From which point, events went further downhill for the “Christian Nationalism” of the Republicans. On which we make no comment other than to refer readers to Harold Macmillan’s dictum: “There are three bodies no sensible man directly challenges: the Roman Catholic Church, the Brigade of Guards and the National Union of Mineworkers”.

Lord High Commissioner to the General Assembly

On Wednesday, the Government announced that the King has approved the reappointment of Lady Elish Angiolini LT DBE KC as HM’s Lord High Commissioner to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland.

Places of Worship Renewal Fund: England

In answer to an Oral Question from Peter Prinsley (Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket, Lab), the Second Church Estates Commissioner, Marsha De Cordova, said this:

“The new places of worship renewal fund will be managed by Historic England on behalf of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. The fund totals £92 million over four years and will support capital repairs to listed places of worship. Priority will be given to buildings in areas of high deprivation or community need. Applications are expected to start with an expression of interest, followed by a full application, with efforts made to minimise administrative burdens on smaller parishes…

… We are still waiting for the Government to publish more detail on this vital scheme. As I said in my meeting with the Minister, I urge the Government to get on and publish that detail at pace so that we can give our churches certainty” [emphasis added].

And so does everyone else.

Places of Worship Renewal Fund: Northern Ireland

In answer to a Written Question from Robert Swann (South Antrim, UUP) asking how much funding has been allocated through the Places of Worship Renewal Fund to places of worship in Northern Ireland, Ian Murray, Minister of State at DCMS, said this:

“The Places of Worship Renewal Fund is England only as Heritage is a devolved policy area. The Northern Ireland Government received Barnett consequentials at the Spending Review, taking into account any changes to DCMS’ overall settlement. It is for the Northern Ireland government to consider whether to set up new arrangements should they so wish.

We are working closely with other funders in the sector to ensure that opportunities for funding places of worship throughout the UK are maximised. The National Lottery Heritage Fund already offers grants for places of worship across all the UK and is currently investing £100m over 3 years through National Lottery Heritage Grants and a strategic initiative designed to provide targeted support to build capacity.”

In other words, “Ask the Northern Ireland Executive”.

Same-sex marriage and the Church in Wales

On Thursday, the Governing Body of the Church in Wales voted to make permanent its liturgy for the blessing of same-sex marriages and civil partnerships, which had been trialled for the past five years, by incorporating it into the Church’s Book of Common Prayer.

The voting on the motion, which required a two-thirds majority, was Bishops, unanimous, Clergy 32-7, with 5 abstentions, and Laity 48-8, with 2 abstentions.

Assisted dying: Isle of Man

On 17 April 2026, Manx Radio reported “UK Government ‘unable to recommend Assisted Dying Bill for Royal Assent’ at this time“. Tynwald became the first parliament in the British Isles to pass assisted dying legislation, approving the Bill in March 2025. As a Crown Dependency, for primary legislation on the Isle of Man to get Royal Assent and therefore become law, the Lord Chancellor, David Lammy, is required to make a recommendation that it should do so.

The Ministry of Justice had sought clarity on the arrangements for monitoring assisted deaths, safeguards against coercion and ensuring that individuals have capacity to make decisions. It says that while the Manx Government provided comprehensive assurances and commitments that would mitigate the legal risk significantly, these do not form part of the bill. It is therefore the UK Government’s view that these matters must be addressed in order for the bill to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights.

While the Ministry is unable to recommend the bill for Royal Assent at this time, it says that this should not be interpreted as disallowing Royal Assent, but rather reflects the need to ensure that the legislation contains the necessary protections.

St George’s Day, 23 April

In an article in the Church Times, Martyn Snow, Bishop of Leicester, said that English churches should fly the flag of St George and the patron saint’s day used to foster a healthy kind of patriotism. Various urban myths have developed about the flying of flags from churches, which is unsurprising given the lack of consistency in the available advice. This was reviewed in our post Flags and flagpoles: Church of England (2022), which notes that the CofE ChurchCare (2021) states that “The Earl Marshal’s Warrant (of 1938) had the approval of the Archbishops of the day, but it does not make it compulsory for the flag to be flown. Unfortunately, other extant CofE guidance is contradictory.

Bitesize Ecclesiastical Law

 Upcoming sessions in the Ecclesiastical Law Society series:

• Bitesize Ecclesiastical Law #15 on “What is an Archbishop?” with Louise Connacher, Registrar of the Province and Diocese of York and the Diocese of Sodor and Man, 21 April, 5.30-6.00 pm.
• Bitesize Ecclesiastical Law #16 “What is a licence?” with Kirsty Duxbury, Diocesan Registrar, Anthony Collins Solicitors, 12 May, 5.30-6.00 pm.
• Bitesize Ecclesiastical Law #17 “What is the General Synod?” with Jenny Jacobs, Clerk to the Synod, 16 June 5.30-6.00 pm.

And finally…

Our LLM colleague and friend, Bishop Paul Colton, of Cork, Cloyne and Ross, is formally retiring this weekend. In 2025, he said that his last public service in the diocese would be on Saturday, 18 April 2026, at which time he would lay down his crozier in Saint Fin Barre’s Cathedral, Cork. The twenty–seventh anniversary of Paul’s election was on 25 March 2026, when he embarked on his twenty–eighth year. a longer tenure as Church of Ireland Bishop of Cork, Cloyne and Ross than anyone else since the first Reformation bishop died in 1617, and the second longest ever. For several years he has been the longest-serving Anglican diocesan bishop still in office in Great Britain and Ireland.

The Bill, which follows a period of reflection and listening across the Church, seeks to make this provision permanent. If approved, it would provide an authorised liturgical form for such services within the Church’s Prayer Book.

On 16 April 2026, the Governing Body voted to make permanent provision for same-sex blessings. The announcement is reproduced below.

Church in Wales Governing Body votes to make permanent provision for same-sex blessings

Provincial news Posted: 16 April 2026

The Church in Wales Governing Body has today voted to make permanent provision for church blessings for couples in same-sex Civil Marriages and Civil Partnerships.

Five years ago, after deciding that it was “pastorally unsustainable” for the Church to make no formal provision for those in committed same-sex relationships. the Governing Body approved a service of blessing for an experimental five-year period, which is due to come to an end in September this year.

Yesterday and today, at its meeting in Llandudno, the Governing Body debated a motion to make the provision permanent by incorporating a rite for the blessing of same-sex marriages and partnerships into the Book of Common Prayer.

The measure needed a two thirds majority of each of the Orders which comprise the Governing Body: Bishops, Clergy and Laity.  All five Bishops voted in favour. The clergy voted 32 – 7 in favour, with 5 abstentions, and the laity 48 – 8 in favour, with 2 abstentions.

You can read the proposed liturgy here, and the amendments proposed by members of the Governing Body here.

The Church in Wales does still not have provision to marry same-sex couples. However, in November 2025, after several months of careful listening exercises, the Bishops of the Church issued a pastoral letter noting that the process had shown a majority “in favour of the view that the time is right to offer equal marriage.”

Further proposals will duly be brought forward in April 2027 to allow the law of the state and of the Church to be changed to permit equal marriage in the Church in Wales.

Speaking about today’s vote, the Most Revd Cherry Vann, Archbishop of Wales, said: “I want to thank everyone for the ways in which this debate was conducted – calmly, and with mutual respect. The Bench of Bishops and I recognise that this is an issue about which people hold strong convictions. We want everybody to be able to hold their views with integrity whilst not losing sight of the image of God that resides in all of us. We want to build a church that can make space for each other whatever our different perspectives.”

The discussion and vote was held on the second day of the Governing Body meeting at Venue Cymru in Llandudno. The livestream is available to watch online here.

Materials

Report of the Select Committee on the Bill to Incorporate into the Book of Common Prayer An Order of Service of Blessing following a Civil Partnership or Marriage of Two People of the Same Sex, (March 2026).

The Governing Body of the Church in Wales is meeting at Venue Cymru, Llandudno, on April 15 and 16. Today, 15 April 2026, the following notice was issued.

Vacancy in the See of Bangor

The Electoral College is reviewing expressions of interest and will meet from 16-18 June 2026 at Holy Trinity Church, Llandudno to elect the next Bishop of Bangor.

Documents relating to the vacancy are available here:

• Diocesan profile
• Provincial statement

If you wish to be considered for this role, or wish to suggest a person for consideration, please contact the Secretary to the Electoral College by email at electoralcollege@churchinwales.org.uk.

The closing date for expressions of interest and suggestions is 12pm on Wednesday 29 April 2026.

Human dignity is ubiquitous in contemporary constitutional law, yet its meaning varies across jurisdictions and even among judges. In a new essay at Emory’s Canopy Forum, I review my friend Andrea Pin’s new book, Dignity in Judgment, which challenges the conventional view that dignity is solely a secular, autonomy-based concept and highlights its religious and communal roots. While I agree with Andrea that dignity has multiple intellectual sources, I argue that courts today overwhelmingly rely on a secular understanding in practice. This convergence, I suggest, reflects the intellectual formation and shared legal culture of judges, who interpret dignity through familiar frameworks shaped by modern constitutionalism.

I’ll be interviewing Andrea about his book in an upcoming Legal Spirits podcast, so please stay tuned! Meanwhle, you can read the full review here.

The post Dignity and the Judges appeared first on LAW AND RELIGION FORUM.

As far as the parish could ascertain, the chair purchase [of the 25 existing upholstered chairs] did not have faculty permission (apparently because of the erroneous belief that this was unnecessary since  the chairs are not fixed to any part of the fabric of the church). Some old, plastic, bucket chairs are stored in a shed in the church grounds and are brought out for larger weddings, funerals, and services, such as the Crib Service at Christmas. With a view to disposing of them, the parish submitted a grant application to fund the purchase of additional chairs of the type they already have. A grant was awarded by the Diocesan Development Fund to purchase the additional chairs, and it was intended that these would be stored, either in the vestry or at the rear of the church, when not in use[14].

The parish is working on a project to improve the use of the Edwardian vestry which requires the parish to empty the shed of the plastic chairs, and to move stored items from the vestry into the shed. The parish would be able to store the newly purchased chairs in the vestry, and also to make use of them to facilitate the conversion of the vestry into a space for meetings and small groups…This work depends upon being able to dispose of the old plastic chairs, and to create space within the shed[15].

In his Analysis and Conclusions [22] to [38], Hodge Ch. noted that the parish had provided a clear and convincing justification for the disposal of the 35 existing plastic, bucket chairs which were in various states of disrepair and desperately needed to be replaced. The CBC was clearly right in its view that the replacement of these chairs would be beneficial to the historic character of the church building: “they should never have been introduced into this church in the first place. They are wholly unsuitable for a Grade II* listed, historic church building” [24].

He unhesitatingly granted a faculty for their disposal. However,

“[25]. …the real question on this petition was what should replace these bucket chairs: Should the parish be permitted to introduce more of the existing, upholstered, stackable chairs, further reinforcing their presence within this church, contrary to CBC guidance? Or should they be replaced (if at all) with a new style of chair which conforms to such guidance?”

[26]. In answering this question, the court must recognise that it cannot compel the removal of the existing chairs. Although they were introduced into the church unlawfully, this was more than a decade ago; and the time has long elapsed since the court could make any restoration order requiring their removal: see s. 72(5) of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and Care of Churches Measure 2018. This case demonstrates the need for the archdeacon, when conducting his regular visitation of each church within the archdeaconry, to be vigilant about identifying any changes that have been made to the church’s fabric and contents since the last visitation, and inquiring as to the nature of any requisite lawful authority for such change…

[…]

[29]. I find that there is a degree of tension in the CBC’s approach, which is not easy to reconcile with the petition that is actually before the court. The CBC has an understandable wish to see a single style of chair introduced into this historic church, so as to give the interior a unified appearance. However, the parish are not seeking, by this petition, any authority to dispose of their 25 existing upholstered, stackable chairs. Thus, the adoption of a single style of chair would seem to involve the acceptance of upholstered seating, contrary to the CBC’s published guidance, and the CBC’s strong suggestion that the parish should consider an alternative replacement chair in line with that guidance.

[31]. I confess that at times my mind has wavered about the outcome of this petition. However, I have reached the clear conclusion that I should refuse the petitioner’s request to replace the 35 plastic bucket chairs with an additional 35 stacking chairs, of the same design as the 25 existing chairs which have been used in the church since 2013 or thereabouts. My reasons are as follows.

[32]. First, I am satisfied that the presence of the existing chairs has caused a degree of harm to the significance of this fine, medieval village church as a Grade II* listed building of special architectural and historic interest. The introduction of any significant number of additional chairs of the same design and style would add to that degree of harm. The parish’s choice of chair departs from the CBC’s published guidance on seating in churches. That guidance is a matter of substance, and not mere form […]

[33]. Second, the burden rests on the petitioners to demonstrate a sufficiently good reason for introducing these particular chairs into this listed church building[…] I agree with the DAC that the parish have provided no clear or convincing justification for the limited harm that would be caused by the introduction of their preferred design and style of chair[…]

[35]. Third…I am satisfied that the same, or substantially the same, benefits could be obtained by the introduction of another form of seating which would cause less harm to the character and special significance of this Grade II* listed historic church building.

[36]. Fourth, I appreciate that the point can be made that, strictly, any new seating will not form a permanent addition to the fabric of this church building. But that is to ignore the realities of the position. If the quality and design of the existing 25 chairs is permitted to dictate, or even to influence, the form of any new seating, similar considerations will apply when any future decision comes to be made about the replacement of the existing 25 chairs.

Since they will be 13 years older than the new chairs, it is likely that they will need to be replaced first. The likelihood is that it will then be said that their replacements should replicate the quality, and design, of the remaining chairs. These chairs will therefore become permanently embedded within this church, perpetuating the inappropriate quality and design of the existing seating for future generations. It is at this point that the second of the principal reasons provided by the DAC for refusing to recommend the parish’s new seating proposal becomes of relevance. The existing, upholstered chairs in the church were never authorised under faculty, and so they cannot provide any precedent for the introduction of additional, unsuitable matching chairs.

[37]. For all these reasons, I find that the petitioners have not discharged the burden that rests upon them of demonstrating a sufficiently good reason for introducing these particular chairs into this listed church building…Whilst I will grant a faculty for the disposal of all 35 plastic, bucket chairs, I refuse to grant a faculty for the purchase of an additional 35 stacking chairs of the same design as the church’s 25 existing, upholstered chairs.

[38].  Should the parish wish to amend their petition so as to seek a faculty for the purchase of up to 35 additional stackable chairs of a quality and design that complies with the CBC guidance note on church seating, then I would be prepared to dispense with the display of any further public notices (since no objections were formally raised to the parish’s present, and more drastic, seating proposal) and to grant such a faculty…

Comment

The CBC Guidance Note Seating is here, which was issued by the Church Buildings Council under S55(1)(d) of the Dioceses, Mission and Pastoral Measure 2007.

Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:

• Vice President J.D. Vance spoke regarding growing tension between the U.S. military and religious leaders and the pushback against current US military operations in Iran.
• In Perry v. Marteney, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a law in West Virginia that required vaccinations for public school students without religious exemptions.
• in Singh v. Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, a case regarding the transfer of a Sikh Temple into a trust, the court held that the ‘neutral principles exception’ to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine can apply outside of church property cases.
• In Maniar v. Noem, a D.C. District Court dismissed a suit brought by a Pakistani-American couple who claimed that being placed on a Screening List at the airport violated their free exercise rights.
• In Johnson v. Fleming a Virginia federal district court dismissed Free Exercise claims regarding religious exclusions from a state tuition program.

The post Around the Web appeared first on LAW AND RELIGION FORUM.

Places of Worship Renewal Fund: update

Historic England, which will be administering the scheme in England, has published a notice about the new Places of Worship Renewal Fund in which it says that “Detailed guidance, including the remit of the fund and all eligibility criteria, is currently being prepared and will be published here in due course. This will include information on how to apply”. In other words, continue watching this space.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act 2025: implementation

On Tuesday, the Chief Executive of the Security Industry Authority (SIA), Michelle Russell, issued a statement marking the one-year anniversary of Royal Assent to the Act. The statement says that, over the past year, the SIA has worked closely with the Home Office and other partners on the preparatory foundations that need to be in place before it is “able to create a regulatory function that is credible and effective”. In the coming year, the SIA will be issuing its statutory guidance, recruiting staff, and building a dedicated online notification portal for premises and events to use.

(The statement begins, “One year ago today, the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act 2025 known as Martyn’s Law…” – to which the only reply can be “No: it’s known as the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act 2025”.)

Woman charged over baptism death

The Crown Prosecution Service reports that a woman has been charged with gross negligence manslaughter following a baptism ceremony in Birmingham in 2023 in which the man being baptised drowned. Malcolm McHaffie, Head of the CPS Special Crime Division, said:

“We have decided to prosecute Cheryl Bartley, 48, with one count of gross negligence manslaughter in relation to her role as a pastor during a baptism. She will appear at Birmingham Magistrates’ Court on Thursday, 14 May 2026.”

West Midlands Police cautioned:

“We remind all concerned that criminal proceedings against this defendant are active and that she has the right to a fair trial. It is vital that there should be no reporting, commentary or sharing of information online which could in any way prejudice these proceedings.”

Artificial Stupidity strikes again

In Your Home Partners v Kellichan and Another [2026] SC KDY 34, the claimants sought an order from the Kirkcaldy Sheriff Court requiring the respondents to pay £5,000 in rent arrears [1]. Sheriff MacRitchie initially rejected the claim on the grounds that it was a matter for the First-tier Tribunal (Housing and Property Chamber) [3].

Zilch to do with “religion”: the interest for this blog is that the claimants then made further submissions disputing the point about jurisdiction, arguing that it was indeed a matter for the Sheriff Court and lodging various decided cases in support of their contention, together with what they said were extracts from the “Small Claims (Scotland) Rules – Section 41a” and the “Interest on Debts (Scotland) Act 1985 – Section 1”.

The problem with that submission, however, as Sheriff MacRitchie pointed out at [13], was that the alleged Rules and Act “simply do not exist”. To which the claimants replied that

“they had obtained these case references and the purported statutes and relative statutory extracts using online Artificial Intelligence in good faith, and that they had not knowingly lodged these references to non-existent decisions, rules and a statute” [17].

Luckily for them, His Lordship decided that, on balance, it was cock-up rather than conspiracy and that he would not initiate proceedings for contempt of court [22].

Further comment by us would be otiose, but Elaine Elder and Hannah Campbell discuss the decision more fully in Scottish Legal News, here.

Chapels Wales Project

Working in partnership with denominations, congregations, heritage organisations, and local communities, the Capeli Cymru project has been established to develop innovative and practical strategies to safeguard chapel heritage across Wales. A  national chapel survey has been designed to map “active, closed, and converted chapels across Wales, capturing data on their sustainability, architectural value, and status of nationally protected assets”. Links are here (general public) and here, (congregation members).

Quick links

• Bernard Capp, The Conversation: Hands off my hat! The hidden power of headwear and ‘hatiquette’ in early modern England: well worth a read, but we couldn’t help thinking that nominative determinism is alive and well…
• The Church Times reports, rather belatedly, on the conference of BPUR International at the House of Commons on 26 March, sponsored by the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group for Freedom of Religion or Belief, which issued a “Westminster Declaration on Preventing the Political Abuse of Religion”.
  

And finally…I

Wikipedia includes a dynamic listing of common initialisms relating to LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer) people and the LGBTQ community. Currently absent from the list is MMIWG2SLGBTQQIA+, the recent use of which by Canadian MP Leah Gazan (Winnipeg Centre, NDP) “has sparked a frenzy online” (Newsweek, 9 April 2026). The acronym stands for: Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women, Girls, and Two‑Spirit, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Questioning, Intersex, and Asexual people.

The Newsweek article states, “the full acronym has been used for years in Canadian government, advocacy, and community contexts to emphasise intersectionality, and is intentionally lengthy in order to name everyone who has historically been left out of national conversations about violence, justice, and safety”.

And finally…II

A Copilot search on the organisation Westminster Declaration, stated [emphasis added]:

“… is a title that has been used for two quite different documents in recent years. Your question most likely refers to the 2023 Westminster Declaration, a high‑profile international statement on free speech and censorship. But there is also a 2025 Westminster Declaration rooted in Christian public ethics. Both matter, but they serve very different constituencies and purposes“…

This exercise proved instructive: for users of AI, the importance of human interpretation of the results of AI and the value in seeking out the original source documents; and for “think-tanks” and others seeking to influence debate, the year-on-year use of a strapline or title may lead to confusion unless qualified. The belated response of the Church Times is perhaps understandable.

• Westminster Declaration, (12 April 2026).
• Artificial Stupidity strikes again, (12 April 2026).
• ChatGPT, Copilot, and L&RUK, (8 April 2026).
• AI and L&RUK readership, (2 April 2026).
• Judicial Appointments Committee, (29 March 2026).
• A further examination of AI in legal blogging, (26 March 2026).
• A brief experiment in legal blogging using AI, (23 January 2023).
• Legal research, blogging and AI, (22 January 2023).
• Might a computer algorithm replace the ECtHR? (23 January 2017).

Other links

• OUP: Author use of Artificial Intelligence (AI), (6 April 2026).
• Law Commission: AI and the Law A Discussion Paper, (July 2025).
• European Commission: Regulation 2024/1689, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008.

Last updated: 12 April 2026 at 16:17. 

Since A brief experiment in legal blogging using AI in 2023, a number of aspects of Artificial Intelligence (AI) have been explored on L&RUK. Recently, A further examination of AI in legal blogging looked at developments in the use of AI in sourcing to material for use on this blog, and AI and L&RUK readership considered referrals to the blog from search engines, visitors and other referral bodies (websites, AI &c).

For the present post, we asked both Copilot and to ChatGTP to provide an answer to the question: To what extent do search engines identify Law and Religion UK as a source of information (on law and religion)?[1]. The responses were followed up by additional considerations on the future role of AI in “specialist blogs”[2].

Copilot

Copilot states that search engines determine the “authority” of a blog through a mix of indexing, backlinks, citations, and topical relevance. It notes that L&RUK is fully indexed and is treated as a legitimate information source; the site is crawled and indexed by search engines, with posts appearing in search results for UK law‑and‑religion topics. Its listing in curated legal directories, such as Access to Law, signals reliability to search engines. Furthermore, its cataloguing by the IALS Digital Resources collection is considered to be “a strong academic endorsement”.

Copilot observes the importance of these inclusions – “search engines use such curated references as quality signals. [L&RUK] is recognised as a specialist, authoritative niche blog“. This reinforced the blog’s authority within its domain, even if it is not a general‑purpose news source. The areas in which search engines tend to identify Law & Religion UK are: ecclesiastical law; religion‑law interactions; burial/cremation law; church governance; human rights issues involving religion. However, it is not treated like a mainstream news outlet, so it will not appear for broad legal or political queries.

Furthermore, “[i]ts authors’ reputations strengthen its search credibility. Search engines factor in author expertise. The site’s main contributors…are recognized in academic and professional contexts, which boosts perceived trustworthiness”. In summary, L&RUK is deemed to have high authority within its niche, with search engines treating it as a reputable, expert‑driven source for UK law‑and‑religion issues.

ChatGPT

The response from ChatGPT was similar to that from Copilot, although it did identify additional specific issues. It noted that the available evidence suggested search engines were the dominant pathway through which users reach Law & Religion UK, (as  noted in in our earlier post), but this did not necessarily mean that the site was strongly “identified” or branded as a primary authority by those engines in the same way as major academic publishers or institutional databases.

However, it demonstrates that search engines consistently identify the site in response to user queries, making them the primary mechanism of discovery. There are two different senses of “identification”:

(a) Technical discoverability — High. Search engines are:

• clearly index a large volume of the blog’s content;
• routinely return the site in search results; and
• drive the overwhelming majority of visits.

Importantly, “this suggests strong SEO visibility and topical relevance, especially for niche queries in UK law-and-religion issues”.

(b) Authority recognition — Moderate / niche. The same evidence also indicated:

• The blog functions as a specialist, issue-driven resource, often accessed via specific queries rather than brand searches;
• Its readership is heavily UK-based (~85%), reinforcing its jurisdiction-specific niche;
• It is classified externally (e.g. by the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies) as a blog resource rather than a formal academic database or journal.

This implies that search engines are likely to treat it as a relevant expert blog for particular topics although not necessarily as a canonical authority such as Westlaw, LexisNexis, or major journals. Interestingly, on the nature of its search visibility, the pattern of usage suggests that:

• Users often arrive via long-tail or issue-specific searches (e.g. case law, ecclesiastical law topics);
• Older posts continue to receive traffic, indicating persistent indexing and retrieval across time.

Thus, “search engines are not just identifying the homepage—they are deep-indexing individual posts as answers to specific legal-religious queries”. Support for this observation has been the recent spike in page-reads of the post on the offence of Preventing lawful and decent burial, 11 March 2024, prompted by the case of Robert Bush, funeral director at Legacy Independent Funeral Directors in Hull, (which we referred to on 19 October 2025).

There has also been a continuing interest in the 2017 post on scattering Ian Brady’s ashes, which appears to have been prompted by uncertainties in the funeral arrangements for Ian Huntley, (the analysis of which we have not covered). However, the same interest does not appear to have been shown in case of the exhumation of Dr David Kelly, the former Iraq weapons inspector who took his own life near his home in Longworth, Oxfordshire, in 2003.

ChatGPT’s overall assessment is that “To a very great extent, search engines identify and surface Law & Religion UK as a source of information—indeed, they are its primary gateway for users. This identification is “strong in visibility and retrieval (high discoverability)” although “[m]ore limited in terms of perceived authority or brand prominence (niche authority rather than dominant source)”.

Future role of AI in L&RUK

At its present state of development, the strength of AI lies in its ability to access and synthesize existing material, and rephrase a wide range available knowledge; in contrast, specialist blogs can give added value through insights which not easily replicated: original analysis; first-hand experience (e.g. interpretation of recent judgments or new/prospective legislation, or commentary on emerging or ambiguous situations.

Furthermore, specialist blogs located at the interface of two disciplines, such as law and religion, occupy a specific niche which it is difficult to replicate, at present. However, this advantage may narrow over time with further developments in AI and its increasing use by experts with “hybrid applications” of AI and expert use becoming common.

It is widely acknowledged that there has been a rapid expansion in the rate of development and use of AI technology. Within the EU, Regulation 2024/1689, adopted on 13 June 2024, established a comprehensive legal framework for artificial intelligence within the European Community. In July 2025, the Law Commission published the discussion paper AI and the law, in which it considers the nature of AI, how might AI issues arise, and the need for clarification on the fundamental issue of legal personality.

The emergence and development of Artificial Intelligence (AI), and Generative AI (Gen AI) in particular, have created both opportunities and challenges for authors, researchers, and publishers. Oxford University Press (OUP) and other publishers have formulated guidelines on the responsible, appropriate, and transparent use of Gen AI by authors and editors in its research publishing.

Whilst AI has the potential of summarizing lengthy judgments &c, or exploring areas for which we have limited expertise, the material so generated is unlikely to be used in the absence of references/links to primary sources. To date, the direct use of AI by L&RUK has been limited and this is clearly identifiable from the context of the text; however, it is possible that indirectly, the many referrals to the site via search engines will have been influenced by the search engine’s own AI.

[1] …noting that “Copilot…gives a response more tailored to a user working with Microsoft 365 (i.e. dp) and their perceived areas of interest”.

[2] A “specialist blog” is a blog that focuses on a specific niche, topic, or area of expertise, rather than covering a wide range of general subjects. Key features are: Narrow focus: It concentrates on one subject; Expert-level content: Posts are often more detailed, informed, and targeted toward people interested in that field; Defined audience: It attracts readers who share a particular interest or need; Authority building: The goal is often to become a trusted source.

Background

In 2011, the authorities investigated a man, K.A, for allegedly distributing pornographic material and violating privacy after he published intimate photos involving a well-known actress, A.S – an incident that sparked widespread public debate about the balance between protecting private life and regulating pornographic content [5]. There was intense media coverage, including unconfirmed speculation that A.S. belonged to Armenia’s biggest “sect”: Word of Life [6]. The newspaper Iravunk Hetaqnnutyun then published an article linking the scandal to Word of Life, claiming that A.S. was a member and accusing her of serious misconduct and alleging “that she had engaged in lewd acts with her own child” [6]. It also stated that Word of Life was a “sectarian union”, and that it exerted influence in certain circles involving television companies and public officials [6]. A similar article appeared shortly after in another newspaper, reinforcing these claims and suggesting that the Word of Life promoted questionable values. A.S. publicly denied ever being affiliated with the organisation [8], but despite that, further publications continued to target the applicants, using inflammatory language and encouraging public opposition to them. Finally, in November 2011, the applicants sued Iravunk Media Ltd, the publisher of the Iravunk Hetaqnnutyun and Argumenti Nedeli v Armenii newspapers, for defamation [10].

In July 2012, the District Court dismissed the claims, ruling that the publications had not contained defamatory or insulting statements and that were protected by the publisher’s right to freedom of expression, which allowed journalists to use exaggerated and provocative language. Further, the applicants had failed to prove defamatory intent on the part of the respondent. The District Court held in particular

“… that the articles and images were published only after the scandalous events involving the actress [A.S.], in which her name was linked to the [applicant] organisation, which was regarded as a sectarian organisation and was subjected to criticism. From the moment [the applicants] entered the arena of open public debate they needed to show a certain amount of tolerance towards criticism, which, taken as a whole, has [had] the nature of an open debate pursuing the aim of instilling society with certain religious ideas or of [preventing it from] deviating from the religious beliefs of the Armenian Apostolic Church, rather than the aim of insulting or defaming someone” [16].

On 8 November 2012, the Civil Court of Appeal dismissed their appeal and upheld the judgment of the District Court. As regards the applicants’ complaints about the use of the word “sect”, the Court of Appeal stated, in particular:

“… having examined the arguments raised in the appeal regarding the word ‘sect’ and its interpretations, ;;; even in their appeal the [applicants] did not deny the fact that their activity deviated from the beliefs of the Armenian Apostolic Church” [15].

In December 2012, the applicants appealed to the Court of Cassation but, in doing so, confused the dates of the two judgments, and in January 2013, the Court declared the appeal inadmissible on the ground that the judgment of the District Court was not amenable to appeal in cassation proceedings. In February 2013, the applicants resubmitted their appeal of December 2012, having amended the last paragraph to refer to the correct decision – that of the Civil Court of Appeal on 8 November 2012 – but the second application was ruled inadmissible as out of time [19-22].

Before the Fifth Section, the applicants contended that the Court of Cassation’s decision to declare their appeal on points of law inadmissible had breached their right of access to a court as provided in Article 6 ECHR [28] and that the District Court had violated the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality in religious matters, contrary to Article 9, because of certain findings that it had reached when assessing the use of the words “sect” and “sectarian” in the newspaper articles [40].

The judgment

On the first ground, the Fifth Section held that the Court of Cassation must have known that the wording of the concluding part of the applicants’ appeal was the result of a typographical error or some similar oversight, and though it could have given the applicants an opportunity to correct their mistake it had chosen not to do so without giving any reasoning for its choice and had declared the appeal inadmissible without giving the applicants any further chance to remedy the situation. As a result of the Court of Cassation’s strict application of the procedural rules, their appeal on points of law was not examined on the merits [37]. Though the limitation applied by the Court of Cassation pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring the proper administration of justice, it had demonstrated “excessive formalism” by applying the rules in a particularly strict manner that disproportionately and unjustifiably restricted the applicants’ right of access to the court [38]. There had therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 [39].

As to the second ground, the Fifth Section said that its judgment was concerned solely with the applicants’ complaint that,

“… when performing the balancing exercise between the competing rights, the District Court itself committed certain acts which breached the guarantees of Article 9 … in particular, … the District Court’s finding that their religious activity deviated from the belief system of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the dominant church in Armenia, and that consequently it was acceptable to call the applicant organisation a ‘sect'”

and that, by doing so, the District Court had assessed the legitimacy of their faith and thereby breached the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality in religious matters under Article 9 [51].

The Court reiterated that, provided that religious or philosophical views attained a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance, the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality was ‘incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed’ [52]. While the Court had no reason to doubt that the applicants’ beliefs passed that threshold, the domestic courts had not been in breach of their duties under Article 9;

“… it cannot be said that the domestic courts interfered with the applicants’ Article 9 rights. It is notable that the domestic courts did not themselves use the word “sect” in respect of the applicant organisation, or characterise it as such. Nor did the scope of their examination ever embrace any issue concerning the legitimacy of the applicants’ faith … the Court cannot agree with the applicants’ argument that, by stating that their religious beliefs differed from those of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the domestic courts delved into an assessment of the legitimacy of the applicants’ faith. In sum, no issue arises under Article 9 with respect to the complaint concerning the alleged breach of the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality, as argued by the applicants” [53].

In brief, there had been a violation of Article 6, but there had been no violation of Article 9.

The Guardian reports that Robert Bush, funeral director at Legacy Independent Funeral Directors in Hull, has admitted giving families the wrong ashes, lying to them, stealing from them and stealing from charities. He pleaded guilty at Hull Crown Court to 30 counts of preventing a lawful and decent burial, and one of theft from twelve charities, including the Salvation Army and Macmillan Cancer Support, after 30 bodies and a quantity of ashes were found at the funeral home in 2024.

