On 13 November 2026, the Netherlands Commercial Court is organizing a seminar on the commonalities and differences between interim remedies available under common and civil law. The speakers will be Mr Andrew Henshaw (Justice at the London Commercial Court), and professors Xandra Kramer and Gerard Meijer (Erasmus University Rotterdam).

This seminar may be joined online or in the courtroom. Registration is free of charge. For more information and registration, see Seminar: Interim Remedies ­– Commonalities and Differences in Common Law and Civil Law | NCC.

At this seminar also the book ‘Private International Law: a Step-by-Step Approach‘, authored by Willem Visser (Boom, 2026), will be presented.

The Conflict of Laws/Private International Law academic team at the University of Oxford invites applications from students interested in pursuing a doctorate (DPhil, corresponding to a PhD) in the field. The Oxford Conflict of Laws team is one of the largest at any academic institution in the UK. It comprises four full-time faculty members (Associate Professor Roxana Banu, Professor Andrew Dickinson, Associate Professor Brooke Marshall and Dr Johannes Ungerer).

We are committed to supporting the next generation of Conflict of Laws scholars and welcome proposals, from prospective applicants in any country, that align with our various research interests, which are briefly outlined below. More information about the application process, the entry requirements, and the resources available to DPhil candidates can be found at https://www.ox.ac.uk/admissions/graduate/courses/dphil-law. A range of financial support is available, including University and Faculty scholarships and need-based Faculty bursaries, with approximately 30 per cent of postgraduate research offer-holders receiving need-based Faculty funding and eligible offer-holders being considered automatically for many scholarships. Prospective applicants are welcome to contact any member of the Conflict of Laws team with any questions about potential supervision. For questions about the application process, please contact: geraldine.malloy@law.ox.ac.uk at the Law Faculty.

Pursuing a DPhil in Law at Oxford offers the opportunity to join an outstanding and diverse academic community. DPhil candidates benefit from membership of an Oxford college and participation in the Faculty’s extensive offering of lectures, seminars, and a wide range of discussion groups, which provide regular opportunities to engage with Oxford researchers and distinguished visitors from around the world, such as in the dedicated Conflict of Laws discussion group. Research is supported by the Bodleian Law Library with more than 550,000 volumes and extensive print and electronic collections covering numerous jurisdictions, including particularly strong holdings in public and private international law. The Institute of European and Comparative Law (IECL) further enriches this environment through exchange opportunities for postgraduate researchers with leading partner institutions.

Roxana Banu

Roxana’s research focuses on the history and theory of the? conflict of laws. She is the author of Nineteenth Century Perspectives on Private International Law (OUP, 2018) and the co-editor of Philosophical Foundations of Private International Law (OUP, 2024). She has written various accounts of the field’s intellectual history in the late 19^th and early 20^th century and of the development of the field during the interwar period. She is also interested in feminist history and theory, having written on relational feminist theories in private international law and on the role of female actors in the field’s history. On the philosophical front, she has developed a moral contractualist account of private international law and has written on theories of justice.

With the generous support of a Leverhulme Research Fellowship, Roxana is currently writing a book on the history of private international law in the British Empire and would be happy to supervise DPhil projects on any topics on the history and theory of private international law.

Andrew Dickinson

Andrew works on a range of topics in the conflict of laws and adjacent fields. He is one of the specialist editors of Dicey, Morris & Collins on The Conflict of Laws (16^th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2022) with responsibility for chapters on the law applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations. His recent publications include a commentary on The State Immunity Act 1978 (OUP, 2025), with Alexander Thompson, and Natural Justice in Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Brill, 2025), a special course of lectures for the Hague Academy.

Brooke Marshall

Brooke’s research examines intersections both within the field of private international law and between the field and other areas of law and legal practice. Her work has a doctrinal foundation in international commercial dispute resolution and engages with normative and comparative questions raised by cross-border relationships, particularly under English, EU and French law. She is the author of Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses (OUP 2023) and a co-author of The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: A Commentary (Elgar Commentaries in Private International Law 2025). Brooke has written on jurisdiction and choice of law, and on their relationship with contract law and international uniform law. She would be pleased to supervise DPhil projects in these areas, as well as projects that bring private international law into dialogue with other fields. Her current research explores aspects of the relationship between private international law and international arbitration, and between private international law and employment law.

Johannes Ungerer

Johannes, a Deputy Director of the IECL, examines private international law from comparative and interdisciplinary perspectives, drawing on his expertise across Common Law and Civil Law traditions. He explores how legislators and courts design and employ legal rules to balance competing interests and implement policy choices in cross-border civil and commercial relationships, including through insights from law & economics and behavioural science. His work addresses both choice of law as well as international jurisdiction in England (especially post-Brexit) and in the EU. In addition to books on private international law in German and Default Rules in Private Law (Hart 2025), he recently co-edited Characterisation in the Conflict of Laws (Hart, forthcoming) and is co-authoring an implicitly comparative monograph on German Private International Law (OUP). Johannes currently supervises three doctoral researchers and would be pleased to consider further DPhil projects in private international law.

As I have mentioned a few times now on this blog, Professor Tim Holbrook and I are coediting the Oxford Research Handbook on Extraterritoriality and Intellectual Property Rights, an edited volume that will bring together contributions from 40+ scholars from around the world to address both the many prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction issues pertaining to the assertion of IP rights—including patents, of course, but also copyright, trademarks, and trade secrets.  In addition, the week after next I will be presenting “On the Law and Economics of Extraterritoriality and IP Rights,” based largely on my own draft chapter for the edited volume, at this year’s IEEM Intellectual Property Seminar, “Patents and (Extra) Territoriality:  Longarm Jurisdiction, Comity, and (Contributory) Infringement,” held in Macau S.A.R. on November 4.  I also am preparing a separate paper from the one I am writing for the Oxford edited volume, for inclusion in an edited volume that I understand Professors Christopher Heath and Anselm Kampelman Sanders will be preparing following the Macau conference.  (While in Asia, I also will be speaking on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent case law on indirect infringement and the current state of U.S. law on unjust enrichment awards in trade secret litigation, at the Professional Intellectual Property Update 2026 in Hong Kong on November 5.)

Anyway, in view of my current interest in territoriality and IP rights, I was pleased to come across a recent paper by Francisco Hernández Fernández, titled “Judicial Extraterritoriality, TRIPS Article 1.1 and the Competitive Governance of Global SEP Licensing,” which he presented recently at the Max Planck Institute in Munich.  Here is a link to the paper on ssrn, and here is the abstract:

Standard-essential patent (SEP) licensing exposes a structural tension between territorial patent rights and global technology markets. This paper examines how WTO dispute settlement is emerging as a forum for addressing the cross-border effects of judicial measures governing SEP licensing. It argues that the interpretation of Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement in China – Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (DS611) supports a limited anti-frustration principle: WTO Members must not adopt measures that materially frustrate another Member’s TRIPS-compliant protection and enforcement system. The paper distinguishes this principle from a general prohibition on adjudicating disputes involving foreign patents and tests its possible extension to non-consensual worldwide FRAND determinations in the pending China – Worldwide Licensing Terms for Standard Essential Patents (DS632) dispute. Comparing this approach with EU and German competition law, it identifies a jurisdictional asymmetry: effective enforcement can support licensing negotiations, while judicial measures in one jurisdiction may disable enforcement options elsewhere. Changes in bargaining leverage, however, do not by themselves establish competitive harm. The paper proposes complementary safeguards through transparency under Article 63, consultations under Article 40.3, domestic controls against abusive enforcement, and consensual dispute resolution. It concludes that coordination among existing institutions offers a more credible response than centralized global rate-setting, while recognizing the institutional fragility of appellate review through the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement.

I am inclined to agree with the paper’s measured interpretation of the arbitration award in DS611, as well as its call for the development of "best practices on FRAND calculation aspects" and “comprehensive guidelines to ensure that national courts adhere to similar approaches or methodology,” which is consistent with a recent piece by Lord Justice Richard Arnold that I noted here.  The paper also highlights the inherent tension between the German approach to SEP matters, which emphasizes the availability of injunctive relief as a means for inducing private parties to reach global settlements, and the anti-frustration principle articulated in DS611.  It also briefly mentions the UPC's Fujifilm v. Kodak decision (see discussion on this blog here and here), though not the CJEU's BSH decision, both of which would be in some tension with an expansive reading of DS611 (see p.13).

1 Introduction

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the African Development Bank finance large-scale public projects globally and regionally to promote sustainable development and reduce poverty. MDBs require the adherence to environmental and social standards to mitigate harm. However, during project implementation these standards are not always respected and communities may be harmed.  Without timely access to justice for affected individuals, basic rights would be compromised, severely undermining the accountability of MDBs as public international organizations (IOs).

IO accountability has been a significant international legal challenge. Fundamentally, due to IO immunities, national courts are not a viable forum for victims to seek justice against IOs. And international or institutional mechanisms are often unavailable or deficient. To give credit where it is due, MDBs have taken important steps to enhance their accountability. In a landmark development, in 1993, the World Bank Inspection Panel was established and is intended to constitute “an independent complaints mechanism for people and communities who believe that they have been, or are likely to be, adversely affected by a World Bank-funded project.” The Inspection Panel exercises its mandate in the context of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA), both World Bank institutions.

In 1999, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), also World Bank organizations, created the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) as its accountability mechanism. Most other MDBs as well as bilateral development institutions followed suit and there are currently more than 20 such independent accountability mechanisms (IAMs) in place (August Reinisch, Third report on the settlement of disputes to which international organizations are parties, paras. 48-58). However, as is demonstrated by the example of the Cambodia micro-finance case examined by the CAO, there remain serious challenges in the effectiveness of such bodies.

2 The Cambodia micro-finance case and the CAO’s findings

In February 2022, two Cambodian human rights organizations (LICADHO and Equitable Cambodia) filed a complaint with the CAO, on behalf of a group of individual microfinance borrowers who took loans with one or more IFC client/sub-client. The complaint concerned IFC’s investments in six Cambodian microfinance lenders and alleged that their lending and debt-collection practices had caused over-indebtedness, forced sale of Indigenous lands used as collateral, food insecurity, and intimidation of borrowers.

IFC Management purported that impact on micro-finance borrowers and financial consumer protection fell outside its Environmental and Social (E&S) Sustainability Framework, and therefore outside the CAO’s mandate. In June 2023, following its preliminary compliance appraisal in which the CAO decided to initiate a compliance review into the case, IFC submitted a request asking the IFC Board of Directors to overturn the CAO’s decision to investigate, arguing that CAO’s interpretation that all E&S issues fall within IFC’s Sustainability Framework is “expansionary and unwarranted.” However, IFC Management withdrew the request a month later, and the investigation went ahead without a formal challenge at that stage.

In October 2025, the CAO published its investigation report. CAO found no basis for excluding sub-borrowers from the Sustainability Framework, which applies to a project’s full range of E&S risks “unless specifically excluded.” The CAO determined that the social risks of microfinance lending fall within the scope of IFC’s E&S requirements. It found that IFC had failed to meet its obligations under Performance Standard 1 in lacking adequate E&S oversight of client lending practices and impacts on vulnerable groups, and under Performance Standard 7 by allowing the use of Indigenous communal land as collateral without community consent and in lacking culturally appropriate products and communication by IFC’s clients. CAO further found that IFC had not ensured that vulnerable people are not disproportionately affected by project impacts.

3 The actions of the IFC Board

As background, it is worth noting that IFC activities are guided by a Board of Governors and a Board of 25 Directors (the “Board”), with the former  delegating most of their powers to the latter. The CAO’s Policy, which governs the mandate and procedures of the CAO and the relationship to the Board, was adopted by the Boards of IFC and MIGA, establishing CAO as an independent recourse and accountability mechanism.

According to the CAO Policy, once CAO’s investigation report has been finalized following its consideration of comments from both IFC/MIGA Management and the Complainants, the final investigation report is “submitted to Management and circulated to the Board for information” (emphasis added). The Policy then provides that, within 50 business days of receiving CAO’s compliance investigation report and findings, Management will be required to submit a report to the Board, stating proposed actions in response to the CAO’s findings. The resulting Management Action Plan is then subject to Board approval.

Nevertheless, in the present instance, the IFC Board’s response to CAO’s investigation report departed from the procedure as set out in the CAO Policy. On 24 June 2026, the IFC Board issued a public statement, noting that the IFC Board approved Management’s report including a “Special Management Action Plan”, and that in approving the plan, the Board “recognized that there has been no policy noncompliance under IFC’s Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability.”On 6 July 2026, the IFC Board further instructed CAO to suspend processing of ongoing CAO cases relating to financial consumer protection in microfinance and to not accept any new such cases, pending discussion on the policy issues. This decision affected 10 ongoing CAO cases in various stages of processing, from initial assessment, compliance appraisal and dispute resolution. These Board decisions contradict the CAO policy which lays out that it is in the sole authority of the CAO to admit complaints and no interruption of ongoing cases through a Board intervention is provided for in the policy.

4 Accountability undermined – independence challenged

The Board’s actions have caused strong reactions. The CAO’s Director General resigned from her role. Civil society organizations and experts responded with an open letter signed by 91 organizations and eight renowned experts in the field of IAMs, warning that the decision “sets a dangerous precedent for accountability at the World Bank Group.”

The Cambodia case brings out a structural tension in the design of IAMs and their relationship with the Board of the MDB. If IAMs are to be effective, they must be independent from both Management and the Board. A critical aspect of independence requires that the IAMs determinations are respected and not undermined by the executive organ of an IO. IAMs are designed to provide impartial, professional and evidence-based compliance oversight, insulated from political considerations, whereas the Board performs a dual function: overseeing Management while also serving as representative bodies of the member states. The IAMs provide the Board with credible compliance findings, to serve their oversight over Management. In fact, an effective IAM improves project outcomes.

In the present circumstances, it is immediately apparent that first, the Board departed from the CAO Policy, which it must not do. Such non-compliance manifestly violates the internal law of the organization.  Second, it is suggested that the Board’s actions undermine the very reasons for which the CAO was created, as well as its functions and mandate. Amongst other things, the CAO was created to facilitate the resolution of complaints related to IFC/MIGA projects, carry out investigations, facilitate “access to remedy for Project-affected people” in “a manner that is fair, objective, and constructive”, and foster public accountability (see especially, CAO Policy, paras. 4, 5 and 7). The Board does not have the authority to arbitrarily ignore or substitute the CAO’s findings; on the contrary, it may strengthen implementation of remedial measures (CAO Policy, paras. 128, 137 and 144). The Board’s response in the Cambodia micro-finance cases does not comply with the letter and spirit of IFC’s own internal legal framework.

Ensuring an effective IAM is not only important for project effectiveness, necessary to ensure compliance with institutional E&S commitments, but also to reduce external legal risk for an MDB. As the Jam et al. v. IFC litigation has demonstrated, MDBs’ immunities are starting to be restricted domestically.

Moreover, recent jurisprudence from the United Nations Human Rights Committee in MLD v Philippines, Communication No 3581/2019 (18 September 2024) has globalised the European Court of Human Rights’ Waite And Kenedy jurisprudence by saying that IOs must provide “reasonable alternative means” of resolving disputes to private persons they have allegedly harm. This jurisprudence is in the labour context, but it can readily be applied to claims by other third parties as well. While an IO has “discretion as to the reasonable alternative means of dispute resolution”, such means must be  independent, impartial, and not amount to “arbitrariness or denial of justice” (MLD v Philippines, para. 9.7). If such “reasonable alternative means” of dispute resolution are not provided, then there is a real risk that IO immunities will be breached.

In fact, in its project on the “settlement of disputes to which international organizations are parties”, the International Law Commission is placing a central emphasis on independence and impartiality as constituting key features of procedural justice and the rule of law (see especially, August Reinisch, para. 223). I have argued elsewhere that access to justice requires that the dispute resolution forum created by IOs is able to deliver justice independently, impartially and fairly, and that, amongst other things, this requires that the mechanism be able to issue binding decisions. A frequent criticism of IAMs is that their decisions are not binding, unlike other review mechanisms which issue binding decisions towards the same institutions, such as administrative tribunal for personnel-related claims, or anti-corruption investigations and sanctions.

5 Concluding comments

Ultimately, an IAM’s legitimacy depends on its independence from Management, as well as on the credibility and predictability of its procedures. IAMs are designed to serve as impartial, evidence- and fact-driven arbiters between Management and external affected parties. MDB Boards are not equipped to perform this function and their intervention in an IAM’s findings or procedures may cause mistrust and undermine the IAM’s credibility, and by extension the credibility of the institution’s E&S commitments.

The lack of acceptance of the independent findings of an IAM such as the CAO does not only undermine its effectiveness and contradict internal regulatory frameworks, but it also raises legal risks that immunities could be breached. This would be a highly undesirable outcome for IOs as well as their member states. Accordingly, regardless of their origin, if they are to be considered a “reasonable alternative means” to resolve disputes between the institution and external parties, IAMs must be able to deliver justice independently and impartially, with an ability to make final compliance determinations which are not open for reconsideration on the merits at the Board level.

The World Bank Group is currently engaged in a restructuring process integrating its three independent accountability mechanisms comprised of the Inspection Panel and the Dispute Resolution Service, as well as the CAO. The aim is to create a single IAM and avoid fragmentation. On its face, creating a streamlined mechanism may seem to be a positive development. However, given the geopolitical circumstances, and the weakening of the rule of law internationally, it is crucial to remain vigilant that this restructuring process does not weaken the existing legal infrastructure in place. As I have argued in this post, MDBs should create IAMs whose decisions are final and binding, where such mechanisms are of a judicial character. Realistically, at the very least, it would be a great disservice to the cause of MDB accountability if existing IAMs are undermined by diluting or ignoring their policies and procedures.

This post is kindly prepared by Akifumi MOCHIZUKI, attorney at law at Atsumi Toshiyuki Law Office and a member of Private International Law Association of Japan

1. The Absence of Divorce under Philippine Law and the Recognition of Foreign Divorces in the Philippines

Philippine law provides for the declaration of nullity and the annulment of marriage, but generally it does not provide for divorce (except for Muslims, Code of Muslim Personal Laws（P.D. 1083). Accordingly, a divorce cannot be obtained under Philippine law, whether between two Filipino nationals or in a case in which Philippine law governs the divorce.

Where a Filipino national and a foreign national divorce abroad, the Filipino spouse must petition a Philippine court for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce. Once the judgment granting recognition becomes final, the Filipino spouse acquires the legal capacity to remarry under Philippine law (Family Code of the Philippines, Art. 26(2)).

It was once argued that Art. 26(2) applies only where the foreign spouse was the petitioner in the divorce proceedings. The Supreme Court of the Philippines has since held that this is not required, so any foreign divorce suffices (Republic v. Manalo, G.R No. 2210129, April 24,2018). By contrast, a divorce obtained abroad by two Filipino nationals will not be recognized (Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, May 10, 2005, Garcia v. Recio, G.R No. 128222, October 2, 2001(obiter dictum)). A divorce that is effected solely by agreement of the parties, without any decision by a court or public authority, such as a Japanese divorce by agreement (kyōgi rikon), is also eligible for recognition, as the Supreme Court held in Racho v. Tanaka, G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018.

2. Problems with the Previous Recognition Procedure in Cases Involving Japan

Filipinos, many of whom are women, who married Japanese nationals in Japan and subsequently divorced there have not always sought judicial recognition of their foreign divorces in the Philippines. The principal reasons include the high cost of legal representation and the length of the proceedings.

