As some readers may know, the blogging service Typepad is complete shutting down as of September 30, 2025.  When I first started this blog back in May 2004(!), Typepad seemed like a good-enough, user-friendly platform, and before long I had the assistance of then-Professor Paul Caron and his then-new Law Professor Blog Network to help with the look and functionality of this space.  Now, 21 years later with this blog old enough to drink, the technology has continued to function well enough and has been comfortably familiar so as to leave me content with its dated charms.  But Typepad is about to go dark, so I am forced to change.

For weeks since hearing about Typepad's coming demise, I have been thinking about whether to continue "traditional" blogging and about other platforms.  I was intrigued now-Dean Paul Caron decided to just stop blogging after all this time.  Meanehile, I have very much enjoyed helping to start the Sentencing Matters Substack last year.  I might just shift my time and energy to more posting there, though I tend to view that platform as a place for longer-form essays rather than the shorter postings that have generally comprised this blog.  Thus, at least to preserve older postings and explore newer technologies, I have been working on migrating this blog to a new space.

The folks at LexBlog this week helped me preserve all my old posts in a new space here (regular readers likely realize I have not been blogging as usual as I explore migration).  Yesterday, I took the new platform for a spin with three new posts at the LexBlog locale:

• Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing releases “A Comprehensive Study of Veterans Involved in the Criminal Justice System”
• “Trapped in Time: The Silent Crisis of Elderly Incarceration”
• “Crime and Punishment Across America: A 50 State Legislative Analysis”

I am not particularly happy with the look or functionality of the new platform.  But I have not yet been "trained" on the technology; I am hoping in the coming weeks and months I can replicate/improve key features from this old Typepad space.  But it quite possible I will turn out to be an old blogging dog that is not especially good at learning new technology tricks.  And, of course, I have a day job keeping me quite busy, and thus a (lengthy?) blogging hiatus may be unavoidable. 

That all said, in the waning days of this platform, I welcome any and all reader comments on what features of this blog may be worth trying to preserve on another platform. I have long been very grateful to all those who have read and commented in this space through the years, and I am eager for input on what might be worth trying to preserve in these trying times.

UPDATE:  I have had a little more time to experiment with, and tweak a bit, this new LexBlog version of Sentencing Law and Policy.  I am not enamoured with aspects of the aesthetic of the new home, and the site does not currently enable comments.  But the LexBlog folks have indicated modifications may be possible, and I am hopeful there will be functionality benefits from a new software and network.  So, for now, I am planning to try to make the bast of this new home.  And that means back to regular blogging with these new posts:

• Prison Policy Initiative publishes “States of Women’s Incarceration: The Global Context 2025” 
• Texas completes its fifth execution of 2025
• Alabama completes its sixth execution using nitrogen gas

I continue to welcome any and all reader comments on what features they would like to see on the new blog, because I remain hopeful I will be able to modify and improve the new LexBlog site. 

The title of this post is the title of this notable essay authored by Shawn Bushway.  I recommend the full piece, and here is how it gets started:

The U.S. now incarcerates 25 percent fewer people than it did at its peak level of incarceration in 2009.  Although this decline exceeds most projections from even 10 years ago, Stanford professor Keith Humphreys recently predicted in The Atlantic that even this smaller number would soon “fall off a cliff,” leaving us with a prison population that is 60 percent smaller than it used to be.

This decline has alarmed some people on the right, who believe we are now incarcerating too few people, rather than too many.  All but the most extreme reformers accept that some number of people need to be incarcerated. The question then becomes, what is the optimal level for our society?

Ultimately, this question is not answerable scientifically.  But there are some important trends in the current data that make me believe incarceration can (and will) continue to fall without any increase in crime.  By the same token, any attempt to reverse the trend and incarcerate more people will not actually make us safer.

I just saw that yesterday the US Sentencing Commission released here its latest federal sentencing quarterly data report which is titled "3rd Quarter Release, Preliminary Fiscal Year 2025 Data Through June 30, 2025." Because these data only capture a little more than five months of sentencing data since the Trump Administration took charge of the US Justice Department, it is probably still a bit too soon to start assessing just where and how this Administration's new priorities are reflected in the 2025 patterns of federal sentencing outcomes.

That said, there are still a couple of notable data points in this latest USSC data run that are worth flagging. Figures 1 and 2 in this new report document that there has been a noticeable uptick in immigration cases and downtick in drug cases as a percentage of the overall caselooad. As I have noted before, for Fiscal Year 2024 (which ended September 31, 2024), the USSC data showed 30% of the federal cases sentenced were immigraton cases, and 29.6% were dug cases. But these latest FY 2025 third quarter federal sentencing data show that over the last nine months, 35.7% of the federal cases sentenced were immigraton cases, and 25.7% were dug cases. Figure 2 tells this story in a slightly different way, showing that well over 5000 immigration cases were sentenced in federal courts from April 1 to June 30, 2025, which is more than in any single quarter since the pandemic.

Because immigration cases are such a big slice of the federal sentencing pie, and because immigration cases result generally in shorter prison sentences (and then deportation), the uptick in immigration sentencings likely accounts for a general reduction in overall average sentences in the federal system so far in FY 2025 relative to FY 2024. For the whole federal sentencing system in Fiscal Year 2024, the mean sentence reported by the USSC was 52 months and the median was 24 month. The latest FY 2025 third quarter federal sentencing data from the USSC indicate that this FY the mean in 49 months and the median in 21.  But if on looks at the median and mean sentences for specific offenses like drugs or fraud, it appears that FY 25 data show a slight increase (though this might be explained primarily by various case mix factors as there continues to be increases in the percentage of meth and fentanyl sentencings, and those drugs carry the longest prison average prison terms among all the drug cases).  The immigration uptick also likly explains why the data show a slight increase in "Within Guideline Range" sentences.

That all said, much of the other data in this latest data report shows the relative steadiness of federal sentencing patterns even when it feels like there have been massive changes brought by new leadership at the Justice Department.  I expect future USSC data runs may reflect and reveal still developing changes resulting from new Justice Department leadership, but the federal sentencing behemoth seems to jeep moving at a mostly consistent clip despite a range of potential upheavals.

As reported in this AP piece, a "Florida man convicted of killing his estranged wife’s sister and parents and setting their house on fire was put to death Wednesday evening in what was a record 12th execution in the state this year."  Here is more:

David Pittman, 63, was pronounced dead at 6:12 p.m. EDT following a lethal injection at Florida State Prison near Starke under a death warrant signed by Republican Gov. Ron DeSantis.

“I know you all came to watch an innocent man be murdered by the state of Florida. I am innocent. I didn’t kill anybody. That’s it,” Pittman was quoted as saying in his last words, according to a statement from DeSantis spokesperson Alex Lanfranconi. As the drugs were being administered, Pittman took a few deep breaths and then was still.

In 1991, Pittman was convicted and sentenced to death on three counts of first-degree murder, according to court records. Jurors also found him guilty of arson and grand theft. Pittman and his wife, Marie, were going through a contentious divorce in May 1990, when the killings occurred, and investigators say he had threatened to harm her family several times.

Trial testimony showed Pittman cut a phone line at the Mulberry, Florida, home of his wife’s parents, Clarence Knowles, 60, and his wife, 50-year-old Barbara Knowles. Pittman stabbed the couple to death as well as their other daughter, 21-year-old Bonnie Knowles. Pittman then set their house on fire and stole Bonnie Knowles’ car, which he also set ablaze. The family was found dead on May 15 of that year.

A witness during his 1991 trial identified Pittman as the person seen running away from the burning car. A jailhouse informant also testified that Pittman had admitted to the killings. Jurors recommended the death penalty on a 9-3 vote....

On Tuesday, Pittman’s final appeal was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. His most recent appeals had focused on recent evidence indicating he suffers from intellectual disabilities, including an IQ in the low 70s, that was apparent at the time of the killings. His lawyers had argued that his execution would violate the Constitution’s protection against executing a person with severe mental problems. Lawyers for the state disagreed, contending it came too late for Pittman to claim mental impairment from years earlier. The Florida Supreme Court, reversing a previous decision, had ruled in 2020 that such claims could not be applied retroactively.

So far 31 people had been executed in the U.S. to date this year, with Florida leading the nation on a flurry of death warrants signed by DeSantis, who has signed more warrants than any of his predecessors. Two more Florida executions are scheduled for this fall. Victor Tony Jones is set to die on Sept. 30 for the 1990 killings of two people during a robbery and Samuel Lee Smithers is scheduled to be executed on Oct. 14 for the murders of two women in 1996.

I have been invited to speak in a few weeks on pardon and expungement topics at the  "White Collar Conference 2025," which is presented by the White Collar Support Group run by the indefatigable Jeff Grant.  Here are links and a few details I received recently from Jeff about the conference to pique interests:

White Collar Conference 2025, Presented by the White Collar Support Group™! Sat., Oct. 11th. 9 am ET, 6 am PT, On Zoom, Open to All, Please join us! 

Details and Registration as well as Sponsorship Info:

The World’s First & Only Conference By & For Those Prosecuted for White Collar Crimes and Their Families - and Attorneys, Professionals, and All Interested!

Confirmed Speakers & Panelists:

• Keynote: CNN Commentator & Author Jeffrey Toobin
• Brent Cassity Interview of Joe Bankman (Sam Bankman Fried’s Father)
• Pardon & Expungement Panel with Prof. Mark Osler, Prof. Doug Berman, Prof. Todd Haugh
• Prof. Erin Frey Presents Yale Research Study on Second Chances for People Convicted of White Collar Crimes
• Restoring Our Dignity Panel with Pamela Winn, Gina Pendergraph, Michael Gaines
• Emcee: Craig Stanland
• Host: Jeff Grant, Co-Host: Drew Chapin

In addition, I have seen some notable recent media coverage of the White Collar Support Group and the coming conference:

From Walter Pavlo at Forbes, "One Group’s Quest To Expand Criminal Expungement For Felons"

From Doug Passon at Set for Sentencing, "White Collar Support with Jeff Grant, Esq."

The title of this post is the title of this new article now on SSRN authored by Max Wolson, Benjamin Flick and Adeel Bashir. Here is its abstract:

This article explains how the U.S. Sentencing Commission's excessively punitive, weight-based drug trafficking guideline has played a key role in exploding prison populations, contributing to the federal Bureau of Prisons' ("BOP") present staffing and facilities crises.  The article explains how a less-frequently relied-upon provision of the code, 28 U.S.C. § 994(g), requires that the Commission formulate the Sentencing Guidelines to avoid such overcrowding and argues for the Commission to act boldly to reduce the lengths of drug sentences.  The article then identifies several, broad changes to the drug trafficking Guidelines that the Commission can make to lessen BOP's population in a manner consistent with the section 994(g) mandate.

The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) today released this lengthy new report written by LawProf Cortney Lollar. Here is the report's executive summary:

Criminal restitution has become a regular part of sentencing in criminal cases.  And yet it remains widely misunderstood — both in its implementation and its effects.  Criminal restitution is seen as one of the criminal legal system’s primary mechanisms for helping those who have committed a wrong recognize the harm they have caused and financially restore the crime victim to their pre-crime status, to the extent possible.  Although courts have repeatedly acknowledged restitution’s punitive nature, many perceive restitution to be a legal financial obligation distinct from criminal fines, forfeiture, and court fees because of its unique role in compensating crime victims.  In practice, however, criminal restitution operates similarly to other criminal legal financial obligations.  Criminal restitution has become a form of punishment whose laudatory compensation goals are eclipsed by its punitive effects.  Closer scrutiny of this criminal remedy permits a clearer picture of its strengths and weaknesses and will allow for a critical re-envisioning of criminal restitution so that it better satisfies crime victims and minimizes the outsized impact on those with criminal restitution orders.

The Marshall Project has this notable new piece exploring some reasons for the higher number of executions throughout the US in 2025.  I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts (with links from the original):

Ten states have executed 30 people since January, according to the Death Penalty Information Center. That’s already the highest annual total in more than a decade, with 13 more executions planned through December.

What explains the rise? Probably not public support. Recent polls show around half of Americans favor executions, but the best evidence of what people really think is found in courtrooms, where jurors have increasingly rejected the punishment. Across the country, juries have sent 10 people to death row this year, compared with a high of 315 in all of 1996.

It’s prisoners like those, from a generation ago, who are now facing execution. Calls to experts on the death penalty led me to four interconnected theories to explain the rise in executions this year.

1. The Trump Effect ...

2. The DeSantis Effect ...

3. The Supreme Court Effect ...

4. The Methods ...

This new Law360 article, headlined "Appeals Courts Rethink Harsh Youth Sentences, Search Rules," details some of the ways state courts have been extending the US Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence precluding some extreme juvenile sentence. Here are excerpts from the article:

Since the U.S. Supreme Court declared mandatory life without parole for those under 18 unconstitutional in 2012's Miller v. Alabama, a growing number of state appeals courts have been reconsidering the most severe sentences for juveniles and young adults.  The movement stems from a growing acceptance of science showing human brain development and youthful impulsivity continue roughly until the age of 25 — long after legal adulthood.