He had previously pleaded guilty to dozens of counts of fraud at a hearing in October and had been charged with 67 offences in total. He was granted bail pending a pre-sentence report, but Hilliard J said that “everybody accepts a custodial sentence is inevitable in this case”.

The Institute of Cemetery and Crematorium Management renewed its call for statutory regulation of the funeral industry in England and Wales where, unlike in Scotland, there is currently no universal system of inspection or enforcement across the industry. As we have previously noted, in October 2024 a statutory inquiry chaired by Sir Jonathan Michael recommended that the Government “should establish an independent statutory regulatory regime for funeral directors in England as a matter of urgency in order to safeguard the security and dignity of the deceased”.

Disclosure and Barring Service: faith groups

The Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) is expanding its Faith in Safeguarding campaign nationally to raise awareness of the legal duty to refer – the process that organisations must follow by law when there are safeguarding concerns about individuals in regulated activity. According to the DBS, faith organisations are currently among the lower-referring sectors for barring referrals, and it suspects that many faith organisations may be unaware of their legal obligations under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006. It is currently running a series of free, in-person pop-up clinics across England, offering practical guidance tailored to faith settings. Further details here.

Consultation on amending the Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 2008

The Northern Ireland Department for Communities has opened a consultation on amending the Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 2008. The consultation document, which includes a draft Bill, is the result of a review of the operation of the 2008 Act carried out in 2021. In the meantime, the Department held a separate consultation on the advisability of repealing the uncommenced section 167 of the Act (which would require institutions which are not charities under the law of Northern Ireland but which operate for charitable purposes in or from Northern Ireland to register there), and concluded that its repeal would avoid duplication of regulatory oversight and the imposition of disproportionate burdens on charities.

This latest consultation looks at:

• broadening the bodies with whom the Charity Commission for Northern Ireland can share information to include “persons discharging functions of a public nature”;
• the possibility of giving the Commission, and possibly its officials, an official warning power;
• expanding the scope of the power to remove trustees to include those trustees who have resigned from office;
• giving the Commission the power to issue directions to trustees not to undertake certain actions;
• extending automatic disqualification as a trustee following an inquiry to cover employment in such roles as an officer, agent or employee of a charity;
• changes to the requirement to prepare accounts;
• relaxing the audit/independent examination requirement for small charities; and
• “template reporting”.

The consultation closes on 24 April.

Quick links

• Thérèse Rankin, Bates Wells: Could withdrawing a job offer because of an applicant’s social media posts be discriminatory? Lessons from Ngole v Touchstone Leeds.

And a Happy Easter to all our readers!

In this short take, Mark Movsesian looks at the Supreme Court’s 8-1 decision this week in Chiles v. Salazar, involving a Christian therapist who challenged Colorado’s ban on so-called conversion therapy for minors. Formally, Chiles is not a free exercise case. But religion is clearly in the background—a reminder that law-and-religion controversies are often worked out through the First Amendment’s speech protections. Listen in!

The post Legal Spirits 076: A Short Take on Chiles v. Salazar appeared first on LAW AND RELIGION FORUM.

Background

WordPress provides its users with information on site traffic through a number of pre-set options[1] including: “Last 7 Days”; “Last 30 Days”; “Last 12 Months”; “Last 3 Years”. It also has details for: “Today”; “Month to date”; and “Year to Date”, which are useful in tracking the development of specific issues, but are of less value for comparative purposes. With L&RUK’s worldwide readership, the “Today” results are influenced by the time zone and different responses over the 24 hour period post-publication.

Likewise ” *** to date” information is of limited value when seeking comparisons on due to possible variations in the length of the time period chosen. Consequently, this present analysis uses information for the “Last 7 Days”; “Last 30 Days”; “Last 12 Months”; and “Last 3 Years”.

Referrals

“Referrals” are made to the blog from two distinct sources: from search engines[2] and through other web links[3]. Search engines are associated with 26.8% to 37.8% of the total number of page views, and of these, the majority are from either Google, (82.34% to 86.28%) with a significant, but smaller number from Bing, (10.4% to 14.0%). Of the remaining referrals through other links, the majority are either from X, or Facebook, with very few via ChatGPT[4].

There are also ~1,160 subscribers who receive email notification of each new post as it is published, although these are not identified separately.

Location

In the context of the blog’s strapline “Issues of law and religion in the United Kingdom – with occasional forays further afield”, it is hardly surprising thar the majority of readers are from the UK. There were 79.5% over the past three years, falling to 68.9% over the 12 months period when there was a significant readership in the the United States (17.1%)  and China (12.5%). Recent UK readership is 71.41% (30d) and 71.69% (7d)[5].

Comment

Search Engines play a significant part in identifying L&RUK to potential users, and as noted earlier, they now rely on AI at almost every stage of the search process—from understanding the query, to ranking results, to generating summaries. Thus whilst the general trend of an increased use of AI is not reflected directly in the above analysis, there is likely to be an indirect effect though the Search Engine searches.

[1] A bespoke option is also available.

[2] Google; Bing; Duck Duck Go; Yahoo; ecosia; and others.

[3] X; Gmail; ChatGPT; Facebook; Inner Temple; Thinking Anglicans; Beaker Folk of Husborne Crawley; Edgepilot; Notebook; and others.  

[4] X, 1.05% to 6.46%; Gmail, 0.91% to 1.87%; ChatGPT, 0.28% to 1.1%; and Facebook, 0.7% to 3.28%.

[5] However, comparing the subject matter of “top ten” posts for this 12 month period, there appeared to be little that would be of specific interest on China or the US.

Update: 4 April 2026 at 14:22. See Comments, below, on information from Copilot: viz. “The spike in 2026 Chinese page‑reads is almost certainly caused by AI‑related automated traffic—crawlers, LLM training systems, or AI‑driven referrals—rather than a sudden surge of human readers in China”.

Comment

The above posts are listed in descending order of number of page-views. These results are appear to be atypical, possibly a consequence of fewer percentage of page reads from the UK, and the greater percentage of the total page views in the “top ten” posts, supra. The following general observations may be made:

• Parochial Fees are a regular feature, and are based upon the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) for August which is reported by ONS in September, and eventually announced by the Church of England in December.
• Two of the above posts relate to events which, to us, were clearly “non-starters”: the substantial increase in burial fees; and the “poisoned chalice” appointment of an interim Bishop to the Diocese of Bangor, (not literally, obvs).
• There was significant opposition to an increase in burial fees, and General Synod voted overwhelmingly against the proposal. Whilst the proposal for an Interim Bishop of Bangor was prima facie a logical approach to the current impasse, the tightly drawn requirements and the associated circumstances militated again the appointment.
• Continuing interest in the post on the scattering of Ian Brady’s ashes appears to have been generated by the death of Ian Huntley at the maximum security HMP Frankland. After a trial at the Old Bailey in 2003, he was jailed for life with a recommended minimum term of 40 years for the “Soham murders”. However, apart from a passing reference to a Sun newspaper headline in February 2013, we have not covered the Soham case, although many of the principles related to the funeral arrangements (possession of the body, the need for secrecy) were similar.

[1]  i.e. those other than the “Home Page”, “Archives”, and “Index”. However, for the present analysis, these categories did not fall within the “top 10”.

[2] 20% for January to April in 2025 and ~12% for posts from 1 August 2024 to 4 July 2025.

Updated: 1 April 2026 at 13:28..

Summaries to the nine consistory court judgments reviewed during March are listed below, with links to the L&RUK review. These included [*]:

• Procedural
• Reordering, extensions and other building works
• Exhumation
• Churchyards and burials

This monthly review also includes: CDM Decisions and Safeguarding; Reports from the Independent Reviewer; Privy Council Business; Other legal issues; Visitations; CFCE Determinations; and Links to other posts relating to ecclesiastical law.

An index to these and earlier judgments in here.

Procedural

Re St. Gabriel Toxteth [2026] ECC Liv 1 The Parochial Church Council wished to enter into a lease/hire agreement with the Ethiopian Orthodox Teklehaymanot Church (EOTC), which had already been using the church for worship and community events, with a view to eventual purchase by EOTC at a cost of £175,000. The arrangement formed part of a broader diocesan reorganisation under the “Fit for Mission” initiative, which merged the parishes of St Gabriel’s and St Cleopas due to declining congregations and the higher maintenance costs of St Gabriel’s [5].

Several former members of St Gabriel’s congregation and local residents objected, arguing that the church had not been properly closed under the Mission and Pastoral Measure 2011 and criticising the transparency of the decision-making process. Some expressed concern that the agreement would effectively end Anglican use of the building [6] to [13].

The Chancellor held that these objections related to parish reorganisation and potential closure—matters outside the faculty jurisdiction [16]. His role was limited to considering the effect of the proposed agreement on the church building’s heritage and proper use. As the hire agreement posed no risk to the building’s fabric or heritage and would place the current occupation on a proper legal footing, the faculty was granted. [Re St. Gabriel Toxteth [2026] ECC Liv 1] [top of section] [top]

Reordering, extensions and other building works

• Substantial reordering
• Removal and replacement of pews

[top]

Substantial reordering

Re St. Thomas Stourbridge [2026] ECC Wor 1 The faculty petition proposed a major reordering of St Thomas’ Church, Stourbridge, a Grade I listed Georgian church designated as a diocesan “renewal church” supported by national mission funding. The proposals included removal of most 18th-century box pews, installation of new flooring, heating, lighting, audio-visual facilities, a servery, flexible seating, and relocation (not removal) of the font. Applying the Duffield framework, the Chancellor found that removing the historic pews would cause serious harm to the building’s architectural and historic significance, given their rarity and integral role in the Georgian interior. However, the court accepted clear and convincing justification: the reordering was necessary to achieve liturgical flexibility, accessibility (especially for wheelchair users), and expanded community and missional use essential to the church’s long-term viability. Alternatives involving only partial pew removal would not meet these needs. The public benefits—sustaining an active worshipping community and securing the building’s future—were held to outweigh the heritage harm. Most works were therefore permitted, subject to detailed conditions (including retention of eight pews, preservation of graffiti, reuse of materials, and DAC approval of final specifications). Permission to remove and replace the font was refused, but relocation within the church was allowed. [Re St. Thomas Stourbridge [2026] ECC Wor 1] [Top of section] [Top of post].

Re St. John Knotty Ash [2025] ECC Liv 3 There was an unopposed faculty petition for reordering works at St. John the Evangelist, Knotty Ash, a Grade II listed church. The proposals—supported by the DAC, PCC, and congregation—aimed to improve accessibility and inclusivity, particularly for children and neurodiverse individuals. Key changes included: creating a sensory space in an existing meeting room; relocating and expanding the children’s area into the north aisle by repositioning (not removing) pews; and installing movable TV screens with live-feed capability to improve visibility and sound access. These responded to identified barriers such as poor audio clarity, limited visibility, and lack of inclusive space. Applying the Duffield framework, the Deputy Chancellor found that the proposals would cause negligible harm to the church’s architectural or historic significance. The works were reversible, did not affect key historic features, and preserved the interior’s character. He concluded that the significant public benefits—enhanced accessibility, participation, and mission—clearly outweighed any minimal impact. As funding was secured and justification strong, the faculty was granted. [Re St. John Knotty Ash [2025] ECC Liv 3] [Top of section] [Top of post].

Re St. Paul Wooburn [2026] ECC Oxf 3 The petitioners sought permission to remove 31 Victorian nave pews installed during William Butterfield’s 1856–57 restoration, replace them with 150 stackable “Icon 40” chairs, and dispose of various surplus twentieth-century furnishings (including a metal altar rail, kneelers, lectern, and a Lady Altar). The Victorian Society objected in consultation, arguing that the pews formed part of Butterfield’s significant ensemble of furnishings and that their removal would harm the building’s architectural integrity. Historic England and the Diocesan Advisory Committee supported the proposal, considering the pews relatively undistinguished and accepting the parish’s case that flexible seating was needed for worship, mission, accessibility, and community activities. Applying the Duffield guidelines for listed churches, the Chancellor held that removing most pews would cause moderate but not serious harm to the church’s significance. However, the parish had demonstrated a clear and convincing justification: flexible space would better support worship, events, and mission. Alternatives such as shortening or moving pews were rejected as impractical. Balancing harm against public benefit, the Chancellor granted the faculty, subject to conditions regarding disposal of the Lady Altar and consultation about retaining some pews around the church perimeter. [Re St. Paul Wooburn [2026] ECC Oxf 3] [Top of section] [Top of post]

Re St. Thomas Stanhope [2026] ECC Dur 1 The Parochial Church Council sought approval to make the church more flexible, accessible, and suitable for worship, community use, and visitors. Key proposals included removing most pews and replacing them with stackable chairs, installing storage cabinets and improved heating, creating a curved dais with a lift at the east end of the nave, adding an access ramp at the south porch, and altering the positions or use of three fonts[4,5].

Eighteen objections were received, mainly opposing pew removal, font changes, cost, and concerns about altering the church’s character [14]. One objector was resident in London and moved away from Stanhope as long ago as 1964. Isles Ch. was not satisfied that this person is an ‘interested person’ within the meaning of rule 10.1 of the Faculty Jurisdiction Rules 2015 (‘the Rules’), but in any event she raises nothing new that is not covered by some of the other objectors.

An objection was from Stanhope Parish Council which alleged that Councillors believed there had been very little consultation on the proposed plans, and in particular the Parish Council had not been consulted. However, the PCC response indicated that this assertion was untrue; the PCC had held a public meeting so that the proposals could be discussed, and some members of the Parish Council were present. Furthermore, the Chancellor noted that under the Rules there is no obligation on the PCC to consult the Parish Council [15].

Heritage bodies largely supported the scheme, noting the pews had relatively low historical significance and that the proposals balanced heritage with contemporary needs.

Applying the legal test for works affecting listed churches, i.e. the familiar principles and questions set out by the Court of Arches in the case of Re St Alkmund, Duffield 2013 Fam 158, and Re St John the Baptist, Penshurst (2015), the Chancellor found that removing the pews would cause only low harm, outweighed by benefits such as flexibility, accessibility, and mission opportunities. Some proposals were modified: the Frosterley marble font must remain in place with its cover, the Crawleyside font must remain inside the church, and the Saxon font may be made movable. [Re St. Thomas Stanhope [2026] ECC Dur 1] [Post] [Top of section] [Top of post].

Exhumation

• Other

Other

Re Newbold Verdon Cemetery [2026] ECC Lei 1 The Chancellor granted a faculty permitting the exhumation of Derek Harold Wilkinson’s cremated remains from Newbold Verdon Cemetery so that they could be reinterred with those of his late wife, Rosemary Wilkinson, in the same grave. Mr Wilkinson was buried in 2019 in his parents’ grave with his wife’s consent.

After Mrs Wilkinson’s death in 2025, their son discovered a 2016 signed letter expressing his parents’ joint wish that their cremated remains be kept until they could be reunited and interred together in the cemetery’s Garden of Remembrance [4]. The court accepted that Mrs Wilkinson’s early dementia at the time of her husband’s burial may explain why those wishes were not followed.

Applying Re Blagdon Cemetery and In re Christ Church, Alsager, Gyane Ch. held that the combination of the couple’s clear prior written wishes, Mrs Wilkinson’s cognitive decline, prompt action upon discovery of the letter, unanimous family support, and the limited disturbance involved constituted exceptional circumstances justifying departure from the presumption of permanence in Christian burial. [Re Newbold Verdon Cemetery [2026] ECC Lei 1] [Top of section] [Top of post].

Re Ormskirk Parish Churchyard [2026] ECC Liv 2 Mr and Mrs Newsome petitioned for a faculty permitting the exhumation of their son Adam’s remains, buried in 2007 at Ormskirk Parish Churchyard, and re-interment in West Lancashire Cemetery[9]. Adam died aged 19 after suffering from cancer. The petitioners argued that the churchyard environment had deteriorated. They reported antisocial behaviour, drug paraphernalia, and intimidation from groups of youths, which made visiting the grave distressing and unsafe. They also described maintenance issues, including a sunken and waterlogged grave, and wished ultimately to be buried together with their son in a new family plot elsewhere.

The Chancellor applied the established principles governing exhumation, particularly those in Re Blagdon Cemetery and Re Christchurch Alsager, which emphasise the presumption of permanence of Christian burial and require exceptional circumstances to justify exhumation[12]. Although expressing sympathy for the family, the Chancellor held that distress caused by antisocial behaviour or dissatisfaction with the churchyard environment does not constitute exceptional circumstances.

Granting the petition could create a precedent for similar applications. Accordingly, the petition for exhumation was refused, though the court suggested that improvements to churchyard management might address the concerns raised[16]. [Re Ormskirk Parish Churchyard [2026] ECC Liv 2] [Top of section] [Top of post].

Churchyards and burials

• Development of churchyard
• Designation of closed churchyard
• Churchyard Regulations

Development of churchyard

Re Malmesbury Abbey [2026] ECC Bri 1 The Deputy Chancellor granted a faculty to authorise the digging of five trial investigation pits within the curtilage of Malmesbury Abbey, to inform improvements to the churchyard, including the proposed erection of a statue to commemorate King Athelstan, who is believed to be buried within the Abbey. [Re Malmesbury Abbey [2026] ECC Bri 1] [Top of section] [Top of post]

Designation of closed churchyard

See Privy Council Business.

[Back] [Top]

Churchyard Regulations

Re Tolleshunt Knights Cemetery [2026] ECC Chd 1 The petitioner, the daughter and an executor of her late father, wished to erect a memorial to her father in the churchyard[2]. The memorial had already been manufactured without prior approval and did not fully comply with diocesan churchyard regulations. Although the shape of the memorial was a technical departure from the regulations, the Chancellor regarded this as a minor issue that would not, by itself, have prevented permission being granted.

The principal difficulty arose from an objection by the petitioner’s mother to the inscription, specifically the phrase “A dear husband,” which she contended did not reflect the deceased’s own manner of expression.

The Petitioner indicated that she has taken legal advice, and has been told, incorrectly, that she and her brother have the “right”, as their father’s executors, to decide on the inscription on his gravestone[8]. The Chancellor emphasised that executors have no legal right to determine the design of a memorial in consecrated ground; any memorial requires ecclesiastical permission.

The Chancellor exercised her discretion, noting family disagreement, the absence of malice by the petitioner, the fact that the wording was not intrinsically objectionable, and that the stone had already been made, making replacement wasteful and costly. Balancing these factors, she granted the faculty and allowed the memorial to be installed. [Re Tolleshunt Knights Cemetery [2026] ECC Chd 1] [Top of section] [Top of post].

Fonts

See Re St. Thomas Stourbridge.

Privy Council Business

12 March 2026

• Burial Act 1853 (Notice) An Order giving notice of the discontinuance of burials in St Peters Churchyard, Clayworth, Retford, Nottinghamshire.

CDM Decisions and Safeguarding

CDM Decisions

Re: the Most Revd & Right Hon Sarah Mullally, Archbishop of Canterbury (February 2026) Review Decision pursuant to section 13(3); President’s Decision on Publication (March 2026).

Church in Wales

Details of any decisions or sentences of the Disciplinary Tribunal of the Church in Wales, where the President of the Tribunal has ordered that details be published on the Church in Wales website.

• Anthony Pierce – February 2026. Decision (3pp, and reported here).
• Samuel Erlandson – February 2026. Decision (3pp).
• Andrew Robinson – February 2026. Decision (3pp).
• Ryan Forey – August 2025. Decision (12 pp, reported here).
• Jason Kennett-Orpwood – October 2024. Details of Penalty (2 paras in E, W).
• Nigel Cahill – August/October 2021. Details of Penalty (2 paras in E, W).

Reports from the Independent Reviewer

Individual Reports from the Independent Reviewer are to be found at House of Bishops’ Declaration on the Ministry of Bishops and Priests (Independent Reviewer), scroll down.

CFCE Determinations

The dates of the Cathedrals Fabric Commission for England may be found by scrolling down to the bottom of the page Cathedrals Fabric Commission.  The programme for 2026 is here and the next meeting will be on Thursday 7 May 2026.

The last published minutes are for Thursday 22 October 2025.

Links to other posts

Recent summaries of specific issues that have been considered in the consistory courts include:

General/Miscellaneous

• Law Commission report on reform of burial and cremation law, (20 March 2026).
• Regulating the funerals industry?, (11 March 2026).
• “Defrocking” in the Church of England, (9 March 2026).
• Deposition of a Bishop from Holy Orders, (2 March 2026).

[Top]

Updated: 31 March 2026 at 08:49.

[*] This is an approximate classification based upon the  main issues considered by the court. Determinations relating to reordering and building works will often address other aspects of the Petition.

Notes on the conventions used for the navigation between cases reviewed in this post are summarized here.

Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:

• The Supreme Court revived a lawsuit by a Mississippi street preacher who claims that his arrest for demonstrating near an amphitheater violated his free speech and religious liberty rights. 
• A federal judge ordered immigration officials to allow clergy and religious workers access to detained migrants in Minneapolis, ruling that denying pastoral visits likely violated religious liberty protections. 
• The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops filed amicus briefs with the Supreme Court arguing that turning away migrants at the border is unlawful and inconsistent with the nation’s moral obligations. 
• Members of Congress introduced legislation that would protect the tax-exempt status of churches and religious organizations from being revoked based on their views or speech. 
• India’s Maharashtra legislature passed a new anti-conversion law this week requiring advance notice before religious conversions and imposing criminal penalties for conversions obtained through coercion, fraud, or marriage. The law has drawn criticism from religious minority groups.

The post Around the Web appeared first on LAW AND RELIGION FORUM.

In R (CKS & Ors) v Secretary of State for Education [2026] EWHC 741, the claimants were three children (their parents acting as litigation friends) who were members of the Charedi Jewish community and attended private Charedi schools. They challenged the Department of Education’s Universal Infant Free School Meals policy (“UIFSM”), which requires state-funded schools to provide a free school meal to all state-funded school pupils in Reception and Key Stage 1 without any means test – but does not apply to pupils in private schools [1 & 2].

The arguments 

The grounds of challenge were as follows [3]:

• that the refusal was discriminatory on grounds of the claimants’ religion or race, contrary to Article 14 ECHR read with Articles 8, 9 and A2P1 (Ground 1),
• that it breached the Public Sector Equality Duty in s.149 Equality Act 2010 (Ground 2), and
• that it failed adequately and rationally to take into account the position of Charedi children (Ground 3).

The claimants argued that the principle in Thlimennos v Greece 34369/97 [2000] ECHR 162 was engaged, that:

“The right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different” [38],

and that they were in a “relevantly different” position from other private school pupils and should not be treated in the same way [137], largely because the Charedi community experienced high levels of economic deprivation.

The judgment

All grounds of challenge were rejected. While Mansfield J accepted that there was clear evidence demonstrating the deprivation of the Charedi community and that it was is in a different financial position from most other families who used private schools,

“… deprivation is not itself an aspect of race or religion. The simple fact that Charedi children are treated differently to other private school pupils does not indicate discriminatory treatment on grounds of race or religion” [137].

If he had accepted that the claimants had no choice but to attend an independent school, “then the relevant comparator for Thlimmenos purposes would be private school children who do have the choice to attend state schools” and “there was simply no evidence as to the composition of the comparator group” [137].

As to the alleged breach of the Public Sector Equality Duty, “there were powerful reasons to continue to provide UIFSM only to state-funded schools” [150].

As to Ground 3, the Minister had been

“… entitled to regard Charedi parents as exercising a choice and entitled to have regard to that choice in making her decision about the request to extend UIFSM. There was no flaw in the Defendant’s reasoning. It was not irrational of the Defendant to have taken that view” [152].

Application dismissed [154].

Overseas marriages

On Tuesday, in answer to a written question from Richard Holden (Basildon and Billericay, Con) asking the Secretary of State for Justice, if he will make it his policy not to recognise overseas marriages that would be illegal under UK law, Jake Richards, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the MoJ, said this:

”There are no plans to change the law that an overseas marriage is normally recognised in England and Wales if it complied with the requirements for the form of the ceremony where it took place (meaning by whom, where, when and how it was conducted) and if both parties had capacity to marry according to the law of their domicile.”

One cannot help wondering what occasioned the question in the first place.

Finland, religion, free speech and homosexuality

The Helsinki Times reports that, by three votes to two, the Supreme Court of Finland has convicted and fined Päivi Räsänen, a Christian Democrat member of the Finnish Parliament, and Juhana Pohjola, a bishop of the small Evangelical Lutheran Mission Diocese of Finland, for hate speech. The charge related to a pamphlet published by the Mission Diocese that described homosexuality as a disorder in psychosexual development and rejected the view that it was a natural variation of human sexuality. The judgment requires the removal of specific passages, but allows the rest of the pamphlet to remain available.

According to the report, the Court said the case did not centre on religious confession and found that the disputed passages reflected social and medical claims rather than expressions tied to religious doctrine, adding that freedom of religion did not protect statements unrelated to religion when assessing criminal liability. However, Ms Räsänen was cleared of charges linked to a social media post in which she cited the Bible.

EU Special Envoy for Freedom of Religion or Belief

Mairead McGuinness, a former European Commissioner for financial services and Fine Gael’s candidate in Ireland’s 2025 presidential election, has been appointed EU Special Envoy for the Promotion of Freedom of Religion or Belief outside the EU.

Assisted dying claims debunked

A summary of posts on X headed Prue Leith’s Assisted Dying Claims Debunked by Lords Records commented:

“Leith accused Archbishop Sarah Mullally and six others of filibustering the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill, but Mullally tabled zero amendments and the changes came from over 50 peers. The bill, which passed the Commons in June 2025 by 315-291, lets terminally ill adults in England and Wales request aid to end their lives under safeguards like dual doctor approval. Now in its 11th committee day, supporters call delays a filibuster while opponents stress vital scrutiny amid time pressures before summer recess”.

On Friday, the BBC reported that both those promoting the bill and those opposed to it had now concluded that it would not become law in the current session of Parliament.

Artificial intelligence

Further to our Wednesday post, A further examination of AI in legal blogging,  Legal Cheek reported that the Judicial Appointments Commission confirmed this week that judge hopefuls may use AI when drafting and reviewing self-assessment or individual skill and ability examples, so long as they remain “fully responsible for the accuracy and truthfulness of all material submitted.”

Acceptable uses include running self-written drafts through AI to improve grammar, clarity and structure, using it to identify key themes or strengths in content already written, and checking whether a draft flows and holds together. Candidates may also use AI to summarise long documents they have personally authored. However, “[AI] must not create substantive content or replace or inaccurately overstate personal experience.”

However, there are two sides to every job application, and one is reminded of a classic Beaker Folk article “If Clergy Ads Told the Full Story”, the assertions in which received a degree of episcopal acknowledgement.

Quick links

• Bible Society: not really “law”, but its report, The Quiet Revival, based on YouGov data and now known to be faulty, has been removed and reissued here; the Society claims, however, that “this faulty survey sample does not undermine the reality of a significant trend in which many people – especially young people – are finding renewed relevance in the Bible and Christianity in Britain today”.
• Jessica Murphy, BBC News: How a ban on religious symbols has triggered a Canadian constitutional debate: on the continuing controversy surrounding Québec’s Loi sur la laïcité de l’État.

Background

Prompted by an observation on the now extensive use of AI by many search engines[1], we examined some recent reviews on this use and as a stand-alone investigative tool[2]. Search engines now rely on AI at almost every stage of the search process—from understanding the query, to ranking results, to generating summaries. Around half of Google searches already include AI‑generated summaries, and this is expected to rise to over 75% by 2028 [3]. Furthermore, search engines no longer match keywords—they interpret meaning, intent, and context using large language models (LLMs). For example, they now understanding conversational questions (“Why is my broadband slow today?”), interpreting ambiguous queries; and personalising results based on past behaviour. This development is important as few have been aware of how AI has been shaping their internet searches.

With regard to the stand-alone use of AI search tools, a Which? survey undertaken in 2025 found an AI usage of 75% among 18–34s, but only 24% among over‑65s[4]. 51% of UK adults use AI search tools (ChatGPT, Gemini, Copilot, &c) in their personal lives; and ChatGPT is the most used AI search tool, with 47% of adults having tried it. Microsoft’s Copilot accounted for 34 % in this survey, but there are important differences between ChatGPT and Copilot, v infra.

ChatGPT vs Microsoft Copilot

ChatGPT is a “general‑purpose conversational AI built by OpenAI, which is optimized for creativity, reasoning, brainstorming, coding, and Q&A”. Microsoft Copilot is “a productivity‑focused AI embedded across Microsoft 365, Windows, Edge, and GitHub, designed to understand documents, emails, meetings, and organisational data”. Analysts expect the two to coexist rather than replace each other; many organisations deploy Copilot for productivity and ChatGPT for creativity and problem‑solving [5], [6], [7].

Copyright 

The use of AI inevitably raises the question of copyright of the material generated. Unlike the United States, the UK is unusual in having a statutory category for “computer‑generated works” under s9 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA), which allows authorship to be assigned by legal fiction where no human creator exists—enabling such works to meet the basic conditions for protection.

9 Authorship of work.

[…]

(3) In the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the author shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.

Syn Ong notes[8]: “despite being on the statute books for over three decades, Section 9(3) CDPA has received remarkably little judicial interpretation. In fact, with only two cases of note, there is a limit to how much doctrinal clarity one can extract from the case law”.

Conclusions

There have been important changes in the use of Artificial Intelligence since our first posts in 2023. Nevertheless, the conclusions we reached then, notably the careful formulation of the questions when seeking information via AI, remain unchanged. On the choice between ChatGBT and Copilot, it is evident that the latter gives a response more tailored to a user who is working with Microsoft 365 and their perceived areas of interest.

With the increased application of AI for internet searches, the use/links to primary sources become even more important. Also, the 4,000 plus posts on this blog are a potential resource for others to access.

[1] In this and subsequent posts, we follow the OUP guidelines on AI; these state:

“We use ‘AI’ to mean applications, tools, and programmes using Gen AI. Gen AI is a type of artificial intelligence which can be used to create new content (for example text, images, videos, or music) based on user inputs or ‘prompts’.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are a type of Generative AI. For example, ChatGPT is a large language model from OpenAI that uses deep learning to generate human-like responses in natural language based on information requested by a user in a prompt”.

[2] Microsoft Copilot was asked three questions: “How extensively do modern search engines use AI?”, “ChatGPT vs Microsoft Copilot?” and “Who owns the copyright of AI output?” These provided an overview, and links to references used, see [2] to [6].

[3] McKinsey & Company: New front door to the internet: Winning in the age of AI search,16 October 2025.

[4] Which? survey, 2025:Consumer use and attitudes towards AI search tools; Yonder, on behalf of Which?, conducted an online survey of 4,189 nationally representative adults aged 18+ between 10th and 14th September 2025.

[5] Institution Labs: ChatGPT vs. Copilot: An Enterprise Feature Comparison (2025), (updated 20 March 2026).

[6] United Nations University (UNU), Japan. Why Users Still Prefer ChatGPT Over Microsoft Copilot in 2025: The Technical Reality, (21 October 2025).

[7] Flexmind: ChatGPT vs Microsoft Copilot: Key Differences You Need to Know in 2026, (17 September 2025).

[8] Syn Ong, Authors’ Alliance: The UK’s Curious Case of Copyright for AI-Generated Works: What Section 9(3), (19 May 2015).

Updated 6 April 2026 at 09:05. This included the renumbering of all the references. 

Earlier this month, the Mattone Center Student Fellows had the privilege of traveling to Rome to participate in the ninth International Moot Court Competition in Law and Religion, held on March 13 and 14 at the St. John’s University Rome campus. The competition brought together teams from law schools from the United States and Europe, including teams from Italy, Poland, and Ukraine–about 100 participants in all. This marked the first time St. John’s has hosted the competition. Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil ’83, a member of the Mattone Center’s board, served as one of the judges at the competition.

The competition problem centered on a hypothetical dispute between a religious school, Thomas More School, and the government of the State of Utopia, which had enacted an “Equality in Education Act” alleged to infringe upon the school’s right to freely exercise its religious beliefs. The fellows were divided into two teams: Kalina Mesrobian ’26 and Stacey Kaliabakos ’27 represented the school, while Vincent D’Avanzo ’27 and Isabel Lane ’27 argued on behalf of the government. 

Being able to represent St. John’s in an international competition was an exciting and rewarding experience for our fellows. The fellows were were very fortunate to receive guidance from Center Director Mark Movsesian, St. John’s Law School Professor Robert Ruescher, and St. John’s Law alumnus James Herschlein, chair of the Litigation practice group at Arnold & Porter, who generously served as their coach and traveled to Rome to support the team in person. Their mentorship played a substantial role in helping our fellows grow their advocacy skills and confidence as they headed into the competition. 

Beyond the “courtroom,” the experience in Rome was truly unforgettable. Our fellows had the opportunity to form friendships with students from different countries, schools, and legal traditions, showing them how the answers to questions at the intersection of law and religion can vary across the globe. They were also able to explore some of Rome’s most iconic sites, including the Vatican Museums, the Galleria Borghese, the Pantheon, the Trevi Fountain, the Spanish Steps, and the Colosseum. 

Participating in this competition was a unique experience that strengthened the fellows’ legal skills, as well as their sense of community within the international legal world.

The post Mattone Center Fellows Reflect on International Moot Court in Rome appeared first on LAW AND RELIGION FORUM.

Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:

• In Stinson et al v. Fayetteville School District No. 1, et al, regarding an Arkansas law that would require elementary schools to hang the Ten Commandments in classrooms, the Court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining certain school districts from complying with the law. 
•  In Chaudry v. Thorsen, an Illinois District Court rejected any Establishment Clause claims against a high school teacher brought by the parents of a student, wherein the teacher provided resources to the student who was seeking to convert from Islam to Christianity. 
• In a case in front of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Court held that a German Catholic Organization could not dismiss one of its employees on the grounds of leaving the Catholic church.  
• Earlier this week, the President’s Religious Liberty Commission held a hearing on the topic of religious liberty in the healthcare industry, discussing topics such as vaccine mandates and potential threats to religious liberties in the medical field. 
• In Arizona Mining Reform Coalition v. U.S. Forest Service, the 9^th Circuit again upheld a transfer of land, which includes ceremonial religious grounds of the Apache tribe, to a Copper Mining company. 

The post Around the Web appeared first on LAW AND RELIGION FORUM.

On Tuesday, the Scottish Parliament rejected the Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults (Scotland) Bill, which had been introduced by Liam McArthur (Orkney, Lib Dem), by 69 votes to 57. The draft report of the debate is here.

Places of Worship Renewal Fund

Further details are emerging – slowly – about how the Places of Worship Renewal Fund will work. In answer to a written question from Lee Pitcher (Doncaster East and the Isle of Axholme, Lab) on the future ability of places of worship (in England)  to reclaim VAT on repairs and maintenance works, Ian Murray, Minister of State at DCMS, said this:

“The Department has not made an assessment of the ability of places of worship to reclaim VAT following the ending of the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme.

The Places of Worship Renewal Fund will have a budget of £23 million per year. The Places of Worship Renewal Fund will award grants for projects to cover capital works, rather than just the VAT element of a project, as is the case with the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme. In some cases, the amount granted could be greater than just the VAT element currently funded” [emphasis added].

For Women Scotland Ltd, Northern Ireland and the CJEU

Readers may recall that the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland applied to the High Court for leave to seek judicial review for clarification of how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Equality Act 2010 in For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16 in relation to Great Britain – basically, that the terms “man”, “woman” and “sex” in the Act must be interpreted as referring to biological sex – should be applied in the different legal context of Northern Ireland, where the Act does not apply.

Irish Legal News reports that last week the CJEU ruled in Shipova [2026] EUECJ C-43/24 [in French], a case about a Bulgarian trans woman living in Italy, that EU member states cannot refuse legal gender recognition to trans citizens who have exercised their right to free movement. The Court said at [54] that

“… tolerating discrimination based on the difference between biological sex and gender identity would amount to disregarding, in the case of transgender persons, the respect for dignity and freedom to which they are entitled and which the Court must protect.”

So far as we are aware, the application for judicial review in Northern Ireland is still pending.

Funeral arrangements and parental disagreement

The Independent reports a particularly sad case of parental conflict over funeral arrangements for a 17-year-old boy, Gabrielle Barbus, who died by suicide in December. The father, Mr Stefan Barbus, an Orthodox Christian, and the mother, Ms Georgia Opritescu, had divorced when Gabrielle was two. Mr Barbus wanted to bury Gabrielle, while Ms Opritescu wanted to cremate him and scatter his ashes in the Devon countryside. Mr Barbus argued that Gabrielle had been baptised as an Orthodox Christian, that burial respected the sanctity of the human body and soul, and that cremation was not acceptable because it destroyed the body and was irreversible, while Ms Opritescu said that her son had not grown up in a religious household and that she wanted him to be free and returned to nature by his ashes being scattered, not confined in a coffin or an urn in the ground.

According to the report, HHJ Klein found for Ms Opritescu on the basis that Gabrielle had had a closer relationship with his mother than with his father, and that, because of that closeness, it was more likely that he would have wished to honour his mother’s wishes.

We hope to publish a formal note if the text of the judgment becomes available.

Human rights in the UK

On Thursday, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the Scottish Human Rights Commission and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission issued a Joint statement on the application of the European Convention on Human Rights, occasioned, it would appear, by the call last year from 27 Council of Europe member states, including the UK, to “re-balance” and “clarify” individual rights and state responsibilities in relation to migration.

The statement urges the UK Government “to commit to no reduction in rights protections. The principle of universality is fundamental to human rights: rights that can be removed from some people are no longer rights for everyone”.

Cardinal Becciu again

Readers may remember that Cardinal Becciu was stripped of his privileges as a cardinal by Pope Francis in 2020 and convicted of financial fraud by a Vatican court in 2023. He appealed, and Associated Press reports that the Vatican appeals tribunal has ruled that the original trial was defective and has ordered a retrial, beginning on 22 June.

And finally…

On Tuesday, Nick Timothy, currently the Shadow Lord Chancellor, posted on TwiX a complaint about Muslims engaging in mass prayer at an event in Trafalgar Square:

“Too many are too polite to say this. But mass ritual prayer in public places is an act of domination. The adhan – which declares there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is his messenger – is, when called in a public place, a declaration of domination. Perform these rituals in mosques if you wish. But they are not welcome in our public places and shared institutions. And given their explicit repudiation of Christianity they certainly do not belong in our churches and cathedrals. I am not suggesting everybody at Trafalgar Square last night is an Islamist. But the domination of public places is straight from the Islamist playbook.

To which Dominic Grieve, the former Conservative Attorney General, who subsequently quit the party over Brexit, posted this in reply:

“This is a very odd post from a Conservative who says he believes in freedom of expression under law and is a principal spokesman of the Free Speech Union. I appreciate that he does not like Islam and there is no reason why he should. As a Christian it is not my faith. But the use of Trafalgar Square (with permission) for religious events, Christian and other, goes back a long way. There have been prayers and hymns, chants and religious events performed there in the past. If such an event ‘shouldn’t happen again’ it raises the question of whether this is to apply to all religious events or just to Muslim ones. If to all, then we are moving like France to imposing secularism as a norm and it is contrary to our national tradition and does not seem to have helped develop social cohesion there. If just to Muslims, then it is an act of discrimination against them without any lawful basis. To achieve it you would have to enact discriminatory legislation targeted at Muslims. Is this what Nick Timothy is advocating?”

Good question… The Guardian reports some political reactions here; the Bishop of Willesden, Lusa Nsenga-Ngoy, the Church of England’s lead bishop for interfaith engagement, comments here; and the Bishop of Kirkstall, Arun Arora, comments here. 

At its meeting on 21 October 2025, the Ecclesiastical Committee (Joint Committee) had deemed both the National Church Governance Measure and the Clergy Conduct Measure as “not expedient”; in accordance with s3(4) Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act 1919, it communicated its report in draft to the Legislative Committee, on 30 October 2025.

The Ecclesiastical Committee in December set out four areas of concern: safeguarding arrangements; the scope of the delegated (order making) powers; aspects of the financial accountability framework; and the breadth of the Church of England National Services’ (CENS) charitable purposes.

Following an informal meeting with members of the Ecclesiastical Committee in January, its was made clear that the Committee’s primary concern was in relation to safeguarding, which it felt should be prioritised ahead of further engagement with Governance reform. At a meeting in early March, the Legislative Committee considered two options:

(i) to seek to reintroduce the Measure to the General Synod with amendments, or

(ii) report on its withdrawal at this stage. In light of the Ecclesiastical Committee’s expressed position, and the absence of clarity that amendments would resolve its concerns, the Committee concluded that reintroduction at this time would not be a simple or straightforward matter.

The update stated the in light of the Ecclesiastical Committee’s expressed position, and the absence of clarity that amendments would resolve its concerns, it was concluded that reintroduction at this time would not be a simple or straightforward matter. The withdrawal of the Measure would be reported to Synod in July 2026. The option for the draft Measure to be reintroduced and amended by Synod remains, although the earliest realistic date at which this could happen is February 2027. That level of delay could be damaging for the work of the NCIs.

The Legislative Committee expressed the hope that National Church bodies would reflect upon what changes could be affected by non-legislative and other routes without the requirement for statute to give effect to the policy intention which the Synod has overwhelmingly supported. The trustee bodies affected are now being invited to review potential non-legislative opportunities to progress governance work over the coming months while the work on the future of safeguarding structures is progressed.

This latest report concludes the Burial and Cremation sub-project. The Commission says that a second report addressing the regulation of new funerary methods, along with draft legislation, will be published shortly. Work on the third sub‑project, Rights and Obligations Relating to Funerary Methods, Funerals and Remains, “will begin shortly and will run until the end of 2027”.

A draft Bill will follow in due course; its estimated publication date is mid-2028.

The principal recommendations of the latest report on burials and burial grounds are as follows:

• The Commission has rejected root-and-branch reform, replacing all the current law with a single, unified burial law regime, because different burial grounds serve diverse religious and cultural needs;
• There should be a minimum level of protection applying to all burial grounds, with aspects of burial regulated issue by issue to continue to permit flexibility where it is needed: “Such change will particularly, but not exclusively, affect private burial grounds, where there is currently little applicable law”;
• Burial ground owners and/or operators should be required to maintain their burial ground in good order appropriate to its current use;
• The current enforcement framework should be modernised by giving the Secretary of State a clearer range of enforcement powers, including powers to authorise inspections, issue notices, impose civil penalties, and, where a burial ground fails to fulfil actions required by the notice, direct the local authority to take on the maintenance of the burial ground and recoup the costs of doing so;
• Currently there are two types of burial rights and one memorial right. An “exclusive burial right” grants the holder an ongoing exclusive right to use a plot, often for multiple burials, while a “non-exclusive burial right” allows a single interment in a plot and is then terminated. A “memorial right” is separate and permits the holder to place a memorial on a grave: the Commission recommends that, except for burial grounds of the Church of England and the Church in Wales (where the faculty jurisdiction applies), in all burial grounds, burial and memorial rights must be issued in writing within two months of the purchase of the right;
• There should be a new uniform registration system applying across all types of burial grounds; all burial ground operators should be under a statutory duty to keep a series of prescribed documents: a burial register; a register of disinterments; a register of the burial of pre-24-week pregnancy remains; a plan of the burial ground; and a register of rights.
• The Secretary of State should continue to have the power to set the fees charged by private burial grounds and should consider using the Church of England’s fee structure as a potential benchmark.
• It should be a requirement that when a private burial ground changes ownership, its burial records be transferred to the new owners.
• It should be a criminal offence knowingly to fail to register a burial on private land and knowingly to fail to transfer the burial register when that land changes hands.
• Grave reclamation and reuse powers should be applied for via the Secretary of State or Welsh Minister, on a case-by-case basis, following a prescribed plan and consultation on each occasion.
• A hundred years (instead of the current 75) must elapse between the last burial in a grave and either the burial rights in that grave being extinguished or the grave being reused; and if there are any remains left in a grave, for the grave to reused they must be no more than skeletal remains.
• A burial ground operator who proposes to reuse graves or extinguish exclusive burial rights must post notices in various media of that intention for twelve months.
• The Commonwealth War Graves Commission and the Ministry of Defence should be notified before any reuse of a grave or any extinguishment of an exclusive burial right is proposed and should have the right to object; their written consent will also be required before a war grave is reclaimed.
• The Privy Council should have the power to reopen closed burial grounds by Order, but to do so, the consent of the burial ground owner, or both the incumbent and parochial church council, should be required.
• The current maximum penalty for the offence of unlawful exhumation should be raised to an unlimited fine or imprisonment for up to 12 months if sentenced in the magistrates’ court, or an unlimited fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years in the Crown Court.
• The offence of unlawful exhumation should be extended to include so-called “coffin-sliding”, except where the burial has not yet been completed.

On cremation, the Commission’s principal recommendations are as follows:

• To prevent mistaken cremation, crematoria should be required to check at least two pieces of identifying information about the deceased person, where available; and when a coffin is used, crematoria should require two identification plates to be fitted to the coffin, one on the lid and one at the base, so that if the two are separated the risk of error is reduced.
• The joint cremation of two dead persons should be allowed only when both applicants for cremation have provided their written consent, and public authorities “should not be permitted to use it in most circumstances”.
• Cremation of unidentified bodies or body parts should not be permitted.
• A scheme should be established under which funeral directors will have the right to return uncollected ashes to the crematorium where the remains were cremated, following a set process that begins six months after the funeral director’s collection of the remains.

Abortion law changes: Bishops take part in House of Lords debate

“Eleven bishops joined a late night sitting in the House of Lords to debate proposed changes to the law on abortion. A clause in the Crime and Policing Bill, inserted in the House of Commons last year, will disapply the existing criminal law for women who access an abortion outside the legal limits.

This means that a woman seeking an abortion outside the terms of 1967 Act – which regulates the term limit – could not be prosecuted for doing so. However providers could still be investigated or prosecuted.

The Archbishop of Canterbury, Sarah Mullally, took part in the debate, alongside the Bishops of Chelmsford, Coventry, Chester, Leicester, Southwell & Nottingham, Portsmouth, Sheffield, Chichester, Hereford and Oxford.

Archbishop Sarah spoke in support of an amendment brought by Lady Monckton, to reject the clause altogether.

“Decriminalisation of abortion is a question of such legal, moral and practical complexity that I do believe it cannot be properly addressed in an amendment hastily added to another bill,” she told Peers.

“Consideration of any alteration to our abortion laws needs public consultation and robust Parliamentary processes to ensure that every aspect of this debate is carefully considered and scrutinised.”

She also spoke in support of amendments from Lady Stroud and the Bishop of Leicester which would reinstate in-person consultations before drugs for the termination of a pregnancy could be prescribed, which were provided before the Covid-19 pandemic. The Bishop of Leicester, Martyn Snow’s amendment related to those under 18.

“Women confronted with the very complex and difficult decision to terminate a pregnancy deserve our utmost understanding, care and practical support as they face what is often a heart wrenching decision,” she said.

“However, I cannot support Clause 208 as it stands.

“Though its intention may not change the 24-week abortion limit, it undoubtedly risks eroding the safeguards and enforcement of those legal limits and inadvertently undermining the value of human life.”

Lady Monckton’s amendment was lost by 185 votes to 148. Full breakdown of the vote. Bishop Martyn’s amendment fell by 163 votes to 68.

Archbishop Sarah’s speech:

My Lords, many noble Lords will know that the Church of England’s view on abortion is one of principled opposition, recognising that there can be limited conditions under which abortion may be preferable to any available alternatives. This is based on the belief of the infinite worth and value of every human life, however old or young, and including life not yet born. The infinite value of human life is a fundamental Christian principle that underpins much of our legal system and has shaped existing laws on abortion. All life is precious. We therefore need to recognise that women confronted with the very complex and difficult decision to terminate a pregnancy deserve our utmost understanding, care and practical support as they face what is often a heart-wrenching decision.

However, I cannot support Clause 208. Though its intention may not be to change the 24-week abortion limit, it undoubtedly risks eroding the safeguards and enforcement of those legal limits and, inadvertently, undermining the value of human life.

I support Amendment 425 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, since it is not clear how the law can function in an enforceable way without in-person consultation before accessing early medical abortion. The risks of medical complications are, as we have heard, much greater if the pills for early abortion are taken beyond the 11-week limit. Although there are benefits to telemedicine—I do not dispute that—there are also flaws, and they are key to the debate on whether Clause 208 should pass.

As I have already said, this is not a debate on whether the legal abortion limit should change, but without the levers necessary to monitor and enforce the law, we are at risk of it becoming exactly that.

In the same vein, I support the amendment in the name of my right reverend friend the Bishop of Leicester, as we have a particular duty of care to those under 18 to ensure that they are properly cared for and supported while making such difficult decisions.

I am reminded of the call of the prophet Micah both to do justice and to love mercy. Balancing justice and mercy is the challenge that we are debating today. I do not think that women who act in relation to their own pregnancies should be prosecuted, but I also do not wish to see any increase in late-term abortions.

Although Clause 208 is well intentioned, it risks making an already imperfect situation worse. Therefore, I support Amendment 424 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton.

Decriminalisation of abortion is a question of such legal, moral and practical complexity that it cannot be properly addressed in an amendment hastily added to another Bill. Consideration of any alteration to the abortion laws needs public consultation and robust parliamentary processes to ensure that every aspect of this debate is carefully considered and scrutinised.

There are many outstanding questions, which deserve greater attention, about the tone of policing in this area, about how we can best ensure that women suffering miscarriages can access the right care when they need it, and about how those who provide abortions outside the law will continue to be held accountable for doing so.

As I have said before in this place, we need a framework that supports women, not one that puts them and their unborn children in the way of greater harm. On that basis, I will support the amendments in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Monckton and Lady Stroud, and my right reverend friend the Bishop of Leicester should they push them to a vote.

Bishop Martyn’s speech

My Lords, I shall speak to the amendment in my name, Amendment 426D. I start by thanking the Minister for meeting me a couple of weeks ago to discuss this matter—and I want to be direct at the outset about what the amendment would do and would not do.

The amendment is distinct from Amendment 425, which stands on its own merits, and which your Lordships will consider on its own terms. This amendment says nothing about adult women’s access to abortion, nothing about where medication is taken and nothing about the broader questions that have been part of our debate up till now. It rests entirely on one safeguarding principle—that when a child is the patient, a professional should meet her before prescribing. I believe that that is something that your Lordships can support, regardless of the views that you hold on everything else before the House today.

The amendment is brought on behalf of the National Network of Designated Healthcare Professionals for Children—NHS doctors and nurses who carry statutory safeguarding responsibilities for children across every local safeguarding partnership in England. Its concern is that the needs of children, particularly looked-after children who become pregnant, are not sufficiently accounted for in this clause. Since 2022, a girl of 14 can telephone an abortion service, receive medication by post, take it at home, and no clinician will ever meet her. How does that give confidence that safeguarding risks are being properly assessed? How does the provider of medication know whether there is someone else in the room when they speak to the child on the phone? How do they know whether someone else has suggested that the child should make the phone call? Surely the only safe way to assess risk is to meet in person.

The noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, says that telemedicine is safe. I fully respect her experience in this field and, in many situations, I would agree, but in the case of children, of which I note she made no mention in her speech, I believe she is wrong. Telemedicine is not safe for children.

Baroness Gerada: Is the right reverend Prelate aware that coercion can also occur in the consultation room, as I have seen many times? It may actually be safer for the girl—or the child, as he is calling her—to be able to choose the place and the time where she has that consultation.

Bishop of Leicester: I am very aware that there are risks to all forms of consultation. My argument is simply that the risks are minimised by in-person consultation.

The considered view of safeguarding professionals in the NNDHP is that the current guidance put in place by the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health in 2022 is simply not robust enough. That guidance, I note, requires an in-person meeting for children under 13. Children under 16 are,

“normally … required to complete their consultation in-person, unless there is a compelling indication to do otherwise”.

Evidence, however, suggests that most providers of abortion care are arguing that the option of telemedicine itself is a compelling indication that an in-person consultation is not required. For those aged 16 or 17, the guidance says only that children—and, of course, 16 and 17-year-olds are still children under the Children Act—should “be encouraged” to attend in person. More fundamentally, guidance can currently be changed unilaterally, without parliamentary scrutiny or public consultation, at the discretion of the body that issued it. I believe, therefore, that legislation is required. What Parliament enacts, only Parliament can remove.

The case for this amendment, however, does not rest on my view or the NNDHP’s alone. The Government’s own consultation found that safeguarding organisations specifically identified under-18s as the group for whom in-person assessment was most critical to reduce the risk from those who sexually exploit children, manipulate the system or force their victims to obtain abortion. Indeed, MSI Reproductive Choices has documented that face-to-face appointments are associated with a significant increase in domestic abuse disclosures compared with telemedicine. This is especially significant given that girls and young women face a higher risk of coercive or abusive relationships than those aged over 24, and are often less equipped to ask for help.

The clinical risks compound this. Beyond 11 weeks’ gestation, home management is not appropriate and the risks to the patient increase significantly. As has been mentioned, accurate gestational age assessment is the foundation on which safe prescribing depends, and it cannot be done reliably by telephone. These are not theoretical risks. We have heard stories already. I would simply add that of a 16 year-old who was estimated by the clinic to be under eight weeks pregnant, but the baby she delivered was in fact 20 weeks. She later said, “If they had scanned me and I knew that I was that far gone, I would have had him”. An in-person appointment would have changed everything for that young woman. This amendment would require such an appointment.

I echo the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, in her amendment. Without an in-person consultation, it is unclear how we will ensure that early medical abortions take place within the law. Indeed, challenges around vulnerability and correct gestational assessment apply to adulthood as well, which is why I fully support Amendment 425. Although I have been assured that abortion providers will remain subject to the criminal law if Clause 208 is passed, it is hard to see how this will make a meaningful difference in the case of early medical abortion, since providers who carry out telephone assessments will have met the standard of due diligence required of them. My amendment offers a reminder that the needs of children and young people should be paramount in our thinking and in that of all who work with them, including abortion providers. My amendment asks for one proportionate safeguard: that when a child is the patient, a medical professional meets her before prescribing. I invite noble Lords to consider whether that is really too much to ask.

Katholische Schwangerschaftsberatung, as its name suggests, is a counselling service for pregnant women that operates in accordance with the norms of the Catholic Church. All staff members working in Catholic counselling centres commit in writing to respecting those norms, which stipulate, in essence, that all pregnancy counselling aims to protect the life of the unborn child and must therefore be guided by the desire to encourage the pregnant woman to continue the pregnancy and accept her child [22].

Ms JB, a mother of five, started working at the Association in 2006 as a pregnancy counsellor; in October 2013, however, she made a declaration before the competent local authority, pursuant to the national provisions, that she was leaving the Catholic Church. Her ground for doing so was that the Diocese of Limburg levied, in addition to the State church tax, an additional church levy on Catholics who, like JB, were in an interfaith marriage with a high-earning spouse [24]. After unsuccessfully attempting to persuade JB to rejoin, the Association dismissed her on 1 June 2019, on the grounds that she had left the Church. In the pregnancy counselling service in which JB was working, the Association employed four Catholics and two non-Catholics [25]. She sued for unfair dismissal, and her claim was upheld at first instance and by the State Landesarbeitsgericht. The Association appealed to the Federal Bundesarbeitsgericht, which referred two preliminary questions to the CJEU:

1: Must national legislation be considered compatible with EU law, in particular with Directive 2000/78, read in the light of Article 10(1) and Article 21(1) of the Charter, which states that a private organisation whose ethics are based on religion may require its employees not to withdraw from a particular Church during the course of their employment, or that the organisation is entitled to make the continuation of the employment relationship conditional upon an employee who has withdrawn from a particular Church during the course of his or her employment becoming a member again, provided that it does not otherwise require persons working for it to belong to that Church and that the person working for it does not engage in publicly anti-Church activities?”

2: If the answer to the first question is yes, what other requirements, if any, apply under Directive 2000/78, read in the light of Article 10(1) and Article 21(1) of the Charter, to justifying such a difference in treatment based on religion?

The Grand Chamber ruled as follows at [88]:

Article 4(1) and (2) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, read in the light of Article 10(1) and Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as follows:

It precludes national legislation under which a private organisation whose ethics are based on a religion may require an employee who is a member of a particular Church practising that religion not to withdraw from that Church during the course of their employment under penalty of dismissal, or, in order to continue their employment, to rejoin that Church after having withdrawn from it, where

– that organisation employs other persons to perform the same functions as those of the employee in question, without requiring them to be members of that same Church, and

– the employee does not engage in publicly perceptible activities hostile to the Church in question,

When, in view of the nature of the employee’s professional activities or the context in which they are carried out, those professional requirements are not essential, legitimate, and justified with regard to the ethics of the said organisation.

Comment: The additional church levy on Catholics in an interfaith marriage with a high-earning spouse (What????) makes one wonder about breach of Article 8 ECHR (respect for private and family life), read in conjunction with Article 14 (discrimination). But obviously, in the real world the EU Directive was the more appropriate route for litigation.

[With thanks to Religion Clause.]

Here is an interesting looking book from Oxford that explores religious freedom from the perspective of sociology: “A Sociology of Religious Freedom,” by Professors Olga Breskaya and Giuseppe Giordan of the University of Padua and James Richardson of the University of Nevada. I’m looking forward to reading the sections on defining religious freedom, in particular. Here’s the description of the book from the Oxford website:

In recent years, the relevance of religious freedom has spread well beyond academia, becoming a reference point for international relations, multi-level policy development, as well as interfaith negotiations. Meanwhile, scholarship on religious freedom has flourished on the boundaries of sociology, law, comparative politics, history, and theology. This book presents a systematic sociological analysis of religious freedom, bringing together classical sociological theories and empirical perspectives developed during the last three decades. It addresses three major questions involved in any sociology of religious freedom. First: considering its complex and controversial nature, how can religious freedom be defined? Second: what are the recurrent sociological conditions and relevant social perceptions that will foster an understanding of religious freedom in varying political, legal, and socioreligious contexts? And third, what are the mechanisms of social implementation of religious freedom that contribute to making it a fundamental value in a society? Olga Breskaya, Giuseppe Giordan, and James T. Richardson suggest that a sociological definition of religious freedom requires us to take into account historical, philosophical, legal, religious, and political considerations of a given society-and that the social dimensions of religious freedom are as important as the legal ones.

The post Breskaya et al., “A Sociology of Religious Freedom” appeared first on LAW AND RELIGION FORUM.

Last week, the Mattone Center Fellows competed in the 9th edition of the International Moot Court Competition in Law and Religion at the St. John’s campus in Rome. We are very proud of Kalina, Stacey, Vincent, and Isabel for their performances and hard work. Thank you also to Jim Herschlein for coaching our team and Judge Vyskocil, Judge Forrest, and Dr. Jeremy Gunn for judging the tournament. This was a truly special opportunity that the Center and its Fellows will never forget. 

The post Mattone Center Hosts International Moot Court Competition in Rome appeared first on LAW AND RELIGION FORUM.

Conflict over actions within the Church of England covers a broad spectrum, from objections raised within the consistory courts to proceedings for assent on the appointment of clergy. Dioceses such as Lichfield have specific policies to address persistent, unreasonable and/or vexatious complaints, and the forthcoming Clergy Conduct Measure includes a dedicated system for handling vexatious complaints[1], including the power to impose restraint orders[2]. The following gobbets are from examples reported to date in L&RUK, and included in our Index. This will be updated in the light of future discussion and case law.

Complaint against Archbishop of Canterbury dismissed. A review of Re: the Most Revd & Right Hon Sarah Mullally, Archbishop of Canterbury,  Review Decision pursuant to section 13(3), February 2026; and President’s Decision on Publication, (March 2026). The President noted the restraining order against the complainant (at [8]), and analysed the complaints making reference to their vexatious nature  (1 in February ’26 and 4 in March ’26), although he did not refer to “N”, as a vexatious complainant.  (12 March 2026).

Confirmation of Archbishop of Canterbury – Legal Ceremony. Since the consecration of the Rt Rev Libby Lane at York Minster in January 2015, these services have attracted a degree of disruption by protestors. On 21 May 2018, we considered the protests at the installation of Rt Revd Sarah Mullally to the See of London based on objections to consecration of women as bishops.

Subsequently, during the legal proceedings on the installation of Sarah Mullally as Archbishop of Canterbury on 28 January 2026, a protest was raised relating to the handling of a safeguarding issue by the Rt Revd Mullally; the Archbishop of York announced that a “full opportunity” had been given for lawful objections, but none had been received and the installation would therefore continue.

Beyond the service itself, Conservative Anglican groups, especially in parts of Africa and the Global South, have expressed strong objections to Mullally’s leadership, on grounds that she is a woman and also because of broader concerns over theological direction and biblical interpretation. (30 January 2026).

“Sufficient interest” in faculty petitions. The otherwise unremarkable case Re St Lawrence Toot Baldon [2023] ECC Oxf 10 concerning a confirmatory faculty for an unauthorized ledger stone, explored the issue of “sufficient interest” in faculty petitions – an issue on which there was “surprisingly little authority”. The Deputy Chancellor (at [30]) cited the judgment of Lord Reed, in the Supreme Court, in Walton v The Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44, [2013] PTSR 51 (at paragraph 92) in which he drew a distinction between ‘the mere busybody and the person affected by or having a reasonable concern in the matter to which the application relates’. However, he noted at [31]: …Because of [a] longstanding friendship with the person commemorated by the memorial I cannot regard her as a ‘mere’ – still less as a ‘vexatious’ – ‘busybody’. (15 January 2024).

Williamson v The Bishop of London & Ors [2023] EWCA Civ 379 (05 April 2023). 

“[2]. …For reasons that do not matter on this appeal, the appellant commenced proceedings on 1 April 2019, in the employment tribunal, without first obtaining such leave.

[5] Although there are five grounds of appeal, it is common ground that there is essentially one question for determination by this court: what is the meaning and effect of section 42, and in particular, in a case to which it applies, where proceedings are brought without leave, does it operate as a jurisdictional or merely a procedural bar?

[8]. The term “any court” in section 42(1A) SCA 1981 has been held to extend to all inferior courts including tribunals. The term accordingly embraces employment tribunals.

[31] It follows that the tribunals below were correct to conclude that the employment tribunal proceedings commenced by the appellant without first obtaining the necessary leave of the High Court were and remain a nullity. For these reasons, which are essentially the same as those given by Eady P, the grounds of appeal cannot succeed. I [Lady Justice Simler] would dismiss this appeal accordingly”.

Lord Justice Popplewell and Lord Justice Baker concurred.

5 April 2023.

Vexatious litigation and tenure (in Law and religion round-up – 7th August 2022). In the late 1990s, the Revd Paul Williamson made several attempts to challenge the lawfulness of the ordination of women. See, for example, R (Williamson) v Dean & Chapter of St Paul’s Cathedral & Anor [1997] EWHC Admin 784. Finally, in R (Williamson) v HM Attorney General [1997] EWHC QB (16 July 1997) a Divisional Court concluded that he was a vexatious litigant and  issued a Civil Proceedings Order (“CPO”) under S42(1) Senior Courts Act 1981.

In 2019, Fr Williamson sought to bring an age discrimination claim before an Employment Tribunal relating to the termination of his tenure as priest-in-charge of St George, Hanworth Park, when he had reached 70 in November 2018.  In Williamson v The Bishop of London & Ors [2022] EAT 118 the EAT held that ET had correctly ruled that the proceedings before it were a nullity; section 42(1A) Senior Courts Act 1981 imposed a substantive barrier to the initiation of proceedings by the subject of a CPO, not merely a procedural one. Appeal dismissed. (7 August 2022).

Court hears objector to female bishops. (Behind the scenes of the installation of Rt Revd Sarah Mullally to the See of London). At 16.00 on Thursday 8 March 2018, the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Court of the Vicar General sat at the church of St Mary-le-Bow to confirm the election of the Rt Rev Sarah Mullally to the See of London. In a move to address any potential disruption by a frequent complainant to the ordination of women as bishops, on 6 March 2018 the Vicar General’s Court of the Southern Province sat to hear his views and to issue a Direction. Following the confirmation of her election, on 12 May 2018, The Rt Revd and Rt Hon Sarah Mullally DBE was installed as the 133rd Bishop of London at St Paul’s Cathedral.  (21 May 2018).

Acclamation, assent and disruption. Further thoughts on objectors to women bishops and how the Church might respond, v infra. With regard to the interjection of objections…should these be considered as an interruption or disruption of the service, as generally portrayed in the media, or a legitimate part of it? […] It could be argued, therefore, that it is not illegal for an objection to be raised in response to the invitation of the Archbishop at this point in the service […]

Nevertheless, there seems to be little justification, other than the management of expected dissent, for the cathedral authorities to facilitate the delivery of an objection as indicated in the WATCH letter, particularly at any other point in the service. However, this leaves the authorities with the dilemma of how “things will be arranged differently”, without recourse to investigating the applicability of the heavy-handed legal options we discussed earlier.  (25 July 2016).

Objectors to female bishops. On 20 July, WATCH (Women and the Church) issued a Press Release commenting on the presence of objectors at the consecration of female bishops, and hoping that at the next consecration of female bishops, “things will be arranged differently”. (21 July 2016). (v supra). 

Contempt and ecclesiastical courts. The judgment Ewing v Crown Court Sitting at Cardiff & Newport & Ors [2016] EWHC 183, concerned the circumstances in which it was appropriate for a Crown Court judge to order that members of the public may not make notes of a hearing otherwise being held in public. The claimant, Terence Patrick Ewing, was a “vexatious litigant” and had been subject to a Civil Proceedings Order since 1989 [2].

S 81 Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 (Evidence and general powers and rights of courts and commissions), as amended, provides as follows: “(1) Any court or commission established under this Measure and the Vicar-General’s Court of each of the provinces of Canterbury and York shall have the same powers as the High Court in relation to the attendance and examination of witnesses and the production and inspection of documents.

On whether or not it is possible to contemn an ecclesiastical court. To which the answer is “yes”: see above. Moreover, that principle is of long standing: in R v Editor etc of Empire News and Davidson ex parte the Bishop of Norwich [1932] All ER 516, Lord Hewart [3] stated that “the justification is an inherent one, and just as this court may correct an inferior court such as the consistory court, so also in proper circumstances it may protect such a court.” However, it would appear that the court can only certify an act or omission where it would have been a contempt in relation to a secular court.

The term “any court” in section 42(1A) SCA 198, 1 has been held to extend to all inferior courts including tribunals. The term accordingly embraces employment tribunals, (10 February 2016).