Under the previous procedure, counsel for the petitioner had to establish two matters before the Philippine court: (a) the fact of the foreign divorce and (b) its legal effect under the applicable foreign law, namely, that the divorce had the effect of conferring the legal capacity to remarry. Unlike in Japan, where the content of foreign law is generally ascertained by the court, Philippine proceedings require the party relying on foreign law to plead and prove its content.

As regards proof of the legal effect of a Japanese divorce, Japan’s Ministry of Justice provides English translations of Japanese legislation, including the Civil Code, through its Japanese Law Translation database. However, because these translations are not officially certified translations, they have often been regarded as insufficient evidence, and expert opinions may be required. Even after the above-mentioned decision in Racho v. Tanaka, the author has encountered numerous cases in which petitions for recognition were denied for lack of sufficient evidence (Republic v. Ng, G.R. No. 249238, February 27, 2024).

Moreover, judicial recognition in the Philippines is not a prerequisite for remarriage in Japan. Suppose that a Japanese national habitually resident in Japan marries a Filipino national and that the couple subsequently divorce in Japan. Under the proviso to Article 27 of the Act on General Rules for Application of Laws (Act No. 78 of 2006), Japanese law governs the substantive requirements for divorce. As regards the form of the divorce, Article 34(1) and (2) of the same Act apply (the governing law is the law of Japan).

Where a divorce by agreement has been validly effected under Japanese law, the Filipino spouse may remarry in Japan, provided that the divorce and the resulting termination of the marriage are duly established for the purposes of Japanese law. The spouse need not obtain a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage or a certificate of single status from the Philippine authorities.

Consequently, a Filipino national who has divorced in Japan may find himself or herself in a “limping” marital status: free to remarry in Japan but still regarded as married in the Philippines (“mariage boiteux”).

3. Amendment of the Philippine Rules of Court

On October 7, 2026, the Supreme Court of the Philippines approved amendments to the Rules of Court intended to ease the evidentiary burden involved in obtaining judicial recognition of foreign divorces. The amendments were announced in the Court’s press briefer dated October 8, 2026.

Under the amended rules, a petitioner seeking recognition of a foreign divorce under Article 26(2) of the Family Code must establish the fact of the foreign divorce. The rules introduce a disputable presumption that the divorce has the effect of conferring the legal capacity to remarry under the applicable foreign law, unless the divorce document indicates that the divorce has only limited effect. The party challenging recognition may rebut this presumption by proving that the divorce does not have the effect of permitting remarriage.

The amendments also introduce a presumption concerning the accuracy of an English translation of a foreign divorce document where the translator certifies its accuracy under oath, subject to rebuttal by contrary evidence.

By reducing the evidentiary burden on petitioners, the amendments represent a significant procedural development. They should facilitate access to judicial recognition of foreign divorces in the Philippines, particularly for Filipinos who have divorced abroad and face practical difficulties in proving foreign law.

For further details, see the Supreme Court of the Philippines’ press briefer dated October 8, 2026.

Compulsory licensing is a topic I briefly discuss in my book Remedies in Intellectual Property Law at pages 235-49, so I was interested when I recently came across a piece in a recent issue of GRUR Int. by Fabian Hoffmann, Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, Niclas Gajeck, Jérôme Kommer, Hendrik Meier, and Carsten Paga, titled AIPPI-SQ 293 – Compulsory Licensing for Patents – the State of Play from a German Perspective, 75 GRUR Int. 409 (2026).  Here is the abstract:

Compulsory licence law – though not often applied in practice – has played a decisive role in the historical development of patent law. Compulsory licences function as an ultima ratio instrument utilized only when patents are not used, when they obstruct crucial innovation, or when the public interest requires the use of the patented technology, especially in the field of public health. Despite this fundamental role, the law governing compulsory licences lacks harmonization on both the European and international level. Such harmonization is desirable to provide for a globally aligned, fast and efficient system. AIPPI Study Question 293 on compulsory licences aims to foster future harmonization in this area. AIPPI collected the responses of 38 national groups, published a summary report, and ultimately adopted a resolution on compulsory licences on 16 September 2025 in Yokohama. This article presents the key responses of the German national group of AIPPI to the study. It outlines the history, legal basis and fundamental case law of compulsory licensing in Germany. Further, it analyses the grounds and scope of compulsory licensing under German law and then discusses current issues relating to the compulsory licensing system, such as sublicensing and compulsory licences for patent applications or for products that are intended for export. The article concludes with insights on the determination of reasonable remuneration and an economic analysis of the impact of compulsory licensing.

As the article states, it is based to some extent on the German national group’s response to AIPPI Study Question 293.  The article is very readable and thorough in its discussion of the relevant history, German statutory provisions, and case law on the topic.  As the authors note, there is only one case since 1949 in which the German Federal Supreme Court has approved a compulsory license granted under article 24 of the German Patent Act (previously noted on this blog here).  The German Patent Court's subsequent determination of the applicable royalty in that case (see brief mention on this blog here) is helpful in setting forth the factors to consider in setting the amount of the compulsory licensing royalty—essentially, as the authors put it, terms reflecting what “reasonable parties would have agreed on in a licence agreement,” probably on the basis of the “abstract licence analogy” (i.e., largely the same sort of factors that would be relevant in an infringement case).  The authors argue that if the patent owner is a practicing entity that has been exploiting its invention as a monopolist, this would weigh in favor of an increase over the typical rate.

Regarding the AIPPI Study Question, all 38 responses, plus AIPPI’s resolution and its summary of responses, can be found on AIPPI’s website.  (From www.aippi.org, go to “Library,” then type “Q293” into “Search Our Library”.)  I haven’t read all of these yet myself, but my initial take is that the U.S. response takes an unduly dismissive attitude toward compulsory licensing, even as a response to public health emergencies.  Toward the beginning it states that the U.S. does not have compulsory licensing of patented inventions as such, but that “in very narrow specific situations, compulsory licensing-like rights may be available,” citing the possibility of march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act (to date, never used); a provision of the Clean Air Act (ditto); ongoing royalties in lieu of injunctive relief under eBay; and 28 U.S.C. § 1498.  This last is a statute that authorizes the federal government to take a nonexclusive license to any patented invention in exchange for fair market value, and actually is used with some frequency.  (For discussion, see this KEI Briefing Note by Jamie Love and Lokesh Vyas).  The U.S. report also does not mention court-ordered compulsory licensing as a remedy for certain antitrust violations, but it has been employed in some antitrust cases, as discussed in this 2004 article by (of all people) Makan Delrahim (who also notes a couple of other federal statutes that authorize compulsory licensing of patented inventions under limited circumstances).    

Interns work with our legal teams in the Family and Child Protection Law Division, the Transnational Litigation and Apostille Division, and the Commercial, Digital and Financial Law Division.

Duties may include carrying out research on particular points of private international law and/or comparative law, taking part in the preparation of HCCH meetings, and contributing to the promotion of the HCCH and its work.

Applications should be submitted by Monday, 9 November 2026 at 18.00 (CET). For more information, please visit the Internships Section of the HCCH website.

This post is published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference of Private International Law (HCCH).

On Tuesday, November 3, 2026, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. (CEST).

Brooke Marshall (University of Oxford) will speak, in English, about the topic

                                                                                                                  “Forum legis in English Law”

About the Speaker:

Brooke Marshall is an Associate Professor of the Faculty of Law, University of Oxford, and a Fellow of St Edmund Hall. Her research examines intersections both within the field of private international law and between the field and other areas of law and legal practice. Her work has a doctrinal foundation in international commercial dispute resolution and engages with normative and comparative questions raised by cross-border relationships.

About the Topic:

An initial determination by an English court as to the law that should apply to a cross-border dispute is commonplace at the jurisdictional stage, directly affecting both the assumption and exercise of jurisdiction. This project, jointly undertaken with Dr Roxana Banu, maps the substantial and increasing role played by choice of law in the jurisdictional enquiry. Focussing on the governing law gateways for service outside the jurisdiction, it provides a theoretical, historical, and doctrinal account of England’s forum legis. We explore its imperial roots, the results it produces in the case law, and whether basing the adjudicatory jurisdiction of English courts on the applicability of English law can be normatively justified in routine commercial cases.

About the Virtual Workshop Series:

The virtual workshop series “Current Research in Private International Law” is organised by Ralf Michaels and Antonia Sittig. The series features leading national and international scholars who present and discuss their work on current developments and research topics in private international law. The workshops are geared to scholars who are researching in the field of private international law, but attendance is open to all individuals having an academic interest (doctoral candidates and students are expressly invited).

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.

I. Introduction

Can a foreign adoption deed be given effect in Mozambique? What procedural steps must be followed, and which requirements must be satisfied? Does the fact that the adoption takes the form of a notarial deed complicate its “recognition” in Mozambique under the applicable legal framework for the “review and confirmation of foreign judgments”? These are some of the questions addressed by the Mozambican Supreme Court in a recent decision concerning the recognition of an Indian adoption in Mozambique. The case is particularly interesting and offers valuable insights from a comparative law perspective, thus warranting closer examination.

II. The Facts

The case concerns the review and confirmation in Mozambique of an Indian public deed of adoption executed by X, a Hindu Indian woman residing in Mozambique, and approved by the competent authorities in India, in respect of A, a Hindu Indian minor girl. X sought recognition of the Indian adoption to enable her husband, an American citizen also sharing residence with X, to proceed with a separate adoption of A in Mozambique, as the court hearing his application had required the prior recognition of the Indian adoption through the ordinary procedure provided for under Mozambican law. X therefore applied to the Supreme Court for review and confirmation of the Indian adoption deed so that it could produce legal effects in Mozambique.

III. The Ruling (brief summary)

Having found that the relevant formalities had been complied with, the Court, in its ruling of 29 April 2026, recognised the Indian adoption. It first addressed whether a foreign public deed of adoption could qualify for recognition under Mozambican law. Although such a deed is not formally a judicial decision, the Court interpreted the concept of “decision” in Article 1094 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) substantively, holding that a registered Indian adoption deed could qualify because of its legal effects, including the establishment of an irrevocable parent–child relationship.

The Court then examined whether the adoption satisfied the requirements for recognition under Article 1096 CPC, namely: (a) the absence of doubt as to the authenticity of the instrument and its proper interpretation; (b) its finality under Indian law; (c) the absence of fraud on the law in establishing the jurisdiction of the foreign authority; (d) the absence of conflicting pending or concluded proceedings in Mozambique, subject to the applicable rules on priority; (e) observance of procedural safeguards, including proper service, the right to be heard and equality of the parties; (f) compatibility with Mozambican international public policy; and (g) compliance with the applicable nationality privilege.

Examining each requirement in turn and addressing the legal issues arising in the context of the Indian adoption, the Court concluded that all the conditions for recognition had been satisfied. It therefore granted the application, allowing the Indian adoption deed to produce legal effects in Mozambique.

IV. Comments

1. General Remarks on the Court’s Approach

The case commented on here is, in many respects, particularly interesting and offers several useful insights. The Supreme Court’s discussion of the recognition requirements is detailed and well-reasoned. Indeed, as is common in the Court’s practice, it begins its analysis of each issue by setting out the relevant theoretical considerations and the general position under Mozambican law before turning to the specific circumstances of the case. This approach helps explain why the judgment is comparatively lengthy. The decision also illustrates the Court’s receptiveness to Portuguese legal scholarship and case law, which it draws on in addressing certain issues. As the Court explains, “Portugal has a closely related legal system and is frequently used as a doctrinal and comparative reference in Mozambique”.

It is also noteworthy that the Court explicitly acknowledged the importance of a “systematic and teleological interpretation”, observing that the wording of the law does not preclude such an interpretation. This is significant insofar as it allows the Court to emphasise the practical effectiveness of the recognition mechanism, its conformity with the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations and, more importantly, the best interests of the child, particularly where the establishment of family ties is at issue.

Against this background, two issues – among many others – deserve particular attention for the purpose of a concise blog comment. The first concerns the procedural complications arising from the absence of automatic recognition in Mozambican law. The second, and in my view the main contribution of the decision, concerns the extension of Mozambique’s regime for the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions to foreign public notarial deeds and the potential implications of the Court’s reasoning for other non-judicial acts. The case also raises broader questions about the role of the HCCH conventions in facilitating the cross-border circulation of documents and addressing the challenges associated with intercountry adoption.

2. The Procedural Complications Arising from the Absence of Automatic Recognition

The first issue is the unnecessary complication of the recognition procedure resulting from the absence of the principle of automatic recognition in Mozambican law (for an overview, see my previous comments on this blog here).

As the factual background shows, X’s application for recognition of the Indian adoption became necessary when her husband sought to adopt A himself. However, for his application to proceed, the Indian adoption first had to be formally recognised in Mozambique. Under Mozambican law, foreign judgments cannot produce legal effects until they have been reviewed and confirmed by the Supreme Court through the applicable recognition and enforcement procedure (for an overview, see see my previous comments here). Consequently, the proceedings concerning the husband’s adoption application were stayed, and the parties were required to obtain recognition of the Indian adoption first.

While these procedural steps follow from the existing framework, which does not provide for automatic recognition, this case clearly illustrates the need to consider introducing such a principle into Mozambican law. Had automatic recognition been available, the judge hearing the husband’s adoption application could have examined, as an incidental matter, whether the Indian adoption satisfied the requirements for recognition under Mozambican law and, if so, proceeded with the application without requiring the parties to initiate separate proceedings before the Supreme Court. This would have avoided an unnecessary procedural detour and facilitated the effective resolution of the adoption application.

3. The Recognition of Foreign Public Notarial Deeds: A Potential Extension to Non-Judicial Acts

The second issue, which in my view constitutes the main contribution of the decision, concerns the extension of Mozambique’s regime for the recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions to foreign public notarial deeds, and the position adopted by the Court in this regard.

It is noteworthy that the Court approached this question as a preliminary issue, examining whether the foreign adoption deed was eligible for recognition and enforcement under the applicable legal framework. The Court acknowledged that the term “decision” generally refers to judicial decisions concerning private rights rendered by a foreign court. It nevertheless considered that the wording of the law did not preclude a systematic and teleological interpretation encompassing other instruments which, although not “decisions” in the strict legal sense, produce equivalent legal effects. In particular, the Court focused on whether such instruments definitively determine subjective legal positions in civil or commercial matters and possess a settled and enduring effect.

Applying this reasoning to the Indian adoption, the Court acknowledged that the adoption deed was not a judicial decision as such but considered that it shared its essential characteristics, notably the stability of the legal status it established between parent and child. The Court also addressed the concern that such an interpretation might unduly broaden the scope of the applicable legal framework. Its answer was straightforward: the interpretation did not extend the regime to instruments that were merely contractual or administrative in nature and lacked a settled effect or the capacity to determine personal status definitively. On the basis of this teleological and functional interpretation, the Court concluded that the Indian adoption deed was eligible for review and confirmation under the applicable legal framework, subject to the adjustments required by the specific nature of an adoption instrument that is not a judicial decision per se.

The Court’s approach is significant because it opens the door to the recognition of other foreign non-judicial acts, notably non-judicial divorces available in several European countries (on this issue, see my previous post here on this blog). The key question in such cases would be whether the foreign act shares with a judicial decision the relevant characteristics identified by the Court, particularly the definitive determination of a legal status and the stability of the legal effects produced. If these elements are present, the Court’s reasoning could provide a basis for considering such acts eligible for recognition under Mozambique’s existing legal framework.

4. Authentication, Intercountry Adoption and the Relevance of the HCCH Conventions

The case raises two distinct questions concerning the relevance of the HCCH conventions: the authentication of foreign public documents (the 1961 HCCH Apostille Convention) and the international context of intercountry adoption (the HCCH 1993 Adoption Convention). The first relates directly to the Court’s reasoning, while the second offers a broader perspective on the cross-border movement of adopted children.

a) Authentication Requirements and the 1961 Apostille Convention

One of the issues raised in the case concerns compliance with the requirements of authenticity and intelligibility under Article 1096(a) CPC. The factual background provides useful insights into this issue. After X applied for recognition of the Indian adoption, she was invited to submit an authenticated and legalised copy of the adoption deed, together with any relevant explanations she considered necessary. In response, X submitted a legal opinion explaining that the adoption complied with Indian law, particularly the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act (HAMA) of 1956, and filed the notarial instrument of adoption together with its translation.

The Deputy Attorney General, however, considered that X needed to take the necessary steps to obtain the signature of a Mozambican consular or diplomatic officer in India to ensure that the legalisation of the adoption deed complied with the formalities required under Mozambican law (Article 540 CPC). In addressing this issue, the Court first referred to Portuguese legal opinions according to which legalisation is no longer required, except where doubts arise as to the authenticity of the foreign document itself or that of its authentication. The Court then observed that the documents had been issued by the Indian authorities, bore the Indian government emblem and appropriate seals, and contained the signatures and fingerprints of the parties, as well as the signatures of the relevant Indian officials. It therefore found no reason to doubt the authenticity of the adoption instrument.

Accordingly, the Court held that, in the circumstances, it was unnecessary to legalise the document by obtaining, through the Mozambican Consulate in India, authentication of the signature of the official of the Registry Office who had approved the public deed of adoption. Such a step would otherwise have been required under a strict application of Article 540 CPC.

One cannot help wondering whether these doubts and procedural complications could have been avoided had Mozambique been a Contracting State to the 1961 Apostille Convention (on the need for African countries to join the Apostille Convention, with reference to Mozambican case law, see my previous comment on this blog here). Since India is also a Contracting State since 2004, an apostille could, where the Convention applies, have facilitated the circulation of the relevant document between the two countries. The Court could then have verified the presence and validity of the apostille rather than having to examine the need for additional consular or diplomatic authentication.

b) The 1993 Adoption Convention and the Cross-Border Movement of Adopted Children

The case also invites reflection on the 1993 HCCH Adoption Convention, to which India is a Contracting State since 2003. Discussions of intercountry adoption often focus on children moving from countries in the Global South, as “States of origin” to adoptive parents in the Global North as “receiving States”. The present case illustrates a different configuration: an Indian mother residing in Mozambique adopted a child in India, and the child was subsequently brought to live with her in Mozambique. It thus highlights the potential relevance of the Convention beyond the more familiar North–South context, particularly in facilitating cooperation between countries of the Global South. Had Mozambique also been a Contracting State, the Convention could potentially have provided a framework for cooperation between the two countries, subject to its conditions of application. This case therefore serves as a reminder that the HCCH conventions can contribute not only to cooperation between countries of the Global North and South, but also to strengthening legal cooperation among countries of the Global South. The 1993 Adoption Convention has already attracted significant participation in Africa, with 24 African States having joined it. This makes it one of the most widely adopted HCCH conventions on the continent.

OxFirst will be putting on a free webinar next Tuesday, October 21, at 1:30 p.m. U.K. time, titled “Putting Economics at the Center:  Munich's New SEP Guidelines.”  Here is OxFirst’s description:

On 13 August 2026, the 7th Civil Chamber of the Munich I Regional Court issued new FRAND Guidelines that move well beyond injunctions and negotiating conduct. The Court sets out in unusual detail how it intends to approach the economics of FRAND, including comparable licences, royalty ranges, top-down calculations, portfolio strength, patent counting, geographic differences and economic evidence.

For patent litigators, the implications are immediate. Which comparables will withstand scrutiny? How should portfolio strength be proved or challenged? And what economic evidence will now be needed to persuade the Court that a proposed royalty is, or is not, FRAND?

Speakers include Dr. Oliver Schön, Presiding Judge, Munich I Regional Court; Chris Longman (Qualcomm); Dr. Corin Gittinger (Freshfields); Dr. Clemens-August Heusch (Nokia); Scott Hayden (Amazon); and Andrew Yen (Panasonic).  Registration is available here. 

