, scholar, and international judge, and about emerging religious-freedom challenges facing Europe. They explore the role of the European Court—which Judge Ktistakis describes as “the Constitutional Court of Europe”—and examine how it supports the protection of fundamental rights across the continent. The conversation offers U.S. lawyers and law students a rare inside look at the Court’s internal workings and its approach to sensitive questions of law and religion.
]]>2026-01-20T12:00:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMhttps://lawandreligionforum.org2026-01-20T12:00:00+00:00LAW AND RELIGION FORUMtag:vifa-recht.de,2026-01-19:/277274Around the WebHere are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:
The Department o...]]>
Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:
The Department of Homeland Security announced that it will implement a rule that eases the requirements for foreign religious workers in the United States.
In the European Court of Human Rights, the judge presiding over Tafzi El Hadri and El Edriss Mouch v. Spain held that Spanish courts did not violate the European Convention on Human Rights by failing to sanction a journalist who had written about Islamist indoctrination at a residential center for minors.
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