"State courts are increasingly more likely to declare that extremely long prison terms [for young people over 18] violate the state constitution, even though they don't violate the federal constitution," said Kathrina Wolfkot, senior counsel for the Brennan Center for Justice and managing editor of its State Court Report publication. "That is probably the biggest trend that has emerged over the last few years, and that shows no signs of letting up."

Michigan's courts have led the pack so far this year, she said. The state's movement on sentencing comes after Massachusetts' Supreme Judicial Court last year found life without parole to be unconstitutionally cruel or unusual punishment for defendants under 21 — laying out a gold standard for other states when it comes to sentencing caps for youths, according to Wolfkot....

But not all state appeals court decisions this year favored defendants convicted of serious crimes in their youth. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the aggregate sentence of 100 years in prison for a man convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder and home invasion. The defendant, Eugene Spencer, committed the crime when he was 20. The state's high court found the sentence was not a de facto life sentence because Spencer would be eligible for parole review after serving at least 20 years of his sentence....

Wyoming's high court is also considering the constitutionality of mandatory life without parole sentences for young adults in Christopher Robert Hicks v. The State of Wyoming.  Interestingly, this case highlights differences between the U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of Wyoming and some other states. While the U.S. Constitution forbids "cruel and unusual" punishment, Wyoming's prohibits the more inclusive category of "cruel or unusual" punishment.

In Commonwealth v. Lee, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will decide whether it is constitutional to require life without parole for murder in commission of another felony. That charge is applied to defendants accused of participating in a felony that results in a homicide — even for defendants who did not directly cause the death. The case is of great interest because no state high court has ever found life without parole sentences for such convictions are unconstitutional, Wolfkot said. Oral arguments were held on Oct. 8, 2024, but the high court has yet to hand down a ruling.

As reported in this New York Times article, "Nadine Menendez, the wife of New Jersey’s former senator, was sentenced on Thursday to four and a half years in prison for her role in a scheme to trade her husband’s clout for cash, gold and a Mercedes-Benz."  Here is more:

In an emotional address before the judge imposed the sentence, Ms. Menendez, 58, laid blame for much of her conduct on her husband, Robert Menendez, once one of the country’s most powerful Democrats. “Iput my life in his hands and he strung me like a puppet,” she said through tears....

Her dramatic admission capped a saga that burst fully into view in September 2023, when the couple was indicted on a raft of charges that stunned Washington and upended politics in New Jersey, where Mr. Menendez had been a fixture for decades. The senator, a bulletproof political survivor, suddenly faced serious challengers angling for his seat. Still, Mr. Menendez remained defiant, resigning only reluctantly after he became the first senator convicted of acting as an agent of a foreign government.  On Thursday, his downfall appeared nearly complete as he was depicted not only as a convict but also a cad, entangling his wife in his schemes and then blaming her.

The judge, Sidney H. Stein of Federal District Court in Manhattan, largely dismissed Ms. Menendez’s effort to distance herself from the corruption, calling her a “central participant.” “You knew what you were doing,” he said. “You were always purposeful.”...  Still, the judge acknowledged that she deserved a more lenient sentence than those imposed on her husband and two other co-defendants who are already in prison. He noted her history of abusive relationships and a breast cancer diagnosis that had led him to separate her trial from her husband’s and delay it by nearly a year....

Prosecutors had recommended that Ms. Menendez be sentenced to at least seven years for her role shuttling messages and bribes to the senator and arranging meetings with Egyptian officials. The officials were later instrumental in awarding a lucrative monopoly to a halal meat business founded by Ms. Menendez’s longtime friend Wael Hana.

I believe that the defense's sentencing arguments urged a prison term of a year and a day, so the final sentence here was reasonablbly close to a mid-point between the parties' sentencing recommendation.  And, as reported in other press pieces, the federal sentencing guidelines called for a sentence of between 17.5 years and nearly 22 years in federal prison.  (In other words, this high-profile case is yet another that highlights that the guidelines recommend a sentence that none of the parties nor the judge thinks is anywhere near the right outcome.)  

Prior posts about Bob Menedez's sentencing:

• Is Senator Bob Menendez now facing a de facto life sentence after being convicted by a jury on all 16 federal corruption counts? 
• Facing guidelines recommending decades in prison, former Senator Menendez requests "sentence that relies heavily on alternatives to incarceration"
• Former Senator Bob Menendez given (below guidelines range) sentence of 11 years in prison

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Rachel Moran now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

When it comes to prosecutions of police officers for homicide-related offenses, opinions are plentiful but data is scarce. Many believe that officers are too rarely prosecuted when they kill people. Some fret that charging officers is futile because juries and judges will be reluctant to convict. Still others feel that criminal prosecutions unfairly scapegoat officers who were using reasonable force in the line of duty.

Despite the debates surrounding these prosecutions, empirical research remains sparse. What percentage of police homicides result in criminal charges? What happens when prosecutors do file charges? What are the conviction rates? How often are these charges dismissed? Are judges or juries more likely to convict? When officers are convicted, what sentences do they receive? How do these outcomes compare to prosecutions of civilians for similar conduct? Legal scholarship is mostly silent on all these questions.

This Article adds data to the conversation. It summarizes the results of a multi-year study of all known criminal prosecutions of non-federal law enforcement officers in the United States who were charged in relation to on-duty homicides between 2013 and 2023.  The data gathered includes the number of officers charged; types of charges filed; demographic information about both officers and decedents; and the outcomes of every case, including whether the charges resulted in conviction, dismissal, or acquittal, and whether the outcome occurred via plea or a decision by a judge, jury, or prosecutor.  When officers were convicted, the dataset also includes the most serious conviction for each officer and the sentences imposed.  The results are fascinating and often surprising, offering lessons for readers on all sides of the debates about police prosecutions.

As I first mentioned a few weeks ago, I am very excited to be part of a planning team for a big event, "Originalism and Criminal Justice Symposium," to take place at The Ohio State University on September 8-9, 2026.  Basic details about the event are available at this link; in short form, the Salmon P. Chase Center for Civics, Culture, and Society and the Drug Enforcement and Policy Center at The Ohio State University are sponsoring a conference delving into the application of originalist methodologies to contemporary issues of constitutional doctrine and practice in the criminal justice context.  This conference includes soliciting of papers — both full-length articles and shorter essays — for a scholarship workshop expected to take place on September 8, 2026.  The full call for papers is available at this link, and here is the heart of the call:

As part of this conference, we are soliciting papers for a scholarship workshop expected to take place on September 8, 2026. Junior scholars are especially encouraged to submit papers (and will be paired with a senior scholar to review and discuss their submission). Scholars who are supportive of, and those who are skeptical about, originalist approaches to the Constitution are all highly encouraged to participate.

Participants should plan to have a full draft to circulate by August 1, 2026, and we welcome submissions of both full-length articles (15,000-30,000 words) and shorter essays (5,000-10,000 words). The full-length articles will be gathered and published in a symposium edition of the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law; the shorter essays will be published in a special issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter.

Deadline for proposals:

• Please submit a title and a proposed abstract of no more than 500 words by November 1, 2025. You can submit your proposal using our Qualtrics form.
• Abstracts should note if the author expects to produce an article or essay, and accepted scholars will be notified by December 15, 2025....

By fostering a dynamic dialogue among originalist experts, as well as jurists and scholars who are skeptical about originalist methods, this conference seeks to deepen understanding of the intersection of originalism and criminal justice doctrines as well as modern debates over constitutional criminal law and procedures.

The title of this post is the title of this article authored by Ronald Allen and Nicolas Elliott-Smith that i just came across on SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The pursuit of knowledge is undergoing a transformation. Scientists and scholars are rejecting standard reductionist efforts, popularly captured by “the scientific method” and embracing the framework of complexity theory and complex adaptive systems.  That framework is invaluable to understand both the law of evidence and the nature of Anglo-American legal systems.  It also has significant implications for the ongoing debate over the concept of law.

This Article demonstrates how the oft invoked concept of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” (BARD) does not exist in any knowable form, except as an emergent property of a complex adaptive system—the criminal process.  First, what constitutes BARD will vary within any jurisdiction.  BARD is a linguistically vague and indeterminate standard.  Second, evidentiary and procedural regimes will differ from state to state and from country to country.  Differences in such regimes will functionally affect what constitutes BARD.  We also demonstrate how plea bargaining, declination, and diversionary programs will affect what constitutes BARD by affecting the proportion of factually guilty and innocent defendants that proceed to trial (incidentally affecting any distribution of errors).  Third, we account for and respond to how the debate surrounding BARD is imbued with a deterministic focus on solving what BARD is and should be, which has proven to be a futile quest.  Scholars must embrace — not ignore — the complexity that permeates our evidentiary and procedural regimes. 

The title of this post is the headline of this New York Times opinion piece authored by German Lopez.  Here is how it starts and ends:

American prisons are fast becoming the world’s worst nursing homes, increasingly filled with aging criminals who can barely walk, let alone commit another crime.  The idea that we should lock up people for life, even through old age, is often framed as being tough on crime. In reality, it gives years, if not decades, of shelter, food and health care to convicted criminals and redirects money from programs we know do a better job of protecting the public.

Older people are much less likely to commit crime than the young.  They are also much more expensive to lock up. Federal prisons with the largest share of older prisoners spend five times as much per person on medical care and 14 times as much on medications as other facilities, according to the Sentencing Project, a nonprofit advocacy group.

States and counties, which oversee a vast majority of people in prison, cannot run deficits for long or print money, as the federal government can.  Every buck that pays for one thing means a dollar less for another.  Funds spent on locking up an old inmate could have helped pay for more police officers or other anti-crime initiatives or schools or roads or any of the myriad other demands on local governments.

I have reported on criminal justice issues for more than a decade.  If I have learned anything, it’s that crime policy is all about trade-offs, more so than in most other areas.  Releasing more old people from prison, however, is close to a free lunch. Not only could it save money, but if the savings are wisely reinvested, it also could improve public safety....

Lawmakers should address this problem with available policies: Governors should issue pardons for older inmates. Parole boards should put more weight on age.  Officials should more aggressively use compassionate release laws that on a limited basis let out inmates who are ill.  But lawmakers should go further.  They should enact laws that require courts to revisit sentences after, say, 20 years.  They should grant inmates the presumption of parole in more cases, meaning a parole board would keep a person locked up only with good reason.  Broader reform should reduce the use of longer sentences in general.

Some caution is warranted.  People deemed dangerous — the criminal justice system has ways of gauging that risk — should not be let out.  Policies might exclude certain kinds of crimes. 

With the savings from releases, lawmakers could pay for more effective approaches to public safety.  Experts often say the United States is overincarcerated and underpoliced, particularly for violent crime. Police departments across the country have reported serious staffing shortages for years, and we know that having fewer officers around leads to more crime. These shortages are one reason nearly half of America’s murderers now get away with it.

You don’t have to mourn an older killer’s lifelong suffering in prison to think reform is a good idea. You can just think, as I do, that the criminal justice system should protect Americans as efficiently and effectively as possible. Paying for the housing, food and health care of someone unlikely to commit a crime should not make the cut.

I have failed to flag here that the US Sentencing Commission has released recently a bunch more of its terrific "Quick Facts" publications.  As regular readers know, I find so very interesting all the these short data documents, which are designed to "give readers basic facts about a single area of federal crime in an easy-to-read, two-page format."  The newest set of postings by the USSC on the "Quick Facts" page cover a range of sentences, offenses and offenders:

• Sentenced Organizations (August 2025)
• Federally Sentenced Native Americans (September 2025)

• Supervised Release (August 2025)
• Mandatory Minimum Penalties (September 2025)

• Credit Card and Other Financial Instrument Fraud (September 2025)
• Health Care Fraud (September 2025)
• Government Benefits Fraud (September 2025)
• Securities and Investment Fraud (September 2025)

In this post a few weeks ago, titled "Starting to gear up for lots of criminal law and sentencing cases during SCOTUS OT'25," I highlighted that the Supreme Court is already scheduled to hear many criminal law cases, including many sentencing cases, in its upcoming Term.  I now see that Rorly Little in this new SCOTUSblog post, titled "The Supreme Court’s upcoming criminal cases," provides an even more detailed accounting of wha criminal law fans can anticipate in OT25.  And I especially like the post's introduction to its full accounting:

The Framers of our Constitution were, of course, all criminals. This is not often said, but it deserves frank recognition. The revolutionary founders were committing violent, treasonous acts against their government, the British monarchy. Announcing independence in 1776, the Framers declared that they had suffered a “long train of abuses” at the hands of the British criminal justice system. Thus much of the Bill of Rights provided for rights and guarantees for people subjected to criminal investigation or prosecution. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments address criminal law directly, and the First, Second, and even the Third address criminal law issues by implication. As Professor David A. Strauss noted long ago, “protections for criminal defendants are arguably the dominant feature of the Bill of Rights.”