Candidates are invited to apply online by 29 October 2026.

This article explores the emerging role of Latin America as a forum for global litigation over standard-essential patents (SEPs), particularly in the context of preliminary injunctions and fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing commitments. Traditionally peripheral in international patent enforcement, jurisdictions such as Brazil and Colombia have gained strategic importance as SEP holders increasingly seek product injunctions in these venues to exert leverage in global disputes. The article provides a comparative assessment of how courts in the two countries have handled SEP related claims, highlighting a discernible shift from automatic injunctions toward a more balanced, FRAND sensitive adjudication framework. The study argues that while Latin America continues to serve as a ‘pressure jurisdiction’ in SEP disputes, its courts and administrative bodies are aligning with global trends that emphasize proportionality, public interest, and regulatory scrutiny concerning product injunctions. This transformation offers important lessons for international observers and policymakers seeking to understand how emerging jurisdictions adapt global doctrines to local legal and institutional contexts.

This is a very informative article.  Even though I try to keep up with developments in the SEP/FRAND space, I was not previously familiar with some of the matters Professor Contreras discusses, including a decision by the Andean Community of Nations that found fault with the Bogota Court of Appeals' decision that applied Colombian national law that requires courts to consider necessity, effectiveness, and proportionality before granting preliminary injunctions (though Professor Contreras also writes the binding nature of the decision is debatable, and he reaches the overall conclusion that the trend in Brazil and Colombia is toward greater judicial restraint in granting preliminary injunctions in FRAND cases).  

I should also note that Professor Contreras published a chapter in Jorge Contreras' (no relation, as I understand it) recent edited volume FRAND Cases in Context (previously noted in this blog here), titled Ericsson v. Apple:  South America Enters the Injunction Race.  He also has written a chapter that will be included in the forthcoming edited volume that Tim Holbrook and I are co-editing, the Oxford Research Handbook on Extraterritoriality and Intellectual Property Law.

I. Introduction

The enforcement of foreign judgments depends on the legal regime applicable to the case. In common law jurisdictions, enforcement may proceed, depending on the circumstances, either by registration under a statutory regime (whether based on reciprocal arrangements or international conventions) or by an action on the foreign judgment at common law. In civil law jurisdictions, enforcement generally requires exequatur proceedings, which may be governed by domestic law or, where applicable, by an international convention. Where an international convention applies, its provisions should, in principle, govern the enforcement process, unless the convention itself provides otherwise or leaves a particular matter to be governed by domestic law.

Although this outline may appear self-evident, judicial practice in many countries, particularly in the MENA region, suggests otherwise. Even where an applicable international convention exists, courts may either disregard it altogether or begin their analysis under domestic law, referring to the convention only as a subsidiary or residual basis. This state of affairs is illustrated by a recent decision of the Egyptian Court of Cassation concerning the enforcement in Egypt of an Italian judgment. Given the significance of this decision, it warrants closer examination, particularly with regard to the relationship between the applicable international convention and the domestic rules governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

II. The Facts

The case concerns an application for the recognition and enforcement of an Italian judgment brought by X (appellant and original claimant, an individual employee) against Y (appellee and original defendant, an Egyptian press institution based in Cairo).

The decision provides limited factual background. It indicates that X sought recognition and enforcement in Egypt of an Italian labour judgment recognising an employment relationship between the parties and ordering Y to pay X salary arrears, together with an inflation adjustment calculated according to the Italian National Institute of Statistics and statutory interest. The Egyptian Court of First Instance granted enforcement, but the Court of Appeal overturned that decision and dismissed the application. The Court of Appeal considered that Y had no place of residence (maḥal ʾiqāmah―محل إقامة) in Italy when the proceedings were commenced. It also considered that the Italian judgment addressed X’s work as a journalist-correspondent without examining the nature of Y’s office (maqarr―مقر) in Italy or the applicability of the conditions laid down in the bilateral treaty between Egypt and Italy on the recognition of judicial decisions.

X subsequently appealed to the Court of Cassation, arguing that the Italian judgment satisfied the requirements for the enforcement of foreign judgments under Articles 296–298 of the Egyptian Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (Law No. 13 of 1968 – hereafter CCCP). In particular, X argued that: (1) the Italian court had jurisdiction because the employment relationship was performed entirely in Italy in accordance with the employment contract; (2) Y had been duly served and had participated in the Italian proceedings by submitting a defence memorandum and presenting its claims; (3) the Italian judgment had become final and res judicata, as evidenced by official certificates issued by the Italian judicial authorities and duly authenticated; and (4) the judgment did not violate Egyptian public policy or public morals. X also challenged the Court of Appeal’s finding that Y had no office (maqarr―مقر) in Italy when the proceedings were commenced. He maintained that Y had a known office (maqarr―مقر) in Rome, used for collecting news and distributing the newspaper, and that official documents submitted to the lower courts established that Y had been duly served at that address.

(※) It should be noted that maqarr (مقر) in Arabic means “domicile”. However, I believe that the reference here is to Y’s office in Italy, rather than to its “domicile” in the technical sense.

III. The Ruling

In its ruling of 11 February 2026, the Court of Cassation upheld X’s arguments and quashed the appealed decision. In doing so, the Court reasoned as follows.

The Court began, as it usually does, by setting out the general legal framework.

First, it recalled that, according to its established case law, where treaties govern the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments between Egypt and another State, their provisions must be applied (Article 301 of the CCCP). It further noted that, under Article 298(1) of the CCCP, the foreign court that rendered the judgment must have had jurisdiction. This requirement concerns the foreign court’s international jurisdiction, rather than its jurisdiction under the domestic rules of the State of origin, whether relating to subject matter or territorial jurisdiction. The Court then explained that, when assessing the foreign court’s indirect jurisdiction under Article 298(1), it must be determined whether Egyptian courts lack jurisdiction over the dispute in respect of which the foreign judgment was rendered. In the Court’s view, this requirement concerns whether Egyptian courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. Where their jurisdiction is merely concurrent with that of the foreign court, this does not preclude enforcement, provided that the foreign judgment does not conflict with a judgment or order previously rendered by the Egyptian courts.

The Court next addressed the principle of reciprocity under Article 296 of the CCCP, according to which foreign judgments may be enforced in Egypt on the basis of reciprocity with the State of origin. It explained that the reciprocity required by the legislature is legislative, rather than diplomatic, reciprocity established through a treaty. Egyptian courts must therefore examine, of their own motion (sua sponte), whether legislative reciprocity exists.

The Court then referred to the bilateral convention between Egypt and Italy on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil, commercial and personal status matters. It noted that, under the Convention, the courts of the State in which enforcement is sought must, when examining the jurisdictional basis of the judgment, be bound by the findings of fact contained in it, unless the judgment was rendered in default. The Court also referred to Article 4(3) of the Convention, under which the court of the State of origin is considered to have jurisdiction where the contractual obligation forming the subject matter of the dispute was performed, and was due to be performed, in that State pursuant to an express or implied agreement between the claimant and the defendant.

Having clarified the applicable legal framework, the Court proceeded to apply it to the case at hand.

It found that the Italian court had jurisdiction, that its judgment had acquired the force of res judicata, that it did not violate Egyptian public policy or public morals, that it did not conflict with any judgment or order previously rendered by the Egyptian courts, and that the respondent institution had been duly represented in the proceedings. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Italian judgment satisfied the conditions for enforcement in Egypt under the bilateral Convention, as required by Article 296 of the CCCP.

IV. Comments

While one can agree with the outcome of the decision, parts of the Court’s reasoning raise questions, if not doubts. This concerns, in particular, the detour through domestic law, notably Articles 296 and 298 of the CCCP, which set out the requirements for the enforcement of foreign judgments in Egypt.

In my view, the Court correctly began by citing Article 301 of the CCCP, which provides that where treaties govern the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments between Egypt and another State, their provisions must be applied. From that point, the Court should have taken note of the bilateral Convention between Egypt and Italy and examined the enforceability of the Italian judgment by applying the provisions of that Convention. Accordingly, the references to the rules of domestic law governing the indirect jurisdiction of the foreign court under Article 298(1) and the principle of reciprocity under Article 296 appear unnecessary.

It should be noted, however, that the Court of Cassation’s established practice frequently follows the same approach as in the present case: it refers to provisions of domestic law, either exclusively or in combination with the applicable international convention, in a manner that is, at the very least, difficult to reconcile with Article 301 of the CCCP.

That said, a few further comments deserve to be made.

First, in examining the question of indirect jurisdiction, the Court essentially reiterated its established position on this matter. The case therefore provides yet another example of how, under Article 298(1) of the CCCP, the indirect jurisdiction of the foreign court is subject to a twofold test or a double control:

1. First, the jurisdiction of the foreign court must be examined in light of its own rules of international jurisdiction. In this respect, Egyptian courts should not investigate whether the foreign court that rendered the judgment had jurisdiction under its own domestic rules governing subject-matter and territorial jurisdiction.
2. Second, Egyptian courts must consider whether the dispute falls within their own jurisdiction. It is well established that this inquiry concerns only whether Egyptian courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute, and does not extend to cases in which their jurisdiction is merely concurrent with that of the foreign court.

In this respect, it is worth noting that, with a few exceptions, Egyptian law does not clearly specify the circumstances in which Egyptian courts have exclusive jurisdiction. This question is particularly relevant in employment disputes, in which a new law has recently been adopted that appears to give certain labour law provisions a mandatory character, raising the question of whether they should be treated as lois de police (overriding mandatory rules). The present case, however, suggests that even the mandatory nature of such provisions does not, in itself, confer exclusive jurisdiction on Egyptian courts.

It is also noteworthy that, although the case concerned an employment contract, the Court treated it as an ordinary contractual dispute and applied the general rules governing contractual obligations. This approach contrasts with the broader development in comparative law, which has increasingly recognised the need for special protective rules to safeguard employees as the weaker party to the employment relationship. From a private international law perspective, Egyptian law still lacks such protective rules, both in relation to international jurisdiction and in the field of choice of law.

The second question concerns reciprocity. The Court recalled its general position on this issue, notably by explaining that the reciprocity required under Article 296 is legislative, rather than diplomatic, reciprocity, in the sense that it does not require the existence of a treaty between the State of origin and Egypt. Recent decisions, as reported on this blog (here and here), however, show that, despite reaffirming this well-established distinction, the Court has concluded that reciprocity was lacking after noting the absence of an applicable treaty. The Court’s position in the present case is somewhat nuanced. Although it confirmed the long-established distinction between legislative and diplomatic reciprocity, it immediately referred to the bilateral Convention between Egypt and Italy, before concluding that the Italian judgment satisfied the conditions for enforcement in Egypt under that Convention, as required by Article 296 of the CCCP. This reference to Article 296 is problematic, as that provision concerns reciprocity, whereas the application of international conventions is addressed by Article 301. It is unclear whether the Court’s reference was a mistake. In any event, it would have been more appropriate to rely on Article 301 as requiring the application of the Egyptian–Italian Convention in preference to domestic law.

(※) Previous Posts on Egyptian PIL:

• Zamzam on Egyptian Private International Law (in Arabic): Towards Reviving the Golden Age of Egyptian Private International Law
• Refusal to Enforce in Egypt of a Californian (U.S.) Judgment for Lack of Reciprocity: What Has Gotten into the Egyptian Supreme Court?
• Reciprocity and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Egypt – A Critical Assessment of a Recent Supreme Court Decision
• Enforcing Foreign Judgments in Egypt: A Critical Examination of Two Recent Egyptian Supreme Court Cases
• Egyptian Supreme Court on the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments – Special Focus on the Service Requirement
• Egyptian Court of Cassation on the application of the Hague Service Convention

Written by Hadrien Pauchard (

The third issue of the Revue Critique de droit international privé of 2026 was just released and is already accessible online. It contains three articles, eight case notes, as well as four book reviews. In line with the Revue Critique’s recent policy, the doctrinal part will soon be made available in English on the editor’s website (for registered users and institutions).

The volume opens with a presentation of Prof. Lauren Benton (Barton M. Biggs Professor of History and Professor of Law at Yale) last book They Called It Peace: Worlds of Imperial Violence, and a French translation of its Chapter 1: From Small Wars to Atrocity in Empires by Ms. Maia Baciu. The book offers a though-provoking historical perspective on the colonial genealogy of private international law, the jurisprudence of jurisdiction, and, more broadly, over the role of law in a world marked by the contemporary resurgence of empires. Now partly available to the French-speaking audience, this important research encourages transnational and transdisciplinary dialogue on the geopolitical aspects of private international law.

Keeping with the tradition of French scholarship, the issue then features a yearly case-law panorama of The Law of Foreign Nationals and Its Presumptions: Selected Reflections on the 2025 Case Law on Migration (Le droit des étrangers et ses présomptions. Retours choisis sur la jurisprudence 2025 en matière de migrations) authored by Prof. Thibaut Fleury Graff (Université Paris Panthéon-Assas) and Dr. Inès Giauffret (Université Paris-Saclay, UVSQ). While the characterization of an individual as a ‘national’ or a ‘foreigner’ entails important legal consequences, the constraints of daily administrative practices often collide with the complex proof of a foreign status, giving rise to a multitude of rules and interpretations regarding the validity of certain documents, the consequences of their absence, and the indicators that allow for a presumption of foreign status. The article takes a critical look at the judicial construction of such presumptions, their conditions for implementation and rebuttal, as well as their limitations.

In the last article, Prof. Michael Sonnentag (Potsdam University) scrutinizes The Interactions between French Inheritance Law and the German Statutory Matrimonial Property Regime (Les interactions entre le droit successoral français et le régime matrimonial légal allemand). The abstract reads as follows:

This article addresses the difficulties arising from the interaction between French inheritance law and the German statutory matrimonial property regime. The primary cause of these problems lies in the succession-based interpretation of the rule in Article 1371, paragraph 1, of the German Civil Code (BGB), as adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). According to this provision, the surviving spouse’s inheritance share is automatically increased by one-quarter. If this automatic increase is classified as a matter of succession law, which is not the solution adopted by the author, the rule in Article 1371, paragraph 1, of the BGB cannot be applied. In such cases, no alternative solution is provided by German law. To address this gap, the author develops a new approach and proposes applying this rule despite its classification as an issue of succession law in order to protect the rights of the surviving spouse.

The full table of contents is available here.

Previous issues of the Revue Critique (from 2010 to 2025) are available on Cairn.

Margaret Casey KC will present on the topic, “The 21st century global family – How science, law and a Convention tried and failed to establish a long-term relationship”. The seminar will be chaired by Jack Wass.

Abstract:

Advances in medical science and changes in what is meant by ‘family’ mean that establishing parentage can be uncertain in domestic and international law. This creates issues for globally mobile families and lifelong status issues for some people. As numbers increasingly turn to surrogacy to form families, this creates legal challenges. Across Australasia, some jurisdictions (eg New Zealand and in Australia) regulate forms of surrogacy and try to accommodate citizens who travel overseas to implement surrogacy plans. However, parents returning home with a child born through surrogacy overseas may still confront problems in having their parentage recognised (with all the consequential rights and benefits for their child). International responses have been attempted. In 2016, Margaret Casey KC was appointed to the experts group established by the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) to recommend an acceptable set of rules for cross-border recognition of surrogacy and parentage. The final report was submitted to the HCCH Special Commission earlier this year. Although this report was substantial, consensus has not been reached and the project has been paused. In this seminar, Margaret will outline the context in which families are now being formed, the global nature of ‘family planning’, and resulting jurisdictional issues. She will comment on reform legislation being considered in New Zealand and whether or not it is fit for purpose for the modern family.

Details:

• Where: online only
• When: Thursday, 29 October 2026, 5:00 – 6:00pm AEDT (Australian time)
• Registration: free, following the details in the flyer below

Please share the invitation with anyone you consider may be interested.

Flyer_AAPrIL Seminar 2026_4

The Lindemann Fellowship was established in 2024 to support promising academics in Europe in the field of private international law. 

Fellows are accepted for a three-year period, with new Fellows joining each year, as existing Fellows complete their tenure. 

Enrico Bonadio and various coauthors have recently published several papers on SEP/FRAND issues in the European Intellectual Property Review.  All of these are available on Westlaw, in case you don’t have a standalone subscription to EIPR.

1.  Enrico Bonadio & Arjun Solanki, Consent, asymmetry and access:  a critical assessment of Acer v. Nokia, 48 EIPR 688 (2026).  Here is the abstract:

This article critically analyses the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Acer v Nokia, [[2026] EWCA Civ 564] in which the Court held that Nokia’s "Adjustable Licence Offer" (combining an interim licence with International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration to determine final RAND terms) constituted a valid RAND-compliant offer. The authors argue that the decision is doctrinally flawed on three grounds: it manufactures fictitious consent to arbitration where none contractually exists; it exacerbates structural asymmetries inherent in SEP licensing by granting patent holders unilateral forum selection rights; and it deprives implementers, as third-party beneficiaries of RAND commitments, of meaningful access to justice. Instead of simplifying RAND dispute resolution, the decision creates a more fragmented procedural landscape.

2. Enrico Bonadio & Robert Pocknell, FRAND injunction estoppel in SEP disputes:  an equitable doctrine as a shield against abuse conduct, 48 EIPR 642 (2026).  Here is the abstract:

This article argues that English equitable doctrines, promissory estoppel, proprietary estoppel, and acquiescence, furnish an independent basis for refusing injunctions to standard essential patent (SEP) holders who deploy them as leverage in what are, in substance, disputes about price. It develops a doctrine of fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) injunction estoppel: where a SEP holder has made an irrevocable FRAND commitment and an implementer has relied upon it by investing in standard-compliant products, equity bars the exclusionary remedy. The article extends to supply chain estoppel, constraining injunctions against downstream device makers where the SEP holder declined to license upstream.

3. Enrico Bonadio & David Katz, The emergence of anti-contract enforcement injunctions in global SEPs disputes, 48 EIPR 558 (2026).  Here is the abstract:

The article analyses recent German and Unified Patent Court (UPC) injunctions that prevent parties from pursuing United Kingdom (UK) interim licences and contract-enforcement remedies in global standard essential patents (SEPs) disputes, conceptualising them as "anti-contract enforcement injunctions". It argues that the UK interim licence framework is a contract-based, jurisdictionally modest response designed to preserve fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) adjudication without resorting to anti-suit injunctions, whereas the Munich and UPC orders undermine voluntary FRAND commitments and third-party beneficiary rights. The authors contend that using patent jurisdiction and European Union (EU) competition law rhetoric to block contractual enforcement erodes international comity, destabilises standardisation governance, and fragments global FRAND and competition law oversight.

4. Enrico Bonadio & Arjun Solanki, Enhancing standard essential patents’ enforcement through litigation:  a case for judicial determination over arbitration, 48 EIPR 159 (2026).  Here is the abstract:

This article examines the enforcement of standard essential patents (SEPs), arguing that judicial litigation offers superior outcomes over arbitration for licensing disputes. It situates SEPs disputes at the intersection of patent law, competition, and technical standards, underscoring the complexity arising from multi-jurisdictional enforcement and FRAND (fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory) licensing obligations. The paper contends that key features of litigation—transparent rate-setting, rigorous expert evidence scrutiny, the development of binding precedent, and appellate review—make courts more effective in addressing the technical, economic, and public interest dimensions of SEPs licensing. While alternative forums like arbitration may provide efficiency and confidentiality benefits for simple commercial disputes, they lack robust mechanisms for rate calibration, transparency, precedent creation, and coordinated global relief. The article concludes that public adjudication remains essential for yielding predictable, equitable, and market-beneficial SEP licensing frameworks, while arbitration should play only a supplementary role in such contexts.