Rt Revd Libby Lane consecrated at York Minster. A summary of the Press Comments is available on the CofE’s Daily Media Digest on 27 January. Thinking Anglicans suggests that some of them give undue prominence to the lone protester, The Rev Paul Williamson. Those who can recall R v Attorney-General ex parte Reverend Paul Stewart Williamson [1997] EWHC Admin 691 or Andrew Brown’s piece for The Independent in 1997 will know that we have been there before. Today the BBC reported “A Church of England spokesman said of Mr Williamson, priest in charge of a church in Hanworth, Middlesex: ‘He’s got the right to protest but the contrast was between a lone voice protesting and a sea of voices affirming.’” (26 January 2015).

Vexatious litigants and the consistory courts considered the practicalities and limitations of legislation dealing with vexatious litigants. In Re St George Hanworth [2016] ECC Lon 1, an application was made by the PCC for an injunction against the London Borough of Hounslow (“the Borough”) in relation to  an area of land adjacent to the church known as Rectory Court (“the site”) which is registered at HM Land Registry as being in the ownership of the Borough. (8 February 2016).

Challenges to school admissions criteria and “vexatious litigation”. The Secretary of State for Education, Nicky Morgan, announced that the Government is to amend the rules relating to the Schools Admission Code in England, inter alia, by: “stopping ‘vexatious complaints against faith schools from secularist campaign groups’. We commented: “DfE seems to think that what ‘vexatious’ actually means is ‘damned annoying’. Moreover, if a particular school’s admission arrangements did not survive challenge then they must surely have been contrary to the DfE School Admission Code (or, in lawyer-speak, ‘illegal’)”. (26 January 2016).

Religion and law round-up – 21st June 2015. (“In the Courts” section). The Church Times reported that the Court of the Vicar-General of the Province of Canterbury dismissed the legal objection of the Priest-in-Charge of St George’s, Hanworth Park, London, the Revd Paul Stewart Williamson, to the election of the Archdeacon of Hackney, the Ven Rachel Treweek, as Bishop of Gloucester. Fr Williamson, who interjected during the ordination of the Revd Libby Lane as Bishop of Stockport, is well-known to canon lawyers as being declared a vexatious litigant in R v AG ex parte Reverend Paul Stewart Williamson [1997] EWHC Admin 691. The CT states that on 15 June 2015 the Court of the Vicar General debarred Fr Williamson from raising any further objection to the court. (21 June 2015).

[1] The term “vexatious” has specific meaning in law according to the context of its use. In most areas of UK administrative law, the complaint is vexatious, not the complainant. A person becomes a vexatious litigant only when the High Court issues a civil proceedings order restricting them from starting or continuing litigation without permission, S42 Senior Courts Act 1981. Their name will also be published in the London Gazette and included on the list of vexatious litigants which last updated 2 May 2025. 

[2] A civil restraint order (CRO) is currently available as a remedy where an individual has been subjected to 2 or more unmeritorious claims or applications made against them by the same person and they relate to the same or similar matters. It is granted for a period up to 2 years, preventing the subject of it from taking certain steps as specified in the order, without first obtaining leave of a designated judge. CROs do not require the intervention of the Attorney General. It should be noted that the Employment Tribunal (ET) and Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) have their own rules.

[3] See Donald M. Gillmor, Free Press And Fair Trial In English Law, 22 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 17 (1965) at reference 5.

On Thursday, in reply to a debate in Westminster Hall initiated by David Mundell (Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale, Con), the Minister for Courts and Legal Services, Sarah Sackman, said that “last year the Government announced the biggest overhaul of weddings law in England and Wales since the 19th century”:

“Our reforms focus on two key areas ripe for change. First, the law will move away from regulating the building in which a wedding takes place, and instead focus on the officiant responsible for conducting the ceremony. That will make it easier for people to get married in a variety of settings, giving them flexibility and choice. Secondly, we will introduce a single set of rules governing all weddings, with the exception of retaining Anglican preliminaries. That will enable many more couples to have ceremonies that reflect their values and beliefs.”

She reiterated that the Government is to publish a consultation early this year:

“I appreciate that it is already March, and as one knows, ‘early this year’ can be a flexible concept in this place, but our determination remains to get on with that consultation, building on the Law Commission’s report. That report was comprehensive, and the Government’s consultation will therefore focus on more detailed aspects of reform, including the dignity and suitability of locations and ceremonies, and the role of independent officiants.”

As to the notice period, under which a couple who have given notice of their intention to marry must generally wait 28 days before they are issued their marriage schedule, she noted that the Law Commission had not recommended any change:

“The Law Commission considered the preliminaries process in detail in its report and emphasised the importance of maintaining a robust notice system, given the protections that it offers for vulnerable people and against forced and sham marriages … However, it noted that the process could be made easier for couples, and recommended providing an online system for giving notice … The Government are carefully considering our approach to preliminaries and the process for giving notice.”

Ireland, Jehovah’s Witnesses and blood products 

Ms E, a 16-year-old Jehovah’s Witness, was 37 weeks pregnant and was admitted to hospital on 8 February 2026 with reduced foetal movement – for the third time during her pregnancy. She had expressed a wish not to receive a blood transfusion in any situation, pursuant to part 8 of the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015. Her parents, also JWs, supported her. The applicant Health Service Executive sought authorisation from the High Court to provide E with all appropriate medical treatment and ancillary procedures, including blood transfusions and clotting agents, and to take all reasonable steps necessary and clinically or medically indicated to treat any complications. Ms E’s Guardian ad litem had stated that Ms E was not “strongly into her religion at the moment” and had confirmed to her that it would be easier for her personally if the decision were taken out of her hands

In the High Court in Dublin, in Re E (etc) [2026] IEHC 134, Heslin J found for the Health Service Executive and granted the reliefs sought. He was satisfied that it was a situation in which it was appropriate to override the single, discrete decision to refuse treatment to avoid the possibility of “the tragic and needless death of the minor, or her serious and irreversible injury”. He emphasised that a refusal by the court to permit a transfusion in the event that it became clinically necessary would constitute a clear failure to vindicate Ms E’s rights to bodily integrity and to life.

[With thanks to Irish Legal News. We hope to post a formal note on the judgment shortly.]

A plethora of fonts

The Grade II* church of St Thomas the Apostle, Stanhope, is unusual in having three fonts, and these reflect changes in their use and misuse over the years, and the applicability of Canon F1. The font currently in use is an 1863 Frosterley marble font with a carved oak cover dating back to 1907; a much older stone font, possible Saxon, stands below the western respond of the north arcade and “was once recovered from the churchyard”; and a third font, a small 19th century example, which previously belonged in the chapel at Crawleyside and “was rediscovered in a garden serving as a bird bath in 1985”. 

The petition in Re St Thomas Stanhope [2026] ECC Dur 1 sought to move the Frosterley marble font to the east end of the north aisle (but without its oak cover), to position the Saxon font where the Frosterley marble font is currently situated, make the Saxon font mobile so it can be easily moved for use during baptisms, and relocate the Crawleyside font to a garden of remembrance within the churchyard. These proposals gave rise to significant controversy and opposition, and in light of the representations made, the PCC  reconsidered its proposals for the Frosterley marble font. They now no longer seek to move it from its existing place, and would keep its cover in situ. Isles Ch commended them for their reappraisal and was satisfied they had come to the right decision. 

However, the petitioners did not provide satisfactory justification for the removal of the Crawleyside font to the churchyard, and it is to be retained within the church; any new position for it is to be agreed with the DAC, and in default of agreement, the court. Likewise, the position of the Saxon font when not in use. 

Quick links

• Chris Cuckney, Lexology: Balancing Protected Beliefs Between Employees and Service Users – Mr Ngole v Touchstone Leeds.
• Kate Dewsnip, Constitution Society blog: Lawmaking as Memorial: Named Laws in the UK : to which we’ve added another candidate, v. infra.
• Ceri Fuller and Hilary Larter, Lexology: Religious discrimination: Tribunal failed to scrutinise whether reasons for not recruiting a Christian social worker were because of his religious beliefs.
• Martin Sewell, Surviving Church: Persistent and Vexatious – Pursuing Justice in the Church of England. 

And finally…

From Scottish Legal News: Anne’s Law passed at Holyrood – or as grumpy old gits like Frank prefer to call it, the Care Home Services (Visits to and by Residents) (Scotland) Regulations 2026. That, dear politicians, is what the Long and Short Titles of statutes and statutory instruments were designed for: to tell decrepit old folk with failing memories (like him) what they are about. Or in the immortal words of Brenda from Bristol: “You’re joking – not another one?”

“On 12 March 2020 the complainant made a complaint against the respondent pursuant to section 8 of the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 (‘the Measure’). That complaint was addressed to the then Archbishop of Canterbury, (The Most Rev Justin Welby) [4]. Most unfortunately, there were a number of procedural errors in the handling of the complaint, which meant that it never proceeded to preliminary scrutiny and was not dealt with. It appears that this failing was only appreciated in 2025, at which time the complaint was referred to the Archbishop of York (“the Archbishop”), the See of Canterbury being vacant [5].

“Nevertheless, the Archbishop of York was satisfied that these procedural errors did not invalidate any step now to be taken under the Measure and considered that he was able to deal with the complaint fairly and expeditiously”. The President agreed with this assessment [7].

The Archbishop divided the complaint into five distinct allegations, which he referred to as Complaints 1 to 5. In each case the Archbishop determined that there was no misconduct by the respondent and directed that no further action be taken on the complaint [10]. Section 13(3) of the Measure provides that if the President of Tribunals considers that the Archbishop’s determination was “plainly wrong”, he may either direct the Archbishop to pursue such of the courses specified in section 12(1)(b) to (e) of the Measure as he considers appropriate or remit the complaint to the Archbishop and direct him to reconsider he determination that there is to be no further action [13].

The complainant’s referral was limited to the Complaints numbered 1 and 4. There was no challenge to the Archbishop’s determination that no further action was required on Complaints 2, 3 and 5 [14]. Allegations made by the complainant against REDACTED resulted in the making of a restraining order against the complainant pursuant to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The order was made by the Thames Magistrates Court on 8th March 2016 and was varied on 9th January 2017 [18].

Complaint 1 is considered in [19] to [28], and Complaint 4 in [29] to [40].

19. Complaint 1 is in the following terms: ‘… the bishops of London, over decades both prior to, and since the installation of Bishop Sarah Mullally in that office have consistently violated Canon C 30 by actively abetting the priest, REDACTED in his harming vulnerable adults, causing vulnerable adults to be harmed and inciting other persons to harm vulnerable adults, and perpetuating conduct unbecoming or inappropriate to the office and work of a clerk in Holy Orders, including sexual, psychological and financial abuse, threats, intimidation, harassment, and bullying of multiple individuals, in ways which have injured an entire community.’

[…]

28. It is impossible to say that the determination of the Archbishop on Complaint 1 was “plainly wrong”. On the contrary, in my judgment his careful reasoning is impeccable.

29. Complaint 4 is in the following terms: ‘Colleagues who wrote using my name to Bishop Mullally in strictest confidence as preliminary to my CDM complaint, maintaining the same private circulation list throughout various emails, discovered that she had violated that abuse complainant confidentiality and forwarded some of this private correspondence to REDACTED.’

30. This refers to an email dated 1st March 2019, sent to the respondent in the name of the complainant from a body called ‘Scriptural Reasoning’ and copied to 19 other people, some of whom were Church of England officeholders, while others included journalists, one of whom was the BBC’s religious correspondent. The email was not marked ‘confidential’.

31. In fact, although this email was sent in the complainant’s name, purporting to be signed by him, and sent from the same email address from which he had previously sent emails to the respondent, it appears that it was not sent by him but by REDACTED, a woman who was administering the email address, and that the complaint referred to was not the complainant’s, but REDACTED.

[…]

35. The Archbishop accepted that the email had not been sent by the complainant and that it referred, not to his own complaint (which had been submitted but which had not reached the respondent due to postal delays), but to a separate complaint submitted by REDACTED. However, he rejected the submission that the email had been sent in confidence.

Three of the recipients had @bbc.co.uk email addresses and one of these was Martin Bashir, then the BBC’s religious affairs correspondent; another was a well-known lawyer who commented publicly on church-related matters; and one was another incumbent in the Diocese of London.

Contrary to the complainant’s case, therefore, there was no expectation of confidentiality, and the email appeared to be intended to cause as much publicity as possible. It appeared to be an attempt to cause embarrassment to REDACTED by publicising the fact of a complaint having been made against him.

[…]

40. In these circumstances the Archbishop’s decision to dismiss Complaint 4 cannot be regarded as plainly wrong. On the contrary, I consider that his decision was obviously correct.

The President concluded:

“41. …that the Archbishop of York’s determination that no further action should be taken on this complaint was not plainly wrong.

42. However, I think it appropriate to go further. I have no doubt, having considered the matter carefully, that he was right to dismiss the complaint. This was a vexatious complaint which ought not to have been brought”.

March ’26 Decision on publication

The President reiterated his view that the complaint was a vexatious complaint which ought not to have been brought, and that the Archbishop of York had been right to dismiss it [3]. On 17 February 2026 he received a request from the Archbishop of Canterbury that his Decision should be published, with suitable redactions relating to the identity of a  priest in the Diocese of London [4]. Dame Sarah gave three reasons for this request, viz:

(1) In view of her office as Archbishop of Canterbury, it would be in the public interest  for the Decision to be published.

(2) The complaint had already been well-publicised, largely due to the complainant  himself revealing details to the press, which had led to some inaccurate reporting.

(3) The Archbishop was aware that further complaints had been made against her  and others; my determination that the complaint was vexatious would give the complainant an opportunity to pause and consider whether he wishes to pursue such complaints.

The President invited representations from the complainant on this request, who in an email dated 2 March 2026, stated is that there was a single course of conduct by the respondent spanning the entire period from 2018 to 2026 which was the subject, not only of the complaint which had now been dismissed, but further complaints made on 6 February 2026.

He made clear that he did not agree with the President’s finding that the 2020 complaint was vexatious and said that he had been under pressure from journalists to give his consent for them to publish facts which he said had come to light pertaining to the respondent’s conduct. He said that he had so far resisted giving his consent to such publication and that it would be prejudicial to him for the President’s Decision to be published until his latest complaints had been resolved. The complainant’s position, therefore, was that th Decision should not be published at this stage [5].

In his Decision, the President expressed no doubt that it was in the public interest that it should be published. The fact of a complaint against the Archbishop of Canterbury had been widely publicised, including (as it appeared) by the complainant himself. It was right that the public should know that this complaint had now been considered in accordance with the applicable statutory procedures and has been found by an independent judge to be vexatious. Those who were interested would be able to decide for themselves whether they agreed with his Decision, but would at least be able to do so with accurate information about the nature of the complaint and the reasons for its dismissal [6].

He did not accept that publication would prejudice the complainant in any way, and accordingly, directed that hid Decision dated 12 February 2026 together with this further Decision on Publication should be published on the Church of England website [7].

Comment

The term “vexatious” has specific meaning in law according to the context of its use. In most areas of UK administrative law, whilst the complaint may be vexatious, a person only becomes a vexatious litigant when the High Court issues a civil proceedings order through the  Attorney General under S42 Senior Courts Act 1981. This restricts them from initiating or continuing civil proceedings in the courts without permission. Their name will also be published in the London Gazette and included on the list of vexatious litigants (Note: the list was last updated 2 May 2025).

With regard to the Decisions discussed above, whilst the President analysed the complaints and made reference to their vexatious nature  (one in February ’26 and four in March ’26) and stressed that it ought not to have been brought, he did not refer to “N”, as a vexatious complainant. 

“Unacceptable and distressing incidents, such as bodies being stored or treated in ways that cause deep anguish, were able to occur. In some instances, the police lacked the powers they needed to act. In the case of Elkin and Bell, the two funeral directors in the hon. Lady’s constituency, charges included intentionally or recklessly causing a public nuisance, the common law offence of preventing the lawful and decent burial of a body, and carrying on a business with intent to defraud creditors or another fraudulent purpose.”

He told the House that the Ministry of Justice was “actively exploring options to strengthen criminal law protections for the deceased, including the potential for new offences as outlined in the Law Commission’s 14th programme of work”, which would identify gaps in the current law and whether new offences were needed “to address behaviours that fail to treat a deceased person with dignity and respect”.

He noted the outcome of the independent inquiry into the crimes committed by David Fuller (who sexually abused the bodies of women and girls in hospital mortuaries) and how those actions went unnoticed:

“The overall recommendation of the inquiry’s chair, Sir Jonathan Michael, was for the Government to introduce an independent statutory regulatory regime to protect the security and dignity of people after death in all settings where deceased individuals are cared for, regardless of the institution, including funeral directors. Eleven of the phase 2 recommendations relate to the introduction of statutory regulation, including regulation of the funeral sector. They remain under consideration. Through the Fuller inquiry recommendations programme board, established in July last year, work continues apace with the Ministry of Justice, the Department for Business and Trade and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government to assess options for Government intervention to improve standards of care for the deceased in the funeral sector, and, as such, to respond to the recommendations”.

It was a complex and sensitive matter that required careful and thoughtful consideration to safeguard the rights and dignity of those who have died, to support their bereaved families, and to ensure that any measures were proportionate, “given that we are working with a number of small and medium-sized enterprises”. Discussions within government were continuing; however,

“The funeral sector comprises 6,500 private businesses across the UK, the vast majority of which serve their communities with compassion and integrity, as we have heard tonight. Some 85% are already members of trade bodies that provide guidance, codes of practice and voluntary inspection schemes. The Government are committed to reducing the administrative burdens of regulation on businesses by 25%, and that will contribute to our approach to regulation in this area.” The Government was committed to making a full response to the Fuller inquiry phase 2 report in summer 2026.”

Diocese of Bangor publishes independent governance review

Comment

The Report was reviewed in the Church Times article (£): Weak financial controls and ‘disempowered’ trustees were background to Bangor débâcle, review says.

“adopting a non-statutory definition of anti-Muslim hostility and will appoint a special representative on tackling anti-Muslim hostility. In addition to the range of actions the government has already taken to combat antisemitism, we will also act on the recommendations of Sir David Bell’s review into antisemitism in schools and colleges, and on the recommendations of Lord Mann’s review of how the healthcare system deals with antisemitism and other forms of racism. We will roll out training on religious hatred across the Civil Service”.

The non-statutory definition of anti-Muslim hostility (see Chapter 3) is as follows:

“Anti-Muslim hostility is intentionally engaging in, assisting or encouraging criminal acts – including acts of violence, vandalism, harassment, or intimidation, whether physical, verbal, written or electronically communicated – that are directed at Muslims because of their religion or at those who are perceived to be Muslim, including where that perception is based on assumptions about ethnicity, race or appearance.

It is also the prejudicial stereotyping of Muslims, or people perceived to be Muslim including because of their ethnic or racial backgrounds or their appearance, and treating them as a collective group defined by fixed and negative characteristics, with the intention of encouraging hatred against them, irrespective of their actual opinions, beliefs or actions as individuals.

It is engaging in unlawful discrimination where the relevant conduct – including the creation or use of practices and biases within institutions – is intended to disadvantage Muslims in public and economic life.”

The policy paper emphasises that it is not intended to resurrect the crime of blasphemy:

“We do not recognise blasphemy law in the UK and will ensure the Police are equipped to respond to … incidents [of intimidation, threats and harassment]  in a way that prevents public disorder and sectarianism and protects the freedom and safety of the public.”

– and in a statement to the Commons, the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, Steve Reed, confirmed that “there is absolutely no question of blasphemy laws by the back door”.

The associated legislation differs between Anglican Churches within the United Kingdom; recent examples within the Church in Wales included the deposition from Holy Orders of a Bishop and his expulsion from the office of Cleric in the Church. Whilst the penalty of deposition has been unavailable in England since the introduction of the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003, (CDM), it is set to return on the enactment of the Clergy Conduct Measure.

Briden[4] emphasizes that “the deposition from Holy Orders (or unfrocking) operates as a ban on the performance of clerical functions. It does not operate to remove the indelible character which theologically ordination and consecration are taken to bestow”. This is encapsulated in Canon C1 §2 which has remained unchanged: this reflects the position in the Roman Catholic Church [5].

“Defrocking” in the Church of England

The Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963  (“the 1963 Measure”) resulted from the Archbishops’ Commission on the Ecclesiastical Courts which reported in 1954; it was introduced “… to reform and reconstruct the system of ecclesiastical courts of the Church of England, to replace with new provisions the existing enactments relating to ecclesiastical discipline, to abolish certain obsolete jurisdictions and fees, and for purposes connected therewith”. The EJM codified the existing disparate legislation on discipline under one Measure. Section 50 of the Measure expressly preserved the power of deposition from Holy Orders following ecclesiastical judicial proceedings in relation to doctrine, ritual or ceremonial, or conduct unbecoming a clerk in Holy Orders.

The Report “Under Authority” (1996) examined the system of clergy discipline in the Church of England and made recommendations for its reform. It states that since the 1963 Measure came into force, no disciplinary cases had been brought before the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved, and only a few disciplinary cases reached the stage of a trial before the consistory court[6]. The report identified weaknesses in the system, including inflexibility, slow procedures, and high costs, and recommended reforms to create a fairer and more effective disciplinary framework.

These recommendations led to the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 (CDM), which received Royal Assent in July 2003 and came fully into force by 2006 on 1 January 2006 [7]. The new Measure did not include the penalty of deposition from Holy Orders on the grounds that it was designed to be more administrative and less punitive; however, the absence of a mechanism to remove clergy from Holy Orders entirely became increasingly untenable in the context of safeguarding failures. The CDM did not repeal section 50 of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963: apart from textual amendments and the repeal of S54 (Disobedience to censure) of the 1963 Measure, Part IV, Censures, no other changes were made. The “Part IV provisions” of the 1963 Measure were retained “as there were clergy deposed under the Measure for whom further deposition remained a possibility for second or subsequent offences involving doctrine, ritual or ceremonial” [8] .

In 2021, the Clergy Conduct Measure Implementation Group (“the Group”) was formed with the specific task of formulating legislative proposals for the creation of a new Clergy Conduct Measure, (Under Authority Revisited, GS 2277). The first major step in the reform of the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 was the Church’s involvement in the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA). The 2003 Measure had also been criticised for being overly legalistic, slow, and burdensome for both complainants and clergy. Originally designed to address serious misconduct, Synod heard that it had become a catch-all process for all complaints, often leading to undue stress and reputational damage for clergy facing minor grievances.

In February 2025, General Synod approved the final drafting of the Clergy Conduct Measure which introduced a tiered approach to complaints, ensuring that different levels of concern were handled proportionately. For cases of serious misconduct it reintroduced the penalty of deposition from Holy Orders. The new Measure restored the ability for a bishop to depose a priest or deacon from Holy Orders following a finding of serious misconduct that does not involve doctrine, ritual, or ceremony.

Following the Ecclesiastical Committee (Joint Committee) meeting on 21 October 2025 to discuss the proposed Clergy Conduct Measure, the Committee, in accordance with s3(4) Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act 1919, communicated its report on the Clergy Conduct Measure in draft to the Legislative Committee.

The draft report that the Ecclesiastical Committee was of the opinion that the Clergy Conduct Measure was “not expedient” – Its principal concern being section 31(3) of the Measure which provides:

“(3) The tribunal or court is to sit in private except in a case where: (a) the respondent requests that the sitting be in public, (b) the tribunal or court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to sit in public, or (c) the rules provide for the sitting to be in public”.

The Ecclesiastical Committee’s view was “that the Measure should … be amended to make clear that the tribunal or court will ordinarily sit in public, with limited exceptions where it may be appropriate and justified for sittings to be held in private – such as cases relating to children” (paragraph 7 of the draft report).

The Legislative Committee withdrew the Measure from the Ecclesiastical Committee and sought its reintroduction into the Synod with a view to an amendment being made to address the principal concern raised[1].

The Clergy Conduct Measure (CCM) was reintroduced to Synod following feedback from the Parliamentary Ecclesiastical Committee. Synod agreed an amendment, reversing the presumption of private hearings so that tribunals and courts will normally sit in public. Final approval for the Measure was then secured comfortably across all three Houses[9].

[1] An overview of the term “defrocking” is given by Wikipedia. It is not used Anglican Canon Law, and “laicization” is often, but incorrectly, associated Roman Catholic Canon Law. However, “deposition from Holy Orders” does not make for a snappily-titled headline, and within this post the term “Deposition” will be used. 

[2] In his post What’s with all this “defrocking” lingo? Dr Ed Peters comments: “Since the advent of the Johanno-Pauline Code in 1983, the correct phrase to denote the most severe expiatory penalty the Church can impose on a deacon, priest, or bishop is “dismissal from the clerical state” (1983 CIC 1336.1, n. 5). Even the term “laicization”, used for a while after Vatican II to soften the harsh rendering of Latin’s degradatio as “degradation”, is generally avoided today as it seems to imply that the lay state itself is some sort of punishment”. 

[3] Clergy who follow the requirements of the Clerical Disabilities Act 1870 and make a formal deed of relinquishment having resigned any and every preferment held by them – a lengthy process: see Rouch v Hawthorne [2015] Winchester Disciplinary Tribunal, (Decision)(Penalty) and our post Is it an offence to impersonate a cleric? – thoughts on deposition from Holy Orders (6 February 2015) and Safeguarding, the C of E and deposition from orders, (13 July 2015).

[4] Moore’s Introduction to English Canon Law, (4th Edition, Ed. T Briden), Page 177.

[5] Canon C1 §2 (Church of England): “No person who has been admitted to the order of bishop, priest, or deacon can ever be divested of the character of his order, but a minister may either by legal process voluntarily relinquish the exercise of his orders and use himself as a layman, or may by legal and canonical process be deprived of the exercise of his orders or deposed therefrom.” [emphasis added].

Canon C290 (1983 CIC 290): “Once validly received, sacred ordination never becomes invalid. A cleric, nevertheless, loses the clerical state: [1] by a judicial sentence or administrative decree, which declares the invalidity of sacred ordination; [2] by a penalty of dismissal legitimately imposed; [3] by rescript of the Apostolic See which grants it to deacons only for grave causes and to presbyters only for most grave causes.”

[6] Under Authority, Report on Church Discipline, Church House Publishing, 1996. Pages 2 to 4 cover the cases since 1963, viz, The Rev Michael Bland, 1969/70; the Rev Thomas Tyler, 1991/2; and the Very Rev Brandon Jackson, Dean of Lincoln, 1995. Mention is also made of  the case of the Rev Anthony Freeman concerning the termination of his PTO.

See also “Archdeacon of Cheltenham v Bland: A Sledgehammer to crack a nut“,  S Pix, Ecclesiastical Law Journal, 2001, [6] (29), 135-149.

[7] Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 (Appointed Day Instrument 2005) No 6. The time between 2003 and 2006 allowed for: drafting and approving the Clergy Discipline Rules 2005; establishing the Clergy Discipline Commission; setting up diocesan and provincial panels; training bishops, registrars, and tribunal members in the new procedures.

[8] Moore’s Introduction to English Canon Law, (4th Edition, Ed. T Briden), Footnote 45, page 182.

[9] Sections 37 to 49 of the revised Measure relate to Penalties: S41 Deposition from Holy Orders for priests or deacons; and 42 Deposition from Holy Orders for bishops and archbishops.

Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:

• The Supreme Court has blocked a California policy that requires public schools to facilitate students’ gender transitions and keep it secret from parents.
• In Childs v. Webster, the 7th Circuit held that there was not a violation of a Muslim inmate’s free exercise rights under RLUIPA or the 1st Amendment when his prison refused to distribute corrected prayer-time schedules to Muslim inmates.
• In State of Washington v. Corporation of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, a Washington state appellate court allowed enforcement of a subpoena issued by the state Attorney General’s Office seeking from the Catholic Archdiocese evidence relating to clergy sexual abuse.
• The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) declared that the State Department has failed to comply with the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA).
• The Military Religious Freedom Foundation reported that it has received numerous complaints from military personnel that their commanders are describing the military operations against Iran in Christian eschatological terms.
• Indiana Governor Mike Bruan signed House Enrolled Act 1389 which prohibits governmental discrimination in adoption and foster care matters.
• An investigation into the Catholic Diocese of Providence, Rhode Island, shows that an estimated 75 priests have abused more than 300 children since 1950.

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On Wednesday, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Nazila Ghanea, presented a report at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva: How freedom of religion or belief relates to death and honouring the deceased.

She concludes that:

• respecting funeral rights requires States to refrain from violating these rights and to recognise the absolute right of everyone to have, adopt and change religion or belief without coercion, including restrictions on or denials of funeral rights in order to coerce the next of kin.
• protecting funeral rights requires States to prevent others from infringing them, “first and foremost by State actors themselves and secondly through due diligence obligations ensuring protection for individuals and communities in exercising funeral rights against threats, interruptions and violence from non-State actors”.
• fulfilling and promoting funeral rights requires States to take positive steps to ensure their enjoyment by everyone, without discrimination; and accountability for infringements “requires justice systems to be alert to, for example, disproportionate or exploitative burdens or charges on those requiring funeral rights that differ from the majority”. [With thanks to Mark Hill KC.]

Antisemitism in education review

On Wednesday, the Government announced an independent review into antisemitism in schools and colleges in England. The review is to be led by Sir David Bell, and will issue a call for evidence and programme of engagement “in Spring 2026”.

Confusion relating to marriages of foreign nationals

In response to the confusion regarding marriages of foreign nationals that could leave clergy falling foul of the Marriage Act 1949, as amended following the EU Settlement Scheme, the Registry of the Diocese of Oxford has issued the document Confusion relating to Marriages of Foreign Nationals. By way of reminder, only British and Irish nationals and those foreign nationals with EU Settled or Pre-Settled Status can be married by Banns or Common Licence. All other foreign nationals who do not have EU Settled or Pre-Settled Status should be married by Superintendent Registrar’s Marriage Schedule as per this guidance note: Foreign National without EU Settled Status. 

Further arrests at Westminster FMH

The Metropolitan Police has announced that on Thursday, officers of its Public Order Crime Team arrested fifteen members of a group called Take Back Power who were holding a planning meeting at Westminster Friends Meeting House for what the Met described as “a campaign that would have seen them steal from high street supermarkets before redistributing the stolen goods elsewhere”. They were arrested on suspicion of conspiracy to commit theft. Some readers may recall that this is not the first time that a non-Quaker group meeting at Westminster FMH has been arrested and charged with conspiracy.

Scotland: the end of the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme

The Church of Scotland, which is the largest owner of listed buildings in Scotland, reports that, in a letter to the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Lisa Nandy, the Scottish Church Leaders’ Forum has raised concerns about the ending of the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme According to the report, the UK Government made the announcement that the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme (LPWGS) would cease at the end of March 2026, without informing the Scottish Government. The Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, a representative from the Kirk’s General Trustees and the President of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Scotland will be holding talks on the matter with Kirsty McNeill MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Scotland, on 10 March.

Scotland: new funerary methods

The Hydrolysis (Scotland) (No. 1) Regulations 2026 and the Hydrolysis (Scotland) (No. 2) Regulations 2026 came into effect on 2 March. The Regulations legalise the practice of alkaline hydrolysis, aka “water cremation”, in Scotland. As the BBC report points out, however, there is no hydrolysis facility in Scotland as yet, and before it can start, the necessary equipment will need to be built and installed, and the process will be subject to planning permission and approval from Scottish Water.

CPS Guidance on male circumcision

Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) guidance on offences against the person now includes male circumcision and states that, in certain circumstances such as the procedure being carried out by those falsely claiming to be suitably qualified practitioners or carried out in non-sterile conditions, it can cross the line into a harmful practice.

Offences such as child cruelty (contrary to s.1(1) Children and Young Persons Act 1933), causing or allowing a child to suffer serious harm (contrary to s.5 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004) and assaults (contrary to the Offences against the Person Act 1861), may apply. Prosecutors are requested to refer to Child Abuse (non-sexual) for prosecution guidance: “Every case submitted to the CPS for charge should be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the act carried out.”

Quick links

• Sarah Gilzean, Lexology: Discrimination on the grounds of holding or expressing a belief will not generally be justifiable: a note on Ngole v Touchstone Leeds.

And finally…

https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5fc4dfff-0182-4f9f-9a5c-36b8bc918fa4

On Tuesday, The Pillar posted The cardinal of Penzance, and camp commandments, which comments on Cardinal James Francis Stafford, who was consecrated a bishop at Baltimore Cathedral on 29 February 1976. Like Frederick — the “slave of duty” in The Pirates of Penzance — Cardinal Stafford can count his episcopal “birthdays” only in leap years. Consequently, he has celebrated only 12 anniversaries of episcopal life. “By that count, he’s hardly been a bishop at all”.

A couple of weeks ago, the en banc 5th Circuit vacated on ripeness grounds a lower court ruling that Louisiana’s law requiring placement of the 10 Commandments in public school classrooms violates the Establishment Clause. In this short take, Mattone Center Director Mark Movsesian explains what the case is all about, and the significance of the en banc court’s decision. Listen in!

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The program also included a thoughtful Q&A with the presenters and remarks from Dean Jefferson Exum of St. John’s Law. Thank you to our speakers and all who joined us for an engaging and timely discussion. 

The post Mattone Center for Law and Religion & St. John’sJournal of Catholic Legal Studies Co-Host Annual Symposium appeared first on LAW AND RELIGION FORUM.