With this in mind, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Supreme Court’s next term, which begins on Oct. 6, has so many criminal cases. (Here is the court’s calendar for the term.) By my count, 15 of the 31 cases for which the court has already granted review are criminal law and related. (A full list appears at the end of this post – last month I explained what I count as criminal cases.)

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Joshua Davis and Whitney Taylor now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

This article examines the rise and politicization of prosecutorial reforms in the United States.  While progressive and conservative prosecutors have initiated reforms in jurisdictions throughout the United States, recent reform efforts have been met with media scrutiny and political backlash.  How do prosecutors understand and respond to efforts to limit reforms? What are the effects of this attention?  To explore these questions, we draw on an analysis of U.S. prosecutors who ran for office in 2024 as well as sixty semi-structured interviews with current and former prosecutors, as well as candidates for the position.  We argue that backlash against prosecutors is a significant phenomenon that has important consequences for individuals, the criminal justice system, and local democracy.

Our interviews show that backlash is pervasive and ranges beyond recall elections (and the attempt to make recalls possible where they once were not) and efforts to replace or remove sitting prosecutors through executive or legislative intervention.  Elected prosecutors often have to navigate challenges from the media, other prosecutors, judges, and law enforcement, and many face verbal attacks and physical threats from members of the public as well as the police.  Prosecutors respond to this backlash in three primary ways: (1) by simply ignoring the backlash and continuing to do what they have always done, (2) by avoiding or slowing down reforms and opting into other career paths, and (3) by continuing to pursue reforms, but doing so under the radar, trying not to draw attention to them. Ultimately, we show that backlash has had a chilling effect on reform prosecutors, pushing some reformers out of office and forcing others to abandon reforms or try to carry out reform programs under personally and professionally fraught conditions.

I do not know why this platform was down yesterday, but I do know I have seen a wide array of intriguing pieces about matters of crime and punishment in recent days.  So, making up for lost blogging time, here is a baker's dozen list of late-summer reading:

From the ABA Journal, "Throwing food at people has led to serious criminal charges for some"

From the AP, "A death row inmate says judges are ruled by Satan as he tries to avoid execution"

From Axios, "Rural South, West states have highest violent crime rates: FBI"

From Axios, "Scoop: Biden officials raised concerns with how he issued pardons, used autopen"

From Ballotpedia News, "Voters in 18 states have decided 41 death penalty ballot measures since 1912"

From Bloomberg Law, "Barrett Found Marathon Bomber Death Sentence Vote ‘Distasteful’"

From Bloomberg Law, "DOJ Charges for Officer Assaults Clash With Trump Jan. 6 Pardons"

From CalMatters, "They were convicted of gang crimes. New California Supreme Court rulings trim their sentences"

From The Conversation, "65,000 Pennsylvania kids have a parent in prison or jail − here’s what research says about the value of in-person visits"

From The Hill, "Republicans unveil slew of bills to overhaul DC criminal justice policies"

From The Marshall Project, "From Surveillance to Robot Guards: How AI Could Reshape Prison Life"

From the New York Times, "Grand Juries in D.C. Reject Wave of Charges Under Trump’s Crackdown"

From the Tennessee Lookout, "Former House Speaker, staff member in Tennessee corruption case object to sentencing ranges"

Am 18. August 2025 ist der Soziologe und Kriminologe Fritz Sack im Alter von 94 Jahren verstorben. Mit ihm verliert die deutschsprachige Kriminologie eine ihrer bedeutendsten Stimmen – einen Wissenschaftler, der mit intellektueller Schärfe, kritischem Geist und unerschütterlichem Engagement die Grundlagen des Fachs neu gedacht und eine ganze Forschergeneration geprägt hat.

Fritz Sack war einer der wichtigsten Vertreter und Mitbegründer der Kritischen Kriminologie in Deutschland. Mit seinen Analysen zu Strafrecht, Machtverhältnissen und sozialer Kontrolle forderte er eine grundlegende Neuausrichtung der Kriminologie – weg von der fixierten Betrachtung des „Täters“ hin zu einer gesellschaftsanalytischen Perspektive auf Kriminalität und Strafverfolgung. Seine Arbeiten zur selektiven Strafverfolgung, zur funktionalen Rolle des Strafrechts sowie zur Punitivität moderner Gesellschaften sind bis heute zentral für eine sozialwissenschaftlich informierte Kriminalitätsforschung.

In den Jahren 1984 bis 1996 war Fritz Sack Professor für Kriminologie an der Universität Hamburg und leitete dort das Institut für Kriminologische Sozialforschung (IKS), das unter seiner Leitung zu einem Zentrum kritischer kriminologischer Forschung wurde.

Als ich mein Studium am IKS aufnahm, war Fritz Sack bereits emeritiert, und sein Nachfolger Sebastian Scheerer hatte den Lehrstuhl übernommen. Dennoch war sein Einfluss im Institut deutlich spürbar: in den theoretischen Diskussionen, in der Haltung vieler Lehrender – und nicht zuletzt in der Sensibilität für gesellschaftliche Machtverhältnisse, die dem Labeling-Ansatz zugrunde liegt. Die Idee, dass Kriminalität nicht einfach „gegeben“ ist, sondern sozial zugeschrieben wird, war tief in die Institutsidentität eingeschrieben.

Unvergessen bleibt mir ein gemeinsames Seminar von Fritz Sack und dem ehemaligen Bundesverfassungsrichter Winfried Hassemer zum Thema Freiheit und Sicherheit, das sich mit Fragen der Kriminalpolitik im Zeichen zunehmender Überwachung und Kontrolle beschäftigte. Die abschließende Exkursion zum Bundesverfassungsgericht in Karlsruhe war nicht nur eindrucksvoll, sondern auch Ausdruck eines Wissenschaftsverständnisses, das Theorie und Praxis miteinander in Verbindung bringt.

Fritz Sack war ein streitbarer Denker, der Kontroversen nicht scheute, sondern produktiv machte. Er verstand Wissenschaft als gesellschaftliche Intervention – nie als bloße Beschreibung, sondern stets als Stellungnahme. Seine Fragen an die Disziplin wirken bis heute nach: Was sagt es über eine Gesellschaft aus, wenn sie soziale Probleme dem Strafrecht überantwortet? Und: Welche Interessen, Deutungen und Machtverhältnisse strukturieren, was als „kriminell“ gilt?

Mit seinem Tod endet ein Kapitel der deutschsprachigen Kriminologie – aber das Denken, das er angestoßen hat, bleibt lebendig.

Weitere Nachrufe sind hier erschienen:

• Universität Hamburg – Fachbereich Sozialwissenschaften: Wir trauern um Prof. Dr. Fritz Sack, Begründer der Kritischen Kriminologie

• taz – Zum Tod des Kriminologen Fritz Sack. Jenseits des Straflustprinzips

[Update: 23.09.2025]

Für alle, die Fritz Sack kannten oder sein Wirken schätzten, gibt es auf dieser Seite die Möglichkeit, Erinnerungen, Gedanken oder Worte des Gedenkens zu teilen: https://memorialsource.com/memorial/fritz-sack

Der Beitrag Zum Tod von Fritz Sack (1931–2025) ist erschienen unter: Criminologia.

As reported in this local article, headlined "State chipping away at SCOTUS ruling that outlawed death sentences for juvenile offenders," Louisiana's Attorney General is taking steps to seek reconsideration of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence precluding the death penalty for juvenile murderers. Here are the notable details:

The Louisiana Attorney General's Office has filed a motion that seeks to uproot the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark ruling that declared the death penalty for juvenile offenders unconstitutional.

The 2005 SCOTUS order abolished executions of those younger than 18 at the time of their crimes, saying capital punishment for juvenile offenders violates Eighth Amendment constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment. Prosecutors for Attorney General Liz Murrill's office, however, argue the death sentence should be reinstated for a man who was just a week shy of his 18th birthday when he shot and killed an LSU freshman execution style during a 1992 carjacking and abduction.

Dale Dwayne Craig, now 50, was convicted of first-degree murder in Kipp Earl Gullett's slaying more than 30 years ago.  He originally was placed on death row after a jury unanimously agreed he should be executed. But when the Supreme Court in March 2005 issued its split decision in Roper v Simmons, a Missouri case also involving a 17-year-old convicted killer, it overturned statutes in 19 states that permitted the executions of culprits who were 16 and 17 years old.

Craig was among more than 70 juvenile offenders who already had been convicted and condemned to death that had their capital sentences vacated after Roper. Craig's death sentence was amended to life in prison without the possibility of parole, probation or early termination. In May 2023, 19th Judicial District Judge Eboni Johnson Rose, swayed by the transformation in character she said Craig has displayed while in prison, made him eligible for parole.

State prosecutors are now appealing Rose's ruling, arguing for the Louisiana Supreme Court to strip away Craig's parole eligibility during a hearing last week in front of justices.

Two weeks before that hearing, Deputy Solicitor General Zachary Faircloth filed the motion to get Craig's death sentence reinstated.  In the Aug. 11 filing, Faircloth acknowledged that “current U.S. Supreme Court precedent requires this court to deny this motion." But he indicated prosecutors intend to challenge Roper in appeals. "The state understands that the court must deny this motion," his motion stated. "The state preserves for appellate review, however, its position that Roper is egregiously wrong and should be overruled.”

In the filing, AG's Office emphasized the fact that Craig was just days away from turning 18 when he squeezed the trigger and ended Gullet's life. “But he was fully an adult," the motion states.  Gullett, an LSU student, was 18 when Craig and three other teens carjacked him at gunpoint as he returned to his dorm on the night of Sept. 14, 1992. The quartet forced Gullet back into his Ford Bronco and they drove around with him for nearly an hour. Court records and trial testimony indicate Craig spearheaded the armed robbery and abduction and terrorized Gullett during the ride. The group of teens drove to a secluded construction site near Kenilworth Parkway, where Craig shot Gullett three times in the head, then stood over him and fired more bullets at him.....

The AG's Office said the state will seek to overturn Roper if and when the case reaches the U.S. Supreme Court. “The Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons is egregiously wrong," Murrill said. "It prohibits States like Louisiana from executing criminals like Dale Craig — who carjacked, kidnapped, terrorized, pistol-whipped and then shot to death Kipp Earl Gullett, an unsuspecting LSU freshman — just because he was a week away from his 18th birthday when he committed this heinous crime. There is no basis in law or logic for that absurd result.”

John Landis is a New Orleans attorney who has been representing Craig throughout his post-conviction relief efforts for much of the past 28 years. He said the state's appeal of Rose's 2023 order has delayed Craig's parole hearing indefinitely. Landis called the motion asking a judge to reinstate Craig's death sentence another stall tactic. “Only the Legislature has the power to change the law governing juvenile offenders. This court cannot do so," Landis argued in an Aug. 13 response to the state's motion....

19th Judicial District Chief Judge Donald Johnson has set an Oct. 15 court date to hear opposing arguments on the motion.

A few weeks ago, via this post, I flagged an effective press piece that detailed some ugly aspects of how New Jersey has been implementing a new state compassionate release law.  Today I just saw this similar press piece regarding Illinois experiences under the headline "26 Died Waiting: Families Call for Reform of Illinois’ Medical Release Program."   I recommend this article in full, and here is an excerpt:

For decades, Illinois was one of only two states, alongside Iowa, that lacked a medical or compassionate release program for incarcerated individuals. That changed in 2022 with the passage of the Joe Coleman Medical Release Act.

The Act allows terminally ill or medically incapacitated individuals to apply for release from prison to reunite with their loved ones toward the end of their lives.  Its namesake, Joe Coleman, was an 81-year-old man who died alone behind bars from cancer, separated from his children who wished to be with him in his final days.  He had been serving a life sentence at Menard Correctional Center for a gas station robbery.

Under the law, medical incapacity is defined as a diagnosable condition, including dementia or severe permanent disability, that prevents an individual from completing daily activities without assistance.  Terminal illness is classified as an irreversible condition likely to result in death within 18 months.

On paper, the medical release process should allow individuals like [James] Handy — who was diagnosed with both medical incapacitation and terminal illness, to receive relief.  But in practice, the process is far more complex than simply proving a medical condition, and many who appear to have conditions that would qualify are either denied release or deemed ineligible, a review of public documents obtained by Injustice Watch shows.

In 2023, Injustice Watch revealed that the vast majority of applicants seeking medical release in 2022 and 2023 were denied. The trend persists today.