Foreign Divorce Judgments

U.S. courts are often asked to recognize divorce judgments rendered by courts in other countries. While the rules relating to foreign money judgments are set forth in the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, there is no uniform act that addresses when a U.S. court must recognize a foreign divorce judgment.

In the absence of statutory guidance, U.S. courts apply common law principles of comity to determine whether a foreign divorce judgment should be given effect. These principles were famously expounded by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot (1895), where the Court held that a foreign judgment should be recognized when:

there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it is sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment.

The Hilton Court also observed that a foreign judgment need not be recognized when contrary to the public policy of the enforcing state:

A judgment affecting the status of persons, such as a decree confirming or dissolving a marriage, is recognized as valid in every country unless contrary to the policy of its own law (emphasis added).

With these principles in mind, let us now turn to the type of divorce here at issue—a talaq divorce.

Talaq

Talaq is an Islamic form of divorce. It has been described by one U.S. court as follows:

Under Islamic law, a husband has the right to initiate a divorce (“talaq”) against his wife. All that is required to achieve talaq is for a husband to pronounce his intent to divorce his wife on three separate occasions, either verbally or in writing. The husband does not need to communicate his three pronouncements to his wife. She need not be present for them or even aware of them. A wife cannot object to a talaq.

In 2008, the Maryland Supreme Court was asked to recognize a talaq divorce in Aleem v. Aleem. In that case, the husband—a Muslim and a national of Pakistan—went to the Pakistan Embassy in Washington, D.C., and executed a written document stating three times that he was divorcing his wife. He argued that this act was sufficient to effectuate a divorce under the law of Pakistan even though he and his wife were residents of Maryland.

The Maryland Supreme Court held that, even if the talaq divorce was valid as a matter of Pakistani law, it was not entitled to recognition in Maryland because (1) it provided no due process protection for the wife; (2) only the husband (not the wife) had a right to invoke this process; and (3) the wife was not entitled to an equitable share of the marital property. On these facts, the Maryland Supreme Court held that recognizing such a divorce would be contrary to Maryland public policy.

The Aleem decision has cast a long shadow. It is cited by each of the more recent cases, to which we now turn.

Adewale v. Adewale

On June 22, 2026, the Pennsylvania Superior Court discussed a talaq divorce in Adewale v. Adewale. In that case, a man and woman were civilly married in Lagos, Nigeria, in 2011, and  subsequently moved to the United States. In 2020, the man filed for divorce in Pennsylvania. After the woman sought alimony, the court ordered the man to pay her a set sum of money each month.

In the course of the divorce proceedings, the man became aware that his putative wife may have been married to another person at the time of their “marriage.” Over the course of several years of evidentiary hearings, he discovered that she had, in fact, married someone else in 2001. The woman’s legal husband testified that the 2001 marriage had occurred and submitted a wedding certificate and photographs as proof. In light of this evidence, the trial court concluded that the parties’ marriage was void ab initio and terminated the man’s alimony obligations.

On appeal, the woman argued, among other things, that her 2001 marriage had been terminated by a talaq divorce in 2006, thereby paving the way for the court to conclude that the 2011 marriage was valid. The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected this argument. Even if her husband had, in fact, repeated “I divorce you” three times in front of witnesses in 2006, the court held, this act was of no legal consequence because talaq could “only be valid if uttered by a Muslim husband.” Since the husband had converted to Christianity in 1980, the court reasoned, he did not identify as Muslim and could not divorce his wife in this manner. The court also observed (citing Aleem) that other “U.S. states have declined to recognize talaq as a valid unilateral method of divorce on the grounds that it violates the right to due process, equal protection, and fundamental fairness.” It ultimately affirmed the trial court’s judgment and held that the parties’ 2011 marriage was void from the beginning.

Ali v. Osman

On August 6, 2026, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the issue of talaq in its opinion in Ali v. Osman. The couple in that case were married in Sudan in 2001 and moved to the United States soon afterwards. In 2024, the wife filed for divorce in North Dakota. The husband moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the grounds that he had, unbeknownst to his wife, obtained a talaq divorce when he was traveling in Sudan in 2022, as evidenced by an official certificate.

The question presented was whether this divorce was entitled to recognition in North Dakota. The trial court held that it was not. It noted that neither the husband nor the wife was a resident of Sudan when the husband obtained the talaq divorce. It pointed out that the wife was given no notice that the husband was seeking a talaq divorce and did not learn of it until after it had occurred. It concluded that these proceedings had failed to provide the most “basic rudiments” of due process to the wife.

This decision was affirmed by the North Dakota Supreme Court, which observed (citing Aleem) that a number of other U.S. courts had declined to recognize talaq divorces in similar situations. It held that the trial court had not “abused its discretion by declining to recognize the Sudanese divorce certificate as a matter of comity.”

Azhar v. Choudhri

On September 25, 2026, the Texas Supreme Court declined to recognize a talaq divorce in Azhar v. Choudhri. In this case, the husband had lived in Houston, Texas, since he was a child. In 2008, he traveled to Pakistan and married a Pakistani woman. The wife moved to Houston to join her husband in 2010. In 2012, the husband sent his wife back to Pakistan under the guise of renewing her visa. He subsequently obtained a talaq divorce against her, in Pakistan, in 2013, without her knowledge:

According to Wife, Husband did not inform Wife before or afterwards that they would be divorced. No one notified Wife of the proceedings or served her with process. Instead, Husband purported to effectuate service by publishing a notice in a small local Pakistani newspaper a mere five days in advance. Wife did not happen to come across that publication.

The wife did not learn of the talaq divorce until 2015.

In that year, the wife filed for divorce in Texas, seeking an equitable division of the substantial marital estate. The husband moved to dismiss on the grounds that the couple was already divorced under Pakistani law and that, accordingly, there was no marriage to dissolve. The trial court held that the Pakistani talaq divorce judgment was entitled to recognition and rendered a take-nothing judgment against the wife. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Texas.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed. It concluded that the talaq divorce was not entitled to recognition because the wife was never provided with notice “reasonably calculated to apprise her of the action.” The notice provided was, in the court’s view, so far short of what Texas law required that the divorce judgment was not entitled to recognition. Although the court acknowledged that the husband had published a notice in a Pakistani newspaper five days before he initiated the talaq divorce, it viewed this as insufficient:

[W]e have cautioned that citation by publication or posting violates due process when the address of a known defendant is readily ascertainable . . . This record forecloses the conclusion that Husband really wanted to find Wife and notify her of the divorce proceeding. Husband put on no evidence that the typical channels of spousal communication—telephone, text messages, email, social media messaging, in-person communication, mutual friends, and so on—were unavailable. Under these circumstances, the trial court should have heeded the default rule that when a defendant’s identity is known, service by publication is generally inadequate.

In light of these issues with respect to notice, the Texas Supreme Court unanimously reversed and remanded the case.

Last week I mentioned that IIC (the International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, published by the Max Planck Institute in Munich) had published an editorial by Richard Arnold titled A Jurisdictionally Neutral Approach to SEP/FRAND Disputes?, 57 IIC 613 (2026). The following month’s issue begins with an insightful essay by Barbara Lauriat titled The Global Politics of Standard Essential Patents, 57 IIC 751 (2026).  Professor Lauriat’s thesis is that global “SEP policies can become disconnected from national interests.”  In support of this thesis, she cites, among other examples, the Brazilian courts’ receptivity to issuing preliminary injunctions in SEP cases, which she says “may be a useful tool for foreign SEP owners," but which may or may not serve the Brazilian economy.  She also writes that "identifying SEP policies that will best promote American leadership in standardized technology” is hardly straightforward, with “major players on both sides of the SEP owner-implementer divide”; and she notes that even countries that don’t set global FRAND rates can affect what happens in other jurisdictions by issuing injunctions (an important point that I am glad to see people beginning to mention).  Recognizing that what favors national interests one day can harm them the next, and that lobbying can divert policymakers from what may be in the national interest, she calls for “a balanced middle ground.”  Recommended!

The publication of the open-access Festschrift in honour of Professor Christopher F Forsyth KC, Commercial Private International Law in Southern Africa: Comparative and International Perspectives, has previously been announced on this blog.

Edited by Professor Jan L. Neels and Professor Eesa A. Fredericks, with the assistance of Dr Solomon Okorley, the volume brings together comparative and international perspectives on commercial private international law in Southern Africa.

To celebrate its publication, UJ Press, in collaboration with the editors and the Research Centre for Private International Law in Emerging Countries (RCPILEC), University of Johannesburg, is organising an online book launch, bringing together the editors, the dedicatee himself, and other distinguished guests.

The programme will include addresses by the University of Johannesburg’s leadership, contributions by the editors, and a reply by Professor Christopher F Forsyth and/or Mrs Gillian Charles.

The book launch will take place online. The details are as follows:

Date: 19 October 2026

Time: 13:00–14:00 SAST

Venue: Online

RSVP: https://events.teams.microsoft.com/event/eba8581c-5659-42fe-b8a7-a41027425328@fa785acd-36ef-41bc-8a94-89841327e045?source=copyLinkLegacyShareEventDialog

Queries: ujpress@uj.ac.za

The new extensive Volume Multistate Torts in European Private International Law was just published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book is the outcome of the second edition of the EAPIL Winter School in Private International Law. The contributions are based on the lectures given during the course, which took place at the Department of Law, Economics and Cultures, University of Insubria, Como, Italy, from 10 to 15 February 2025. It is edited by Silvia Marino (University of Insubria, Como), Anna Wysocka-Bar (Jagiellonian University, Kraków) and Javier Carrascosa González (University of Murcia).

The chapters discuss the current and future challenges related to the resolution of complex cases of cross-border torts and related damages. Globalisation and digitalisation are particularly crucial in these areas, where the lack of a truly common regulatory fragmentation could leave victims in a situation of helplessness. New challenges, such as distance delicts and the rise of modern social sensibilities, risk affecting the traditional goals of private international law, such as predictability and legal certainty, but especially substantive targets, as the protection of the victim and the enhancement of human rights. The Chapters of this book address these newest challenges with particular regard.

Silvia Marino sets the scenario, analysing the causes that lead to a potential multiplicity of courts granted with jurisdiction multiplicity of applicable law. The immediate reaction is the transnational treatment of lis pendens and related actions (Bartosz Trocha). In the EU, one of the torts that gave rise to the most heated debates is the violation of personality rights, especially online. Javier Carrascosa González deals with the delicate issue of jurisdiction and, after an analysis of the general rule of Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation, examines the consequences of libel tourism. The specific problems derived from the SLAPPs are specifically analysed in the light of the new EU Directive (Caterina D’Osualdo). In a vertical approach, climate change litigation, private enforcement of EU competition law, AI-related harm are separately examined, signaling characterisation difficulties and the potential globality of losses (Magdalena Ličková, Silvia Marino, Olivera Boskovic, Benedetta Cappiello). The clear risk of rendering potentially conflicting judgments by different courts makes it essential to deal with the cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments (Francisco José Garcimartín Alférez, Sara Sánchez Fernández) also in the framework of the human rights protected by the ECHR (Satu Heikkilä). Anna Wysocka-Bar stresses in the last chapter how coordination problem can arise in other subject matters, such as cross-border succession.

The blurb reads as follows:

This book provides theoretical and practical insights into emerging problems concerning multistate torts in private international law. Prominent authors analyse the issue of multistate torts in the context of the core of the European legal system and its classic coordination tools.

The book highlights how cross-border torts can cause difficulties of localisation, including the complexities associated with the involvement of a high number of national courts with full or partial jurisdiction. It examines how this can lead to simultaneously pending proceedings, conflicting judgments and a multiplicity of applicable laws for the same claim. Chapters evaluate the main areas in which tort cases can arise, including cases of online defamation with a focus on Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP), the violation of competition law, climate change litigation, AI-related harm and product liability and succession matters. The book will also address the problem of inconsistent judgments that limit the circulation of enforcement proceedings in human rights cases.

Multistate Torts in European Private International Law is an essential reference for students and scholars of private international law and comparative law. With an in-depth analysis of contemporary issues, it is also relevant to legal practitioners facing related cases.

The table of contents can be accessed here. The book may be purchased or accessed online here.

Choice of forum clauses are an important means of managing litigation risk in international commercial contracts. Their effectiveness, however, depends on how courts understand and enforce the parties’ agreement. This well-researched book offers a substantial comparative examination of that problem across seven Asian jurisdictions: Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, China, Indonesia and Japan. Presented as the first work devoted to this particular comparative inquiry, it makes a valuable contribution to Asian private international law and offers insights that will interest readers working on choice of forum agreements elsewhere.

The selection of jurisdictions gives the study considerable comparative breadth. Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia represent common law systems strongly influenced by English law. The Philippines provides a mixed legal tradition shaped by American and Spanish influences, while China, Indonesia and Japan represent civil law traditions, with Dutch law having exerted a particularly significant influence on Indonesia. By bringing these systems together, the author examines how shared problems are addressed through different legal concepts and procedural arrangements.

The book’s analytical framework, introduced at the outset, comprises six connected questions: the characterisation of choice of forum clauses; party autonomy; the procedures available for enforcement; judicial discretion in granting relief; the applicable law; and the overriding effect of forum state and international interests (p 1). This framework is one of the book’s principal strengths. It connects questions that are often examined separately and demonstrates why the practical effectiveness of a clause cannot be assessed solely by reference to its contractual wording. The central argument is persuasive: choice of forum clauses can help manage the risks associated with international commercial transactions, but their effectiveness requires careful drafting and coherent judicial treatment.

Chapter 2 provides the conceptual foundation by examining competing understandings of the nature of choice of forum clauses. It explores the tension between their contractual or substantive character, commonly associated with traditional common law approaches, and their procedural or public character, associated with civil law approaches. The author appears to favour an approach that recognises both dimensions. I agree with this position. A choice of forum agreement records a private commitment, but its enforcement also affects the exercise of judicial authority. An account that accommodates both features provides a convincing basis for understanding the questions addressed throughout the book.

The chapter also considers the relationship between choice of forum clauses and arbitration agreements, their effects on non-parties, and their interaction with other contractual provisions. The comparison with arbitration is useful because both mechanisms enable parties to organise the resolution of future disputes. The author distinguishes the dual public and private character of choice of forum clauses from the contractual nature of arbitration agreements, thereby clarifying the conceptual basis of the book’s subsequent analysis.

Chapter 3 develops the discussion of party autonomy by distinguishing the parties’ freedom to determine the contents of their clause from their freedom to control the conduct of litigation. This distinction is helpful: agreement on a forum does not necessarily give parties unrestricted control over the court’s response. The treatment of the ouster rule illustrates the tension between private agreement and judicial authority. The book describes the movement away from the traditional objection that parties cannot oust the jurisdiction of common law courts, while showing the continuing influence of that objection in the Philippines. Its discussion of the Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005 places these domestic approaches within a broader framework for giving effect to party autonomy.

Chapter 4 examines the relief and remedies available in Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia and the Philippines. The comparative account reveals important differences within jurisdictions influenced by the common law. Singapore emerges as particularly receptive to contractual enforcement and party autonomy, whereas the Philippine treatment of choice of forum agreements as venue stipulations, together with the continuing influence of the ouster rule, limits their effect. Malaysia places greater emphasis on judicial discretion. The chapter also examines anti-suit injunctions and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments associated with the enforcement or breach of choice of forum agreements.

The Singapore discussion is especially instructive. The Singapore International Commercial Court and the operation of the Hague Choice of Court Convention demonstrate the jurisdiction’s commitment to facilitating international commercial dispute resolution. Yet the coexistence of different enforcement regimes also creates complexity. Parties may encounter different approaches depending on the court concerned, the applicability of the Convention, the exclusive or non-exclusive character of the clause, and the involvement of third parties. Singapore’s experience therefore illustrates a recurring theme of the book: strong support for party autonomy must be accompanied by rules whose practical operation parties can understand and predict.

Chapter 5 considers judicial discretion, including England’s judicial influence of The Eleftheria and Spiliada on the treatment of exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses in Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia. Its examination of whether those clauses should be subjected to similar tests raises an important question about the relationship between contractual commitment and the assessment of the appropriate forum. The discussion helps explain why a court’s stated commitment to party autonomy does not, by itself, determine the outcome of an enforcement application.

Chapter 6 examines the relationship between choice of forum clauses and choice of law, focusing on existence, validity and interpretation. The account of Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia shows the influence of English common law approaches, including reliance on the law governing the main contract and the reservation of certain questions to the law of the forum. The operation of the Hague Choice of Court Convention in Singapore introduces a different reference to the law of the chosen court for substantive validity.

The discussion of exclusivity is also valuable. The cases examined suggest that, outside the relevant Convention framework, courts in Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia approach exclusivity principally as a question of contractual interpretation rather than through a general presumption. This finding reinforces the practical importance of clear drafting. Parties who intend to confer exclusive jurisdiction should express that intention in terms that minimise uncertainty about the scope and effect of their agreement.

Chapter 7 broadens the analysis by considering forum state and international community interests. Mandatory rules, public policy, comity and related concepts may affect the existence, validity and interpretation of clauses, the availability of relief, and the recognition and enforcement of resulting judgments. The attention given to weaker parties is particularly welcome. Asymmetric agreements, standard-form contracts and consumer transactions reveal why formal consent may not provide a sufficient justification for enforcement in every case. This chapter strengthens the book’s account of party autonomy by examining the interests that may legitimately qualify its operation.

Chapter 8 applies the preceding framework to China, Indonesia and Japan. Its discussion demonstrates both the usefulness and the limits of broad classifications into common law and civil law traditions. The Chinese treatment of disputes involving Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan introduces distinctive questions concerning conflicts between legal systems. The discussion of forum non conveniens, anti-suit injunctions and asymmetric jurisdiction agreements further reveals how familiar mechanisms may acquire different functions within a particular legal system. In particular, the book contrasts the emphasis on efficiency in the Chinese approach to forum non conveniens with the attention to justice in the English approach.

The Indonesian analysis identifies difficulties arising from the conflation of choice of law and choice of court, including reliance on a foreign choice of law clause as a basis for declining jurisdiction. This is a useful illustration of the practical consequences of failing to distinguish two different exercises of party autonomy. The Japanese discussion addresses the special circumstances test, the presumption of exclusivity, the treatment of asymmetric clauses, and rules protecting consumers and employees. Together, these accounts show that support for choice of forum agreements operates within procedural and regulatory arrangements that vary considerably across the jurisdictions examined.

Interestingly, the book reveals differing approaches to asymmetric jurisdiction agreements in the civil law jurisdictions examined. Chinese courts enforce such agreements, while a Japanese court has treated an asymmetric jurisdiction clause as exclusive. The Japanese approach nevertheless operates within a framework that includes the special circumstances test and protections for weaker parties, particularly consumers and employees. These findings suggest that asymmetry does not, by itself, necessarily prevent enforcement in China or Japan.

The final chapter draws the comparative findings together effectively. Characterisation shapes the legal tools available; party autonomy guides judicial approaches; forum procedure determines the means of enforcement; and discretion remains an important element of the court’s response. The applicable law also matters, although the allocation of questions of existence, validity and interpretation differs between systems. Finally, forum state and international interests may override both private agreement and the otherwise applicable law. These findings support the book’s emphasis on careful drafting, predictable judicial analysis and procedural reform. They also provide a basis for considering wider participation in the Hague Choice of Court Convention and the Hague Judgments Convention 2019.