There have been a number of referrals to the Tribunal on similar grounds, but here the Court commented (at [20]): “The Church in Wales has never before found itself in the circumstance of deposing a Bishop from their Orders.”

IN THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL OF THE CHURCH IN WALES

AND IN THE MATTER OF A REFERRAL IN RESPECT OF RIGHT REVEREND ANTHONY EDWARD PIERCE

JUDGMENT, [1] to [3]

1. By Reference dated the 10th April 2025 the then Archbishop of Wales, Andrew John, and the Bishop of Swansea and Brecon jointly referred to the Disciplinary Tribunal of the Church in Wales the Right Reverend Anthony Edward Pierce (‘the Respondent’), the grounds of the referral being that the Respondent engaged in conduct giving just cause for scandal or offence contrary to Chapter IX, Paragraph 9(c) of the Constitution of the Church in Wales(‘The Constitution’).

2. The grounds for the referral were that on the 12th March 2025 the Respondent was sentenced to a period of 4 years and one month imprisonment, was placed on the Sex Offenders’ Register indefinitely and was made the subject of a Barring Order.

3. The Reference from the Archbishop and Bishop enclosed the relevant Certificate of Conviction from the Crown Court. In accordance with S11(4) of Chapter IX of the Constitution, the preliminary stage of the Tribunal Proceedings was dispensed with and the matter set down for full hearing on 3rd November 2025.

THE BACKGROUND, [4] to [5]

4. The conviction relates to various dates between the late 1980s and early 1990s when, whilst serving as Parish Priest in West Cross Swansea, the Respondent committed acts of indecent assault on a parishioner, a boy aged approximately 14-15 years at the date of the first offences…

5. At the time of the incidents giving rise to the convictions, the Respondent was a Parish Priest, but in 1999 he was elected Diocesan Bishop of Swansea and Brecon. The matters before us are limited to those giving rise to the conviction, although likely because of his subsequent appointment from which he retired in 2008, the referral to us came from both the Diocesan Bishop of the Diocese in which the offences took place, and the [then] Archbishop of Wales.

THE LAW, [6] to [9]

6. The Proctor, Ms Helen Randall, of Counsel, brings the case and the burden rests on her to prove the case upon the balance of probabilities. However, in accordance with Rule 31 of the Tribunal’s rules a certificate of conviction in criminal proceedings is to be regarded as conclusive proof that the acts therein specified were committed by the person named in the document. This only issue  before us, therefore was whether the Proctor was able to prove that the set out in the Certificate constituted conduct giving just cause for scandal or offence.

[…]

9. Given the facts that prompted this Referral we do not need to trouble ourselves with a detailed consideration of precisely what scandalous or offensive mean. We accept the meanings ascribed to them by common usage.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT, [10] to [15]

The Respondent did not appear before the Tribunal, and indicated that he did not wish to attend the hearing or be represented. However, the Tribunal  later received two character references (sent directly to the Tribunal by the authors), the second of which asked it “to consider the environment at the time of the offending and how matters have changed since then“. The writer said “Bishop Anthony’s behaviour was as wrong when it happened as it is now, but our understanding of the impact of such actions has changed. I think we have to be careful not to make judgements of past events based on current thinking” [14].

The Tribunal was unable to accept this proposition and stated: “15. Child sexual abuse is child sexual  abuse whether it happened 35 years ago or now. The damage it causes has not  altered with the passage of time and in our judgment the fact that understanding of that damage may have developed over the relevant period provides no  mitigation to the gravity of the Respondent’s actions. In any event, in the criminal proceedings the Respondent was sentenced in accordance with the law as it  stood at the time of his offending, and received an immediate custodial  sentence of over four years” [15].

OUR DECISION, [16] to [17]

16. We have no doubt that the facts which led to the convictions were scandalous and would, in the eyes of a person of reasonably robust persuasion, be regarded as both scandalous and offensive. The information before us shows that Mr Pierce knowingly entered into a course of conduct which is undoubtedly inherently wrong, in the eyes of both the Church and wider society. His failure to confess what he had done when he was considered for preferment is an indication of a clear hope that he would never be found out.

17. We thus find the charge proved.

THE PENALTY, [18] to [24] 

18. Chapter IX of the Constitution of the Church in Wales sets out at Paragraph 18 the powers of sentence open to the Disciplinary Tribunal. They range from the most minor, an absolute discharge, to the most serious, the deposition from Holy Orders and expulsion from the office of a Cleric in the Church in Wales.

19. This is clearly a case which demands the most serious of sanctions…We find that the only appropriate sanction that is consonant with the gravity of his offending is for Mr Pierce to be deposed from Holy Orders.

20. The Church in Wales has never before found itself in the circumstance of deposing a Bishop from their Orders. Section 42 of Chapter IX of the Constitution envisages the duty falling to the Bishop of the Diocese where the cleric holds, or last held, office. It does not make separate provision for Bishops, although a Bishop clearly falls within the Constitutional definition of a Cleric. However, we are mindful that powers of deprivation of Bishops (and other disciplinary sanctions) were vested in the Metropolitan prior to disestablishment [1]. For the avoidance of doubt and uncertainty, we believe the appropriate way forward is for the Archbishop and the Diocesan Bishop jointly to execute a deed of deposition.

21. We therefore direct the present Archbishop of Wales, jointly with the Diocesan Bishop of Swansea and Brecon, to depose the Right Reverend Anthony Edward Pierce from Holy Orders and to expel him from the office of Cleric in the Church in Wales.

The Tribunal further commented that It was worth noting the effects of a deed of  deposition, here, the effects of which are the same as a deed of relinquishment.

[1] See Halsbury’s Laws of England (1st edition, 1910), Ecclesiastical volume, para 726.

This post was first published on 2 March 2026. 

The post Movsesian to Lecture at University of Padua Next Week appeared first on LAW AND RELIGION FORUM.

Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:

• The U.S. and Israel carried out strikes on Iranian leadership and military targets, and Iran responded with missile and drone attacks on Israel and U.S. bases in the region. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in the initial attack.
• St. John’s University said it will withdraw recognition of its faculty unions, writing that it had become clear the school lacked “the flexibility required to fulfill its Catholic-centered mission” while core academic decisions were tied to collective bargaining. 
• Two Jewish advocacy organizations filed suit Thursday against California, its Department of Education, and state officials, alleging that authorities failed to address widespread antisemitic harassment targeting Jewish and Israeli students on campus. 
• Attorney General Pam Bondi announced federal civil rights charges against 30 additional individuals in connection with a January protest inside a Minnesota church where a pastor works for ICE, stating that 25 people are in custody and more arrests are expected. 
• The New York City Council held its first hearing this week on a package of bills focused on protecting houses of worship and schools and addressing antisemitism and other religious hate. The proposals, part of Speaker Julie Menin’s action plan, would require the NYPD to create a response plan for credible threats that block access to religious institutions and schools. 

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Probably the major law and religion news of the week was that, on Thursday, Jersey’s States Assembly approved the Draft Assisted Dying (Jersey) Law 2025 by 32 votes to 16. The draft Law is now awaiting Royal Assent – as is the Isle of Man’s Assisted Dying Bill 2023, which was passed by Tynwald almost a year ago, in March 2025. 

Meanwhile at Westminster, the Government has indicated that it will not allocate further time for the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill before the end of the current session in May. With only a limited number of Friday sitting days remaining in the Lords, the Bill seems unlikely to complete its parliamentary stages in time and will therefore fall automatically. 

At Holyrood, MSPs will begin considering amendments to the proposed Scottish legislation on 10 March, with a final vote expected on 17 March.

VAT on private school fees

On Friday, in R (BYL & Anor) v Chancellor of the Exchequer [2026] EWCA Civ 170, the Court of Appeal dismissed a challenge to the imposition of VAT on fees at private schools operated for disadvantaged Charedi Jewish children and for parents wishing their children to follow a strictly Evangelical Christian curriculum. The nub of the application was that “Parliament ought to have carved out an exemption for low-cost schools, particularly religious schools”, but the Court was satisfied that the Government had provided an objective and reasonable justification for declining to do so [184]. We hope to post a note on the judgment in due course – though the claimants have already made it known that they will seek permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. 

Abuse Redress Measure 2025: progress

In answer to a written question from Julia Buckley (Shrewsbury, Lab) asking when the Church of England Redress Scheme will be open to applications, the Second Church Estates Commissioner said this:

“Following the Abuse Redress Measure receiving Royal Assent on the 18th December 2025, the National Church Institutions (NCIs) are finalising the technical operational details before the scheme launches. The NCIs are working with a multi-stakeholder Steering Board, survivors and the scheme’s administrator to put the operational arrangements for the scheme in place, including building and testing the application process and preparing support systems and communications.

The NCIs are working to ensure the scheme launches in 2026 and will provide as much notice as possible via the scheme’s website, where any interested party may register for updates: www.redresscofe.org/w/webpage/registration.”

Religious slaughter again

On Tuesday, Esther McVey (Tatton, Con) was given leave under the Ten-Minute Rule to bring in a Bill “to introduce compulsory labelling of halal and kosher meat and products containing halal and kosher meat; and for connected purposes”. Despite leave having been given without a division, its chance of becoming law is pretty well zero.

In its explainer on Ten Minute Rule Bills (TMRBs), the Hansard Society comments:

“Realistically, there is rarely time for TMRBs to be considered beyond their introductory stage. Few TRMBs become law, but they are a useful mechanism to enable MPs to generate debate about an issue and to test the opinion of the House on a subject”.

In accordance with standard practice, the Bill was ordered to be read a second time – on Friday 10 July – and to be printed. It should be noted, however, that lots of TMRBs never even get drafted, let alone printed, so don’t bother watching this space – although our Index on Religious slaughter gives an overview of developments and a link to the informative document produced by the House of Commons Library in 2025.

The Met Police and Freemasonry

In R (United Grand Lodge of England & Ors) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2026] EWHC 330, Chamberlain J refused to strike down the new requirement that all Metropolitan police officers and staff who are or who have been members of “an organisation that has confidential membership, hierarchical structures and requires members to support and protect each other” must declare that fact, confidentially, to the local professional standards unit.

“Freedom of belief” rather than of “religion”: but it was subsequently announced that the United Grand Lodge had decided not to appeal. Lewis Graham comments on the decision in the Administrative Court Blog, here: Freemasons in the police force.

Ngole

Our apologies to anyone who was confused by the way our note on the outcome of the EAT appeal in Ngole appeared: so were we. Because of an unexplained WordPress glitch, we had to post it twice. Grrrrrr.

Quick links

• Sylvie Bacquet, Law and Religion Forum: Public Funding and the Autonomy of Faith Schools.
• Mario Ferrante, Law and Religion Forum: Religious Freedom and Equality in Funding Religious Schools.
• Javier Martínez Torrón, Law and Religion Forum: Public and Private Education.

And finally…I

On Tuesday 17 February, the Ancient Briton blog ceased posting, but with its strapline “‘Anonymous’ comments for publication must include a pseudonym”, it was never a primary source of information for us.

And finally…II

Likewise, whilst the Beaker Folk of Husborne Crawley blog is not one of our primary sources, as well as being great fun it does generate a number of referrals to the blog, and as a quid pro quo, here’s a recent post – God Loves a tidy Toilet alarm cord. To us, this appears to support the view that “health and safety” issues can be “an objection of last resort”, as we sometimes see in consistory court deliberations and anonymous comments on other blogs…

Interim Bishop of Bangor: Message from the Archbishop of Wales

Summaries to the four consistory court judgments reviewed during February 2026 are listed below, with links to the L&RUK review. These included [*]:

• Reordering, extensions and other building works
• Net  Zero Issues
• Exhumation
• Churchyards and burials

This monthly review also includes: CDM Decisions and Safeguarding; Reports from the Independent Reviewer; Privy Council Business; Other legal issues; Visitations; CFCE Determinations; and Links to other posts relating to ecclesiastical law.

An Index to these and earlier judgments in here.

Reordering, extensions and other building works

• Other building works, including re-roofing
• Removal and replacement of pews

Other building works, including re-roofing

Re St. Nicholas Bradfield [2026] ECC She 1 The Petitioners from St Nicholas, High Bradfield, a Grade I listed medieval church, sought permission to install a new kitchen, servery, accessible toilets, and a shallow access ramp on the north side of the building [1,2]. The works, planned over several years, aimed to replace inadequate and outdated facilities. The current kitchen was cramped and unsuitable, and the church had no internal lavatory; the only permanent toilet was down a steep and slippery cobbled lane and not owned by the church. A temporary Portaloo was in place, but was inappropriate for regular use, especially for elderly or those with disabilities. These shortcomings hindered worship, mission, and community events, including the well-attended annual music festival [5] to [6].

Consultation with amenity societies raised no objections [8]. The Church Buildings Council supported the scheme but insisted on replacing proposed Karndene flooring with engineered oak, a change the petitioners accepted [9]. Planning permission and building regulations approval have been granted, and public notices produced no objections. Applying the Duffield framework, the Chancellor found that any harm to the church’s significance was minimal, the need compelling, and the benefits substantial. A faculty was therefore granted, subject to a proviso in respect of the flooring. [Re St. Nicholas Bradfield [2026] ECC She 1] [Top of section] [Top of post].

Re St. Kenelm Minster Lovell [2026] ECC Oxf 2 The Chancellor considered a faculty petition for internal works at the Grade I listed church of St Kenelm, Minster Lovell. In the absence of an incumbent, the petition was brought by the two churchwardens, Brenda Bennett and Judith Warwick (who also serve as the PCC Treasurer and Secretary respectively) and a third member of the PCC, the Rt Hon Jack Straw. [2]. The proposals included: re-ordering the north transept to create a WC, servery and heritage/interpretation space; removing and adapting some mid-19th-century pews; installing a ramped accessible route (with possible removable handrails); relocating the war memorial; and creating a new accessible external path to the south door [2,3]. The church is described in [4] and [5], with photographs on pp 26 to 36 of the judgment.

The DAC consulted Historic England [10] who did not wish to offer any comments on the proposals and Historic Buildings & Places (HBP), (the working name of the Ancient Monuments Society) [11],  the Church Buildings Council (the CBC) [12], and The Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB) [16]. Although the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB) objected—mainly to pew removal, handrails in the crossing, and the handling of damp—the DAC ultimately did not object, subject to extensive conditions.

Applying the Duffield test for listed churches, the Chancellor accepted that there would be some harm to the church’s significance, particularly from the loss and relocation of pews and visual intrusion, but found it limited and justified. The public benefits – improved accessibility, welcome, facilities for visitors and worshippers, heritage interpretation, and the long-term viability and mission of the church – were clear and convincing and outweighed the harm. [42] to [45].

Being satisfied that some, albeit modest, degree of harm would be caused by the parish’s proposals for the reordering of the north transept [53], the Chancellor considered the fourth of the Duffield questions, and was “entirely satisfied that the
petitioners [had] established a clear and convincing need, and justification, for these proposals if St Kenelm is to improve its connection with, and fulfil its evangelical potential as a place of welcome, and education, for the very many visitors to the neighbouring Minster Lovell Hall who do not currently choose to enter the church, and thereby provide the financial support required to continue the thousand-year Christian presence in Minster Lovell [54].

A faculty was therefore granted, with detailed conditions to control design, conservation, drainage, ventilation, archaeology, and (if needed) handrails [54]. [Re St. Kenelm Minster Lovell [2026] ECC Oxf 2] [Post] [Top of section] [Top of post].

Net zero issues

Re St. John the Baptist Tideswell [2025] ECC Der 2 The petitioners wished to replace the gas boilers at the Grade I listed church with new gas boilers. The existing gas boilers had been damaged by flooding. An initial request for like-for-like replacement was delayed because it failed to demonstrate “due regard” to the Church of England’s Net Zero Carbon guidance, which is mandatory under the Faculty Jurisdiction Rules. After criticism from the Diocesan Advisory Committee (DAC), the petitioners produced a detailed revised options appraisal assessing a wide range of low-carbon heating solutions. The appraisal concluded that a fully electric system was currently impractical due to inadequate electricity supply and cost, but proposed a phased approach: short-term replacement of gas boilers, followed by medium-term integration of air source heat pumps, and longer-term carbon offsetting. The Chancellor held that the petitioners had now properly engaged with the Net Zero guidance and that immediate heating was necessary for the church’s mission and community use. A faculty was therefore granted, but only on strict conditions: the new gas boilers must be hydrogen-ready, supplied on a green tariff, subject to carbon offsetting, and approved for a limited period of five years to 2030, during which progress towards low-carbon alternatives must be demonstrated. [Re St. John the Baptist Tideswell [2025] ECC Der 2]  [Top of post]

Exhumation

Other

Re St. Peter Aubourn [2026] ECC Lin 1 The petitioner sought to have the cremated remains of her husband exhumed and reinterred elsewhere in the churchyard, as the area where the remains were interred had become waterlogged and made access difficult. The cremated remains were interred in September 2023. The problem that had arisen was that the area where cremated remains are interred became heavily waterlogged over a lengthy period making it difficult to attend this grave. Bishop Ch. had given judgement for a Faculty in another exhumation application in the same cremated remains area for the same reason, Re St. Peter Aubourn [2024] ECC Lin 1. 

It was proposed that the interred remains, which were in a cardboard container, would be exhumed and reinterred in a new cremated remains plot in the churchyard at a higher elevation. It is near the footpath which will also make it easier to visit the graves. The undertaker also states that removal of the ashes is possible [2].

The Chancellor commented:

“[9]. This is a case in which it was plainly a mistake to have cremated remains interred in a place that was to become so waterlogged so soon after the interment when immediate family members are likely to want to visit, and who are now prevented from visiting.

[…]

[12]. The new grave will require a new flat memorial set flush with the ground to the prescribed dimensions in conformity with the Churchyard Regulations. All new interments in the new cremated remains area will have the same style of memorial. This is so that the churchyard can be easily maintained and also contributes to a sense of harmony in the churchyard. I note that the Petitioner’s expectation from her application is that the existing memorial will simply be lifted and reinstalled in the new position.

If it is not flat and is not flush with the ground and to the same size as other memorials in that cremated remains area, then I am minded to direct that it will have to be replaced by a new memorial.

[13]. … if having spoken to the Rural Dean or the Vice Chair, the Petitioner remains concerned about this I will of course hear any further representation she may want to make to me about this. I would also in those circumstances be assisted by having the views of the Rural Dean and some more photographs of the new cremated remains area. I will then rule on that issue
definitively.

[14]. However, subject to that the Faculty for the exhumation and reinterment is granted.

[Re St. Peter Aubourn [2026] ECC Lin 1] [Top of section] [Top of post].

Churchyards and burials

• Development of churchyard
• Designation of closed churchyard
• Environmental Permit

Designation of closed churchyard

See Privy Council Business.

Environmental Permit

The PCC of St Paul’s Church: environmental permit application advertisement – EPR/RP3122LW/A001: Application No EPR/RP3122LW/A001 for Trench Arch Drainage System. National grid reference discharge point: SX 44798 72740; Receiving environment: discharge to Trench Arch Drainage System; Effluent type: Trench Arch effluent; Volume: 0.153 cubic metres per day.

Privy Council Business

3 February 2026

• Burial Act 1853 (Notice): Order giving notice of the discontinuance of burials in: St Mary’s Church (Annex) Churchyard, Chithurst, West Sussex ; St Paul’s Church Churchyard (Extension), Coven, Wolverhampton, West Midlands; All Saints Churchyard, Elsham, Brigg, North Lincolnshire.
• Burial Act 1853 (Final) Order prohibiting further burials in: St John the Baptist Churchyard, Hammerwich, Burntwood, Staffordshire; St Thomas Becket Church Churchyard, Bridford, Exeter, Devon; and St Mary’s Churchyard, Thundridge, Hertfordshire.

CDM Decisions and Safeguarding

Penalties by consent

Name: The Revd DEAN RAYMOND EDWARD HALL
Diocese: Worcester
Date imposed: 12th January 2026
Relevant CDM section: 16(1)
Statutory Ground of Misconduct: 8(1)(d) = Conduct unbecoming & inappropriate to the office & work of a clerk in Holy Orders
Penalty: Removal from Office and prohibition from ministry for a period of 5 years (with effect from 1st February 2026)

Name: The Revd SION AWEN MIHANGEL HUGHES CAREW
Diocese: Lincoln
Date imposed: 25th January 2026
Relevant CDM section: 16(1)
Statutory Ground of Misconduct: 8(1)(d) = Conduct unbecoming & inappropriate to the office & work of a clerk in Holy Orders
Penalty: Rebuke and injunction

Name: The Revd EDWARD PHILLIPS-SMITH
Diocese: Chelmsford
Date imposed: 8th January 2026
Relevant CDM section: 30(1)(a)
Statutory Ground of Misconduct: 8(1)(d) = Conduct unbecoming & inappropriate to the office & work of a clerk in Holy Orders
Penalty: Prohibition for life

Name: The Revd TIMOTHY BILES
Diocese: Salisbury
Date imposed: 18th December 2025
Relevant CDM section: 30(1)(a)
Statutory Ground of Misconduct: 8(1)(d)
Penalty: Prohibition for life

Safeguarding

Anthony Pierce

The Church in Wales has published the findings of a detailed review into the way in which the former Bishop of Swansea and Brecon was appointed to senior church roles in the 1990s despite senior clergy knowing of sexual abuse allegations against him. [Post] [CiW Review].

CFCE Determinations

The dates of the Cathedrals Fabric Commission for England may be found by scrolling down to the bottom of the page Cathedrals Fabric Commission.  The programme for 2026 is here and the next meeting will be on Thursday 5 February. Decisions taken on Thursday 11 December 2025 are yet to be reported.

Links to other posts

Recent summaries of specific issues that have been considered in the consistory courts include:

Reordering, extensions and other building works

• Phased replacement of gas boiler in Grade I church, (10 February 2026).

General/Miscellaneous

• Anthony Pierce Review Published, (26 February 2026).
• Bishop of Lincoln suspended, (22 February 2026).
• Significant opposition to significant rise in burial fees, The Church Times reported that Synod voted overwhelmingly against the proposed increase of £1000 in burial fees, (18 February 2026)
• David Tudor Statement: A Bishop’s Disciplinary Tribunal for the Diocese of Southwark which in November upheld a new complaint against David Tudor under the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 has today published its penalty of a lifetime prohibition from ministry. This is the second lifetime prohibition against Tudor. (16 February 2026).

[Top]

Updated: 27 February 2025 at 16:04.

[*] This is an approximate classification based upon the  main issues considered by the court. Determinations relating to reordering and building works will often address other aspects of the Petition.

Notes on the conventions used for the navigation between cases reviewed in this post are summarized here.

The Institute will be led by project co-leads Whittney Barth and Silas Allard of Emory University’s Center for the Study of Law and Religion, with guest faculty drawn from leading institutions in law, religious studies, and history. A full list of faculty is available here. 

For more information and application details, visit the official Institute website. 

The post Emory’s Center for the Study of Law and Religion to Host Summer Institute appeared first on LAW AND RELIGION FORUM.

Background

Mr Ngole, who holds an MA in Social Work from Sheffield University, applied for the role of discharge mental health support worker at Pinderfields Hospital in Wakefield [6 & 7]. He has firm religious beliefs in marriage as a divinely-instituted lifelong union between one man and one woman,  that sexual relationships may only be expressed within a monogamous marriage of one man and one woman, that sex is a biologically immutable, and that it is not possible for a person to change sex/gender [8] – and Touchstone accepted that he held those beliefs [9]. He had been removed from the Sheffield social work course, but was restored after he successfully sued in the Court of Appeal to be reinstated: see R (Ngole) v University of Sheffield [2019] EWCA Civ 1127 [16-21].

Touchstone gave him a provisional offer of a job, but when it became aware of the content of his Facebook posts and media report on the outcome of his appeal [22-25] and called him for a second interview [27], after which the offer was withdrawn.

In 2024, an Employment Tribunal ruled that Mr Ngole had been directly discriminated against when the job offer was withdrawn, but rejected his further discrimination claims about the second interview and Touchstone’s final decision not to employ him: we noted the judgment here. He appealed on a series of grounds.

The judgment

At the EAT, Employment Judge Tayler concluded that some of Touchstone’s reasoning might have been problematic, especially where it relied on fears that third parties would discover Mr Ngole’s beliefs; however, it had been lawful for Touchstone to seek reassurance by way of a second interview about how he would treat LGBTQI+ service users:

“On a fair reading of the judgment as a whole … it appears that the Employment Tribunal decided that the reasons for the respondent’s decision to invite the claimant to a second interview were because of the firm views that the claimant had expressed about homosexuality and same-sex marriage in the posts, of which the respondent was aware from reading the Guardian and BBC news stories, and the conclusion that the claimant should demonstrate that he would be able to meet the needs of the respondent’s service users and work with all his colleagues, including by complying with the respondent’s policies. The reference to reputation damage in this context is to the damage that would be caused if the respondent did not support its service users and employees from the LGBTQI+ community” [93].

He concluded, however, that the appeal succeeded in part. Touchstone’s refusal to reinstate the job offer was to be remitted to the Employment Tribunal that had heard the case originally, which

“must analyse each reason, or group of related reasons, for the treatment separately and decide whether, at least in part, the treatment of the claimant was, in reality, because of his religious beliefs as opposed to something properly separable from them that justified the treatment. While there has been a significant passage of time, I expect that the Employment Tribunal will remember the case well, and will be better placed than a newly constituted Employment Tribunal to carry out the necessary analysis” [123].

Anthony Pierce Review Published

Provincial news Posted: 26 February 2026

The Church in Wales has published the findings of a detailed review into the way in which Anthony Pierce, the former Bishop of Swansea and Brecon, was appointed to senior church roles in the 1990s despite senior clergy knowing of sexual abuse allegations against him.

Mr Pierce, who was Bishop between 1999 and 2008, was jailed for four years in March last year after admitting separate sexual offences against a boy aged under 16, committed between 1985 and 1990, when he was a parish priest in the West Cross area of Swansea.

When those offences were admitted in 2025, the Church in Wales reviewed how issues relating to Mr Pierce had been handled in the past and found that senior clergy had apparently been aware of sexual abuse allegations against him when he was appointed Archdeacon in 1995 and then Bishop of Swansea and Brecon in 1999. These allegations were not reported to the police until 2010. As a result, the Church appointed Gabrielle Higgins to carry out a review which has now been published.

While the review was being prepared, the Church in Wales has also taken forward a referral to its Disciplinary Tribunal. As a result of the Tribunal’s findings, the Bishop of Swansea and Brecon, the Rt Revd John Lomas, has deposed Mr Pierce from holy orders and he is no longer a priest of the Church in Wales. The decision can be viewed here.

[…]

Anyone with safeguarding concerns to contact a member of our team via the Church in Wales website:

Web: https://www.churchinwales.org.uk/en/safeguarding/reporting-safeguarding-concern/

Tel: 02920 348200

Alternatively, Safe Spaces is a free and independent support service, providing a confidential, personal and safe space for anyone who has been abused through their relationship with either the Church of England, the Catholic Church in England and Wales or the Church in Wales. You can contact the Safe Spaces team by:

Web: www.safespacesenglandandwales.org.uk

Tel: 0300 303 1056 (answerphone available outside of opening times)

Email: safespaces@firstlight.org.uk

Anyone with concerns or information about this case should contact South Wales Police on 101.

Update: 3 March 2026 at 11:22. On 2 March 2026, Nation Cymru reported that a former Archbishop of Wales had lost the right to officiate at church services (PTO) following the abuse report. 

Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. María-José Valero Estarellas (Universidad Villanueva) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here.

A Question That Looks Small — But Isn’t

It is not uncommon that an employment dispute quickly becomes a constitutional stress test. This is exactly what happens in many European and Latin American countries when the State hires teachers to provide denominational religious instruction inside public schools. These teachers stand in a legally unusual place: they are paid by public funds and formally linked to the State through an employment contract, yet their ability to teach depends on ecclesiastical approval and, often, on a heightened “duty of loyalty” that reaches beyond the workplace. This dual status—public employee and religious representative—creates recurring conflict between church autonomy, state neutrality, and the individual rights of teachers.

In the background sits a simple question with complicated consequences: who gets to decide whether a particular person can credibly teach a faith? Religious communities argue that credibility is inseparable from doctrine and conduct. Teachers, not infrequently laypersons, point to privacy, family life, expression, and anti-discrimination guarantees. Public authorities, acting as employers, must decide whether they are merely implementing a religious decision or whether they are responsible for it in the language of fundamental rights.

The different major judicial models that are shaping the field have provided different approaches and solutions: the U.S. ministerial exception, the European Court of Human Rights’ balancing method, the Court of Justice of the European Union’s equality-driven review, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ delegation logic. The through-line is the Stat’s duty of denominational neutrality: what courts say it means, what proportionality requires them to do, and why those two can collide.

The structural tension: “dual status” work in a public institution

Denominational religious education within public schools is common in many national systems. The arrangement appears straightforward: the State provides the institutional and employment framework; the religious community determines who is qualified to teach its faith; and students (or their parents) choose whether to participate. Legally, however, the model is hybrid.

Religion teachers are typically employed under public contracts, yet access to the post depends on a religious “gateway” condition. Churches or other faith communities issue certificates of suitability—such as the missio canonica—and may withdraw them when a teacher is deemed no longer to meet doctrinal or moral expectations. That withdrawal may trigger termination or non-renewal of the public contract. While this may resemble an ordinary labor decision in form, in substance it reflects an ecclesiastical judgment about morality, representation, credibility, and trust.

From a constitutional perspective, this tension is inseparable from the scope of religious freedom itself. The right to freedom of religion, as protected in international human rights law, entails the correlative right to the autonomy of religious communities. That autonomy extends beyond institutional independence to include the authority to define doctrine, articulate duties of loyalty, and determine how closely a particular function is connected to the core of the community’s religious or evangelizing mission. These are internal determinations, grounded in the community’s self-understanding as a body of belief.

This is why such cases are particularly difficult. A court cannot treat a religion teacher in a public school as it would any other civil servant, because the teacher’s function is explicitly religious: it involves transmitting a faith tradition as true, not teaching about religion from a neutral, historical, or sociological perspective. The legal question, therefore, is not merely whether the teacher was treated fairly under ordinary employment standards, but whether courts may legitimately second-guess an ecclesiastical decision about representation and credibility without turning the State into an arbiter of religious identity—precisely the role that the principle of state neutrality is meant to preclude.

The U.S. model: a clear jurisdictional boundary

In the United States, these questions are largely settled for two reasons linked to constitutional design. First, there are no public schools that provide confessional religious instruction in the way found elsewhere; public education is expected to remain secular under prevailing Establishment Clause doctrine. Second, U.S. law recognizes a robust “ministerial exception.”

The ministerial exception exempts certain religious organizations’ employment decisions from civil judicial review when the employee performs important religious functions. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (2012) and Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (2020) reaffirmed and broadened this principle, emphasizing that the relevant question is function, not formal ordination. When a teacher’s role includes transmitting faith and forming students religiously, courts generally may not override a church’s decision to hire, retain, or dismiss.

This is not a “balancing test.” It is a boundary rule. The point is not that individual rights do not matter, but that civil courts are institutionally barred from adjudicating certain disputes because doing so would require them to evaluate religious reasons. In this model, neutrality is best protected by non-interference: the State does not decide whether the church’s reasons are good enough.

Strasbourg’s path: from deference to balancing

Europe has taken a different path. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) approaches church–employee disputes through a balancing of competing rights. Early case law tended to be deferential. The ECtHR accepted that States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in regulating relations between religious institutions and civil authorities. Within that framework, domestic courts could limit their review to procedural safeguards—checking, for example, that basic fairness was respected—without reviewing the religious motives behind the decision.

The shift came with the twin judgments Obst v. Germany and Schüth v. Germany in 2010. In those cases, the Court made clear that domestic judges should not simply defer. Instead, they must weigh, in concrete terms, the individual’s rights (often privacy and family life) against the church’s institutional autonomy. This new approach treated church autonomy as an important interest, but not an automatic trump card.

The Grand Chamber refined the method in Fernández Martínez v. Spain (2014), a case that resonates strongly with the topic of religion teachers in public schools. Fernández Martínez, a former Catholic priest, taught religion in a Spanish public school. After marrying and fathering children, and after publicly opposing Catholic doctrine, the bishop refused to renew his authorization. Because authorization was a condition of the teaching post, the State did not renew the employment contract. He claimed violations of privacy and non-discrimination. The Grand Chamber found no violation, emphasizing that Spain had appropriately balanced the competing interests and respected the Church’s autonomy.

The Court later consolidated the approach in Travaš v. Croatia (2016), involving a Catholic religion teacher whose authorization was withdrawn after he remarried following a civil divorce, contrary to Church doctrine. Again, the public contract ended. Again, the Court found no violation, holding that the domestic authorities had struck a permissible balance.

On the surface, these outcomes might reassure religious communities: the ECtHR sometimes upholds dismissals. The deeper story, however, is methodological. In making the decision depend on proportionality, Strasbourg invites national judges to look into the “reasons” behind an ecclesiastical judgment.

Neutrality and the proportionality trap

Here is where neutrality becomes the key theme. The ECtHR repeatedly says that state neutrality precludes public authorities from assessing the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the coherence of ecclesiastical doctrines. Neutrality, in this sense, draws a red line: the State may not act as theologian.