Between 2022 and 2024, 717 people applied for release, yet only 99 were granted freedom, an analysis by the Chicago Reporter found.  Even among those approved, three died in custody a year later.  Meanwhile,  618 applicants ... were denied or deemed ineligible.  26 of them, including Handy, died behind bars, hoping for the chance to reunite with their loved ones — one that never came.

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Mark William Osler now avaialble via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The crack epidemic of the 20th century and the fentanyl epidemic of the 21st century both created a wave of American tragedies. However, the two events were met with very different approaches by government.  Crack was addressed through largely punitive measures, with harsh mandatory minimums and guidelines aimed even at those involved with relatively small amounts of the drug.  Fentanyl was approached differently, with a greater emphasis on treatment and administrative changes rather than super-criminalization.  This symposium article addresses this disparity by looking to the stories that framed each approach.  They suggest that the difference in response was driven by race (and racism), changes in the media, the impact of advocacy, and (perhaps) learning from past mistakes.

Last week, a divided Tenth Circuit panel handed down yet another a notable new Second Amendment opinion regarding the (un)constitutionality of federal law’s criminal prohibition of gun possession by anyone "who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).  The ruling in US v Harrison, No. 23-6028 (10th Cir. Aug. 26, 2025) (available here), is at least the third notable Second Amendment opinion on this matter in just the last few months.  Harrison highlights the persisting challenges lower courts face when seeking to apply originalist Second Amendment jurisprudence to modern criminal gun prohibitions, and the majority opinion starts this way:

Jared Michael Harrison was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which prohibits firearm possession by “any person . . . who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance.” He moved to dismiss the indictment under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 37 (2022), contending the charging statute violates the Second Amendment as applied to non-intoxicated marijuana users.

The district court granted the motion. The government now appeals. The district court comprehensively analyzed the constitutional question. But the district court ruled before the Supreme Court decided United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), which issued while this appeal was pending and clarified our constitutional inquiry.  Rahimi instructs “the appropriate analysis [in Second Amendment cases] involves considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” Id. at 692. With the benefit of Rahimi, we cannot fully endorse the district court’s understanding of the historical record.

According to the district court, our historical tradition of firearm regulation is limited to disarming those who have acted dangerously in the past.  But we conclude, contrary to the district court, disarming those believed to pose a risk of future danger is consistent with a “principle[] that underpin[s] our regulatory tradition.” Id. at 692.  Still, we cannot yet decide the ultimate constitutional question.  To determine whether § 922(g)(3) as applied here is “consistent with” the principle that the government has correctly identified, the government must show non-intoxicated marijuana users pose a risk of future danger. This inquiry, which may involve fact finding, is best suited for the district court. Exercising jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, we therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Some (of many) prior related posts:

• Are broad drug user gun dispossession statutes now constitutionally suspect after Bruen?
• Fifth Circuit panel declares unconstitutional application of federal prohibition on gun possession by “unlawful user” of controlled substances
• Eighth Circuit indicates Second Amendment limits federal gun possession crimes for drug users under § 922(g)(3)
• Will federal prohibition on gun possession by unlawful drug users be the next Second Amendment issue taken up by SCOTUS?
• Does new Third Circuit opinion suggest regular drug users are more likely to have Second Amendment rights than ocassional drug users?  
• Eleventh Circuit rules federal prohibition of gun possesion by medical marijuana users problematic under Second Amendment

The quirky question in the title of this post is prompted by the latest essay by Jonathan Wroblewski over at the Sentencing Matters Substack.  The essay, which should be read in full, is titled, "An AI Experiment — Part 1: How would a large language model consider the sentencing of Sam Bankman-Fried."  As Jonathan explains at the outset, the Federal Sentencing Reporter will soon publish a big double issue focused on various ways artificial intelligence (AI) may already be changing our criminal justice systems.  Jonathan was the chief editor of this exciting forthcoming FSR issue, and here is part of his preface in this new Substack essay to his discussion with the AI tool Claude about a famous recent white-collar sentencing:

There has certainly been a lot of hyperbole about how AI will soon take all our jobs and upend all aspects of our civilization. Some fear that the robots are coming for us, that they will end up as our overlords, and that we are all doomed. Having lived through other periods of technological change, I’ve seen that predicting the future is not so easy.

One thing about all of this is for sure, though. AI is here now, and it will certainly be changing the landscape of working with words, ideas, and data. It is increasingly part of the criminal justice process and increasingly important to that process. And to be an effective advocate, jurist, probation officer, other criminal justice professional, or policymaker now and into the future, one will need to understand these tools, how they are used, and how they might be regulated and governed.

With that in mind, I hope to publish here, in the run-up to the forthcoming FSR issue and beyond, a few experiments in and around AI and sentencing.  Here’s an opening one, rather simple and rudimentary, around the sentencing of Sam Bankman-Fried in 2024.  It is my conversation, if you will, with Anthropic’s Claude 4 Sonnet. (The version I have access to has a 200k token context window — a maximum amount of text, ~150k words, it can process and remember in a single conversation or session — and its knowledge cutoff is March 2025.)

Adam Gelb, who heads the Council on Criminal Justice, has this intriguing new Newsweek commentary concerning the term "early release."  I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts (links from the original): 

"Early release" is used casually and nearly universally — by journalists and by reform advocates and opponents alike — to describe anyone who gets out of prison at anything shy of 100 percent of the maximum possible sentence.  Google "early release" and click the News tab to see just how common this is.

Its potency reflects the legacy of Willie Horton, the convicted murderer who was released from a Massachusetts prison on a weekend furlough and committed a rape.  This was in 1988, and Horton's case, used against the Massachusetts governor and presidential candidate Michael Dukakis in that year's election, became an incinerator for policies characterized as "soft on crime."

Yet the phrase "early release" is fundamentally inaccurate and misleading.  As anyone involved in the criminal justice process will tell you — victims and survivors included — all states and the federal government have laws and policies that not only permit people to earn release prior to the expiration of their sentence, they encourage it.

In fact, that's the central thrust of the First Step Act, which Congress passed with bipartisan support and President Donald Trump signed during his first term. That landmark legislation allows people in federal prison who are considered low risk, and who complete rehabilitative programs, to earn time credits that can trim their sentence or allow them to serve the final portion in home confinement or residential reentry centers....

The state and federal system each have their own complex set of rules that determine the minimum and maximum boundaries of prison terms, and they vary tremendously.  In Arkansas, people may serve as little as 17 percent of their possible maximum sentence, while in Arizona, they must serve 85 percent of the maximum before release. But whether that "release window" is large or small, judges and lawyers — and reporters — understand that the various release mechanisms mean defendants are highly unlikely to serve every day of their maximum sentence behind bars.

As such, there's nothing "early" about the release of people who have completed certain programs, avoided disciplinary infractions, and/or convinced a parole board that they are ready to return home. Nor is there anything untoward and deceptive about it. It's the law.... 

People have tried through the years to come up with an alternative. "Accelerated" and "expedited" release are among them.  "Earned" release is gaining popularity but so far, nothing's really stuck outside the community of reformers. Finding a phrase that does stick isn't a matter of political messaging or spin. It's about acknowledging that when someone goes home before they max out their prison sentence, the system isn't pulling one over on the public. 

The title of this post is the title of this new article authored by Michael Smith now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Defendants in criminal cases are routinely detained pending trial because they are deemed dangerous.  In some of these cases, these defendants are detained without bail, in others, bail is set at an amount which defendants are unable to pay.  These determinations are made after brief, minimal hearings, often based on the charging documents and the defendant’s prior criminal record.  To those defendants who are detained, prosecutors frequently make time-served plea offers — effectively giving them the option to go free in exchange for a conviction.  Refusing the offer, however, means the defendant remains in custody due to the court’s dangerousness determination.

This is absurd.  For pretrial release purposes, these defendants are too dangerous to release, but for plea purposes, these defendants can be deemed to have served their time and go free upon accepting the offer.  I propose that time-served plea offers trigger a mandatory, immediate review of defendants’ pretrial release conditions.  Unless a court confirms that it would reject the plea outright, the defendants’ dangerousness cannot be a part of this reconsideration.  Defendants who might otherwise be detained on inapplicable dangerousness grounds may consider the time-served offer without the pressure of remaining in jail.  More broadly, this reform requires courts and prosecutors to reckon with otherwise routine release determinations that often determine the outcome of criminal cases.

A couple of years ago, as noted in this post,the Drug Enforcement and Policy Center at The Ohio State University released all of Season One of a new podcast, "Drugs on the Docket."  All six full episodes of this first season, each running under an hour, were released at once (and are all still available YouTube and various podcast platforms, along with six bonus mini-episodes released as updates to the first season episodes).  And, around this time last year, as highlighed in this post, DEPC released all of Season Two of "Drugs on the Docket" and all those episides are also still available via YouTube and various podcast platforms.

DEPC has been hard at work on Season Three of "Drugs on the Docket," and this time around we have been releasing new episodes roughly once a month.  I have been remiss in highlighting each of the episodes of Season Three as they are released, but I figure the Friday before a holiday weekend is a good time to highlight all the newer content on this podcast webpage.  In particular, I wanted to highlight the fourth episode of the season, which was just released today and ought to be of particular interest to sentencing fans: 

Season 3 Episode 4 – “Justice Abandoned: How the Supreme Court Ignored the Constitution and Enabled Mass Incarceration” with Rachel Barkow

In this episode, Host Hannah Miller and co-host Douglas Berman speak with NYU law professor Rachel Barkow about her latest book, Justice Abandoned. Barkow presents a powerful critique of the Supreme Court’s role in perpetuating mass incarceration by failing to enforce key constitutional protections.  She offers insights into how the justice system got here — from the political climate of the late 1960s to the rise of the war on drugs — and how judicial appointments can shape the future of criminal justice reform.

Barkow is the Charles Seligson Professor of Law at NYU School of Law. She also serves as the faculty director of the Zimroth Center on the Administration of Criminal Law at NYU and served as a member of the United States Sentencing Commission from 2013 to 2019.

Show notes:

• Publisher’s page for Justice Abandoned
• Publisher’s page for Rachel Barkow's prior book, Prisoners of Politics: Breaking the Cycle of Mass Incarceration
• Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)
• John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 Va. L. Rev. 899 (2011)
• Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Harmelin’s Faulty Originalism, 14 Nev. L.J. 522 (2014)

Check it out!

As reported in this AP article, a "man convicted of killing his girlfriend, her mother and a man he claimed owed him $2,000 was put to death Thursday in a record 11th execution this year by the state of Florida." Here is more:

Curtis Windom, 59, was pronounced dead at 6:17 p.m. following a lethal injection at Florida State Prison near Starke, authorities said. He was sentenced to die for the Nov. 7, 1992, killings of girlfriend Valerie Davis, her mother Mary Lubin, and Johnnie Lee in the Orlando area....

Kemene Hunter, a sister of victim Valerie Davis, wore a T-shirt to a news conference after the execution that read, “Justice for her, healing for me.” “All I want to say is, it took 33 years to get some closure,” Hunter said, adding “Vengeance is mine says the lord.”

Windom was the 30th person executed in the U.S. to date in 2025, with Florida leading the way behind a flurry of death warrants signed by Republican Gov. Ron DeSantis. A 12th inmate, David Joseph Pittman, 63, is scheduled to be put to death in the state on Sept. 17.

Court records show a friend told Windom the day of the killings that Lee — who supposedly owed Windom $2,000 — had won $114 at a greyhound racetrack. Windom told the friend that “you’re gonna read about me” and that he planned to kill Lee. Windom went to a Walmart to buy a .38-caliber revolver and a box of 50 shells, according to court testimony. Not long after, Windom drove to find Lee, located him and shot him twice in the back from his car, followed by two more shots standing over the nab at close range.

Then Windom headed to Davis’ apartment and fatally shot his girlfriend “with no provocation” in front of a friend, court records show. Windom randomly shot and wounded another man before encountering Davis’ mother, Mary Lubin, as she drove to her daughter’s apartment. Lubin was shot twice in her car at a stop sign....

Davis was the mother of one of Windom’s children, a daughter who had campaigned to stop the execution from being carried out. “Forgiveness comes with time, and 33 years is a long time. I, myself, have forgiven my father,” the daughter, Curtisia Windom, said in a statement from an anti-death penalty group that delivered more than 5,000 petition signatures to the governor this week, urging him to intervene....

Since the 1976 restoration of the death penalty in the U.S. by the Supreme Court, the highest previous annual total of Florida executions was eight in 2014. Florida has executed more people than any other state this year, while Texas and South Carolina are tied for second place with four each.