A modest criticism concerns the presentation of the findings. The chapters generally begin with clear and helpful introductions, but more consistent concluding sections would have made it easier to identify and compare their principal lessons. In a study of this breadth, short chapter conclusions could also have helped readers retain the relationship between the detailed national analysis and the book’s overarching framework. The strong final chapter substantially compensates for this omission.

Overall, this is an impressive and richly analysed comparative study. Its contribution lies in bringing contractual commitment, procedural rules, judicial discretion and public interests into a sustained examination of choice of forum clauses across diverse Asian legal systems. It will be valuable to scholars and practitioners of Asian private international law, while also providing a useful framework for comparative work beyond the region. I will certainly return to it, particularly when examining choice of forum agreements in African jurisdictions.

Lord Justice Richard Arnold has published an editorial titled A Jurisdictionally Neutral Approach to SEP/FRAND Disputes?, 57 IIC 613 (2026).  The essay argues that the best solutions to jurisdictional conflict in SEP/FRAND disputes would be, in order, a supranational tribunal; legally enforceable arbitration; and ad hoc agreement to arbitration.  In the absence of any of these, the author argues, “the next best thing would be a jurisdictionally neutral approach,” by which he means that “any court of competent jurisdiction faced with an SEP/FRAND dispute reaches the same conclusion”.  To this end, he identifies three common principles (while noting that the essay does not aspire “to present a fully developed proposal”):  first, that “courts should apply the law which governs the relevant IPR policy” (in the case of ETSI, for example, French law); second, that the provisions of these policies be interpreted to prevent both holdup and holdout; and third, that courts “bear[  ] in mind that a range of terms may be FRAND.”  Lord Justice Arnold expresses surprise that few jurisdictions thus far have undertaken to determine FRAND rates, and thinks that more should do so—and that if they followed the three principles, much of the tension among jurisdictions could be reduced.

This is an interesting piece—short and, as the author states, not intended to present a full development—but useful for thinking through what the core principles really are, and speculating how jurisdictions might converge on similar results if they took all three seriously.  Still, I wonder how much convergence there would be, given differences of opinion in specific cases over which licenses are relevant comparables; the utility of the top-down approach; and other issues that do not arise in every case but can be important in some of them, such as access-to-all versus license-to-all and the use of the smallest salable patent-practicing unit as the royalty base.  Just a few months ago, for example—after the editorial was published—in the Samsung v. ZTE dispute, a Chinese court determined that a six-year FRAND license for the relevant technology would be in the amount of $731 million, while the Munich Regional Court opined that a five-award license would be for $640 million, and the EWHC determined that a five-year license would be $392 million (see my blog post, As Many as Three Incompatible FRAND Judgments Before Breakfast).  Another issue is that, at present, some courts are more receptive than others to issuing injunctive relief in FRAND cases, and that possibility obviously impacts strategy in a big way—so for any convergence to take place, we might need to see a change of perspective on that issue, from one that sees FRAND-committed SEPs as just another kind of patent to one that recognizes, as Lord Justice Arnold states in this essay and has stated previously, that every SEP owner and every SEP implementer is, respectively, a willing licensor or willing licensee, as long as the terms are right.   

In related news, outgoing U.S. Representative Darrell Issa is quoted in MLex as recommending the issuance of an executive order forbidding U.S. courts from recognizing foreign judgments awarding global FRAND royalties or injunctive relief (“Unless there’s a US patent, unless it’s adjudicated by a US court, we are not going to respect foreign [court orders]”).  I’m not sure if there have been cases in which foreign courts have issued injunctions against the use of U.S. patents in the U.S., but Congressman Issa may have in mind the English courts’ practice of compelling implementers to choose between a domestic injunction and acquiescence in the court’s determination of global FRAND royalties.  Another possibility he may have in mind is that a court might award specific performance of the global license it determines to be FRAND (see my May blog post above), which I suppose would have extraterritorial impact even if directed only against a party over whom the court has personal jurisdiction.  Or maybe I'm just missing his point altogether.  In any event, I thank Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss for bringing this development to my attention.

Private international law in Egypt has often been described as being in a state of stagnation. After enormous efforts by the government since the end of the 19th century, and particularly during the beginning of the 20th century, Egypt succeeded in developing a relatively comprehensive PIL framework, covering choice of law (Arts 10–28 of the 1948 Civil Code), international jurisdiction (Arts 28–35 of the 1968 Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure), and the enforcement of foreign judgments (Arts 296–301 the 1968 Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure), alongside other rules scattered across various pieces of legislation. While these rules could be considered relatively modern and well developed, and broadly in line with the general tendencies of comparative law at the time, they have since become quite outdated and, in many respects, old-fashioned. This, however, has not prevented Egyptian law from exerting considerable influence throughout the region, with more recent codifications often reproducing or adapting Egyptian solutions.

The influence of Egyptian law is due not only to its legislation, but also to the role played by Egyptian scholars in laying the foundations of a genuine Egyptian PIL scholarship. Early treatises were, more often than not, encyclopedic in scope, deeply engaged with comparative law and attentive to judicial practice. In this respect, one may cite the seminal work of Ezzeddine Abdallah, Al-qānūn ad-Duwalī al-Khāṣ [القانون الدولي الخاص – Private International Law], which consists of two volumes: Volume I, dealing with Nationality, Domicile and the Status of Aliens (1986), and Volume II, dealing with Conflict of Laws and Conflict of Jurisdictions (1986). This work remains, in my view, one of the leading and most authoritative scholarly works in the field.

Slowly, however, the golden age of Egyptian scholarship in private international law entered a period of decline. Much recent scholarship has, more often than not, contented itself with reproducing the work of the great early scholars, while often neglecting the comparative-law dimension from primary sources that was so prominent in those earlier works. Indeed, it is not uncommon for recent publications to refer to existing descriptions of old French case law, to engage in detailed discussions of issues with little practical relevance for Egypt, such as renvoi, or to refer to private international law systems that no longer exist, such as those of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Some also continue to cite, without any particular relevance to the issues under discussion, rather outdated French scholarly works.

More importantly, recent scholarship has generally paid insufficient attention to developments in case law. Rather than systematically examining the more recent decisions of the Egyptian Court of Cassation, despite their relative accessibility, many works continue to rely heavily on older French decisions or on relatively old Egyptian Court of Cassation judgments. This is particularly unfortunate in a field such as private international law, where the practical meaning and development of legal rules can often be understood only by looking closely at how courts actually apply them.

In this regard, the publication of Professor Abdel Moneem Zamzam‘s book on Egyptian private international law provides a useful opportunity to examine the current state and development of Egyptian law and legal scholarship in this field. Professor Zamzam, who is also Head of the Department of Private International Law at the Faculty of Law, Cairo University, is an outstanding scholar of private international law and international civil procedure, including international insolvency and arbitration, as well as international investment law. He obtained his PhD from the University of Dijon in 2003 with a thesis entitled “Overriding Mandatory Rules in State Courts and International Arbitration: A Comparative Franco-Egyptian Study” (Les lois de police dans la jurisprudence étatique et arbitrale : étude comparée franco-égyptienne). The thesis was first published in 2004 by the Atelier national de reproduction des thèses and was republished in 2021 by Éditions universitaires européennes. Professor Zamzam has also published several works in English, notably an article published in 2010 in the Journal of Private International Law, entitled “Bankruptcy Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Foreign Bankruptcy Judgments in Egypt”.

The book, entitled Al-muṭawwal fī al-Qānūn al-Duwalī al-Khāṣ [المطول في القانون الدولي الخاص – The Treatise on Private International Law] (Dar al-Nahḍa al-ʿArabiyya, 2027), revives an old Egyptian tradition of lengthy legal treatises, running to approximately 1,100 pages. It covers the core areas of private international law, namely choice of law, international jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, with particular reference to the case law of the Egyptian Court of Cassation (Maḥkamat al-Naqḍ / محكمة النقض).

The book, kindly made available by the author here for the benefit of Arab PIL scholars and other Arabic-speaking readers, consists of three main parts, preceded by a general introduction.

Part I deals with the general theory of private international law, notably the nature and scope of private international law and its branches (Chap. I), the nature of the conflict-of-laws rule (Chap. II), the application of the conflict-of-laws rule (Chap. III), and disregarding the conflict-of-laws rule and correcting its application (Chap. IV).

Part II deals with the substantive rules of the conflict of laws, notably conflict of laws in personal status matters, or The Principle of the Personal Law (Chap. I), conflict of laws in immovable and movable property, or The Principle of the Territorial Law (Chap. II), conflict of laws in international contractual obligations, or The Principle of Party Autonomy (Chap. III), and conflict of laws in international non-contractual obligations, or The Principle of the Local Law (Chap. IV).

Part III deals with procedural private international law and is divided into two main sections: the first concerns conflicts of international adjudicatory jurisdiction and the international jurisdiction of Egyptian courts (Chap. I), while the second deals with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (Chap. II).

The book has several notable strengths. First, it builds on the existing literature while proposing a broader treatment of private international law in Egypt, often advancing positions that are original, or at least distinct from those prevailing in Egyptian scholarship. Second, it gives an important place to the case law of Egyptian courts, particularly that of the Egyptian Court of Cassation. Finally, in keeping with the tradition of Egyptian scholarly works, it adopts a comparative-law approach, presenting different approaches in major legal systems.

Despite these strong points, there are also some aspects that could, in my view, be taken into account by the author in future editions.

First, I found it particularly unfortunate that the book pays relatively little attention to private international law in other Arab countries. For instance, when discussing the trend towards comprehensive codifications of private international law, the author refers, inter alia, to the Swiss codification of 1984 and the Italian codification of 1995. Surprisingly, however, he also refers to a number of outdated codifications that have since been repealed and replaced by new legislation, such as the Turkish codification of 1982, which was replaced by new legislation in 2007, the Hungarian PIL Law-Decree of 1979, replaced in 2017, and the Romanian PIL Act of 1992, whose substantive provisions were subsequently incorporated into Book VII of the Civil Code, adopted in 2009 and in force since 2011. He also refers to instruments that, although bearing the title “private international law”, deal essentially with choice of law and therefore cannot properly be regarded as comprehensive codifications, such as the Polish Act of 1965, which was replaced by a new Act in 2011.

Surprisingly, the author does not refer to the Tunisian Code of Private International Law of 1998, despite its being available in both Arabic and French. This could have provided a particularly relevant point of reference for a comparative examination of Arab private international law systems. More generally, this reflects a second aspect that, in my view, deserves closer attention: a more systematic comparative-law approach would have benefited from references to the EU regulations, recent developments in US conflict of laws, and, importantly, the work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), including the more recent conventions and other instruments adopted in areas such as international jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, choice of court agreements, and international family law. It would also have been useful to consider contemporary developments observable in other Arab jurisdictions. These developments are largely overlooked, with the author relying instead on classical references found in classical Egyptian legal literature, together with citations to older French textbooks that have since been substantially revised, updated or, in some cases, ceased to be regarded as authoritative references, except in relation to the historical issues that were relevant at the time of their publication.

Another aspect that deserves attention is the use of the case law of the Egyptian Court of Cassation. The author’s effort to identify and discuss relevant cases is certainly to be appreciated. At times, however, the references to the case law appear to be more illustrative than substantive. The treatment of derogative choice-of-court agreements provides a good example. The author cites only two decisions in which the Court of Cassation appears to uphold the validity of such agreements. A closer examination of the available case law on the issue, however, reveals a considerably more complex picture, and one that does not necessarily support the author’s position in favour of derogative choice-of-court agreements. It is also unfortunate that some recent decisions, including cases reported on this blog (here, here, here, here, and here) together with the relevant references to the case law, as well as other useful and more recent sources, have not found their way into this latest contribution to Egyptian private international law.

A third point, and in my view the most important one, concerns the history of Egyptian private international law, which is almost entirely overlooked in the book, as if its development had begun only in 1948 with the adoption of the Egyptian Civil Code and the set of private international law rules contained therein. A historical approach to Egyptian private international law, however, would reveal the broader context in which the present rules were developed, the tensions surrounding their adoption, the extraordinary work undertaken by the early scholars, and, above all, the important role played by the case law of the Mixed Courts in shaping the Egyptian private international law that we know today.

These comments may appear critical, but my intention is simply to express the hope that the tradition of the classical authors, who through meticulous comparative research combined with close attention to judicial practice succeeded in bringing Egyptian private international law to a remarkably advanced level for its time, can be revived. In this sense, the challenge today is not merely to describe the current state of Egyptian private international law by largely reproducing the prevailing literature, but to build on the foundations laid by earlier generations while engaging seriously with contemporary comparative developments and the evolving case law of Egyptian courts. If Egyptian private international law is to regain the dynamism and intellectual ambition that characterised what might be described as its golden age, future editions could benefit from a broader comparative perspective, more systematic and substantive engagement with the case law of Egyptian courts, including the Court of Cassation, and greater attention to the historical experiences that have shaped the present system. Such an approach would not simply document the current state of Egyptian private international law; it could also contribute to reviving the golden age of Egyptian private international law and laying the foundations for its further development.

Despite the above comments, the book remains an important contribution to the field and a valuable addition to the literature on Egyptian private international law. It provides a comprehensive account of the current state of Egyptian PIL and, importantly, brings together the relevant statutory provisions, doctrinal debates and judicial developments in a single work. I hope that it will stimulate further discussion and research and, in future editions, contribute even further to the renewal and development of Egyptian private international law.

Readers probably have already heard that on Friday a jury awarded damages in the amount of $5.72 billion in Taction Technology, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB (S.D. Cal.).  This case has been the subject of one previous Federal Circuit appeal, which resulted in a nonprecedential opinion in August 2025 vacating a summary judgment of noninfringement based in part on an erroneous claim construction.   As the Federal Circuit explained at that time, the patents in suit “share a common specification and relate ‘to tactile transducers that produce bass frequency vibrations for perception by touch,’ with each asserted claim “requir[ing] damping the moving portion’” of the apparatus.  Taction claimed that certain iPhones and Apple Watches with haptic (“the science of enabling interaction with technology through the sense of touch, including, for example, using vibrations”) technology infringed the patents in suit.  

Anyway, the case went to trial this month, and on Friday the jury found that Apple infringed claims 17 and 19 of U.S. Patent No. 10,659,844 and claim 16 of U.S. Patent No. 10,820,117; that Taction proved its damages to be $5,721,961,750; and that the infringement was not willful (so no risk of trebling, at least!).  This is the largest patent damages award in U.S. history—though as others have noted, stratospheric awards like this rarely survive intact, following post-trial motions and appellate review for possible substantive legal errors and/or errors specifically relating to damages calculation.   

I don’t know a great deal yet about the damages issues.  A quick review, however, of the parties’ trial briefs on damages (see here and here), the jury instructions, and a couple of pretrial evidentiary rulings reported on Westlaw (see 2026 WL 2608208 and 2026 WL 2325817) indicate, if I understand correctly, that Taction relied primarily on the “Corsair” license as a comparable, but that the district court excluded the royalty amount in the Corsair license, and the testimony of Taction's damages expert, for failure to adequately apportion the value attributable to the patents in suit in this case.  Taction's September 20 damages brief therefore instead relies on lay testimony that “the cost of ferrofluid required to implement the patented technology in the Corsair product was approximately 20 cents per unit,” and that this cost “is limited to implementing the patented technology and does not relate to the only other technology licensed,” so that "20 cents provides a minimum for a per unit reasonable royalty and, at the very least, provides a data point for the jury to consider in addition to the other evidence":  "[a] party would not pay 20 cents for just one component to implement the infringing technology unless the value that the technology provides exceeds that amount."  Apple counters that without a royalty amount from the Corsair license in evidence, or admissible evidence on how to apportion such a rate, there isn't enough here to justify anything more than nominal damages.  (Apple cites Rex Medical, L.P. v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 156 F.4^th 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2025), as precedent for an award of nominal damages, on the ground, contested by Taction, that that case involved “materially identical facts” including a failure to apportion.  For discussion of Rex on this blog, see here.)  Apple further argues that the testimony about the cost of ferrofluid doesn't overcome these problems, because "ferrofluid is not the claimed invention, and a contribution attributable to an unclaimed component is not an apportionment of the patents' value." 

Reports on Bloomberg, Law360, and ip fray provide some further background on the case, including that the plaintiff’s suit is funded by two related litigation financing entities. 

Update:  I should note that it is not immediately obvious to me how you get to $5.72 billion, even if you credit the plaintiff's argument about the cost of ferrofluid being a relevant reference point.  At 20 cents per unit, you'd have to sell over 28 billion units to get to $5.72 billion.  Apple surely sells a lot of iPhones and Apple Watches, but given earth's population of about 8.3 billion people, that would be about 3.44 products per person.  I suppose we will see what other evidence comes out post-trial and on appeal.  

The event is open to all, but registration is required.

On Tuesday, October 6 2026, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. (CEST).

Sandrine Brachotte (University of Antwerp) and María Julia Ochoa Jiménez (Comillas Pontifical University) will speak, in English, about the book

“Conflicts of Worldviews and Private International Law” (Hart Publishing, 2026).

This book brings together European private international law and decolonial thinking. It examines how European courts deal with conflicts between legal frameworks and postcolonised worldviews. Through three case studies—religious arbitration, Indigenous sacred land, and sexual minorities in the Global South—it shows that these conflicts are often overlooked. This results in the inadequate protection of the claims and identities of formerly colonised peoples. The book therefore proposes a more pluralist approach to jurisdiction, choice of court, and foreign law, giving greater weight to postcolonised worldviews. Prof. Ochoa Jiménez will comment on it, while focusing on private international law.

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.

I recently received a copy of a new edited volume, Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property in Asia:  Sources, Significance, and Side-Effects (Kung-Chung Liu & Tianxiang He eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2026).  The book consists of eighteen chapters, ten of which address criminal sanctions for IP infringement in selected Asian jurisdictions (China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Malaysia, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam).  In addition to an introductory chapter by Roland Moerland, there also are chapters on criminal punishment under the international treaties, on AI, and on comparison and reform, along with chapters on the U.S., the U.K., the E.U., and Germany.  This should be an excellent source for researchers who are interested in comparative IP remedies.  In my recent book Remedies in Intellectual Property Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2026), I drew on a earlier paper coauthored by some of the same authors represented here (Masabumi Suzuki et al., Civil Follow Criminal or Criminal Follow Civil Procedure as Models to Deal with IP Infringement: Asian vis-à-vis Western Approaches, in Kreation Innovation Märkte – Creation Innovation Markets: Festschrift Reto M. Hilty 663 (Florent Thouvenin et al. eds., Springer 2024), previously noted on this blog here), but I surely would have benefited from this more detailed volume (and plan to cite it if I do a second edition!). 

Here is the abstract of the book:

IP scholars are not familiar with criminal law and nor are criminal law scholars familiar with IP law. This edited volume delves into this no man’s land. It identifies and addresses one aspect of IP laws and regimes in Asia that has been long overlooked but is shaping or even distorting the IP landscape in Asia, namely the actual use and/or overuse of criminal punishment for protecting IP rights. This is in stark contrast to leading Western jurisdictions, whose criminal punishment of IP infringement is provided for but rarely enforced. The overarching theme of this book is to critically review the rationale, legitimacy, and effectiveness of criminalizing IP infringement, assess its significance, expose its side effects, and propose reform suggestions. It has five parts. It starts with a criminological discussion of IP crimes, followed by five chapters that study the sources and models of criminal punishment of IP infringement, namely international treaties, the US, UK, Germany, and the EU. Part III then surveys six major civil law Asian jurisdictions—Japan, Taiwan, Korea, China, Thailand, and Vietnam. Part IV research four major common law Asian jurisdictions—India, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The sequence of Parts III and IV follows the order of seniority in introducing criminal punishment for IP infringement and is based on a common structure. The last part of the book provides policy analysis by first rethinking the criminal sanctions against the background of generative AI and the evolution of IP, followed by a comparative study and reform suggestions for IP leading jurisdictions, Asian jurisdictions, and the WTO community.