Yet proportionality review makes it difficult to honor that red line. To assess whether an interference with a teacher’s private life is proportionate, a judge must ask whether the church’s concern is serious enough, whether the teacher’s conduct truly harms the church’s credibility, and whether the employee’s role is close enough to the religious mission to justify a stricter duty of loyalty. These questions are not purely procedural. They require a court to evaluate how much weight a religious norm should carry in each given situation.

The Court attempts to manage the tension by framing its analysis as contextual rather than doctrinal. Judges are not asked whether a doctrine is “true,” but whether the application of the doctrine to the employee’s case is reasonable and proportionate. The problem is that reasonableness is itself a substantive standard. Once a court declares that a religious reason is not “relevant and sufficient,” or that it does not justify a loyalty expectation, it is necessarily making a judgment about internal religious criteria.

That is why one can describe proportionality as a neutrality trap. Neutrality begins as a promise not to judge faith. Proportionality ends by requiring courts to judge how faith-based reasons should translate into civil consequences. The line between oversight and intrusion becomes blurry. What was meant to be a shield against interference risks turning into a tool for intervention.

This risk is particularly acute for religion teachers in public schools because the State is the employer. A judge may feel compelled to scrutinize the church’s decision more closely, reasoning that public employment should not hinge on unreviewable religious determinations. But that instinct places secular courts in the uncomfortable position of evaluating ecclesiastical rationales to decide whether the State should enforce them.

Luxembourg’s contribution: equality law and effective judicial review

A parallel development appears in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Although the CJEU’s cases often involve religious organizations as employers rather than the State as employer, the underlying move is similar: religious reasons are subjected to intensive judicial review under anti-discrimination law and Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.

In Vera Egenberger (2018), a non-confessional applicant was excluded from a post advertised by a Protestant welfare organization because she was not Protestant. The CJEU held that national judges must verify whether the religious requirement is objectively justified by the nature or context of the work and is directly related to the organization’s ethos. In IR v. JQ (2018), involving a Catholic hospital director dismissed after remarrying civilly, the CJEU stressed that differences of treatment must be assessed under the Directive’s framework and that courts must be able to review whether the requirement is essential, legitimate, and justified.

These rulings interpret Article 4(2) of Directive 2000/78, which permits differences of treatment in religious employment when religion constitutes an “essential, legitimate and justified occupational requirement” consistent with the organization’s ethos. The CJEU reads this exception narrowly. It insists on “effective judicial review,” meaning that courts must not simply accept the employer’s characterization of its ethos and requirements. They must test it.

Again, the rhetoric is equality, not theology. But the operational effect is similar: secular judges must decide how closely a particular job is linked to a mission and whether a loyalty expectation is genuinely required. The interpretive authority shifts from the religious body to the court. Neutrality is reframed from non-interference into oversight in the name of non-discrimination.

The Inter-American twist: delegation and state responsibility

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) adds a further layer by foregrounding the State’s responsibility when ecclesiastical decisions affect public employment. In Pávez Pávez v. Chile (2022), the IACtHR held that when a State allows church authorities to issue and withdraw certificates of suitability for religion teachers in public schools, the State effectively delegates a public function. Consequently, the State must ensure adequate safeguards against discriminatory decisions.

The IACtHR’s reasoning introduces a differentiated approach between religion teachers in public institutions and those working in private ones. The public setting changes the analysis because the State is involved, directly or indirectly, in implementing the religious decision. The result is a stronger push toward procedural and substantive safeguards, and thus toward increased judicial review.

So what should “neutrality” mean in a pluralist democracy?

At this point, the debate becomes less about one teacher and more about constitutional architecture. Is it compatible with pluralist democracy for courts to review the coherence of religious doctrines or moral expectations under the guise of equality law? Can judges realistically assess whether a religious motive is “reasonable” without substituting secular reasoning for the community’s own understanding of faith and mission?

The European model tends to answer these questions with the tools it knows best: proportionality, balancing, and context. Those tools have virtues. They take individual rights seriously. They avoid categorical immunities. They offer a way to explain outcomes with reasons rather than with jurisdictional bars.

But the same tools carry predictable costs. Once courts are required to evaluate the centrality of a belief, the seriousness of a moral rule, or the proximity of a job to a mission, neutrality stops being a barrier and becomes an invitation. The State, through its judges, becomes a manager of the boundary between the spiritual and the civil, and that management inevitably reflects secular assumptions about what religion should be allowed to demand of its representatives.

Why religion teachers are the fault line

Religion teachers in public schools are the place where these tensions are hardest to avoid. The teacher is not merely an employee; the teacher is a transmitter of doctrine. The church is not merely an employer; it is a community of belief that claims authority to define who can represent it. The State is not merely a bystander; it is the contracting party and the institution responsible for education.

That triadic structure makes the disputes unavoidably high-stakes. If courts grant broad deference to churches, teachers may find their public employment contingent on religious judgments with limited civil protection. If courts intensify review, churches may see their internal standards filtered through secular reasonableness tests. Either way, a choice is being made about what neutrality demands.

What judges end up weighing (even when they say they won’t)

In the Strasbourg line of cases, domestic courts are encouraged to look at a familiar set of factors. They ask whether the employee knew, when accepting the job, that loyalty expectations applied; whether the employee’s duties were “close” to the church’s mission; whether the conduct that triggered the conflict was public and likely to affect the church’s credibility; how severe the consequences were for the employee; and whether alternative employment was realistic. These are practical considerations—and they are precisely the kind of things proportionality is designed to capture.

But notice what sits underneath each factor. If a court asks how “close” a teaching post is to a religious mission, it must first describe what the mission is. If it asks whether conduct damages a church’s credibility, it must assess the public meaning of that doctrine. Even when framed as social context, the court’s reasoning necessarily interacts with religious content.

This is why the procedural/substantive distinction matters. Procedural review can check notice, process, and consistent application of civil rules. Substantive review asks whether the religious reason is strong enough. The moment courts take that second step, neutrality is no longer simple abstention; it becomes a contested practice.

Public versus private: should the State’s role change the level of scrutiny?

A recurring argument—especially after Pávez Pávez—is that public employment should trigger heightened protection. If the State pays the salary and controls the post, then it seems troubling if a public contract can be ended by an ecclesiastical decision that the State cannot meaningfully review.

Yet the counterargument is that if the State chooses to offer denominational instruction in public schools, it must accept that the faith community can define who can credibly teach that religion. Otherwise, denominational instruction becomes a hollow label: a confessional course without confessional control. The State cannot have it both ways.

Why this debate matters beyond religion classes

Religion teacher cases may look niche, but the logic reaches further. Democracies often partner with faith-based actors in schools, hospitals, and charities. In many of these settings, a job involves representing a religious ethos while also serving the public. When disputes arise, courts face the same choice: defer to religious self-definition, or apply reasonableness tests that interpret the ethos from the outside.

What is clear is that “neutrality” cannot be a slogan. It must do real work—protecting rights without turning judges into supervisors of religious meaning.

Looking ahead: design choices that reduce conflict

For U.S. readers, these disputes underscore how much institutional design shapes constitutional outcomes. Where public schools do not offer confessional instruction, and where the ministerial exception draws a firm jurisdictional line, courts are largely spared the task of weighing religious reasons against civil standards. In systems that combine public employment with denominational teaching, that line is harder to draw—and neutrality becomes harder to sustain.

The recent trajectory of the European Court of Human Rights is therefore worth watching. Strasbourg has not abandoned balancing, but it has increasingly tried to objectify it. Rather than inviting courts to assess the substance or social plausibility of religious norms, the Court has placed growing emphasis on whether religious communities act in a non-arbitrary, coherent, and intelligible way when enforcing loyalty expectations—especially where those expectations affect access to public employment.

This shift does not amount to a European version of the ministerial exception, nor does it eliminate judicial review. What it does is narrow the field of inquiry. Courts are asked less to evaluate what religious communities believe, and more to verify how their decisions are made and applied. In doing so, some of the pressure placed on the principle of neutrality is relieved: judges can exercise oversight without becoming de facto theologians.

That approach is no panacea. Hard cases remain, particularly when the State itself enforces the consequences of ecclesiastical decisions. Still, it points toward a pragmatic middle ground—one that seeks to contain, rather than resolve, the tension between church autonomy and individual rights. For systems that cannot rely on categorical boundaries, this more disciplined form of review may offer a way to protect both without turning secular courts into arbiters of religious identity.

The balance is fragile, and unfinished. But the direction matters: away from theological second-guessing, and toward judicial restraint grounded in institutional competence rather than abstract neutrality alone.

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Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Tania Pagotto (University of Milan-Bicocca) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here:

1. Academic religious teachings contrary to human rights standards  

The 2025 European Parliament briefing on Academic Freedom reports that academic freedom declined across many European states, with concerning developments in Lithuania, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Hungary, and other traditionally liberal countries. Similar trends emerge in North America, where academics face pressure or negative consequences for expressing controversial views (Seckelmann et al. 2021). 

Tensions are common in the context of religious instruction and in the teaching of religious law, when religious doctrines taught in universities conflict with contemporary human-rights standards. For instance, a Canon law professor might note that marriage is a sacred covenant between a man and a woman and that and that homosexual relations contravene natural law. While a Sharia law scholar might teach that Islamic law recognises stoning as a sanction for adultery to protect an alleged public morality.  

How can public institutions respond to the teaching of religious doctrines that conflict with human-rights principles? 

Academic teaching and research are increasingly regulated considering the pursue “academic justice” (Ragone 2024). Academia, colleges and research institutions aspire to create learning environments free from discrimination, hatred and distress, a safe spaces for learning for the community, including vulnerable groups, marginalised communities, and protected minorities.  

Comparable dynamics can be observed also in other fields, such as controversies surrounding dark heritage, monuments or statues tied to colonialism, slavery, and racial inequality. Supporters of the removal of such a dissonant inheritance promote a more inclusive collective memory and public spaces through the elimination of the symbols of oppression and the emergence of “the forgotten history” (Olusoga 2016).  

To pursue educational justice and to create a space free from anxiety for everyone, institutions adopted a range of regulatory measures, tools, and initiatives that impact upon individual academic freedom. 

Students, university unions, and governing bodies amended certain practices. For instance, with “no-platforming” universities and colleges might deny “unpopular” speakers the opportunity to research or teach at their institutes. A well-known example is the 2008 controversy stemming from Pope Benedict XVI’s invitation to the inauguration of the academic year at Sapienza University of Rome, due to his theological position on Galileo.    

Other practices include the use of “gag orders”. Faculty can be prohibited to foster open discussions over sensitive subjects, to prevent embarrassment and feelings of marginalisation among students. Such orders restrict directly religious academic freedom and may produce a chilling effect on scholars. For instance, at the Idaho University, a faculty adviser affiliated with a Christian society was subjected to a gag order injuncted by a Court after a student’s complaint about the biblical explanation of marriage. 

2. Distinctions to be made: blasphemy laws and memory laws  

At first glance, the legal issues surrounding religious academic freedom may appear to resonate with the restrictions on blasphemous speech adopted to safeguard respect for the religious convictions of believers (Temperman and Koltay 2017). 

A further parallel can be drawn with European memory laws, whereby state authorities regulate public discussion of certain historical events, most notably, traumatic episodes in a nation’s past (Belavusau and Gliszczyńska-Grabias 2017).  

Blasphemy laws and memory laws restrict free speech to protect the dignity of believers, on the one hand, and of victims and their families, on the other hand. They limit religious hatred speeches and expressions denying past atrocities or glorifying them to prevent today offences and to preserve collective memory. Both laws divide public opinion: either people advocate for restraints on offensive expression, or they defend the free exercise of opinion and speech. 

The context of religious academic freedom, however, calls for important distinctions to be drawn. The rationale grounding academic research and academic teaching, in fact, operates within distinct realms when compared to that of blasphemy laws or memory laws.  

Religious academic freedom of research is pivotal because of the features of the “soft sciences” themselves. Opposing views and disagreement are “the shoulders of giants” through which scholarship advances. Above all, limiting religious academic freedom of teaching would weaken not only the autonomy of schools and colleges, but also their the educational mission, acting as an intellectual gymnasium for future citizens (Ragone 2025).  

3. Religious academic freedom and dissent on campus  

While human rights and fundamental freedoms change over time to reach new (hopefully higher) levels of protection, religious doctrines will always preserve their eternal truths. This inherent and unremovable tension suggests that questions surrounding religious academic teaching and research will probably become increasingly contentious in the near and far future.   

Given the particular nature and research methodology of human sciences, removing religious teachings altogether or pressing religious schools to change the curriculum they offer may not constitute the most adequate response by the States and governments to such a delicate challenge.  

From this perspective, restricting the dissemination of contentious religious teachings should be approached with utmost caution. Gagging and no-platforming methods not only constitute direct prohibitions but also operate in a preventive way, with the outcome of denying in advance any exercise of free speech by and with the learning community.  

By contrast, procedures that alert the audience to possibly sensitive content, without censoring it, are a less intrusive means of minimizing distress for students while guaranteeing academic freedom. One example is the use of trigger warnings issued before teaching doctrines in conflict with contemporary understandings of rights, liberties, and democratic values.  

However, neither trigger warnings are infallible nor uncontroversial. On one side, backlash may arise because the trigger warning itself is perceived as stigmatizing religious expression; on the other side, complaints may be brought when, notwithstanding the trigger warning, the alert is regarded as insufficient. 

4. Greater pluralism means stronger pluralism  

The strength of all these measures lies in their intender aim: although imperfect, they try to reconcile academic freedom of individuals and schools’ autonomy with the pursuit of academic and educational justice. 

Their weakness, however, may eclipse this virtue, since all of them are difficult to reconcile with the enduring presumption that greater pluralism fosters stronger pluralism. This intuition has been extended by scholars application even to the sensitive domains of dark heritage and dissonant cultural site, such as the permanence of racist monuments in public spaces (Lixinski 2017, 153).  

Teaching religious doctrines dissonant with contemporary understanding of human rights and democratic standards should not be limited by virtue of the content (what academics teach). In fact, it would be incongruous to limit academics in the enjoyment of their free speech rights in a place where free ideas always flourished, while ordinary citizens would be permitted to express contentious opinions in the public sphere  (Darian-Smith 2025).  

Should any obligation be imposed upon the academic religious teachings, it should at most be limited to the responsibility to present opposing scholarly views and interpretations whenever a sensitive or contested topic arises while lecturing.  

Limiting any religious teachings contrary to human rights standards would undermine the mission of universities and schools. But discussing and facing the coexistence of irreconcilable religious perspectives would strengthen democracy and cultivate critical engagement.  

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Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Víctor Moreno Soler (University of Valencia) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here.

I. Introductory remarks

The debate surrounding single-sex education (SSE) raises a fundamental question: Does SSE deliver developmental benefits and encourage women to enter nontraditional fields, or does it allow gender stereotypes to go unchallenged?[i] This issue reflects a complex negotiation between three core principles: parental rights, understood as the freedom to choose the educational model that best aligns with family values; institutional freedom, referring to the autonomy of the center to define their pedagogical identity; and the public interest, which upholds the principles of equality and non-discrimination, as well as the best interests of the child.

It is important to emphasize that single-sex schools are not necessarily religious, and religious schools are not necessarily single-sex. A wide variety of institutional models and rationales exist behind the provision of SSE, ranging from pedagogical theories to cultural or religious convictions.

Some scholars argue that SSE is based on the premise that men and women differ biologically, psychologically, and developmentally. From this perspective, SSE is not merely a pedagogical model, but a response to those differences aimed at improving educational outcomes. Others, however, contend that such schools may not provide the most conducive environments for girls’ social and academic development and might risk reinforcing gender stereotypes or traditional gender roles.

The purpose of this analysis is not to determine whether single-sex education is pedagogically desirable. Instead, it is to consider the extent to which schools adopting this model may claim access to public funding.

II. International Regulatory Framework

At the international level, there are key instruments that address single-sex education, establishing its legality provided that equivalence criteria are met.

1. The 1960 UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education.

This Convention is the first binding international legal instrument dedicated entirely to the right to education. It plays a pivotal role in legitimizing single-sex education, provided certain conditions are met.

First, it explicitly states that the establishment or maintenance of separate educational systems or institutions for male and female students shall not be considered discriminatory.

It then sets out the criteria for compliance: institutions must offer equivalent access to education, employ teaching staff with qualifications of the same standard, ensure school premises and equipment of comparable quality, and provide students with the opportunity to pursue the same or equivalent courses of study (Article 2.a of the 1960 UNESCO Convention).

Another distinct issue — the one directly at stake here — is the question of whether this SSE may claim a right to state funding. This Convention does not provide any guidance on this matter, as none of its provisions addresses the public funding of single-sex education.

2. The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

This Convention does not prohibit single-sex education, even though it appears to promote coeducation. In fact, it encourages “coeducation and other types of education which will help to achieve this aim (the elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women).” (Article 10.c).

We must ask whether single-sex education inherently reflects or reinforces stereotyped conceptions of the roles of men and women. Regardless of the model, CEDAW establishes that States Parties are obligated to take all appropriate measures to ensure equal conditions for access to education—including access to curricula, examinations, teaching staff, equipment, and scholarship opportunities.

These requirements apply to all educational settings, including single-sex institutions, which could demonstrate that their institution does not compromise necessarily gender equality in substance or outcomes.

Here again, no provision addresses the issue of public funding for single-sex education. Each State remains free to decide whether it wishes to finance SSE or to withhold such funding.

III. National Framework

The situation of single-sex education varies significantly from one country to another, each presenting its own particularities. It would neither be feasible nor appropriate to examine all existing systems in detail. Therefore, this analysis will focus specifically on the cases of the United States and Spain. The former has been presented as one of the most prominent examples of a country with single-sex education; however, the actual scope for implementing SSE in public schools depends on the interplay between federal regulations, judicial interpretation, and state-level education policies. The latter has undergone two major educational reforms in the past decade—both of which addressed the issue of SSE—prompting the Spanish Constitutional Court to take a position on the constitutionality of public funding for such models.

1. United States

A. Regulation

Historically, the 1972 Title IX federal law prohibited sex discrimination in publicly funded educational programs, leading many public schools to transition to coeducational models. This framework changed with the enactment of the Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001/2002, which relaxed Title IX’s implementing regulations and allowed public school districts to establish single-sex classes or schools if they considered such programs to be “in the best interest of their students”. This flexibility was intended to allow for innovative programs aimed at improving student performance.

However, it was not until 2006 that the U.S. Department of Education established strict requirements for public schools implementing single-sex education programs, primarily focused on ensuring non-discrimination and parental freedom. These regulations established three key safeguards:

1. Voluntary enrollment: Participation in single-sex school must be absolute and completely voluntary for parents and students. They must receive clear information about the program and give explicit consent. Thus, their silence or passivity cannot be interpreted as acceptance.
2. Substantial equality and alternative offerings: If a school district offers a single-sex school or class, it must provide a substantially equal coeducational alternative in the same subject or activity. This equality is assessed by factors including, but not limited to, admission criteria, curriculum, facilities, and staff qualifications, and disciplinary policies.
3. Educational justification: Implementation must be based on a “reasonable motive” that justifies the program, such as the need for academic improvements due to high failure rates or discipline problems, and must be periodically evaluated.

Although these regulations remain formally in force, recent federal case law has raised significant obstacles to the practical implementation of SSE in public schools, as illustrated by Doe v. Vermilion Parish School Board (2011), and A.N.A. v. Breckinridge County Board of Education (2012). Thus, while the regulatory framework is permissive in theory, the scope for implementing public SSE has become increasingly limited in practice.

B. Exception for religious schools

Religious schools that receive federal funds are generally subject to Title IX unless they claim a religious exemption. Under 34 CFR § 106.12, a religious organization may request exemption from provisions of Title IX if compliance would conflict with its religious tenets. This exception requires two conditions: (1) the institution must be controlled by a religious organization; and (2) the challenged requirement must be inconsistent with its religious doctrine. This includes rules on sex-based separation.

Nevertheless, this exemption applies only to Title IX. Religious schools remain subject to state laws, many of which impose stricter anti-discrimination requirements or exclude SSE from eligibility for public funding. Therefore, a religious school may be exempt from federal obligation but still barred from offering SSE if state law conditions public funding on coeducation. In that case, it could legally operate, but it would not be entitled to public funding.

2. Spain

The central legal controversy in Spain has consistently focused on whether SSE schools should receive public funding (concerts), rather than the absolute legality of the model itself, which is generally uncontested in the private sphere.

For decades in Spain, the permissibility of SSE was derived from the lack of explicit prohibition in early educational laws and the interpretation that coeducation was a means – though not the only means – to promote the elimination of gender inequality.

In 2013 the Parliament passed a law which explicitly stated that SSE did not constitute discrimination – if UNESCO 1960 criteria were met – and prohibited unfavorable treatment in the granting of concerts. The Spanish Constitutional Court (SCC), subsequently confirmed that if the pedagogical model is constitutional, it cannot be excluded from public funding in conditions of equality (Decision 31/2018).

However, in 2020, the Spanish Parliament enacted a new law that prohibited public funding for single-sex education (SSE) centers that separate students by gender. In its Decision 34/2023, the SCC validated this refusal of public funding to SSE schools, since it affirmed that the denial of financing constitutes a “legitimate political option” of the legislature. The legislator has an ample margin of discretion to decide which educational models to support, and the denial of funds is seen as consistent with the State’s duty to remove obstacles to real equality (Art. 9.2 Spanish Constitution, SC).

Therefore, it could be said that the question of whether to permit or exclude public funding for SSE ultimately depends on the policy direction chosen by the ordinary legislator. It should also be noted that regional authorities cannot go beyond the framework established by the national legislation, and the last two national education reforms illustrate this clearly: they neither allowed regions to bar funding for SSE when it was guaranteed nor to permit it when the national law prohibited it.

In Spain, the legislation does not establish any exceptions for religious schools, so the same framework applies uniformly.

IV. Some Questions

Does separating students by sex inherently violate principles of gender equality, or can it be justified pedagogically and legally under certain conditions?

How should states assess whether single-sex schooling promotes or undermines inclusion and equal opportunity?

Is the freedom to choose single-sex education part of the broader right to educational freedom protected under constitutional or international law?

If a state chooses not to fund single-sex education, does it violate parental rights or principles of educational pluralism?

Should the legal assessment of public funding for SSE differ when the provider is a religious institution?

[i] Rose, L., Pierce, M., Dale, J., Miller, I. and Zong, L. (2023). Single-Sex Education. The Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law, 24 (2), 787-809.

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Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Javier Martínez Torrón, (Universidad Complutense), submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here:

Introductory note on conceptual issues: public and private education 

I. A frequent confusion 

When the issue of education is addressed in academic circles, in the political discourse, or even in the context of colloquial conversations, it is usual to make an essential distinction between public schools and private schools¹. Often, the dichotomy public and private schools is presented as implying that there is some sort of opposition between those two types of schools, not only with regard to their nature but also the goals and interests they pursue, as if they were different or even diverging.  

The terminology “public and private schools” may be confusing in a way that can affect the approach to the issue of public funding of schools, as well as some other aspects of the basic notions about education and the educational system. For that reason, I think it would be important to clarify some points about the nature of education and the State’s role in it.  

Two ideas — sometimes forgotten — seem particularly significant to me. First, the education offered by the national educational system is always public to some extent; irrespective of which schools provide it, education is a public service that concerns the entire society. Second, the term “public” should not be understood as synonymous with “State owned” or “State managed”; public implies the notion that something should be controlled by society, and society is not equivalent to the State or State authorities. 

For those reasons, it has been often suggested that a more precise terminology would be “schools managed by the State” and “schools managed by private institutions”. In my opinion, thereis no problem in using the usual terminology — public and private schools — provided that we know what we mean by those terms and we do not incur confusion. 

Let us see some of the consequences of the above remarks. 

II. Public funding of private schools: a matter of quality and equality 

Some of those consequences regard private schools. If we conceive education as a public service, the fact that a school is owned or run by a private institution — religious or not — does not give that school carte blanche to do whatever it wants. Private schools do not have an unrestricted right to teach anything, or to choose what not to teach, or to organize the school system and environment. They certainly have the right to their own ethos, and to have that ethos permeating the entire school system and practices; this will necessarily have an impact on issues such as the teaching program and textbooks, as well as the admission of students and the recruitment teachers. But private schools also have a responsibility towards society, and therefore they have accountability. Such responsibility and accountability are in connection with the role of State authorities, which are competent to regulate education and to design the educational system, both for public and private schools. This, however, does not give in turn State authorities a limitless power in the area of education. I will return to this point later. 

From this perspective, it is difficult to understand why there should be any constitutional or legal problem in allocating public funds for the maintenance and functioning of private schools, including those with a religious ethos. They provide the same public service as public schools; they just do it in a different way. The school ownership or management do not change the nature of the service provided. The purpose of public funding is to guarantee that the public service of education is provided with the quality that society expects from it, and that all citizens have equal access to such public service. Again: the notion of public money does not imply that the State is the owner of it; the State is just its administrator, an agent of society.  

Quality and equality should be the main points of reference in this area. Who is the owner or manager of a school should be secondary, or even irrelevant. Except for some extreme political positions, these notions are normally understood in European countries, most of which have a tradition of funding private schools (i.e., schools run by institutions other than the State) with public money, under certain conditions. In the US, the situation is less clear, due to some Supreme Court judgments declaring unconstitutional, as contrary to the establishment clause, the use of public money to support religious schools². Even though the trend in the Supreme Court has gone in the opposite direction for a few years, in some US legal and political circles there is still some belief — as a sort of dogma — in the unconstitutionality of devoting any public money to private schools, especially if they are religious. Such approach, in my view, goes against the rights of parents to decide on the religious and moral orientation of their children’s education, as well as against the principle of equality — why should religious schools be discriminated with regard to other schools (public or private) when they provide the same service and have been freely chosen by parents?  

One of the issues often raised when discussing the public funding of religious schools is that of the State’s religious neutrality — if the State is not supposed to support any particular religion, or even religion in general over non-religion, it should not give money to religious schools, as this would be a way to support religion. However, this argument forgets that the fact that the State itself is religiously neutral does not mean that neutrality has to be a characteristic of each and every institution providing a public service. Religious neutrality is a feature — and a duty — of the State but not of the public service itself, including education. What States must guarantee, as a consequence of their religious neutrality, is that no citizen is prevented from receiving such public service because of his religion or belief, and that no parent is obliged to accept for his children a type of education that is in violation of his religious or philosophical beliefs. 

III. The limited competences of governments on education, especially when values are concerned 

Some other consequences of my two initial statements relate to the conception of the State’s role in education. On the one hand, it is society, not just the State authorities, who is responsible for public schools. Therefore, it is important that, when managing public schools, State authorities act in consultation with the civil society, especially the students’ parents and other members of the school community. 

On the other hand, from a more general perspective, such consultation should be a characteristic of all government’s action in the area of education, once we assume that the State’s role in education is limited. As indicated above, State authorities do not have a limitless power over the educational system. Indeed, this point, in my opinion, has not been sufficiently addressed in international documents, which seem too deferent to the self-understanding that national States have of their role and competences in the realm of education. Thus, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights, when dealing with the right to education and parent’s rights with regard to their children’s education, refers to “any functions” that States assume “in relation to education and to teaching”; there is no indication that no one but the States themselves will define which those functions would be, and therefore the Convention does not provide clear guidance about any possible limitation on the States’ self-definition of their competences³. 

In my view, the conception of the State’s role in education must depart from an essential premise: the aim and raison d’être of the national system of education understood as a public service is to educate citizens — especially the youth — to live in community. This includes a general cultural education, professional education, and education on commonly shared civic values. The purpose of a national system of education should not be instructing about how to be a good person — but just a good citizen — or about what is the meaning of one’s life. Thisfundamental idea, so often forgotten, should be taken into account when designing school curricula for public and private schools, particularly in areas with a stronger moral profile or more ethical implications.  

In other words, governments do not have complete freedom to organize the national education system in whatever way they like or fits better their political or ideological agendas. They must be aware of their limitations, which include parents’ rights. And, even prior to that, governments must assume that their role in planning and implementing the education of youth is limited. It is important to keep this in mind, because it often happens that “enlightened” officials and experts tend to enlarge State’s competences on education, and feel entitled to teach members of society what is best for the education of their children as persons. 

Certainly, the education of youth has to do with values and not only with providing information and helping develop skills. The value side of education is precisely the one that most frequently raises concern in families, for it is closely linked to the realm of morals. In this area, it is legitimate for States — and perhaps necessary — to teach about values that are part ofpublic morals or about commonly shared values. Conversely, States do not have legitimacy to teach about ethical values concerning people’s choices strictly related to their destiny or the meaning of their lives. This is the role of families and, if that is the individual’s choice, religious or belief communities.  

Such limitations on the State’s function vis-à-vis education is in direct connection with its religious neutrality, which in turn is a consequence of the State’s incompetence to make judgments on the truth or falsity of religious and comparable doctrines⁴. The realm of the State is not the truth but the good, and this circumscribed to interpersonal relationships, i.e., to the living together of citizens under its jurisdiction. The State’s religious neutrality is also a relative moral neutrality, which compels governments to refrain from invading the sphere of strictly personal moral choices. This is the reason why teaching programs or courses designed by State officials cannot interfere with personal morals. The only morals that governments are entitled to transmit through the educational system are those embedded in the fundamental international human rights documents, the Constitution, and the legal system, as well as in commonly shared values. Nothing else. 

Such remarks are pertinent when we consider the recent proliferation of new courses in the school curricula of many countries: about sex education, and about citizenship, which often include contents concerning human emotions, affectivity, and moral choices in extremely delicate matters. Many of such courses generate social division and cause strong social reaction, which is a clear sign that the values they teach are not commonly shared⁵. 

IV. The State’s neutrality and how to address morally sensitive issues 

The State’s religious neutrality has also consequences with respect to the way certain morally sensitive issues are addressed at school, such as religion, the beginning and end of human life, sex, or sexual identity. The teaching about such subjects — which is no doubt difficult but is at the same time necessary — has created numerous controversies, and the question they bring up is: are controversies caused by the attitude of stubborn and reactionary parents or rather by invasive educational policies aimed at imposing a particular moral view on students? 

Such type of teaching raises issues not dissimilar from those derived from neutral teaching about religions or beliefs⁶. Teachers in charge of those courses need academic competence and moral integrity, so that sound scholarship goes hand in hand with impartiality and the endeavor not to cross the boundaries that separate legitimate school activity from the sphere reserved to private moral choices. And, as there is always the risk of abuse, a proper school system should have mechanisms of control — ex ante and ex post — that are efficient and agile.  

Both teachers and academic programs must recognize the moral dimension or profile of sensitive topics and be very honest about it. Indeed, ignoring such moral dimension implies a moral positioning, and presenting it as the only valid or objective view would be an unacceptable moral indoctrination of students. For the same reason, it is important to make the appropriatedistinctions. For example, adolescents can learn about the essentials of reproduction and contraception, but they should not be taught that those areas are morally irrelevant. Just the opposite, their moral dimension should be emphasized, noting that each person is entitled to take his own choices or sides, and it is not the school’s function to tell students anything in that regard. Moral choices in the area of sexuality are their problem, and this is something they should discuss with whomever they want, e.g., their families, their friends, or their religious communities. The same applies to sexual orientation or identity: teaching that all people have equal rights and equal dignity irrespective of their sexual identity or orientation does not entail denying that some sexual behaviors may be in conflict with some religious or moral choices. Such conflicts exist, and it does not mean that those religious or moral choices are illegitimate or bad, for the realm of law and personal ethics should not be confused, and we should be careful not to make them equivalent or transplant values from one to the other as if itwere inconsequential.  

Many of the difficulties that arise in the teaching of morally sensitive issues could be solved if the State authorities with competences on education engage in a proper dialoguing and cooperation process with the civil society⁷. The main stakeholders are families, but also religious and belief communities should be considered. Such dialogue requires empathy and a delicate combination of firmness in keeping some basic ethical values that structure society and flexibility to accommodate a diversity of beliefs as much as possible. In other words, holding on to the essential while negotiating everything else, and keeping in mind that sometimes the best is the enemy of the good; i.e., that pursuing the ideal educational system at the expense of ignoring the legitimate choices of families and religious communities is not a sensible policy because it is bound to create social division, and education should generate social harmony. 

This dialoguing process is not necessarily easy; indeed, it is often arduous and time-consuming. But the most valuable things are difficult to achieve. Guaranteeing freedom is complex.Authoritarianism is much simpler, but that fact does not make it better. 

1. There are, of course, further distinctions and terms. And as in some national contexts as the United Kingdom, the term “public school” has a meaning which is different from the one taken into account in this paper. ︎
2. See especially Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).. ︎
3. This is the text of article 2 of the Protocol to the European Convention: “Right to education. — No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions”. ︎
4. For a more developed explanation of my ideas in this regard, see J. Martínez-Torrón, “State Neutrality and Religious Plurality in Europe”, in W.C. Durham Jr. & D. Thayer (eds.), Religion, Pluralism, and Reconciling Difference, Routledge, 2018, pp. 159-176.  ︎
5. The fact that some teaching causes a strong social reaction in a particular national context is not necessarily a sign that it should be avoided or is not necessary. Sometimes it is just the opposite — think, for instance, of the fight against racism in the US in the 1960’s — but the government will need a solid legal and ethical justification to try to rectify some social tendencies through the education system.  ︎
6. See the Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools, OSCE/ODIHR, 2007. ︎
7. See ibid.., chapter V, pp. 63 ff. ︎

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Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Ariel J. Liberman (Auburn University) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here. 