The title of this post is the title of this new article now available via SSRN and authored by Tobie Smith.  Here is its abstract:

The Supreme Court has revitalized the jury’s role in criminal sentencing over the past quarter century, reaffirming that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury extends to factfinding that increases the punishment range for a conviction.  But one class of sentencing findings — those related to a defendant’s criminal history — has been excluded. The Court has upheld an exception to the jury right where the fact to be found is whether a defendant has a prior conviction. Relying on that prior-conviction exception, many jurisdictions have continued to allow judges to increase the possible sentence based on their own preponderance-of-the-evidence findings about disputed details of defendants’ criminal histories, even where the evidence is ambiguous, contradictory, or unconvincing.

The prior-conviction exception is a subject of continuing criticism from legal scholars and a substantial segment of the current Court. Yet even as the Court has declined to revisit those precedents, it has in recent years made clear that the exception is narrow — too narrow, in fact, to allow judges to make many of the factual determinations that recidivism enhancements require.

This article argues that today recidivism laws across jurisdictions often require findings beyond the mere fact of a prior conviction, and therefore constitutionally require a jury.  Those laws were enacted, however, with the expectation that judges could apply them in summary sentencing proceedings. Involving juries presents new challenges for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and courts, because jury trials about past offenses — sometimes distant in time and place — raise unfamiliar issues of proof, competency of evidence, and procedural fairness.  Such challenges, and high stakes like mandatory minimum prison terms and increased statutory maximums, provide incentives for defendants to contest enhancements even as criminal trials are vanishingly rare.

Fully realizing the possibility of recidivism jury trials will require procedural accommodations, most notably bifurcated proceedings that ensure evidence of prior crimes does not taint the jury’s consideration of new criminal allegations. And the costs of recidivism trials could prompt pushback by courts, prosecutors, and legislators, raising the possibility that spillover effects from these legal developments could significantly reshape sentencing laws and procedures in the United States.  Procedural justice for criminal defendants will be promoted by restoring the jury’s role in deciding factual disputes under recidivism enhancements, but it is not yet assured that justice in substantive outcomes follows.

This press piece, headlined "US Prosecutors Challenge 'Unusually Lenient' Sentence in HashFlare Mining Fraud," reports that federal prosecutors were quick to appeal this notable federal sentencing decision in a cryptocurrency fraud handed down this week.  Here is a bit of the story from the press piece:

Federal prosecutors have moved to overturn what one legal expert called an “unusually lenient” outcome in one of the largest crypto frauds ever tried in the region.  The government on Tuesday appealed with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals the “time served” sentences handed down to Estonian nationals Sergei Potapenko and Ivan Turõgin, who pleaded guilty to conspiracy in a $577 million cryptocurrency mining Ponzi scheme....

The appeal targets [Judge Robert S.] Lasnik's decision to sentence Potapenko and Turõgin to only three years of supervised release and $25,000 fines each, rejecting prosecutors' request for 10-year prison terms in what authorities called "the largest fraud ever prosecuted" in the Western District of Washington....

Navodaya Singh Rajpurohit, legal partner at Coinque Consulting [said] that while the sentence may seem "unusually lenient," Judge Lasnik clearly articulated his reasoning around “time already served, immigration risks, and restitution concerns.”...

The HashFlare defendants pleaded guilty in February to defrauding 440,000 victims worldwide through fraudulent crypto mining contracts from 2015 to 2019. They showed customers "fake online dashboards" with fictitious returns while lacking the mining infrastructure they promised, instead using investor funds for luxury purchases and buying Bitcoin through exchanges to pay early withdrawers.

Judge Lasnik has described the case as "one of the most difficult sentencings the Court has encountered during 27 years on the federal bench." He noted that all parties agreed the defendants should serve any prison sentence in Estonia through a treaty transfer, but is "taking too great a risk by assuming that office [Department of Justice's Office of International Affairs] will approve defendants' treaty transfer rather than reject it,”

Lasnik warned that without treaty transfers, the defendants would "face a significantly longer and harsher term of imprisonment" than American white-collar criminals receiving identical sentences, followed by "indefinite detention" by Immigration and Customs Enforcement before deportation.

This press overview highlights only some of the issue that the sentencing judge had to sort through, including calculation of the guideline range. Notably, though federal prosecutors were arguing for "only" a 10-year sentence, the calculated guideline range was 360 months to life (which was higher than the applicable statutory maximum). I recommend the full 14-page sentencing opinion, and here is how it concludes:

The foregoing shows that this case presents certain unique circumstances. Taking the totality of those circumstances into account, the Court finds mitigating circumstances here that justify a major downward departure from the statutory maximum of 240 months (and from the ten-year sentence sought by the Government, which itself was a major downward departure from the both the Guidelines range of 360 months to life and the statutory maximum of 240 months).

The seriousness of this crime is indisputable, but having considered the § 3553 factors the Court, under these unique circumstances, will accept the defense recommendation and impose a sentence of credit for time served.  The Court will also impose three years of supervised release, which can be done remotely, as well as a special assessment of $100 and a fine of $25,000 for each defendant.  In addition, each defendant shall perform 120 hours of community service per year of supervision in their neighborhoods in Estonia and provide verification to the probation office.  Defendants shall have their passports returned to them upon release.

The Court agrees with the Government that it is important to send a message with this sentence, and the message the Court intends to send to fraudsters is this: “You will be punished, and the punishment will vary depending on the totality of the circumstances.”

Download POTAPENKO sentencing opinion

I was pleased to learn via an email that The Sentencing Project has updated its report from last year (noted here) on second look sentencing developments.  This new 44-page report is titled "The Second Look Movement: An Assessment of the Nation’s Sentence Review Law," and here is how its executive summary gets started:

Today, there are nearly two million people in American prisons and jails — a 500% increase over the last 50 years. In 2024, over 194,000 people in U.S. prisons were serving life sentences — nearly as many people as were in prison with any sentence in 1970.  Almost two-fifths of people serving life sentences are 55 or older, amounting to almost 70,000 people. People of color, particularly Black Americans, are represented at a higher rate among those serving lengthy and extreme sentences than among the total prison population.

Harsh sentencing policies, such as lengthy mandatory minimum sentences, have produced an aging prison population in the United States.  But research has established that lengthy sentences do not have a significant deterrent effect on crime and divert resources from effective public safety programs.  Most criminal careers are under 10 years, and as people age, they usually desist from crime.  Existing parole systems are ineffective at curtailing excessive sentences in most states, due to their highly discretionary nature, lack of due process and oversight, and lack of objective consideration standards.8 Consequently, legislators and the courts are looking to judicial review as a more effective means to reconsider an incarcerated person’s sentence in order to assess their fitness to reenter society.  A judicial review mechanism also provides the opportunity to evaluate whether sentences imposed decades ago remain just under current sentencing policies and public sentiment.

This report presents the evolution of the second look movement, which started with ensuring compliance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Graham v. Florida (2010) and Miller v. Alabama (2012) on the constitutionality of juvenile life without parole (“JLWOP”) sentences.  This reform has more recently expanded to other types of sentences and populations, such as other excessive sentences imposed on youth, and emerging adults sentenced to life without parole (“LWOP”).  Currently, officials in 15 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government have enacted a second look judicial review beyond opportunities provided to those with JLWOP sentences, and courts in 16 states determined that other lengthy sentences such as LWOP or term-of-years sentences were unconstitutional under Graham or Miller.  The report provides an overview of the types of second look and resentencing laws in the United States as well as illustrative information about and citations to some of the legislation and court decisions.

The question in the title of this post is prompted by Prez Trump's latest social media posting, which asserts that "Speaker Mike Johnson, and Leader John Thune, are working with me, and other Republicans, on a Comprehensive Crime Bill."  I assume any future crime bill will be given a catchier name at some point, and I know I am already giving thought to what I would like to see in a new piece of federal crime legislation to build on the successes of the First Step Act enacted by Congress during Prez Trump's first term. 

A decade into the Trump era, I have learned not to take too literally or too seriously what Donald Trump says on social media.  But given that Prez Trump and his GOP allies are viewing crime fighting and crime policy as a winning political issue (and also that Democrats are struggling with a reponse, see recent press pieces here and here), new political talk of a new "Comprehensive Crime Bill" makes lots of sense.  Indeed, not that long ago in the 1980s and 1990s, some significant crime legislation would be enacted by Congress just about every two years in sync with election cycles no matter who was in the Oval Office.

But, of course, the devil is the details when it comes to enacting big new federal legisaltion and in navigating the modern politics and policy-mkaing of crime and punishment.  The First Step Act was truly the culmination of decades of federal criminal justice reform debates, and it is unclear what sets of criminal justice proposals will get enough support in Congress to get to the desk of the President.  (I assume a crime bill would not find a way to be immune from the Senate filibuster, so at least 60 Senate would seem to be a necessity for any bill.)

So, perhaps we can and should be making a wish list here for federal criminal justice reforms.  What would folks like to see in a new "Comprehensive Crime Bill"?

As reported in this CNN article, Prez Trump today was making a pitch for pursuit of the death penalty in response to ebery murder in Washington DC:

President Donald Trump said that his administration will seek the death penalty in all murder cases in Washington, DC, a move that could run into significant obstacles with city juries.

“Anybody murders something in the capital, capital punishment. Capital, capital punishment. If somebody kills somebody in the capital, Washington, DC, we’re going to be seeking the death penalty,” the president said during a meeting with Cabinet members Tuesday. The president did not immediately outline any specifics, but called capital punishment a “very strong preventative” measure....

Traditionally, the DC Superior Court handles the bulk of murder cases in the city, and it would be bound by the city code that does not authorize capital punishment. However, the US attorney’s office in DC, which prosecutes crimes in both the local and federal court in the city – unlike any other jurisdiction in the country – could bring federal charges in many capital-eligible cases and seek the death penalty....

Actually getting a death sentence, though, might not be so easy, as prosecutors would have to convince jurors to sign off. Historically, prosecutors have faced challenges in convincing special juries to impose capital punishment in DC, even if they vote unanimously to convict the defendants, multiple people in Washington’s legal community have told CNN in recent weeks.,,,

The federal court in the District of Columbia hasn’t held a death penalty trial since 2003, when Rodney L. Moore was convicted of 10 killings and Kevin L. Gray was convicted of 19 killings, according to multiple people familiar with the court and that case. In that case, the jurors said they couldn’t agree unanimously on death sentences for the two men rather than life imprisonment, court records show....

In recent months, the Justice Department has indicated in at least three cases in DC’s federal court that it may seek the death penalty, according to court records. One of those cases is against Elias Rodriguez, who is accused of shooting two Israeli embassy staff members leaving a Jewish community event in May. The Department of Justice is also actively considering seeking the death penalty in DC District Court for two Mexican nationals who were charged in 2008 in a gang case and recently brought to the US, and for two young men who were indicted for a 2023 carjacking, according to court records.

Unless the Justice Department was prepared to reassign a lot of additional prosecutors to the DC, it likely would prove extremely difficult as a practical matter for the feds to bring dozens and dozens of capital prosecutors in the Capitol.  It will be interesting to see if this tough talk is followed by any significant actions.

I am very excited to be part of a planning team for a big event, "Originalism and Criminal Justice Symposium," to take place at The Ohio State University on September 8-9, 2026.   Basic details about the event are available at this link; in short form, the Salmon P. Chase Center for Civics, Culture, and Society and the Drug Enforcement and Policy Center at The Ohio State University are sponsoring a conference delving into the application of originalist methodologies to contemporary issues of constitutional doctrine and practice in the criminal justice context.  This conference includes soliciting of papers — both full-length articles and shorter essays — for a scholarship workshop expected to take place on September 8, 2026. The full call for papers is available at this link, and here is the heart of the call:

As part of this conference, we are soliciting papers for a scholarship workshop expected to take place on September 8, 2026. Junior scholars are especially encouraged to submit papers (and will be paired with a senior scholar to review and discuss their submission). Scholars who are supportive of, and those who are skeptical about, originalist approaches to the Constitution are all highly encouraged to participate.

Participants should plan to have a full draft to circulate by August 1, 2026, and we welcome submissions of both full-length articles (15,000-30,000 words) and shorter essays (5,000-10,000 words). The full-length articles will be gathered and published in a symposium edition of the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law; the shorter essays will be published in a special issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter.

Deadline for proposals:

• Please submit a title and a proposed abstract of no more than 500 words by November 1, 2025. You can submit your proposal using our Qualtrics form.
• Abstracts should note if the author expects to produce an article or essay, and accepted scholars will be notified by December 15, 2025....

By fostering a dynamic dialogue among originalist experts, as well as jurists and scholars who are skeptical about originalist methods, this conference seeks to deepen understanding of the intersection of originalism and criminal justice doctrines as well as modern debates over constitutional criminal law and procedures.