I have seen one review so far, by Niharika Salar on IPKat, here.

Update:  A review by Thanh Cu Vu is now available as well at 75 GRUR Int. 995 (2026).  

Facts of the case

An unreported judgment of the Family, Childhood and Capacity Section of the Tribunal de Instancia de Alicante (No. 3), dated 29 April 2026, has attracted attention for ordering a Mexican gestational surrogate to pay child maintenance to the Spanish father for whom she carried a child, despite having no custody, no exercise of parental authority, and no contact rights (here and here).

A Spanish man, described in some reports as resident in Alicante province and in others as working in Switzerland, had a child through gestational surrogacy in Mexico using his own sperm and a donor egg; the surrogate has no genetic link to the child. The child was born on 24 April 2024 and travelled to Spain in January 2025, since when he has lived with the father. A separate, earlier 2024 judgment of the same Alicante court had already determined the father’s biological paternity and registered the child, under ordinary Spanish civil-registry rules, with the father’s and the surrogate’s surnames. In the April 2026 judgment, at the Prosecutor’s request and applying Arts. 154 and 158 of the Spanish Civil Code (CC), the court declined to strip the surrogate mother of parental responsibility (patria potestad) but suspended its exercise, gave the father sole custody, denied the mother contact and, because she remains the child’s legal mother, ordered her to pay €150/month plus half of extraordinary expenses.

Recent Spanish case law and practice on surrogacy

The Alicante case follows a line the Spanish Supreme Court has been building with similar facts. In STS 496/2025, of 25 March 2025 (ROJ: STS 1262/2025), the Court dealt with a case originating from a surrogacy arrangement in Tabasco, Mexico. The surrogate contributed no genetic material, and the contract expressly stated she was not the legal, biological or genetic mother and renounced patria potestad and custody in the father’s favour. The children were registered in Tabasco with the father’s two surnames, but the Spanish consular registration ultimately recorded the gestational carrier as mother. Years later the father sued in Spain to have her maternal filiation struck entirely and the surrogate mother herself supported his claim. The Spanish Court of Appeal (Audiencia Provincial) granted it; the Public Prosecutor appealed in cassation, and the Spanish Supreme Court reversed, reinstating her as legal mother. The Supreme Court applied Art. 10.2, Ley 14/2006 which expressly provides that the maternal filiation of children born through gestation by substitution is determined by childbirth. The Supreme Court treated this as a mandatory rule that could not be circumvented by agreement or by an action challenging the maternal filiation (Arts. 131, 139 CC). The court also rejected a request to refer the question to the CJEU because it considered that nothing in Arts. 19 and 20 TFEU was offended by it. The Court also cited its own earlier judgment, STS 1626/2024 of 4 December 2024, for the related but distinct proposition that a foreign judgment attributing parentage to intended parents cannot be recognised in Spain (exequatur) on the same public-policy grounds.

The current administrative framework is set out in the guidelines of the Spanish Ministry of Justice (DGSJFP Instruction of 28 April 2025). The Instruction expressly leaves without effect the earlier Instructions of 2010 and 2019. It provides that a foreign civil-status certificate, a declaration accompanied by medical evidence of birth, or even a foreign judicial decision determining parentage is not, by itself, a sufficient title for registration of a child born through surrogacy. Instead, filiation is to be established through the ordinary mechanisms recognised by Spanish law, including biological filiation and, where appropriate, subsequent adoption.

This doctrine is not merely a registration technicality; it holds even where both the father and the surrogate want the registration undone, which is a stronger statement than a case about recognition of a foreign judgment. Second, the Alicante court’s own earlier 2024 filiation ruling, and its 2026 refusal to go further than suspending (rather than terminating) parental responsibility, both sit squarely within this line: once the gestational carrier was treated as the child’s legal mother, the ordinary legal consequences of parenthood, including the duty to contribute to the child’s maintenance, followed. The Alicante court did not deprive her of parental responsibility; instead, it suspended its exercise, while assigning custody exclusively to the father and excluding contact.

Potential enforcement in Mexico

Whether Mexican law would recognise the same maternal relationship the Spanish courts are drawing consequences from is doubtful. STS 496/2025 illustrates the potential divergence particularly clearly: the contract stated that the gestational carrier was not the legal, juridical or biological mother, and the children were registered in Tabasco with the father’s two surnames, whereas the Spanish courts ultimately treated the gestational carrier as the legal mother under Spanish law. Mexican rules on surrogacy and parentage are state-specific, making it necessary to identify the law applicable to the particular arrangement before drawing conclusions about the status that Mexican law would attribute to the gestational carrier. On that view, the child in the Alicante case could be, simultaneously, solely his father’s child under Mexican law and jointly his and the surrogate’s under Spanish law. That divergence matters practically: a Mexican court asked to enforce the Spanish maintenance order might see the underlying “motherhood” it rests on as itself inconsistent with Mexican public policy, not merely as a foreign court applying stricter substantive rules.

Filiation is governed by Art. 9.4 CC, pointing primarily to the law of the child’s habitual residence at the time when filiation is established, with nationality only a fallback. Maintenance is governed, per Spain’s own conflicts rule (Art. 9.7 CC), by the 2007 Hague Protocol, whose Art. 3(1) points primarily to the creditor’s habitual residence and which, per its Art. 2, applies even where the resulting law is that of a non-Contracting State. The press record is unclear on the relevant facts: the father is described both as Alicante-based and as working in Switzerland, and the child reportedly holds a Swiss passport. A passport evidences nationality, not habitual residence, and nationality isn’t the operative factor for either rule, but if the family’s actual centre of life was split between Spain and Switzerland, that bears on which law governed the 2024 filiation ruling in particular, made before the child’s reported move to Spain.

If pursued in Mexico, recovery of the Spanish maintenance order would fall under the 1956 UN Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance (Mexico: party since 1992; Spain: since 1966), since the 2007 Hague Child Support Convention doesn’t bind Mexico and the 1989 Spain-Mexico bilateral convention expressly excludes maintenance from its scope. The Mexican authorities or courts would still have to apply the applicable Mexican rules governing recognition and enforcement, including any applicable public-policy limitations. However, the father has reportedly said he won’t pursue enforcement of the order. The EU proposal on parenthood recognition does not solve this problem either. The proposal is designed to govern recognition of parenthood established in one Member State by another Member State; it expressly leaves recognition of parenthood established in a third State to national law. Negotiations on the proposal remain ongoing. Thus, even if adopted in its present basic structure, it would not govern recognition in Spain or elsewhere of a parent-child relationship established in Mexico.

The human rights angle

The case sits at an angle to the ECtHR’s surrogacy jurisprudence. Mennesson v. France found a violation of Article 8 in respect of the children’s right to respect for private life because of the failure to recognise their legal relationship with their biological father, while finding no violation as to the parents’ own family-life claim; Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, on referral to the Grand Chamber, found no violation where the intended parents had no biological link to the child at all; Valdís Fjölnisdóttir and Others v. Iceland likewise found no violation in the non-recognition of a same-sex couple’s intended parenthood, given the practical continuity secured through foster care. All three cases concern the position of intended or genetic parents seeking recognition, not, as in the Alicante case, the position of a gestational carrier who is treated as a legal parent for purposes of imposing parental obligations while her exercise of parental responsibility and contact with the child have been suspended or excluded

The ECtHR’s 2019 Advisory Opinion concerning France (P16-2018-001]) further clarified that Article 8 does not require a State to register the details of a foreign birth certificate in order to recognise the legal relationship between a child born through gestational surrogacy and the intended mother. The Court held that another means of recognition, such as adoption, may satisfy the requirements of Article 8, provided that the procedure available under domestic law can be implemented promptly and effectively and in accordance with the child’s best interests. The Advisory Opinion therefore leaves States a choice as to the legal mechanism through which the relationship with the intended mother is recognised, rather than imposing direct registration as the only permissible solution.

The Alicante case raises a different question. Its human-rights significance lies not primarily in the refusal to recognise intended parenthood, but in the consequences of attributing legal motherhood to the gestational carrier. The Strasbourg case law does not appear to have addressed the precise question raised here: whether the attribution of legal motherhood to a gestational carrier may subsequently generate parental obligations, including maintenance, despite the absence of an intended parental relationship between that woman and the child.

As I discuss at pages 199-204 of my book Wrongful Patent Assertion:  A Comparative Law and Economics Analysis (Oxford Univ. Press 2026), several countries, though not the United States, recognize an “abuse of economic dependence” doctrine.  In general terms, the doctrine forbids a firm with relative strength in comparison with another from abusing that strength.  Exactly what that means, of course, may vary from one country to another; but where applicable the doctrine can result in liability under circumstances in which the defendant lacks sufficient market power to be liable for abuse of dominant position.  At least in some countries, moreover, the doctrine is (or as originally conceived was) specifically intended to protect small and medium-sized enterprises, analogous in some ways to the Robinson-Patman Act in the U.S.  But can the doctrine be employed in response to (alleged) abuses of patent rights?

In this regard, I devote several pages to a recent decision of Belgium’s Cour de cassation, Victrix Socsan S.L. v. Tunstall Group Holdings Ltd., which I also have discussed on this blog at various times as it made its way from trial court to appellate court to Cour de cassation (see here, here, and here).  I was therefore pleased to see an English-language translation of portions of the decision by David Wright-Policepayeh in the current issue of GRUR Int. (specifically, 75 GRUR Int. 781-83 (2026)).  The translation highlights the portion of the decision holding that an abuse of economic dependence claim can be asserted even in the absence of a contractual relationship between the claimant and the defendant.  My own take, as expressed in the book, is that the lower court’s narrower interpretation (requiring a contractual relationship) is more sensible than the more expansive interpretation adopted by the Cour de cassation, which (I argue) “may threaten to provide every disappointed business suitor with a potential cause of action” (p.204).  In contrast, “where there is a contractual relationship, the abuse of economic dependence doctrine arguably could fill a gap by discouraging “holdup” in the sense originally developed by Oliver Williamson and others—as a form of opportunism on the part of the dominant party in a contractual relationship, the ex ante possibility of which could discourage some non-dominant undertakings from proceeding with otherwise beneficial transactions, or induce parties to incur inefficient ex ante costs to prevent such opportunism”—though the efficacy of the doctrine in this regard would hinge on the courts’ ability to apply the doctrine in a manner that would maximize social benefits over unintended social costs.

Whether the Belgian decision will lead to more cases, in Belgium or elsewhere, in which claimants assert the doctrine in response to alleged abuses of patent rights remains to be seen.  Meanwhile, for readers who want to learn more about the doctrine but don’t read French, the GRUR-Int. translation should be helpful—as is, I hope, my discussion in Wrongful Patent Assertion.  (And, just a reminder:  you can download the first chapter of the book for free using this link, through the end of this month; and you can use the promotion code AUFLY30 for a 30% discount). 

Christian Helmers and Brian Love have posted a paper on ssrn titled Injunctions and Venture Capital: An Empirical Look at eBay's Effect on Startups, 16 NYU J. Intell. Prop. & Enter. L. __ (forthcoming 2027).  Here is a link to the paper, and here is the abstract:

In the two decades that have passed since the Supreme Court raised the bar for awarding injunctive relief in eBay v. MercExchange, numerous descriptive studies have documented a corresponding reduction in the frequency with which patent enforcers obtain injunctions against ongoing infringement. However, surprisingly few attempts have been made to assess whether eBay had a broader effect on incentives to innovate. As a result, it remains controversial whether eBay advances patent law's fundamental goal of spurring invention--and thus should be preserved--or instead stands in the way of progress--and thus should be reversed or legislatively abrogated. We inform this active policy debate by presenting the results of an empirical analysis of eBay's effect on venture-backed startups, a segment of the innovation economy that is generally regarded as both disproportionately affected by patent protection at the margin and disproportionately responsible for economic growth and job creation. Our results suggest that eBay had a modest and mixed effect on startup performance, not the broadly negative effect predicted by critics of the decision. This is true even among medical technology startups, a group that theory predicts is especially susceptible to eBay's hypothesized harms.

This is an important paper that deserves attention from policymakers.  It adds to the empirical literature evaluating the effect of eBay (in particular, papers by Mezzanotti & Simcoe, Mezzanotti, and Bereskin, Hsu & Wang, previously cited on this blog here) by focusing specifically on venture-backed startups founded between 2002 and 2005, information on which the authors obtained from PitchBook (see pp. 21-22).  Helmers and Love summarize their findings as follows:  

. . . our analysis indicates that the eBay decision had, at most, a modest, mixed effect on startups. What our results primarily suggest is that medtech and IT startups performed no differently than startups in all other areas. We find no evidence that the eBay decision was associated with an increase in shutdowns or down rounds, a reduction in firms’ likelihood of raising an additional round of VC funding, or changes in the quarterly frequency of VC investments. In addition, when we focus on the set of startups that was likely most impacted by eBay—those that filed patent applications prior to the decision—we likewise find no evidence that startups in either set of impacted industries were relatively less likely to progress to late-stage VC funding, more likely to resort to unpriced fundraising deals, or slower to close funding rounds; nor do we find that they grew at relatively slower rates as measured by headcount or the size of the VC deals they completed.

Moreover, when our specifications do produce statistically significant results, those results are mixed. In the medtech industry, our results suggest that startups grew relatively rapidly in the years following eBay as measured by the size of the deals they closed (in the overall sample) and the valuations reflected in those deals (in the overall and patenting samples) and, in addition, were generally more likely than startups in control industries to progress to a Series C funding round. At the same time, our results also suggest that patenting medtech startups were relatively less likely to obtain an initial round of VC funding post-eBay. Similarly, in the software and IT industries, our results indicate that startups grew relatively rapidly in terms of deal size and valuation overall, yet were also less likely to obtain an initial VC investment following eBay in both the overall and patenting samples (p.39).

One possible conclusion to draw, among others, is that "the association between patenting and startup performance may not be driven by the potential enforceability of . . .  patents, but rather . . . their value as signals" (p.41).  

The publisher’s blurb is as follows. Readers of the blog may use the discount code indicated below to get 20% off.

Conflicts of Worldviews and Private International Law

Sandrine Brachotte

This book develops a decolonial theory of European private international law. To do so, it begins with Western court cases involving what the author terms a ‘conflict of worldviews’: a clash between the legal frameworks governing the dispute and the worldviews of the formerly colonised parties involved, referred to here as ‘postcolonised worldviews’.

Through three case studies – respectively addressing religious arbitration, Indigenous sacred land, and sexual minorities in the Global South – the book demonstrates that courts routinely overlook these conflicts. As a result, the claims of formerly colonised parties are inadequately addressed. To remedy this structural discrimination within European private international law, the book proposes a pluralised theory of choice of court, foreign law, and international jurisdiction, more empowering of the postcolonised worldviews present in the case studies, and supportive of the emancipation of vulnerable identities among postcolonised people.

Sandrine Brachotte is an FWO Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Antwerp, Belgium, and a Guest Professor in Legal Theory at UCLouvain and UCLouvain Saint-Louis Bruxelles.

Sep 2026   |   9781509978533   |   416pp   |   Hbk   |    RRP: £100

Discount Price: £80

Order online at www.hartpublishing.co.uk  – use the code GLR BD8 to get 20% off!

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The empirical picture is striking. Of the reported South African REFJ cases collated for this study, roughly 44 per cent of foreign judgments brought for enforcement are refused. Contrary to what one might expect, the leading cause is rarely fraud or public policy. Instead, over half of all refusals (53 per cent) turn on a single, narrow ground: the rendering court’s lack of “international competence” under South African law. Under the framework laid down in Jones v Krok (1995), a foreign court is internationally competent only where the debtor was resident in, or voluntarily submitted to, that court’s jurisdiction. Every other basis for jurisdiction recognised elsewhere – the place of contractual performance, the place where harm occurred, or a valid choice-of-court agreement standing alone- is, on the weight of authority, insufficient.

The doctrinal puzzle at the heart of the article is comity’s curious position within this framework. South African courts have invoked comity rhetorically and sporadically for well over a century, from Acutt, Blaine & Co v Colonial Marine Assurance Co (1882) through to Richman v Ben-Tovim (2006) and Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick (2013). Yet in each instance, comity’s role has been exceptional, ad hoc, and ultimately subordinate to the ad personam residence-or-submission requirement. Even the closest thing to an operative use of comity: Duarte v Lissack (1973), where enforcement followed despite the absence of personal jurisdiction, was swiftly confined and effectively overruled. The result is a doctrine that is normatively invoked but structurally inert: comity as symbol, not substance.

The article argues that this need not remain the case. Drawing on the Canadian Supreme Court’s development of the “real and substantial connection” test (Club Resorts v Van Breda; Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje), it proposes a tailored adaptation for South Africa, allowing courts to recognise a foreign court’s competence where a genuine and substantial connection exists between the dispute and that forum, without collapsing into an unbounded “doing justice” inquiry that risks forum shopping, particularly in cross-border IP and e-commerce disputes. To guard against the corresponding risk of default judgments enforced against debtors with only tenuous links to the foreign forum, the article further proposes strengthening the natural justice defence, requiring proof of adequate notice and a proper evidentiary basis for the judgment, bringing South Africa closer to the approach already taken in India and other Commonwealth African jurisdictions.

Finally, the article situates this proposed judicial reform in relation to the possibility of treaty accession, considering what ratification of the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention and the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention would mean for South Africa’s REFJ regime, as the UK and Singapore have both illustrated in recent years.

The full article, including an appendix collating 39 reported South African REFJ decisions and their outcomes, is open access at the Journal of African Law: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021855326101089

Masabumi Suzuki has posted a paper on ssrn titled Standard Essential Patent Disputes in Japan:  From Apple v. Samsung to Pantech and the Future of SEP Dispute Resolution.  Here is a link to the paper, and here is the abstract:

After more than a decade of silence following the 2014 IP High Court Grand Panel decisions, Japanese courts issued three SEP judgments in 2025, all arising from suits by Pantech. This paper analyzes the Tokyo District Court's Pantech v. Google I — Japan's first case where an injunction was granted on an SEP — arguing its abuse-of-rights reasoning is unpersuasive: it offers no normative standard for good-faith FRAND negotiation, and barely evaluates the patentee's own conduct, unlike the more balanced Osaka judgment in Pantech v. Google II. It also covers Pantech v. ASUS JAPAN's FRAND royalty calculation. The paper then examines the Tokyo District Court's 2026 "Procedures" that push early settlement on global FRAND terms in litigation and initiate a judicial mediation system. It concludes that while this pragmatic turn suits SEPs' inherently global nature, more predictability about Japanese courts' position on FRAND negotiation is needed for Japan to become an attractive forum for SEP disputes.

This is an essential paper, if you want to understand the recent district court decisions in Tokyo and Osaka concerning SEPs—what they say, how they compare to the 2014 Apple v. Samsung decisions, what the possible weak spots are in the courts’ analyses, and what questions remain open—as well as how court-supervised settlement negotiations enter into the mix.

For previous discussion on this blog of the recent decisions discussed in Professor Suzuki's article, see here and here. 