I. Introduction: ‘Hate’ Despite Inclusive Education Policy 

Recent years have seen great exertions from educational ministries across North America and Europe to emphasize inclusivity in the context of public school.  Expressly designed with an aim of combatting discrimination against religious, national, ethnic, and sexual minorities, legislation on inclusive education has been broad and targeted, and involved systemic redesign as well as substantive curricular reforms.  The project is noble and necessary in theory and in practice; there is an avowedly civic benefit to introducing such educational curricula in nations which prize pluralism and require collective engagement from a diverse citizenry. And yet, despite many visionary efforts, ‘inclusivity’ seems to effectively stop at the theoretical.  For instance, we have seen marked increases in incidents of expressed ‘hate’ on school grounds. As a focal point for this paper, we might direct our concern particularly at the rampant hate speech – or even physical violence – directed against religious minorities (as one example) that are taking a political visage. These incidents present a unique problem: more than just immature religious bullying, they exemplify emboldened student proclivities to ‘other,’ exclude, peers on the basis of identity. Worse, we are seeing these students excused for doing so on grounds of free expression, activism, or national values. Schools, in other words, are permitting the incubation of hate; inclusivity is relegated to theory and curricula, never practiced. 

The rising global tide of antisemitism in education offers an example. Such ‘hate’ against Jews often stems from a perceived political, historical dual-loyalty to their community, or, more contemporarily, connection to the State of Israel. Across the world, the denial of Jewish identity, the expression of antisemitic tropes disguised as political speech, and the marginalization of Jewish voices in educational spaces have become mainstay, legitimated by teachers in classrooms as anti-Zionism.  

Consider one example out of California. By 2022, dozens of states in America had championed ‘inclusive education’ policies, with California having served as a thought-leader championing the advent of mandatory ‘ethnic studies’ curricula across lower schools dedicating to educating students on “marginalized groups” and their contributions to America. The proposal raised expressly that “school curricula must not only provide content knowledge but must also equip students with the tools to promote understanding as community members in a changing democratic society.”  And, yet, by some accounts California boasted the highest percentage increase in antisemitic incidents across K-12 classroom spaces in the country. A great percentage are attributed to the equating of Jews with the entity of Israel at a time when hostilities in that region received international media attention.  More, teachers were supportive, excusing absences and touting their own positions on grounds of protecting democratic engagement and perceived political expression. To them students coalesce as young Americans exercising constitutional freedoms to stand with Palestinians. This is laudable and patriotic, deserving protection despite virulently hateful overtones.  

I seek to raise for discussion the problem of hate in schools – legitimized by teacher and administration in our primary and secondary education either affirmatively or by silence – and disguised as political expression or aligned with advocacy. I try to discuss it as a function of ‘inclusive education’ policy and ask: how can hate, as expressed by children – even in ‘inclusive’ environments– be protected, encouraged, and defended under the color of national values and in spite of ‘inclusive’ educational efforts? Is it a necessary evil to protect other important pillars in education, particularly academic freedom?  

There are a few normative arguments that I hope to raise in taking the above position. First, I argue that there exists a fundamental dissonance between the vision of inclusive education espoused at the highest legislative levels in many nations and the practical realities of implementation of ‘inclusive communities’ at local levels. It is this dissonance that allows ‘hate’ to remain in schools – even ensuring that ‘hate’ thrives. In addressing the issue, I argue in favor of top-level mandates that expand the of principle of ‘inclusive education’ at the primary and secondary level to contemplate ‘teach-not-to-hate’ curricula, representing a larger social and moral imperative to combat expressions of hate which justifies necessary limits on ‘academic freedom’ – or, in the case of K-12 schooling – local implementation and teacher discretion in content instruction.  

II. Teacher Responsibility in Incubating ‘Hate’ in Lower School Contexts 

Teachers are responsible for so much of a child’s identity and values formation. The public-school space uniquely checks lessons learned in the home, church, or community; at school, one learns to be a citizen in a broader sense. Research further affirms the relationship between teachers’ attitudes, self-efficacy, and the ultimate implementation of any top-level education policy.  They are responsible for teaching inclusively and cultivating inclusive environments. And, by extension, I posit they are responsible for excising hate in the classroom. This, I trust, is not too radical a view. 

But what does it really mean to be responsible for inclusivity? There are varied definitions of ‘teacher responsibility,’ and most carry both internal and external dimensions. Internally, to be ‘responsible’ is to believe (or at least buy-in) in the inclusive education project.  Externally, the teacher must be held accountable to it by some measure.  Turning back to the problem of permitting or justifying ‘hate’ in primary and secondary school spaces, we might analyze the phenomenon as a function of teacher responsibility. 

One explanation for administrators permitting ‘hatred’ – as speech, as physical violence, as intimidation – against selected students on the basis of their identity could always be that teachers simply do not really believe in the idea of ‘inclusion,’ or the policy project. But this, I would wager, is not the case.  When it comes to addressing incidents of hate, teachers must objectively respond as trained professionals. Yet, what constitutes ‘hate’ is adjudged by a highly individual measure. Qualitative research supports that “teachers [experience difficulty] distinguishing appropriate speech from hate speech, [or else] will not necessarily recognize subtle forms of hate speech or trivialize the phenomenon.” 

Their own prejudice emboldens them to engage – or, if not engage, then witness without intervening – in the ‘hate.’ In Ontario, Canada, for instance, “nearly 16% of reported incidents of antisemitism involved anti-Israel actions or activities supported or organized by teachers or school administrators.” In 2024, a major rights group in Berlin, Germany assessed the 20% of their caseload involved addressed incidents of Islamophobic expression by educational staff. Put another way, where teachers are the ultimate arbiters of what constitutes hate.   

Additionally, teachers’ own internal impression of what should constitute ‘hate’ is often colored by the endorsed positions of the teachers’ unions and local associations to which they belong.  it is these local associations and unions which often have a principal role in evaluating and engaging teachers, and, from a policy perspective, influencing the implementation of top-level inclusive education policy regimes (environmental and curricular). This thereby impacts the ‘external’ dimensions of the teacher responsibility calculus. In other words, teachers’ unions often provide the lenses by which teachers and administrators judge teachers’ reactions to ‘hate’, and even their determinations as to what is ‘hate.’  

In an American congressional hearing on antisemitism, one witness reported that “teachers’ unions have a significant role in spreading [hateful] ideologies” by encouraging and endorsing the “introduction of antisemitic and anti-Israel content into the classroom.” In California, particularly, one union encouraged teachers’ use of an unapproved ‘Teach Palestine’ curriculum which problematically characterized Zionism, touted Jewish global conspiracy tropes, and related these back to American experiences of settler-colonialism. The union actively combatted legislation aimed at blocking such antisemitic materials in classes required for students’ graduation, and upheld that, as a union, they “have the right to support Hamas as part of its political activism.” 

In these ways, both ‘belief’ in the project of inclusion and the ‘measures’ by which we can assess teachers’ activities have become compromised.  Teachers, in many ways, are preempted from appreciating certain manifestations of ‘hate’ on campus or reacting to it with appropriate severity. Further, they become unable to secure a classroom environment which allows for effective, inclusive engagement with “hate” so long as they engage such curricula which alienate Jewish students.  

This reality impacts the project of a truly inclusive education. I argue therefore that policy regimes which overly defer ‘responsibility’ to teachers, administrators and local boards in executing plans for ‘inclusive education’ projects is not only ineffective in actually assuring against the persistence of ‘hate’ in schools but potentially offers an invitation for fostering this hate. It is the position of this author that ‘responsibility’ in determining curricula in certain areas be subsumed back to higher levels. 

III. Measuring A Social and Moral Imperative in Lower Schools Against Teachers’ Academic Freedom 

What I propose is a top-down legislative mandate for a ‘no-hate curriculum,’ an affirmatively imposed obligation on teachers and local boards – under threat of financial sanction – to vet curricula which may nurture hate and exclusion, combat physical incidents of hate, and promote inclusivity in a broader sense. But is this appropriately contemplated as part of the broader inclusive education project? Let us first focus on one major concern: that such a mandate has repercussions on academic freedom.   

Recently, California has played host to a path-breaking attempt to legislatively combat the rising tide of ‘hate’ in their primary and secondary school spaces.  Assembly Bill 715 (AB 715), the Antisemitism and Civil Rights Bill, was passed by the legislature in September 2025, and signed by the Governor in October 2025.  A brief glimpse of AB 715 draws one’s focus to the bill’s outright prohibition of instructional materials which “would subject a pupil to unlawful discrimination,” expansion upon law that “afford[s] all persons in public schools . . . equal rights and opportunities in the educational institutions of the state,” assurance that teacher instruction be “factually accurate and align with the adopted curriculum,” and setting of broader guideposts which articulate the bounds of “discriminatory bias.” AB 715 represents an attempt at broadly proscribing the contours of ‘inclusive education;’ it is a statement that some ideas ought not be introduced in schools, and that certain principles ought be prioritized. 

I will outline those principles in a moment but first let us consider the chief opposition to AB 715. The California Teachers Association (CTA) offers one scathing rebuke: a failure to honor a full, robust interpretation of teachers’ academic freedom. CTA reads ‘academic freedom’ as meaning “the ability of educators to ensure that instruction includes perspectives and materials that reflect the cultural and ethnic diversity of all of California’s students,” and contemplating “the rights of educators to assist students in developing critical thinking skills by exploring and discussing divergent points of view.” The provisions of AB 715 which delimit instructional materials on the basis of “factual accuracy” introduces a subjective standard which inherently privileges some students’ points of view over others, they argue. Mara Harvey notes that a teacher’s work requires “trust, nuance and open dialogue. [AB 715] undermines a real fight against antisemitism by conflating legitimate political debate with hate speech.” 

Indeed, it is derivative to some extent of the discussions in the higher education sphere in the United States and Europe. Such restrictions, some argue, will simply discourage teachers and students from engaging in controversial discussion on Israel, reading materials, or having their beliefs on the subject challenged.  And, yet, unlike the case for higher education, the case for robust academic freedom at this schooling levels remains unconvincing.   

This position comes down, in many ways, to a question of balancing values.  The educational principles at play are myriad: instillment of factual, descriptive knowledge, prevention of discriminatory conduct, but also moral and civic objectives. Morally, such legislation posits that a priority in early school is to cull that impulse to hate, to teach with a mind toward connecting. Complimentarily, a civic goal is to empower freedom of religion and bolster freedom of expression, though without isolating, vilifying, demeaning fellow citizens.  It is in our civic interests to live harmoniously together, and to educate children toward coexistence.  Further, such initiatives maintain that educating for coexistence, preserving child’s safety and well-being, and fostering connection through learning, ought to be weighed more heavily than other values, like a teacher’s academic freedom. 

AB 715 has its flaws, but it is a guardrail against material and instruction which isolates fellow students.  They promote, implicitly, the value of co-existence citizen-to-citizen. Of course, this does not mean shying away from difficult conversations or engaging controversy in the classroom. Rather, students ought to learn about injustice, protest, resistance alongside values like honesty, respect, empathy, temperance, responsibility, and kindness. When the student is set to engage “sensitive geopolitical issues,” the goal shifts away from galvanizing them toward a position on an issue and toward facilitating conversation and understanding.  

In short, as the identities of future citizens are being forged, certain educational and civic values ought to take prescience over curricular protection. It belies the assumption that children need first be educating in how to navigate conflict as a part of a broader civic ecosystem with diverse citizens, without hate, before being invited to engage in taking sides in a controversial debate. School, ought to be foremost a place of safety; it ought to be a check modulating minds towards harmony as a civic virtue for the sake of peace coexistence in a democracy.  

IV. Conclusion: National Prescriptive Mandates and the Inclusive Education Project 

Taken together, these ideals – the reality of heightened incidents of hate in primary and secondary school spaces, the failures of teacher ‘responsibility’ in effectively ensuring inclusive environments, and a demand that primary and secondary school spaces primarily honor civic values of coexistence– counsel in favor of prescriptive mandates like California’s AB 715. AB 715 is also unique in its effort to allocate resources toward ensuring proper enforcement of this new view on ‘inclusive education’ at a higher level. it is geared to actively fight existing antisemitism on school grounds.  This bill, in particular, establishes a new Office of Civil Rights and funds an Antisemitism Prevention Coordinator. It also requires districts to investigate and take corrective action when discriminatory content is used in education. the power of this prescriptive mandate also lies in returning authority from local teachers and to statewide actors over those ‘external measures’ by which one responds to ‘hate.’ 

But perhaps we must go farther than AB 715 does. More than simply prohibiting certain cirricula (i.e., ensuring a ‘no-hate curriculum), legislative action ought to oblige affirmatively that teachers ‘teach not to hate;’ they ought to channel a clear social, moral and civic imperative to ‘teach not to hate’ in schools.  On this score, Germany’s legislative history on antisemitism offers interesting guidance.  

In 2021, Germany’s Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs issued a joint recommendation which mobilized a clear definition of antisemitism  to provide “orientation for dealing with different forms of antisemitism, describes their effects and highlights prevention and intervention measures.” Directed at “classroom teachers and other educators at schools of all kinds and levels,” the recommendation is distinctive in its discursive tenor – bringing educators into conversation with legislators, rather than projecting a top-down mandate, but moored in a more concrete ideal of a hate-free school. “Open, free and democratic societies based on the rule of law,” the recommendation maintains, are seriously threatened by antisemitism, and indeed any form of hate, and the “schools’ mission [is to] instill maturity and a sense of responsibility in children and young people” to prevent and combat hate. 

The recommendation offers specific guidance on how administrators and teachers effectively combat antisemitism on the ground, prescriptions for fighting ‘hate’ by way of cultivating “civic courage and argumentative strategies” and emphasizing the essentiality of a “respectful and open learning environment.” 

While detractors of this recommendation and other pieces of legislation proffer similar counterarguments previously discussed, the profundity of Germany’s formally articulation hatred’s manifestations and affirmation of a democratic obligation to avoid it, is striking. Is this a model to which legislators should take heed? Or is this too much of an infringement on academic freedom? 

While the extent and definiteness of any prescriptive mandate is open to debate, the broader notion that such a ‘prescriptive mandate’ is needed, is clear, Obvious tensions will arise, but the position more satisfies the ultimate objectives of education for a plural democracy. and principally ensures a more accurate realization of the vision of ‘inclusive education.’ 

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Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Alessandra Lazzarini (University of Padua) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here.

1. Introduction  

The contention over the dismissal of faculty members in U.S. religiously-affiliated universities suggest that the scholarship and the case law on academic and religious freedom do not seem to provide a roadmap to reconcile the claim of academic freedom of professors with the autonomy of religious institutions. Unlike the strong protection of religious freedom offered by the First Amendment, academic freedom is the offspring of the decades-long efforts of the AAUP (American Association of University Professors) and of the ambivalent case law of the Supreme Court of the United States. 

Academic freedom has two dimensions: individual academic freedom, which is the freedom of the individual faculty members; and institutional academic freedom, which is the freedom of the institution to pursue its mission and to be free from outside control. Thus, both the university and its professors possess (at least in theory) academic freedom as well as religious freedom; sometimes these protections overlap or align, but other times they clash. For example, in 2016 Wheaton College dismissed Professor Hawkins because she said publicly “I stand in religious solidarity with Muslims because they […] are people of the Book” and wore a headscarf as a symbol of solidarity. While this statement was perceived by many as inclusive, Wheaton College regarded it as raising significant theological concerns and as inconsistent with, if not contrary to, the institution’s mission and vision. Professor Hawkins and the College later reached an agreement outside of court. 

In this short piece, I consider what happens when such disputes are actually litigated by reflecting on the tensions between the institutional academic freedom through which religious universities preserve their mission and the individual academic freedom of professors in U.S. dismissal cases, with a focus on the so called “ministerial exception” doctrine.  

2. Individual and institutional academic freedom 

The most authoritative and consequential statement on academic freedom in the United States issued by a private institution is the 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom of the AAUP. The Statement does not mention the institutional dimension and reports the three principal aspects of the individual academic freedom of faculty members: “full freedom in research and in the publication of the results,” “freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject,” and freedom from “institutional censorship or discipline» when they «speak or write as citizens.” The 1940 Statement, however, did not require religious institutions to adopt this conception of academic freedom. In fact, the Statement simply reads: “Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment.” Hence, the “Limitations Clause” allowed religious colleges and universities to implement autonomous principles and policies, provided that such restrictions were explicitly disclosed in advance.  

However, subsequent attempts by the AAUP to refine this position generated more tensions between individual and institutional academic freedom. In 1970 the AAUP added a footnote to the Limitations Clause of the 1940 Statement: “Most church-related institutions no longer need or desire the departure from the principle of academic freedom implied in the 1940 Statement, and we do not now endorse such a departure.” From this moment on, the distance between the position of the AAUP and the right of religious universities to uphold their faith has been widening. In 1988 a subcommittee of the AAUP stated that “an institution has no ‘right’ under the 1940 Statement simultaneously to invoke the Limitations Clause and to claim that it is an institution of learning to be classed with institutions that impose no such restriction.” Hence, the Limitations Clause works as a switch: universities relying on it lose the status of member of the higher education community. Furthermore, through the decades the AAUP has conducted numerous investigations of religious colleges and universities to ensure respect for the principles of academic freedom, and these institutions continue to be included in the “censure list,” often with no regard for the religious institution’s need to preserve its own identity. In a few words, the AAUP has progressively espoused an “all or nothing” view that sees individual and institutional academic freedom as alternatives. This view has exacerbated political controversies and criticism whenever a professor is dismissed by a religious higher education institution, as the AAUP has constantly sided with the former without advocating any real protection to the latter.  

The Supreme Court first recognized the principle of individual academic freedom during the McCarthy era when it affirmed that it “is a special concern of the First Amendment,” thus providing some protection to communist professors from unjustified dismissal and pressures. The Supreme Court’s decisions in the field have grounded academic freedom in freedom of expression, but they have been more rhetorical than practical, as they did have not provided a clear understanding of what this right actually guarantees to professors. Furthermore, because of the “state action” doctrine, the First Amendment can limit the internal authority of a university only if its administrators can be characterized as exercising state powers. Therefore, only faculty members of state universities enjoy substantial and procedural constitutional rights against their institutions. Since the 60% of higher education institutions in the United States is private and one in five U.S. colleges has ties to a religious organization, the First Amendment’s jurisprudence cannot afford a real protection for faculty members of private institutions, particularly in cases of dismissal from denominational universities.  

The Supreme Court has never pivoted around the concept of individual academic freedom. The Court has instead developed an institutional model of academic freedom. In the Court’s case law, institutional academic freedom guarantees “the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university” and includes a university’s “four essential freedoms”: ‘to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.'” Furthermore, the lower Courts have repeatedly echoed this approach and affirmed that the institutional dimension should prevail and that the individual one has never been endorsed by the Supreme Court: “The Supreme Court […] appears to have recognized only an institutional right of self-governance in academic affairs. […] It was not focusing on the individual rights of teachers.” Thus, the existing jurisprudence on academic freedom offers no meaningful protection in cases of dismissal, especially since it does not shield even faculty members at public universities. In order to warrant some protection to academics, the lower Courts have begun to apply the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the free speech rights on the workplace of public employees, with ambivalent results.  

3. The ministerial exception  

For the First Amendment, religious organizations, including those of higher education, must be free to pursue their mission. Put differently, through its Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the First Amendment guarantees the institutional academic freedom of religious colleges and universities. Yet, the very mechanism that protect this autonomy, i.e. the ministerial exception, overrides the individual academic freedom of professors. Furthermore, this legal doctrine was primarily developed by the Supreme Court in the context of K-12 education, where individual academic freedom is not a recognized value.  

The ministerial exception bars an individual from suing for employment-related discrimination if a religious institution employs the individual and deems him or her to be a “minister.” In 2012, the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC recognized for the first time the exception grounding it on both the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses. Eight years later, the Court reaffirmed and reinforced its approach in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru. Both cases concerned teachers dismissed by a religious elementary school and the central legal question was when the teacher could be considered a “minister.” In Hosanna-Tabor the Court did not adopt a “rigid formula” in order to decide if the plaintiff (whom the school considered as a ‘called’ teacher) was a minister. However, it took into account four factors: “(1) she had the title of “minister,” (2) her position had a significant degree of religious training, (3) she held herself out as a minister, and (4) her duties reflected the Church’s message.” The Court stated that because of her status of called teacher, she should be considered a minister and that «by imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments. According to the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions».  

In Our Lady of Guadalupe the Court reasoned that, while they did not have the title of “minister,” the teachers still served as ministers for purposes of the ministerial exception because they carried out certain teaching responsibilities that were within the scope of a “minister” and analogous to those employed by the teacher in Hosanna-Tabor. Furthermore, the Court stressed that “What matters is what an employee does. Implicit in the Hosanna-Tabor decision was a recognition that educating young people in their faith, inculcating its teachings, and training them to live their faith are responsibilities that lie at the very core of a private religious school’s mission.”  

In the years following Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe, lower courts have applied these decisions in numerous dismissal cases involving professors and their religious universities (see some examples here, here, and here). However, the outcomes have been quite divergent, highlighting the difficulty of applying jurisprudence originally developed for the K–12 education system to the context of higher education and the resulting discretion left to the courts. Amid this uncertainty, in 2022 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Gordon College v. DeWeese-Boyd, a case litigated in the Massachusetts state courts which involved an affiliated religious higher education institution and its professor, who had been denied promotion to full professor. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stressed that the U.S. Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe adopted a “functional analysis” for determining whether an employee is a minister within the meaning of the exception. And it stated that DeWeese-Boyd “was, first and foremost, a professor of social work. She taught classes on sustainability and general social work practice and oversaw practicums.”  Furthermore, unlike the Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe cases, DeWeese-Boyd had no obligation to engage in specifically religious duties. Finally, the Court noted that “a faculty member with DeWeese Boyd’s responsibilities at Gordon is significantly different from the ordained ministers or teachers of religion at primary or secondary schools in the cases that have come before the Supreme Court” and it concluded that “the significant expansion of the ministerial exception doctrine requested by Gordon is not dictated nor, do we believe, directed by existing Supreme Court precedent. It is our understanding that the ministerial exception has been carefully circumscribed to avoid any unnecessary conflict with civil law.”  

In 2022, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the aforementioned ruling and, in a statement “Respecting the denial of certiorari”, Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, commented on the merits of the case. In this statement the Court described as “troubling and narrow” the vision of religious education developed by the Massachusetts JSC. Furthermore, in the Court’s arguments there is an evident shift from a focus on the minister’s figure to the “autonomy” of the religious institution in defining the content and method of its religious instruction. Quoting Our Lady of Guadalupe the Court stated: “The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment sometimes forbid courts to intervene in employment disputes involving teachers at religious schools who are entrusted with the responsibility of instructing their students in the faith.'” Thus, the Court’s criterion consists in the total deference to the higher education institution.  

4. Conclusions 

The individual academic freedom of professors emerges as an important value in legal scholarship but lacks support in the First Amendment’s jurisprudence. Conversely, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the institutional academic and religious freedom of religious institutions. The AAUP’s emphasis on the individual freedom of faculty members overlooks the institutional perspective, while the ministerial exception’s jurisprudence does not consider the specificities of institutions of higher education. Indeed, if the Court’s reasoning prevails, faculty members at religious institutions would be left without meaningful legal protections. As employees of private institutions, they would not benefit even from the already weak guarantees of academic freedom. Nor could they seek protection under anti-discrimination laws, since the university has unilaterally classified them as “ministers”.  

Two significant steps seems to be available to safeguard both individual academic freedom and the institution’s confessional identity. First, the AAUP may reconsider their position and appreciate that the institutional dimension of academic freedom is an essential feature of the First Amendment. Second, courts could diversify the K-12 education system from the higher education context in their decisions. Indeed, college students are no lo longer children. They have the possibility to choose which university to enroll in, and even whether to attend university in the first place. Furthermore, mature students should be engaged in critical thinking. The Supreme Court has long acknowledged these positions in its broader academic freedom jurisprudence (for example here, here, and here); applying them to the dismissal cases in denominational universities could fundamentally transform how courts evaluate the rights of university faculty.  

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Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Weronika Kudła (Pontifical University of John Paul II) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here.

I. Religious Education in Public Schools: Lessons from Poland

In most EU countries religious education is present in public schools, often organized in cooperation with religious authorities and financed by the state. Only in four Member States—France (outside Alsace–Moselle), Slovenia, Luxembourg, and Bulgaria—religious instruction takes place outside the public school system. Thus, religious education is part of the public school system in 23 EU Member States. In eight countries, it is formally compulsory, although students may usually opt out at their parents’ request (only in Greece and Cyprus are Orthodox pupils required to attend). In fifteen EU countries, including Poland, participation in religion classes is voluntary and depends on a written declaration by parents or older students.

Against a European backdrop increasingly defined by secularism and framed as religious neutrality, Poland stands out as a predominantly Christian country, though some experts note that  Poland seems to be the fastest secularizing country in the world. Recent social, political, and legal shifts make the Polish experience particularly noteworthy in discussions of religion in public education. While this post focuses on schooling, these debates unfold against a backdrop of broader cultural and religious changes in Poland, including declining engagement with the Catholic Church and shifting patterns of religiosity.

Religious education remains firmly embedded in the Polish public school system, yet it has become the focus of legal disputes, administrative interventions, and symbolic controversies. These conflicts reveal deeper constitutional tensions around religious freedom, state impartiality, and cooperation between public authorities and religious communities. Poland’s experience thus offers more than a national story: it functions as a test case, exposing how fragile carefully balanced legal arrangements can become amid political polarization and social anxiety.

II. Cooperation as a Cornerstone

Church–State relations in Poland are structured by four principles enshrined in Article 25 of the Constitution: 1) equality of churches and religious associations, 2) impartiality of public authorities, 3) mutual autonomy, and 4) cooperation for the good of the person and the common good. This model, often described as coordinated separation, rejects both hostility to religion on the one hand and confessional dominance of a single church recognized as the state church on the other. It is also common across Europe and shapes the model of religious education and the limits of freedom of religion or belief in schools.

Article 53 of the Constitution protects freedom of conscience and religion as a personal right rooted in human dignity and, in Article 53(4), explicitly permits churches and other recognized religious associations to provide religious instruction in public schools, provided that others’ freedom of religion or belief is not infringed.

Complementarily, the Preamble to the Education Law  defines education as a common good and stipulates that teaching and upbringing—while respecting the Christian system of values—shall be based on universal principles of ethics. Respect for Christian values in the preamble does not convert education into a confessional enterprise; rather, it guides teleological interpretation in a system that is axiology-aware but constitutionally impartial, not secularist.

These principles are further specified and implemented by ordinary statutes. Religion classes are organized at the request of parents or pupils (after reaching the age of majority), attendance is optional, and students may choose religion, ethics, both, or neither. Curricula and textbooks are developed by religious communities, while teachers—although employed by public schools—require denominational authorization. Beyond the classroom, the law allows voluntary prayer, religious symbols, and participation in religious practices, provided that no coercion occurs. Normatively, the framework is coherent and balanced: it reconciles religious freedom, pluralism, and state impartiality through cooperation rather than exclusion. However, the Polish case demonstrates that strong constitutional principles only produce effective protection when paired with faithful implementation and political consensus; without it, polarization can undermine the practical exercise of rights.

III. Executive Regulation and the Breakdown of Cooperation

Between 2024 and 2025, the Ministry of National Education adopted a series of executive regulations that significantly altered the organization of religious education in public schools. Mixed inter-grade and inter-stage groups are now explicitly permitted. Grades from religion and ethics no longer appear on the school certificate nor are they counted toward the final grade average, following the Regulation of 22 March 2024. The weekly load of religious instruction has been reduced from two lessons to one lesson per week, without the need for prior consent of church authorities. This change, introduced by the Regulation of 17 January 2025, has been particularly criticized for infringing the principle of cooperation, since it was not preceded by the required consultation with religious associations.

Religious communities challenged the Ministry before the Constitutional Tribunal, arguing that the regulations not only affected organizational matters but also interfered with constitutionally protected autonomy and the institutional dimension of freedom of religion. The reasoning of the Constitutional Tribunal in case U 10/24 —which was subsequently reiterated in judgments U 11/24  and U 2/25 —was grounded in a consistent constitutional logic. The Tribunal held that the challenged regulation was unconstitutional in its entirety because it violated the consensual model of regulating Church–State relations guaranteed by Article 25(3) of the Constitution. By adopting executive measures concerning religious education without the agreement required by statutory law, the Ministry breached not only the cooperation principle, but also the principles of legality and the rule of law.

Importantly, the Tribunal emphasized that the disputed provisions went beyond technical organization. By enabling extensive inter-grade and inter-level aggregation of religion classes, the regulation interfered with parents’ constitutional right to ensure the moral and religious upbringing of their children in a manner appropriate to the child’s age and maturity (Article 53(3) in conjunction with Article 48(1) of the Constitution). It also undermined pupils’ right to education adapted to their developmental capacities, making it impossible to tailor religious instruction to differentiated curricula and pedagogical methods.

The Tribunal further found that these organizational changes conflicted with Poland’s international obligations under the Concordat with the Holy See, which guarantees that religious education in public schools is to be conducted in accordance with approved curricula. Finally, the regulation was held to violate the principle of protection of legitimate expectations and the constitutional protection of work, as its abrupt entry into force—following only a one-month vacatio legis—created a real and foreseeable risk of sudden job losses among religion teachers without adequate transitional safeguards. Taken together, the Tribunal’s reasoning confirms that the executive regulations did not merely adjust the framework of religious education, but structurally altered it in a manner incompatible with constitutional guarantees of cooperation, parental rights, legal certainty, and institutional autonomy.

However, these judgments were never published in the Journal of Laws and therefore did not acquire formal legal force (in March 2024, the Polish Parliament adopted a resolution addressing the effects of the 2015–2023 constitutional crisis concerning the Constitutional Tribunal, in which it declared that appointments of several Tribunal judges made between 2015 and 2018 were unconstitutional, that the office of the President of the Tribunal was held without proper authorization, and that numerous judgments are legally defective, a view echoed by the European Commission, which has questioned the Tribunal’s independence under Article 19 TEU).

As a consequence, regulations found to be unconstitutional continue to be applied in practice. Schools, parents, and teachers are left navigating a landscape of conflicting norms, where constitutional guarantees formally remain in place but lack effective protection. This situation exposes a deeper systemic problem. The non-implementation of constitutional judgments transforms freedom of religion in public education from a constitutionally secured right into a matter contingent on current governmental policy. In this way, religious freedom—designed to be shielded from political fluctuation through the mechanism of cooperation—becomes politicized. The Polish case thus demonstrates that even a carefully balanced constitutional framework may lose its normative force when institutional checks fail and political polarization undermines respect for constitutional adjudication.

IV. Legal Instability and Its Social Consequences for Religious Education

Legal instability coincides with rising social anxiety surrounding religion in public schools. For instance, in December 2025, a teacher at a primary school in Kielno allegedly removed a classroom cross and threw it into a trash bin  after students refused to take it down themselves. The incident provoked immediate protests outside the school, involving local politicians, parents, and public figures, and attracted widespread media attention. Importantly, the prosecutor’s office opened an official investigation into the potential offense of offending students’ religious feelings, underscoring the legal significance of the act.

Authorities emphasized the sensitivity of the situation: the Minister of Education warned that religious symbols are being used politically, while local officials ensured psychological and pedagogical support for students and clarified the investigative process. The incident highlights the emotional weight of religious symbols in schools and illustrates how regulatory uncertainty can escalate localized classroom events into broader social and political conflict. It underscores the importance of clear legal guidance and faithful implementation of constitutional guarantees to reduce anxiety, prevent politicization of school life, and maintain trust in educational institutions.

Religion classes scheduled at marginal hours discourage participation and stigmatize both pupils and teachers, amounting to indirect discrimination. Inconsistent local decisions regarding religious symbols, prayers, or celebrations fragment constitutional standards and undermine equality. Polish education law remains largely silent on new educational spaces, such as online learning, where questions of religious expression and neutrality are increasingly pressing.

The lack of a specialized complaint mechanism leaves students, parents, and teachers dependent on general remedies, which are slow and ill-suited to resolve school-level disputes. In this environment, social anxiety magnifies conflicts, showing that constitutional guarantees require both legal clarity and practical mechanisms for their enforcement.

V. From Conflict to Constitutional Lessons

The Polish experience demonstrates that freedom of religion in education cannot be secured by legal text alone. Cooperation between the State and religious communities, faithful implementation of constitutional principles, and sensitivity to social and political dynamics are all essential. At its core, the current crisis is not about whether religion belongs in public schools. It is about how constitutional principles are implemented—and whether they are treated as binding norms or adjustable policy preferences. Poland’s Constitution provides clear answers: denominational teaching is lawful, voluntariness is essential, pluralism must be respected, and cooperation is obligatory. Experiences from recent controversies show that legal frameworks gain meaning only when embedded in a culture of dialogue, procedural transparency, and institutional accountability.

Poland’s experience offers a cautionary lesson for all societies committed to religious freedom: when constitutional guarantees are subject to political manipulation, even a majority faith can find itself under pressure, while minority perspectives can be leveraged to marginalize religion more broadly (see comparative analysis of religious expression in schools in Poland and the United States).