A Second Circuit panel issued a notable opinion yesterday in United States v. Mercado, No. 25-206-cr (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 2025) (available here), regarding supervised release rules.  Here is how the opinion starts:

The government appeals from an amended order, entered on January 24, 2025, by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Stefan R. Underhill, Judge), denying its motion to detain Defendant-Appellee Carlos Mercado pending revocation proceedings for an alleged violation of the terms of his supervised release. In doing so, the district court explained that under the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), Mercado, as a United States citizen, could be detained pending revocation proceedings only if his detention was authorized by statute, and it found there was no such statutory authority.  Thus, the district court concluded that it was not authorized to detain Mercado pending the adjudication of his alleged supervised release violation.

On appeal, the government contends that the district court erred in denying its detention motion because, among other reasons, the detention of a supervisee alleged to have committed a supervised release violation pending revocation proceedings is authorized by statute, namely, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1).  Separately, in response to Mercado’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the government asserts that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under, among other provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

As an initial matter, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because an order related to detention or release, under Section 3145(c), constitutes a final order under Section 1291 that can be appealed to this Court.  We further hold that a district court has the authority to detain a supervisee charged with a supervised release violation pending revocation proceedings.  In particular, we hold that Section 3143(a)(1) authorizes such detention because a supervisee was found “guilty of an offense” when he was originally convicted and, with the initiation of revocation proceedings, is “awaiting . . . execution” of a portion of his sentence for that conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1). Therefore, because the district court erred in determining that it lacked the authority to detain Mercado pending his revocation proceedings, the district court shall determine on remand whether such detention is warranted in this case pursuant to Section 3143(a)(1) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(a)(6).

A Second Circuit panel issued a notable opinion yesterday in United States v. Mercado, No. 25-206-cr (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 2025) (available here), regarding supervised release revocation procedure.  Here is how the opinion starts:

The government appeals from an amended order, entered on January 24, 2025, by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Stefan R. Underhill, Judge), denying its motion to detain Defendant-Appellee Carlos Mercado pending revocation proceedings for an alleged violation of the terms of his supervised release. In doing so, the district court explained that under the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), Mercado, as a United States citizen, could be detained pending revocation proceedings only if his detention was authorized by statute, and it found there was no such statutory authority.  Thus, the district court concluded that it was not authorized to detain Mercado pending the adjudication of his alleged supervised release violation.

On appeal, the government contends that the district court erred in denying its detention motion because, among other reasons, the detention of a supervisee alleged to have committed a supervised release violation pending revocation proceedings is authorized by statute, namely, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1).  Separately, in response to Mercado’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the government asserts that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under, among other provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

As an initial matter, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because an order related to detention or release, under Section 3145(c), constitutes a final order under Section 1291 that can be appealed to this Court.  We further hold that a district court has the authority to detain a supervisee charged with a supervised release violation pending revocation proceedings.  In particular, we hold that Section 3143(a)(1) authorizes such detention because a supervisee was found “guilty of an offense” when he was originally convicted and, with the initiation of revocation proceedings, is “awaiting . . . execution” of a portion of his sentence for that conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1). Therefore, because the district court erred in determining that it lacked the authority to detain Mercado pending his revocation proceedings, the district court shall determine on remand whether such detention is warranted in this case pursuant to Section 3143(a)(1) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(a)(6).

The title of this post is the title of this short paper authored by Mark Osler now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The Trump and Biden administrations established new trends in the use of the pardon power. One of the most striking shifts was both Presidents’ willingness to extend clemency to those convicted of violent crimes. This short book chapter reveals and analyzes this development while arguing for a fresh-start reform of the federal clemency evaluation process. 

The Prison Policy Initiative, which has some of the best data visuals on incarceration level and other criminal justice metrics, today released this new report titled "Youth Confinement: The Whole Pie 2025." Here are excerpts from the start of the report:

In the past 25 years, the number of youth confined in facilities away from home as a result of juvenile or criminal legal system involvement has dropped by over 70%, to about 31,900 at last count in 2023. In the criminal legal system context, this is an unparalleled rate of decarceration. But while the juvenile system’s shift from carceral punishment to more community-based responses to law- and rule-breaking behavior offers lessons for the broader criminal legal system, our analysis of the most recent data shows this work is far from complete. Tens of thousands of children and adolescents are still held under lock and key each day, most in restrictive facilities that look and feel a lot like adult prisons and jails. In fact, the U.S. still confines youth at a rate that’s more than twice the global average, and well above that of all other NATO member countries....

Generally speaking, state juvenile legal systems handle cases involving defendants under the age of 18. (This is not a hard-and-fast rule, however; every state makes exceptions for younger people to be prosecuted as adults in some situations or for certain offenses. ) Of the 29,300 youth in juvenile facilities, more than two-thirds (68%) are aged 16 or older. Troublingly, about 400 confined children are no more than 12 years old.

Gender. The vast majority (85%) of confined youth are boys, but girls make up a greater proportion of the youngest kids in the system: 45% of girls in confinement are under 16 compared to 30% of boys. Below age 13, these differences grow even starker, as nearly 1 in 10 girls in the system are younger than 13, compared to nearly 1 in 20 boys.

Race and ethnicity. Black and Indigenous youth are overrepresented in juvenile facilities, while white youth are underrepresented. These racial disparities are particularly pronounced among both Black boys and Black girls, and while Indigenous girls make up a small part of the confined population, they are extremely overrepresented relative to their share of the total youth population. While 14% of all youth under 18 in the U.S. are Black, 47% of boys and 39% of girls in juvenile facilities are Black — a level of disparity that has actually worsened in recent years. In some jurisdictions, Black children make up more than 60% of the confined youth population. And even excluding youth held in Indian country facilities, Indigenous children make up 3% of girls and 2% of boys in juvenile facilities, despite comprising less than 1% of all youth nationally.

Today I start another year of teaching at The Ohio State University MorItz College of Law, and I am very much looking forward to meeting a new cohort of 1Ls in my Criminal Law class this afternoon.  Much has changed (and not changed) in my many years of law teaching, but the excitement of "the first day of school" is a wonderful constant.  Another constant has been robust debate over so-called "experiential" education in law school.  I taught in one great OSU clinic for a few years, taught legal writing for many years, and have regularly incorporated "experiential" elements into my traditional classes.  I am a fan of providing robust "experiential" opportunities to law students, but I am also disinclined to place too many mandates on upper-level law students.

I provide this personal background in part to explain why I am posting here a new article on legal education, titled "The Evolution of Experiential Legal Education."  As the article's abstract explains, the American Bar Association is considering a proposal to double (from six to twelve) the required "experiential" credits for law students:

To help bridge the gap between legal education and legal practice, in 2014 the American Bar Association adopted a requirement that law students take at least six credits of "experiential" courses.  Despite limited research on the effects of this reform, the ABA is currently considering a new reform that would require law students to take twice as many experiential credits to graduate.  We provide new evidence for this debate by studying the evolution of experiential legal education and the impacts of the 2014 reform.  We compile data reported by law schools to the ABA to document a dramatic rise in the number of experiential opportunities available to students even before the reform, and we find no evidence that the reform improved bar passage rates or employment outcomes. However, we also find no evidence that the reform increased tuition.  We then use transcript data from one law school to study how the 2014 reform impacted students' course selections.  We find evidence suggesting that the reform expanded access to clinics primarily to students least inclined to benefit from them but without displacing students most inclined to benefit from them.

As I gear up to kick off another semester of traditional 1L Criminal Law instruction, I am quite interested in hearing any thoughts from lawyers, law stucdents or anyone else about "experiential" education (especially, but not exclusively, in law school).  And, of course, I am especially eager to hear about "experiential" experiences (or recomendations) that involve criminal justice and sentencing elements. 

A set of US Supreme Court cases to be argued in November — which are already being discussing at the Sentencing Matters Substack in recent posts here and here — seems likely to bring more attention to so-called "compassionate release" laws and practices.  But the cases before the Justices highlight why, at least in the federal system, the term "compassionate release" can be something of a misnomer if thought to encompass only releases based on a prisoner's age, illness or family matters.  Applicable federal law authorizes judges to "reduce the term of imprisonment" on various grounds, and the cases involving federal sentence-reduction authority that SCOTUS has taken up do not involve medical or family issues.

That all said, even in the federal system, sentence-reduction authority is often ussed to address what might be called traditional "compassionate release" issues: the latest data from the US Sentencing Commission detail that "serious physical or medical condition" and "terminal illness" and "family circumstances" are among the most common reasons given by federal judges when granting a sentence reduction so far in Fiscal Year 2025.  In addition, many states have more traditional "compassionate release" laws that are much narrower in design and application than federal sentence-reduction law.  (FAMM has a robust accounting of all state compassionate release laws here on its website.)

This background provides some content for this notable new article from New Jersey headlined "Minimal savings achieved from NJ law allowing sick inmates to die at home."  In addition to providing a disconcerting report on how the Garden State has implemented a new compassionate release law, this piece provides a critical reminder that the implementation intricacies of any form of sentencing reform can often be more important and consequential than enactment.  I recommend the local article in full for anyone interested in these issues, and here are excerpts:

When New Jersey lawmakers passed a law in 2020 meant to free more gravely ill people from prison so they could die at home, they also ordered state corrections officials to reinvest any savings into programs that aid reentry and reduce recidivism. Five years later, officials have yet to do so.

Seven seriously ill people have been freed from state prisons since 2021 under the compassionate release law, cutting a combined 1,849 days off their sentences and saving the system, by the Department of Corrections’ own estimate, $71,585. But that money remains in departmental coffers, unspent....

The law replaced a 1997 medical release statute under which hardly anyone got released. But the newer law has not had much more success, averaging just over one person a year freed. That makes little sense to prison reformers, who say health care costs soar as the prison population grays while recidivism risks fall as people age....

Department officials placed blame on judges, who ultimately decide whether to free the people the department deems eligible. Thirty-six people met eligibility requirements in the past five years, but judges did not approve 26 of them for release (another three await court decisions), according to departmental data.  To be eligible, a person must have a terminal illness or be permanently physically incapacitated by a medical condition they didn’t have when sentenced and that requires 24-hour care....

While New Jersey could save more if more people were freed on compassionate release, it’s tough to quantify exactly how many eligible people remain behind bars or have been rejected as ineligible.  To get compassionate release, incarcerated people must be medically evaluated by prison health care providers and be granted a certificate of eligibility from the department.  Superior Court judges then decide whether to grant their release.

Corrections officials did not respond to the New Jersey Monitor’s questions on how many people have applied for consideration.  The department also denied a public records request for those applications, citing health privacy restrictions.  Peter McAleer, a courts spokesman, said the court system does not track compassionate release cases. Almost 1,100 people now incarcerated in New Jersey state prisons are 60 or older, departmental data shows.

As reported in this BBC piece, headlined "Pub and travel bans proposed under sentencing rule changes," some notable reforms spurred by prison overcrowding are emerging across the pond.  Here are the basics:

People convicted of crimes in England and Wales could find themselves barred from going to pubs, concerts and sports matches under changes to sentencing rules being planned by the government. The reforms would allow courts imposing non-custodial terms to have the power to hand out driving and travel bans too, and order offenders to remain in specific areas.

Justice Secretary Shabana Mahmood said criminals must have "their freedom restricted" in society if they are serving community sentences, but some have raised concerns about how the new measures will be imposed.  A recent review recommended fewer custodial sentences for less serious offences as a way of dealing with overcrowded prisons.

Courts are currently able to impose limited bans on people convicted of certain offences - for instance, someone found guilty of violence at football matches can be banned from all stadiums.  But the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) says it plans to introduce legislation to allow more restrictions to be imposed by judges and magistrates "as a form of punishment for any offence in any circumstance".

It means offenders could face additional penalties unrelated to their specific offence, with those who break the rules being taken back to court.  Offenders released from prison who are supervised by the Probation Service could also face similar restrictions under the plans - as well as more mandatory drug testing, even if they do not have a history of misuse.

Former Old Bailey Criminal Judge Wendy Joseph KC told BBC Breakfast "a number of really good results" could come from the scheme, but that "it's not going to work unless its properly funded" and carefully thought through. "The idea you can keep people out of pubs might be putting a lot of weight on people who run pubs," she said. She added that if the scheme was introduced, "you've got to find a way of catching the people who breach the rules, and punish them"....

The MoJ said the plans were part of wider sentencing reforms aimed at deterring crime and ensuring prisons never ran out of places for dangerous offenders. The government began releasing thousands of inmates early, soon after coming to power in 2024, saying they had inherited a prison system from the previous Conservative government that was on the brink of running out of spaces.

Mahmood said widening the range of sentencing options short of prison time was part of Labour's plan to cut crime and make streets safer. "When criminals break society's rules, they must be punished," she said. "Those serving their sentences in the community must have their freedom restricted there too."