B. Steinrötter: The UNIDROIT Conflict-of-Laws Rule on the Law of Crypto-Assets. A contribution to the classification of Principle 5 of the UNIDROIT Principles on Digital Assets and Private Law

With Principle 5 of the DAPL, UNIDROIT has set out an early general conflict-of-laws rule for digital assets in relation to “proprietary issues”. However, the connecting factor cascade in Principle 5(1) of the DAPL primarily serves substantive-law interests. Neither choice of law nor objective connecting factors are typical of private international law: The lex causae cannot generally be determined by the parties to the transaction, but only by those who create crypto-assets or administer DLT systems, as the choice of law must be specified within the crypto-asset itself or within the system. Nor does the objective connecting factor first and foremost serve the closest connection. Overall, an international law of crypto-asset proprietary rights understood in this way could add a further dimension to the debate on the materialisation of private international law.

M.F. Müller-Berg: On the third-party effects of international jurisdiction in European civil procedure law

The third-party effects of international jurisdiction are only sporadically regulated in European civil procedure law. Against this backdrop, the ECJ has, over the past four decades, established rules governing such third-party effects in a multitude of judgments which cannot always be reconciled. These rules are, in principle, autonomous within the EU legal order, but cannot be applied without recourse to national substantive law, the scope of which, however, remains unclear in specific cases. Four recent judgments add to the existing picture: In the AirHelp case, the ECJ convincingly recognizes a procedural succession to the contractual forum in the event of assignment. Similarly, in the E.B. case, the Court recognizes procedural succession to the beneficial effect of a choice of court agreement in the event of assignment, but makes the procedural succession under EU law dependent not only on the substantive succession but also on the procedural succession under national law, which is itself subject to EU law restrictions. However convincing the decision may be in its outcome, its line of reasoning is equally unconvincing. The German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) arguably leaves open a procedural extension of the beneficial effect of a choice of court agreement in the event of accession to a debt, whilst the French Cour de Cassation convincingly affirms a procedural extension of the onerous effect of a choice of court agreement in case of a contract for the benefit of a third party. Taken as a whole, an increasingly uniform picture emerges. However, the recourse to national law in the E.B. case not only to substantive succession but also to procedural succession appears inconsistent.

M. Lieberknecht: Demarcating the Scopes of Art. 25 Brussels Regulation and National Law with Regard to the Substantive Validity of Jurisdiction Agreements

Regarding the substantive validity of jurisdiction agreements, Art. 25(1) Brussels I Regulation generally refers to the lex fori prorogati. However, the provision also provides an autonomous standard which governs certain questions of validity and, to that extent, supersedes national law. Given that the CJEU is only incrementally developing these pertinent (unwritten) standards, the precise scope of the ostensibly straightforward referral in Art. 25(1) Brussels I Regulation remains somewhat unclear. The Pome judgment further illustrates the CJEU’s understanding of how the domains of national and EU law are demarcated in this context. Specifically, the decision deals with a provision in the Estonian Code of Civil Procedure which limits the permissibility of jurisdiction agreements to disputes connected to the economic or professional activity of the parties. The CJEU held that such a provision is subordinate to the Art. 25 Brussels I Regulation and therefore has no bearing on the validity of a jurisdiction agreement that falls within the ambit of the Brussels regime – a conclusion that proves both correct and, in light of the Court’s recent obiter dictum in the Lastre case, all but inevitable.

W. Hau: The treatment of foreign decisions alleged to be contrary to EU law under EU recognition rules

It is not uncommon for a party seeking to prevent the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment to invoke public policy, claiming that the foreign court has infringed a provision of EU law. However, although it may seem paradoxical, the ECJ emphasises that it is precisely EU law that may prohibit the review of the compatibility of a decision from another Member State with EU law. The implications of this are discussed here using a case from the Higher Regional Court of Schleswig-Holstein, which confirmed the enforceability of a Belgian judgment in Germany under the Brussels I Regulation, even though the Belgian court may have disregarded provisions of European competition law.

D. Coester-Waltjen: The duty to hear the child – when is it indispensable?

The ECHR and the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) both concentrate on the question whether the failure to hear the child in child proceedings constitutes a violation of the European Human Rights Convention (EHRC) and the German Constitution, respectively. The courts arrive at different results: Whereas the German FCC holds that in this case the failure to hear the child is irrelevant, the ECHR stresses that the hearing of the child is the key issue of child proceedings and that courts must justify duly if they refrain from hearing the child.

The facts of both cases differ considerably as do the legal implications. However, it seems worthwhile to look closely at the reasoning of both decisions. Despite the different context, the question arises whether and to which extent the arguments of the ECHR might have implications also for those situations the German FCC had to deal with. Despite the multiplicity of proceedings in both cases and the variety of arguments brought forward the following lines will concentrate on child hearing exclusively.

M. Gebauer: German law of parenthood and Italian public policy

The Italian Court of Cassation has ruled that a German decision establishing the paternity of the deceased can be recognised, even if the heirs were not involved in the German proceedings. This is also in line with German law, whereas in Italian parenthood proceedings an application for a declaratory judgment following the death of the alleged parent must be made against the heirs because their legal position depends on the preliminary question of parenthood. These differences raise issues of public policy at the recognition stage, particularly when the right to a fair hearing is at stake. The Court of Cassation convincingly reasons that these differences are primarily due to substantive law and the interests deemed relevant by the respective legislator. The decision highlights the intra-European relevance of matters of parenthood on the one hand, but also the limits of unifying conflict of laws when it is not designed to overcome differences in parenthood legislation between Member States.

M. Stürner/I. Riva: Post-mortem paternity determination and Italian public policy

The Italian Court of Cassation has ruled that a German judgment establishing post-mortem paternity does not violate Italian public policy merely because the brother of the deceased (an Italian national), his wife and her son were not parties to the German proceedings. The decision is also based on the argument that the German judgment to be recognised originates from a highly reliable legal system, which serves as a point of reference for Italian civil procedure doctrine and is a key player in the European legal area; however, this rationale is hardly convincing in light of the postulate of the equivalence of legal systems.

S. Deuring: Choice of Law for Unjust Enrichment – regarding Cour de Cassation, Judgment of 26.11.2025 – Nr. 24-10.781

In the present case, the French Court of Cassation had to address a wide range of legal issues relating to the choice of law regarding unjust enrichment. The professional liability insurance of a German notary demanded repayment of the amount paid to the aggrieved bank, which is headquartered in France. Ultimately, the Court of Cassation concluded that German law on unjust enrichment should apply, a conclusion that is sound in substance but not in its reasoning. On more than one occasion, it had the opportunity to have the European Court of Justice clarify contentious questions of interpretation regarding Article 10 of the Rome II Regulation. Instead, the court developed its own guidelines with varying degrees of elaboration: In cases involving multiple parties, Article 10(1) of the Rome II Regulation providing for a primary connection to an existing relationship cannot be applied. The connecting rule of Article 10(3) of the Rome II Regulation refers to the law of the place where the enrichment occurred. Through the escape clause in Article 10(4) of the Rome II Regulation, the state with which the closest connection exists must be determined by weighing the overall circumstances. How the individual circumstances are to be weighed is left to the lower courts.

D. Tarikanov: Regulations governing various issues in the General and Special Parts of Private International Law under the PIL-Rulings of the Russian Supreme Court

This article analyses the Russian Supreme Court’s Regulation No. 24 of 9 July 2019, on the application of Private International Law. It examines the following issues: the legal nature of the Judicial Application Rulings in Russia; the triad of the foreign elements (the foreign subject, the foreign object, and the foreign juridical fact); the economic or legal connection of the domestic contract with the international contract as a foreign element; severance (dépeçage) of the contract statute and the personal statute in cases of absolute or relative invalidity of legal transactions for reasons relating to the person; the possibility of freedom of choice of law in international property law; and the transfer of title to movable property shifting from the sphere governed by the separation principle to that governed by the consensual principle.

The project has now been extended with the publication of Part 2: Litigating International Child Abduction Cases under the 1980 Hague Convention in the EU (2026, ISBN 978-619-93392-1-3). While Part 1 provides the conceptual and terminological foundations, Part 2 applies them to one of the most demanding areas of cross-border family law: international child abduction proceedings.

The new handbook may be viewed and downloaded free of charge.

Following the course of a return case

Rather than following the sequence of the 1980 Hague Convention, Part 2 mirrors the progression of an actual return case. It moves from identifying the applicable framework and establishing whether the Convention applies to the parties’ positions, exceptions to return, evidence, child participation, domestic violence and protective measures. It concludes with return decisions, appeals, enforcement and post-decision proceedings.

This structure enables practitioners to move directly from a concrete problem to the relevant principles and authorities.

Comparative case law at the centre of the analysis

The handbook contains 481 case notes drawn from national decisions in 23 jurisdictions: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. These are considered alongside judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights and encompass first-instance, appellate and supreme-court decisions.

This comparative approach reveals how recurring legal questions may produce different outcomes depending on the facts, available evidence and procedural context.

Issues capable of determining proceedings

Particular attention is devoted to issues that may prove decisive, including:

• custody rights and their exercise;
• consent, acquiescence and the child’s settlement;
• grave risk and intolerable situations;
• child objections and the right to be heard;
• burdens of proof and foreign-law evidence;
• domestic violence and protective measures;
• parallel parental-responsibility proceedings; and
• return orders, appeals, enforcement and the Brussels IIb overriding mechanism.

In her handbook, Nadia Rusinova examines throughout the interaction between the 1980 Hague Convention, Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 – Brussels IIb – and the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention. Its treatment of child participation, domestic violence and protective measures is especially timely, reflecting the need to reconcile prompt return with an effective, evidence-based and child-centred assessment of risk.

A practical and accessible resource

The handbook is an essential resource for all professionals engaged in international child abduction and cross-border family law, including judges, lawyers, central authorities, court staff, researchers, trainers and translators. Wherever possible, the electronic edition provides direct links to the underlying decisions, enabling readers to examine their full factual context and judicial reasoning.

Part 2 complements Part 1 of the Practical Handbook on EU Family Law. The two volumes are designed to work together while remaining fully usable independently.

Further information is available on Nadia Rusinova’s EU Family Law Handbook webpage. Readers may also be interested in her related 2026 research project, Domestic Violence in Dutch Return Proceedings.

B. Case Law under the 1965 Hague Convention
The three judgments published examine the application of the 1965 Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents (ratified by Law 1334/1983). More specifically, the question is whether, under Article 15 HSC, proceedings may continue when the defendant resides in another Contracting State, and no certificate of service has been produced at the hearing.
1. In the first judgment, the court held that actual service of the statement of claim and summons on a defendant residing in Northern Ireland had not been established. Although the documents had been transmitted through the Prosecutor of the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance to the competent foreign authorities, and those authorities had informally confirmed receipt of the documents, no certificate of service had been returned by the time of the hearing.
The court held that it could not render a final judgment in default of the defendant because the requirements of Article 15(2) of the Convention had not been satisfied, in particular because it had not been established that the authorities of the State addressed had undertaken persistent efforts to complete service and obtain the relevant certificate. For that reason, the Greek Court stayed the delivery of a judgment until service had been established in the manner described above.
2. In the second judgment (concerning a divorce action against a defendant residing in the United Kingdom), the court adopted a different approach. Although no proof of actual service of the summons on the defendant had been produced, it was established that the documents had been duly transmitted to the competent UK authorities, that more than six months had elapsed, and that the failure to complete service was attributable to mishandling by the British authorities, which had unjustifiably returned the documents to the Greek Agency, making a new transmission necessary. The court held that the claimant should not bear the consequences of that error and that the requirements of Article 15(2) of the Convention had been satisfied. It therefore held that the hearing could proceed in the defendant’s absence.
3. In the third judgment, the court considered an application for revocation of an interlocutory decision which had stayed the delivery of a final judgment until service on the first defendant, who resided in India, had been established.
The claimant sought revocation of the previous decision, but produced neither the certificate referred to in Article 6 HSC, nor any other document establishing that the document had been transmitted to the competent Indian authority and that, despite the relevant reminders or persistent efforts, it had not been possible to obtain a certificate of service. The court held that actual service had not been established and that the condition laid down in Article 15(2)(c) HSC, namely, the inability to obtain a certificate despite persistent efforts by the competent authorities, had not been satisfied. For that reason, it dismissed the application.
4. Taken together, the three judgments demonstrate that the mere transmission of judicial documents through the Prosecutor to the foreign authorities is not, in itself, sufficient. What is decisive is either that actual service on the foreign party be established or, by way of exception, that it be shown that the cumulative conditions of Article 15(2) HSC have been satisfied, so that the proceedings may continue without the relevant certificate. Nevertheless, the judgments differ precisely as to whether the necessary efforts were established and whether the conditions for this exception were satisfied.
C. The Corresponding Provision of the EU Regulations
It is universally acknowledged, and beyond dispute, that the Regulation governing cross-border service within the EU almost reproduces the substance of the HSC. In particular, with regard to the functional equivalent of Article 15(2)(c) HSC, the wording of the European Regulations leads, in virtually identical terms, to the same legal result. To illustrate:
1. Regulation 1348/2000 [Article 19(2)(c)]: “no certificate of any kind has been received, even though every reasonable effort has been made through the competent authorities or bodies of the Member State addressed.”
2. Regulation 1393/2007 [Article 19(2)(c)]: “no certificate of any kind has been received, even though every reasonable effort has been made through the competent authorities or bodies of the Member State addressed.”
3. Regulation 2020/1784 [Article 22(2)(c)]: “no certificate of any kind has been received, even though every reasonable effort has been made to obtain one through the competent authorities or bodies of the Member State addressed.”
4. In contrast to the earlier versions of the EU Regulation (1348/2000 and 1393/2007), the explanatory material accompanying the Regulation currently in force (2020/1784) contains a much more extensive reference to the issue. In particular, Recital 35 states as follows:
Where national law and this Regulation allow the court to give judgment even if no certificate of service or delivery of the document instituting the proceedings or its equivalent has been received, every reasonable effort should be made to obtain the certificate through the competent authorities or bodies of the Member State addressed before any judgment is given, in compliance with any other requirements safeguarding the interests of the defendant. Unless incompatible with national law, all reasonable efforts should be made to inform the defendant that court proceedings have been instituted using any available channels of communication, including modern communications technology, for which an address or an account is known to the court seised of the proceedings.
D. The New Greek Provision on (Article 134A GCCP)
The new provision, entitled “Procedure for the Service of a Judicial Document Abroad,” provides in its second paragraph as follows: The court may, even if no certificate of service of the document or other equivalent document on the addressee residing abroad has been received, immediately render judgment if:
(a) the document was transmitted in accordance with the international rules applicable to the particular service or paragraph 3 of Article 134;
(b) a period of at least six (6) months has elapsed between the transmission of the document and the hearing; and
(c) it is established that the document was transmitted to the State addressed in sufficient time, so that further service on the addressee has been possible.
A reading of the above provision makes it clear that persistent or reasonable efforts are no longer required. It is therefore sufficient that the timely transmission be established and that the possibility of service upon the addressee in the State addressed be confirmed. It remains for the courts to interpret and define the possibilities embodied in the formal wording of the provision, namely, in the direction of expeditious service resulting from the timely transmission of the document from Greece to the State of destination.
E. Persistent & Reasonable Efforts
The assessments of the Hague Conference on Private International Law concerning this issue are, of course, of particular interest, namely, with regard to the third condition of the provision (failure to obtain the certificate). The type of certificate depends on the channel used to transmit the document. If the principal channel (Article 5 HSC) was used, the certificate is the one required under Article 6 HSC. However, a United States court has held that a police report documenting attempts to effect service constitutes a certificate within the meaning of Article 15(2)(c) HSC. In the case of alternative channels, any evidence of service could qualify as a certificate. The Special Commission of the Hague Conference has expressly noted that receipt of a certificate stating that service could not be effected does not constitute an obstacle to the rendering of a judgment in accordance with the domestic law of the Requesting State, where that State has made the relevant declaration.
The requirement that every reasonable effort be made to obtain the Certificate has been considered by a number of United States courts. In one case, a federal district court held that making a single telephone call to the Central Authority in order to obtain oral confirmation of service was insufficient to satisfy that requirement.
In another case, an appellate court held that, in proceedings against the Consulate General of a Contracting State, notification of the defendant’s attorney amounted to “every persistent effort,” given that the rules of professional conduct under the law of the forum prohibited the claimant’s attorney from communicating with the defendant except through the defendant’s attorney. The court’s decision was based on the premise that the legal personality of the defendant extended to all officials of the foreign State. By contacting the defendant’s attorney, the claimant had accomplished “the only step ethically permitted.”
F. Persistent Efforts vs. Reasonable Efforts?
Is there a difference between the persistent efforts required under the Greek version of the HSC, and the reasonable efforts contemplated by the Regulations? Attempting a preliminary comparison, it could be argued that the “treaty-based” version perhaps indirectly emphasizes the temporal dimension of the efforts. In other words, repeated attempts to locate the addressee are required and expected. From the EU perspective, the center of gravity is not linked to the temporal dimension, but rather to a somewhat indeterminate prerequisite, namely, the
Returning to the “duel” between the Greek version of the HSC and the EU and multilateral treaty legislative frameworks, we arrive at the following conclusion: even assuming that the above distinction offers some useful clarification, in practice everything will depend on the court’s discretion in assessing each individual case. Delay attributable to an error by the foreign authority of the State of destination; inability to locate the addressee, even where the addressee is a legal person; an oral assurance that service has taken place, without the certificate of service nevertheless being produced before the Greek courts; complete silence on the part of the foreign authority, whether or not following a request or reminder from the Greek side, all of the foregoing constitute a mixture of circumstances requiring classification.
G. The Discussion in the German Legal Order
Without intending to diminish the importance of other legal systems, the scholarly debate originating in German legal thought has historically been of considerable value and is, for that reason, indispensable. At the outset, it is understood and expected by legal scholarship that the competent authorities of the State of destination have taken the necessary measures to obtain a certificate of service. General assumptions and conjecture that the defendant received the document do not render the production of proof of service unnecessary. Quite the contrary: Schlosser interprets the critical provision by formulating the rule of the threshold of reasonableness (Zumutbarkeitsgrenze). Within this framework, he considers it sufficient, both on the part of the competent authority and on the part of the claimant, to submit an inquiry concerning the stage reached in the service procedure, in the form of a good-faith effort. In general terms, his position leans toward limited involvement by the competent authorities of the State of origin, apparently in order to avoid slowing down the system as a whole.
Much more detailed is Ulrici’s analysis in Rauscher’s article-by-article commentary on Regulation 2020/1784. First, in contrast to the Greek focus on the basic model of judicial cooperation (Transmitting and Receiving Agencies), German legal scholarship approaches the problem from other perspectives as well. Thus, what efforts have been undertaken by the Receiving Authorities is not decisive. This already follows empirically: The Authority cannot become involved in every cross-border service.
It is emphasised that the authority ordering service abroad and bearing the obligation to take all reasonable measures is the court seised of the dispute. In the case of direct service, that role is assumed by the person designated pursuant to Article 20 Regulation 2020/1784.
The purpose of the efforts, contrary to the relatively vague wording of paragraph 2(c), is to obtain a certificate concerning service that has already been effected, as well as confirmation that the procedure has been effectively carried out and completed. The purpose of the efforts is also to make a possible new attempt at transmission feasible, either at the initiative of the party seeking to expedite the proceedings or as an expression of the effort to make a new attempt in order to obtain a certificate. This is required equally by the defendant’s right to a fair trial and by the claimant’s right to effective judicial protection.
If no certificate within the meaning of Article 10(1) of Regulation 2020/1784 is received, the matter requires immediate reconsideration and intervention by the Central Authority after the expiry of a further reasonable period. The same applies where no certificate is received in cases of direct service. If the Receiving Agency indicates that a request for service is deficient or does not fall within the scope of the Regulation, an appropriate response must be provided (Article 10(2) and (3) Regulation 2020/1784).
The competent authority may also have an obligation to order a new attempt at service by another procedure provided for by the Regulation, for example, where no acknowledgement of receipt has been received, by using direct service, or by service through judicial assistance. Where there are indications concerning the possibility of locating the address, it is recommended that they be pursued, provided that the law of the State of origin does not preclude an attempt at informal notification by any means recognisable to the authority ordering service, provided that such means permits notification exclusively to the addressee and therefore not publicly. It may be necessary to notify the defendant through a known email address, mobile telephone number, etc., and then allow a reasonable period of time for the defendant to respond.
H. Conclusion
I conclude my reflections by assessing the ruling of the First Instance Court in Judgment No. 3118/2025. The judge held that “the claimant should not bear the consequences of the error of others” and, for the aforementioned reason, considered that the hearing could proceed in the absence of the defendant. Prima facie, there does not appear to be, at least within Greece, a reported case corresponding to this situation under Article 22(2)(c) of the Regulation and Article 15(2)(c) HSC. Nevertheless, beyond safeguarding the right of the addressee-defendant to be heard, this interpretative approach also highlights the intention to safeguard the claimant’s right to effective judicial protection. It is to this potentially balanced position of the parties that we look for the sober and harmonising approach of the country’s judges, so that a common line may be developed and secured within the Greek legal order.