One constructive response would be the establishment of an independent ombudsman for religious freedom in education, tasked with promoting dialogue, fostering tolerance, and guiding administrators, teachers, and students in navigating religious diversity. By investing in education that respects both freedom of conscience and pluralism, societies can prevent the politicization of religious practice and cultivate inclusive, respectful learning environments.

What is at stake is constitutional culture. In the Polish constitutional order, neutrality is not equated with the exclusion of religion from the public sphere. Instead, it is conceived as positive impartiality: the state does not identify with any belief system, but it also does not suppress religious expression or treat it as inherently suspect. This distinction is central to understanding both the legal framework governing religious education in Poland and the controversies that have emerged around it. Neutrality achieved through exclusion breeds conflict, while neutrality grounded in cooperation fosters stability. These questions extend far beyond Poland. They go to the heart of democratic governance in pluralistic societies, reminding us that constitutional law ultimately lives not only in judgments and statutes, but in classrooms, school corridors, and everyday social practice.

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Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Richard W. Garnett (University of Notre Dame) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here. 

In 1947, the Supreme Court of the United States constitutionalized a metaphor taken from a constituent-service letter authored by Thomas Jefferson. When Jefferson, in his 1801 Letter to the Danbury Baptists, professed his “sovereign reverence” for the decision of the American people to constitutionalize church-state “separation,” he supplied what is for many the “authoritative interpretation” of the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses. “No metaphor in American letters,” Prof. Daniel Dreisbach has observed, “has had a greater influence on law and policy than Thomas Jefferson’s ‘wall of separation between church and state.’” 

And yet, as then-Justice William Rehnquist observed in a prescient 1985 dissenting opinion, the “wall” metaphor is “based on bad history” and has “proved all but useless as a guide to sound constitutional adjudication.” The term “cooperation” points to a more promising path. The Constitution of the United States and the history, practices, and traditions of our political community, reveal and call for an appropriate “differentiation” between political and religious authority, that is, between “church” and “state.” They invite us not to search for a “wall” separating the two but instead for the appropriate terms of reasonable and productive cooperation in efforts to secure the common good and human flourishing. 

* * * * * 

The American law of church and state is, to a large extent, the product of political and other struggles over education and, in particular, over the funding of education in Catholic schools. For a long time, the relevant legal doctrines could not be understood apart from American anti-Catholicism, nativism, and nationalism. For several decades in the mid-to-late Twentieth Century, these doctrines were constructed around the “wall of separation” metaphor; more recently, though, the conversation has become one about permissible cooperation. 

During the first half of the nineteenth century, the development and rapid expansion of “common schools” coincided with – and was, in many respects, a reaction to – a dramatic increase in Catholic immigration. Catholic parents and leaders objected to the pervasive Protestant ethos of these schools and sought accommodations from curricular practices that they found burdensome on religious grounds, especially mandatory recitations from the King James Bible. While accommodation occurred in some places, elsewhere, Catholic children were punished when they refused to participate in these recitations. 

When Catholics’ efforts to exercise “voice” failed, they turned to “exit.” As the fiery bishop of New York, “Dagger John” Hughes, explained at the time, the common-school practice of putting Protestant material “into the hands of our own children, and that in part at our expense, was … unjust, unnatural, and at all events to us intolerable. Accordingly, through very great additional sacrifices, we have been obliged to provide schools … in which to educate our children as our conscientious duty required.”  

In the years that followed, equality-based demands for the public funding of Catholic schools increased; these demands also fueled new waves of nativism and conspiracy theories that Catholics were engaged in a concerted effort to destroy American democracy. In 1875, James G. Blaine, then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, proposed an amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibiting any public funds from flowing to “sectarian” schools. That anti-Catholic animus fueled this effort is widely accepted. While the federal Blaine Amendment narrowly failed to secure approval, Congress thereafter required several new states to adopt similar language in their state constitutions as a condition of statehood. Other states voluntarily amended their own constitutions and, eventually, thirty-seven states’ constitutions included “Baby Blaine” anti-aid Amendments. 

Nativist organizations, including the Ku Klux Klan, wanted to go further. The Klan and allied organizations, including the Masons, joined movements for obligatory public schooling in several states. These efforts were ultimately successful in Oregon, which enacted a law mandating instruction in public schools in 1922. Three years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the law violated the due process rights of both parents and private schools: “The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose,” the justices said, “excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.” 

The Pierce decision did not address the question whether the Constitution had anything to say about government assistance to parents seeking to exercise this fundamental right. However, and despite the battles over the public funding of Catholic schools in the nineteenth century, it is clear that local governments, states, and the federal government had, from the time of the Founding, financially supported private religious schools for a variety of reasons and in a number of ways. 

For decades, these practices by and large flew under the federal constitutional radar. That changed with the Supreme Court’s decision in Everson. In that case, the Court considered an Establishment Clause challenge to a New Jersey law authorizing school boards to reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children to private schools, including religious ones. Upholding the law, the Court made two significant moves that would shape future school-funding litigation: First, the Court “incorporated” the Establishment Clause, holding that it applied to state and local laws as well as federal ones. Second, employing the “wall of separation” metaphor, it held that the clause “requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary.” Two decades later, in Board of Education v. Allen, the Court relied on this neutrality principle to uphold a New York program that lent textbooks to students attending religious schools, reasoning that the beneficiaries of the program were students, not schools. 

While Everson and Allen took a relatively accommodationist approach to programs providing public benefits to children attending religious schools, the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine took a strong “separationist” turn in the early 1970s. Importantly, in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Court established a three-part test to determine whether a law violated the Establishment Clause. In Lemon the Court concluded that the school-aid programs at issue violated the Establishment Clause due to the potential for excessive entanglement, and found that monitoring the secular content of instruction would require substantial, ongoing state oversight. Two years later, in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist (1973), the Court used the Lemon test to invalidate a New York tuition reimbursement and tax benefit program for parents of private school students on the ground that the financial aid would “advance religion.”  

Thereafter, the Court repeatedly held that a variety of public-benefit programs violated the Lemon test. For example, in Meek v. Pittenger (1975), the Court struck down a Pennsylvania program that provided instructional materials and equipment to religious schools while upholding only loaned textbooks. The Court reasoned that items like maps, films, and projectors could be diverted to religious instruction, making state aid impermissible. The incongruence of the books-but-not-maps reasoning led the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan to quip, “But what about atlases?” In Wolman v. Walter (1977), partially invalidated an Ohio program that provided standardized tests and diagnostic services to religious schools. And in Aguilar v. Felton (1984), the Court held that the Lemon test prohibited states from using federal education funds to pay teachers in religious schools to provide supplemental tutoring to disadvantaged students. 

Beginning in the 1980s, the Court gradually began to soften this this position, returning to the neutrality benchmark, especially when government aid reached religious schools indirectly through individual choice. In Mueller v. Allen (1983), the Court upheld a Minnesota tax deduction for educational expenses that benefited both public and private (including religious) school students. In Witters v. Washington (1986), the Court held that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit a state from permitting a blind student to use public funds to pursue a degree in ministry. In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District (1993), it reached the same conclusion about a publicly funded sign language interpreter for a deaf child attending a Catholic school. And in Agostini v. Felton (1997), it allowed public school teachers to provide remedial instruction in religious schools under a federally funded program. 

In 1995, two important things happened in the history of the parental-choice effort. First, Wisconsin expanded eligibility to participate in the Wisconsin Parental Choice Program – the nation’s first modern voucher program – to include religious schools. Second, Ohio enacted the Cleveland Pilot Scholarship Program, a modest means-tested program that also enabled participants to attend religious schools. Both of these programs were challenged on Establishment Clause grounds, and the Court ultimately reviewed the Cleveland case. In 2002, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court upheld the Cleveland program, rejecting an establishment for two reasons: the program was both neutral toward religion and  of “true private choice,” with public funds ultimately flowing to religious schools only as the result of parents’ independent choices. 

* * * * * 

The law of religious-school funding in the United States today is that governments and religious actors may, and increasingly do, cooperate in providing education to children and, therefore, in promoting authentic human flourishing and development. It is worth nothing, though, what has not happened: It is not – at least, not yet – the law that equal treatment of state and non-state schools and education providers is required. True, a recent line of cases, starting with Trinity Lutheran, prohibits states from invoking extra-strict understandings of “separation” as a justification for discriminating against otherwise eligible religious schools in the context of school-funding programs. Still, governments remain free to adopt policies that, in effect, impose a financial penalty on the exercise of that right. A next step in the repairing of American religious-freedom law must be remedying this defect. 

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Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Mario Ferrante (University of Palermo) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here.

The public funding of religious schools is one of the most sensitive issues in contemporary constitutional law. It simultaneously engages three cornerstones of democratic coexistence: religious freedom, freedom of education, and the principle of equality – both formal and substantive. At the heart of current debates lies a simple yet demanding question: how can a legal system fund religious schools without undermining state neutrality or creating unjustified privileges?

Over the last few decades, the gradual transformation of European school systems has made it clear that state neutrality in education cannot be understood as indifference towards religion. Rather, it implies a commitment to ensuring equal dignity for different educational options within the framework of shared constitutional values. In this context, the balance between religious freedom and equality becomes crucial in determining whether – and under what conditions – public money can legitimately support religious schools.

In this perspective, the question of public funding for religious schools cannot be reduced to a technical issue of public–private relations. It must instead be situated within the broader framework of parents’ freedom of educational choice and the right to education. In the Italian case, these are guaranteed by Articles 30 and 34 of the Constitution. The implementation of these principles requires that educational pluralism should not result in new forms of inequality, nor that cooperation with religious institutions should degenerate into religious privilege.

The Italian experience is particularly interesting when viewed in comparative perspective. The United States has recently moved towards a form of “inclusive neutrality,” which allows religious schools to participate in generally available public programs, with religious freedom often prevailing over concerns about separation. France, by contrast, maintains a strict model of laïcité, centered on a sharp institutional separation between state and religion. Italy, for its part, seeks to define an intermediate model of “cooperative secularism,” in which collaboration between the state and religious communities in the protection of civil and religious rights operates within the limits set by substantive equality and the general interest.

This intervention takes that balancing problem as its central thread. It first sketches recent U.S. case law on the funding of religious schools, then presents the Italian model and its constitutional and legislative framework, and finally situates Italy in the broader European landscape. The underlying claim is that equality – understood in both its formal and substantive dimensions – can serve as the key to reconciling religious freedom and state secularism in the funding of religious schools, allowing for cooperation without privilege and genuine pluralism without discrimination.

1. The U.S. Trajectory: From Exclusion to “Inclusive Neutrality”

In the United States, the public funding of religious schools has been at the center of a significant evolution in Supreme Court case law, marked by ongoing tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Carson v. Makin (2022) represents a turning point. By a six‑to‑three majority, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the exclusion of religious schools from a tuition‑assistance program established by the State of Maine for families living in school districts without public secondary schools. Denying a public benefit solely by reason of the religious character of an institution, the Court held, violates the Free Exercise Clause and amounts to discrimination on grounds of religion.

Carson is consistent with a line of precedents increasingly favorable to the participation of religious institutions in generally applicable public programs, inaugurated by Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer (2017) and developed further in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2020). In these decisions, the Court reiterated that, once a state decides to fund private education, it may not discriminate between secular and religious schools purely on the basis of their religious status.

At the same time, scholars have underlined the risks of an expansive reading of the Free Exercise Clause that effectively narrows the scope of the Establishment Clause and, with it, the principle of state neutrality. Under this approach, the separation between state and religion is redefined in a more permissive direction, and neutrality risks being transformed into a form of mandatory inclusion of religious actors in public funding schemes.

Recent U.S. case law thus illustrates a model of secularism based on a logic of non‑exclusion: the state may not withhold public benefits from an entity solely because it is religious, except in situations where such support would amount to the state’s endorsement or coercive imposition of a particular faith. This is a delicate balance, in which religious freedom tends to prevail over strict separation, and the traditional idea of “benevolent neutrality” is recast in a more assertive and participatory form.

From a European and Italian perspective, this shift raises an important question: how far can a system go in the direction of “inclusive neutrality” without eroding the distinct role of the Establishment Clause (or its functional equivalents) as a safeguard of state neutrality and equal treatment among beliefs?

2. The Italian Framework: Secularism, Equality, and the “National Education System”

In Italy, the regulation of public funding for religious schools operates within a different constitutional framework, marked by the principle of secularism, which the Constitutional Court has recognized as a “supreme principle” of the legal order. Since the late 1980s, the Court has described secularism as a structural principle that requires both neutrality of public authorities towards different religious and non‑religious beliefs, and an active protection of religious freedom in its individual and collective dimensions (a key decision is judgment no. 203 of 1989, available on the Italian Constitutional Court website).

The freedom to establish schools and to provide education is guaranteed by Article 33(4) of the Constitution, which recognizes the right of individuals and entities to set up educational institutions “at their own expense,” traditionally paraphrased in Italian debate as “without cost to the State”. This wording, the result of a compromise between different political and ideological forces, has given rise to intense controversy. Constitutional case law has generally interpreted it as excluding full financial equivalence between private and state schools, rather than as an absolute ban on any form of public support to private – including religious – schools.

A major shift came with Law No. 62 of 2000, which defined a “national education system” composed of state schools and “state‑recognized” private schools (s.c. “scuole paritarie”). These private schools – including many religious schools – must comply with public standards on curricula, teacher qualifications, non‑discriminatory admissions, and the accessibility of fees. In return, they are integrated into the public system, their diplomas have the same legal value as those issued by state schools, and they may access certain forms of public funding. A brief description of this framework (in Italian) is available on the Ministry of Education website.

The inclusion of state‑recognized schools within the national system thus marked a transition from a model of rigid separation to one of functional integration, in which public and private providers cooperate to pursue constitutionally protected educational objectives. However, this reform has also generated new tensions. On the one hand, it affirms parents’ freedom of educational choice; on the other, it raises concerns about preventing public resources from turning into unjustified religious privileges.

These tensions were heightened during the Covid‑19 pandemic, when state‑recognized private schools – many of them religiously affiliated – complained of insufficient public support and alleged unequal treatment in comparison with state schools. This situation reignited the debate on the meaning of “without cost to the State” and on the scope of the principle of substantive equality.

More recently, Italy’s 2026 budget law introduced a private‑school bonus in the form of vouchers worth up to €1,500 per student, intended for families with an Equivalent Economic Situation Indicator (ISEE) not exceeding €30,000. The vouchers are designed to cover enrollment costs for private lower‑secondary schools and the first two years of upper‑secondary education, with higher amounts for lower ISEE brackets. This measure has reignited political debate on the appropriateness of allocating public funds to private schools.

If freedom of teaching and freedom of educational choice are to be effective, access to public benefits should not depend on the religious affiliation of an institution, but on its compliance with objective criteria of social usefulness and conformity with constitutional principles. From this perspective, public funding of religious schools does not necessarily amount to a privilege, but may represent a means of implementing educational pluralism, provided that equal treatment and non‑discrimination are ensured.

The balance between freedom and equality is thus central to a form of secularism that is not merely “passive” but cooperative: a model that can value the contribution of religious institutions without compromising state neutrality.

3. Catholic Religious Education and the Logic of Cooperation

Questions of cooperation between the state and religious institutions in education are particularly evident in the teaching of Catholic religion in public schools and in the presence of religious schools within the national education system.

Instruction in Catholic religion is one of the main expressions of collaboration between the Italian state and the Catholic Church under the 1984 Villa Madama Agreements, which revised the Lateran Concordat and were implemented by Law No. 121 of 1985. Article 9 of those Agreements governs instruction in Catholic religion in public schools as an optional subject: the content and teachers are approved by church authorities, while the subject is offered within the public-school timetable under the constitutional framework of state secularism and religious freedom. (An English translation of the 1984 Agreement is available on Concordat Watch).

Article 9 seeks to balance two requirements: on the one hand, the aim of school teaching that highlights principles (Catholic principles) considered to be “part of the historical heritage of the Italian people”; on the other, the “respect for freedom of conscience and for the educational responsibility of parents.” In line with the latter requirement, instruction in Catholic religion is an optional subject, and pupils (or their parents) may freely choose whether or not to attend. In accordance with the first requirement, and within the framework of cooperative secularism envisaged by the Agreements, certain confessional elements are maintained – even in the public-school context – such as the need for teachers to receive ecclesiastical approval and the determination of curricula by the competent church authority.

Some scholars argue that the evolution of the constitutional framework and the increasing religious diversity of Italian society require a rethinking of instruction in Catholic religion, transforming it into a cultural subject focused on knowledge of different spiritual traditions and on interreligious dialogue. Such a reform, they contend, would reconcile the historical role of Catholicism in shaping national identity with the need to promote genuine pluralism. Others reply that such a “cultural” subject would pursue objectives that are, if anything, additional to those envisaged by Article 9 of the Agreements, which refer to a specific function of religious instruction that is both of ecclesiastical interest and of public relevance.

From this perspective, the issue of public funding for religious schools must also be read in light of these considerations. Public support is justified only insofar as it serves to make the right to education and the freedom of educational choice effective, while reasonably reconciling these aims with the Constitution’s concern to recognize and protect specific religious identities. What must be avoided are a priori advantages granted to particular denominations, which would be inconsistent with the Italian model of secularism embodied in the Constitution.

4. The European Context and the Italian “Middle Way”

In Europe, the relationship between education, religion, and secularism has developed in different ways, reflecting the diverse constitutional traditions of the Member States.

The French model, rooted in the experience of the Revolution, is based on a strong principle of separation between state and church. Public education is strictly secular, and the exclusion of religious instruction from state schools is an integral feature of the republican order. This has produced a deliberately rigid model that leaves little room for religious actors within the school system and has generated growing tensions in the face of increasing cultural and religious diversity.

By contrast, in several Germanic and Scandinavian countries, religion is more openly recognized as a possible component of the educational process. Cooperation between public authorities and private providers often takes the form of equal participation by religious schools in the national education system, provided that they comply with state‑defined quality standards and with principles of non‑discrimination. The German case, in particular, offers a model of balance between religious freedom and the secular character of the state: religious schools, especially those linked to the main Christian traditions, may receive public funding commensurate with their educational functions, if they offer teaching consistent with constitutional values and guarantee equal access to pupils irrespective of their beliefs.

In this comparative context, Italy occupies an intermediate position. The principle of secularism, as developed by the Constitutional Court, does not entail passive neutrality, but rather an attitude of openness and cooperation. Educational pluralism is considered an integral part of the democratic system, and the legal recognition of state‑recognized religious schools is a direct expression of this approach.

However, significant difficulties remain at the level of practical implementation, largely due to the persistent ambiguity surrounding the constitutional formula that private schools must be established “without cost to the State.” The experience of other European democracies shows that public funding of religious schools is not, in itself, incompatible with secularism, provided that it is governed by transparent criteria and serves the general interest – in particular, the promotion of the right to education and the safeguarding of substantive equality.

5. Equality as the Key to Cooperative Secularism

The principle of equality, in both its formal and substantive dimensions, is the conceptual and practical pivot for balancing religious freedom with state neutrality.

Formal equality requires that no religious institution receive direct or indirect privileges in access to public funding. Substantive equality, however, demands that the state adopt appropriate measures to remove obstacles that effectively prevent families – especially those belonging to religious or cultural minorities – from exercising their freedom of educational choice. A combined reading of Articles 3, 8, 19, and 33 of the Constitution supports the conclusion that religious freedom and freedom of education cannot be meaningfully exercised under conditions of marked economic inequality.

The achievement of educational pluralism therefore requires public intervention that promotes equity, without compromising the secular character of the state. In practical terms, any public funding scheme that includes religious schools should be governed by general and non‑discriminatory criteria, such as compliance with national educational standards, openness of admissions, respect for fundamental rights, and effective oversight by public authorities. Funding should be proportionate to the public educational function performed and should not be tied to adherence to, or promotion of, a particular faith.

In this way, equality operates not only as a limit on privilege, but also as a positive requirement to design regulatory frameworks that enable families from different social and religious backgrounds to make genuine educational choices. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly stressed that secularism does not coincide with indifference towards religion, but translates into a positive commitment to safeguarding freedom in all its individual and collective dimensions. It follows that cooperation with religious institutions – including in the form of balanced and reasonable financial support – is legitimate when it serves to give effect to fundamental rights and to promote social cohesion.

Italy can thus put forward an original model of balance in which the principle of secularism takes the form of cooperative secularism: a state that does not privilege any faith, but recognizes and values the contribution of religions to the common good, while guaranteeing equal dignity and equal access to public benefits for all.

6. Concluding Remarks

The question of public funding for religious schools cannot be adequately addressed by simply opposing religious freedom and the principle of secularism. Both principles contribute to shaping a model of democratic coexistence grounded in the plurality of worldviews and in the equal dignity of all forms of education that comply with constitutional standards.

In comparative perspective, the recent U.S. trajectory towards “inclusive neutrality” highlights the potential of non‑exclusionary models, but also the risk of weakening institutional safeguards of neutrality. The French model of strict separation underlines the value of a clear public secular space, but struggles to accommodate growing religious diversity. The German and broader North‑European experiences suggest that regulated integration of religious schools into the public system, under strong equality‑based conditions, can reconcile religious freedom, secularism, and social cohesion.

Against this background, the Italian system, thanks to its distinctive balance between freedom, equality, and cooperation, offers an original model: a secular state that recognizes the educational value of religious institutions without renouncing its neutrality. Secularism, understood as a “space of freedom,” permits cooperation with religious denominations for purposes of general interest, while preventing any form of subordination or privilege.

Only such a balance can ensure that religious freedom and secularism do not conflict, but instead cooperate in building a genuinely pluralistic and inclusive school system.

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Last November, the Mattone Center co-hosted a regional conference of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies. The conference, “Education, Religious Freedom, and State Neutrality,” brought together scholars and jurists from the United States and Europe to compare approaches to these subjects in their respective countries. Participants were invited to submit short reflections. Sylvie Bacquet (University of Westminster) submitted the following reflection, which we are delighted to publish here.

Public funding of religious schools depends largely on how religion is positioned within each state’s constitutional framework. While some countries such as the UK, Belgium or Canada accommodate faith schools within a state funded structure, others such as France and the US have constitutional restrictions linked to secularism models. There are different levels of funding but usually, higher levels of funding come with increased state regulation. Such regulation may limit the autonomy of faith schools to admit pupils solely on the basis of the school’s religious ethos. This paper examines the extent to which receiving public funding may limit a faith school’s freedom to filter the admission of students according to their religious affiliation. Particular attention is given to the specific examples of England and France given that their church-state relations systems are at polar opposites and affect school funding radically differently. I will argue that while state funding places limitations on the autonomy of the religious school, it also ensures a level of oversight which protects against discrimination, preserves children’s autonomy and protects the right to education.

The UK Context – state funding with relative autonomy

The UK education system is rooted in the establishment of the Church of England. As a result, one third of state-funded British schools have a religious character. While the majority are Christian, a growing number represent other denominations including Judaism, Islam, Sikhism and Hinduism. These schools benefit from certain exemptions in relation to admission of pupils and staff and when oversubscribed can use faith as an admission criterion, therefore prioritizing applicants of their own faith (s.11 of the Equality Act 2010). In England, admission criteria are dependent on the funding agreement of each school type. In practice, religious schools of minority faith are almost always oversubscribed given that they represent a smaller proportion of faith schools. In contrast, Church of England schools, are in greater number due to their association with the established church and therefore are more likely to have places available for all applicants not just those affiliated with their faith.  

There are broadly speaking three categories of faith schools: voluntary aided, voluntary controlled and faith academies. Each receives a different type of state funding.

Voluntary aided (VA) schools receive funding for their day to day running costs from the local authority and the Department for Education (DfE) provides capital grants for major building projects. This typically covers 90% of the costs of the school while the remaining 10% must be met by the schools’ governing body. Voluntary aided schools design their own admission policy and if they are oversubscribed can give priority to applicants of their own faith.

Voluntary controlled (VC) schools also receive funding from the local authority to cover their running costs and staff salaries. While the local authority employs staff and is the main admissions authority, the school’s land and buildings are usually owned by a charitable foundation, and the local authority may consult with this foundation on admissions policy. Unlike VA schools, VC schools do not have to contribute to the costs of the school. As a result, admission policies may not always prioritize religious applicants. The local authority typically gives priority to those who live close to the school (proximity), those who have a sibling at the school, children in care and those with an Education Health and Care Plan.

Faith academies were introduced in 2000. Unlike VA and VC schools, their funding comes from central government rather than local authorities. The academy trust is responsible for how the money is used and they are accountable to the government for performance and financial management. They have more autonomy in their governance and operations compared to community schools as described above. Admission criteria are set out in their funding agreement, but academies are generally responsible for setting their own admission criteria. Like other faith schools, they can discriminate on the basis of faith when they are oversubscribed. Since 2007 however there is a 50% cap on religion-based admission to protect inclusivity. As a result, those schools may only select up to 50% of pupils based on religion when they are oversubscribed. The cap only applies to entirely new academies and free schools.  

In 2024, under the Conservative government, there was an attempt to scrap the 50% cap so that faith academies were no longer restricted but this was later abandoned due to a lack of public support and concerns about equality and discrimination by organizations that campaign for the abolition of faith schools such as the Secular Society. The primary motivation behind the proposal was to support the expansion of free schools by addressing the restrictions imposed by the current 50% admissions cap, which some faith groups view as conflicting with their religious obligation to prioritize children of their own faith. Critics of the proposed reform were particularly worried about the impact this would have on children with disabilities and more disadvantaged children generally as there is evidence that faith schools are less inclusive in relation to those children.

Admission criteria and Case Law

The UK school admission code 2021 provides statutory guidance on religious selection by faith schools and stipulates that faith schools are required to consult with their respective religious authorities when designing their faith-based admission criteria.  This was initiated following persistent concerns about faith schools’ policies and a number of judicial interventions. It has been argued however that ‘this complex intertwinement of religious and state authorities has led to an unjustified intrusion of the secular into religious matters’ (Myriam Hunter-Henin, 2018).

In order to be considered a priority applicant for the purpose of the oversubscription criteria applicants are usually required to demonstrate their belonging to the faith through a supplementary information form (SIF). Depending on the schools those requirements may be more or less stringent and as a result may exclude certain groups within the communities. In the UK, this was the subject of a Supreme Court case in 2009. In the JFS case, the UKSC held that JFS school, a modern Jewish Orthodox school had discriminated against the applicant on the basis of ethnic origin when he was denied admission due to his mother’s ethnic origin which was not deemed halachically Jewish as she had undergone a process of conversion. In other words, the applicant did not satisfy the matrilineal test used by JFS at the time to determine his connection with Orthodox Judaism.  Following the ruling, JFS changed its admission criteria to a point system based on religious practice rather than matrilineal descent. Those point-based systems however remain controversial as they might exclude certain applicants. This was recently put to the test in a High Court decision.

In CKT v. OSA, High Court of England and Wales examined whether a Church of England school was ‘indirectly discriminatory’ in relation to the protected characteristic of race. Twyford school provided for the allocation of an extra point (‘Church of England Point’) in their admission criterion for certain applicants: One point is awarded to applicants whose family’s main place of worship is at a Church of England church or Churches in Communion with the Church of England.

While the claim failed on the basis of race discrimination, the court nonetheless acknowledged [para 194] that faith-based admission criteria are likely to cause indirect discrimination. On this occasion the extra point was found to be a proportionate mean of achieving the school legitimate aim, in this case preserving an Anglican ethos.

As mentioned above, those who campaign to end faith schools however have highlighted that faith-based criteria lead to discrimination not only based on race but also disability and lower socio-economic backgrounds.

The case of France – limited public funding with controlled autonomy

In France, where article 1 of the Constitution provides for strict separation between religion and the state, the situation is completely different due to the principle of laïcité and the law of 1905 which prevents the state from remunerating religion. As such, state schools which are publicly funded must not be associated with religion, this includes funding, teaching and the display of religious symbols (Law of 2004 on the wearing of religious symbols at school). Schools with a religion denomination exist but they are usually within the private sector and do not receive state funding, with the exception of private schools called ‘sous contract’. Those schools have an agreement with the state which imposes certain conditions in exchange for funding.

Private schools under contract (‘sous contrat’)

Private schools may enter into agreements with the state, becoming ‘sous contrat.’ These schools receive public funding in exchange for adherence to the national curriculum and non-discriminatory admissions. Teachers are employed and remunerated by the state, and religious instruction must take place outside official school hours. While these institutions may retain a confessional ethos, they are prohibited from selecting students based on religious affiliation. 96% of private schools under contract are Catholic while the remaining 4% is made up of Jewish, Muslim, Protestant and secular schools. This model integrates faith schools into the public system under strict regulatory control, ensuring both access and accountability.

By contrast, private schools deemed ‘hors contrat’ do not receive public funding but enjoy complete autonomy over curriculum and admission (Loi Debré 1959). They currently only represent 4.4% of the student population but are increasing in number. Concerns have arisen regarding inadequate oversight, particularly within ultra-conservative or extremist institutions, leading to closures by the Ministry of Education. The French model thus demonstrates the state’s preference for regulation through funding.

Discussion: state funding as a limitation or safeguard?

State funding inevitably restricts religious autonomy, but it also ensures adherence to equality norms and protects the right to education.  Critics of faith schools, including Humanists UK and the National Secular Society, argue that faith-based admissions undermine social cohesion and perpetuate segregation. Data from the UK suggest that faith schools are more socially selective than non-religious schools, with disparities in Free School Meal eligibility reflecting socio-economic stratification. Nevertheless, advocates assert that faith schools contribute positively to moral development, community engagement, and academic performance. There is also evidence to show that faith schools have better academic results although this has been debated as some have argued that it is mainly as a result of socio-economic factors.

While state funding may indeed impose limitations on the autonomy of faith schools and religious communities, they can also provide a level of scrutiny and accountability by acting as a safeguard against potential discrimination, segregation or indoctrination. There is evidence to suggest that this has been an issue especially with schools which fall outside of public funding.

Ultimately, the challenge is to balance the competing interests of parents to educate their children according to their religious convictions and the interests of the general public to be protected from discrimination in education. If there was no public funding available, it may marginalize religious communities which are poorer. Left unregulated however, faith-schools and schools in general may pose a threat to children. There have been reported cases of gender segregation, failure to provide core curriculum teaching, safeguarding risks and exposure to extremist ideology.

Conditional funding therefore not only ensures fair distribution of public resources but can also be seen as a proportionate mean of achieving the legitimate aim of protecting tolerance and equality in a pluralist society. As such, it cannot be found in breach of the right to religious freedom.

The English exemption of allowing schools to give preference to applicants of their own faith when the school is oversubscribed seems reasonable as this usually affects schools of minority faith which make up for a small proportion of all faith schools. The imposition of strict quota in this instance would be counterproductive but in a schooling system where a third of all schools are faith-schools, the imposition of a quota on certain types of schools is a reasonable intervention to ensure public values are respected.

Conclusion

The comparative analysis of England and France illustrates how the relationship between religion and the state fundamentally shapes the administration of faith schools. In England, state funding is compatible with a degree of religious autonomy, yet the 50% admissions cap and related equality frameworks reflect the government’s ongoing attempt to balance inclusivity with respect for faith identity. In France, by contrast, the principle of laïcité establishes a stricter divide between state and religion, with public funding conditional on the renunciation of religious selection. Both models demonstrate that state funding inevitably imposes limits on religious freedom, but these limits serve an essential function in safeguarding equality, protecting children’s rights, and ensuring public accountability.

Ultimately, public funding should not be viewed solely as a constraint on religious schools but as a mechanism that reinforces pluralism within a democratic society. Conditional funding provides a means to reconcile faith-based education with universal principles of non-discrimination and social cohesion. The challenge for policymakers lies in maintaining this delicate equilibrium ensuring that religious diversity enriches, rather than fragments, the public education landscape.

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Here are some important law-and-religion news stories from around the web:

• Sitting en banc, the 5th Circuit overturned a panel decision declaring a Louisiana law requiring the display of the Ten Commandments in all classrooms of the state’s public schools and universities unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the dispute was not yet ripe for review.
• A Woman’s Concern, Inc. v. Healey, (D MA, Feb. 17, 2026) was an action brought by Your Options Medical Centers (YOM), a religiously affiliated pregnancy resource center, wherein they alleged that the state of Massachusetts’ Department of Public Health violated their free speech, free exercise and equal protection rights when it disseminated information critical of pregnancy resource centers. This week, the federal district court for the District of Massachusetts rejected this claim, primarily reasoning that YOM was not targeted for actual or threatened enforcement action.
• President Trump posted a Presidential Message on Ash Wednesday, calling for all Americans to remember that the Lenten themes of the “prayer, fasting, and almsgiving have been foundational to our strength from the earliest days of our national story.”
• The Department of Justice announced that it is opening Title IX investigations into three Michigan school districts “to determine whether they have included sexual orientation and gender ideology (SOGI) content in any class for grades pre-K-12.” If the districts are including such content, “the investigations will examine whether the schools have notified parents of their right to opt their children out of such instruction.”
• The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops released its “Annual Report on the State of Religious Liberty in the United States.” “The report summarizes developments on national questions and federal policies affecting religious liberty in the U.S., including the role of religion in American public life, and the challenges and opportunities of the present moment.”
• Earlier this month, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas received a draft constitution “that aims to transition the PA to a full-fledged state”. The draft contains a number of provisions on religion and religious freedom.

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