The latest announcement comes in the wake of the MoJ giving details of its plan to place tighter restrictions on serious sexual and violent criminals when they are released from prison, forcing them stay in a specific area. The government said limiting offenders to a geographical zone, policed by tougher monitoring and enhanced tagging, would give victims greater peace of mind.

Under reforms announced in May, some prisoners in England and Wales will now be eligible for release after serving a third of their sentence. But this - as well as the early releases - have faced criticism for placing further pressure on the probation service and police forces.

In his first day back in the Oval Office, through this January 20 executive order, Prez Trump called the death penalty the "only proper punishment for the vilest crimes" and asserted that his "Administration will not tolerate efforts to stymie and eviscerate the laws that authorize capital punishment against those who commit horrible acts of violence against American citizens."  That order included a variety of action items, and this new AP article reports on aspects of how the capital punishment push is going:

President Donald Trump’s administration is faltering in its aggressive pursuit of the death penalty as it revisits cases in which predecessors explicitly decided against seeking capital punishment.

Since taking office in February, U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi has authorized prosecutors to seek the death penalty against 19 people, including nine defendants in cases in which President Joe Biden’s administration had sought lesser sentences. But judges have blocked those reversal attempts for all but two defendants, most recently on Monday in a pair of cases in the U.S. Virgin Islands, showing the limits of the Trump administration’s power to undo decisions in cases already well underway.

In pursuing capital punishment, the Justice Department is seeking to follow through on a Trump campaign promise to resume federal executions after they were halted by Biden’s Attorney General Merrick Garland. The Republican president’s Justice Department has accused the previous Democratic administration of supplanting “the will of the people with their own personal beliefs” in failing to seek death sentences in many cases involving horrific crimes.

Detailed opinions haven’t been issued in the most recent two cases, which involve a man accused of killing a police officer in 2022 and two men accused of armed robbery and murder in 2018. But other judges who have rejected reversal attempts on constitutional and procedural grounds were blunt in their assessment of the Trump administration’s approach.

“The government has proceeded hastily in this case, and in doing so has leapfrogged important constitutional and statutory rights,” Trump appointee U.S. Judge Stephanie Gallagher in Maryland wrote in June, striking the notice of intent to seek the death penalty against three alleged MS-13 gang members accused of killing two teenage girls in 2020. “That is unacceptable.”

Authorization of capital prosecution typically occurs years before trial, but in the Maryland case, prosecutors filed the death penalty notice less than four months before the trial was scheduled to start. None of the defendants were represented by attorneys who specialize in death penalty litigation, which they would have been entitled to under federal law due to the complexity of capital cases and the potential consequences.

“The government does not hide the ball here — the only reason for its flip-flop on the death penalty was the change in administration,” wrote Gallagher, who called the government’s “willful blindness” to the differences between capital and non-capital trials “startling.”...

Trump, whose first administration carried out a record-setting 13 federal executions, signed an order on his first day back in the White House compelling the Justice Department to seek the death penalty in appropriate federal cases and support capital punishment in states. Bondi, who has said she will seek the death penalty “whenever possible,” quickly lifted a Biden-era moratorium on federal executions and ordered a review of decisions made by the previous administration.

The 120-day deadline for that review has passed with no official word on the results, but a senior Justice Department official told The Associated Press that all but about 30 cases have been examined. The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity under terms set by the department, said roughly 1,400 decisions not to seek the death penalty were issued by Garland, with all but 459 having already been fully adjudicated by the time Trump took office.

Bondi isn’t the first attorney general to review past cases: Not only did Garland authorize just one death penalty case during his tenure, he also withdrew 35 notices of intent to seek the death penalty issued by his predecessors. The Justice Department says the Bondi-ordered review was essentially “the flip side” of Garland’s action and was the right thing to do to ensure consistency and achieve justice for victims and their families.

 

As reported in this Fox News piece, "Lyle Menendez, one of the two brothers convicted in the 1989 shotgun slayings of their parents in Beverly Hills, was denied parole by a California review board on Friday in his first appearance before the board."  Here is more:

The decision came after his brother, Erik, was denied parole on Thursday. The brothers will be eligible to go before the parole board again in three years.

The California Board of Parole Hearings recommendation marks a significant development in the decades-long case that drew international attention, with the brothers’ televised trial becoming one of the most infamous of the 1990s. Lyle, now 57, has spent more than 30 years behind bars....

A panel of parole hearing officers evaluated the brothers individually. Similarly to his brother, Lyle Menendez faced the board via video conference from the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego. "The panel has found today that there are still signs" that Lyle poses a risk to the public, Parole Commissioner Julie Garland said.

"We find your remorse is genuine," she said. "In many ways, you look like you've been a model inmate. You have been a model inmate in many ways who has demonstrated the potential for change. But despite all those outward positives, we see ... you still struggle with anti-social personality traits like deception, minimization and rule breaking that lie beneath that positive surface."

"Don’t ever not have hope … this denial is not … it’s not the end," Garland added. "It’s a way for you to spend some time to demonstrate, to practice what you preach about who you are, who you want to be."

The board members mentioned Lyle's history of breaking rules behind bars and his repeated cellphone use in prison. "You seem to be different things at different times," Deputy Parole Commissioner Patrick Reardon said....

The brothers' family said in a statement after Lyle's hearing that "this is not the end of the road," and that both will go before the board again, and their habeas petition remains under review. "While we are of course disappointed by today’s decision as well, we are not discouraged. The process for parole is exceptionally rigorous, but we are incredibly proud of how Erik and Lyle showed up — with honesty, accountability, and integrity."

The California Board of Parole Hearings (BPH), under the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), has 21 full-time commissioners.  Each commissioner is appointed by the Governor of California and confirmed by the state Senate.  The commissioners serve three-year terms, with the brothers' each meeting with 2-3 commissioners.

Because the California Board of Parole Hearings did not recommend Lyle Menendez for parole, he will remain incarcerated.  [California Governor] Newsom, while he’ll be unable to reverse the independent board’s decision, will still be able to affirm, reverse, or take no action on the board’s decision.  Under California law, he has 30 days to make a decision. If the governor chooses not to act, the parole board’s decision stands.

Some prior related posts:

• Kim Kardashian advocates reconsidering Menendez brothers' LWOP sentences just as Los Angeles DA begins to do so
• LA District Attorney announces that he will seek resentencing for the Menendez brothers
• Continuing coverage and comment on Menendez brothers' possible resentencing 
• California Gov to hold off on Menedez clemency decision pending resentencing review by new DA
• New Los Angeles DA asks to withdraw prior DA's motion for resentencing in Menedez brothers' case 
• Judge rejects new Los Angeles DA's request to revoke predecessor's resentencing petition for Menendez brothers 
• Menendez brothers resentenced by California judge to 50 years to life, making them parole eligible 
• Eric Menedez denied parole due to "behavior in prison" 

The title of this post is the title of this new essay now available via SSRN authored by Jessica Eaglin. Here is its abstract:

In response to the tenth anniversary of the Ferguson uprisings, this Essay examines how the protests reshaped legal discourse on algorithmic decision-making in criminal law, with a specific focus on systemic racial injustice.  By deconstructing the metaphorical "black box," the Essay surveys the intersection of race, technology, and incarceration while also illustrating how the uprisings influenced public and scholarly engagement with criminal legal technologies.  The Essay analyzes current critiques and cautions against focusing too narrowly on reforming specific technologies rather than addressing the legal and social structures that sustain racial inequality.  The Essay concludes by urging scholars and policymakers to engage with the structural dimensions of technology in criminal law and develop more comprehensive approaches to justice in the digital age. 

As reported in this CBS News piece, headlined "Lyle Menendez set for parole board hearing day after brother was denied," California parole practices are getting significant attention thanks to a couple of high-profile hearings.  Here are some details:

After the board denied his brother parole on Thursday, Lyle Menendez will try to convince a separate panel of commissioners to release him after serving decades in prison for killing his parents. Menendez is scheduled to appear virtually from the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego on Friday.

Erik and Lyle Menendez were convicted in 1996 to life in prison without the possibility of parole for murdering their parents, Kitty and Jose Menendez, in their Beverly Hills home. In May, a judge reduced their sentences to 50 years to life, making them eligible for parole under California's youth offender law because they were under the age of 26 when they committed their crimes.

The brothers have maintained that they acted in self-defense after suffering years of alleged physical, sexual and emotional abuse from their parents. The Menendez brothers' appellate attorney, Mark Geragos, and several family members have said they believe the brothers have changed after so much time in prison.

Los Angeles County District Attorney Nathan Hochman has publicly opposed the brothers' possible release. He believes they have lied about the alleged abuse and have not taken full responsibility for their crimes. In a statement he shared prior to Erik Menendez being denied parole on Thursday, he said that "justice should never be swayed by spectacle," referencing a number of documentaries and television shows based on the brothers in recent years.

The panel presiding over Erik Menendez's hearing denied his bid for parole after a nearly 10-hour meeting. Parole Board Commissioner Robert Barton explained that the panel understood the gravity of the hearing but could not recommend parole primarily because of Erik Menendez's "behavior in prison."

"We probably spent four times more than we do on our usual average here," Barton said. "This is a tragic case. I agree that not only two, but four people, were lost in this family." Barton said he believed the parole panel's decision would have been different if Erik Menendez had not violated prison policies since 2013. Following the denial, the commissioner listed Menendez's violations, including inappropriate behavior with visitors, drug smuggling, misuse of computers, cell phone usage and incidents of violence in 1997 and 2011. "One can pose a risk to public safety in many ways, with several types of criminal behavior, including the ones you were guilty of in prison," Barton said.

Along with Menendez's violations, the panel also discussed the brutal murders of Kitty and Jose Menendez. Instead of dismissing the alleged abuse, Barton expressed empathy for the brothers and their claims, but argued that they did not have to kill their parents. In hindsight, Barton suggested that the brothers could have left their parents, sought shelter with their relatives, or gone to the police rather than killing them. The commissioner described the murder of Kitty Menendez as "devoid of human compassion."

"I can't put myself in your place," Barton said. "I don't know that I've ever had rage to that level, ever. But that is still concerning, especially since it seems she was also a victim herself of the domestic violence." Barton continued, saying that he and his colleagues "recognize and understand that many sexual assault victims find it hard to come forward, especially when the perpetrators are family members," but noted that victims don't usually kill their abusers.

Some prior related posts:

• Kim Kardashian advocates reconsidering Menendez brothers' LWOP sentences just as Los Angeles DA begins to do so
• LA District Attorney announces that he will seek resentencing for the Menendez brothers
• Continuing coverage and comment on Menendez brothers' possible resentencing 
• California Gov to hold off on Menedez clemency decision pending resentencing review by new DA
• New Los Angeles DA asks to withdraw prior DA's motion for resentencing in Menedez brothers' case 
• Judge rejects new Los Angeles DA's request to revoke predecessor's resentencing petition for Menendez brothers 
• Menendez brothers resentenced by California judge to 50 years to life, making them parole eligible 

The title of this post is tht title of this new paper authored by Lucas Brolin that I just came across via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Capital punishment presents an inherent tension between due process and retributive justice: When inflicting death, we strive for a just punishment, but also seek fairness and reliability in procedure. However, it is questionable whether these competing interests can coexist.  This paper addresses the mounting evidence of capital punishment's procedural failures and questionable penological merit. It argues that the death penalty's sole justification is retributivism; however, that retribution's purposes are frustrated by constitutional requirements of due process.  Thus, a purportedly proportionate punishment is mutated into one that exceeds just desert and causes collateral harm repugnant to retributivism's tenets.  Legislative endeavors to streamline capital proceedings, such as AEDPA, have failed to resolve this fundamental tension.  Revealed is an inescapable dilemma: An American death penalty system cannot mutually satisfy both legitimate penological purposes and constitutional demands for procedural fairness and reliability, suggesting that the death penalty is unconstitutional in either form. 

In this post from January 2025, I flagged a ruling by Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal holding that a state requirement for convicted sexual predators to have the words "SEXUAL PREDATOR" on their driver’s licenses violated their First Amendment rights.  That 2-1 decision panel decision was reheard en banc, and late last week the full Fifth District rejected the constitutional claim of those with branded Florida licenses.  The full 92-page ruling with concurrences and dissents is available at this link.  And the opnion for the court in Crist v. Florida, No. 5D2022-2966 (5th App. Fla. Aug. 15, 2025), gets started this way:

Florida law requires that Michael Crist’s driver license state a truth about his criminal history: he is a “SEXUAL PREDATOR.” § 322.141(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2019).  Florida law also prohibits Crist from possessing a driver license “upon which the sexual predator . . . marking[ ]” is “not displayed” or has “been altered.” Id. § 322.212(5)(c). Crist stands convicted of violating this latter statute, but he urges us to overturn his conviction on the ground that his marked driver license compels him to speak in violation of the First Amendment.  After careful study of relevant historical practices, the United States Supreme Court’s compelled-speech jurisprudence, and lower-court decisions applying that jurisprudence, we reject Crist’s constitutional claim and affirm his conviction.