The authors are all professors or emeritus-professors at the UCLouvain, as was the initial author François Rigaux. He involved Marc Fallon in the second and third editions, and Marc Fallon invided Jean-Yves Carlier and Stéphanie Francq to join for the latest edition.

Volume I contains the general part, discussing the history and method of private international law, as well as general approaches to jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement and procedure. Volume II covers specific topics.

The authors aim to provide students with both solutions and tools to learn methods of finding solutions. They state this approach in their preface, and remain faithful to it. The book is not restricted to students, but aimed at practitioners, lawyers, judges, notaries, civil servants, legal advisors and researchers alike. Each of these groups will use the book with a slightly different expectation – to find the correct approach, the learn about the law as it is, where it comes from and why it is the way it is. The book offers all of this, at the same time bringing together national, EU and international law, as is indispensable in current-day private international law. The book is therefore not limited to Belgian private international law. As the authors have a deep foundation in EU law, their discussions of private international law are grounded in this broader context. And as Marc Fallon states in the preface, EU law has become “omnipresent” next to the conventions of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. He adds that EU law is now covering a major part of private international law, and that even the parts that are not yet the subject of EU legislation are heavily influenced by primary EU law. Therefore the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU is now a major source of private international law.

The approach is not article-by-article but a coherent discussion of the legal domains of private international law. It contains a thorough explanation of the particular terminology as well as the links to substantive law. It is balanced, providing on the one hand a global analysis of the real complexities of the discipline, and on the other hand clear and precise information and illustrations from case law. Each chapter or section starts with an extensive bibliography of Belgian and international legal literature and websites, divided into the categories relevant for the chapter or section that follows.

The first volume is dedicated to the general part of private international law. Its first chapter sets private international law in the context of international law, international human rights protection, EU law, and transnational legal orders such as religious laws and acts by sports federations. The authors discuss the place of state law in this plurality of legal orders, and the method of private international law to solve system conflicts. It is didactic in its explanation of core notions such as State jurisdiction and sovereignty, spatial limits of State law, territoriality, and nationality.

A rich account of the historical foundations of private international law and different schools make up Chapter 2. The following Chapters, 3 to 7, discuss the connecting factor, its applicability, application, and operation. Chapter 6 dedicates its full 93 pages to the determination of foreign law, including internal conflicts and temporal issues. Renvoi is set out in 23 pages, which explain meticulously the various forms and effects of this technique, and offering an evaluation from various perspectives. This analysis allows the reader to understand the technique, and invites us to view it in all its nuances, for all its advantages, vices and practical value. The Chapter also reviews various methods, such as the method of recognition, and complications such as the preliminary question. It investigates how foreign law must be applied – ex officio or invoked by the parties, and how a court should find such foreign law. The reader encounters again an admirable combination of theory and practice. On the fiction of jura novit curia the authors showcase the different approaches on determining foreign law, and they link this to the nature of the connecting factor (multilateral or unilateral).

Chapter 8 turns to the sources of international procedural law, including the methods to interpret these sources. It covers sources of the EU, international law as well as bilateral treaties. Chapter 9 is a general chapter on civil jurisdiction for international cases. Chapter 10 is the same for recognition and enforcement, called the “effect” of foreign judgments and authentic instruments. The name simultaneously indicates the breadth and depth – the authors cover the many potential effects, and again in detail. They for example delve into the evidentiary effect of foreign acts, a matter that is causing jurists and negotiators headaches during discussions of the EU’s parenthood proposal that is currently on the drawing table. They discuss the external and internal effects, and the factual effects of foreign decisions and authentic acts. The lucidity they bring is welcome in current private international law. Placing this discussion in the general part of their book allows them to draw from various of the so-called third generation private international law Regulations in the EU, i.e. the Regulations that cover jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement, and cross-border cooperation.

Volume II, the thicker of the two, approaches the various domains of private law step by step. It contains chapters on the law of persons and family (including marriage, divorce, registered partners, cohabitants, matrimonial property, filiation, the protection of children and of adults, and maintenance obligations), property law (including trusts, intellectual property, insolvency, succession), contracts (general and specific contracts), tort (general and specific). Each of these sections discuss jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, and where relevant enforcement. The authors include the specificities of each domain of the law, covering international conventions, EU legislation and its Belgian implementation, Belgian legislation, and case law of EU and Belgian courts. They showcase where mandatory laws, EU primary law (such as free movement), public policy or other exceptions or peculiarities come at play. Old law that could still extend to current situations is also included, for instance with respect to matrimonial property.

The structure of the two books is to a large extent in line with the Belgian Private International Law Code of 2004 (and the Swiss code). But perhaps it is the other way around: perhaps the code followed the initial Rigaux and Fallon structure, with all its didactic qualities. Yet, the Private International Law Code is now full of large holes, eaten out by EU law. The same cannot be said of this Précis.

My copy, which initially served for this book review, is already filled with post-its for my own teaching and research.

Thalia Kruger

On 29 May 2026, the WEAKER PIL research line at the Faculty of Law of the University of Groningen hosted the symposium ‘Digitalisation of Justice: Perspectives from Germany and the Netherlands’ at the House of Connections in Groningen. The symposium brought together scholars from both jurisdictions across four fields of law: private international law, civil procedure, criminal procedure, and administrative procedural law. They were joined by practitioners, emerging scholars, and more than 40 participants.

The symposium was guided by the central research question of the legal and institutional conditions under which the digitalisation of justice in Germany and the Netherlands can contribute to improved access to justice and to the quality of judicial decision-making, without undermining minimum standards of the rule of law and procedural guarantees.

The choice of a bilateral, cross-doctrinal design was deliberate: national legislators and courts are responding to digital transformation at remarkably different speeds, and innovative solutions to shared problems have often already emerged in the other legal system or in a neighbouring field of law. This report focusses on the conference’s discussions around private international law, summarizing the cross-cutting themes that emerged over the course of the day. A full report will be published in the Springer-volume ‘Digitalisation of Justice: Perspectives from Germany and the Netherlands’ in the course of 2027.

Opening and Keynote

The symposium was opened by Dr. Benedikt Schmitz (University of Groningen), who described the critical crossroads at which the ongoing digitalisation and our legal system find themselves, with the latter lagging behind when it comes to adjusting existing norms to changing realities. He raised central questions about the use of AI in the legal field and its relation to the rule of law and the principle of fairness. His opening was followed by welcome addresses by Prof. Dr. Wilbert Kolkman, Dean of the Faculty of Law, and Prof. Dr. Jouke de Vries, President of the University Board. In a humorous way, Kolkman criticised what the support of AI has done to the quality of academic legal papers by describing the evolution from the printing press, to pressing print on a computer, to the ‘depressing print’ that he called the papers of students, who are not the only ones handing in AI-generated texts that lack the meaning human-produced work entails. De Vries emphasised the importance of cross-border cooperation to tackle complex societal issues that cannot be approached from one discipline or jurisdiction alone. He further encouraged incorporating the knowledge of civil society organisations into academic debate through transdisciplinary research.

In his keynote address, Dr. Benjamin Grimm (Minister of Justice and for Digitalisation, Federal State of Brandenburg, Germany) offered the perspective of a Land justice ministry engaged in the practical implementation of digital justice. Even in an integrated European Union, he observed, judicial matters continue to reflect national traditions. Precisely for that reason it is necessary to look across borders and learn from one another. Brandenburg was the first German Land to combine the portfolios of justice and digitalisation in a single ministry – a deliberate pairing of a traditionally conservative judiciary with a policy field associated with progress, modernity and new ideas, a combination for which Estonia in particular served as a point of reference. In Brandenburg, responsibilities for digitalisation projects, including their funding, have been consolidated centrally – a choice Grimm defended while acknowledging the tension it creates with Germany’s federal structure.

Grimm placed these institutional choices in a sobering context: in a recent survey, only 15 per cent of citizens said that their expectations of the modern, digital administration were met, and only one in three people expressed trust in their government. Digitalisation, he argued, is therefore not merely a matter of efficient administration but of countering fears and proving that the State remains capable of being future-proof. The State, he insisted, must meet the expectations citizens bring from a world in which goods ordered online arrive the next day. This idea, however, would require central coordination beyond Brandenburg to ensure successful implementation.

For the judiciary, Grimm identified the digital availability of files as the indispensable foundation: the use of AI cannot be accepted, let alone succeed, while courts remain stuck with analogue files. The introduction of the electronic case file, imposed on a sometimes reluctant judiciary, is in his words not even digitalisation but ‘merely electrification’ and thus a first, but certainly not a last, step.

Grimm closed with a plea for coordination: the tools currently in use across the federal states are outdated and scattered, and all ministers of justice are working together towards a uniform software solution and unified architectural standards to fundamentally reform the judiciary’s use of digitalisation. The judiciary, he said, is standing at the dawn of a digital revolution. Several of his themes – the loss of citizens’ trust in a slow-moving administration and the question of how much decision-making may be delegated to machines – returned throughout the day, most directly in Panel 4 and in the closing plenary discussion.

First panel: Private International Law

The first panel, moderated by Benedikt Schmitz (Groningen) and sponsored by the Royal Netherlands Society of International Law, addressed the digitalisation of cross-border civil justice. Susanne Lilian Gössl (Bonn) opened with an assessment of digital justice and cross-border proceedings in Germany, where the progress of digitalisation is slow (and slower still in cross-border cases), marked by general scepticism and uncertainty. Alongside structural features of the field – the applicable law follows the lex fori, the strongest impulses come from EU law (which is nonetheless cautious to interfere with Member States’ procedural law), and the eCodex system provides decentralised, interoperable communication between Member State courts – she pointed to concrete hurdles such as the beA special electronic mailbox, which makes it difficult for foreign attorneys to file cases in Germany, and to courts’ initial resistance to online participation of parties abroad. However, what was once regarded as an affront to the other State’s sovereignty is now increasingly accepted if parties voluntarily participate. Gössl ended by briefly touching upon enforceable and non-enforceable mediation and arbitration agreements and the challenges Germany’s paper-based approaches pose in international settings.

Kirsten Henckel (Groningen) asked whether we can really digitalise justice – and whether courts can actually use the new technologies. EU digitalisation efforts, she argued, largely digitise existing processes while creating problems of their own, relating to, inter alia, privacy, AI, and non-EU service providers. Presenting collective actions as a Dutch tradition of forty years, most recently under the 2020 WAMCA (Dutch Act on the resolution of mass damages in collective actions), she made the Netherlands a case study for access to justice in a digitised world, and raised the question which law prevails when jurisdiction must be established under both the Brussels Ia Regulation and the GDPR as lex specialis.

Frederick Rieländer (Bremen) began his presentation from a comparative perspective: the most technologically advanced countries were at the forefront of digitalising justice, and the EU is now committed to digitalising cross-border proceedings, with the Commission wanting all relevant processes to be digital by the end of the decade. He emphasised that digital tools can reshape the handling and administration of cross-border litigation in the EU, but the legal framework needs to be refined through uniform European standards to unlock these transformative abilities without undermining the procedural rights of users. Rieländer distinguished between German pilot projects of organisational assistance systems, decision-support systems and (semi-)automated ‘case deciders’, the former two already in use, as illustrated by a tool that helps judges detect hallucinated citations in lengthy party submissions. He extended his analysis to immersive technologies (virtual, augmented and mixed reality) as new evidentiary possibilities across borders, not yet employed in most EU Member States. As a way forward, Rieländer pointed to the European Law Institute and UNIDROIT as potential drafters of a soft-law instrument to create rules on the use of AI that can set minimum standard while the digitalisation within the EU continues to move forward.

The ensuing discussion turned to international arbitration, which in some respects has moved faster than the courts: the Dutch Arbitration Act, it was noted, already allowed for digital hearings during the COVID-19 pandemic. On the use of AI in arbitration, a consensus emerged to remain cautious: because AI can never be impartial, decision-making should not be entrusted to it. As a tool, however, it is of great value and may eventually enable arbitrators to draw on more information than any human could; provided its (confirmation) bias is overcome. Two practical constraints were added: AI will only be integrated into practice if it is simple to use, whereas practitioners currently face a difficult choice between too many confusing tools. Moreover, most Member States are too small to gather sufficient data to train large language models on their own – an observation that led back to the panel’s emphasis on common standards within a European legal framework.

Second panel: Civil Procedure

The second panel, moderated by Patrick Koerts (Groningen), turned to domestic civil procedure. Gralf-Peter Calliess (Bremen) traced Germany’s history of digital false starts – from a digital signature too secure ever to be affordable to the repeatedly postponed electronic case file – and remained sceptical of the online-procedure pilots introduced in December 2025 in the new Book 12 of the German Code of Civil Procedure: digitalisation, he argued, requires a change of mindset from adjudication as an exercise of sovereign power (Hoheit) to adjudication as a judicial service (Dienstleistung). Pauline Ernste (Nijmegen) examined judicial fact-finding via Google and ChatGPT under Dutch procedural law: LLM-derived facts cannot qualify as facts of common knowledge, the duty to tell the truth requires parties to disclose their own use of AI, and AI literacy must be structurally embedded in legal training.

Third panel: Criminal Procedure

In the third panel, moderated by Glenn Thodé (Groningen), Hannah Ofterdinger (Hamburg) took stock of the digitalisation of German criminal procedure and its obstacles, concluding that the question is not whether, but how we digitalise. Dorris de Vocht (Tilburg) asked why the Netherlands treats remote hearings as a last resort and argued that the assumption that meaningful participation requires physical presence should itself be questioned: procedural fairness should not – and does not have to – depend on whether a hearing is physical or remote. Laura Peters (Groningen) presented the AIWITNESS project and the FAIR method, contending that criminal procedural principles must guide the design of AI systems from the outset She concluded that criminal procedural law is moving from ex post review to procedural design.

Fourth panel: Administrative Procedure

The fourth panel, moderated by Ida Varosanec (Groningen), addressed administrative procedural law. Sarah Rachut (Braunschweig) mapped Germany’s asymmetric regulation of administrative authorities and courts, presented survey evidence from the TITAN project on the use of AI within the administration, and identified a regulatory gap: fully automated administrative acts are regulated, AI-assisted decision preparation is not. Sofia Ranchordás (Tilburg/Rome) argued that the procedural safeguards of administrative law – the right to be heard, the duty to state reasons, the right of access, and judicial review – are built on the paper logic of the file, which digital transformation dissolves. She noted how discretion migrates from the decision to the design, and the task is not to retrofit, but to rethink. The following lively discussion closed on a question that hung over much of the day: what do we do with the law that was not made for digitalisation?

Closing Session and Outlook

The closing session opened with elevator pitches by five emerging scholars. Of most direct interest to readers of this blog, Mustafa Can (Groningen) turned to the law applicable to civil liability in EU token markets, contrasting public money with digital assets issued by private institutions. Individual proceedings are possible, but the cross-border setting creates an inherent foreign element, leading him to emphasise the importance of simplification. The remaining pitches ranged from a digital ‘zeroth instance’ for German civil proceedings and its constitutional tensions (Noelle Frick, Speyer), via automation bias and the limits of human oversight in AI-based evidence verification (Sabrina Pölle, Passau) and the missing mechanisms for reviewing the decision logic of administrative tools (Constanze Rothermel, Berlin), to algorithm-driven benefit sanctioning in Denmark and the Netherlands (Anne Spijkstra, Tilburg).

In the plenary discussion that followed, the threads of the day converged on a recurring theme: humans in the judiciary were not perfect before AI either. The discussion cautioned against measuring machines by a standard of perfection that humans have never met. A second observation reached back to the fourth panel: the digital is built on top of a long paper trail, and digital justice inherits the logic, and the legacy, of the file.

Viewed across the four panels, the relevant divide did not always run between Germany and the Netherlands, but frequently between fields of law: Germany’s infrastructure-first trajectory has repeatedly stumbled over its own thoroughness, while in the Netherlands the frontline questions lie further downstream: judges googling and parties submitting ChatGPT-written claims. The tension between efficiency gains and procedural guarantees returned in each panel in different ways. For private international law, it took the form of the question whether cross-border digitalisation can proceed without uniform European standards protecting the procedural rights of users – standards all the more necessary because most Member States are too small to develop trustworthy systems alone.

How much of legal decision-making can be left to AI was answered formally (any final decisions must remain human) but not substantively. Finally, the question what we do with the law that was not made for digitalisation remained open. Perhaps the day’s most consistent answer was voiced almost identically at its beginning and its end: the electronic case file is ‘merely electrification’, a first step but not a last (Grimm). Now, the task is not to retrofit, but to rethink (Ranchordás). An edited volume with contributions by the panellists and emerging scholars, taking up these questions in greater depth, will be published by Springer in the course of 2027 under the title ‘Digitalisation of Justice: Perspectives from Germany and the Netherlands’.

Registration link available here.

Further information on the series is available here: Civil Justice Conversations Planning

Last May, I published a post on Versata Software, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., a case in which a panel of the Federal Circuit held that, under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) and the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act, a plaintiff is entitled to recover “unjust enrichment” damages as a matter of statutory right.  The panel issued a modified opinion today, though only in respect of correcting its previous statement that Ford did not “claim” that certain costs should have been deducted from the breach of contract damages the plaintiff also sought (see p.15).  The holdings with regard to trade secret law therefore remain intact, in particular the panel’s conclusion that unjust enrichment is a remedy available at the plaintiff’s option (a position that, as noted in my previous post, some other courts have endorsed, while others have rejected it); and that an unjust enrichment award can exceed the royalty the parties would have negotiated, based on their licensing history.  (Compare this with the outcome of the recent Lucent v. Astronics case in the U.K., as discussed here.)  For now, I remain somewhat skeptical that disgorgement of profits or avoided costs should be available as a matter of course in trade secret litigation, but I am still thinking through the issues in anticipation of writing a paper on trade secret remedies sometime next year.  I'll just note, as I did in May, that U.S. courts are somewhat divided on the relevant issues, and that approaches to unjust enrichment outside the U.S. also reflect a range of perspectives.