Among other notable passages, the majority opinion flags a split among lower courts on these issues.

An Eleventh Circuit panel issued a notable Second Amendment ruling yesterday in Florida Commissioner of Agriculture, et al. v. Attorney General of the United States, et al., No. 22-13893 (11th Cir. Aug. 20, 2025) (available here).  Though the case is in a preliminary procedural posture, the panel discussion of Second Amendment law after Bruen and Rahimi is significant. Here is how the case begins:

“[W]hen the Government regulates arms-bearing conduct . . . it bears the burden to justify its regulation.” United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 691 (2024) (quotations omitted). In this case, two Florida medical marijuana users who wish to purchase guns and one gun owner who wishes to participate in Florida’s medical marijuana program brought a pre-enforcement action seeking declaratory relief that 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3) and (g)(3), which prohibit unlawful drug users from possessing or being sold firearms, are unconstitutional as applied to them.  The district court, applying the framework first established in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and built on in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), dismissed the complaint. After assuming that plaintiffs were among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, the district court conducted Bruen’s history-and-tradition test to determine if the challenged statutes were similar to historical gun regulations. The district court concluded that the laws and regulations at issue in this case were consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation and therefore did not violate the Second Amendment.

After holding oral argument, we held this case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Rahimi and ordered supplemental briefing on Rahimi’s effect on this case.  After careful review, we hold that the district court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs did not state a claim for relief.  We reach this conclusion because, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the allegations in the operative complaint do not lead to the inference that the plaintiffs are comparatively similar to either felons or dangerous individuals — the two historical analogues the Federal Government offers in its attempt to meet its burden.  We therefore vacate the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Some months ago, this Law360 article details the many jurisdictions in which courts are struggling with the interplay of Second Amendment rights and uncertain originalist jurosprudence and modern gun control laws that incorporate various drug prohibitions.  This new Eleventh Circuit ruling serves as another reminder that these issues are likely to continue to churn in lower courts until there is some additional Supreme Court  guidance.

The title of this post is the title of this new paper available via SSRN authored by Ian Ayres and Fredrick Vars. Here is its abstract:

In February of this year, we published a call for the government to relaunch the federal Gun Control Act's long-dormant 925(c) petition process, which empowers anyone subject to a federal restriction on their ability to purchase or possess firearms to apply to the Department of Justice for restoration of their gun rights.  We write again in support of this  925(c) relief process.  A functioning pathway to the restoration of firearm rights would help insulate federal gun regulation from constitutional attack.  Nevertheless, several targeted refinements would make the program fairer, safer, and more sustainable: 1.) Requiring applicants and the affiants to attest that applicants are not at risk of suicide; 2.) Aligning eligibility standards for mental‑health relief with the NICS Improvement Amendments Act; 3.) Conditioning relief eligibility on evidence-based drug-, alcohol-, mental-health-, and terrorism-related risk indicators; 4.) Reconsidering the permanent ineligibility of permanent aliens to obtain relief; and 5.) Requiring the biennial release of aggregate program data.

In this post last week, I asked "Will Prez Trump's federal take-over of DC police lead to more federal charges and sentencings?".  This new New York Times article, headlined "Pirro Orders Office to Maximize Criminal Charges on Street Arrests," certainly suggested the answer will be a resounding "yes."  Here are the basics:

The U.S. attorney in Washington, Jeanine Pirro, has instructed her prosecutors to maximize criminal charges against anyone arrested in the administration’s crackdown on street crime, and charge them with stiffer federal crimes whenever possible.

Ms. Pirro held a staff meeting on Monday, as did her deputy overseeing criminal cases, to emphasize that going forward, there would be far less prosecutorial discretion to allow for charging lesser offenses in any case, according to people familiar with the remarks. “In line with President Trump’s directive to make D.C. safe, U.S. Attorney Pirro has made it clear that the old way of doing things is unacceptable,” said Tim Lauer, a spokesman for Ms. Pirro. “She directed her staff to charge the highest crime that is supported by the law and the evidence.”

The new directive comes as an influx of hundreds of new federal agents are deployed in Washington, suddenly thrust into street patrol duty. Many federal agents have never done such work before, have little training in the use of force and are inexperienced in what types of suspicious behavior justifies a search of a stranger on the street.

Ms. Pirro’s decree also reflects the unique role that her office holds in local law enforcement. She oversees prosecutions in Superior Court, which pursues categories of crime usually handled by local district attorneys, and she also oversees prosecutions in Federal District Court, which handles more serious violations of federal criminal statutes.

Ms. Pirro’s instruction amounts to a declaration that her understaffed office will now seek to ramp up criminal charges arising from the president’s takeover of law enforcement in the nation’s capitol and shift more defendants into the federal courthouse, where prison terms are often much stiffer.

Based on newly public emails, there are two new articles about Justice Department official in January of this year complaing about one set of out-going Prez Biden's mass clemency actions:

From the New York Post, "Biden DOJ ripped White House over clemency grant to ‘non-violent offenders’: ‘Stop saying that because it is untrue’"

From the Washington Examiner, "Biden ignored DOJ warnings over legally flawed autopen pardons"

Here is the start of the lengthy NYPost piece:

Senior Justice Department officials were left befuddled by the sweeping pardons then-President Biden approved for thousands of convicts days before leaving office earlier this year — and rebuked the White House for falsely labeling the clemency recipients “nonviolent” offenders, according to emails reviewed by The Post.

Associate Deputy Attorney General Brad Weinsheimer struggled to make sense of the commutations granted nearly to 2,500 federal convicts Jan. 17 and requested “a list as to each inmate listing the offenses that are covered by the commutation.”

The emails were obtained by the government watchdog the Oversight Project and first reviewed by The Post.

“I think the language ‘offenses described to the Department of Justice’ in the warrant is highly problematic and in order to resolve its meaning appropriately, and consistent with the President’s intent, we will need a statement or direction from the President as to how to interpret the language,” Weinsheimer wrote in a Jan. 18 email to members of the White House Counsel’s Office and the DOJ Pardon Attorney’s Office."

A helpful reader sent me this notable local article from Louisiana about a sex offender plea deal with some notable terms. Here are the details:

A Leesville man agreed to be physically and chemically castrated as part of a plea deal.

Thomas Allen McCartney, 37, pleaded guilty Tuesday to attempted first-degree rape of a child under the age of 13. As part of the plea deal, he also agreed to serve 40 years in state prison, according to the Vernon Parish District Attorney’s Office.

When McCartney was arrested in 2023, authorities said he had been caught sexually abusing a 7-year-old girl.  He was already a Tier 3 sex offender in Louisiana, having been convicted of attempted aggravated rape in 2011. He was arrested on one count of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile in 2006 and on two counts of aggravated rape of a 12-year-old in 2010.

“This is a horrific crime that never should have happened. Thomas McCartney is a predator that needs to be locked away from others in our community,” Vernon Parish District Attorney Terry Lambright said in a statement.

As reported in this AP piece, a "man convicted of abducting a woman from a Florida Panhandle insurance office and killing her received a lethal injection Tuesday evening in the state’s record 10th execution this year."  Here is more:

Kayle Bates, 67, was pronounced dead at 6:17 p.m. following a three-drug injection at Florida State Prison near Starke under a death warrant signed by Republican Gov. Ron DeSantis. The execution extended Florida’s record for total executions in a single year, and two more are planned in the state within the next month.

Bates was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, armed robbery and attempted sexual battery in the June 14, 1982, killing of Janet Renee White in Bay County in the Florida Panhandle.  The woman’s husband, Randy White, was one of the witnesses to Tuesday’s execution....

Since the U.S. Supreme Court restored the death penalty in 1976, the highest previous annual total of Florida executions was eight in 2014. Florida has executed more people than any other state this year, while Texas and South Carolina are tied for second place with four each.

With Tuesday’s execution, a total of 29 men have died by court-ordered execution so far this year in the U.S., and at least nine other people were scheduled to be put to death in seven states during the remainder of 2025.

According to court documents, Bates abducted his victim from the insurance office where she worked, took her into some woods behind the building, attempted to rape her, fatally stabbed her and tore a diamond ring from one of her fingers.  Attorneys for Bates had filed appeals with the Florida Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as a federal lawsuit claiming DeSantis’ process for signing death warrants was discriminatory. The lawsuit was recently dismissed by a judge who found problems with its statistical analysis.

I just came across a notable ruling from a Third Circuit panel late last week in US v. Harmon, No. 24-2057 (3d Cir. Aug. 14, 2025) (available here) addressing the required process for the adjudication of sentence reduction motions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Here is how it starts:

Paul Harmon pled guilty in 2021 to one count of wire fraud. In 2024, he moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for a sentence reduction because of a new, retroactive section of the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1.  The District Court, relying on a victim impact statement from the initial sentencing, denied the motion on the ground that Harmon’s crimes had caused substantial financial hardship to his victims. It offered Harmon no opportunity to challenge the facts in the statement at the motion-for-sentence-reduction stage. He appeals, contending the Court’s reliance on that statement violated his due-process rights.

We hold that U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a), which outlines dueprocess protections for sentencing, applies to the consideration of motions for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Put simply, defendants must be “given notice of and an opportunity to contest new information relied on by the district court in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding.”  United States v. Jules, 595 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2010). Applying this rule here, we affirm Harmon’s sentence because the information he seeks to contest is not new.

Among a number of notable aspects of the penal ruling is the flagging of circuit split because the Ninth Circuit held some years ago that "Section 6A1.3 applies only in original sentencing proceedings, and not in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings."

As detailed on this page at DOJ's Office of the Pardon Attorney, Prez Donald Trump was quite active with his clemency pen at the start of his second term in the Oval Office. In fact, he granted multiple pardons in each and every month from January through May (and, of course, did a massive clemency grant on Inauguration Day for those prosecuted for Jan 6 events). 

But, interestingly, it has now been almost three full months since Prez Trump has granted any form of clemency.  Intriguingly, after the last big batch of pardons and commutations in late May, there were press reports that more clemency grants were expected "in the coming days."  And yet, none have been recently forthcoming, leading me to wonder whether some of the pundit criticism around the last group of grants (some examples collected here and here and here) may have had some impact on how Prez Trump is thnking about clemency action.

I provide this backstory as a prelude to flagging a couple notable new press stories about efforts to advance clemency applications for a couple notable defendants:

From Bloomberg Law, "How a $30 Million Pardon Scheme Failed Before It Got to Trump"

From the New York Times, "Flattery, Lobbyists and a Business Deal: Crypto’s Richest Man Campaigns for a Pardon"

I have no idea whether and how these press pieces may be impacting clemency decision-making inside the White House.  But I do think it notable that it has now been quite some time, at least by second-term Trump standards, since the clemency pen has been active.

A few of many prior recent related posts:

• "Lawyers Are Quoting $1 Million in Fees to Get Pardons to Trump"
• Notable reporting on the new "wild west" of clemency in Prez Trump's second term

I was pleased to see a number of new items on the US Sentencing Commission's website this morning, including the announcement of new "Crime Victims Fact Sheets."   The USSC website front page describes the new work as a new series that "gives readers basic facts about victims of particular categories of federal crime in an easy-to-read, two-page format."  This detailed USSC webpage includes this overview and links/descriptions to the first two fact sheets in the series:

This Crime Victims series presents information collected and analyzed during a recent project in which the Commission reviewed court documents to identify victims in offenses for which a sentence was imposed in fiscal year 2023.

The Commission will release additional fact sheets on crime victims in drug offenses and sex offenses as well as on vulnerable victims and official victims, among others.... 

• Issue 1: Federal Offenses Involving Force or Threat Against the Person (Published August 18, 2025)
  • The first issue covers offenses involving force or threat against the person (including Homicide; Assault; Kidnapping, Abduction, or Unlawful Restraint; Air Piracy and Offenses Against Mass Transportation Systems; and Threatening or Harassing Communications, Hoaxes, Stalking, and Domestic Violence). Other such offenses are found under Chapter Two, Part B (Robbery, and Extortion by Force or Threat of Injury or Serious Damage). 
     
• Issue 2: Federal Economic Offenses (Published August 18, 2025)
  • The second issue covers economic offenses, which can be found in Chapter Two, Part B of the federal sentencing guidelines (Theft, Embezzlement, Receipt of Stolen Property, Property Destruction and Offenses Involving Fraud or Deceit; Burglary and Trespass; Blackmail and Similar Forms of Extortion; Commercial Bribery and Kickbacks; Counterfeiting and Infringement of Copyright or Trademark; and Motor Vehicle Identification Numbers).